Download International workshop `The Economic (Dis)integration in East and

HIKITA
A Survey of Japanese researches on Japan’s Colonialism in Asia
International workshop 'The Economic (Dis)integration in East and Southeast Asia, 1920s-1960s'
Held on 4 – 6 November 1998
HIKITA Yasuyuki
Rikkyo University
Preface
Many Japanese researches on Japanese modern economic history have taken the method of the
‘structural’ analysis.
Example OISHI Kaichiro ed., ‘The History of Japanese Imperialism’ Vol.3 (1937-1950),
University of Tokyo Press, 1994.
Contents: Introduction, International relations, Economic mobilization, Public and private finance,
Munitions industries, Civilian industries, Monopoly capitals and Zaibatsu dissolution, Labor
mobilization and Labor reformation, Food production and agrarian reform, Aggravation of living
situation and the ‘Black Market’, Control of colonies and occupied territories, State and the social
classes.
This method succeeded OISHI Kaichiro ed., ‘A Research on Industrial Revolution in Japan’,
University of Tokyo Press, 1972 and YAMADA Moritato, ‘An analysis of Japanese capitalism’,
Iwanami Shoten, 1932. It is based on the reproduction theory, suitable to grasp the social division of
labor as a whole and able to link with the political structure through the understanding of the social
classes. In spite of these merits, it has some week points.
The first point is that this method inclines to bring a static understanding of a national economy.
The dynamic structural changes or developments, not the simple growth, of the economy sometimes
must be explained by external factors. Though Japanese economy has been very sensitive to the world
economy and politics, we should consider the immanent factors in Japanese economy. The
competition among capitals, including the monopolistic and foreign ones, must be introduced in order
to explain the inherent factors of economic development. The second point is the luck of the area
structure in the national economy. There has been the consideration on the relation between the
capitalized non-agricultural economy and pre-capitalized agricultural economy, but scarce on the
inter-areas or structural analysis on area economy. This is the reason why they treated the colonies
excluding from the Japanese national economy. Recently there come to be some researches trying to
analyze Japanese economy by areas, but they do not always include colonies in their approach.
The recent and comprehensive work on Japan and its colonies is “Iwanami series, Modern Japan
and the colonies”, 1992～1993. I would like to survey Japanese research trends mainly on the series.
The colonization means in economics as follows; ‘Colonization is a sort of economic and
political integration by ruling nation. Economic integration implies, as a rule, a free trade and a
liberalization of productive factors' transfer between ruling nation and ruled countries (KIMURA
Mitsuhiko, ‘Manufacturing and Mining Industries in Taiwan and Korea’, MIZOGUCHI and
UMEMURA ed., “Basic economic statistics of former Japanese colonies 1895 - 1938”, Toyo Keizai
Shiposha, p.55).’ Ruling nation reorganized the pre-modern economies of ruled nations or areas
through the transfer of productive factors and turned them into non-autonomous but capitalized ones.
The imperial powers compelled the unequal treaties with military pressures, or direct rules if it need,
in order to get this aim.
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HIKITA
1. The formation of Imperial Japan (1) – avoidance of colonization
“Iwanami series” does not deal with the Japan’s avoidance process from colonization by
Western powers, but Japanese researches have been concentrating to clarify the reasons of avoidance
from colonization. This process was, at the same time, the rise as an imperialistic power
Japanese peasants had developed their commodity production under the Baku-han system that
integrated the feudalistic commerce route as a ruling tool and there had been some manufacturing
villages by opening of the free trade with western countries. The commercialization of peasant
economies limited the exploitation of surplus by the feudal lords and the lords must reform their rule.
The invasion of ‘Free trade Imperialism’ reorganized the commercializing Japanese economy into the
colonial mono-cultural economy.
1. Formation of new commercial routes pivoting the opened ports damaged both the peasants and
lords commerce.
2. The increase of exportation (row silk, tea and others) meant the mono-culturalization.
3. The import of cotton goods damaged Japanese traditional cotton production system and
reformed their management; retrogressing from manufacture to putting-out system, using the
imported yarns
4. increase of weapons imports
5. loans from foreign banks and merchants, that was likely to transfer the feudal lords to
compradors, especially the French loans to the Bakufu
Japanese counter policies against this serious crisis can summarize as follows;
1. New government of Meiji, that overthrew the Bakufu transferring itself to a comprador,
hurried to form the capitalist economy. (Shokusan- Kogyo)
2. Meiji government led the formation of independent capitalist economy by reserving of national
surplus within the government and Seisho (businessmen who had political affiliations,
forerunners of zaibatsu), and avoided new foreign loans.
3. Meiji government expanded its armaments in order to defend against the western powers and
to invade into the neighbor nations. (Kyohei)
4. Japan became a militaristic and semi-feudal imperialism with the ruling classes of bureaucrat,
zaibatsu and landlords. The authority of the government was heavily dependent on the
territorial expansion as the result of its ‘westernization’.
The movement of demand for democratic rights in early Meiji era criticized the development strategy
of the government. They requested the establishment of a national assembly, the rest of people’s
financial resources and the revision of unequal treaties. The despotic Meiji government conceded and
promised to establish a national assembly. But the government enforced the expansion program to
Korea and China, and the democratic movement was involved into the war policy. The emperor
government built up on the social basis of local landlords and zaibatsu. The second criticism was
‘Taisho Democracy’ movement. They requested the universal suffrage, the brake down of ‘Han’ or
military clique and the small Japan-ism, and brought about the party politics. But the parties
compromised with the military cliques and the senates, and involved into the establishments. The third
wave of criticism was those of socialists and/or communists, but the communists were heavily
influenced by USSR and the social democrats also were not able to get enough strength. Though they
gave a threat to the establishments, the military fascism finally oppressed away the movements.
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2. The formation of Imperial Japan (2) – acquisition of colonies and their economic
reorganization
The acquisition of colonies; Taiwan → Korea → Manchuria → China → Southeast Asia
Economic reorganization;
The case of Korea and China (main areas of Japanese planed invasion)
military activities and loans -> compulsion to create the capitalistic economic circumstance => takeover of sovereignty -> direct investment to the colonies / Japanese emigrant => economic
reorganization complementary to suzerain nation (Japan) => dependent economies
‘Han’ clique ruled Korea in early stage of its colonization and selected the investment from Japan.
The case of Taiwan, Sakhalin and Southern Islands (Nan’yo)
The previous period for colonization by Japan was very short or nothing.
Military invasion and grasp the practical rule => direct investment, especially in the infrastructure
(1) Investments
Table 1 Gross domestic fixed capital formation by areas
Areas
Japan proper
Taiwan
Korea
South Sakhalin
Southern Islands
Total
1935
Average annual growth rates
(1,000 yen)
1903-14 1914-20 1920-31 1931-38
3,371,775 (88.9%)
6.32% 12.39%
-6.20% 13.87%
169,589
(4.5%) 11.22% 23.82%
2.42%
9.71%
235,651
(6.2%)
1.49%
2.49%
9.54% 19.07%
13,478
(0.4%) 15.65%
8.16%
9.87% 16.97%
2,401
(0.1%)
35.39% 39.99%
3,792,894 (100.0%)
6.75% 12.26%
-0.31% 13.90%
Source: MIZOGUCHI Toshiyuki and UMEMURA Mataji ed., "Basic economic
statistics of former Japanese colonies 1895-1938 Estimates and findings",
Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, Tokyo, 1988.
One of the basic means for economic reorganization was the investment.
The gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) of Japanese colonies, Taiwan, Sakhalin
and Nan’yo, were comparably high at early periods of possession. On the contrary, GDFCF in Korea
was not so high till the inter-war period. The small investment in Korea soon after its annexation was
‘abnormal’ compared with other colonies. The recent work of KIMURA, KOBAYASHI and KONO
clarified that the company regulation of Korea was depressed the setting up of companies of Japanese,
Koreans and foreigners.
The weight of construction in GDFCF was very high, 80% in Taiwan and 70% in Korea. Japan
invested mainly in agricultural facilities in order to make both colonies supply foods (rice and sugar)
to Japan proper. In Nan’yo, Japanese developed its natural resources like sugar and apatite.
GDFCF of Korea exceeded that of Taiwan in 1935, but GDFCF per capita of Taiwan was ¥32,
three times as much as Korea, ¥11, compared with Japan proper, ¥49. Investment to manufacturing
industry spurted in almost all colonies late 1920s. Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company developed
such industries as power stations, electric metallurgy and electrochemistry supported by Korean
government-general and resulted a little rise of the percentage of construction in GDFCF. Taiwan
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HIKITA
government-general, too, constructed the power station of 日月潭 (Zu Yue Tang) and promoted the
industries processing the raw materials of Southeast Asia, then established the Taiwan Development
Company. Such Japanese heavy industrialization of colonies may have been a little earlier than
western colonial powers.
Japanese capital exportation having brought about such capital formation, basing on
Yamamoto’s estimation, was one third of GDFCF of Taiwan and exceeded that of Korea. The transfer
from Japan proper stopped by 1914 and the flow of capital reversed from 1931 in Taiwan. Thereafter,
most of the capital import from Japan came to be composed of business investment and stock purchase
by the companies located in. Japan proper. On the contrary, the government-general transfer kept
heavy weight in Korean capital import from Japan, but the capital export of private companies
increased in 1930s.
Table 2. Capital Import of Taiwan and Korea from Japan proper
1,000,000 yen
1900-04
1905-09
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
Total
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
Total
Government
Long-term capital
General
Transfer Government
Business
Debentures Loans Stocks
bonds
investments
Taiwan
14.0
31.1
…
-0.3
0.7
…
15.3
1.7
…
-0.9
21.2
…
41.2
-4.3
-3.3 -1.3
29.1
12.4
5.6
11.9
0.0
72.0
22.7
54.1
41.9
9.6
50.2
34.7
25.5
32.4
1.5
18.0
120.6
-12.2
15.9
-15.0 -1.1
14.5
32.4
-66.6
0.3
-4.4 -3.8
47.1
…
-8.3
129.9
63.5
3.7 252.8
222.8
Korea
103.4
50.6
1.0 …
10.4
13.6
76.2
59.8
16.5 …
38.9
19.9
165.4
123.2
100.9 …
88.8
82.9
174.6
85.6
103.6 …
-5.6
44.4
158.2
114.2
53.6 …
34.9
102.4
176.0
318.3
237.1 …
655.1
165.5
853.8
751.7
512.7 …
822.5
428.7
Total
31.5
22.0
32.6
112.2
190.5
198.0
46.7
39.2
672.7
Grand
Total
45.5
37.3
73.8
112.2
190.5
198.0
34.5
-27.4
664.4
Gross domestic
capital formation
14.1
69.9
118.2
271.3
544.8
542.4
566.6
717.0
23.4% 2,844.3
1903-04
1905-09
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-38
75.6 179.0
106.5
135.1 211.3 88.5% 238.8
395.8 561.2 140.5% 399.4
228.0 402.6 69.6% 578.1
305.1 463.3 74.0% 626.1
1,376.0 1,552.0
1,433.7
2,515.6 3,369.4 99.6% 3,382.6
1911-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-38
53.4%
62.4%
41.4%
35.0%
36.5%
6.1%
Source: MIZOGUCHI and UMEMURA, ibid.
Japan imperialism transformed its colonies at first the agricultural and then industrial economies
accorded with its reproduction structure. There were a sharp contrast between in Taiwan depended on
the funds within the area and in Korea on Japanese funds.
KANEKO Fumio, ‘Japanese investment to colonies and their industrialization’, Iwanami Series,
Vol.3.
“Japanese investment to semi-colonial China came to a deadlock in late 1920s, but Manchurian
Incident changed the condition of investments, As the result, Japanese foreign investment
increased again (p.30).”
“Japanese investment to colonies can be classified into such three type as the government leading
Korea, the private companies leading Taiwan and the intermediate type of Manchuria (p.32).”
“Japan treated its colonies as agricultural areas and did not always promote industries by the end
of 1920s. Though Japan rather restrained the industrialization, the industrial production in
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colonies such as the processing of farm products and those related to urbanization brought about
by colonial development, steadily increased (p.39).”
“Industrialization of Japanese colonies must be understood a process with two or three steps;
early stage of the processing of farm products, next stage of chemical, textile and metallurgical
industries by the direct investment in late 1920s, and the wartime heavy industrialization based
on those previous stages (p.41).”
Japanese capitals were overwhelmingly predominance in each colony. But, according to the firm
statistics, the native capitals exceeded Japanese in both numbers of firms and labors in Taiwan
and Manchuria, compared with Korea in which the natives were less than Japanese but increasing.
Japanese small and medium capitals could not entirely enter in Taiwan and Manchuria where the
natives were strong. The natives had not the expectation for large scale firms but were steadily
growing by the incentive from the trade enhance, the growth policy for agriculture, the
construction of infrastructure and the need for market of heavy industries.
(2) Economic welfare of colony
Table 3. Per capita private consumption expenditure
Areas
Japan Propre
Taiwan
Korea
South Sakhalin
Southern Islands
1935
¥182.92 (100.0%)
¥115.26 (63.0%)
¥88.65 (48.5%)
¥145.93 (79.8%)
¥135.14 (73.9%)
1903-14
0.54%
-0.25%
3.07%
-0.90%
-
1934-36 constant prices
Annual growth rates
1914-20 1920-31 1931-38
2.59%
0.74%
0.78%
0.30%
0.86%
2.70%
1.53%
-0.79%
2.81%
-3.23%
0.90%
10.17%
11.09%
10.19%
Source: MIZOGUCHI and UMEMURA, ibid.
I would like to consider the economic results of Japanese investments in colonies using the
statistics of per capita private consumption (PCPCE) (Cf. table 3).
The consumption level of Korea was very low, that was under 50% of Japan proper even in
1935, even after the spurt of 1930s’ high economic growth. As MIZOGUCHI pointed, “the figure of
Korea clearly exceeded the tolerable level, (even in the macro economic statistics that neglected the
share issue between Japanese and Korean) showed the problem of Japanese colonial policy for Korea.
(p.7)” Moreover, PCPCE of Taiwan was declined before First World War because the economic
growth was behind the population growth, and then increased much slower than Japan proper in the
First World War period even though its low growth rate of population. As the result, PCPCE of
Taiwan was about 50% of Japan proper in the first half of 1920s compared with 80% just after its
possession by Japan.
Even though the high growth rate after Manchurian Incident, the figure recovered only 60%
with difficulty. Therefore PCPCE of Taiwan ‘exceeded the tolerable level’ just like that of Korea
before and after the period of First World War. The low level of economic performance of two main
colonies shows clearly the problem of Japanese colonial policy. On the contrary, those of Sakhalin and
Nan’yo were near Japan proper because of the large proposion of Japanese.
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HIKITA
(3) The growth rate of population and the migration
Table 4. Populations of Japanese Empire by areas
1935
Japan Proper
Taiwan
(Japanese)
Korea
(Japanese)
South Sakhalin
Southern
Islands
Kwantung
province
(Japanese)
Attached Area
to SMR
(Japanese)
Total
69,254
5,316
(270)
21,890
(583)
322
70.30%
5.40%
(0.27%)
22.22%
(0.59%)
0.33%
103
0.10%
1,120
1.14%
(160)
501
(191)
98,506
1000 persons:
Average annual growth rates
1903-14 1914-20 1920-31 1931-38
1.22%
1.22%
1.42%
1.44%
1.56%
0.94%
2.26%
2.59%
(9.75%) (2.81%) (3.53%) (3.50%)
1.28%
1.25%
1.44%
1.52%
(11.37%) (3.04%) (3.63%) (3.00%)
17.28%
8.13%
11.17%
2.42%
-
-
4.09%
7.78%
4.32%
4.21%
3.17%
3.90%
(0.16%) (20.70%)
(7.14%)
(4.51%)
(6.07%)
13.24%
6.23%
9.62%
0.51%
32.51%
(0.19%) (43.41%) (11.29%)
100.00%
5.91%
5.69%
(4.60%) (15.27%)
3.84%
5.69%
Note: the estimate period of each area is; Korea after 1991, Sakhalin after 1909, Nan’yo
after 1922, Kwantung province after 1906 and Attached area to South Manchuria
Railway Co (SMR) 1906 – 1936.
Annual growth rates are the averages of the rates to each previous year during the period.
Source: MIZOGUCHI and UMEMURA, ibid.
The population of Japan proper was 70% of Japan empire, Korea was 20% and Taiwan was 5%
in 1935. The total of three areas composed 98%. The growth rate was less in more populated area, but
the rate of Taiwan declined and was under Japan proper in the period of First World war. The rate
declined in each area in this period, but Taiwan’s figure was unordinary small.
The populations of Japanese in colonies were largest in Korea and second largest in Manchuria.
That in Taiwan, the oldest colony of Japan, was under Sakhalin but steadily increasing. The Japanese
population swiftly increased in every colony without Nan’yo Islands in the period soon after the
acquisition by Japan. Japanese navy tried to develop sugar plantation under its military government in
Nan’yo. The immigrant company was bankrupted in 1920 crisis and Nan’yo Kohatsu Co. was built for
dealing with the fact had happened. Thereafter the development of Nan’yo Islands got off the ground.
The growth rate of Japanese population was larger than that of total in every areas, but, in
Attached Area to SMR, Japanese growth rate was under the total in the period of First world War and
declined in inter-War period. As most people other than Japanese was Chinese in the area, it can be
said that the undertakings of SMR attracted these Chinese, but, on other hand, it probably shows that
Japanese concessions were depressed by Chinese. After the Manchuria Incident, the populations of
Kwantung province and Attached Area to SMR, especially Japanese, increased swiftly. The
circumstance of emigration turned good for Japanese and Japanese government started the policy of
emigration to Manchuria. There were a loose and reversed synchronization in the trend of Japanese
population in Manchuria and that of Japan proper. This shows the relationship between both labor
markets.
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HIKITA
The growth rate of population in Korea was as small as in Japan proper, and in the smallest
group of Japanese empire. There was a large emigration from Korea, too. The Korean population in
China was greatly increased from 50 thousands of 1910 to 240 thousands of 1912. The growth rate in
Japan proper was not so small but the number was less than 10 thousands till 1916. Korean in Japan
was swiftly increased in the period of First World War and the growth rate of Koreans in China was
declined. The growth rate of Koreans in Japan came to synchronize with that in China and to be larger
than the latter. Korea involved in Japanese labor market and China came to be a buffer market.
The growth rate of population in Taiwan declined under 1% in the period of First World War,
then increased in geometrical progression and reached 2.5% in early 1930s. This figure was contrast
with that in Korea that was around 1.5%. Taiwan had close socio-economic relationship with South
China and Southeast Asia long before the possession by Japan. There were many people that advanced
into these areas after the Japanese possession.
Japanese rapidly increased in Sakhalin and Nan’yo Islands compared with the minor natives,
and built Japanese societies through the development by Japanese. There were, it is said, many
Okinawa people and Koreans in Nan’yo Islands (Mark Robert Peattie, "Micronesia as a Japanese
Colonial Territory", Iwanami Series, Vol.1).
3. Japanese advance into the territories under other imperial nations – over-sea businessmen
Table 5. Numbers of Japanese over-sea businessmen in late 1935
Areas
Far eastern area of USSR
Manchuguo
Republic China
Hongkong
Southeast Asia
Indo
Africa
Australia
USA
Canada
Latin America
Europe
Total
person;
7
0.08%
3,016 33.69%
1,496 16.71%
74
0.83%
961 10.74%
48
0.54%
18
0.20%
86
0.96%
2,146 23.97%
77
0.86%
961 10.74%
61
0.68%
8,951 100.00%
Note: There is a lack of the datum surveyed by
Japanese consulate in San Francisco. The figure can
be estimated around 1000, because that of Los
Angels is 1188. The figures included not only
proprietorships but also the branches of big
companies, whose amount of transaction or incomes
were over ¥10000 or $10000 per year.
Source: Japanese Foreign Ministry, “Zaigai Honpo
Jitsugyosha Shirabe (Survey of Japanese over-sea
businessmen)”, July 1937, Tokyo.
Table 5 shows that there were about 10,000 Japanese emigrants succeeded in business at 1935.
Each 30% of them lived in Manchuria and USA (especially in West coast and Hawaii), 15% in China,
and each 10% in Latin America (especially in Peru) and Southeast Asia. The emigrants backed up
with Japanese imperialistic policy were those in East Asia. They advanced “supported with the
prerogatives and into the settlements, the concessions and the protectorates by unequal treaties,” set up
the associations in settlements and concessions, and was supported and supervised by Japanese
government (KIMURA Kenji, ‘Social activities of Japanese residents associations in settlements or
concessions’, Iwanami Series, Vol.5). Japanese emigrants to Manchuria increased after Manchurian
Incident and East Asia became the main target of Japanese emigration. It should be a noteworthy
phenomenon that many Korean businessmen advanced in Manchuria and Taiwanese in South China.
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HIKITA
Table 6. Japanese businessmen in Southeast Asia in 1935
Total
Philippine
Merchant
216 (21%)
128
100%
59%
Malaya
113 (11%)
55
100%
49%
Dutch Indies
570 (56%)
322
100%
56%
French Indochina
24
(2%)
10
100%
42%
Thai
15
(1%)
2
100%
13%
Indo
42
(4%)
9
100%
21%
Burma
23
(2%)
3
100%
13%
Ceylon
6
(1%)
3
100%
50%
Total
1,016 (100%)
535
100%
53%
Source: Japanese Foreign Ministry, ibid.
Foreign Manu Banker Fisher Planter
Trader facturer
18
20
1
8
38
8%
9%
0%
4%
18%
18
5
3
3
8
16%
4%
3%
3%
7%
98
23
8
7
36
17%
4%
1%
1%
6%
12
1
0
0
0
50%
4%
0%
0%
0%
13
0
0
0
0
87%
0%
0%
0%
0%
17
6
5
0
0
40%
14%
12%
0%
0%
9
1
1
0
1
39%
4%
4%
0%
4%
3
0
0
0
0
50%
0%
0%
0%
0%
191
56
18
18
83
19%
6%
2%
2%
8%
persons
Mis cellaneous
3
1%
21
19%
76
13%
1
4%
0
0%
5
12%
8
35%
0
0%
115
11%
Japanese over-sea businessmen in Dutch Indies held 56% of those in Southeast Asia. There
were as many planters in Dutch Indies (rubber) as in Philippine (Manila hemp), and also quite many
foreign traders and merchants. Some managed bus or taxi businesses in mid-Java. There were many
Barbers and photographers like in other areas. Banks were the branches of Yokohama Specie Bank
and others. In Philippine, there were many foreign traders and merchants, too, and the high ratio of
planters was a peculiarity of Philippine. Japanese businessmen in British Malaya concentrated in
Singapore (76% of them). Their features were the variety of businesses and the existence of mining
industrialists. Other areas had relatively few Japanese businessmen, but the ratio of foreign traders was
commonly high. They were engaged in the import of Japanese goods and export of specialities, such
as cotton flower of British Indo and hard coal of French Indochina.
Peter POST, “Japanese economic expansion into prewar Indonesia and the Dutch reaction”,
Iwanami Series, Vol.3.
“Japanese and Chinese trading companies came to monopolize the import from Japan by 1932,
and Chinese brokers dealt in most of domestic sales of them (p.67).” → Manchurian Incident
brought about Chinese boycott of Japanese goods.→ Japanese government backed up the
formation of Japanese trading network in which Japanese retailers, Dutch traders and native
business families tied up.
All of Dutch import trading companies dispatched their staffs to Japan and began to deal with
Japanese goods in Early 1932. But they complaint about the low profit margin and had
antagonism to Japanese and Chinese policy of maintaining a narrow profit margin and a large
sales volume. → Japanese took the policy of excluding Dutch and Chinese traders by getting in
touch with the native business families.
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HIKITA
→ Japanese succeeded in touch with the natives in Padang, Palembang and Surabaya supported
by Ishihara Industry and Marine Co. and Taiwan Bank. These native businessmen backed up the
nationalist leaders.
4. The Second World War and the “Great Asian Co-prosperity”
Chinese overthrew the Chin government and set up a pro-capitalizing government through the
revolutions. Western imperialism changed its ‘gun boat policy’ to economic influencing method, then
recognized the Kuomingtang government late 1920s. This process was an increasing crisis for Japan
empire. Japanese government reached a deadlock in its China policy. This, with the economic crisis
and the threat of socialism, made Japanese establishment get involved in the military invasion to China
(the Manchurian Incident) and the fascistic reformation of the political system. Just before and after
the break of Japanese-Chinese war of 1937, Japanese government started to control the economy. The
aim was not only to mobilize the existing producing powers and resources but also to change the
industrial structure (the productivity expansion project). Japan spread its fascistic ruling system and
economic control system over the occupied areas. Though Japan made up Yen block, it was heavily
dependent on goods (both raw materials and equipment) from outside of Yen block. So, Japanese
economic control was limited by its foreign exchanges and later by the tonnage of sea convoys.
Japanese advanced into other imperial territories with the aims of getting row materials and
expanding economic influence in early 1930s, but Japan changed its aim to get colonies after the Nazi
occupation over continental Europe. Japan had tried to promote the industrialization of its colonies and
occupied areas for munitions before the freezing Japanese assets and the attack for Pearl Harbor, but
thereafter it entirely lost the room for investment. Japan destroyed the economies of occupied areas by
both its one-sided exploitation of resources and the mal-management of economic control.
There are many researches on the Japanese war time economy. The first collective work is
INOUE Harumaru & USAMI Seijiro, “The Structure of Japanese Capitalism in Crisis” (Iwanami
Shoten, 1951). Their research is quite comprehensive and deals with Japanese domestic matters
relating to colonies and occupation areas. The successors of this work increased after 1970s and
focused on economic control over Japan proper and Manchuria. They clarified that Japanese economic
control measures were developed in Manchuria and then introduced into Japan proper and other areas.
Some of the important collective works are “Manchuria under Japanese Imperialism” (Research group
of Manchurian history ed., Ochanomizu Shobo, 1972), “Japanese imperialistic rule over Manchuria”
(ASADA Kyoji & KOBAYASI Hideo ed., Jichosha, 1986), “Wartime Economy” (Research
association of modern Japan ed., Yamakawa Suppan, 1987) and “Japanese Wartime Economy –
planning and market” (HARA Akira ed., Tokyo University Press, 1995). They based on mainly on the
non-compiled documents of government, and the documents became gradually open by their effort.
Two of the most important documents are Nichiman Zaiseikeizai kenkyukai Siryou (Documents of the
research association of Japanese and Manchurian fiscal economy) and Kokusaku Kenkyukai Bunsho
(Documents of the research association for national policy). The latter involves the many documents
related to colonial and occupied areas’ matters, too. There are also some researches on Japanese
wartime economic control over occupied China; “China under Japanese Imperialism” (ASADA Kyoji
ed., Rakuyu Shobo, 1981) and “Japanese economic control over North China in wartime”
(NAKAMURA Takahusa, Yamakawa Shuppan, 1983). These works deal with the economic policies
and/or economic structures under Japanese rule and systematically based on the method of economics.
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Compared with the systematical works on East Asia, those on Southeast Asia still have been few.
Early systematical one is “Construction and Corruption of ‘the Great East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere’” (KOBAYASI Hideo, Ochanomizu Shobo, 1975). I formerly introduced the method of
Kobayashi in my paper, ‘Japanese companies’ inroad into Indonesia under Japanese military
domination’ (Peter POST & Elly TOUWEN-BOUWSMA ed., “Japan, Indonesia and the war”, KITLV
Press, 1997). Kobayashi analyzes in order most typical areas in each period of Japanese invasion after
Manchurian Incident, so the economic situation of each period is not comprehensively clarified. Hikita,
Suzuki, Shibata edited “’Southern Co-prosperity Sphere’ - Japanese economic domination in South
east Asia during the war” (Taga Shuppan, 1995). This focused on the Japanese business activities
under Japanese military rule. We intended to grasp the Japanese business inroads into occupied areas
as a expansion of the competitive ruling structure in Japanese economy that Zaibatsu were in the
center, basing on the traditional method of Japanese economic history i.e. structural analysis. We
developed the way of documentary proof; a combination of the macroscopic observation using
comprehensive database and the case studies using both central and local documents.
The researches on Japanese wartime rule over Southeast Asia are increasing from 1980s.
Especially, Documentary Forum of Southeast Asia backed up by Toyota Foundation promoted this
movement. Its results are "Philippines under Japanese military occupation" (IKEHATA Setsuho ed.,
Iwanami Shoten, 1996) and "Japanese occupation in the history of Southeast Asia" (KURASAWA
Aiko ed., Waseda University Press, 1997). Though these books contain many important papers, many
of them are non-economic histories. But these accumulated works opened up to systematical
researches, that is structural and inter areas.
Economic historical research of Southeast Asia before and during the war is just started. This
area is very extensive, has many diverse societies and, furthermore, is closely related to both western
and eastern powers. We must continue case studies of each area as structural as possible and clarify
inter-areas dynamic relations of not only trading but also finance, investment, companies and national
policies. In the latter topics, the relation among companies is very important, because they are the
motive power of capitalistic social change through their international competition and cooperation
with each other involving the governments and international organizations.
5. The ‘legacy’ of Japan Empire and the Asian economic development after Second World War
Iwanami Series has a volume of dealing with ‘de-colonization’ that contains some articles with
comprehensive consideration. I would like to introduce them from the viewpoint of the Japanese
legacy and Asian industrial expansion after 1970s.
To Tsuauen (余照彦, ‘De-colonization and oriental capitalism’, “Iwanami Series”, Vol.8) insists
that there are such legacies of Japanese colonial rule in post war Korea as infrastructure, industrial
basis and commercialized agriculture, and that they were built from Japanese unique colonial
industrialization policy and the industrial structure among Japan, Korea and Taiwan. He also insists
that ‘oriental capitalism’ is an expansion process in which Japan runs at the front, NIEs run the next
and ASEAN and China are being involved, and that the capitalism has a triangle relationship of USA,
Japan and NIEs on the basis of IMF and GATT reflecting the Cold War.
Kim Yonho (金泳鎬, ‘De-colonization and the fourth generation of capitalism’, “Iwanami
Series”, Vol.8) stands rather counter position on To’s issue. He emphasizes that there were four tradeoff relations in the Korean colonial economy under Japanese rule; 1. the industrialization and labor
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wages, 2. The industrialization and the rent paid by tenant farmer, 3. the industrialization and the
employees, 4. rice production and rice consumption in Korea. He insists that Japanese legacy
contributed only in micro economic level and that Japanese rule destroyed the framework of national
economy. Then, what are the promoted factors of postwar industrialization? He answers that the
illusionary state created by USA turned out the development despotism and built up its ‘Unterbau’
through export leaded industrialization.
Both of the two articles emphasizes heavy influence of US in the post war Asia. Li Jhon wong
(李鐘元, ‘US postwar far eastern policy and the de-colonization of Korea’, “Iwanami Series”, Vol.8)
clarifies the case of Korea; US had pursued ‘regional integration policy’ covering East and Southeast
Asia and placed Japan in the center in order to industrialize or to modernize the region against USSR.
As the result, Korean independence policy through industrialization was not able to get US assistance.
Japan damaged so heavily East and Southeast Asia before and during the war that its return to
the area after the peace treaty was not so easy. It was US that promoted Japanese return to these areas.
Furthermore, US protected the Emperor and a part of other members of establishment from the blame
of Asian and Oceanian countries. These living relics of Japanese ancient régime transformed
themselves to the compradors of US and reproduces the ideology that Japan begun the Asia-pacific
war in order to of liberate Asia from western imperialism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Iwanami series, Modern Japan and the Colonies’, 1992～1993
OE Shinobu ed., Vol.1, Japan, the colonial empire
WAKABAYASHI Masatake ed., Vol.2, The controlling structure of the empire
KOBAYASHI Hideo ed., Vol.3, Colonization and industrialization
ASADA Kyoji ed., Vol.4, The logic of integration and rule
TAKASAKI Souji ed., Vol.5, The expansion of human intercourse of the empire
GOTO Ken’ichi ed., Vol.6, Resistance and submission
KAWAMURA Minato ed., Vol.7, Colonies in the cultures
MITANI Taichiro ed., Vol.8, Cold war in Asia and the de-colonization
This series is a compilation of historical researches on East and Southeast Asia before 1990s. The
works of economic histories are mainly included in third volume and scattered in some other volumes.
Other related works on East and Southeast Asia
MIZOGUCHI Toshiyuki & UMEMURA Mataji ed., "Basic economic statistics of former Japanese
colonies 1895-1938 Estimates and findings", Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, 1988
HIKITA Yasuyuki ed., "Southern Co-prosperity Sphere -Japanese economic domination over
Southeast Asia in pre-war period", Taga Shuppan, Tokyo, 1995
IKEHATA Setsuho ed., "Philippines under Japanese military occupation", Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo,
1996
P. Duus, R. H. Myers, M. R. Peattie ed., "The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945", Princeton
Univ., 1996
KURASAWA Aiko ed., "Japanese occupation in the history of Southeast Asia", Waseda University
Press, Tokyo, 1997
Peter Post and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma ed., "Japan, Indonesia and the War", KITLV, Leiden, 1997
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