Download INF Treaty Dilemma

Unclassified
Issue Paper
Responding to Russia’s Violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty
Issue: What should U.S. objectives be in this situation, and how should the
United States respond to Russia’s violation of the provisions of the 1987 INF
Treaty?
Background: Intelligence indicates Russia has violated its obligations under the
INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM) with a range of between 500 kilometers (km) and 5,500 km (the
“prohibited range”) or to possess or produce associated launchers.
Iskander M
The Iskander M missile is estimated to have a range of 700 kilometers although it
has not been tested at that range. It is probably correct to describe this missile
as a circumvention of the treaty rather than a violation.
The Russians deployed the Iskander to Kaliningrad during a recent exercise; the
systems were returned to St. Petersburg after the exercise. The Russians have
threatened to deploy Iskanders to Crimea. During the exercise of the fall of 2014,
an Iskander was test fired from Wrangle Island in Arctic
Iskander K
The K version of this system is a cruise missile capability. The Russians have
tested the capability. Its range is estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000
kilometers. This is a violation of the treaty.
The Russian tests of this missile began in 2008. The U.S. raised objections on
this specific system in 2013 and 2014.
RS-26
This missile system is best described as a circumvention of the treaty.
It has been tested at ranges in excess of 5,500 kilometers; therefore would seem
to be an ICBM. Those tests, however, have been with a single warhead. The
missile is designed to carry multiple warheads. When configured with multiple
warheads, its range would be within the “prohibited range.”
Beyond these three weapons, Russia recently announced that it would develop
an upgraded version of the Oka tactical missile system (SS-23). The original
version had a range of 400 kilometers.
Unclassified
The original U.S. objective was to have Russia return to compliance with the
provisions of the treaty. In September 2014, the State Department lead a
delegation that met with Russian officials in Moscow to discuss Russia's
violations. That meeting produced no positive responses from the Russian side;
Russia has failed to make corrections.
The Russians continue to assert that Aegis Ashore is a violation of the treaty
provisions.
The Russians point that Article 1 of the treaty prohibits nuclear states to transfer
control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to
anyone directly or indirectly. According to Russia, the United States has done
this by allowing non-nuclear states to be involved in training with nuclear
weapons.
A recent Pew poll points to stronger public support for the goals of NATO in the
United States than in Europe. Options for dealing with Russian violations of the
provisions of the INF Treaty should be seen through this lens. Does the option
erode or enhance European support for Alliance objectives? This may be more
important than the consequences of the violations.
Public Statements:
“We have made clear to Russia and to our allies that our patience is not unlimited.
We will take steps to protect ourselves and our allies, if Russia does not cease to
violate the contract and leave our concerns unanswered.” Assistant Secretary of
State Frank Rose – March 30, 2015.
A "counterforce" policy meant the United States "could go about and actually
attack that missile where it is in Russia." Robert Scher, an aide to the SECDEF
Carter in Congressional testimony – April 2015
Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, when
referring to the counterforce policy, “The policy would involve deploying groundlaunched cruise missiles in Europe."
Options:
1. Declare a Counterforce Policy.
a. Threaten the U.S. deployment of a land-based nuclear missile
capability that could counter the Russian developments.
Unclassified
b. Begin an accelerated effort to develop a land-based nuclear cruise
missile capability or reconfigure the ATACM’s with a nuclear
warhead.
The United States does not currently have a missile with this capability. The
Army’s ATACM’s was originally planned to be dual capable. The nuclear
capability, however, was abandoned. It would probably take two years or more
to actually achieve a weapon that could be deployed to Europe.
Europeans would most likely not support this option.
When asked about deploying missiles to the U.K., the Foreign Secretary said in
June 2015 that they would consider consulting with the Americans on such a
move.
Russia has said publicly that it would withdraw from the treaty if the United States
were to deploy missiles to Europe to target Russian systems.
If the United States were to adopt a counter force policy, it would sever a linkage
between the defense of Europe and strategic U.S. nuclear systems. The policy
implies that sub-strategic nuclear weapons are in a category of their own. The
policy implies the United States would accept the use of nuclear weapons on
European soil but not on its territory.
2. U.S. Withdraws from the INF.
The Department of State told the Congress in its report on treaty violations that it
was not in U.S. interests to withdraw from the treaty. The problem arising by the
Russian systems would remain.
3. U.S. Reconnects NATO with U.S. Strategic Systems.
During the Cold War, the United States had a very clear policy of connecting the
defense of NATO to U.S. central nuclear systems. If the Soviets were to use
nuclear weapons against NATO, they would face the definite possibility that the
United States would respond with strategic nuclear weapons. NATO and the
United States were “linked” by this policy.
The United States stopped making assurances to Europe of linkage.
Russia has invested a heavily in weapons and policy that separate strategic
systems from theater systems. They write about dominating the theater nuclear
force capabilities. Even in their exercises aimed at NATO, their “use” of nuclear
weapons is at the sub-strategic level.
Unclassified
4. NATO Reenergizes its Planning and Exercising for the Use of Nuclear
Weapons.
NATO’s nuclear policy was originally planned for the summit in Chicago. It was
abandoned as a topic because of such widely different views.
NATO continues to be ambivalent about nuclear weapons. During the Cold War,
annual exercise underlines the Alliance commitment to the potential use of
nuclear weapons. Maintaining an emphasis has gone.
If the United States would take a strong position to bring back exercises and the
planning for the use of nuclear weapons, support for the Alliance would diminish,
and our policy could end up frightening Europeans.
5. U.S, Continues to Make Violations a Charge Against the Russians Without
Any Concrete Moves.
The Europeans have not embraced challenging the Russians on INF violations,
and all indications are they would be reluctant to support strong measures, such
as the Counterforce Policy. If the United States were to continue down a path of
hard line, we are likely to diminish support for NATO. NATO will not be
strengthened by the discussion of nuclear weapons but will be weakened.
Conclusions
None of the possible options seem likely to change Russia’s development of the
RS-26 or Iskander missiles. It is best, therefore, to proceed with limited
objectives:
Objectives: The United States should proceed with this issue in a way that
strengthens collective agreement that supports views by governments and
publics to isolate the Russians. The United States should not proceed in ways
that would diminish support for NATO and collective European security.
Recommendation: The United States should continue to raise the issue of
Russian INF violations in diplomatic and public venues.