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Pragmatism and Biological Thinking in the Evolutionary Philosophy of Chauncey Wright
Chauncey Wright (1830-1875)1 was an American philosopher best known today for being the
"coryphaeus"2 of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, that around 1872 brought together the best
philosophical minds of the United States and that, as today it is believed, was the birthplace of American
Pragmatism. Almost all of its members (as James and Peirce, or Fiske and Abbot) were Wright’s old friends
and their philosophical thought was greatly influenced by him3. We can even consider Wright, with its
brilliant epistemological interpretation of the evolutionary theory, a kind of philosophical medium in
promoting that fruitful interaction between the pragmatist thought and the Darwinist tradition, which still
continues to produce very interesting results both in philosophical thought, and in the biological4.
Except for the works of E.H. Madden - Wright’s greatest scholar who devoted two general monographs5
and a good number of essays on various aspects of his philosophy - there are not many pages on this author.
That is why today Wright seems to be a «forgotten philosopher»6.
Wright, at first was interested in Hamilton’s "philosophy of the conditioned", then he was converted to
the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. Later, from 1860, when Darwin’s Origin of Species appeared in
America raising a large debate, Wright immediately declared himself a convinced Darwinian7. The American
philosopher spent more than ten years to assimilate and fully understand the "descent with modification"
theory and he was one of the few who fully understood the philosophical content of this theory, as witnessed
by Darwin himself8. In his evolutionist papers9, while defending the principle of natural selection, Wright
was able to fathom the logic that inspired Darwin’s theory, clearly identifying its philosophical core and
grasping its theoretical importance far ahead of his times10.
However, few scholars show to be aware of the originality of Wright’s thought. Even those who have
dealt with this philosopher until now examined mainly the more general aspects of his thought, as his
philosophy of science, his theory of knowledge, his criticism of metaphysics. In their studies, critics have
focused mainly in an attempt to make a comparison between the philosophy of Wright and the subsequent
pragmatist and neo-positivist thought, in order to determine if this thinker could be defined a “founder” , a
“precursor” or a “forerunner” of these philosophical currents11. Moreover, a good part of the few pages that
For a full list of Chauncey Wright’s works, as well as the studies carried out on his thinking, an almost complete
bibliography is contained in PARRAVICINI 2011. In particular, on Wright’s life and figure cf. NORTON 1877;
WRIGHT 1878; WIENER 1949; MADDEN 1963 & 1964; SINI 1972, ch.II; WRIGHT 2000, vol.3; MENAND 2001,
ch.IX.
2
See PEIRCE, 1931-1958, v.5, pp.8. Hereinafter it will be cited with the usual acronym CP followed by the volume and
reference paragraph (in this case, CP 5.12).
3
In general, about the influence that Wright exerted on the various members of the Metaphysical Club, see the volumes
already mentioned in note 1.
4
On the close relationship between Darwinism and Pragmatism, cf. SINI 1972; FABBRICHESI 2009; FRANZESE
2009, PARRAVICINI 2009a (in particular see the concluding section); PARRAVICINI 2009b; for a biological
application of the pragmatist approach to the problem of mind evolution see DEACON 1997.
5
MADDEN 1963 & 1964.
6
In this way Justice Holmes referred to Wright in a letter, cit. in WIENER 1949, p.174. Moreover, Madden wrote an
essay entitled Chauncey Wright: forgotten American philosopher (MADDEN 1952). Nevertheless, it should be noted
that at the beginning of the new millennium a reprint of Wright’s Philosophical Discussions - a collection of his most
important essays and reviews - was published together with his letters and a series of short essays by various scholars
who have examined different aspects of his thought (WRIGHT 2000).
7
WRIGHT 2000, v.2, p.43.
8
WRIGHT 2000, v.2, pp.230-1.
9
I especially refer to WRIGHT 1870; 1871a; 1871b; 1872; 1873. The latter is the most important, but it is probable that
Darwin never read it. Concerning the others, Darwin deemed it appropriate to publish The genesis of species in England
too, as a philosophical defense against the serious criticisms made by G. Mivart to the theory of natural selection, and
he cited the paper of 1870 in several marginal notes to Descent of Man. See the letter dated 14 July 1871 from Darwin
to Wright, now in WRIGHT 2000, v.2, pp.230-231.
10
As Carlo Sini wrote, Wright handed us «the first philosophical arrangement of the evolutionist theory (that is to date
basically unsurpassed) and especially […] the genetic-evolutionist framework of the problem of the birth of selfawareness» (SINI 1990, p. III. Our translation).
11
The positions vary from those who argue that Wright was actually the "founder" of pragmatism (but without
convincing evidence) as RATNER 1936; to those who say that Wright has more or less "prefigured" it, as KENNEDY
1
scholars have devoted to Wright’s Darwinism was composed before 198012 while in any case the remainder
never covers an attempt of comparison between Wright’s Darwinism and the epistemological approach of
contemporary biology. It is quite emblematic of the attitude of a certain part of American scholars towards
Wright’s work the judgment of the aforementioned Madden, according to which «we can ignore Wright's
biological view [...] because it is philosophically irrelevant»13.
In spite of this, we aim to show in this paper, on the one hand, that Wright’s biological interpretations
were relevant for the economy of his thought, especially if we want to recognize those aspects that make
Wright’s approach similar to the pragmatist attitude; and, on the other hand, that the same interpretations are
of great interest when compared with today’s biological and epistemological addresses.
***
During the sixties, the interest of Wright focused mainly on the structure of scientific thought in general,
and then, in the seventies, it focused almost exclusively on the logical aspects of the theory of evolution. One
of the most significant writings belonging to the first mentioned period is entitled The philosophy of Herbert
Spencer14.
In this essay, Wright not only criticized the philosophy of Spencer effectively, but at the same time he
also worked out his analysis on the logic of science in general. According to Wright, the process that
properly characterizes the method of science is the following: in any way a theory arises, whether it comes
from a careful examination of empirical facts by aware induction, whether it originates from some mental
source, «the value of these theories can only be tested [...] by deductions from them of consequences which
we can confirm by the undoubted testimony of the senses»15. The value of scientific hypotheses is measured
not by looking at their origin, but by examining the effects that are produced when tested in «concrete
experiences of a kind common to all»16. The scientist is in fact interested in the consequences of a tested
hypothesis rather than in the method used to obtain it.
For “traditional” empiricist philosophers such as Hume and Mill, all knowledge derived from sensible
experience. This view, applied in epistemology, usually resulted in the idea that also scientific hypotheses
should originate from sensible experience. Although Wright was certainly a follower of the empiricist
tradition, according to him the origins of a scientific hypothesis are irrelevant. Conversely, what is important
is that the same hypothesis should produce a series of predictions that can be tested in sensible experience
and that it should lead to new observations and new truths.
Wright, like Peirce, knew well and admired the work of Whewell17, and therefore he placed in the
foreground the unique role of hypotheses and gave it a central place in the experiment, not only as a method
of discovery, but also (and above all) as a method for testing hypotheses themselves18. Science is not
concerned with the «ontological pedigree» of a theory, or with its «a priori character». Science is rather
concerned in its «performance». In fact, «A theory which is utilized receives the highest possible certificate
of truth». So, the countless applications of mechanics and chemistry, for example, «are constant and perfect
tests of scientific theories»19, and the usefulness of a hypothesis appears as a perfect criterion of verification,
providing the parameters of certainty that science has been able to apply extensively in the interpretation of
natural phenomena.
Wright’s empiricism appears therefore as completely original compared to the tradition of British
empiricism because it re-oriented the interest of philosophical and scientific inquiry diverting attention away
from the origin of concepts and hypotheses, and directing it to the control of their consequences. While the
interest of the majority of the empiricists prior and contemporaneous to Wright was directed to show how
1935 or WIENER 1949; finally, to those who show that Wright has merely influenced the later pragmatist approach, as
FISCH 1947 and MADDEN 1963 & 1964.
12
See e.g. WIENER 1945; CHAMBLISS 1960 & 1964; MADDEN 1963 & 1964; WHITE 1972; DE GROOT 2004.
13
MADDEN 1964, p.108.
14
WRIGHT 1865.
15
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.47.
16
WRIGHT 2000, v.2, p.97.
17
Cf. WRIGHT 2000, v.2, p.364. On Whewell’s thought see LANARO 1987.
18
MADDEN 1964, pp.64-5.
19
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.51.
each hypothesis should move from the experience, the American philosopher insisted that the origin of a
theory should be totally indifferent to the empiricist position, because the key point is to consider the future
consequences produced by it. In this sense, as Madden wrote, Wright turned the "classic" empiricism into a
forward-looking empiricism20.
These remarks allow us to consider Wright’s thought as an important theoretical guideline pointed
towards the direction of a rising pragmatism. We can say that an essential element to understand the meaning
of what might be called "the pragmatist revolution", as we often read in the writings of Peirce and James, is
precisely the move that aims to highlight the central importance of the role of "effects" and that insists on
what "real difference" any hypothesis or idea involves in order to clarify its meaning for our knowledge21.
It should be specified, however, that Wright never got at the generalization of its epistemological
approach to a pragmatist theory where the meaning of a concept or object is defined as the totality of its
conceivable effects which would result in all possible circumstances of its occurrence. Anyway, we should
also add that the particular strategy adopted by him is a good starting point in the direction of pragmatism. In
short, we can say that the strategic orientation connoting pragmatism appears to be very close to Wright’s
forward-looking approach and this can be probably attributed to the frequent and prolonged philosophical
discussions that the American thinker entertained since the sixties with Peirce, James and the other friends
that later would animate the meetings of the aforementioned Metaphysical Club.
***
In his essays written in the early 70's against G.Mivart and in defense of the theory of "descent with
modification"22, talking about random variations Wright, according to Darwin, was determined to point out
that the term "random" does not refer to the pure chance, but rather to an incapacity for forecasting variations
themselves and to an ignorance of their causes due to the presence of a complex and inextricable interplay of
factors23. In short, the word "chance" is connected to a complex phenomenon, originated from a series of
intertwined causal chains that we are not able to disentangle and to control for the purposes of a prediction.
Then, the explanation of these "random" phenomena lies in showing retrospectively how they might have
occurred, bringing them back to certain laws or principles24.
Concerning this point, we can say that Wright had understood a fundamental feature of the Darwinian
theory, namely that the causal level of variations and that of natural selection must be seen as totally
independent each other, in the sense that classes of individual variations, «Constant and normal in a race»,
may be regarded as «accidentally related to the advantages that come from them»25.
As Darwin wrote, variations are accidental as far as to the consequences (positive, negative, irrelevant)
that they produce in organic forms. Variations, in short, are to be understood as «accidental as far as purpose
is concerned»26, that is, accidental with respect to the functional and adaptive result that has been reached.
They spring from complex causal lines completely freed from the causes that determine the adaptive
significance of structures or behaviors within the network of relationships in which the organism is inserted,
and which belong to the plane of selective pressures. According to this accidental nature of variations with
respect to their purpose, noted Wright, «the origin of that which through service to life has been preserved, is
to this process arbitrary, indifferent, accidental (in the logical sense of this word), or non-essential. This
20
MADDEN 1964, pp.124-6.
As James wrote, from a general point of view, pragmatism can be defined as «the attitude of looking away from first
things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards the last things, fruits, consequences,
facts» (JAMES, 1978, p.32, author’s italics). We can also recall Peirce’s famous “pragmatic maxim”. E.g., see CP
5.402. On this issue, cf. also FABBRICHESI 2009a and FABBRICHESI 2010. To further understand how Wright’s
philosophical move focused on the criterion of verifiability of future consequences shifted the “gravity centre” of the
empiricist strategy in a pragmatist direction, see what Wright maintains for example in WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.55-56.
See also WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.348 and WRIGHT 2000, v.2, p.131, where he seems to be saying that being needs to be
identified with its effects and it coincides with what is knowable, just as Peirce would support shortly afterwards in his
Questions Concerning Certain Faculties claimed for Man (1868; CP 5213-263).
22
WRIGHT 1871 and WRIGHT 1872.
23
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.130-133.
24
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.173.
25
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.143-4.
26
Darwin to F.J.Wedgwood, 11 Jul. 1861, in BURKHARDT 1985-, v.9, p.200.
21
origin has no part in the process […]»27. The Darwinian explanation, therefore, can overlook the causes of
variations and turn to their selected effects in view of their significance for life.
We should note that this idea is completely confirmed today, since scientists are convinced, for example,
that genetic mutations are caused by specific reasons (radiation, chemical mutagens, etc.), but they consider
largely useless, as well as almost impossible, to identify the precise reasons that, from time to time, have
produced a mutation in a certain portion of DNA, in an infinitesimal interval of time. In fact, from the point
of view of the evolutionary theory, it is not important to know which precise causes have given rise to a
certain variation. Conversely, it is fundamental to examine the actual consequences of a variation, once it has
been, so to speak, “tested” on the ground of experience, or of specific environmental conditions in which the
mutated organic form lives28.
In the light of these remarks, the process subtended by the misleading term "evolution" does not refer, as
traditionally believed, to a process involving a «relation of beginning and end – a development»29. Therefore,
we must not understand the process as an unfolding of properties already implicitly present from the
beginning or as a movement directed towards a predetermined path, similarly to «an epic poem» that is
divided into «a beginning, a middle, and an end»30. Wright strongly opposed these cosmic-evolutionary
views that flourished in his time. Darwin's theory, in his opinion, has produced a radical break with all these
ideas «which make the cause to be engendered by the effect»31, outlining a process in which every
adaptation, every organic form, is considered as the result of causal intertwinings that are unpredictable a
priori. Now, the effects of these unpredictable interlacements become visible only in retrospect, making any
variation as a kind of hypothesis on the future, that only in the future is possibly validated as useful to the
survival of the organism, or even discarded as irrelevant or harmful. All variations, in any way have arisen,
«are beginnings, not ends; potentialities, not finalities; candidates for office, not appointments due to their
inherent goodness»32.
It is not difficult to see a strong analogy between this interpretation of evolutionary theory and the general
epistemology outlined by Wright in relation to the hypotheses of science. The organic variations acquire a
meaning only once placed in front of the test-bed of the selective principle, by which they are sifted on the
basis of the consequences generated in relation to the life of the organisms. Only then, in retrospect, a
variation may be said to be useful or meaningful for life. The same remark goes for scientific hypotheses.
Before being accepted or held to be true, they must be tested by examining the consequences that follow
from their implementation into the sensible experience.
In this sense, we can say that such evolutionary process as outlined by Wright shows the same ratio of
effects that also characterized his aforementioned looking-forward empiricism and, in general, the whole
pragmatist philosophy. The meaning of a variation is selectively given as a tested result of its utility or
"cash-value", as James would say, in terms of adaptation and advantage in the struggle for existence33. This
kind of Wrightian approach, based on the pre-eminence of practical effects, is a very important bridge in
order to combine the Darwinian tradition with the pragmatist philosophy.
In conclusion we can say that, first, Wright’s interpretation of the evolutionary theory is a key element of
his thought, and by no means irrelevant from a philosophical point of view; in the second place, this
interpretation, in conjunction with the Wrightian particular empiricism, has probably played a decisive role
in the genesis of pragmatist philosophy, while throwing a new light to clarify the theoretically deep
interlacement between Darwinism and pragmatism.
27
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.252.
Cf. PIEVANI 2011, p.113.
29
WRIGHT 1866, p.725.
30
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.73-4.
31
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.101.
32
CHAMBLISS 1960, p.146.
33
JAMES 1978, pp.35, 117. See also FISCH (1996, p.15), who has mentioned some word about this possible analogy
between the Darwinian evolutionary process and the experimental theory that unites wrightian looking forward
empiricism and pragmatist philosophy.
28
***
According to Wright, the ratio of effects which is the hallmark of Darwinian theory should be combined
with another fundamental idea. That is, the event itself of evolutionary change, unpredictable when it
happens, can assumes the features of an authentic novelty compared to the characteristics of the elements
which give rise to it after having combined each other. In chemical processes, we often observe the
emergence of «new properties or new powers, which, so far as the conditions of their appearance were
previously known, did not follow from antecedent conditions, except in an incidental manner, - that is, in a
manner not then foreseen to be involved in them»34. Similarly, Wright noted that in living processes
unpredictable evolutionary novelties can always emerge from a set of conditions which, taken individually,
have characteristics qualitatively different from the result of their combination.
On the other hand, we should not see any miraculous event before the «appearance of a really new power
in nature». This event is rather to be thought as «involved potentially in previous phenomena», as in the case
of the power of flight in the first birds or the self-consciousness in our apelike progenitors35. Any
combination of events, we might say, is always open to new emerging possibilities. In a process of this kind
we can only try, rationally and a-posteriori, to reconstruct the conditions which, combining together, have
made possible the occurrence of the emerging novelty. In this way we can bring the discontinuity of a new
event within the continuous tissue of the causal series.
This reconstruction process of the conditions that produced the studied event is not very different, if we
think about, from that kind of inference that Peirce called "retroduction", or the attempt to bring an unknown
phenomenon to the case of a known36. In this sense, we could say that the logic of retroduction, which fully
supports the pragmatist philosophy as a guiding principle, is also the principle underlying the «retrospective
prophecies»37 of the Darwinian scientist.
It is not difficult to show that Wright’s analysis were actually right if compared with contemporary
biologists’ view. For them, living phenomena, to quote Simon, are something where «the whole is more than
the sum of the parts […] in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws
of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole» 38. According to modern
biologists, as stated by Mayr quoting Popper, «We live in a universe of emergent novelty», in which «such
emergence is quite universal»39.
On the pragmatist front, who expressed an "emergentist" view very close to Wright was G.H. Mead. In
his Philosophy of the Present (1932) Mead argues that «it is the task of the philosophy of today to bring into
congruence» the idea of «universality of determination which is the text of modern science, and the
emergence of the novel»40. Now, the characteristic of the emerging phenomenon, such as life or human
consciousness, is that it happens «under determining conditions», but «these conditions never determine
completely the “what it is” that will happen»41.
***
From what has emerged up to this point, we can say that Wright’s theoretical approach is still of great
interest to contemporary thought.
This interest is expected to increase further if we consider that as early as 1871 Wright’s Darwinian
interpretation put in the foreground a mechanism that is now gradually gaining the interest of a growing
number of scientists and philosophers. We refer to what Wright called the "principle of uses" or "new uses
34
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, p.201.
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.200-1.
36
As Peirce wrote: «The surprising fact, C, is observed; but if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there
is reason to suspect that A is true» (CP 5.189).
37
«Retrospective prophecies» is an expression of GINZBURG 1984.
38
MAYR 1982, p.53.
39
MAYR 1982, p.63.
40
MEAD 2002, pp.45-46.
41
Ibid. In addition to this quoted text, see also MEAD 1929.
35
for old powers", closely related to the fundamental ideas of his Darwinism and very similar to the
mechanism that today’s evolutionary biologists call exaptation, in the wake of the proposal by Gould and
Vrba in 198242.
Wright had clearly begun to suggest an idea similar to that of exaptation in his review on A.R. Wallace’s
Limits of natural selection, especially referring to the origin of human language and self-consciousness, in
order to refute the well known Wallace’s "paradox"43. The following year, Wright made extensive use of the
same principle in his essay on phyllotaxis44 and in his reviews on Mivart's book on the Genesis of Species45
in order to refute the criticisms of the Catholic naturalist on the «the incompetency of natural selection to
account for the incipient stages of useful structures»46. All this, it should be noted, took place even before
Darwin published in February 1872 his famous chapter VII added to the sixth edition of the Origin in which
he used against Mivart arguments very similar to Wright’s47. The principle of uses was further developed and
deepened in Wright’s essay on The Evolution of self-consciousness (1873)48. In this paper, Wright applied
his principle to the problem of the origin of human mind, largely anticipating the proposal by today’s
scientists to apply the exaptive mechanism in order to account for the emerging of human culture49.
To clarify his idea, Wright argued that
[…] new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and mental natures of the animal, [...]
although, at their rise, these uses are small and of the smallest importance to life. [...]. The new uses are related
to old powers only as accidents, so far as the special services of the older powers are concerned, although [...]
their relations to older uses have not the character of accidents, since these relations are, for the most part,
determined by universal properties and laws, which are not specially related to the needs and conditions of living
beings50.
For Wright, this notion of «new uses of old powers» embodies a leading principle of the evolutionary
process. It is based on the aforementioned idea that the emergence of a variation is always something
accidental as far as purpose is concerned. In particular, each new variation or use can always be co-opted for
a new function, useful for survival, and therefore developed in a certain direction and invested with a precise,
but always temporary, meaning for life through the selection process. By this principle we can distinguish the
historical origin of a certain feature and its current utility, so eliminating any teleological or ultraadaptationist interpretation of the principle of natural selection51.
Thus, even in his last letter to Darwin in February 1875, Wright did not fail to point out that this idea of a
“plurality of uses” actually deserved an absolutely central role within the architecture of the evolutionary
theory, despite Darwin considered it as a mere scholium52. In this way, Wright lit a theoretical direction that
just today a certain school of contemporary biology (whose chief exponents are S.J.Gould and N.Eldredge)
has decided to take, towards a non-adaptationist view of living phenomena.
42
GOULD-VRBA 1982. See also GOULD 2002, ch. XI.
WRIGHT 1870, particularly pp.107-108 in WRIGHT 2000, v.1. Wallace explains his paradox in WALLACE 1869 &
1870, in order to prove that the principle of natural selection is not able to explain the origin of the most typical human
traits, both mental and physical. On Wright and Wallace see also PARRAVICINI 2012, in particular §3.3.5 and §4.1.2.
44
WRIGHT 1871a
45
MIVART 1871; WRIGHT 1871b & 1872.
46
MIVART 1871, ch.2.
47
On the arguments used by Darwin in the sixth edition of the Origin, in relation to the concept of exaptation, in order
to face up Mivart’s objections, see GOULD 2002, ch. XI.
48
WRIGHT 1873.
49
Among scholars or scientists who have proposed an explanation of the origin of human mental capacity by the notion
of exaptation, see for example TATTERSALL 1998; TATTERSALL 2002; SKOYLES-SAGAN 2002;
RAMACHANDRAN 2003; PIEVANI 2008.
50
WRIGHT 2000, v.1, pp.199-200.
51
See on this idea GOULD 2002.
52
WRIGHT 2000, v.2, p.336.
43
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