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Individuality and the Group
Advances in Social Identity
Edited by
Tom Postmes
and
Jolanda. Jetten
($) SAGE Publications
London • Thousand Oaks. New Delhi
Chapter I © Jolanda Jetten and Tom
Postmes 2006
Chapter 2 © John C. Turner, Katherine J.
Reynolds, S. Alexander Haslam, and Kristine
E. Veenstra 2006
Chapter 3 © Deborah Prentice 2006
Chapter 4 © Cynthia L. Pickett and Geoffrey
J. Leonardelli 2006
Chapter 5 © Matthew 1. Homsey 2006
Chapter 6 © Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi 2006
Chapter 7 © Jolanda Jetten and Tom
Postmes 2006
Chapter 8 © Michael J. Halloran and Emiko
S. Kashima 2006
Chapter 9 © Fathali M. Moghaddam 2006
Chapter 10 © Russell Spears, Naomi Ellemers.
Bertjan Doosje, and Nyla R. Branscombe
2006
Chapter II © B. Ann Bettencourt, Lisa
Molix, Amelia E. Talley, and Kennon
M. Sheldon 2006
Chapter 12 © Tom Postmes, Gamze Baray,
S. Alexander Haslam, Thomas A. Morton,
and Roderick I. Swaab 2006
Chapter 13 © Stephen Reicher and S.
Alexander Haslam 2006
Chapter 14 © Tom Postmes and Jolanda
Jetten 2006
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9
Interobjectivity: The Collective
Roots of Individual
Consciousness and
Social Identity
Fathali M. Moghaddam
The Mind of the universe is social. (Marcus Aurelius, 180/1964, p. 88)
The three arguments developed in this chapter are related through their
common support for a more social approach in psychology. By "more
social" I mean an approach that reflects the collective processes associ­
ated with the collaboratively constructed and mutually upheld nature of
social reality (following Bruner, 1986; Harre, 2002; see also Postmes,
Baray, Haslam, Morton, & Swaab, Chapter 12 in this volume). First, I
argue that social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is compatible
with a cultural account of behavior. Second, I contend that the conception
of the individual central to social identity theory entails assumptions that
leave sufficient room for cultural variations. Third, I articulate an exam­
ple of how a cultural perspective suggests new directions in which social
identity theory and research could further develop.
Social identity theory emerged as part of a larger movement toward
achieving a non-reductionist psychology (the wider historical and ideolog­
ical background to the theory is reflected in Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Sampson,
1977). The theory has stimulated an impressive body of research that comes
under the broad umbrella of "the social identity tradition" (e.g., see
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Robinson, 1996; Worchel, Morales,
Paez, & Deschamps, 1998) as well as self-categorization theory (Thmer,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and other theoretical offshoots
(some of them reflected in the chapters of this text, e.g., Pickett &
Leonardelli, Chapter 4). However, because of space limitations I address
mainly the original theory of intergroup conflict and change.
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I begin by clarifying what I mean by "a cultural perspective". This
c1aritication is necessary because of considerable divergence in cultural
perspectives in recent years (Moghaddam & Studer. 1997). In the second
section, I explore the compatibility of social identity theory with the cul­
lural perspective I adopt. The third section, the longest in the chapter.
examines assumptions underlying the concept of the individual within
social identity theory and how these assumptions allow for cultural varia­
tions. Finally. I discuss how a cultural perspective on rights and duties
suggests extensions to social identity theory and research in the domain of
social change and stability.
The cultural perspective of this chapter
The central feature of the cultural perspective that guides this di.scussion is
the adoption of a normative rather than a causal account of human thought
and action. Thus, my position stands in sharp contrast to both traditional
psychology and traditional cross-cultural psychology (Moghaddam &
Studer. 1997), which share the search for assumed causes (operationalized
as independent variables) and their assumed effects (operationalized as
dependent variables) on social behavior. The shift from behaviorism
to cognition as the dominant paradigm in psychology has moved the search
for "causes" from solely the stimuli in the environment to also include
cognitive mechanisms assumed to function in the mind. But common
to both hehaviorism and cognitive psychology is the insistence that thought
and action are causally determined. The limitations of such positivisl
cause-effect accounts have heen convincingly articulated elsewhere
(e.g.. Harre, 2002), and need not be repeated here. Suffice to say that the
positivist cause-effect account leaves no room for personal agency and
intenlional i ty.
An alternative nonnative account entails an underst<Jnding of individual
choice not as an "effect" causally determined by assumed "underlying cog­
nitive mechanisms" or by external factors, but as regulated by the nonns.
rules. and other aspects of the normative system that a person interprets to
be appropriate in cultural context (see Moghaddam, 1998). In any given
context the individual has available various normative systems within
which to think and act correctly or incorrectly. For example, an individual
who wants to position herself as a rebel in a Western society has a variety
of choices, such as in tenns of what to rebel against (e.g., classical music)
and what "rebel" cause to take up (e.g., post-punk rock). Individual choices
are made within constraints, and different degrees of freedom are presenl
in different situations, so that more choices are available in some contexts
than in others.
In terobjectlvlty
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According to this normative account, regularity and predictability in
behavior arise because most people most of the time consciously or uncon­
sciously behave correctly according to the normative system dominant
in their culture. For example, when participants enter an experimental
laboratory, they search for guides as to how they should behave (often par­
ticipants enter a laboratory and ask "What am I supposed to do?", as a way
of seeking information about correct behavior). Most participants inter­
pret the situation and "how they should behave" in a similar way to others
who share their culture, and these are the participants whose behavior is
used as data to yield "significant results". The other participants, usually
a minority, who interpret the situation differently and behave in other
ways (such as by deciding that they do not want to be in the experiment)
contribute to error or variance in experimental results. Thus, culture
guides behavior in the laboratory context, but does not "cause" individu­
als to behave in particular ways.
The cultural perspective that I am advocating does not negate the
utility and value of the laboratory experiment as a research method in psy­
chology. The laboratory has served a highly useful and, indeed, essential
role in psychological research. It is the causal interpretation of findings
rather than the laboratory method that is faulty (for a more in-depth
discussion of the utility of the laboratory method in psychology, see
Moghaddam & Harre, 1992).
Is social identity theory compatible
with a cultural perspective?
Social identity theory is compatible with the cultural perspective
advocated in this discussion, although mechanistic interpretations of the
theory that have become dominant in the social identity tradition are not
compatible with this cultural perspective. The theory has identified a
series of preferences individuals tend to show in social life. From a cul­
tural perspective, these preferences are regulated by belief structures and
other important components of normative systems.
The point of departure for certain readings of social identity theory
(e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988) is that individuals are assumed to have a
preference for group membership that supports their proposed need for a
positive and distinct identity. My interpretation is that this preference is
learned through socialization processes, as individuals are taught that
belonging to groups with positive and distinct identities is more rewarding,
both in direct material ways and in less direct ways related to emotional
support and social acceptance. For example, as a child enters school and
moves in and out of different groups, she learns that membership in some
158
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groups (e.g., the advanced math class, the winning swim team) hrings
with it far more positive reactions from her parents, teachers, friends, and
so on, than memhership in other groups (e.g., the "e" math class, the losing
swim team).
Similarly. the child learns the "correct" way to think as a memher of
different types of groups, including sex, ethnic, and religious groups. This
comes ahout through often subtle but powerful carriers - vehicles through
which cultural values and "ways of doing things" are sustained, propa­
gated, and moved forward from generation to generation (Moghaddam.
2002). Examples of symholic carriers are national flags. team mascots.
trihal colors and costumes. Other carriers include various scripted prac­
tices and rituals. such as initiation ceremonies and the like, and rules ahout
how an individual can correctly enter into and exit from different groups.
From a cultural perspective, social identity theory has postulated
certain preferences individuals show in different intergroup contexts.
That is, for example, if individuals are members of a group that already
enjoys positive and distinct identity they will prefer one kind of strategy
(i.e., to try to maintain the status quo), but if their group membership
leads to inadequate social identity they will prefer other hehavioral
options (e.g., try to exit from the group). Again. such preferences are
acquired during the course of socialization and are dependent on cultural
conditions, training, and dominant belief structures. This interpretation
is more in line with Tajfel's broader writings than an interpretation
hased on genetic factors or inheritance more broadly (for a more
in-depth discussion of Tajfel's hroader approach, see Billig, 1996). From
a cultural perspective, a key research question concerns the extent to
which the identified preferences actually are consistent across cultures.
a topic on which there is as yet little serious research (for an exception.
see Wetherell, 1982).
Thus. the general approach adopted hy social identity theory is com­
patihle with the cultural approach advocated in this chapter. Next, I tum
to consider more specifically the fit hetween the conception of the indi­
vidual central to social identity theory and this cultural perspective.
The individual within the social
identity tradition and SIT
The conception of the individual central to SIT entails five main sets of
assumptions that are particularly noteworthy from a cultural perspective."
In this section, I identify these assumptions and show how they leave
room for cultural variations in conceptions of the individual.
f
159
Positive and distinct identity
A first assumption is that the individual is motivated to achieve a positive
and distinct identity. The theory does not postulate the particular criteria
according to which the positiveness and distinctiveness of identity are
evaluated.
Cultural research suggests that "positive and distinct identity" is not a
fixed idea in an individual's head, but should be viewed as a set of col­
laborative social practices that vary depending on the context and inter­
locutors. Such practices are used to try to position oneself in relation to
others, to achieve particular presentations of oneself, as more or less like
others for example, depending on who the interlocutors are and what the
context is (see discussions in Harre & Moghaddam, 2003). For example,
in supposedly "more conformist" societies such as Germany and Japan,
individuals showed less conformity than Americans (a supposedly "low
conformist" society) in the standard Asch-type experimental situations
(see Moghaddam, 19915, Chapter. 7). A plausible explanation for this find­
ing is that although Germans and Japanese may be more conformist than
Americans within certain ingroups (such as family, close friends, and
work colleagues), they are less confonnist when interacting with strangers
(as is the case in the typical psychology experiment). Such processes sug­
gest that motivation, to conform for example, is not something fixed
within an individual, but is manifested in ongoing social practices that
vary across contexts (see the related discussion by Halloran and Kashima,
Chapter 8 in this volume, on how culture moderates the ways in which
identities are being expressed). By implication, how motivated an
American, German, Japanese, or any other person is to achieve a positive
and distinct identity is context dependent. So too are the attributes or
"criteria" of the positive and distinct identity.
Of course, a complicating factor is that the context itself changes. I am
writing the final draft of this chapter in China, where rapid change has
been the most salient feature of society for the last half century. The cul­
tural revolution of the late 1960s and the "perpetual revolution" launched
by Chairman Mao Zedong have been overtaken by a state-sponsored mar­
ket economy and the emergence of a super-rich capitalist elite in the "New
China" of the twenty-first century. A "positive and distinct" identity in the
context of the cultural revolution meant something completely different
from a "positive and distinct" identity in the context of the New China,
characterized as it is in many ways by unbridled "wild west" capitalism.
As regards the criteria according to which individuals evaluate posi­
tiveness and distinctiveness, enormous variations are suggested by cul­
tural research. Consider, for example, the range of physical characteristics
l
160
Individuality ,'lnd tho C;roup
that have been selected to serve as criteria. The most pervasive in Western
societies is skin color, on the basis of which the social world is divided
into "black" and "white". However, such criteria are "arbitrary", in the
sense that they are not objectively selected, and infinite other possibilities
are also available. Consider, for example, the division of the social world
in Rwanda on the hasis of height (Maquet, 1961), and the even more
intriguing division between "long-ears" and "short-ears" on ancient Easter
Island (Heyerdahl, 1989). In all such cases, social categorization is hased
on objectively measurable differences, which are transformed into social
criteria by the majority group wielding power. For example, the "one
drop" rule as practiced by whites in the United States defined "black" as
any individual with even "one drop" of "black hlood". Such a rule was
clearly designed to maximize the size of the population who could be
defined as slaves, and later as "colored" (and thus be disenfranchised).
By implication, through the manufacture and manipulation of different
criteria for evaluating positive and distinct identity, the majority group
can determine rights, demands placed on others by the person who possesses
them, and duties. demands placed by others on the person who owes them.
with respect to how the memhers of different groups will assess their
social identity.
Social identity integral to personal identity
Social identity is defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups)
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that mem­
bership" (Tajfel, 1978. p. 63). There are at least two key issues left open:
first. the question of how many groups a person belongs to; second, how
strong are the value and emotional significance attached to memhership(s)
(these issues are to some degree addressed in self-categorization theory and
research, where it is assumed people have networks of identities they draw
from). Enormous cultural variations exist in both of these areas.
First, on the matter of how many groups an individual belongs to, con­
sider the range of possibilities between the extremes of mono-group soci­
eties. where membership in one group dominates life and fundamentally
influences the behavior of aJl or most individuals in that society in all
domains, and multi-group societies, where the influence of memhership in
many different groups with diverse characteristics has different levels of
influence on the behavior of different individuals. An example of a society
closer to the mono-group extreme is the Islamic Repuhlic of Iran, where
for Shi' i Muslims the importance of membership in the group "Shi' i
Muslim" is in practice by far the most important group membership (see
Inrerub;eUlvily
161
Moghaddam, 2004a). This is because the rules and practices of Shi' i Islal11
.ue used to regulate official Iranian government policy, as well as the
minute details of everyday social life, such as the clothing people are
allowed to wear, the names they are allowed to give to their children, what
they are permitted to eat, who they can shake hands with, who they can
socialize with, how many wives a man can have at one time and whether
he can have "pennanent" or "temporary" wives. Even though an individ­
ual in the Islamic Republic of Iran can be a member of many different
groups, membership in the group "Shi'i Muslim" in practice dominates all
other memberships. An example of a society closer to the multi-group end
of the continuum is the United States, where conformity is no less than in
most other major societies (Moghaddam, 1998, Chapter 7), but member­
ship in no one group has a dominating influence on all or most individu­
als in that society. In the United States, there are a greater variety of
subcultures with different nonnative systems, such as those relating to
sexual orientation, than in Iran, but conformity is /lot necessarily weaker
(1998, pp. 240-241).
There is also diversity in the sheer number of groups individuals belong
to in different cultures. In most large modern societies multiple group mem­
bership is the nann, with family, social, professional, recreational, political,
religious, cultural, and other group affiliations competing to influence the
individual. However, at the other extreme are examples of much smaller
societies where individuals belong to far fewer groups. The clearest cases
of this are isolated smaller societies, contemporary examples being the
Tibetan Nyinba in the Himalayan mountains (Levine, 1988), the Old Order
Amish of Pennsylvania (USA) (Hostetler, 1980), and the Yanomamo who
live in the Amazon jungle in Brazil and Venezuela (Chagnon, 1992); but
there are even more numerous historical examples, such as the Ti wi of
northern Australia (Hart, Pilling, & Goodale, 2001).
By implication, in mono-group societies individuals have a duty to
follow the nonnative practices of one or two groups in all areas of life, and
social identity is based in important ways on just those one or two groups;
whereas in multi-group societies individuals have the right to practice dif­
ferent lifestyles and develop a social identity that is founded on multiple
diverse groups. This has important implications for the range of options
available for expressing individuality and personal freedoms within a cul­
tural context.
Second, on the issue of the value and emotional significance attached to
group membership, on the surface it would seem that higher individualism
should be associated with lower value and emotional significance to group
attachment. After all, Hofstede (1991) defines individualism as pertaining
to "societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is
f
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162
expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family"
(p. 5 \). By contrast, collectivism pertains to societies "in which people
from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups" (p. 5\).
Accordingly, we should find that in more individualistic societies, indi­
viduals have weaker attachments to groups. This seems to be in line with
arguments from communitarians warning of weakening social ties in the
United States and other "individualistic" Western societies (e.g., see
Etzioni, 1993), as well as empirical evidence from Putnam (2000) and
other political scientists in support of the argument that in the United
States, the epitome of an individualistic society, more people are "bowling
alone" and refraining from affiliation with all kinds of groups. However,
the actual cross-cultural picture is more complicated.
Part of the complexity arises out of the processes of increasing special­
ization associated with modernization (Moghaddam, 1997). Increasing
divisions of labor lead to a paradoxical situation, in the sense that more
specialized individuals are more dependent on others to complete "whole"
tasks and to function effectively. The United States and other industrially
advanced societies are individualistic, yet they pursue a goal of "collective
actualization" to try to maximize "how each person can most effectively
develop specialized talents specifically in the narrow domains needed for
group functioning. In the pursuit of this collective ideal. the criterion for
development becomes the requirement on individuals to function effec­
tively in the integrated dynamic structures of the collectivity ... The main
objective of socialization ... is to develop individual talents to hetter meet
market demands" (Moghaddam, 1997, pp. 4-5). An implication of this
argument is that we should differentiate between individualism­
collectivism at the level of the individual and at the level of the larger soci­
ety, and this is in line with other recent interpretations (see Oyserman, Coon,
& Kemmelmeier, 2002): increasing individualism at the individual level
need not translate to individualism at the cultural level, and vice versa.
An implication for social identity theory is that increased individual­
ism, at least at the level of the individual. need not translate into weaker
value and emotional significance attached to group membership. This idea
receives tentative empirical support from a recent correlational study that
assessed the relationship between individualism-collectivism and indices
of group affiliation across the different states of the United States. as well
as across 42 different countries around the world (Allik & Realo, 2004).
The results support the view that as individuals become more individual­
istic, they also become more dependent on others. This seemingly para­
doxical relationship reflects the "plight of the individual in the age of
individualism" (Moghaddam, 1997), and should be a rewarding area of
social identity research in the future (see also the, related discussion on
163
individualism and identitication in Jetten & Postmes, Chapter 7 in this
volume ).
Social comparisons determine adequacy of identity
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The theory assumes that individuals in making intergroup comparisons
come to an idea about the positiveness and distinctiveness of the groups to
which they belong. Presumably, through "social creativity" groups can
reconstruct the basis and dimensions of social comparisons. However,
in the social identity tradition too little consideration is giwn to local
normative systcms that guide the individual to make some typcs of intcr­
group comparisons and not others.
Each culturc guidcs individuals to makc somc ty pes of intergwup com­
parisons rathcr than others. Thcre is considerable cultural diversity with
respect to the targets that are idcntiticd as "correct". Consider, for example,
comparisons across gcndcr groups. In many Western societies, women are
cncouragcd (particularly by some feminists) to compete with mcn and to
compare their status and rewards not only with other women but also with
mcn (of course, not all women make comparisons across gendcr lines, and
even those who do also make many other types of comparisons). Thus,
there are annual publications rcporting the avcrage earnings of women
and mcn in different professions, and statistics reporting scholastic
achievements of women and mcn from elementary school to graduate pro­
grams. In contrast, women in islamic societies are encouraged (particu­
larly by government authorities) to see themselves as having a
complementary rather than a competitive relationship with men ("like the
two wings of a bird, men and women complement one another"). There is
an absence of debates about issues such as "same salary for same work"
and the like. The same kind of within-gender (rather than cross-gender)
social comparisons arc nonnative in many smaller traditional societies,
such as the Old Ordcr Amish, the Yanomamo, the Tiwi, and thc Tibetan
Nyinba.
A closer examination of some traditiol1Jl societies reveals more subtle
cultural variations in comparison targets. For example, in both modem
Western societies and in traditional Tiwi culture. it is not proper for young
men to compare themselves with old men on the criterion of how much
access they have to young women (as girlfriends, companions, wives). But
this similarity hides a subtle difference. In Wcstern societies young men
have greater access to young women than do old men. In traditional Tiwi
society, however, young men havc far less access to young women than do
old men. This is because in traditional Tiwi society men can only attain a
wife after achieving a high level of status and resources, which typically
164
Individuality and the Group
only comes about in the early 30s. Moreover, the first wife of a "young"
man is typically a much older widow. However, as a man works his way up
the status hierarchy and gains greater resources, he marries younger and
younger wives (men can have many wives, and every woman is married all
of her life, from birth to death). The Tiwi normative system favors older
men; while there is little possibility of a man marrying in his 20s, he typi­
cally acquires many young wives when he reaches his 50s. Thus, social
comparison targets for both young Western males and young Tiwi males is
other young rather than older males, but for very different reasons.
By implication, individual group members have rights and duties to
make some types of social comparisons, and not others. Such rights and
duties reflect majority group interests, such as "old men" in traditional
Tiwi society.
Perceived stability and legitimacy determine
availability of cognitive alternatives
Whether or not an individual perceives alterative ways of organizing inter­
group relations is postulated by SIT as being dependent on the perceived
legitimacy and stability of the present situation. The bases for evaluating
stability and legitimacy are not specified, nor is the extent to which insta­
bility and illegitimacy would have to be perceived for cognitive alterna­
tives to arise. Finally, the priorities given to different cognitive alternatives
remain open.
Considerable cultural variation exists with respect to the basis used to
evaluate stability and legitimacy in society. In contemporary Western soci­
eties, democratic ideals suggest that stability and legitimacy rest on repre­
sentative government. In theory, those who win elections govern on behalf
of the people, and stability is ensured through smooth transitions from one
election to the next. In practice, there is variation as to how such ideals are
put into practice, as evident in the United States Presidential elections of
2000 that brought George W. Bush to power. Thus, even within Western
democracies, there are considerable differences in how stability and legiti­
macy play out. Consider now a dramatically different system, that of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, where the constitution stipulates that a "supreme
Islamic leader", or a council of "Islamic leaders", will oversee all govern­
ment laws and actions, to ensure that there is no deviation from "true
Islam". In this case, representatives elected by popular vote are subordinate
to, and only gain legitimacy through, religious authorities.
But to appreciate the deeper difference between legitimacy in Iran and
in Western societies, we must consider in greater detail the concept of
leadership in each context (Moghaddam, 2004a). In Iran, every practicing
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Shi'i Muslim is obligated to select alllwja-i-taqlid, "a source of emulation",
a religious leader who literally will act as an example and guide for how
to live, including every detail of daily life. For the Shi'i faithful, the legit­
imacy and stability of the world are defined by the marja-i-taqlid, from
the realm of macro social and political events, to the details of how to
wash and eat. Even those Iranians who do not routinely practice Shi'i
Islam are nevertheless influenced by the normative system put into place
by major religious leaders in their society. This leads to complex and
subtle points about continuity of cultural systems, and the issue of how
much perceptions of stability and legitimacy can be intluential (see also
the discussions of individual/group perceptions by Reicher and Haslam,
Chapter 13 in this volume).
SIT gives considerable importance to perceptions of stability and legit­
imacy, but evidence from studies of revolutions suggests that social prac­
tices may continue despite changed perceptions (Moghaddam & Crystal,
1997). These include detailed analysis of revolutions, from the great
French revolution (Schama, 1989) to more recent ones in Iran and else­
where (see Moghaddam, 2004a). Middlebrook (1995) termed this the
"paradox of revolution" - the continuity of the "same old" social practices
after a major revolution, so that "the more things change, the more they
stay the same". This continuity is sustained by carriers, discussed earlier
in this chapter. Carriers such as flags, traditions, status symbols, informal
norms and rules, act as "conveyers" of social practices; carriers inform
people about "what to do", "when to do", and "how to do", in everyday
contexts (Moghaddam, 2002). They sustain belief structures and the
"mundane" everyday social practices that act as a break and as a limita­
tion on revolutionary programs.
By implication, local cultural carriers can effectively maintain tradi­
tional social practices in intergroup relations, despite perceptions of insta­
bility and illegitimacy, and even after major revolutions. The social
identity tradition should give more attention to continuity and what
remains the same at the individual and interpersonal levels in informal
life, despite changes in formal macro political and economic systems
(the issue of change and continuity is further discussed in the final section
of this chapter).
Change-seeking strategies
SIT articulates a range of strategies individuals adopt in ordcr to try to
maintain or improve a positive and distinct identity. Depending on the
characteristics of the intergroup situation (for example, whether exit from
a minority group is possible and whether cognitive alternatives to the
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Jndivirjupfftl,/ nnei fhe (;rouo
present intergroup situation are perceived), such strategies range from the
nonnative and individualistic, as in the case of making intragroup com­
parisons, to the non-normative and collective, as in the case of directly and
collectively challenging the majority group. The theory assumes causal
relations between belief structures and the strategies preferred by individ­
uals, and this leaves the door wide open for cultural variations.
Clearly the strategies given priority by an individual are influenced by
the belief structures dominant in society. For example, the theory postu­
lates that when the situation is perceived as unstable and illegitimate, the
individual will select one of the following strategies: individual mobility,
social creativity (which has three dimensions: finding a new dimension of
comparison, changing values assigned to attributes of the ingroup, and
engaging in comparison with a different outgroup), and social competi­
tion. The choice of strategy is not made by the individual in isolation, as
is suggested by the image of the lone participant calculating the "best
strategy" in paper-and-pencil laboratory tests. Rather, both what are
understood to be available strategies, and selection from among them, are
achieved though social interactions, collective discourse, and collabora­
tive negotiation. The outcome of these processes is fundamentally influ­
enced by the narratives pervasive in society, as reflected by the emphasis
on belief structures in social identity theory. For example, in the United
States the "American dream" narrative is particularly pervasive, involving
the idea that "anyone can make it in America", that through self-help and
personal responsibility any individual can rise to the top positions in society.
Associated with this emphasis on individual social mobility are campaigns
by powerful economic interest groups against labor unions, government
intervention, and social welfare generally, leading to what has been
described as a "winner-takes-all society" (Frank & Cook, 1995). The indi­
vidual, then, comes to appropriate a strategy through participation in col­
lective social life, and through the unequal influence of various minority
and majority groups.
By implication, then, in order to understand the actual preferences an
individual shows between strategies, it is necessary to consider the shared
understandings both within and between groups that typically enjoy
unequal power and influence, and this is what I tum to next.
Interobjectivity and change: an example of a
cultural extension to social identity theory
There is a fundamental difference between social identity theory, a theory
of intergroup conflict and social change processes, and the social identity
tradition, a body of literature that has tended to neglect social change
",if
i
.~
167
specifically and collective processes of meaning-making morc broadly.
From the cultural perspective adopted in this chapter, a vital and invalu­
able feature of social identity theory is the concern with changing inter­
);roup situations and the preferences individuals show, through the
influence of belief structures, for different behavioral options in the con­
text of such changes. The fusion of social identity theory and a cultural
perspective can help shift the focus back onto change processes and col­
lective meaning-making, and indeed suggest ways in which further theory
development could take place in the domain of change and stability.
In several ways social identity theory does address the "puzzle of change",
related to the often repeated observation that "the more things change, the
more they stay the same" (for a broader discussion of this puzzle, see
Moghaddam, 2002, particularly Chapters 1-3 and 15). First, the theory posits
thar in cases where individuals are content with their social identity, they will
make behavioral choices that serve to maintain the present intergroup situ­
ation. Presumably, in such contexts a great deal could change in terms of
cultural, technological, and even economic and political facets of life, with­
out necessarily changing the intergroup situation and the status and power
hierarchy of groups. Second, from among the broad array of behavioral
options identitied as available to individuals who perceive themselves to
have inadequate social identity, only one (collective action) has the poten­
tial to lead to social change, and it is the less likely option.
Thus, social identity theory suggests part of a solution to the puzzle of
change to be the tendency of individuals to avoid collective action and to
prefer individualistic strategies that sustain the Slatus quo. But another
part of a solution to the puzzle of change is suggested when we consider
the role of multiple identities in the change processes.
Multiple social identities
Social identity theory presents a view of individuals as members of mul­
tiple groups and having multiple social identities. This is in agreement
with the cultural perspective adopted in this chapter, where the emphasis
is on choices made by individuals between competing normative systems
associated with different groups within the same context (in contrast to
traditional cross-cultural psychology, which typically presents a picture of
a homogeneous culture acting as a cause of behavior). The social identity
perspective of multiple social identities provides another possible solution
to "the puzzle of change": change impacting on social identities at one
level (e.g., the "macro" national level) need not impact on social identities
at another level (e.g., the "micro" local level). For example, a revolution that
creates disruptions at the macro level of national identity need not change
social identities at the micro level of social relations within families.
168
fndwiclua/itv [1nr:1 1170 Grou!'
Similarly, social identities might change at the level of an individual's
intrafamily relations, without social identities at the national level being
affected.
It may also be that social identities at the micro or macro levels are trans­
formed, without disrupting other social identities at the same level but in a
different sphere. For example, the feminist movement and transformations
in gender roles may change Jane's social identity based on her being a
woman, but not change her social identity based on her nationality (gender
and nationality both being at the macro level, but in different spheres). But
there are also cases where social identity based on membership in one
group will influence changes in many other social identities, at different
levels and in different spheres. Such cases are particularly instructive with
respect to the sources of individual consciousness. Consider the case of
Shi'i Islam in Iran, discussed earlier in this chapter. For Muslims in Iran,
Shi'i Islam has become a superordinate social identity, one that embraces
and impacts on all other social identities available in a context.
This has come about through the influence of the majority group,
Islamic fundamentalists, who hold the reigns of power in Iran. The key
point here is that social reality within all groups, particularly minority
groups, is in major ways shaped by a majority group that monopolizes
power (see also Postmes et aI., Chapter 12; Reicher & Haslam, Chapter) 3
in this volume).
How are power inequalities perpetuated?
The cultural perspective advocated here leads to an emphasis on change
processes in intergroup relations and belief structures dominant within
groups, and the question of how power inequalities are often perpetuated
despite changes in the relative status of particular groups. The "paradox of
revolution" is pervasive (although not inevitable): revolutionary groups
often come to power only to perpetuate former inequalities (Moghaddam,
2002). Social identity theory already does provide some answers to this
riddle, such as through the idea of multiple social identities (above), but
another avenue for future research is to explore how belief structures dom­
inant in minorities and majorities lead them to adopt particular rights and
duties as priorities.
It is useful to begin a normative account of intergroup relations with two
basic ideas. First, culture and the normative system precede the arrival of
the individual and help shape individual consciousness. All individuals, no
matter how powerful they later become as adults, begin life as helpless
infants within the all-embracing normative system of a culture. More
specifica)]y, the groups into which individuals are born (e.g., woman, man;
169
·.In·. .J.
"
J
,
~
hlack, white; Christian, Jew, Muslim) have a profound impact on the social
(onstructions individuals acquire, Second, the cultures within which indi­
viduals are born vary in some important ways, including with respect to
;lssumptions about the characteristics of individuals, Such ditferences are
rdlected in the literature on individualism-collectivism and elaborations
such as the "horizontal-vertical" distinction (Nelson & Shavitt, 2002), but
a more dynamic account is needed of the processes through which indi­
viduals come to share certain social constructions, such as those relating to
justice, and more broadly the very conception of an individual,
In order to help explain the processes through which individuals
hecome integrated into culture, and culture in individuals, I have intro­
duced the concept of interohjectil'ity, the understandings that are shared
within and between cultures about social reality (Moghaddam, 2003),
Through socialization processes, individuals arrive at objectifications of
the world based on the normative system of their cultures. They come to
see their version of social reality as the correct one. But in many ways
such understandings are not unique to their culture, nor are they shaped
solely by the ingroup. In the case of minority groups, in particular, inter­
objectivity is shaped by powerful outgroups.
Interobjectivity highlights a fundamentally important feature of under­
standings shared within and across groups: such understandings arise out
of unequal intergroup power relations, Some groups have more power
than others, and are able to shape in important ways the understandings
held by less powerful groups - a tendency discussed in various traditions
under titles such as "false consciousness" (e.g" see Moghaddam, 1998,
pp. 424-425; and the distinction between "groups-for-themselves" and
"groups-in-themselves" in Billig, 1976). This process of unequal inter­
group inlluence is reflected, for example, in understandings shared within
and across groups with respect to rights and duties, Despite the centrality
of rights and duties in relationships within and between groups, rights and
duties remain almost completely neglected in research on groups (e.g" see
contents of Brown & Gaertner, 200 I; Ellemers et aI" 1999),
Beliefs about what constitutes an individual are in large part based on
the rights and duties ascribed to an individual (Moghaddam, 2000;
Moghaddam & Riley, 2004; Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mar, & Harre,
2000). In practice, rights and duties are ascribed not just on the basis of
individual characteristics, but also on the basis of group memberships.
That is, the concept of an "abstract individual" with universal rights is
severely tested by cultural variations. Consider, for example, cultural vari­
ations in rights reflected in polyandry and polygamy: among the Tibetan
Nyinba a woman has the right to practice fraternal polyandry (i.e., marry
several husbands who are brothers); in contrast, Shi' i Muslim men have
170
1,,'.1·
in;)'
the right to practice a particular form of polygamy (to have up to four
"pennanent" wives and countless "temporary" wives).
The preferences identified by social identity theory are reflections of
perceived rights and duties: for example, an individual perceiving it as her
right to attempt individual mobility to try to exit from a lower status group
in order to gain entrance to a higher status group. and the same individual
perceiving it to be her duty to refrain from the "radical" path of collective
action. In general. authorities maintain political stability by teaching indi­
viduals it is their right and their duty to "work within the existing system"
rather than to take up collective action that might overturn the existing
order. Revolutionaries, on the other hand, attempt to persuade people to
adopt a redefinition of rights and duties. so that collective action takes pri­
ority over individual mobility. But what happens when revolutionaries do
succeed and people do adopt collective action with the result that the
majority group is toppled?
The reappearance of intergroup inequalities
On the surface. at least, it seems that cultural variations prevent us from
proclaiming any universals with respect to rights and duties. However, a
closer examination suggests a different picture. Ideas about rights and
duties renect intergroup inequalities: majority rather than minority groups
define rights and duties as understood and shared across groups. For
example. at the international level. Western conceptions of individual
rights rather than alternative conceptions emphasizing collective rights
have become influential (Finkel & Moghaddam. 2004). Historically,
Western powers have defined rights and duties for all humankind, the eco­
nomically rich for the economically poor, men for both men and women.
whites for both whites and blacks, and so on.
However. rights and duties are not static, just as the concept of the indi­
vidual and social relations are not static. Consider. for example, the rights
and duties ascribed to children in contemporary Western societies. As the
child develops and acquires notions of "rights" and "fairness", she makes
demands such as "It's only fair that I go to the cinema with my friends". But
her parents give priority to duties. as in "You can only go to the cinema after
you've finished all your homework". When the child becomes an adult
and has children of her own, the cycle of rights and duties resumes, and
she now gives priority to duties when interacting with her own children.
Thus, the concept of what the person is and what rights and duties she has
changes, both in the larger society and in her own mind.
This has implications for intergroup relations that supplement the
strategies identified by social identity theory. Specifically, the priority a
Intorobjectlvlty
It
I
,
i
J
171
group gives to rights and/or duties can change across situations, particularly
depending on changes in the relative power status of the group. A cycle of
rights and duties has been identitied: in situations of conflict and/or change,
minority groups give priority to rights and majority groups give priority to
duties (Moghaddam, 2003, 2004b). For example, since the I960s a number
of minorities have mobilized using slogans such as "women's rights",
"Black rights", "gay rights" (rather than "women's duties", "Black duties",
"gay duties"). Countering these minority movements, representatives of
established majority group authority have emphasized duties, as in the
duties of women, Blacks, and gays to abide by long established traditions
("family values", and the like). Similarly, revolutionaries attempting to seize
power do so by appealing to rights, "the right to free speech", "the right to
power sharing", and the like; while those in power evoke the "duties of
citizens to obey the law" and maintain the status quo. However, when a
minority group manages to come to power and achieve majority status, it
shifts from giving priority to rights to giving priority to duties; just as the
adult who once gave priority to rights as a child interacting with her parents
now gives priority to duties as a parent interacting with her children.
Thus, the cultural perspective adopted here suggests several avenues
through which the social identity tradition could constructively be
expanded to provide a better solution to the "puzzle of change". A first
avenue of future research is the relationship between multiple group mem­
berships and change: change at one level and in one sphere of social iden­
tity need not influence change at other levels and spheres. Indeed, in some
contexts change at macro levels of social identity may be resisted by
stability in social identities at micro levels, helping to create the "paradox
of revolution". A second avenue for future research is in the realm of rights
and duties: the majority group is often able to define rights and duties for
both majority and minority groups, but in times of conflict there is a ten­
dency for majorities to give priority to duties and for minorities to give pri­
ority to rights. After revolutions, there is often a tendency for the new
majority to shift from a priority of rights to one of duties, and for a minor­
ity (who still sees itself in a situation of conflict) to give priority to rights.
This "cycle" is another part of the solution to the "paradox of revolution".
Concluding comment
SIT depicts individual thought and action as guided by belief structures,
and this view is in line with the cultural perspective presented here. Belief
structures are collaboratively constructed and collectively upheld; they
arise out of social interactions, although they reside in individual persons.
Moreover, belief structures are shaped by inequalities in the power of
172
Individuality and the Group
different groups. The cultural perspective advocated here leads to a greater
focus on interobjectivity and the question of how individual minority
group members are often influenced by belief structures that reflect the
interests of majority groups, particularly in relation to social change and
perceived rights and duties.
NOTE
I am grateful to Rom Harre for comments made on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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