Download Family and Religion in Germany and Japan: Theoretical discussions

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Family and Religion in Germany and Japan:
Theoretical discussions and empirical findings＊
Kazufumi Manabe＊＊
Wolfgang Jagodzinski＊＊＊
１．Introduction
Family issues have for long been one of the themes covered by the theories of contemporary society.
A focus has been on “the breakdown of family.” Putting aside the definitions and the measurement of “the
breakdown of family” in the past, it is undeniable that various “reports of facts” and “developments of discourses” surrounding this phenomenon have evoked much controversy among sociologists. The emergence of such arguments is not a phenomenon seen only in Japan. In a way, this subject may take on
more seriousness in Western society, because religion has infiltrated deeply into the people’s minds and
defined every part of their lives. But the look of society is changing as it is being swallowed by what is
called “the waves of secularization.” In this context, the orientation of value and ethics concerning families
originated (or were thought to originate) from religion. If so, at least logically, the orientation toward secularization and away from religion inevitably shakes the orientation of value to its foundations. Therefore,
the subject of “Family and Religion” has become an extremely relevant issue, particularly in Western society.
While the preceding paragraph focuses on “secularization,” the discussion on this phenomenon holds
true for not only Christian society in Western countries but also for Jewish society in Israel. Secularization
of Leisure, by E. Katz and M. Gurevitch (Faber & Faber, 1976) can be cited as an excellent theoretical and
empirical study in this field.
The issues of Jewish society, however, have to be discussed at another opportunity. This paper focuses
on German society alone and discusses the relationships between family values and religion theoretically
and empirically. The discussion here covers not just the current status of German society (including its history) but compares it with Japanese society, because comparing these two societies will more clearly reveal the subject in question. Jagodzinski and Manabe hypothesize that Japan provides a contrast to Germany, because Japanese people are not particularly aware of the religiousness of Japanese religions, and
religions rarely become the direct source of their orientation of value and ethics observed in everyday life.
２．Theoretical Discussions
２．
１ Religion and Religiosity
<Jagodzinski>
Religion in Germany and Japan are so different that from the outset one hesitates to speak of them as the
same phenomenon.
１．Religion in Germany is exclusive in the sense that a person either belongs to no religion or only one religion. Religion in Japan is non-exclusive: In different situations the same person may draw from different
religious traditions, Buddhism, Shinto, Confucianism, and so on.
＊
Key Words : family and religion, theoretical discussions, empirical findings
Professor, School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan
＊＊＊
Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics Management, and Social Sciences, and Director, Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, and Institute for Applied Social Research, The University of Cologne, Germany
＊＊
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２．Religion in Germany is highly organized in two main churches, the Catholic and the Protestant. Religion
in Japan is much less organized and splits itself into many small religious associations.
３．Religion in Germany is highly predictable in the following sense: If we roughly distinguish between
Catholics, Protestants, and a religiously unaffiliated group, we can predict for these denominations different
levels of church involvement. Catholics in Germany attend religious services more often than Protestants,
and the latter more often than religiously unaffiliated persons. Furthermore, church attendance is an excellent predictor of religious beliefs. The more frequently a person attends church, the more likely he or she is
to believe in God, sin, heaven, hell, and so on. It is for this reason that we often consider religious practice
to be an indicator of a latent dimension which is called religiosity, or more specifically, church religiosity.
The higher the levels of religious practice, the higher the dimension of church religiosity. Church religiosity
is a good predictor of many, but not all, moral attitudes. The more religious a person is, the less permissive
he or she is in sexual matters. Church religiosity also correlates with attitudes towards abortion or divorce,
and with many other family values. Finally, religiosity is related to social capital and social behavior. Religious persons are more strongly integrated into society, they have more children, they have more trust in institutions and in other persons, are more often engaged in voluntary activities and they are happier. Religious people tend to vote for the Christian party (CDU, CSU). The tendency to vote for the Christian Party,
however, is much stronger for Catholics than for Protestants.
<Manabe>
Manabe comments on Jagodzinski’s foregoing argument. Putting aside Items 1 and 2, it can be said that
Item 3 only compiles the findings from earlier studies in Germany. The high predictability of religious phenomena in Germany cannot be claimed until those findings are compared with Japanese equivalents. Manabe argues that comparing those findings from both countries should be the starting point of an empirical
study. Various similarities and differences illustrated by the comparison will be reliable clues to the next
step of analysis. If a hypothesis were ventured at this point, the phenomena in Germany would be highly
predictable―needless to say, from the viewpoint of empirical scientific observability―while those in Japan
would be less predictable. However, what is important here is that Japan’s predictability is low with German standards of operationalization. If a Japanese version of operationalization were developed and used,
the predictability could naturally become higher. Therefore, the final objective of this project will be to develop such a Japanese operationalization; specifically, satisfactory indicators in terms of reliability and validity to observe religious phenomena.
２．
２ The Influence of Religion on Moral Values
<Jagodzinski>
What are the necessary conditions for observing the impact of religion on moral attitudes and behavior?
Four seem to be particularly relevant:
１．The first is that moral rules have to be an integral part of the religious belief system. Only if religious
stories include moral advice can religiously socialized children be different from others in their moral attitudes and behavior. In the world religions we investigate, the first condition is met. They include a more or
less elaborated body of moral rules. It may be sufficient to mention the ten commandments of the Bible.
２．The next condition is more complicated. An impact of religion on morality can only be observed if
people hold different moral attitudes and beliefs. As long as we focus on a single society, it must be internally diverse. Or, to put it an other way: The higher the consensus in a society, the smaller the chances of
detecting the impact of religion. Consensus can occur for two reasons.
（１）We have to make a distinction between general and specific norms: The consensus on general norms
and values can be very high. We all believe that freedom, equality, or the like are highly valuable goods.
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Similarly, all world religions include norms like “Thou shall not kill.” People can agree on this commandment but deeply disagree on the implications of this general norm. A warrior who has killed many of his
enemies will probably consider the killing in wars as justified, and as an admissible exception to the rule.
To the contrary, the true pacifist will not accept such an exception. The warrior and pacifist agree on the
general norm but not on the more specific application. The same holds for abortion. Even though the
views of advocates and opponents on this issue are irreconcilable, both sides may agree that life is a most
valuable good and that human beings are not allowed to kill. The advocates of abortion will only have a
specific conception of life. To them the embryo is no life at all, or at least not a fully developed life so that
the general rule (”Thou shall not kill”) is not applicable here. People with a less permissive view on abortion come to a completely different conclusion. Thus, to find differences between the cultures, we probably have to look at specific issues: For example, we should look not at the respect for life in general, but
at the attitude towards abortion; not at the value of equality in general, but at the equality of men and
women in the family, and so on.
（２）Cultural differences may conceal the amount heterogeneity at this more specific level. In Western societies, it has become quite common to frankly express competing interests and views. Even in Germany
which was formerly characterized as a consensual society we have learned to handle dissent. Children may
frankly disagree with their teacher and students with their professors. The Japanese situation may still be
slightly different. Even if people internally disagree it may be impolite to express it frankly. Consequently,
mental dissent will not necessarily be verbally expressed. The dissent, if it should exist, is hidden and can
hardly be measured by standardized interviews.
３．Apart from the second condition mentioned above, there is a third necessary condition for identifying
the impact of religion on moral attitudes: Denomination may have an impact on moral attitudes if a religious denomination holds specific norms and if all members are highly integrated into their religion. However, high integration is not necessary if a religion succeeds in creating a homogeneous social and cultural
environment for its members and keeps them away from all external influences. In Europe, denominations
were indeed able to achieve this goal. They were often organized in regional monopolies, i.e. all members
in a given area belonged to the same religion. Thus, they could hardly escape the influence of their religion. In addition, these religions started to build up their own kindergartens, schools, universities, mass media, unions, and employer organizations. Therefore, religions could control the information transmitted to
their members. We call such a closed system a religious pillar. In a pillarized society a person has an extremely high likelihood to adopt the norms and values of his or her environment even if he or she is not
firmly integrated in the religious institutions. There is no recognizable alternative and therefore the individual cannot choose among different norms and values.
４．Religion can then have an impact on the moral attitudes of the individual. If it can exercise such an impact, it does not necessarily imply that the moral norms are logically derived from the moral codex of a
holy book or were invented and established by religious leaders. Religions very often have only adopted
the norms which have emerged elsewhere in the society, particularly in the ruling elite. It is then true, in
such a case, that the norms of a religion have been influenced by another group. Once religion has
adopted these norms, however, it can contribute to their dissemination by teaching and preaching them.
Religions have their own specific means to increase the acceptability of moral norms, a least in traditional
societies. By declaring these norms as the will of God, they become sacrosanct. Norm disobedience is then
seen as a sin which is punished by God. These are typical means by which religions can increase their influence in the process of moral socialization.
<Manabe>
In response to Jagodzinski’s argument above, the following should be pointed out as preliminary work for
an empirical study focusing on a comparison between Germany and Japan.
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As for Item１，at least the next two points must be examined if religious influence is to be empirically
grasped.
（１）An analysis should cover not only whether religion includes moral rules and advice−which can be
studied by content analysis−but also whether people perceive, or are aware of those rules and advice. Because when religion is sought after, especially in Japan, the people are deemed more conscious of forgiving than forbidding. Manabe hypothesizes that Japanese people are more attracted to a Buddhist sermon
from Tannisho (A writing by Yuien in the Kamakura Era, about 800 hundred years ago, that compiled Buddhist sermons by Shinran, Yuien’s mentor.) , “Even a good person attains birth in the Pure Land (paradise),
how much more so an evil person,” than the religious precepts that Buddhists must obey. There is the following passage in Visual Human Life: The Nippon (Kodansha Ltd., 1986, p. 852): “Amitabha in the Western
Pure Land, and Jizo who is always with people, can be construed as the gods of remission or atonement.”
（２）Also, it should be asked whether moral rules and advice are included in religion either in a “direct
way” or “indirect way.” For example, Tetsuro Watusji has already recognized clear Buddhist influence in
Taketori Monogatari (The Tale of the Bamboo-Cutter: a story of unknown authorship from around the late
9th to early 10th centuries). He states that the story implies supernatural existence beyond secular power
(Twtsuro Watsuji. Nippon Seishinshi Kenkyu [A Study on the History of Japanese Spiritual Culture]:
Iwanami Bunko, 1992). Such supernatural existence is symbolized by Lady Kaguya who is not human and
by the moon that she eventually returns to, while secular power is represented by the emperor, imperial
family and soldiers. If his argument is right, what the story tries to tell people in an indirect way may be
that blind obedience to secular power is not everything.
As for Item 2, the following two points are worth noting:
（１）Under Item 2, it may be a good idea to focus on “specific norms” rather than “general norms” in order
to grasp the effects of religious influence. Unquestionably, such distinction between the two aspects is an
idea based on “theory of attitude structure” and can be extremely useful. However, this does not mean
abandoning the former and studying the latter only. Rather, such a distinction should become more useful
by developing it into an idea that indexes the dissociation phenomena between the two aspects, and measures the relevance of the phenomena with religious consciousness. As for the special norms in Japan, what
can be called “considerations for special circumstances” have been devised. Examples of these devices are
the Merciful Goddess and a guardian deity for aborted children. In such special cases, it is likely that the
“considerations for special circumstances” have already defined general norms as well. In this context, the
Japanese phrase “Tatemae Wa Tatemae (This is only the official stance)” fits perfectly. Under these circumstances, the chasm between “the consciousness of general norms” and “the consciousness of specific
norms” is, in fact, not very great. Thus, the indexation of the dissociation phenomena will be an extremely
fascinating subject.
（２）It is also suggested that if a consensus is contrary to what respondents have on their mind, it will be
difficult to grasp religious influence through a questionnaire survey. However, Manabe’s hypothesis on the
Japanese situation is different from this suggestion. He theorizes that people articulate more clear−and, as
a result, more polarized−opinions through an artificial device like a questionnaire survey than they do in
their everyday life.
As for Item 3, observation of pillarization phenomena is necessary in Japan to see whether such phenomena have emerged, as in Germany. In this respect, a study on the geographical distribution of religious denominations by Masao Fujii is noteworthy (Gendaijin No Shinkokozo [The Faith Structure of the Moderns]:
Hyoronsha, 1974, pp. 19−65). The findings from his research show an uneven distribution and geographical differences among religious denominations, but do not clarify whether they could lead to pillarization,
as seen in Germany. In this sense, this research does not fully explore the subject. This, therefore, calls for
an extensive literature review and an independent survey, which is tantamount to proposing another new
project.
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Jagodzinski’s proposition under Item 4 has been made for the religious phenomena in Japan. What should
be analyzed, however, are whether religion incorporated all norms of a specific society, especially of the
ruling elites of the society, whether such a process of incorporation was carried out according to some
principle of selection, and what the mechanism was. And based on these analyses, a further exploration
into the relationship between religion and morals will be a highly interesting subject.
２．
３ The Influence of Religion on Family Values
<Jagodzinski>
Let us first consider the impact of religious denomination, and then turn to the other dimensions of religiosity.
１．At least until the end of World War Ⅱ，we could expect a strong impact of religious denomination on
a variety of moral norms in Germany. After the reformation in the 16th century Germany was divided into
two camps, Protestants and Catholics. These two camps did not only fight each other in a war which lasted
for thirty years, they were also able to build up regional monopolies, i.e. areas which were clearly dominated either by Protestants or Catholics. Until the 19th century, homogeneous religious regions were an immediate consequence of the rule that subordinates had to adopt the religion of their sovereign. Consequently, if the sovereign switched religions, the subordinate had to do so too. In the 19th century, these religious divisions stabilized. While large areas in the south of Germany and in the Rhineland were homogeneously Catholic, areas in the north and east of Germany remained Protestant.
This situation gradually changed when Germany transformed into a more mobile society. In West Germany, this process accelerated at the end of the nineteen fifties. The Protestant church for a long time had
already placed more emphasis on the individual conscience, and therefore less strongly influenced moral
teaching. The influence further declined when many Protestants left the churches. The Catholic church experienced a similar development with some delay.
In East Germany, socialism as a quasi-religion fought the old religions intensively. The SED was largely
able to suppress religious socialization in the families and schools. The effects of this policy became visible
only after the unification of West and East Germany when many East Germans left the church. In sum, the
influence of religious denomination on moral norms has probably weakened in both parts of Germany. If it
still exists, it is rather faint.
２．Nowadays, the two main religions in Germany hardly exert an influence on all their members. Secular
groups of agnostics and atheists have expanded within many European countries since the French enlightenment. Materialists and communists joined them in the 19th century. All these world views and quasireligions did not only consider religion as a superstition or the opiate for the people, but also strongly opposed the traditional image of the family. In fact, they often saw the hierarchical order of society as a mere
reflection of the authoritarian family structure and vice versa. Accordingly, the difference between religious
Catholics and non-religious atheists or agnostics should be extremely large in Germany, particularly in the
East. Religious Protestants in Germany should lie somewhere in between, certainly much closer to the religious Catholics than to the religiously unaffiliated. On balance, religiosity should be a good predictor of
many family values in Germany: religious people should support traditional values, they should be less permissive with respect to abortion, more favorable to traditional gender roles, and so on.
<Manabe>
As above, Jagodzinski has discussed religion as quantifiable in the two aspects of “religious denominations”
and “religiosity (specifically, faith and practice)” which serve as frameworks to analyze religious influence
on family values. If comparison is attempted between Germany, as mentioned above, and Japan whose religious background and tradition are completely different, what conceptual device should be prepared?
As the preceding section has already discussed the proposal for the methodology intended for a comparison between Germany and Japan, the following summarizes the points that do not overlap with that
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proposal.
As already mentioned regarding the influence of religious denominations under Item 1, it should be
noted again that the relationships between religious denominations have not always been exclusive. For
example, both a Shinto shrine and Buddhist altar are placed in the same household, and it is not uncommon that Buddhists of the Jodo-Shishu sect make a pilgrimage through the eighty-eight holy places of the
Shingon sect. In the Japanese case, the differences among religious denominations do not carry much significance, but comparing “established old religious denominations” with “newly formed ones” is a more attractive subject. However, no explicit distinction was drawn between these two types of old and new denominations in the ISSP Survey on Religion by NHK Public Opinion Research Division in 1998.
As regards the influence of religiosity under Item 2, a comparison of findings from various research on
Japanese religious consciousness in the past, produced the following results (Kenji Ishii. Data Book: Gendai
Nihonjin No Shukyo [Data Book: Religions Among the Modern Japanese]: Shinyosha, 1997, p. 6): In response to the question of whether one has faith or not, nearly 30% of the respondents answered “yes.”
However, when asked whether one believes that God and the Buddha exist, a much larger proportion of
the respondents replied “yes”, and this proportion increased further for the question of whether one believes in a higher power of some sort beyond human beings or nature. Therefore, the most important challenge in this area will be the development of indicators to grasp the religiosity of Japanese people. Jagodzinski and Manabe are attempting to develop such indicators as a trial, using the country-specific questionnaire items in the NHK Survey above.
３．Empirical Findings
３．
１ The Perspective of Data Analysis
Our topic of interest is how religion influences one’s family values in contemporary society. A comparison between Japan and Germany motivated by this interest suggests a hypothesis that in Germany―
particularly in West Germany―religion continues to influence one’s family values, although to a lesser extent recently, while such influence is hardly recognizable in Japan.
A data analysis has been conducted using ISSP Religion Module Data on religious influence over four
aspects of family values:（１）marital status,（２）gender role norms,
（３）attitudes toward sexual morality,
and（４）opinions about abortion.
To briefly summarize the results of this analysis, the theoretical hypotheses―nonreligious people tend
to have the least orientation toward traditional family values, and the more frequently people participate in
religious activities, the more traditionally oriented they become―are more applicable to West Germany,
and less applicable to East Germany and Japan (Kazufumi Manabe, Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Noriko
Onodera, Family Values and Religion in Germany and Japan: An Analysis of ISSP Data, Kwansei Gakuin
University Social Science Review, Vol. 6, 2002, pp. 1−18).
But, why are these hypotheses less applicable to East Germany and Japan? Setting aside the question
of East Germany, the following two possibilities are examined for Japan.
（１）Japanese religion actually has no influence over family values.
（２）The ISSP Module cannot measure the religious influence over family values in Japan.
To empirically evaluate the latter possibility, we must pursue the following three lines of inquiry.
① Examination of the findings from another large scale multi-national survey such as the World Values Sur-
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vey.
② Examination of the translation from the Master Questionnaire into the Japanese Questionnaire.
③ Examination of the reliability and validity of the general items on religiosity which were used in the
1998 ISSP Religious Module, by comparing them with Japanese Nation Specific Items on religiosity.
３．
２ A Comparison of ISSP Data and WVS Data
We can observe similar findings concerning marital status and opinions about abortion in both the
ISSP Data and WVS Data (Kazufumi Manabe, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Family and Religion in Germany and
Japan: An Analysis of World Values Survey Data, Kwansei Gakuin University School of Sociology Journal ,
No. 91, 2002, pp. 13−33).
（１）Within any of the life stages,
・the percentages of “Married” are highest in Japan, and
・the “Divorced” percentages are lowest in Japan.
Therefore, both the ISSP Data and WVS Data show that Japanese tend to orient themselves more to traditional family values than Germans do.
（２）Both datasets show the tendencies that
・in West Germany the divorce rates are higher for the “No Denomination” respondents than the “Denomination” respondents.
・in West Germany the divorce rates are lower for the respondents with more frequent religious participation.
・these tendencies do not hold for East Germany and Japan.
（３）When the relationship between religious participation and opinions about abortion are examined,
both datasets indicate a rather high correlation in Germany―the higher the participation of the respondents, the higher the proportion of those opposing abortion―，but not in Japan.
３．
３ Translation of the Master Questionnaire into the Japanese Questionnaire
As you will see from a separate paper, there are some considerable differences between the translations of independent variables of the two questionnaires, while there are almost no differences between
those of the dependent variables. Nevertheless, we can hardly believe that these translation problems are
the primary cause of the differences between Germany―particularly West Germany―and Japan in tendencies concerning religious influence over family values, as shown by the ISSP data(Kazufumi Manabe and
Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Religion and Family Values: A Comparative Study of Japan and Germany, Kwansei
Gakuin University School of Sociology Journal , No. 88, 2000, pp. 1−21).
３．
４ Nation Specific Items as Independent Variables
We have attempted a data analysis by defining question items about family values as dependent variables, and those about Nation Specific Items of Japanese religiosity as independent variables.
Based upon such a data analysis, we have obtained findings which explicitly show that respondents
who feel attracted to “Shinto” or “Buddhism”, and those who indicate high religious participation are inclined to express “traditional family values” (Appendix: Table 1∼Table 16).
Therefore, we can say that Nation Specific Items are more appropriate than general religiosity items in
analyzing the relationship between Japanese religiosity and family values.
３．
５ Age and Religiosity
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In Japan it has been said that religiosity is closely related to age, therefore we have tried to analyze the relationship between Nation Specific Items and age (Appendix: Table 17).
The result of the analysis shows:
・the older the respondents are, the more likely they feel attracted to “Shinto” or “Buddhism.”
・the younger the respondents are, the more likely they feel attracted to “Christianity.”
・the older the respondents are, the more likely they are to participate in religion.
３．
６ Conclusion
The analysis above suggests that family values are closely related to age, and religiosity does not have influence over family values in Japan.
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Appendix
Table１
Religious Attraction and Marital Status
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Marital status
１．Married
７
５．
９％
７
２．
２％
６
５．
４％
６
３．
５％
２．Widowed
５．
５％
９．
５％
１．
３％
３．
４％
３．Divorced
０．
５％
２．
７％
１．
９％
２．
９％
４．Separated
０．
５％
０．
５％
０．
６％
０．
２％
５．Not married
１
７．
６％
１
５．
１％
３
０．
８％
３
０．
０％
Table２
Religious Attraction and Sexual Morality ①
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Sexual relations
before marriage:
１．Always wrong
１
５．
１％
１
４．
６％
１
２．
６％
７．
２％
２．Almost always
wrong
３
３．
０％
３
１．
３％
１
８．
５％
２
０．
５％
３．Wrong only
sometimes
４
１．
１％
４
４．
８％
５
３．
６％
５
４．
８％
４．Not wrong at all
１
０．
８％
９．
３％
１
５．
２％
１
７．
４％
Table３
Religious Attraction and Sexual Morality ②
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Sexual relations
with other than spouse:
１．Always wrong
５
２．
４％
４
９．
５％
３
６．
２％
４
１．
５％
２．Almost always
wrong
３
８．
５％
４
３．
７％
５
１．
７％
４
６．
９％
３．Wrong only
sometimes
７．
５％
５．
５％
１
２．
１％
９．
７％
４．Not wrong at all
１．
６％
１．
３％
０．
０％
１．
９％
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Table４
Religious Attraction and Sexual Morality ③
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Homosexual
relations:
１．Always wrong
４
５．
７％
４
５．
７％
３
２．
３％
３
９．
３％
２．Almost always
wrong
３
０．
６％
３
３．
６％
３
７．
１％
３
２．
３％
３．Wrong only
sometimes
２
０．
２％
１
７．
７％
２
３．
４％
２
１．
８％
３．
５％
３．
１％
７．
３％
６．
６％
４．Not wrong at all
Table５
Religious Attraction and Sexual Morality ④
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Couple together
without marriage:
１．Strongly agree
２
２．
３％
１
５．
８％
３
０．
３％
２
６．
２％
２．Agree
１
０．
９％
１
１．
４％
１
６．
８％
１
４．
３％
３．Neither agree nor
disagree
２
１．
２％
２
４．
３％
２
０．
６％
２
５．
３％
４．Disagree
１
５．
０％
１
５．
６％
１
１．
６％
８．
７％
５．Strongly disagree
３
０．
６％
３
２．
９％
２
０．
６％
２
５．
５％
Table６
Religious Attraction and Sexual Morality ⑤
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Couple together
before married:
１．Strongly agree
１
０．
５％
１
１．
６％
１
５．
５％
１
９．
０％
２．Agree
１
３．
６％
１
３．
５％
１
９．
４％
１
６．
５％
３．Neither agree nor
disagree
３
１．
４％
３
１．
０％
３
１．
６％
３
２．
８％
４．Disagree
１
３．
６％
１
２．
２％
５．
８％
１
０．
１％
５．Strongly disagree
３
０．
９％
３
１．
８％
２
７．
７％
２
１．
６％
October ２
０
０
２
―３
３―
Table７
Religious Attraction and Abortion
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Child handicapped:
always wrong
８．
９％
９．
４％
１
４．
６％
１
１．
０％
Low family income:
always wrong
２
３．
４％
１
８．
９％
２
６．
８％
２
１．
４％
Table８
Religious Attraction and Gender Roles ①
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Husbands earn money,
wife’s job family
１．Strongly agree
１
５．
２％
１
２．
６％
７．
０％
８．
７％
２．Agree
２
９．
４％
２
７．
１％
２
３．
６％
２
１．
０％
３．Neither agree nor
disagree
２
２．
３％
２
６．
１％
２
４．
８％
２
７．
５％
４．Disagree
１
１．
７％
１
２．
０％
１
３．
４％
１
２．
３％
５．Strongly disagree
２
１．
３％
２
２．
３％
３
１．
２％
３
０．
５％
Table９
Religious Attraction and Gender Roles ②
Attraction to religion
Shinto
Buddhism
Christianity
No attraction
Woman at work,
family will suffer
１．Strongly agree
１
９．
４％
１
７．
２％
１
３．
５％
１
５．
５％
２．Agree
２
６．
０％
２
６．
８％
２
２．
６％
１
９．
４％
３．Neither agree nor
disagree
２
６．
０％
２
６．
５％
２
８．
４％
２
７．
１％
５．
６％
９．
４％
１
２．
９％
１
２．
６％
２
３．
０％
２
０．
１％
２
２．
６％
２
５．
４％
４．Disagree
５．Strongly disagree
―３
４―
社 会 学 部 紀 要 第９
２号
Table １０ Religious Participation and Marital Status ①
Praying at home: Shinto shrine
Everyday
Sometimes
Occasionally
Never
Have no shrine
Married
７
２．
８％
８
４．
４％
６
８．
６％
５
０．
６％
６
８．
９％
Divorced
１．
８％
２．
７％
２．
９％
３．
０％
２．
４％
Not married
４．
７％
６．
５％
２
４．
６％
４
４．
６％
２
３．
６％
Table １１ Religious Participation and Marital Status ②
Praying at home: Buddhist alter
Everyday
Sometimes
Occasionally
Never
Have no alter
Married
７
１．
７％
７
４．
６％
６
２．
６％
４
１．
１％
７
３．
４％
Divorced
１．
９％
４．
３％
２．
０％
２．
７％
２．
３％
Not married
５．
９％
１
６．
５％
３
２．
７％
５
４．
８％
２
４．
１％
Table １２ Religious Participation and Marital Status ③
Religious practice: Zen
Praying in times of distress
yes
no
yes
no
Married
７
３．
２％
６
７．
０％
７
１．
０％
６
５．
７％
Divorced
３．
２％
２．
２％
２．
４％
２．
９％
Not married
１
６．
７％
２
４．
５％
１
８．
８％
２
７．
３％
October ２
０
０
２
―３
５―
Table １３ Religious Participation and Family Values ①
Praying at home: Shinto shrine
Everyday
Sometimes
Occasionally
Never
Have no shrine
Sexual relations
before marriage:
Always wrong
２
８．
６％
１
６．
９％
９．
１％
８．
９％
７．
２％
Sexual relations with
other than spouse:
Always wrong
６
０．
６％
６
０．
５％
４
１．
５％
４
２．
８％
４
０．
１％
Homosexual relations:
Always wrong
６
１．
８％
５
５．
５％
３
９．
４％
３
９．
３％
３
６．
０％
Couple together
without marriage:
Strongly disagree
４
７．
８％
３
７．
５％
２
８．
８％
２
２．
７％
２
２．
５％
Couple together
before marriage:
Strongly disagree
４
０．
０％
３
５．
８％
２
７．
１％
２
３．
３％
２
１．
３％
Child handicapped:
Always wrong
１
６．
８％
１
０．
２％
９．
３％
１
２．
８％
１
０．
４％
Low family income:
Always wrong
２
３．
６％
２
３．
５％
２
０．
０％
１
９．
６％
２
１．
２％
Husband earns money,
wife’s job family:
Strongly agree
２
３．
６％
１
８．
５％
８．
７％
９．
６％
６．
８％
Woman at work,
family will suffer:
Strongly agree
２
６．
８％
１
８．
１％
１
５．
９％
１
８．
４％
１
３．
１％
―３
６―
社 会 学 部 紀 要 第９
２号
Table １４ Religious Participation and Family Values ②
Praying at home: Buddhist alter
Everyday
Sometimes
Occasionally
Never
Have no alter
Sexual relations
before marriage:
Always wrong
２
５．
１％
９．
１％
６．
９％
１
０．
３％
６．
９％
Sexual relations with
other than spouse:
Always wrong
６
３．
３％
４
４．
０％
３
７．
３％
３
８．
６％
４
１．
４％
Homosexual relations:
Always wrong
５
６．
９％
４
６．
１％
３
３．
７％
３
４．
９％
３
７．
９％
Couple together
without marriage:
Strongly disagree
４
３．
４％
２
８．
１％
２
２．
０％
２
２．
２％
２
５．
４％
Couple together
before marriage:
Strongly disagree
３
６．
５％
２
８．
６％
２
１．
９％
２
４．
７％
２
３．
５％
Child handicapped:
Always wrong
１
２．
７％
９．
０％
９．
３％
１
９．
７％
１
１．
２％
Low family income:
Always wrong
２
３．
４％
１
５．
０％
１
９．
１％
２
６．
６％
２
４．
７％
Husband earns money,
wife’s job family:
Strongly agree
１
９．
５％
１
１．
６％
８．
９％
１
１．
０％
６．
２％
Woman at work,
family will suffer:
Strongly agree
２
２．
７％
１
７．
３％
１
４．
６％
１
９．
４％
１
３．
０％
October ２
０
０
２
―３
７―
Table １５ Religious Participation and Family Values ③
Religious practice: Zazen
Yes, I have
No, I have never
Sexual relations
before marriage:
Always wrong
１
２．
８％
１
１．
４％
Sexual relations with
other than spouse:
Always wrong
４
４．
２％
４
７．
３％
Homosexual relations:
Always wrong
４
４．
１％
４
２．
７％
Couple together
without marriage:
Strongly disagree
３
１．
５％
２
８．
０％
Couple together
before marriage:
Strongly disagree
３
２．
８％
２
４．
３％
Child handicapped:
Always wrong
１
３．
３％
１
０．
１％
Low family income:
Always wrong
２
１．
９％
２
０．
９％
Husband earns money,
wife’s job family:
Strongly agree
１
５．
８％
８．
９％
Woman at work,
family will suffer:
Strongly agree
２
０．
３％
１
５．
０％
―３
８―
社 会 学 部 紀 要 第９
２号
Table １６ Religious Participation and Family Values ④
Praying in times of distress
Yes, I have
No, I have not
Sexual relations
before marriage:
Always wrong
１
２．
８％
１
０．
３％
Sexual relations with
other than spouse:
Always wrong
４
７．
７％
４
３．
２％
Homosexual relations:
Always wrong
４
４．
１％
４
１．
４％
Couple together
without marriage:
Strongly disagree
３
０．
５％
２
６．
９％
Couple together
before marriage:
Strongly disagree
２
８．
２％
２
５．
７％
Child handicapped:
Always wrong
９．
６％
１
４．
０％
Low family income:
Always wrong
２
１．
６％
２
０．
６％
Husband earns money,
wife’s job family:
Strongly agree
１
２．
８％
８．
６％
Woman at work,
family will suffer:
Strongly agree
１
７．
４％
１
５．
９％
October ２
０
０
２
―３
９―
Table １７ Religious Attraction and Participation by Age Groups
Attraction to
１
６∼１
９
years
２
０∼２
９
years
３
０∼３
９
years
４
０∼４
９
years
５
０∼５
９
years
６
０∼６
９
years
７
０years
and over
Religious Participation
Shinto
Buddhist Religious Practice: Praying in times
Christianity No Attraction
（sometimes）（sometimes）
Zazen
of distress
Shinto
Buddhism
６．
９％
２
６．
４％
１
９．
４％
６
２．
５％
１
１．
１％
２
２．
７％
１
８．
１％
５
２．
８％
１
１．
３％
３
５．
９％
１
５．
９％
５
３．
８％
８．
９％
３
４．
６％
２
２．
１％
５
７．
９％
１
３．
１％
３
７．
９％
１
５．
０％
５
１．
５％
２
３．
６％
４
６．
８％
２
８．
６％
６
７．
０％
１
６．
１％
４
４．
１％
１
４．
０％
４
３．
４％
３
９．
７％
５
７．
８％
４
０．
２％
６
９．
６％
１
４．
３％
５
５．
６％
１
０．
０％
３
４．
７％
４
５．
６％
６
８．
４％
４
１．
２％
６
３．
８％
２
２．
４％
６
０．
７％
５．
６％
２
７．
０％
５
９．
３％
７
９．
９％
３
９．
８％
６
０．
２％
１
２．
１％
７
０．
１％
４．
５％
２
１．
０％
６
５．
７％
８
６．
５％
３
８．
０％
７
０．
９％
―４
０―
社 会 学 部 紀 要 第９
２号
Family and Religion in Germany and Japan:
Theoretical discussions and empirical findings
ABSTRACT
This paper is a report of our comparative and collaborative research in Germany and Japan, which analyzes the relationships between family values and religion, combining both
theoretical discussions and empirical findings.
The first part deals with the results of the following theoretical discussions: (1) a comparison of Germany and Japan, based on a comprehensive review of previous research in
the sociology of German religion, and religious trends in Japan; (2) investigation of the
analytical framework of studies on the influence of religion on morals; (3) investigation of
the analytical framework of studies concerning the influence of religion in family life.
The next part describes the following four lines of inquiry.
1. Examination of the findings on the relationships between family values and religion using data from the 1998 ISSP Religion Survey.
2. Examination of the findings from another large scale multi-national survey such as the
World Values Survey.
3. Examination of the translation from the Master Questionnaire into the Japanese Questionnaire.
4. Examination of the reliability and validity of the general items on religiosity which were
used in the 1998 ISSP Religious Module, by comparing them with Japanese Nation Specific
Items on religiosity.
The examination above suggests:
・the theoretical hypotheses−nonreligious people tend to have the least orientation toward traditional family values, and the more frequently people participate in religious activities, the more traditionally oriented they become−are more applicable to Germany
(particularly West Germany), and less applicable to Japan.
・In Japan family values are closely related to age, and religiosity does not have influence
over family values.
Key Words: family and religion, theoretical discussions, empirical findings