Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
The Cold War - Mutual Deterrence Speech (1967) "Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara | Arms … and Nuclear Proliferation | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com 1/29/14, 3:52 PM "Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara In a complex and uncertain world, the gravest problem that an American Secretary of Defense must face is that of planning, preparation and policy against the possibility of thermonuclear war. It is a prospect that most of mankind understandably would prefer not to contemplate. For technology has now circumscribed us all with a horizon of horror that could dwarf any catastrophe that has befallen man in his more than a million years on earth. Man has lived now for more than twenty years in what we have come to call the Atomic Age. What we sometimes overlook is that every future age of man will be an atomic age, and if man is to have a future at all, it will have to be one overshadowed with the permanent possibility of thermonuclear holocaust. About that fact there is no longer any doubt. Our freedom in this question consists only in facing the matter rationally and realistically and discussing actions to minimize the danger. No sane citizen, political leader or nation wants thermonuclear war. But merely not wanting it is not enough. We must understand the differences among actions which increase its risks, those which reduce them and those which, while costly, have little influence one way or another. But there is a great difficulty in the way of constructive and profitable debate over the issues, and that is the exceptional complexity of nuclear strategy. Unless these complexities are well understood rational discussion and decision-making are impossible. One must begin with precise definitions. The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to be to deter nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies. We do this by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. This can be defined as our assured-destruction capability. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 1 of 3 Page 1 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. The Cold War - Mutual Deterrence Speech (1967) "Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara | Arms … and Nuclear Proliferation | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com 1/29/14, 3:52 PM It is important to understand that assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept. We must possess an actual assured-destruction capability, and that capability also must be credible. The point is that a potential aggressor must believe that our assured-destruction capability is in fact actual, and that our will to use it in retaliation to an attack is in fact unwavering. The conclusion, then, is clear: if the United States is to deter a nuclear attack in itself or its allies, it must possess an actual and a credible assured-destruction capability. When calculating the force required, we must be conservative in all our estimates of both a potential aggressor's capabilities and his intentions. Security depends upon assuming a worst plausible case, and having the ability to cope with it. In that eventuality we must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country -- on our retaliatory forces, on our command and control apparatus, on our industrial capacity, on our cities, and on our population -- and still be capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth-century terms. That is what deterrence of nuclear aggression means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole. Let us consider another term: first-strike capability. This is a somewhat ambiguous term, since it could mean simply the ability of one nation to attack another nation with nuclear forces first. But as it is normally used, it connotes much more: the elimination of the attacked nation's retaliatory second-strike forces. This is the sense in which it should be understood. Clearly, first-strike capability is an important strategic concept. The United States must not and will not permit itself ever to get into a position in which another nation, or combination of nations, would possess a first-strike capability against it. Such a position not only would constitute an intolerable threat to our security, but it obviously would remove our ability to deter nuclear aggression. We are not in that position today, and there is no foreseeable danger of our ever getting into that position. Our strategic offensive forces are immense: 1,000 Minuteman missile http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 2 of 3 Page 2 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. The Cold War - Mutual Deterrence Speech (1967) "Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara | Arms … and Nuclear Proliferation | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com 1/29/14, 3:52 PM launchers, carefully protected below ground; 41 Polaris submarines carrying 656 missile launchers, with the majority hidden beneath the seas at all times; and about 600 longrange bombers, approximately 40 percent of which are kept always in a high state of alert. Our alert forces alone carry more than 2,200 weapons, each averaging more than the explosive equivalent of one megaton of TNT. Four hundred of these delivered on the Soviet Union would be sufficient to destroy over one-third of her population and onehalf of her industry. All these flexible and highly reliable forces are equipped with devices that ensure their penetration of Soviet defenses. Now what about the Soviet Union? Does it today possess a powerful nuclear arsenal? The answer is that it does. Does it possess a first-strike capability against the United States? The answer is that it does not. Can the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future acquire such a first-strike capability against the United States? The answer is that it cannot. It cannot because we are determined to remain fully alert and we will never permit our own assured-destruction capability to drop to a point at which a Soviet firststrike capability is even remotely feasible. Is the Soviet Union seriously attempting to acquire a first-strike capability against the United States? Although this is a question we cannot answer with absolute certainty, we believe the answer is no. In any event, the question itself is -- in a sense -- irrelevant: for the United States will maintain and, where necessary strengthen its retaliatory forces so that, whatever the Soviet Union's intentions or actions, we will continue to have an assured-destruction capability vis a vis their society. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 3 of 3 Page 3 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. What is it? Nixon Doctrine (1969) At a press conference in Guam in July 25, 1969, Nixon first announced his new strategy, elaborating upon it in a speech to the American people later in the year. What eventually came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine proposed that the United States would still honor any existing treaty with a foreign nation. It also stated that the country would provide a nuclear shield for any threatened allied country or for any threatened area deemed important to American security. The most important and novel aspect of the doctrine was the last part, which stated that, while the United States would provide aid and assistance to an imperiled country, that country itself would ultimately have to provide the manpower for its defense. http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-nixon-doctrine.htm Nixon (Guam) Doctrine - July 25, 1969 What Was Said First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Nixon_Doctrine.html ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 4 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Détente Détente (French pronunciation: [detɑ̃t], meaning "relaxation") is the easing of strained relations, especially in a political situation. The term is often used in reference to the general easing of the geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States which began in 1969, as a foreign policy of U.S. presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford called détente; a 'thawing out' or 'un-freezing' at a period roughly in the middle of the Cold War. Détente was known in Russian as разрядка ("razryadka", loosely meaning "relaxation of tension"). What is it? The period was characterized by the signing of treaties such as the SALT I and the Helsinki Accords. A second Arms-Limitation Treaty, SALT II, was discussed but never ratified by the United States. There is still ongoing debate amongst historians as to how successful the détente period was in achieving peace. After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers agreed to install a direct hotline between Washington D.C. and Moscow (the so-called red telephone), enabling leaders of both countries to quickly interact with each other in a time of urgency, and reduce the chances that future crises could escalate into an all-out war. The U.S./U.S.S.R. détente was presented as an applied extension of that thinking. The SALT II pact of the late 1970s continued the work of the SALT I talks, ensuring further reduction in arms by the Soviets and by the US. The Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviets promised to grant free elections in Europe, has been called a major concession to ensure peace by the Soviets. Détente ended after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which led to the United States boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980, based in large part on an anti-détente campaign, marked the close of détente and a return to Cold War tensions. In his first press conference, president Reagan said "'Détente' has been a oneway street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its aims." ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 5 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Détente and President Nixon In dealings with the Soviet Union and communist China, Nixon and Kissinger pursued a policy of détente. Détente is a French word that means a relaxation of tension or hostility. To many conservatives, détente seemed inconsistent with Nixon’s earlier anticommunism. Some also saw it as a sellout of U.S. interests and ideals. Most liberals, however, applauded any policy that had the potential to prevent a nuclear holocaust. The policy of détente brought a dramatic change in U.S. interactions with China. In 1970, Nixon reported to Congress that it was in America’s national interest to improve “practical relations with Peking [Beijing].” The president had several reasons for wanting better relations with China. One was the sheer size of that nation—one fifth of the world’s population lived in China. In addition, Nixon had watched the relationship between China and the Soviet Union change from one of communist comrades to one of hostile neighbors. He believed that establishing friendly diplomatic relations with China might pressure Soviet leaders, who feared Chinese power, to cooperate more with the United States. What is it? In July 1971, Nixon announced that he would visit China the next year. The following February, Nixon and his wife, Pat, made an official state visit to China. While there, Nixon pledged to establish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. He described the trip as bridging “12,000 miles and twenty-two years of non-communication and hostility.” The historic visit marked a turning point in relations between the United States and the world’s largest communist nation. The trip led to the communist government, based in Beijing, taking over China’s seat in the United Nations. Until that time, the Nationalist government of Taiwan had occupied China’s seat. In 1973, the United States and China opened information offices in each other’s capitals. By 1979, the two countries engaged in full diplomatic relations. Nixon’s expectation that by improving relations with China he could push the USSR toward détente proved accurate. Just three months after visiting China, Nixon embarked on another historic journey. In May 1972, he became the first American president to visit Moscow, the capital of the USSR. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had invited Nixon partly in response to Soviet concerns about U.S. involvement with China. The invitation had also revealed Brezhnev’s desire to receive U.S. economic and technological aid. Brezhnev and Nixon were able to negotiate a trade deal that benefited both countries. The United States agreed to sell to the USSR at least $750 million worth of grain over a threeyear period. The grain deal helped the people of the Soviet Union, which was not growing enough grain to feed its population. It also helped American farmers, who were happy to sell their surplus grain. The two leaders then negotiated a much more difficult agreement—to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), later called SALT I, was a five-year agreement. The treaty limited the USSR to 1,618 missiles and the United States to 1,054. The United States accepted the smaller number because its missiles were more advanced. ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 6 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Détente and Containment Containment was ... and examples include... Détente means... and examples include... ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 7 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Carter and Reagan Carter Doctrine The Carter Doctrine was a policy proclaimed by President of the United States Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, which stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. The doctrine was a response to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and was intended to deter the Soviet Union—the Cold War adversary of the United States—from seeking hegemony in the Gulf. After stating that Soviet troops in Afghanistan posed "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil," Carter proclaimed: Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Carter_Doctrine.html Reagan Doctrine The Reagan Doctrine was a strategy orchestrated and implemented by the United States under the Reagan Administration to oppose the global influence of the Soviet Union during the final years of the Cold War. While the doctrine lasted less than a decade, it was the centerpiece of United States foreign policy from the early 1980s until the end of the Cold War in 1991. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the U.S. provided overt and covert aid to anti-communist guerrillas and resistance movements in an effort to "rollback" Soviet-backed communist governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The doctrine was designed to serve the dual purposes of diminishing Soviet influence in these regions, while also potentially opening the door for capitalism (and sometimes liberal democracy) in nations that were largely being governed by Soviet-supported socialist governments. http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Reagan_Doctrine.html “Peace Through Strength” From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than thirty years to establish their legitimacy. But none — not one regime — has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root....If history teaches anything, it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly....Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in the struggle that's now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated. Ronald Reagan - June 8, 1982 www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagan ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 8 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Carter and Reagan “Peace Through Strength” This is why I'm speaking to you tonight--to urge you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that you know we must continue to restore our military strength. If we stop in midstream, we will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends and adversaries alike. Free people must voluntarily, through open debate and democratic means, meet the challenge that totalitarians pose by compulsion. It's up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best while the enemies of freedom grow stronger day by day. After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. -Ronald Reagan - March 23, 1983 www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagan “Tear Down This Wall” And now -- now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty -- the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagan ®SAISD Social Studies Department —Ronald Reagan - June 12, 1987 Page 9 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. ®SAISD Social Studies Department Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals 0.0 12.5 25.0 37.5 50.0 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1 1977 1978 1979 1980 % Spent on Department of Defence - Military Programs 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Percentage of the National Budget Spent on the Department of Defense - Military Programs From Détente to Peace Through Strength Carter and Reagan Page 10 Reagan Carter Ford Nixon Johnson Kennedy Eisenhower Truman Changes in Policies Towards Communist Nations ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 11 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. The End of the Cold War What Contributed to the end of the Cold War By... Glasnost Perestroika Eastern Europe Changes Fall of the Berlin Wall August 1991 Coup ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 12 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1a Quick Look: US - Israeli Relations On 15 May 1947, the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations resolved that a committee, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), be created "to prepare for consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine". In the Report of the Committee dated 3 September 1947 to the UN General Assembly, the majority of the Committee in Chapter VI proposed a plan to replace the British Mandate with "an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem ... the last to be under an International Trusteeship System". On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as Resolution 181 (II). The Plan attached to the resolution was essentially that proposed by the majority of the Committee in the Report of 3 September 1947. The Jewish Agency, which was the recognized representative of the Jewish community, accepted the plan, but the Arab League and Arab Higher Committee of Palestine rejected it. On 1 December 1947, the Arab Higher Committee proclaimed a threeday strike, and Arab bands began attacking Jewish targets. The Jews were initially on the defensive as civil war broke out, but gradually moved onto the offensive. The Palestinian Arab economy collapsed and 250,000 Palestinian-Arabs fled or were expelled. On 14 May 1948, the day before the expiration of the British Mandate, David BenGurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, declared "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel". The only reference in the text of the Declaration to the borders of the new state is the use of the term, Eretz-Israel. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of 29 November 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948 With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations. Very respectfully yours, ELIAHU EPSTEIN Agent, Provisional Government of Israel Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_States_relations ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 13 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1a Quick Look: US - Israeli Relations This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel. Harry Truman Approved 14 May 1948 Under Eisenhower, U.S. policy was to remain neutral and not become too closely allied with Israel. At this time, the only assistance the U.S. provided Israel was food aid. In the early 1960s, the U.S. would begin to sell advanced, but defensive, weapons to Israel, Egypt and Jordan. Eisenhower's standing during the Arab–Israeli Suez Crisis convinced many Middle Eastern moderates that, if not actually lovable, the United States was at least a fair country to deal with; this view of U.S. fairness and impartiality still prevailed during Kennedy's presidency. Prior to the Six-Day War of 1967, U.S. administrations had taken considerable care to avoid giving the appearance of favoritism. During Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, U.S. policy shifted to a whole-hearted, but not unquestioning, support for Israel. During the Six-Day War, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty, a U.S. Navy intelligence ship in Egyptian waters, killing 34 and wounding 171. Israel claimed the Liberty was mistaken as the Egyptian vessel El Quseir, and it was an instance of friendly fire. The U.S. government accepted it as such, although the incident raised much controversy. Following the war, the perception in Washington was that many Arab states (notably Egypt) had permanently drifted toward the Soviets. In 1968, with strong support from Congress, Johnson approved the sale of Phantom fighters to Israel, establishing the precedent for U.S. support for Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors. The U.S., however, continued to provide military equipment to Arab states such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to counter Soviet arms sales in the region. On 6 October 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria, with the support of Arab expeditionary forces and with backing from the Soviet Union, launched simultaneous attacks against Israel. The resulting conflict is known as the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian Army was initially able to breach Israeli defenses advance into the Sinai and establish defensive positions along the east bank of the Suez Canal, but were later repulsed in a massive tank battle when they tried to advance further to draw pressure away from Syria. The Israelis then crossed the Suez Canal. Major battles with heavy losses for both sides took place. At the same time, the Syrians almost broke through Israel's thin defenses in the Golan Heights, but were eventually stopped by reinforcements and pushed back, followed by a successful Israeli advance into Syria. Israel also gained the upper hand in the air and at sea early in the war. Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_States_relations ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 14 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1a Quick Look: US - Israeli Relations The Soviets began to resupply Arab forces, predominantly Syria. Golda Meir asked President Nixon for help with military supply. It wasn’t until after Israel went on full nuclear alert and loaded their warheads into waiting planes, President Nixon ordered the full scale commencement of a strategic airlift operation to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel; this last move is sometimes called "the airlift that saved Israel". However, by the time the supplies arrived, Israel was gaining the upper hand. After the war, Kissinger pressured the Israelis to withdraw from Arab lands; this contributed to the first phases of a lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace. American support of Israel during the war contributed to the 1973 OPEC embargo against the United States, which was lifted in March 1974. The Jimmy Carter years were characterized by very active U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process. With the May 1977 election of Likud's Menachem Begin as prime minister, after 30 years of leading the Israeli government opposition, major changes took place regarding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. This, in turn led to friction in U.S.–Israeli bilateral relations. The two frameworks included in the Carter-initiated Camp David (Camp David Accords) process were viewed by right wing elements in Israel as creating U.S. pressures on Israel to withdraw from the captured Palestinian territories, as well as forcing it to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt. Likud governments have since argued that their acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of these accords and the eventual Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty fulfilled the Israeli pledge to withdraw from occupied territory. President Carter's support for a Palestinian homeland and for Palestinian political rights particularly created tensions with the Likud government, and little progress was achieved on that front. U.S.–Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term. Israel was granted "major non-NATO ally" status in 1989 that gave it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on U.S. defense contracts. The United States maintained grant aid to Israel at $3 billion annually and implemented a free trade agreement in 1985. Since then all customs duties between the two trading partners have been eliminated. However, relations soured when Israel carried out Operation Opera, an Israeli airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Reagan suspended a shipment of military aircraft to Israel, and harshly criticized the action. Relations also soured during the 1982 Lebanon War, when the United States even contemplated sanctions to stop the Israeli Siege of Beirut. The U.S. reminded Israel that weaponry provided by the U.S. was to be used for defensive purposes only, and suspended shipments of cluster munitions to Israel. Although the war exposed some serious differences between Israeli and U.S. policies, such as Israel's rejection of the Reagan peace plan of 1 September 1982, it did not alter the Administration's favoritism for Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States. Although critical of Israeli actions, the United States vetoed a Soviet-proposed United Nations Security Council resolution to impose an arms embargo on Israel. Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_States_relations ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 15 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1b Quick Look - 1973 Oil Embargo In the Yom Kippur War of that year, Egypt and Syria, with the support of other Arab nations, launched a military campaign against Israel on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar in order to regain Arab territories lost to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. The United States chose to re-supply Israel with arms and in response, OAPEC decided to retaliate, announcing an oil embargo against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It lasted until March 1974. With the Arab nations' actions seen as initiating the oil embargo and the long-term possibility of high oil prices, disrupted supply, and recession, a strong rift was created within NATO. Additionally, some European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the U.S. policy in the Middle East. Arab oil producers had also linked the end of the embargo with successful U.S. efforts to create peace in the Middle East, which complicated the situation. To address these developments, the Nixon Administration began parallel negotiations with both Arab oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pull back from the Sinai and the Golan Heights . By January 18, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the Sinai. The promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was sufficient to convince Arab oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974. The effects of the embargo were immediate. OPEC forced the oil companies to increase payments drastically. The price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly US$12 per barrel.The effect of the Arab embargo had a negative influence on the U.S economy through causing immediate demands to address the threats to U.S. energy security. On an international level, the price increases of petroleum disrupted market systems in changing competitive positions. The Arab embargo left many U.S. companies searching for new ways to develop expensive oil, even in the elements of rugged terrain such as in hostile arctic environments. The problem that many of these companies faced is that finding oil and developing new oil fields usually require a time lag of 5 to 10 years between the planning process and significant oil production. In the United States, the retail price of a gallon of gasoline (petrol) rose from a national average of 38.5 cents in May 1973 to 55.1 cents in June 1974. Politicians called for a national gas rationing program. Nixon requested gasoline stations to voluntarily not sell gasoline on Saturday nights or Sundays; 90% of owners complied, which resulted in lines on weekdays. The national government also-instituted a 55 MPH speed limit on national interstates. States were forced to mandate when people could get gasoline based on their license plates. American consumers switched from large gas-consuming cars to automobiles that used less fuel. Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_States_relations ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 16 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. Modified from:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Oil_Prices_1861_2007.svg Quick Look - 1973 Oil Embargo 1c ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 17 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1d Quick Look: Panama Canal Treaty The Torrijos–Carter Treaties are two treaties signed by the United States and Panama in Washington, D.C., on September 7, 1977, which abrogated the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. The treaties guaranteed that Panama would gain control of the Panama Canal after 1999, ending the control of the canal that the U.S. had exercised since 1903. The treaties are named after the two signatories, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the Commander of Panama's National Guard, General Omar Torrijos. Although Torrijos was not democratically elected as he had seized power in a coup in 1968, it is generally considered that he had widespread support in Panama to justify his signing of the treaties. This first treaty is officially titled The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (Spanish: Tratado Concerniente a la Neutralidad Permanente y Funcionamiento del Canal de Panamá) and is commonly known as the "Neutrality Treaty". Under this treaty, the U.S. retained the permanent right to defend the canal from any threat that might interfere with its continued neutral service to ships of all nations. The second treaty is titled The Panama Canal Treaty (Tratado del Canal de Panamá), and provided that as from 12:00 on December 31, 1999, Panama would assume full control of canal operations and become primarily responsible for its defense. Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torrijos–Carter_Treaties ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 18 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1e Quick Look: 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis The Iran hostage crisis was a diplomatic crisis between Iran and the United States. Fiftytwo Americans were held hostage for 444 days (November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981), after a group of Iranian students supporting the Iranian Revolution took over the US Embassy in Tehran. President Carter called the hostages "victims of terrorism and anarchy," adding that "the United States will not yield to blackmail." The crisis was described by the western media as an entanglement of "vengeance and mutual incomprehension." In Iran, the hostage taking was widely seen as a blow against the United States and its influence in Iran, its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution, and its longstanding support of the recently overthrown Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Following his overthrow, the Shah was allowed into the U.S. for medical treatment. The Iranians wanted the United States to return the Shah to them for trial of the crimes committed by him during his reign on ordinary citizens with the help of his secret police, the SAVAK. In Iran the asylum granted by the U.S. to the Shah was seen as American complicity in the atrocities meted by the Shah on the Iranian people. In the United States, the hostage-taking was seen as an outrage violating the principle of international law granting diplomats immunity from arrest and diplomatic compounds' inviolability [will not be invaded]. The episode reached a climax when, after failed attempts to negotiate a release, the United States military attempted a rescue operation off ships such as the USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea that were patrolling the waters near Iran. On April 24, 1980, Operation Eagle Claw resulted in a failed mission, the deaths of eight American servicemen, one Iranian civilian, and the destruction of two aircraft. On July 27, 1980, the former Shah died; then, in September, Iraq invaded Iran. These two events led the Iranian government to enter negotiations with the U.S., with Algeria acting as a mediator. The hostages were formally released into United States custody the day after the signing of the Algiers Accords, just minutes after the new American president, Ronald Reagan, was sworn into office. Considered a pivotal episode in the history of Iran–United States relations, political analysts cite the crisis as having weighed heavily on Jimmy Carter's presidency and run for reelection in the 1980 presidential election. In Iran, the crisis strengthened the prestige of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the political power of those who supported theocracy and opposed any normalization of relations with the West. The crisis also marked the beginning of U.S. legal action resulting in economic sanctions against Iran, further weakened ties between Iran and the United States Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 19 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact. 1f Quick Look: 1983 U.S. Marines in Lebanon The Beirut Barracks Bombings (October 23, 1983, in Beirut, Lebanon) occurred during the Lebanese Civil War when two truck bombs struck separate buildings housing United States and French military forces—members of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon— killing 299 American and French servicemen. An obscure group calling itself 'Islamic Jihad' claimed responsibility for the bombings. Suicide bombers detonated each of the truck bombs. In the attack on the building serving as a barracks for the 1st Battalion 8th Marines (Battalion Landing Team - BLT 1/8), the death toll was 241 American servicemen: 220 Marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers, making this incident the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States Marine Corps since World War II's Battle of Iwo Jima, the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States military since the first day of the Vietnam War's Tet Offensive, and the deadliest single attack on Americans overseas since World War II. Another 128 Americans were wounded in the blast. Thirteen later died of their injuries, and they are numbered among the total number who died. An elderly Lebanese man, a custodian/vendor who was known to work and sleep in his concession stand next to the building, was also killed in the first blast. The explosives used were later estimated to be equivalent to as much as 9,525 kg (21,000 pounds) of TNT. In the attack on the French barracks, the nine-story 'Drakkar' building, 58 paratroopers from the 1st Parachute Chasseur Regiment were killed and 15 injured by a second truck bomb. This attack occurred just minutes after the attack on the American Marines. It was France's single worst military loss since the end of the Algerian War. The wife and four children of a Lebanese janitor at the French building were also killed, and more than twenty other Lebanese civilians were injured. These attacks eventually led to the withdrawal of the international peacekeeping force from Lebanon, where they had been stationed since the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Modified from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Beirut_barracks_bombing ®SAISD Social Studies Department Page 20 Reproduction rights granted only if copyright information remains intact.