Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Religion and Democracy Abstract This study is viewing religion as a cultural artifact and tests for the direct influences of some exogenous religious variables on democracy and human development. The main argumentation line is that religion - as a mental collective structure with the function to generate meanings, values and purposes and to compensate for the insecurity of human existence - could shape the believes, behaviors, ethic structures and institutional frameworks and, thus, influence directly the democratic and human development status. Based on the World Values Surveys 2005 data, measures of different aspects of religion are constructed and tested against various measures of democracy on a cross-national level for a set of 41 countries. The analyses reveal that there are some significant inter-linkages between the involved variables; however, the religious variables act in a non-uniform manner on the explanatory ones. We conclude that both conceptual and empirical arguments support the idea of democracy viewed as a religious dependent variable. Key Words: Cultural paradigm, democracy, human development, religion, WVS JEL: Z12; A13 Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia. Medieval distich Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen. Hebrews 11:1 No change has come over the purpose. I Ching- The Book of Changes 1. Introduction The choices we made in regard to this paper’s motto are designed to reflect the complexity of religion as societal process. Firstly, the Dominican medieval distich presented above represents a pledge for a polysemic interpretation of the revelation; whereas The Letter to Hebrews views the function of faith as a guarantee for the believer. On the other hand, the I Ching approaches the ethic imperative of the sincerity that it is perfect in itself and of itself. So, we view religion as dealing with a variety of individual and social life related aspects: the position of an individual in the web of social interaction networks, or in relation with the universe and the Divinity; the formal structures and the content of the dominant ethics; the ultimate goals of personal and social evolutions as these could derive from the assessment of a set of existence’ meanings. Thus, religion could influence a wide range of beliefs and social behaviors and outcomes. It could affect the societal architecture, institutions and mechanisms through a multitude of economic, politic and attitudinal variables. In particular, religion could affect the social preference for a democratic societal framework. There can be identified two major channels for such an influence: one based on the impact exercised by religion on economic development and, consequently, on the infrastructure of democratic institutions and mechanisms of human development; the other is via the shape of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors reverberating into the social dynamics. As Eilinghoff (2003:2) notes: “A religious concept in total can lead an individual to infer a certain course of action towards one or several specific goals that are usually regarded as the ‘meaning of life’”. In regard to the first transmission channel, the research was initiated by Smith ([1776] 1965), Weber ([1905] 1958, 1988, 2002), Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Currently, there is an emerging body of literature studying the connections between religion and economy. Iannaccone (1998:1466) identifies three major analytical directions in this body of literature: 1) the interpretation of religion from an economic perspective, seeking to explain patterns of religious behavior among groups and cultures; 2) the study of religion’s economic consequences; 3) the use of the religious doctrinal corpuscle to promote or criticize different economic policies - religious economics. These studies view religion both as independent and dependent variable and conclude that religious activity could affect economic performance on various levels. The research field corresponding to the second transmission channel is an interdisciplinary one with various approaches inspired by sociology, psychology, anthropology or institutional economics. This research direction was initiated by de Tocqueville ([1835; 1840] 2001) who suggested that as the American experience shows religion is compatible with democracy (if the public and religious spheres are kept separately). Moreover, Durkheim ([1912] 2001) focuses on religion as a factor able to contribute to social cohesion. Currently, this field is dealing with issues like secularization and post modernization and their impact on social and politic status. The present paper is an attempt to empirically analyze the direct impact of religion on democracy, by recognizing that religion could shape believes, behaviors, ethic structures and institutional frameworks with consequences on social preference for a democratic status. The first step of our research consists in defining religion and democracy in order to provide an operational framework. A particular emphasis is placed on the view of religion as a cultural artifact and as a generator of meanings, values and purposes of human existence. Democracy is understood as a consequence of the dominant collective position regarding the fundamental social equalities and freedoms and hence as a complex system of entitlements and their borderlines. The second section is searching for the linkages between these variables. Both direct and indirect transmission channels of religion influence on democracy via the social ethics and economic development are briefly discussed. Furthermore, we test our hypothesis by constructing some measures of different religious variables based on World Values Surveys’ data; variables dealing with aspects such as religious concentration, de facto religious behavior, the perception of the social role of religion and of its involvement in political life, the approach toward the “spiritual life” of the society’s members, and the religious denomination, and by taking into account various measures of democracy (and some specific aspects such as electoral processes and political participation, the functioning of the government, political culture and civil liberties) - all these analyzed on cross-national level for a set of 41 countries. To preview the output of the analysis, it appears that religion matters for democracy, but the impact exercised by the individual religious variables is non-uniform. Empirically, the religious variables are correlated with the dependent measures of democracy, but the robustness of these correlations varies according to the involved methodologies of estimating the democratic status. Still, overall there is a significant predictive power of religion in respect to democratic status. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 seeks to define the key concepts. Section 3 is searching for possible linkages between the involved variables. Section 4 tests for empirical evidences, while Section 5 comments on results. The findings are summarized and some research limits are revealed in the final section. Therefore, we believe that an analysis concerning the influence of religion on social choices is a critic condition for a more accurate view of societal evolution. In addition, by carrying out this study we learned that beliefs have a tremendous capacity to modulate the societal construction. 2. Defining the key concepts 2.1. Religion as a functional generator of meanings, values and purposes Our starting point in defining religion is the observation that the human spirit needs several filtering mechanisms for the apparent chaos of the existence. More exactly, it needs systematic answers to questions like: Why are we living? What is our main purpose? How can be explained what is happening to us? Why do we suffer? Is there a justice in the world’s mechanisms? Is there a superior sense of life? Is dead the end or there is another level of existence? In providing answers to such questions, there were generated various consistent and auto-coherent collective mental structures, represented by myths and symbols and by means to communicate, adjust and preserve these in an inter-generational framework. The ensemble of these structures and means constitutes the cultural paradigm as a societal product, a provider of meaning, which guides the collective and individual actions and as a tool used by members of a collectivity to place themselves in a system of relationships among them, with the Others and with the world. In such a perspective, it can be argued that culture is not only an “environment”, but also an active source of social life by determining the societal actions and stimulating / inhibiting their results. If such approach is seen as viable, then a definition of religion as a cultural artifact could derive. There is a certain tradition in seeing religion as a social and cultural artifact since Émile Durkheim’s functionalist approach (and going beyond and sometimes divergent from this): “Religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions- beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a church”- Durkheim ([1912] 2001:46). Let’s consider for instance the Clifford Geertz’ view of religion as one of the cultural systems of a society. He defined religion as a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence. These conceptions are presented as factual ones in such a manner that the explanations appear to be realistic - for a presentation and comments on Geertz arguments and other similar ideas, see Kunin (2003:153). According to such approaches, it seams that religion is a collective mental structure providing and communicating explanations about the meaning and purpose of life, by referring to an “exogenous”from the world and mankind referential - cause of existence (the Divinity). And in this process of explaining, religion provides a set of fundamental values which are component of the cultural paradigm. Thus, the role of religion is to explain the universe and the human existence and by doing so to produce a set of meanings and values in accordance with these. Subsequently, it generates an ethics in accordance with these explanations (i.e. a set of prescriptions for human actions perceived as being the “right ones”). Such a definition of religion is not necessary contradictory to other approaches. As an example, it could be argued that if the output of such a “generator of meanings” is sufficiently consistent and persistent, it could act as a system of "compensators" like in the rational choice theory; compensators which represent languages and practices compensating for a number of physical needs or frustrations, in particular, and for the frustration induced by the apparent lack of existence’ purpose in general. Still, our view is that the primary function of religion is not to compensate for frustration on one or another aspect of human life, but for almost all of them. In other words, religion provides a large set of “supernatural credence commodities” (from explanations and meanings for the human condition to afterlife rewards). Moreover, this function is carried out by providing inter-correlated sets of explanations. In other words, we accept that religion is compensating, but we emphasis that this is done by providing explanations and these explanations are acting as an ultimate compensator for the global feeling of life insecurity. Thus, religion is not primary about our perception of Divinity, good and evil, sins and redemption, rituals or dogmas. It is about the purpose of life, our ultimate objectives, our fear, hopes and expectations, our position in respect to others and to the universe. And mostly, religion is about a meaning greater than ourselves, a justification of our existence; not so much how, but mainly why. Hence, this constitutes the main reason for seeing religion as a cultural element. If culture is the assembly of the collective mythic structures, then there is a special dialectic of πιστις (pi'stis) creation from mythos and logos. With this framework, our operational definition of religion will be: Religion is a particular system of culture since it has the same function of providing meanings, but differs from other cultural systems by that it relates its explanations to Divinity. Its institutions (communities of believers, dogmas, ethical structures, norms, behaviors and practices) are functioning as compensatory structures for the uncertainty in individual and social life and are offering a set of rewards and penalties which shape the religious ethics. In the mean time, these support specific individuals’ relationships according to the structure of a particular ethics and, by doing so, are acting as social integration structures. This definition incorporates the grassroots definition of Stark and Bainbridge (1985:5):” Religion is any shared set of beliefs, activities and institutions premised upon a faith in supernatural forces” but adds the role of religious institutions as compensator and societal integrator structures. Being a culture’ component, religion is an organized effort to fill the emptiness of a universe which otherwise appears to be stripped by signification. 2.2. Democracy as a status of collective mental ∆ηµοκρατία is one of the most polymorphic concepts from the political field. “Democracy” is a politic term, since it implies a form of social governance “the power (rule) of the people”. Still, there is no unanimously accepted definition and not a single type of social design. There are two key concepts required by a minimalist definition of democracy: “equality” and “freedom”. By “equality” it could be understood at least that all citizens are equal before the law and they have equal access to exercise the social power - in other words, there is a social isonomy. Such isonomy is both positive and negative. The positive aspect implies that, in the societal decision-making process, all citizens have equal capacity to influence the outcome and that any act against the social rules is judged and punished according to the same principles. In a negative sense, “equality” means that there is no discrimination for the members of a certain group in taking part to the collective decisions and that there are no variations in the legislative system’s interpretation and application according to the social status. The existence of such negative interpretation of equality is controversial since there could be cases of societies in which there is certain discrimination for some particular social groups, but the equality is applied in a positive sense for the members of the society allowed to participate at the political life. In our view, such a politic system could not be defined as fully democracy, being rather hybrid. Also, a cautious approach is required in regard to what is understood by the use of negative and positive interpretation of equality to all citizens. For instance, the positive interpretation should not be connected with the consequences of binary “majority rule”, but rather with “all expressed votes are equals” (everyone could exercise the same influence on the final decisional output and there is nothing like a “super vote”); since it does not concern the implementation of a particular decisional rule, but the equal access to the decisional processes. Similar, the negative sense should not be associated with any kind of positive discrimination (some groups should benefit from a “special treatment” as a compensation for past injustices) since such discrimination is in fact a functional inequality in respect to the social groups which do not benefit from the special treatment. Thus, the definition of “equality” could be formulated based on the next set of assertions: 1. For any two individual social subjects “A” and “B” there is a isomorphic capacity to influence the outcome of collective decision-making processes; 2. For any two individual social subjects “A” and “B” there is a isomorphic penalty for breaking the same social rule in similar conditions; 3. Any of the two “A” and “B” could not impose to the other a limitation of the “natural” rights; 4. For any two individual social subjects “A” and “B” there is no positive discrimination in any element of the social life; 5. No matter how we choose “A” and “B”, they can impose one another a de facto limitation of the “achieved” rights, especially the economic ones. However, such a limitation should not exceed a certain level; 6. There is no constraint for the social subjects “A” and “B” to have an equivalent social status but they should have equal opportunities to reach for it. “Freedom” is the capacity of all members of the society to fully exercise their various types of “natural” and “achieved” rights. The fundamental premise is that the social subjects are roughly endowed with undifferentiated “natural rights” (or equivalently they should be treated as ends, in Kantian setting), but they have abilities of non-uniform use of these, because of their various native abilities, as well as of the circumstances in which they practice these abilities. If the term “freedom” is applicable to all citizens, then the full capacity to exercise rights should not be understood in a genuine sense: there must be a “borderline” of this capacity defined by the points up to which exercising an individual social subject’s rights harms the capacity of the others to benefit from their own rights. In other words, it is convenient to claim that a total freedom is only a potential state. The argument for this claim relies on requirement that the individuals’ interactions should not set nonnecessary limitations while they pursue a particular right. Thus, “freedom” is a system of entitlements. Such an approach is close (up to some similarity degree) to Nozick’s (1974:238) thesis, i.e. “The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. No one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and entitlements over”. However, our view goes in another direction since we focus mainly not on owning but on doing; in the sense that the social subjects are constraint to appoint actions from a single subclass of social actions in order to derive an economic good. Still there is a large variety of subclasses of social actions with a common characteristic consisting in that complex set of interactions rise from such actions. “Freedom” emerges as one possible mechanism to carry out such interactions. One can make a distinction between two main types of rights (from the above mentioned perspective): 1) “autonomous” and, respectively, 2) “subordinate” (see, for instance, a discussion of the views on the relationships between these two types of rights, Coleman, 1996). An “autonomous” right is exercised by an individual without any interaction to others and the outcome of such exercise will solely depend of the intrinsic capacity of the owner to fully benefit from his/her actions. Au contraire, a “subordinate” right cannot be carried out in an isolate manner and it requires the interaction with a least one other social subject. Thus, our definition of freedom relies on the next assertions: 1. There is an isomorphism between any two sets of individuals’ “autonomous” rights; 2. No matter how we choose two social individuals “A” and “B” there is no chance to find an isomorphism between their sets of “subordinate” rights; 3. There is no need to impose a borderline of practicing a large amount of “autonomous” rights that are mutually independent, for any two social subjects “A” and “B”; 4. There is a need to set up an upper bound for the amount of inter-correlated “subordinate” rights of any two social subjects “A” and “B”, in the sense that their actions should not reach a level that harms the capacity of others to exercise their own rights of the above type. If these assertions are considered, then the Nozick’s argumentation refers only to the “subordinate” rights and the “limitation of freedom in order to preserve the freedom” should not be extended beyond the sphere of such rights. One peculiar aspect of this definition is that it is built on a set of conditions that reflects an intrinsic equality and a certain degree of extrinsic inequality. In other words, the degree of freedom appears as a consequence of the degree of social recognition of different types of (in) equalities. Still, it accounts for the fact that the liberty of one should not be exercised in a vacuum, but in given social space which requires interactions with the others. It can also be regarded as a ground to reject positions such as: “democracy and liberalism are concerned with two entirely different problems. The former is concerned with the question of who should be vested with ruling authority, while the latter deals with the freedom of the individual, regardless of who carries on the government” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, 1952:9). In other words, we are sympathetic with the idea that democracy should not be carried out in the context of a significant lack of freedom. In a weak form of this thesis, there could be a certain trade-off between “equality” and “freedom”, but this is not a central element of the democratic core, but rather a “functional compromise”. In a stronger sense, “equality” is necessary but not sufficient for “freedom” as the latter is necessary for the social recognition of the fundamental “equality” between all humans, and both are required to be based on a democratic system. Supplementary, such an approach allows the understanding of democracy by referring to several crucial aspects for any social system, connected to the mechanisms through which the political power is generated, legitimated, distributed, exercised and controlled. Resuming, democracy is not about majority rule, governance by elected representatives, open political life and so one. All these are consequences of the respect paid to two fundamental ideas: that we are all equal as humans despite that we could be socially unequal and that we are free to act for self-fulfill in material and spiritual dimensions as long as our actions do not harm somebody else. Democracy is a social system based on a combination of equality and freedom together with their borderlines; based on the general recognition of an identical set of “autonomous” rights and more non-identical sets of “subordinate” rights. This combination provides all the “positive” and “negative” prerequisites for the existence of a democratic society. 3. Searching for the inter-linkages Currently, there is a growing literature analyzing the connections between religion and democracy. For instance, Bruce (2006) argues that Protestantism has been implicated in the development of democratic politics and civil liberties. Patterson (2005) provides detailed evidence on religion influencing politics in Latin America. Driessen (2010:56) notes that: „once the core autonomy prerequisites [of democracy] have been fulfilled, there is a wide range of Church-state arrangements which allow for religion to have a public role in political life and simultaneously maintain a high quality of democratic rights and freedoms”. Smith (2009) documents for European countries a link between religion and trust in democratic institutions. Bader (2003) argues that there are mutual relationships between society, culture, politics and state and (organized) religions and that a role of organized religion in political processes can be legitimate. This section discusses some arguments from this literature and to grasp from these arguments the basis of our main research hypothesis. A central concept for our analysis is the salvific merit. As McCleary and Barro (2006:51) are pointing out: “Otherworldly compensators like salvation, damnation and nirvana are great motivators of behavior in this world”. If the universe is guided by a conscious force (or forces) and if such directing conscience(s) has/have an intrinsic objective, than it could be reasoned that any “correct” decision is in accordance with God’s plan” (which is revealed or unknown in a direct manner but suggested in an indirect one). Correlatively, any “wrong” decision is a “deviationist” one, opposing a transcendent objective more important than the individual goals. So that, there could be identified three sets of rewards / costs associated with each individual decision. The first set is intrinsic deriving from the satisfaction / discomfort in respect to the own decisions who could or not be sanctioned by a “higher instance”. The second set is related to the judgments of other members of the social referential group in regard to the correctitude of an individual action, being partially extrinsic. The last one is fully extrinsic and may well be granted / imposed by the conscience which is governing the universe. From this perspective, any religious action will seek to fulfill two inter-correlated objectives: 1) to complete the prescript acts in order to achieve all the types of rewards; 2) to correct the incomplete, imperfect or “wrong” past actions in order to minimize the subsequent costs of these. Even in the cases when religion does not provide an absolute certainty (“it could be if God decides” but “is not sure”) about the fully extrinsic rewards or costs (life after dead, salvation of soul or physical resurrection, heaven / damnation, hell, the complete destruction of the inner), a believer will attempt to maximize the intrinsic or partially extrinsic rewards, to reinsure her / him that will not support the costs of past or current “mistakes” and to improve others’ perception over her / him. Thus, several of the differences between religions emerge from the characteristics of the nature, level and channels of rewarding / applying of the rewards / costs and from the mechanisms of their confirmation as well. In order to be efficient, these systems of rewards and costs which form the structure of the religious ethics should be: a) consistent; b) self-explanatory; c) appropriate for the socio-economic current environment; d) able to provide answers and action guidelines for larger set of problems and actions. The religious acts influence the social and economic conditions through the associated ethics. If such acts are fostering traits - like a pronounced work ethics, social and economic performances (as a sign of being a “community of chosen ones” or part of such community), trust, thrift and decisional prudence, charity, tolerance, openness and acceptance of the specific cultural, sexual or racial differences and so on -, these could contribute to an increase in the degree of societal openness and also could spur economic development in support in the adoption and evolution of the democratic institutions. In other words, religion can influence, via its specific ethics, the social framework by stimulating / inhibiting different types of social behavior, in order to promote the corresponding values of religiosity. It must be noticed that this line of argumentation does not mainly emphasize the impact of religion on formation of networks, of social clubs, with their capacity to congregate and mobilize a large number of citizens, but more on the influence on social beliefs and, hence, behaviors. As McCleary and Barro (2006:51) explain: “A key concept is ‘salvific merit’ which connects the perceived probability of salvation to a person’s lifetime activities. In some religions, salvific merit can be earned in this life to enhance the chances for a better outcome in the next life”. For religion to boost up the democratic evolution of a society, it ought to have the capacity to influence both the positive and negative conditions of democracy. Minimally, it should: 1) agree that there is a reason for taking individual and collective actions (to view this world as more than transitory to a better condition which can not be achieved here by its believers) or, at least, not to discourage such actions (by insisting that these are futile); 2) encourage the “right” actions through a well articulated description of rewards and costs; 3) not promote the “negative actions” against the “non-chosen” or “non- believers” - actions translated in anti-social acts, such as violence - in addition recommending the avoidance of such actions; 4) stimulate the social mobility by not sustaining any type of caste system on the argument that each individual social status is predetermined (this request can be controversial in the initial stages of democracy emergence, when religious institutions take position in favor of more rigid social structures; however, this could change in time due to the emergence of more solid and fully functional democratic structures and social faith doctrine may be lost in the process); 5) perceive some actions (charity, self-sacrifices for the good of others and so on) as active instruments of salvation (assuming, of course, that, in a way or another, such salvation is possible) and, correlatively, to not promote the idea that extremely spiritual of physical pain is a correct instrument of salvation; 6) promote a doctrine from which it could be concluded that neither autocracy nor anarchy are social systems in accordance with the Divine will; 7) perceive the democratic social order as a “natural” one (given by God) and so any attempt to change such order is not according to the Divine objectives. Summarizing, the transmission channels are more complex than the issue of religion’s position in respect to the secular authority. Different religions are giving different answers to the issue of the “correct” political ideas and consequently are placing their believers in a wide range of political opinions. Generally, the main idea is that: “By spiritually rewarding networks of mutual aid and charitable acts, religion lowers the uncertainties of daily life. That is, charity is a form of communal insurance, which can be efficient if the society has a lot of uncertainty…” - Barro and Cleary (2007:193). Summarizing: H: In caeteris paribus conditions, religion could influence both the positive and negative conditions of the democratic status of a society. Such influence may vary according to the particular conditions of religious and democratic evolutions, the nature of religious institutions, the contents of its fundamental dogma, the religious behavior of individuals as well as to the stance of the relationships between political structures and mechanisms and civil society. Briefly, at a certain point in time, the relative democratic performances of a country can be explained among a variety of factors by the nature and relevance of its religious institutions. 4. Empirical evidences The purpose of this section is to provide some empirical evidences about the inter-linkages between the religious behavior characteristics in modern societies and their degree of democracy acceptance. In order to provide such evidences, there is necessary to involve some operational measures of the religion and democracy variables. For instance, it could be noticed that various aspects of religion such as religion concentration, the religious practices and behaviors (including religious devotion), the degree of acceptance of a certain social role of religion and of its involvement in political life, the approach toward the “spiritual life” of the society’ members, and the predominant religious denomination (and implicitly the predominant dogmatic structures), all these and others are susceptible to induce different effects on societal status and on level of human development. So that a first task of such a study should be the advance of some quantifiable measures of such variables. Also for characterizing empirically the democratic status is necessary to decompose the democratic architecture in some of its constituents (e.g. the nature and mechanisms of electoral processes and political participation, the efficiency of government functioning, the global levels of political culture and civil liberties) and to provide a synthetic measure. 4.1. International Data Our starting point is the measurement of cross-country differences in religious practices, based on the last wave of World Values Surveys (WVS) - carried out from 2005 to 2008. Since we are interested in obtaining current comparative results for the assessment of religion’s impact on democracy, in accordance with our research hypothesis, the dataset allows us to examine the present outcome of historical religious and societal evolutions; however, it does not allow a dynamic view of these evolutions’ mechanisms. Thus, this type of data fits the narrow purposes of our study. We selected from the entire data base a set of 41 countries with complete religion-related information. Since different questions are covering a wide range of religious behavior patterns we built a set of 4 synthetic indexes in order to capture the common areas of religious practices focusing especially on the aspects connected to the religion’s social role. We use individual data which typically contain 1000 to 2000 participants in each national survey - and aggregate them according to the next topics: 1) the religion concentration - the differences between the share of society’s members with formal religious beliefs which belong to the largest denomination and, respectively, the shares for the second and third denomination; 2) the religious behavior - the degree of involvement in religious practices; 3) religion’s social role - opinions on church’s capacity to answer to social problems and on the interference of religion in public governance; 4) the spirituality - the frequency of the reflections on the meaning and purpose of life. These indexes are constructed according to our working definition of religion. They are designed to reflect the societal behavior as is this influenced by the structure of religious dogmas and practices in accordance with the position to the salvific merit and the possibility of redemption by a pro-active social attitude. Thus, these indexes are not referring to the content itself of the religious beliefs, but rather to the implications of such beliefs on the perceptions over the potential role of religious institutions. While the religious concentration is not necessarily connected to the views about salvific merit, the religious behavior and the positions about the social role of religious institutions are directed derived from such views. If the believer has at her / his disposal, according to the core dogmas, a set of redemption’ instruments - which consists both in following the structured religious prescriptions and in positive social actions -, she / he will tend to increase, in certain specific conditions, her / his participation to religious practices and rituals and to adopt a pro-active social role. In other words, if the proposed indexes are adequately constructed, there should be observed a greater emphasis on the religious institutions’ involvement in social and political life as their members seek to maximize the perceived compensatory benefits from positive social actions. The purpose of the first index is to capture the heterogeneity of the religious beliefs by comparing the relative importance of the first three denominations. The index does not account for the existence of an official state religion or for the state regulation of the religious sector. It simply considers the religious choices of the respondents which are identifying themselves as belonging to a religious denomination. These choices can be influenced by the existence of legal provisions, including statements about religion in fundamental laws or by the de jure or de facto religious persecutions, but these aspects are not directly addressed. The construction of the index is based on an explicit question from the WVS questionnaire and the index is computed based on the differences between the shares of the largest religious denominations as: 2 Re ligionConcentration Index j = ∑i=1( sij − si−1 j ) 2 2 (1) Here s is the share of the denomination i for each individual country j. It should be noticed that the index does not account for the intra-religion concentration, but only for the absolute inter-religions one; so that if there are two or more denominations in a country for a certain religion the shares are summed up. Of course, this is not a perfectly accurate measure of concentration since it is not based on census data but it could provide a global picture of denominations’ shares among the members of a society. The second index reflects the de facto religious behavior, going further then the formal adherence to a certain denomination. It is based on the idea that the self-perception as a “religious person” is not necessarily associated with the frequency of one’s involvement in religious practices but a certain consistency of beliefs and actions should be observed. So, the index is the equally-weighted aggregation of the frequencies of “regular” religious services’ attendance and the self identification as a religious person: fm1 j + f1 j Indexof Re ligious Behaviorj = 2 2 + rp j ( 2) Hence fm1, f1, rp stands for the shares of respondents attending religious services more than once a week, once a week and, respectively, describing themselves as “religious people” - with equal weights of these variables. Since the shares fm1, f1 are equally weighted, it is supposed that there is no de facto difference between a regular daily and, respectively, a weekly attendance. However, the weekly frequency could be seen as an arbitrary one, since, for instance, the religious rituals are different for each individual denomination; so that these may require the believers’ presence to religious practices with different timetables. Still, this time span is short enough to reflect a higher intensity of participation to religious services. Also, the participation at religious practices and the selfidentification as a “religious person” are considered equally important in describing the religious behavior. It should be noticed that this index only describes the formal institutional religious practices and not the individual and informal actions of praying / meditation; so that it does not capture all the aspects of religious behavior. The third index addresses the issue of the perception of churches’ capacity to provide adequate answers to the social problems and the level until where the involvement of the religious institutions in the political life is perceived as acceptable (and necessary). The index is defined as the average of five variables from WVS reflecting the dominant views in a society in relation to the role that can be attributed to religion in political life: Indexof Re ligion Social Role j = 1 5 ∑ sr ( 3) 5 i=1 ij The shares sr denote the proportion of the respondents which a) are believing that the religious institutions are able to provide adequate answer to the social problems and b) which agree to the involvement of these institutions in political life by c) rejecting the politicians “who don’t believe in God”, d) accepting the influence of the religious leaders on vote and public governance processes and e) requiring more people with strong religious beliefs in public offices. These variables are chosen in order to focus as much as possible on the construction of the index toward the space that religious institutions can have in public life. There is no specific question concerning the implication of the respondent themselves in active politics and, thus, these variables are reflecting the overall attitude of society in respect to the political activism of believers. The index places an equal weight to each component so that the views about religion’s capacity to provide answers to the social issues are considered equally important as the involvement of religious institutions in the public decisions processes. This implies that the index should reflect both the legitimacy of the religiously motivated social actions as well as connections between religious and political spheres. In order to complete the picture, a fourth index is computed to describe the “spiritual life”. This index reflects the shares of the respondents frequently meditating at the “meaning and purpose of life”: In d e x o f S p ir itu a lity β 1 = 0 .7 , β 2 = 0 .3 j = β 1m oj + β 2 m sj (4 ) The mo, ms variables denote the shares of respondents thinking “often” and, respectively, “sometimes”, to the sense of life. The weights β1,β2 are arbitrarily chosen to discriminate between different levels of intensity for such meditations. In order to reflect more synthetically the religious state, an aggregate index could be constructed based on the four indexes: G lo b a l R e lig io n In d ex j = 4 ∑ i =1 ω ij In d ex ij ( 5 ) Since we are not ex-ante imposing any condition about the relative importance of individual indexes, the ωij weights are not predetermined. Several solutions are possible in order to set the values of the weights. We are considering two of them. The first is to simply compute an equiponderate version of the global index (ωij = 0.25). The second consists in a factor analysis and in the use of score coefficients as weights. Such an analysis is reported in Table 1. Exploratory factor analysis is a method for explaining the covariance relationships amongst a number of observed variables in terms of a much smaller number of unobserved variables called factors. For our dataset, a single factor is selected based on Standard-error scree procedure (Zoski and Jurs, 1996). This procedure is an attempt to formalize the visual comparisons of slopes used in the visual scree test. It is based on the standard errors of sets of regression lines fit to later eigenvalues; when the standard error of the regression through the later eigenvalues falls below the specified threshold, the remaining factors are assumed to be negligible. For the estimation, we are using maximum likelihood method which is scale invariant so that rescaling of the original data matrix or the dispersion matrix does not alter the basic results. [Insert Table 1 about here] The levels of the un-rotated loads suggest that the factor “F1” could be reasonable seen as a measure of the religious state. It could be noticed the lower level for the Index of Religion Concentration load which could be explained by the fact that the dominance of a certain religious denomination does not automatically determine a certain homogenous behavior. To the right of the loadings are communality and uniqueness estimates which apportion the diagonals of the correlation matrix into common (explained) and individual (unexplained) components. The communalities are obtained by computing the row norms of the loadings matrix, while the uniquenesses are obtained directly from the Standard-error scree estimation algorithm. From this it could be considered that 6.75 % of the correlation for the concentration index is accounted for by the common factor while for the rest of the indexes this varies between 37.25% and 66.77%. The bottom portion of the output shows basic goodness-of-fit information for the estimated specification with the chi-square test values. Two distinct versions of this test are performed. The first set compares the fit of the estimated model against a saturated model; the second set of tests examines the fit of the independence model. The first column displays the discrepancy function, number of parameters, and degrees-of-freedom (against the saturated model) for the estimated specification. Both versions of the chi-square test have p-values of over 0.87, indicating that the factor adequately explains the variation in the data. The properties of the resulted global indexes are displayed in the first columns of Table 2. It could be observed that the variations in the levels of the second version are larger than the corresponding ones from the first computation; suggesting that this version could provides a more sensitive perspective. The highest values of the two global indexes are obtained in Jordan’s case while the lowest is corresponding to the values observed in Japan’s case. [Insert Table 2 about here] Furthermore, we grouped adherence in seven categories: Protestant (including Lutheran, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Evangelical, and others); Catholic; Orthodox; Muslim (this could be roughly breakdown into Sunni, Shiite, and other types but such delimitation is not taken into account); Buddhist (including Shinto and Taoist); Hindu (including Jains and Sikhs) and other religions (including Jew, Jehovah witnesses, Native, as well as other denominations). From the total sample representative for the countries selected in the analysis data set, 17.33% of the respondents had identified themselves as Protestant, 23.59% as Catholic, 14.30% as Orthodox, 17.20% as Muslim, 4.44% as Buddhist, 3.26% as Hindu and 4.85% as other religions. The sample represents 69.23% of the total 2005-2008 World Values Survey sample. For assessing the direct impact of religion on democracy we are using as dependent variable the Democracy Index which captures various formal aspects of the democratic status. The Democracy Index is an index compiled by The Economist. It examines the democratic status of 167 countries, focusing on five general categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation and political culture. The countries are categorized into "Full Democracies", "Flawed Democracies", "Hybrid Regimes" (all considered democracies), and "Authoritarian Regimes" (considered dictatorial). The Democracy Index is a kind of weighted average based on the answers of 60 questions, all distributed into the five mentioned categories. Each answer is translated to a mark, either 0 or 1, or for the three answer alternative questions, 0.5. The five category indices, which are listed in the report, are then averaged to find the Democracy Index for a given country. Its level determines the country classification, as quoted: 1) Full democracies - scores of 8 to 10; 2) Flawed democracies - scores of 6 to 7.9; 3) Hybrid regimes - scores of 4 to 5.9; 4). Authoritarian regimes - scores below 4. In our sample, 27% of the countries could be classified as “"Full Democracies"” and 15% as "Hybrid Regimes" while only 10% are "Authoritarian Regimes" and the most consistent part is represented by "Flawed Democracies" (41%). This index includes several elements relevant to the adopted definition of democracy, since it seeks to reflect not only the stance of formal architecture of democratic mechanisms, but also the effectiveness of political arrangements susceptible to ensure the autonomy of civil society from political inference and the equality of participation to political processes. However, the index does not provide enough details on social recognition of various types of individual rights and, thus, it cannot account for the relationships between these rights playing an important role in our approach to the definition of democracy. Thus, the results can count, only at a very general level, for a completely concordant way to measure the democratic status in a particular society. Thus, from the point of view of our analysis, this index provides rather a “black box” assessment of democratic performances, since it allows us to evaluate if a country has achieved the necessary mix of entitlements for free political actions, but does not say much on the exact contents of such mix. 4.2. The Impact of Religion on Democracy We are testing our hypothesis on a set of 41 developed and developing countries with a large variety of political institutions and mechanisms. Our dependent variables are the country’s ranks in our dataset for the Democracy Index as well as for its components. As explanatory variables, we are considering our four descriptors of the relevant aspects of religion and two versions of the Global Religion Index. We use as control variable the per capita real GDP based on prior evidences in the literature for its association with democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2005, Barro, 1996, Shen, 2002). The regressions involve instrumental variables in order to allow for a potential endogeneity of per capital GDP with respect to democracy. The set of the instrumental variables is composed by (shares in GDP formation): the general government final consumption expenditure as a proxy for the public sector importance in the economic system; gross capital formation which is designed to capture the technological base of the economic system and the internal propensity to invest; total value added by services sector as a proxy for the structure of economy; and the Index of Economic Freedom scores for 2007 to describe the legal and institutional economic environment. We argue that differences in these variables can explain the differences in economic performances, but they are unlikely to directly be relevant for cross-section non-uniformity of democracy levels. The estimations replace the log of per capita GDP (average values for a 1990-2007 time span) ranks with the fitted values from a first-stage regression. This first-stage equation has the log of per capita GDP as the dependent variable and has as independent variables the four instruments. The idea of this instrumental-variable procedure is to isolate the effects of economic development on democracy, rather than the reverse. The estimations give equal weight to each country. We also use White robust covariances estimators assuming that the errors are contemporaneously (cross-sectionally) correlated (period clustered). The method treats the regression as a multivariate one, and computes robust standard errors for the system of equations. The estimator is designed to accommodate arbitrary heteroskedasticity and it is particular relevant for our estimations due to the large heterogeneity of data. The results are reported in Table 3. [Insert Table 3 about here] The first relevant result consists in that religion has a negative impact on democracy. Both global indexes of religion are negatively and significantly correlated with democracy indexes, but positively with all the other variables. This finding supports approaches as the life-cycle religious participation profile in a rational-choice perspective based on Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Since we do not use timevarying data we cannot conclude directly that this is an effect of a secularization process. However, we tend in a certain extend to agree with McCleary and Barro (2006:62) that “secularization can be seen as a gradual tendency”. Particularly, it could be noticed that the religion concentration affects statistically significant all the dependent variables with the exception of the political participation and civil liberties. One possible explanation is that the absence of religious pluralism does affect the religious beliefs and behaviors and their translations in political practices. However, religion concentration is negatively correlated with the global democratic status, the functioning of government and the political culture. In other words, a monopolistic supply of religious products contributes to a decrease in the relative social preference for politic pluralism and politic competition: the rejection of religious / cultural heterogeneity is associated with a rejection of political diversity. Not surprisingly, a greater level of the Index of Religious Behavior is positively and significant associated with a higher level of democracy rank in the sample. Assimilation of religious ethics in the framework of social behaviors could support a democratic culture and enhance the pluralist functioning of the political mechanisms. The interference between religion and democracy could harm the democratic mechanisms and limit the electoral processes and civil liberties. In the mean time, a religious motivated bureaucracy could be relatively more efficient since its members will take into account not only a politically motivated system of rewards and costs for their actions, but also a religious one. There does not emerge a significant connection between Index of Religion Social Role and the political participation or political culture. One possible explanation for these findings is that the religious institutions are frequently developing parallel non-political networks for their social actions through them mobilizing the believers and substituting the political involvement. Such argument could partially be connected to Verba et al. (1995) who posit that variation in political participation could be explained by the differences in the acquisition of civic skills through different civil society institutions and, in particular, the religious ones. But this process varies according with the internal functional and dogmatic structure of religious institutions and does not imply a uniform impact of religion on the involvement in political life. Hence, our dataset includes several countries with high levels of political participation (Germany, Australia, Canada, Finland or Bulgaria) and lower social role of religious institutions as well as countries with low level of participation and religion’s social importance (Spain, Sweden, Norway or Ukraine and Vietnam). The Index of Spirituality is negatively correlated with the global level of democracy and civil liberties and positively correlated with political participation. For the other dependent variables, there is no statistically significant association with this index. Such a result could be linked to the impact of a greater focus on meanings and values search on social relationship, the development of the communities and hierarchy of human needs. The shift from Protestantism to other religious denominations is correlated to a decrease in the global level of democracy and political participation; the others dependent variables are not significantly influenced by the denomination. Overall, it appears that religion matters for democracy, but various aspects of religion exercise a nonuniform impact on the dependent variables. There can be formulated a concern about the robustness of this result in respect to the manner in which the degree of democracy is estimated. In other words, a more “narrow” or “broader” institutional or functional emphasis in democratic measures could be sensitive to the stability of the evaluated association between religion and societal status. 4.3. An Indirect Robustness Check with Other Measures of Democracy In order to provide at least an indirect robustness check of our results, we evaluate the effects of choosing other measures of democratic status. Table 4 reports estimations of the connections between the religion indexes and various measures of the global democratic stance for the countries included in the dataset. [Insert Table 4 about here] All the regression have been carried out by adding to the instrumental variable already used a dummy for the ex-communist countries in order to control for the heterogeneity of the methodologies involved in the estimation of democracy. While the communist period had affected all the components of the religious life, this effect appears to be only a temporary one, since there could be found a considerable rebound in religion in the ex-communist countries. However, from the institutional point of view, the impact of the communist regime could be more persistent due to the necessity of institutional reconstruction of religion as well as of democratic infrastructure. It could be argued that for the excommunist countries the framework of the interrelations between religion and democracy was substantially modified and so the consistency of the use of different democracy measurement methodologies could be altered. The results are quite puzzling. For instance, there could be find a negative and statistical significant association between the religious global indexes and Polity IV project measures but a positive and yet significant one between these indexes and Vanhanen's Index of Democracy and respectively Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes provided by Freedom House. Several explanations could be advanced for such output. A short list of them could include: The Vanhanen's Index of Democracy is focused on political participation and electoral processes so that it appears that country with medium to high level of religiosity such as Italy or Turkey but also others like the ex-communist Bulgaria, Poland, Romania or Moldova displays more or almost the same degree of “democracy” that United States, Canada or Japan; Despite their more complex methodology, with an important emphasis on institutional elements of democracy, the Political Rights and Civil Liberties displays more or less similar features with almost the same outliers for countries like Italy, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine or Ghana and Trinidad and Tobago which are reported to have close values of democratic characteristics close to the mature Western democracies; From such observations, it could be argued that the mentioned measures of democracy are able to capture the institutional aspects of political architecture and the electoral processes but is still an open question about how much these measure are reflecting the de facto functional infrastructure of a democratic society. Secondly, it appears that there is a strong and stable negative correlation between the Index of Religion Social Role and the various measures of democracy: the more able is religion considered to supply answers to the social problems in a country, the less this country democratic appears to be regardless the methodology used to estimate the level of democracy. Through, it could be presumed that the religion monopole on societal life acts like an inhibitor for the development of the democratic institutions and mechanisms. Of course, this result could not be use for answering to the question if such loss in representative democracy quality is not counterbalanced in religious countries by the adoption of some alternative forms of civil society’ participation to social and political issues. Thirdly, a correlative positive and robust relationship is the one manifested between the Index of Religious Behavior and the involvement measurements for the level of democracy: the more the citizens of a country are involving themselves in organized religious practices, the more are they are willing to accept the specific institutional arrangements of an representative democracy. Such an output should be correlated with the less clear finding that the extent of religious concentration is negative correlated with the democracy indexes (except for the Vanhanen's Index of Democracy and Freedom House’ Civil Liberties ones). Thus, is there is achieved a certain degree of religious competition in the conditions of a “sufficient” demand for religious products it is less possible that a single denomination with possible non-democratic doctrines to influence a large number of civic behaviors. Of course, one crucial aspect concerns the nature of the doctrinal corpuscle and practices of a significant or dominant religious denomination. For instance, a country like Norway with a 62.6% share of Protestant denomination subsequently displays a high level of democratic status regardless the methodology used to describe this status. The religious concentration as a single variable has only a limited capacity to explain to relative preference for democratic systems without a more detailed description of the religious demand and supply. Fourthly, there is a certain negative interrelationship between the Index of Spirituality and democracy indexes (again with the exception of Vanhanen's Index of Democracy): the more spiritual issues are included in the cultural paradigm, the less a society prefers the representative democracy. This statement does not imply that democracy is only a pragmatic social arrangement rejected by more “spiritual” societies. There could not be a democracy without a social acceptance of its fundamental values directly incorporated in paradigm up to a certain threshold and as a consequence without a conscientious effort to provide senses for personal and social existence . Such result could be more related to a shift toward individualistic points of view and more fragmentation of the societal coagulation processes with the increase in the focus in “here and now” approaches of life. Again, such a thesis should not be considered in an absolute sense. On one hand, peoples could be stimulated to reflect more on the meaning of life in conditions of a short life expectation, a low level of “rational” education and in situations when they feel that there are few opportunities for personal fulfillment. On the other hand, is religion itself which could provide answers on this topic so that if there is a high level of religiosity it compensates for the personal efforts in attributing sense to our lives. However, this last argument is less supported by data since almost all countries with high level of religiosity have also at least medium to high levels for Index of Spirituality (maybe with the exception of Mali). Fifthly, one of the most striking results insensitive to the changes in the methodology of measuring the democracy is that Protestantism is a clear ground for both representative and direct types of democratic regimes and that the relative preference for democracy diminish in non-Christian denominations countries. Of course, such outcome should be corrected with the unequal weight of different religions in the data sample but still there seems to be a certain evidence for the Weberian argument. In the context of these results, there appears that there are two other particular issues. The first issue is related to the fact that all mentioned indexes are measuring, in a way or other, the representative type of democracy. Or it is interesting to see if the direct democratic forms are also interrelated with religion. Column 6 of Table 4 reports the linkages between the religion indexes and a direct democracy index build on data concerning the legal provisions about referendums, citizen initiatives and recalls at different levels, the topics which could be subject of such referendums and the usage of referendum mechanisms since 1980 provided by Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. By direct democracy we understood a system in which the social decisional sovereignty is lodged to the civil societies in all the relevant matters for the social processes. The associated mechanisms are: (a) referendums, which are votes on a specific single issue or piece of legislation (; (b) citizen initiatives, whereby citizens can propose new legislation or constitutional amendments; and (c) recall, under which citizens can force a vote on whether to oust an incumbent elected official. The common characteristic of these mechanisms is that they all place more power directly in the hands of voters, as opposed to elected representatives. But it should be noticed that in practices this pure type of democracy is in the best case intent but not realized as a fully operational societal framework. Rather the societies which emphasis such democratic design are deliberative democracy which incorporates elements of both direct democracy and representative democracy. So that, the Direct Democracy Index should be seen as a measure of the degree in which a society accepts to incorporate direct democracy elements into its political mechanisms. The output of the system suggests that there could be found a negative interaction between economic development and the relative preference for direct democracy and, correlatively, a positive one with the religiosity. The first finding could be partially explained by some historical factors specific for mature economies and societies. More exactly, it could be argued that the “traditional democracies” has been evolving like representative democracy’ projects and the outcome was stable enough over time in order to be preserved (with various adjustments). In the mean time, we could presume that the emergent societies and / or the not fully consolidate democracies could find in the direct democracy mechanisms a way to compensate and / or to reduce the costs of the institutional construction for the infrastructure of a representative democracy but we do not have data to support this idea. The second finding could be enlighten by the observation that, since that Switzerland is not included in the dataset, countries with high Direct Democracy Index are represented by Orthodox and Catholic dominant denomination ones (like Peru, Serbia, Guatemala, Italy or Poland and Slovenia). A possible explanation could subsist in the emphasis that both Orthodoxy and Catholicism are placing on communion – a an especially close relationship of Christians, as individuals or as a Church, with God and with other Christians, relationship which could be translated into a strong communitarian sense which serve as ground to the preference for direct form of the community consultation in a larger spectrum of social and political issues. Of course, this argument is not complete since a medium to high level of index could be found for non-Christian Buddhist dominant countries like Thailand or Korea. However, such line of argumentation could be supported by the observation that according to our results a higher level of religious concentration stimulates the adoption of direct democracy elements. Thus is could be argue that this concentration is a stimulus for the communitarian spirit and for a larger autonomy of local structures. Supplementary, the Index of Religious Behavior and the Index of Religion Social Role appear to be negative correlated with the Direct Democracy Index which could be explained by the importance of individual actions in more “social secularized” societies. In other words, there is a certain consistency in assuming that factors as “destiny” or “predetermination” are less important in explaining the output of personal acts and also that religion could not provide answers to the social problems and simultaneous to give up only with limitations the control over the social decisions to representatives eventually perceived to form a “political aristocracy” (or a “benevolent technocracy” or a “omniscient bureaucracy” or a similar term designed to referrer to an “exogenous” specialized structure). Overall, it seems that a religious ethic which emphasis systematic “correct” interactions between individuals and thus shorter societal interspaces is a strong support for the emergence of direct democracy mechanisms. But the analysis is only partial since it not includes a balanced comparative approach of the relative efficiency of religious and non-religious networks through which the citizens gain and exchange information and engage themselves in social actions. A second particular issue is one about the effectiveness of the democratic mechanisms, effectiveness which in a narrow sense could be synthesized by the degree of participation to the political processes. Column 7 of Table 4 shows the correlations between the religious indexes and the average political participation rate based on the data provided by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. It results that an increase in the religiosity is associated with a higher participation to the electoral processes. Of course, this outcome should be more clearly explained. For instance, Djupe and Grant (2001: 311) are arguing that to the extent that religion is positively associated with political participation is much more related to the role of churches in “recruit[ing] parishioners to participate in politics” and in creating the perception among members of a common set of political norms and expectations that would encourage participation. Indeed, churches are “civil” (i.e. non-political) structures and there could be through their specific channels a mobilization for the political life together with other non-religious organizations of the civil society. And some churches have significant potential for social mobilization. Supplementary, it could be argued that if there are some monopolistic characteristic of the religious supply (i.e. a high denominational concentration) it is much easier for a particular denomination to mobilize a large share of the citizens and to support their involvement in politic life (of course, if the utility of such denomination is increased by the maximization of the degree of participation for its believers). Our data does not support such an argumentation since there appears to be a negative (and not yet consistent) relationship between the Index of Religious Concentration and the participation. But there is only a point. Another one is the extent to which a certain set of religious beliefs and practices are encouraging the individuals for selfengagement in the political processes. As Patterson (2005:149) finds in the examination of political life in Latin America: “the primary cleavage in political participation was not between Catholics and Protestants but between the devout and the not devout.” Still, in our data appears a manifestation of both type of cleavages since the denomination variable is positively and statistical significant correlated with the political participation. In highly developed countries which largely are Protestants or Catholics (or a combination between these two denominations), the electoral apathy is (up to a certain level) a wide phenomena. Au contraire, in the new emergent democracies (which have a lower share of Christian denominations) the electoral processes are still attracting the citizens. Since in our opinion the electoral absenteeism is the output of a multi-periodic process, a cross-section analysis of religion and democracy could not explain why the attractiveness of democracy fades out in the mature societies. We could only status that: 1) there is such a process and 2) this affects especially the historical democracies (based in Protestants or Catholics countries). It is interesting to note that there was found a positive and relevant connection between the religious behavior and the tendency to vote: the more somebody acts in a religious formal way the more is likely to participate in electoral processes. This result is somehow different from other findings in literature. For instance, Thornton and Kent (2009:9) conclude for a set of Latin America countries that:” Church attendance was not a predictor of the other forms of participation (voting, contacting, or campaigning)”. Such a difference could be explained by both the facts that our dataset incorporate also non-Christian countries with a different pattern of religious behavior (more exactly, with a different content of what it means a “religious life”) and also that there are significant differences among the countries in the content of political participation beyond the existence of eventually formal similar electoral mechanisms. Relatively surprising, the participation decrease with the increase of Index of Religion Social Role: despite the fact that citizens believe that religion could provide answers to social problems and that they are requiring more members of public authorities with religious beliefs, they are involving themselves less in politic occasions. But such a paradox could be only a partial one since it could be recalls that a higher level of the belief in the social role of religion could have an adverse effect on democracy and thus could reduce the opportunities to exercise the right to vote. The Index of Spirituality seems to act on the same way on political participation as on direct democracy: an increase in the concerns about the meaning of life stimulates a higher involvement in the political life as a result of a proactive attitude toward the social problems. 5. Concluding Observations, Limits and Further Research We have focused in this analysis on the impact exercised by different aspects of institutional religious life on democracy. The empirical research relied on surveys data, and on four analytical indexes based on this data, indexes describing the processes of religion concentration, religious behaviors, and perception about the social role of religion, the importance of spiritual issues in the society, together with the dominant religious denomination, as well on two global indexes of religious status. The dependent variables are designed to reflect various aspects of democracy such as electoral process, functioning of government, political participation and culture or civil liberties. The main findings could be resumed as follows: ♦ The level of economic development is positively connected with higher levels of all the representative democracy measures but negatively with the relative societal preference for the adoption of some direct democracy mechanisms; ♦ There is a significant impact of religion on the global democratic status for all the measures of democracy involved in analysis, but this impact appears to be more ambiguous that it could be deduced from the theoretical framework. It could be found that for both overall religion indexes a higher level is associated with lower levels of The Economist’ Democracy Index and Polity IV project measures but also there is a positive and yet significant relationship between these indexes and Vanhanen's Index of Democracy and respectively Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes provided by Freedom House. Such differences could be attributed to the non-uniform aspects reflected by each measure of democracy but also to the existence of some outliers in the dataset. The religious variables constructed based on the World Values Surveys questions exercise a nonuniform influence on democracy dependent measures: ♦ First, the religious concentration tends to limit the various components of democracy: a monopolistic supply of the religious products is translated into a decrease of the relative social preference for politic pluralism and politic competition; ♦ Second, the Index of Religious Behavior is positively associated with a higher level of democracy: the religious ethic could support a democratic culture but does not appears correlated with efficiency of the public authorities nor with political participation as it is this measured by The Economist. However, a more consistent religious behavior seems to increase the Turnout variable from the IDEA data so that there is some room for the idea that a higher religion concentration could in certain conditions support the political mobilization; ♦ Third, there is a certain negative relationship between our Index of Spirituality and democracy but this is less clear and stable among the various measures of the democratic aspects; ♦ Fourth, there is a certain cleavage between the societies with a dominant Protestant (and for certain aspects Catholic) denomination and the others in respect of democratic achievements; Several questions could be raised regarding these results. A brief list of them includes: 1. Our view is that religion is a cultural variable. Even more, we believe that in initial stages culture was religion in the sense that the construction of cultural paradigms was based on the “magic hypothesis” and only lately there was a development of non-religious cultural components. But even if the above fact was true, does the cultural generation of culture still holds in the “rational age” or there is a separation between the spheres of these variables? If there is such a separation, then religion is an autonomous factor (eventually generated by private revelation and accepted for various reasons by a group of individuals) which interact with culture. As Hofstede (1997, 16; emphasis in the original) argued: “Religious affiliation by itself is less culturally relevant than is often assumed if we trace the religious histories of countries, then the religion a population has embraced along with the version of that religion seem to have been a result of previously existing cultural value patterns as much as a cause of cultural differences”. In respect to this quote, we are arguing that this critical challenge – how to sort out the pattern of religion and culture and how to establish the causality between them- can be approached by carefully defining the concepts. Our line of constructing these definitions is based on the thesis that both religion and culture are structural providers of meanings and goals for individual lives. Of course, our view is not that “as mammals, the cat and the dog are in a certain sense alike” but that there are organic connections between religion and culture with the last as a generator for the first. It could be noticed that this issue could be address in an empirical framework by checking for a regular pattern of the religious and cultural variables. Since we are not testing directly this we could only hypothesis about the existence of such pattern. More generally speaking, our definition of religion is a not enough structured one. This is the result of the fact that our view of religion is basically derived from the cognitivism framework (a la Weber / Tocqueville) as a major strand of religion sociology but we also intend to incorporate some elements of the structural functionalism (in the line of Durkheim) in order to account for the capacity of religious institutions to act like social integration structures. In the absence of an organic synthesis, this attempt remains somehow vague and in fact at the operational level the proposed measures of religion are rather focused on institutional and behavioral level that on beliefs and attitudes. Also, it remains to be defended the selection of the religion variables considered susceptible to influence the dependent ones since there is no explicit methodology and theoretical support for their selection. 2. How much does our understanding of democracy (regarded as a combination of equality and freedoms, together with their borderlines) fits in the empirical configurations of the today democratic societies? It can be noticed that maybe one of the striking evidence is that these societies are characterized by significant differences as it concern both freedoms and equalities. Thus, the borderlines of entitlements could vary over the time or also along contemporaneous societies for a variety of reasons but this does not invalidate both these and the corresponding freedoms as critical condition for qualifying a society as democratic. 3. How reliable are our measures of religious variables? And what are they really reflecting? These variables are constructed based on World Values Surveys with the countries selected on the principle of all data required by the computation of variable being complete. There are some issue concerning both the data and the methodology. First of all, there is a rather intuitively methodology of classification. The prevalent criterion used was the doctrinal teaching about the salvific merit as the main dogmatic element considered in our explications and supplementary for Christian denominations the sola scriptura position. But such an approach is less systematic for non-Christian denominations and generally interpretable even for the distinction between Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox groups and other Christian religious structures. Second, these are not census data and their accuracy heavily depends on the representative tail of the included population. Third, it is not clear to which extent the methodology is able to generate unbiased measures of the corresponding variables. For instance, it could be considered that the weights used for discriminate between different scale components are rather arbitrary and can induce some distortions. In the mean time, the content of the features incorporated in the construction of the variables can be seen as debatable. Just to give an example, why thinking “about the meaning and purpose of life” is a “spiritual” act and not a component of the current religious practice? We could argue that such a meditation could be done inside or outside of an institutional religious framework but however the interpretation of the survey questions depends on respondents cultural referential. The World Values Surveys have the advantage comparative with other cultural data (e.g. Hofstede’ ones) that their formulation is more general and less Western culture based on but still there could be variations in the meaning attributed to different terms. Despite the involved argumentation, it could appear that our indexes are at the limit of some ad hoc constructions. Still, the factor analysis suggests that, at least partially, there is some internal coherence of these religious composites. Fourth, the data used are corresponding to a single wave of surveys so that there is not possible to have time-varying analysis. We could say that the religious variables are adjusted in “long cycles” so that these are “stable enough” but in conditions of cultural and societal openness this is rather a pious wish than a de facto situation. 4. How could be explained the fact that overall global religious indexes (and the economic development measure) exercise an impact on democracy variables in a manner consistent with the theoretical framework while this impact is more hieratic for the analytical ones? In general terms, these variables discriminate in a non-uniform manner between the countries with higher levels of democracy and the ones with medium and lower levels. One of the most plausible explanations is that the caeteris paribus conditions are not hold between different groups and subgroups of countries according to their economic development. 5. What about the caeteris paribus conditions? There appears to be some outliers for which one or other of the results is less conclusive and / or contrary to the theoretical prediction. Despite the usage of some instrumental variables, it could be argued that the list of control variables is too short and other possible determinants should be utilized in order to control for the variations in the particular situations of the countries included in the dataset. Of course, the composition of the sample is a heterogeneous one and there could be a complex set of influence factors from historical conditions, quality of institutional designs geography, technological infrastructure or resources to economic structures, mechanisms and performances. Thus the analytical framework should be improved by the inclusion of such factors. And these are only some limitations of the proposed analysis which can be subject of even further criticism. However, beyond all questionable points, our point is that there is a case for substantial inter-linkages between religion and democracy. References Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., Yared, P., 2005. “Income and Democracy”, NBER Working Paper Series, 11205, Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11205. Azzi, C., Ehrenber, R.G., 1975. “Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance.” Journal of Political Economy, 83 (1): 27–56. Bader, V., 2003. “Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism”, Political Theory, vol. 31, no. 2 (April 2003): 265-294. Barro, R.J., 1996. ”Democracy and Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 1 (March): 1-27. Barro, R.J., McCleary R.M., 2007. “Political Economy and Religion in the Spirit of Max Weber”, in Nee, Victor and Swedberg, Richard (Eds.) On Capitalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-5664-8 Berger, Peter L., 1967. “The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion.” Garden City: Doubleday, 1967; New York: Anchor Press, 1990. Bruce, S., 2006. Did Protestantism Create Democracy, in Anderson, J. (Ed.) Religion, Democracy and Democratization, New York, NY: Routledge. Coleman, J. (Ed.), 1996. The Individual in Political Theory and Practice, European Science Foundation, Oxford University Press: Oxford. Djupe, P.A., Grant J.T., 2001. “Religious Institutions and Political Participation in America.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40(2): 303-314. Driessen, M., 2010. “Religion, State, and Democracy: Analyzing Two Dimensions of Church-State Arrangements”, Politics and Religion, vol. 3, no. 1 (April 2010): 55-80. Durkheim, D.É., [1912] 2001. The elementary forms of religious life. (Cosman, Carol transl.) New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-283255-7. Eilinghoff, C., 2003. “Religious Information and Credibility”. German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Paper 8, Volume 2003. Hofstede, G., 1997. Cultures and Organizations (revised edition). New York: McGraw Hill. Iannaccone, L.R., 1988. “A formal model of Church and Sect.” American Journal of Sociology, Supplement, 94:241-268. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, E. von. 1952. Liberty or Equality. The Challenge of Our Time. London: Hollis & Carter. Kunin, S.D., 2003. Religion. The modern theories. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh McCleary, R.M., Barro R.J., 2006. “Religion and Economy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2):49–72. Nozick, R.,1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Patterson, E., 2005. Latin America’s Neo-Reformation: Religion’s Influence on Contemporary Politics, New York, NY: Routledge. Shen, J.-G., 2002. „Democracy and growth:An alternative empirical approach”, BOFIT Discussion Papers, No. 13, Available at: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/0303/0303008.pdf. Smith, A., [1776] 1965. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library. Smith, K.M., 2009, “ Differentiated Trust in Democratic Institutions Among Religious Minorities: Does the Size of the Largest Religious Group Matter?”, International Journal of Sociology, 39(1): 30-48. Stark, R., Bainbridge W.S., 1996. Theory of Religion. Rutgers University Press, ISBN 0813523303. Tocqueville, A. (Charles-Henri Clérel) de, [1835 /1840] 2001.Democracy in America.New York: Signet Classic / New American Library, ISBN 0-451-52812-3. Thornton, D., Kent, C., 2009. "Religion and Political Participation in Latin America" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, Available at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363845_index.html Weber, M. [1905]. Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. English translations: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Unwin Hyman, London & Boston, 1930; New York: Scribner's Press, 1958; Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith , 1988; New York: Penguin Books, 2002; American Studies archive from University of Virginia, Retrieved November, 20, 2009 (http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/WEBER/ cover.html); Max Weber Reference archive, Retrieved November, 24, 2009 ( http://www.marxists.org/reference/ archive/weber/index.htm); Abukum Academy, Max Weber archive, Retrieved November, 21, 2009 (http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/world/ethic/pro_eth_frame.html); Max Weber archive at the Pfeiffer University, Retrieved November, 24, 2009 (http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/DSS/Weber/PECAP. HTML); Max Weber texts at SocioSite, Retrieved November, 25, 2009 (http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/ DSS/Weber/PECAP.HTML). Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., Brady, H.E., 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ISBN 0-674-94293-0. World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association , Retrieved October, 15, 2009 (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. Zoski, K.W., Jurs, S. 1996. “An Objective Counterpart to the Visual Scree Test for Factor Analysis: The Standard Error Scree”. Educational and psychological measurement, 56(3): 443-451. Appendix Table 1: Factor Analysis of the Religion Indexes Loadings F1 Communality Uniqueness Index of Religious Concentration 0.082 0.007 0.980 Index of Religious Behavior 0.736 0.541 0.455 Index of Religion Social Role 0.817 0.668 0.331 Index of Spirituality 0.610 0.373 0.623 Model Independence Saturated Discrepancy 0.006 0.308 0.000 Chi-square statistic 0.266 12.645 --- Chi-square prob. 0.875 0.049 --- Bartlett chi-square 0.248 11.976 --- Bartlett probability 0.883 0.063 --- Parameters 8 4 10 Degrees-of-freedom 2 6 --- Table 2: Data statistic characteristics (Cells show un-weighted averages across countries) A) Explanatory variables Global Global Index of Index of Index of Index of Dominant Religion Religion Religious Religious Religion Spirituality religious Index I Index II Concentration Behavior Social Role Mean 38.01 90.36 28.44 51.84 29.44 42.31 2.63 Median 39.04 91.77 30.30 51.75 27.16 42.15 2.00 Maximum 59.97 141.96 49.40 94.80 54.22 64.30 7.00 Minimum 16.29 35.00 1.42 12.25 5.54 25.43 1.00 Std. Dev. 10.53 28.51 13.93 20.87 13.14 8.90 1.50 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 Cross denomination sections B) Dependent variables Democracy Electoral Functioning of Political Political Civil Index process government participation Culture liberties Mean 6.91 8.11 6.49 6.47 5.68 7.81 Median 7.06 9.17 6.79 6.25 5.56 8.53 Maximum 9.88 10.00 10.00 9.38 10.00 10.00 Minimum 2.53 0.83 0.79 4.38 1.67 1.47 Std. Dev. 1.77 2.47 2.15 1.55 1.82 2.12 41 41 41 41 41 41 Cross sections Table 3: Religious determinants of democracy and human development (ranks regressions) Cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in () Explanatory Democracy Electoral Functioning of Political Political Civil variable Index Process Government Participation Culture Liberties Log of per 1.099 0.894 0.952 0.622 1.140 0.904 capita GDP (0.017)* (0.020)* (0.086)* (0.064)* (0.043)* (0.044)* Index of -0.063 0.069 -0.085 0.052 -0.112 0.001 Religious (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.056) (0.056) (0.037)* (0.029) Index of 0.213 0.224 -0.034 0.265 0.171 0.211 Religious (0.044)* (0.020)* (0.116) (0.174) (0.093)*** (0.054)** Index of Religion -0.105 -0.207 0.169 0.149 -0.006 -0.153 Social Role (0.024)* (0.032)* (0.035)** (0.107) (0.071) (0.032)** Index of -0.061 -0.030 0.007 0.187 -0.073 -0.035 Spirituality (0.028)*** (0.023) (0.043) (0.066)** (0.0836) (0.020)** Dominant -0.719 0.286 -0.046 -1.676 -0.783 0.609 religious (0.193)** (0.230) (0.756) (0.690)** (0.609) (0.422) Global Religion -0.044 0.058 0.073 0.409 0.013 0.007 Index I (0.015)* (0.003)* (0.010)* (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.003)*** Global Religion -0.026 0.053 0.082 0.409 0.009 0.01 Index II (0.015)* (0.000)* (0.004)* (0.001)* (0.005)*** (0.005)*** Concentration Behavior denomination 2 R - for each equation (explanatory variables: : log of per capita GDP, the four religious indexes and denomination): ): 0.72; 0.40;0.51;-0.11;0.45;0.58. R2- for each equation (explanatory variables: : log of per capita GDP, Global Religion Index I and Global Religious Index II- in []):0.73 [0.73]; 0.35 [0.34];0.51 [0.52];0.07 [0.08];0.50 [0.50];0.53[0.53].*p<0.01, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). Notes: a. The Democracy, Electoral Process, Functioning of Government, Political Participation, Political Culture and Civil Liberties indexes as dependent variables in Columns 1 through 6 figures are the ones reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2008 Report (http://www.eiu.com). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes. The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in the following critical areas for democracy: 1. whether national elections are free and fair; 2. the security of voters; 3.the influence of foreign powers on government; 4. the capability of the civil service to implement policies. If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government category index. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes: 1. Full democracies —scores of 8-10; 2. Flawed democracies—score of 6 to 7.9 3. Hybrid regimes—scores of 4 to 5.9; 4 Authoritarian regimes—scores below 4. The values are obtained from experts (not clearly identified), public opinion surveys—mainly the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Latin American Barometer, and national surveys. b. The religious indexes are computed according to the methodology described by the relations (1) to (5). For all the variables, the figures represent the corresponding ranks (“1” for the highest value and “41” for the lowest). Each system treats the log of per capita GDP ranks as endogenous and uses as instruments: the general government final consumption expenditure; gross capital formation; total value added by services sector; the Index of Economic Freedom scores for 2007 and the other explanatory variables. c. The economic variables are from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008: http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx?IF_ActivepathName=P/VIII.%20Development%20indicators d. The Index of Economic Freedom s built upon analysis of 10 specific components (Business Freedom ;Trade Freedom; Fiscal Freedom; Government Size; Monetary Freedom; Investment Freedom; Financial Freedom; Property rights; Freedom from Corruption; Labor Freedom) of economic freedom, some of which are themselves composites of additional quantifiable measures by assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The 10 component scores are equally weighted and averaged to get an overall economic freedom score for each country. The index is provided by Heritage Foundationhttp://www.heritage.org/Index/. Table 4: Religious determinants of democracy –miscellaneous measures of the democracy status (ranks regressions) Cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in () Explanatory Polity IV Polity IV Vanhanen's Political Civil Direct Turnout variable Institutionalized Revised Index of Rights Liberties Democracy (IDEA) Democracy Combined Democracy (Freedom (Freedom (IDEA) House) House) Polity Score Log of per 0.121 0.133 0.748 0.111 0.110 -0.077 0.44 capita GDP (0.004)* (0.000)* (0.103)* (0.012)* (0.004)** (0.018)* (0.046)* Index of -0.003 -0.009 0.248 -0.011 0.0001 0.283 -0.047 Religious (0.002) (0.001)* (0.075)* (0.004)* (0.001) (0.028)*** (0.031) Index of 0.062 0.078 0.006 0.065 0.041 -0.044 0.177 Religious (0.005)* (0.004)* (0.125) (0.007)* (0.003)** (0.016)* (0.070)*** -0.018 -0.024 -0.399 -0.006 -0.006 -0.164 -0.233 Concentration Behaviour Index of (0.002)* (0.006)* (0.050)* (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.049)* (0.082)*** Index of -0.060 -0.072 0.189 -0.052 -0.034 0.126 0.400 Spirituality (0.002)* (0.007)* (0.045)* (0.006)* (0.003)** (0.032)* (0.072)* Dominant 0.240 0.280 1.443 0.046 0.014 2.682 1.878 religious (0.015)* (0.014)* (0.879)*** (0.094) (0.028) (0.271)* (0.413)* Global -0.003 -0.006 0.024 0.004 0.007 0.227 0.341 Religion (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.018)* (0.004)* Global -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.206 0.350 Religion (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)** (0.003)* (0.011)* Religion Social Role denomination Index I Index II Number of countries for each equation: 41; R2- for each equation (explanatory variables: log of per capita GDP the four religious indexes and denomination):0.62;0.61;0.73;0.59;0.65;-0.03;0.17; R2- for each equation (explanatory variables: log of per capita GDP, Global Religion Index I and Global Religious Index II- in []): 0.48 [0.48];0.42 [0.42]; 0.57 [0.57]; 0.43 [0.44]; 0.53 [0.53];-0.18 [-0.22];0.01 [0.04]; *p<0.01, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). Notes: a. Polity IV Institutionalized Democracy is an index provided by the Center for Systemic Peace-Polity IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). The institutionalized democracy elements considered are concerning: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive;3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The Polity IV Institutionalized Democracy is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the “autocracy” score from the “democracy” score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to 10 (strongly autocratic). The Revised Combined Polity Score is a modified version of the POLITY variable. It modifies the annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ““fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). For both indexes the figures used in the ranks’ computation are the ones corresponding to year 2006. b. The Vanhanen's Index of Democracy represents the data constructed by T. Vanhanen (http://www.prio.no/ CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/Polyarchy-Dataset-Manuscript/) in his study of polyarchy. The index is a combination of two variables: a) the degree of political competition and, respectively, b) the percentage of the population who actually voted in these elections which was used to indicate the degree of participation in the political processes. The “competition” indicator is biased to produce somewhat higher values for countries using proportional electoral systems than for countries using plurality or majority electoral systems. In order to restrict the effects of this bias, there is an upper limit of the smaller parties’ share that is used in the calculation (70%). In several countries using proportional electoral systems, the smaller parties' share rises higher than 70 percent, but the value of “competition” is not higher than 70 percent for any country. The two indicators — “competition” and “participation” — are combined into an index by multiplying them and dividing the outcome by 100. a low value for either of the two variables is enough to keep the index value low. A high level of participation cannot compensate for the lack of competition, or vice versa. The data used here are the ones for the last electoral cycle in each country (generally from the 2000 electoral processes). c. The Political Rights and the Civil Liberties indexes are reported by Freedom House (http://www. freedomhouse.org/). The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Raw points are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 points represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The political rights section also contains two additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?). For additional discretionary question A, 1 to 4 points may be added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, 1 to 4 points may be subtracted (the worse the situation, the more points that may be subtracted). The highest number of points that can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 10 questions). The highest number of points that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 15 questions). The total number of points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom corresponds to a range of total points. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free. The figures are corresponding to the 2007 values. d. The Direct Democracy index’ values represents own computation based on information supplied by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int/elections/dd/world_survey.cfm). The involved methodology implies to score the countries according to the next rules: 1 point if there are legal provisions for mandatory referendums -national level; 0.8 points if there are legal provisions for optional referendums- national level; 1 point if there are legal provisions for citizens’ initiatives- national level; 1 point if there are legal provisions for agenda initiatives- national level; 1 point if there are legal provisions for recall- national level; 1 point if the referendum results are binding always , 0.5 points if this is happened sometimes and 0 points if this is never happened; 0.75 points if both constitutional and other issues could be brought to a referendum, 0.3 point if only constitutional issues and 0.1 if only other issues could be subject of a referendum; 1 point for legal provisions at regional level; 1 point for legal provisions at local level; 1 point if there has been a national referendum since 1980 and 0 point otherwise. The index is the nonweighted aggregation of these scores (legal framework updated by the Institute for May 2009). e. Turnout represents the average political participation rate computed based on the voting age population as well as the number of registered voters as these are reported by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int). The voting age population figure includes an estimated number of all those citizens over the legal voting age while the registration rate comprises the actual number of people on the voters roll. The criteria for including elections in the database refer to: 1) the election has been held after 1945; 2) the elections are for national political office in independent nation states (with some exceptions); 3) there was a degree of competitiveness (that is, more than one party contested the elections, or one party and independents contested the elections, or the election was only contested by independent candidates); 4) the franchise was universal. For the European countries, data includes the elections for the European Parliament. The figures are a simple non-weighted average of the political participation rate. f. The religious indexes are computed according to the methodology described by the relations (1) to (5). For all the variables, the figures represent the corresponding ranks (with“1” for the highest value). If there are two equal values, the ranks in the democracy indexes are the same. All the regressions are including as instrumental variable a dummy which take the value of 1 for ex-communist countries and 0 otherwise together with the other mentioned variables.