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Transcript
Karma and Justice: Buddhist Perspectives on
Said Nursi’s Views on ‛adl and qisṭ
By:
Dec 29, 2010
Abstract
This paper aims to contribute to the phenomenological and comparative analysis of the problem
of injustice as addressed by the World's religions and in particular by the Qur‛ānic concepts of
‛adl and qist and their evaluation by Said Nursi.
The concept of Causality (karma) can be interpreted as the closest Buddhist equivalent to the
Abrahamic theologies of divine and human justice, as expressed by ‛adl and qist. Throughout the
history of Buddhist thought, this concept was subjected to manifold transformations - from
'intention-led action' to the tantric de- and reconstruction of reality; moreover, from the 19th
century onwards, we find a fruitful critique of karma theories in the work of Buddhist thinker,
culminating into the re-evaluation of this core Buddhist tenet in the social movement of 'Engaged
Buddhism'.
This paper will explore the question, to what extent our understanding of the concept of and the
discourse about causality in Buddhist philosophy can add comparative and additional value to
the Islamic theological discourse on ‛adl and qist, including Said Nursi's views on the issue.
The comparative investigation can raise interesting questions about the extent to which religions
such as Buddhism and Islam have interacted and are still interacting with modernity without
loosing their identities.
1. Justice in Buddhism and Islam – paradigmatic differences
Before we can meaningfully compare Buddhist and Islamic views on justice and especially
before we can critically honour Said Nursi’s contribution to Islamic understandings of ‘adl and
qisṭ, we have to acknowledge paradigmatic phenomenological differences between the religions
Buddhism and Islam. The most fundamental divide between the two religions can be described
along the lines of ‘prophetic’ vs, ‘mystical’ (Max Weber) or ‘religions of faith’ vs. ‘religions of
experience’ (Scherer 2006). This entails a fundamentally different approach towards spirituality
along the lines of doctrine and revelation vs. experience, creation vs. uncreated openness
inseparable with dependent arising of phenomena and beings, prayer vs. meditation and in the
attitude towards the world such as election and exclusive truths vs. inclusive truths or
proselytising, centripetal activity vs. inner transformation and centripetal activity (Scherer 2006,
96).
From this paradigmatic distinction follows naturally that the questions of social ethics and
especially social justice play a more distinctive role in Islamic thought than in Buddhism. Or in
other words, talking about social ethics in Islam refers naturally to core Islamic tenets whereas
social justice in Buddhism can be seen as relating to derivative or secondary philosophical
discussions within Buddhism. The emergence of Engaged Buddhism (cp. Queen & King 1996)
can thus be seen as a struggle to rectify a situation in Buddhist societies where centripetal, inner
activity led to social indifference. At the other hand, in Islam the exact meaning and expression
of the interplay between divine and social justice in Islam is one subject of the continuing
struggle of Islamic thought to define the place of Islam in the modern world.
2. ‘adl and qisṭin Qur‘ānic thought and in the Risale-i Nur
It falls neither in the scope nor space of this investigation to discuss here comprehensively the
concepts of ‘adl (‫ ) ءدل‬and qisṭ( ‫ ) ق سط‬in Qur‘ānic thought and in the Risale-i Nur. Other learned
presenters have and will elaborate on that in more detail. I will content myself here with giving
some summative impressions on aspects of justice in the Qur‘ān and in the Risale-i Nur.
As commonly known, the Arabic Qur‘ānic term ‘adl denotes the universal ideal of justice or
order; theologically it entails Islamic monotheism as opposed to evil al-faḥshā’ (evil deeds incl.
idolatry/polytheism), cp. 16:90; someone who ‘commands justice’ is defined as Muslim as
opposed to the infidel, cp. 16:76. It is quite relevant that in Islam ‘adl also figures under the 99
names of God, linked with al-Ḥakam, the judge/arbitrator. In the Qur‘ān, God as the Light (anNūr) is justice (cf. 24:35 - 40 and 2:256 –257). Injustice is accordingly denoted as darkness
(ṭhulumāt) and deluge (tughiyān). In comparison, another relevant Qur‘ānic term, qisṭ, denotes
primarily a practical aspect of justice: ‘balance’ i.e. the preservation of the Law and the
avoidance of its violation. Both terms emphasise justice in the sense of balanced relations.
Cognate Qur‘ānic terms include al-mīzān (balance) keeping the golden middle (al-wasat), cp.
55:7-9; mīzān and the revelation, the Qur‘ān itself are set up to guarantee the qisṭ(57:25).
In one of the few instances in the Qur‘ān where ‘adl and qisṭare joined (49:9) the context refers
to the case of disharmony within the faith communities. It is important to not that both justice
and balance are seen as purely inner-Islamic categories, leaving the kuffar (Pl. of kāfir, infidel)
and zalimūn (polytheists etc.) etc in ethical suspense.
It is clear that Said Nursi linked justice intrinsically with Islam and the Qur‘ān; e.g., he states in
his Damascus sermon, first addendum, second part, p. 67: As for justice, it can be achieved only
through direct application of the way shown by the Qur’an.
Justice is addressed as the cosmic order, when Nursi speaks of … the imperious beauty of a
justice which holds the whole universe and all its beings in equilibrium (2nd Ray, Third station,
2nd Proof, Fourth Point). Nursi utilises the Islamic theological concept of relative (=worldly)
justice and pure (=divine) justice in order to justify the common Islamic ethical suspense towards
heretics or non-Muslims (cp. His 15th letter, second station). Political justice is for him an
expression of true Islam; though not opposed to punishing the Unjust (non-Muslims), he still he
strongly advocates the deference of ultimate justice to the “Supreme Tribunal”, meaning God’s
judgement (The Words, 10th word, p. 61, Flashes, 10th flash etc.). There is a very interesting
angle in Nursi’s 13th Flah, 3rd point, in which he subscribes to the mechanism of the Supreme
Tribunal regarding the Infidel:
When Almighty God weighs up deeds with absolute justice on the supreme scales at the Last
Judgement, He will judge in accordance with the predominance of good deeds over evils and
vice versa. And since the causes of evil deeds are numerous and their existence is easy,
sometimes He veils many bad deeds with a single good deed.
This point is quite important and can be used as a starting point for bringing in and comparing
Buddhist perspectives on justice.
3. karma and social justice in Buddhism
When viewing the Islamic concepts of divine and social justice from a Buddhist perspective, the
first striking observation to be made is that there is no close equivalent to the concepts of ‘adl
and qisṭin Buddhist thought. In Buddhism, questions of justice derive secondarily from the
central concept of Causality (karma). Hence, cause and effect as empirical natural law and
mechanism of conditioned reality can be interpreted as the closest Buddhist equivalent to the
Abrahamic theologies of divine and human justice, as expressed by ‛adl and qisṭ.
In Buddhism the concept of causality - or karma - is intrinsically linked with both the
fundamental empirical or scientific approach to the human condition taken by the Buddha
himself and with the puzzling paradox of rebirth without soul or Self.
So first, I would like to introduce karma to you: How does the Law of cause and effect work?
How does it relate to the notion of re-birth, or better birth and 're-becoming'?
In Buddhism, the observation is that everything we think, say, or do has consequences. These
consequences can be in the terminology of the 3rd C. CE Buddhist scholar Harivarman agreeable
and constructive (kuśala), disagreeable and destructive (akuśala) or indifferent and neutral
(avyākr`ta) (Satyasiddhiśāstra 100). Accordingly, future pleasant, unpleasant or neutral
conditions are effectuated. This empirical finding is the law of cause and effect: karma (Pāli
kamma). ‘Karma’ literally means 'action'; it denotes not only a law of nature as such, but refers
also to specific contexts and imprints in the consciousness, which express themselves in past,
present and future conditions.
The world exists due to karma; by karma everyone exists. The beings are fettered by karma, just
as a chariot wheel is pinned down by a peg (Suttanipāta 654 PTS, 657 BJT).
The effects of our actions do not vanish with our death, but continue in continuous, dependently
arising births or rebirth, but without any substantial or ontological identity (soul, Self) being
passed on from birth to birth: Continuity without identity. This chain reaction rather likens one
Domino stone pushing over the other; its identity-less continuity can be likened to streams of
waves in an ocean or a recurring pattern in a rainbow – dependently arising, discernable but
insubstantial or lacking of intrinsic existence.
Let's first examine the actions and their effects: How do we accumulate these positive or
negative imprints for future conditions? E.g. how grave is it to have harmful thoughts? Well, it
depends whether these thoughts are part of our all-day-life delusional Disneyland of disturbing
emotions, or if they are combined with conscious intent. In the first case, the imprints are easily
counteracted, e.g. by filling the mind with positive imprints, especially the mental generation of
universal compassion and loving-kindness. In the second case, the firm intent to do harm leaves
a difficult and confusing imprint, which will effectuate unpleasant consequences. However,
actually, in order to effect clear-cut negative/difficult conditions, an action needs to fulfil four
criteria: There needs to be (1) the complete understanding of the action itself (eg the object of a
negative action is clearly understood to be a sentient esp. a Human being), (2) the conscious
intent to do harm, (3) the harmful action itself, and finally (4) unremorseful joy about the
afflicted harm. Accordingly, antidotes constitute (1) Repent: the realisation of the negative
action, (2) intent not to do it [any more], (3) amending the situation as far as possible, and finally
(4) the resolution to do the opposite in future.
For our investigation, this first survey of Buddhist karma results into the striking observation that
what is called divine justice in Abrahamic theologies is substituted in Buddhist thought by the
empirical mechanism of causality. Actions judge themselves, the seeds of unwholesome deeds –
when sawn, remain sawn and will bear fruit. Still there is leeway in Buddhist thought regarding
the conditions under which the karmic seeds will ripen. But cosmic justice in Buddhism is for the
most part purely mechanical and there is in Buddhist thought no need of a personal, divine
intervention or for that matter a almighty creator God, a divine guarantor of justice.
The second point to make is that the creation of socially just societies in Buddhism is often seen
rather as a naturally occurring result of cumulative positive karma than as the result of individual
pro-active engagement. In the modern critique of Engaged Buddhism, this reasoning is
challenged.
Before we now move to the development of karma-theory in Buddhism, let's quickly contrast
this concept of 'what goes around comes around – and bites you in the butt'-causality with
western religious or philosophical concepts: sin and fate.
Coming from an Abrahamic background, you could ask "Is 'bad karma' not the same as 'sin'"?
The answer is: Absolutely not. In Abrahamic theologies, 'sin' normally denotes an 'offence
against the will of God' and the term 'guilt' describes the emotional of sinning men in his
asymmetric, deficient relationship with the almighty God. Valued judgements connected with
'sin' and 'guilt' have been abused throughout the entire religious history in order to oppress
people. Buddhists, at the other hand, don't believe in an almighty, creator God who will judge
them at the end of the days. Instead of morally prescribing any conduct to their fellow human
being, Buddhist just understand cause and effect: Being difficult towards others creates
difficulties in the future, being kind and loving creates constructive conditions. It boils down to
the global variant of the old English saying 'Smile and the world smiles with you; cry, and you
cry alone" – only maybe with the last sentence reading "be nasty, and you'll experience nastiness
yourself". Intelligent conduct is, hence, no question of morality; rather a question of insight.
Forgiving and loving instead of hating is not a question of doing God's will; it's simply a
question of wisdom.
The next concept I want to put forward for comparison is 'fate'.
Fate is indeed very different from karma – actually karma basically means that nothing is
accidental, everything has its cause. Who we are, which capacities, interests and inclinations we
possess, which conditions we encounter, whatever happens to us – all this is based on passed
choices. Karma is the contrary to fate: We experience the effects of previous actions. So there is
neither a supernatural force to be blamed, nor blind chance, nor society nor our parents. Karma
stops or egotistic blame games and self-victimisation: We are ourselves responsible for our lives,
every minute and second new. So karma is ultimately real freedom; with no god or other people
to blame for our actions, we can act truly free in the knowledge that we and we ourselves have
been and are and will be sowing the seeds for future conditions. That's what karma means. And
this applies not only to negative actions, but also to positive ones: Understanding karma correctly
means, we have a precious opportunity here and now to benefit countless beings. Today, we are
sawing the seeds for our future. That's also why Buddhists are not that interested in their
previous lives; decisive is, what opportunities we have now. It is not important what was and
who we have been; important is the Here and Now shaping the future and bringing us closer to
experiencing the true nature of reality, the way things are: enlightenment as timeless, highest
bliss.
The Buddha's teaching on causality developed the Upaniṣadic gradual process into full
ethicisation of causality (Gombrich 1996); he put forward a re-interpretation of karma as
intention-led. Still, by denying the existence of a soul or self (ātman), the Buddha created a
paradox which will spawn the different quirks of the Buddhist concepts of karma (cp.
McDermott 1980): Causality and re-birth without essence being passed on; human existence and
re-becoming can be described as continuity without identity. The philosophical dilemma
remains: Without a quasi ontological assumption of mind as mental essence and ultimate reality,
intention driven causality seems to provoke more questions then answers; the difficult here lies
in the Buddha's unique, non-ontological, non-cosmological speculative approach: An approach
which can only be described as scientifically empirical; in lecturers elsewhere, I have called this
the "deconstruction of ontology by practise": the Buddha's refusal to develop ontology in favour
of teaching an experience-oriented andragogy (cf. SN IV 15).
In Early Buddhism, "the result (phalam) of an action" was seen as "unalterable" (dhruvam). The
Māhāyana Śālistamba Sūtra (around 250 CE) clarified the relationship between primary causes
(hetu) and circumstantial conditions (pratyāya), allowing more flexibility in the explanation of
the ripening of karma (karma-vipāka): The seed of rice (hetu) brings fruit according to its growth
conditions (pratyāya). Influencing karmic seeds would hence relate to the conditions, not to the
causes itself. And soon, mitigating factors would be identified in the form of transfer of merit
and the compassion of the Bodhisattvas.
The agent of this line of thought seems to have been the need to soften the rigorous mechanics of
karma. In theistic systems, normally the mercy of a/the God can take away the consequences of
negative actions. How to meet this human need in a spiritual method involving no creator god,
divine redemption and external salvation? At this point we find the notion of transfer of merit
(puṇyadāna), i.e. the idea that own actions can counter or annul the ripening of someone else's
actions (karma). However, this paradoxical "softening of karma" in mainstream Mahāyāna
thought is clearly relating to the freedom to act beneficially in each and every present moment
anew; it's affirmative and intentional focus is the present shaping the future, rather than
eradicating the past.
Mahāyāna thought developed further to the effect that far advanced realised beings
(Bodhisattvas) sometimes are depicted with the ability take away negative karma of other
sentient beings; it is important to note, that the mechanism of these seeming interferences into
the course of causality are ultimately strictly concordant with karma if we remember that
Buddhist karma is seen as predominantly mental intention with mental and physical results; the
development of altruistic motivation such as willing to better the karmic position of a being by
transfer of merit and at the other hand the ultimate trust into the methods of the Buddha and the
realisation of a Bodhisattva leave strong positive imprints in consciousness countering
other/earlier imprint.
As for karma within Mahāyāna philosophy, it is well known, that Mahāyāna refocused from the
Ābhidhārmic (scholastical) inventarisations and discussion about the ontological value of basic
components of reality (dharmas) on ineffable experience of enlightenment. Finally, Late Indian
Tantric Buddhism brought with an unprecedented radical and often seen as transgressive
application of Buddhist teaching into transformative practise, practise leading towards
enlightenment within a single lifetime. The methods used in Tantric Buddhism (both in their
Indian expression and its successive Tibetan assimilation) are seen as bringing karma towards
accelerated ripening.
In the modern critique of karma theories expounded by the movement called Engaged Buddhism,
the common Buddhist karma theory is generally re-interpreted in order to make space for proactive social engagement (Pietz 2005, 206-7). Most prominently, Dr Ambedkar’s political
utilisation of Buddhism in his fight for Dalit (outcast) –rights in India has earned him the
criticism of abandoning karma and enlightenment all together and reducing Buddhism to “a
merely social system” (The Maha Bodhi 1959, 352-3 see Queen 1996, 47).
4. Buddhist perspectives on Islamic justice
From our discussion of karma, causality, and its relationship to concepts of justice, it can be seen
that in Buddhist view justice, both cosmic and social does not need to be guaranteed by a
superhuman or divine institute or personal creator God. Actions bring results through a purely
natural mechanics, uncreated and timeless conditioned arising of phenomena and empirical
persons. According to Mahāyāna and Tantric philosophy, ultimately everything that happens is
the free play of openness (space, emptiness) manifesting itself in the game mind plays with itself.
In that sense, everything is already just: perfect and pure. Our perception might be flawed, and
here compassion has its place in a twofold way. On the basic level compassion means joyful
activity for the happiness of others. On the higher Buddhist level it means providing the methods
for permanent happiness. In short: if we are happy, Buddha is happy. There is no need for
conversion or one way for all. It’s just about permanent happiness.
Here, Buddhist thought challenges naturally the Islamic notions of justice. The Islamic concept
of an almighty creator God is challenging for the establishment of universal and inclusive
compassion and justice. God in Islam is absolutely transcendent in the sense that his justice,
absolute justice, is not limited to human empirical reasoning and is not fettered by human
concepts as Human equal Rights. This notion differs e.g. from the Christian notion, since in
Christian theology by the doctrine of incarnation, the almighty creator God has established
himself as both transcendent and immanent; hence Christian theology can argue the application
of reason in ethical questions rather then being bound to trans-rational, absolute divine Law.
Islamic theology makes it perfectly clear that Islamic ethics and justice is dualistic and
hierarchical and that anybody outside Islam is not covered by the same ethical code and
protection as the faithful. Ultimately, Islamic justice means God’s justice depending whether we
accept the Islamic revelation or not. This dualistic approach, which is also found in the work of
Said Nursi, is utterly unsatisfactory for Buddhists who have been deemed ‘idolaters’ and hence
suffered in the past on multiple occasion from aggression and intolerance in the name of Islam.
Justice, if only valid for Muslims, is no justice at all, but tyranny.
From a Buddhist perspective, a real advancement would be the acknowledgment of an universal
religious objective to strive for happiness for all sentient beings regardless their religious
convictions and to respect Human Rights in word and action whether we share the same faith or
not. Religious rhetoric of hell and damnation, of faithful and infidel, of evil and good (rather than
confused vs. meaningful) fuels religious violence and intolerance. If this rhetoric is seen to be an
intrinsic part of a religious revelation, then it might be time to challenge trans-rational notions of
revelation in the light of Humanistic Enlightenment. For example, it would be odd to
acknowledge that any incentive to criminal behaviour such as the killing of the Infidel is deemed
as unacceptable and legally prosecutable on a secular level, but that it could be justified if part of
a religious ideology. From a Buddhist perspective, any revelation which propagates suffering and
oppression has to be challenged and invalidated. There simply can not be peace and justice in a
world where one group thinks they are better ‘or more just’ than another group and hence beyond
the confinements of Humanistic values and Human Rights.
In the Modern World, where the news abound of instances of religiously motivated hatred and
violence, all religions need to ask themselves whether they want to serve mankind or whether
they expect mankind to serve them. From a Buddhist view, any religion not aiming for happiness
for all and expecting mankind to serve it for its own sake would be in contradiction to the
enlightened attitude and would pose a threat to Humanity.
References
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N.J.: Athlone.
McDermott, James P. (1980) “Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism” in: Doniger O'Flaherty,
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London: University of California Press, pp. 165-192.
Nursi, Bediüzzaman Said & Vahide, Şükran, tr., (1996 [2000]). Risale-i Nur (English
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