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7. s = t â D(pÏq) â D(pÏ[s/t]q).16 8. D(pÏq) if Ï is a theorem of PA, an instance of 1-7, or is one of the principles (i)-(ix) (see footnote.17 ) To show the consistency of ADT Scharp introduces a fairly elaborate construction involving revision sequences and a novel way of modeling truth predicates which arenât closed under deduction which he calls âxeno modelsâ. As far as I can see, these models have little intuitive rationale, and are primarily introduced as a technical device for showing that no contradictions follow from the axioms of ADT. While there is certainly nothing wrong with this approach to consistency arguments, I suspect that the complexity of this particular construction obscures some of the more quirky features of the theory. Alternatively, the consistency of ADT can be demonstrated with a fairly humdrum construction, albeit one which I think reveals the structure of descending truth in an illuminating way. Consider the following three rules of inference: From Ï infer Ï â¨ Ï and Ï â¨ Ï From Â¬Ï infer ¬(Ï â§ Ï) and ¬(Ï â§ Ï). From Ï infer Ï0 whenever a = b is a true arithmetical identity statement and Ï0 is the result of substituting some occurrences of b with a in Ï. We can then think of the sentences that are descending true in Scharpâs theory as those sentences that are either axioms of his theory (the principles (1)-(7), (i)(ix) listed above), theorems of PA (including the theorems of logic) or things one can prove from those two sets using only the above rules. Indeed, it turns out that if we let M be a standard model of arithmetic that assigns the descending truth predicate the set of sentences just described then M is a model of ADT (see appendix).18 This model is also, in some sense, a minimal model of ADT: the descending truth predicate is as small as it can be in a way thatâs consistent with the 16 This principle corresponds to Scharpâs E principles, which appear to be stated as rules. However he treats them as axioms in the statement of his axiom D7. 17 Principles (i)-(ix) are principles that are redundant in Scharpâs axiomatisation, modulo definitions, except for the fact that he declares them descending true. They are, respectively: (i) Ï â ¬D(p¬Ïq), (ii) ¬¬D(p¬Ïq) â ¬D(p¬¬Ïq), (iii) ¬D(p¬Ïq)â¨Â¬D(p¬Ïq) â ¬D(p¬(Ï⨠Ï)q), (iv) D(pÏq) â ¬¬D(p¬¬Ïq), (v) D(pÏq) ⨠D(p¬Ïq)) â (D(pÏq) ⨠¬¬D(p¬Ïq), (vi) Ï â§ (D(pÏq) ⨠D(p¬Ïq)) â D(pÏq), (vii) ¬D(p¬Ïq) â§ (D(pÏq) ⨠D(p¬Ïq)) â Ï, (viii) s = t â (¬D(p¬Ïq) â ¬D(p¬Ï[s/t]q)), (ix) s = t â (D(pÏq) ⨠D(p¬Ïq)) â (D(pÏ[s/t]q) ⨠D(p¬Ï[s/t]q)) when s = t is a true arithmetical identity. Note that all of these principles are obviously logically equivalent to or provable from axioms (1)-(7). However we have to include them manually since descending truth isnât closed under logical equivalence or consequence, and Scharpâs theory treats these particular sentences as descending true, modulo definitions. 18 Note here that I donât include conjunction elimination, despite the presence of axiom 3. This is because the set Iâve described is already closed under conjunction elimination: the only conjunctions in the extension of D are theorems of arithmetic, and the conjuncts in this case are also theorems of arithmetic. A similar point applies to axiom 4, and the rule it corresponds to. 11