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Persian Gulf Conflict: American Gunboat Diplomacy of the 1980’s By Randy Baker As American troops depart Iraq after a nearly 9 year conflict, it seems a natural time to reflect on our military involvement in the Persian Gulf region. Of course, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not our first foray in the area. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was a relatively brief, but well known, episode of our history. Following the cease-fire agreement from that war, U.S. forces maintained a significant presence in the region, to enforce both a trade embargo and two no-fly zones that were established to protect Iraqis from their own government. In 2003, a complicated and controversial decision was made to invade Iraq, as part of what was deemed a larger global "War on Terrorism". Regardless of the actual merits or conventional wisdom of such a decision, there can be little argument that Iraq had never abided by the terms of the 1991 cease-fire agreement and, as such, had been justifiably subject to military action throughout the 12 year interim period between the two wars. In fact, sporadic, low intensity action had taken place periodically during the inter-war period. Winding down on our two decades long conflict with Iraq, it might be easy to forget that our history of military involvement in the Persian Gulf did not begin with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As a veteran of the "First Gulf War", I remember people talking at the time about how they had never heard of Kuwait until we went to liberate them. If those people had watched the evening news over the preceding several years, they should have been more aware of Kuwait and all of the other key players in the Persian Gulf. The Navy's post-WWII operations in the Gulf began in 1948, when various Task Forces were organized to escort and monitor the increasing flow of traffic in the region by Fleet Oilers and chartered tankers picking up oil. In 1949, these operations were formally structured as Middle East Force. The United States established a more tangible and permanent foothold in the Persian Gulf in 1971, when the US Navy leased part of a former British naval base from the newly independent island nation of Bahrain. The strategic economic importance of the region by this era was unquestionable. In 1983, the Navy's Middle East Force was reorganized as United States Naval Forces Central Command, as an element of United States Central Command. It's area of responsibility includes the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The U.S. Fifth Fleet and a number of task forces fall under its operational control. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, tensions in the region rose sharply and American relationships became more complicated; a situation that has remained much the same until the present day. The Iran Hostage Crisis was the central event in the collapse of Iranian and American relations, which seemed compounded by a failed rescue attempt by the American military. The hostages were ultimately released, but formal diplomatic relations between the two countries have never been re-established and tensions have existed to varying degrees ever since. The revolution in Iran, however, proved to have a destabilizing effect beyond their relations with the United States. As a result of ongoing border disputes and a growing fear of an Iranian influenced insurgency among its own Shia population, Iraq launched an invasion of neighboring Iran in September of 1980. Given the United States relationship with Iran at the time, it is probably not surprising that American support was given to Iraq. The U.S. was among a number of suppliers that supported the Iraqi side, including the USSR. Iran was mainly supplied by China, North Korea and Libya. The situation for American military forces in the region became pricklier at the beginning of 1984, with the onset of what became known as the Tanker War. Initiated by the Iraqis, this phase of the Iran-Iraq War was intended to disrupt oil exports by both parties, as well as incoming supplies. Iraq further hoped that Iran would take the bait and make good on threats to close the Straits of Hormuz, knowing that this would provoke promised action by the United States. That did not happen, but meanwhile, civilian ships were being attacked in the Gulf, including those of noncombatant and neutral nations. While the ongoing Tanker War made U.S. Naval operations in the Persian Gulf more dangerous and tense, the Americans did not allow their alarm to take the form of any real action until 1987. After several attacks by Iran on their shipping, Kuwait requested assistance from the United States in escorting their vessels. The U.S. agreed and, in order to legally escort the ships, Kuwaiti tankers were registered and reflagged in the United States. This began what was known as Operation Earnest Will and its partially secret subcomponent, Operation Prime Chance. During this same period, however, a tragic incident occurred with the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, resulting in the death of 37 American sailors and another 21 wounded. Iraq claimed the attack was an accident; a case of mistaken identity. While the situation seemed suspect and answers were often less than satisfactory, the United States ultimately accepted Iraq's version of the story. Aside from anything else, the incident highlighted the dangers of operating in such close quarters in middle of someone else's shooting war. With the commencement of Operation Earnest Will, American’s relinquished their role as mere bystanders. Though they did not overtly enter the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had finally chosen to insert itself directly into the situation. Operation Earnest Will would become the largest Navy convoy operation since World War II. While, as a shipping escort operation, it was a primarily Navy mission, the broad operation included the involvement of all American military branches. Operation Earnest Will was conducted from July 1987 – September 1988. The Air Force provided AWACS for surveillance, as well as Combat Controllers for the Special Operations Forces involvement under Operation Prime Chance. Navy SEAL Platoons, Navy Special Boat Units and Army aviators from the 160th SOAR provided the majority of manpower for the SOF elements of these Operations. Escort duties were carried out by various frigates, destroyers and cruisers, supported by both aircraft carriers and amphibious dock landing ships. The first U.S. ships to take up escort duties were the USS Crommelin (FFG-37), USS Copeland (FFG-25), USS Kidd (DDG-993) and USS Fox (CG-33). On the very first escort mission, one of the reflagged tankers – Bridgeton – struck an Iranian mine. Initially, the Army helicopters operated from Navy frigates, moving from one ship to another to avoid allowing the Iranians to predict their movements. Though the helicopter units did participate in escort duties, the primary specialty of the 160th SOAR is night ops. Since the Iranians typically conducted their mine laying operations under cover of darkness, the 160th focused much of their attention on flying night missions. Among the ships to participate in Operation Earnest Will was the USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7). The Guadalcanal was on a routine deployment to the Mediterranean when it was diverted to the Persian Gulf, following the mining of Bridgeton. The Guadalcanal was tasked as a minesweeping platform, for which purpose it embarked the hastily deployed Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 out of Norfolk, Virginia. Additionally, the ship hosted both SEAL and EOD units, thus the ship was actively involved in both the Earnest Will and Prime Chance aspects of Persian Gulf operations. One of the more dramatic engagements of Operations Earnest Will and Prime Chance came in September of 1987 with the capture of the Iranian mine laying vessel, Iran Ajr. The USS Guadalcanal had encountered this ship during the course of its minesweeping operations. The Iran Anjr was a Japanese built landing craft, but was believed to be part of Iran’s mine laying activities. On September 21, U.S. forces tracked the ship and Army helicopters from the 160th SOAR were launched from the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) to take a closer look. When the pilots reported that they’d observed crewmembers aboard the Iran Ajr, they were ordered to “stop the mining”. The Nightstalkers of the 160th SOAR stopped the ship by firing guns and rockets. Despite coming under attack, the Iranians continued to push their mines overboard until a second assault by the helicopters put an end to their operation, forcing those left alive to abandon ship. At daybreak, a platoon of SEALS was sent from the Guadalcanal to board the Iran Ajr. Once the Navy took possession of the ship, nine mines were found remaining on deck, along with a number of arming mechanisms. This also marked only the second time since 1815 that the U.S. Navy had captured an enemy vessel on the high seas. The previous occasion was the capture of German U-505 during World War II. Patrol boats picked up 13 Iranian survivors out of the water, as well as 10 from a lifeboat. They were transferred to the Guadalcanal where the wounded were treated in the ship’s hospital. Eventually, the Iranians were repatriated to their home country. Members of Navy EOD Mobile Unit 5 scuttled the captured ship in international waters on September 26th. The captured colors from the Iran Ajr are now housed at the U.S. Navy Museum at Washington’s Navy Yard. The Navy had leased two oil rig servicing barges for use in the prosecution of Operation Prime Chance. These barges were designated Mobile Sea Bases and came into service in October 1987, being moored in the northern Persian Gulf, within 15 miles of each other. Operationally, they were set up as Naval Special Warfare Task Units, commanded a SEAL officer. Mobile Sea Base Hercules was manned by units from the U.S. East Coast, while Mobile Sea Base Wimbrown VII was manned by West Coast units. Each floating base consisted of two Mark III patrol boats, a SEAL platoon, an EOD detachment, Marines to provide security, Army MH-6 and AH-6 helicopter gunships and Black Hawk rescue helos. Air Force Combat Controllers were also present at both bases. On October 16th, the Iranian’s conducted a missile attack against a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, the M/V Sea Isle, while in Kuwaiti waters. Though it had been escorted by American warships, they had been detached at the time of the attack. The Silkworm missile struck the wheelhouse of the Sea Isle, causing significant damage to the vessel. More significantly, the American master of the ship, as well as 18 crewmembers was wounded in the attack. In retaliation, the U.S. launched Operation Nimble Archer against Iranian platforms in the Rashadat oil field. The attack was against two platforms that had been damaged a year before by the Iraqis. Since that time, they were no longer producing oil, but were being used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a base for military operations against commercial shipping. American ships involved in Operation Nimbel Archer included USS Thach (FFG-43), USS Hoel (DDG-13), USS Leftwich (DD-984), USS Kidd (DDG-993), USS John Young (DD-973), USS William H. Standley (CG-32), USS Ranger (CV-61) and USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7). Twenty minutes prior to taking action, the U.S. force radioed the platforms, warning the crews to abandon them. Then at 2 PM, four of the warships opened fire, shelling both platforms simultaneously. One of the platforms was boarded by SEALS, which they destroyed with explosives after collecting intelligence. According to some accounts, a third platform was later boarded and searched by SEALS. Aside from their mine laying operations, the Iranians actively used small boats to attack and harass shipping in the northern Gulf. These militarized oil platforms were commonly used as operating bases for such small craft operations. The Navy continued its escort duties into 1988, as well as SOF operations from Hercules and Wimbrown VII. On April 14th of that year, USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG25) was on escort duty when it struck a mine. The explosion opened a 25 foot hole in the ship’s hull, but resulted in no loss of life. Though the ship was nearly sunk, the crew managed to save her and was towed into port at Dubai on April 16th. Navy EOD divers recovered other mines from the area of the incident and were able to match the serial numbers to mines seized from the Iran Ajr several months earlier. With proof in hand of Iranian responsibility, a retaliatory operation was launched on April 18th. Operation Praying Mantis was the U.S. Navy’s strike against the Iranian Navy, in response to the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts. This engagement proved to be the largest U.S. naval surface action since World War II and marked the first use of anti-ship missiles by U.S. Navy ships. The Americans suffered two casualties during the battle; two Marine aviators whose helicopter crashed due into the Persian Gulf. On the Iranian side, there was a loss of 1 frigate sunk, 1 gunboat sunk, 3 armed speedboats sunk, 1 frigate damaged and 2 armed oil platforms damaged. This event is considered by naval analysts to have been decisive in establishing U.S. naval superiority in the Persian Gulf; a situation that remains to the present day. This major naval engagement continued through multiple episodes throughout the day before U.S. forces were order to de-escalate. The Iranians took advantage of the opportunity to disengage, as well. Throughout that night and into the next morning, both sides remained on alert and there were some near clashes, but further hostilities were avoided. When two days later, an American destroyer escorted a U.S. oiler through the Straits of Hormuz the Iranians made no attempt to contest the transit. Tensions remained high, but this particular conflict was deemed to be over. A month later, the USS Vincennes (CG-49) was tasked with the protection of the Roberts during the extraction of that vessel. Less than two months after its arrival in the Persian Gulf, the Vincennes infamously shot down a commercial airline flight; Iran Air Flight 655. While the Americans maintained that it was mistaken as an Iranian fighter jet, the Iranians contend that the civilian aircraft was intentionally shot down. Two hundred and ninety passengers and crew were killed aboard the airliner. The heightened tensions that existed in the Persian Gulf at that time were undoubtedly a factor in this tragic incident. Again, all of these American military actions took place against the back drop of the Iran-Iraq War. While the U.S. was a supporter of Iraq during this conflict, its own military operations were aimed at protecting American economic interests, rather than to directly influence the outcome of the war. In other words, there was no direct military coordination between the United States and Iraq. However, both Operation Praying Mantis and the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 are credited as major factors in Iran’s willingness to sign a cease fire in July 1988, heralding the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August. By the time it was over, it had become the longest sustained, conventional war of the 20th Century. The Americans brought a close to Operation Earnest Will about five months after the ceasefire. The Wimbrown VII Mobile Sea Base soon shut down, as well. Operation Prime Chance patrols continued from Hercules, though, until June of 1989.At that time, America’s quasi-war against Iran effectively ceased and some form of normalcy returned to American military operations in the region. A little more than a year later, the United States would find itself once again embroiled in the region, only this time on a firm war footing. The Iraqi government that it had so recently supported in its war against Iran had invaded its neighboring ally, Kuwait and was suddenly perceived as a further threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With widespread UN support, the United States began a massive mobilization to the Persian Gulf region, in order to affect the liberation of Kuwait. When the Coalition Forces, lead by the Americans, began squaring off against Iraq in August of 1990, they faced the 3rd largest standing army in the world at that time. Their ranks were still full of battle hardened veterans of a brutal, protracted war with Iran, not to mention that Iraq perceived itself as the victor in that conflict. They had a history of aggression, having initiated the war against Iran and now having invaded Kuwait; a country with which they had previously been on good terms. While the Americans were confident in their ability to win a war with Iraq, they had every reason to expect a stiff and bloody resistance. For U.S. naval forces, we were reminded that the last time Iraq had fired on an American warship, the missiles had gone undetected and resulted in the loss of nearly forty sailors. We were told that we would stay until the job was done. Like World War II, there were no planned rotations. Only in hindsight can we perceive the eventual rout that would go down as one of the quickest and most decisive victories in annals of war, but that’s the topic of another story.