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The Impermanent Impulse: Toward a Theory of Nihilism in Nietzsche’s The Will to Power Che-ming Yang, Assistant Professor Department of Foreign Languages & Literature National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan Two ideas are psychologically deep-rooted in man: self-protection and selfpreservation. For self-protection man has created God, on whom he depends for his own protection, safety and security, just as a child depends on its parent. For selfpreservation man has conceived the idea of an immortal Soul or Ātman, which will live eternally. In his ignorance, weakness, fear, and desire, man needs these two things to console himself. Hence, he clings to them deeply and fanatically. —Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (1959) Introduction There are always a lot of use and abuse of Nietzsche’s works, among which his posthumouslypublished work—The Will to Power (WP)—is one of the most thoroughly exploited works by the Nietzschean scholars. The notions nihilism, will to power, and eternal recurrence are those among which the Nietzsche reader uses and abuses most frequently. In this paper, I intend to focus on Nietzsche’s discussions of nihilism and will to power, as presented in The Will to Power. In WP Nietzsche elaborates intensively on the idea of nihilism and how it paralyzes the Western society. In addition, he considers will to power to be the way leading to man’s redemption from the abyss of nihilism, a godless cosmos. Besides, though Nietzsche vehemently attacks Buddhism as a form of “passive nihilism”; nevertheless, paradoxically, Nietzsche and Buddhism “bear ironic affinities” with each other (Morrison 126). For both of them emphasize “the centrality of humans in a godless cosmos and neither looks to any external being or power for their respective solutions to the problems of existence” (Loy 1998). In addition, though not a direct influential figure in postmodernism, Nietzsche happens to mark a prelude/forerunner to postmodernism with his questions of the conception of the transcendental ego/soul. Thus understood, if we put the Buddha and Nietzsche in the context of the postmodern, we could detect that their visions of nihilism reveal a skeptical attitude toward the conceptions of the transcendental ego or autonomous/unchanging subject/ego/soul; that is, their skepticisms toward self parallel the postmodern/deconstructionist view of the subject/subjectivity. Still, between Nietzsche and Buddhism there exists an extremely significant difference regarding the ideas of the subject—only the Buddha emphasizes the concept of Non-Self. Furthermore, Nietzsche declares that to redeem oneself from the abyss of “a godless universe, a world without any transcendent basis of values,” man can but establish new values through the assertion of his will (Loy 129), whereas the Buddha insists that nihilism is the natural law and that 1 willing is the origin of karmic vicious cycle (endless suffering) that can only be terminated by the vision of selflessness—the cease of willing/volition. Nietzsche’s focus on willing for more power happens to consolidate the idea of a self when he tries to find some way out for the self, on which the will is based, to escape nihilism. For Nietzsche the problem of existence is “overcoming nihilism, for Buddhism it is the unsatisfactory nature of our lives” (Loy 129)—to rid oneself of the suffering inherent in one’s karmic vicious cycle. Accordingly, this paper aims to explore with close scrutiny The Will to Power (WP) by focusing on the Nietzschean centrality of humans in a godless cosmos/nihilism and his contribution to the formation of postmodernism; then, to compare the Nietzschean nihilism with Buddhist voidness/nihilism ( ); and finally, to contrast Nietzsche’s endeavors in overcoming nihilism with the Buddhist insight into man’s redemption from the nihilistic karmic “vicious cycle” (samsara ). By so doing, I intend to show how both of them bear “ironic/paradoxical affinities” in marking an impermanent impulse toward postmodernist/deconstructionist view of the subject, despite Nietzsche’s constant misunderstanding of Buddhism. Regardless of some details of differences, early Buddhism (based on the Pali Buddhist canon, whose central tenets of karma are fundamental Buddhist concepts and thus are free from denominational dispute)1 and Nietzsche’s thought reveal a common tendency to shift focus away from “speculative metaphysics” to a “practical ethic of self-redemption” (Rajapakse 333). Nietzsche as Postmodernist To further explore Nietzsche’s contribution to the formation of postmodernism, we have to construe postmodernism as a continuity rather than a discontinuity of modernism, for it is not a new phenomenon that breaks completely away form modernism, though it does aim to subvert some modernist discourses. Though adopting some modernist theories, postmodernism still keeps a “critical distance” from the concepts it incorporates (Hutcheon 1985, 18). Likewise, Nietzsche uses and abuses, constructs and then deconstructs the idea of nihilism while diagnosing modernity as nihilism, which is tied to his philosophical concern with the ways in which humanity reproduces its ideal conditions of existence (cultural production), namely, our will to power. Or, to put it in Lyotard’s discourse of postmodernism, Nietzsche’s nihilism marks an “incredulity toward metanarratives [grand narratives]”—the metaphysical conceptions of the Christian Morality/God or the Ultimate Truth that traditional Western philosophers have been looking for: This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy [my italics] and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. (1984, xxiv) In other words, Nietzsche’s attack on the Christian Absolute/God and the Church is no more than “an incredulity toward the metanarrative”—God as the Ultimate Truth of the Universe. Nonetheless, while deconstructing/challenging the power/existence of God, Nietzsche has to incorporate the idea of nihilism into his own discourse in explaining that we are living in a godless and ever-changing cosmos in which nothing is permanent and logical (meaninglessness). In so doing, not only echoing the Buddhist philosophy of voidness/nihilism, Nietzsche’s manipulation of nihilism actually parallels 2 the postmodern contradictory phenomenon in that he “uses and abuses, installs and then subverts, the very concepts it challenges” (Hutcheon 3, 1988). Nietzsche’s Use and Abuse of Nihilism There are always a lot of arguments regarding the definition(s) of the ambiguous “nihilism,” including Nietzsche’s own discourses of this topic. In other words, the use and abuse of nihilism have been prevalent in the discourses on its validity and definitions among the Nietzschean scholars. In denying the validity and power of the Christian God and modes of morality as well as “all values,” Nietzsche compares the invalidity of Christian God/Morality to that of Buddhism, to which he is also strongly opposed, for he mistakenly takes Buddhism as a religion of “passive nihilism.”2 However, paradoxically, it seems inevitable that while constructing a proposition to de/construct a theory of nihilism, Nietzsche needs to sanctify nihilism as the “Absolute Truth.” Otherwise, his “attempt at a revaluation of all values” would be doomed to failure. Thus, he takes nihilism as “the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to its end” (WP: 411): But in order to endure this type of extreme pessimism [nihilism]3 (it can be perceived here and there in my Birth of Tragedy) and to live alone “without God and morality” I had to invent a counterpart for myself. (WP: 91) Now a contradictory phenomenon comes into being. Let’s observe: If everything is nihilistic/void, then on what basis can Nietzsche establish his proposition? For if you say all things are nihilistic or meaningless, then your statement that “all things are void” must be void too. Furthermore, if Nietzsche or anyone insists that his/her own statement is valid because it reveals the Truth of all things, then there arises the following discordance: “some things are void, and some other things, non-void.” For this no satisfactory explanation could be given to resolve that discordance. Hence, this statement that all things are void is not valid. To cope with this perplexing reasoning argumentation, we have to resort to the insight of a Buddhist saint and scholar—Nāgājuna (2nd B.C., founder of the Buddhist school Mādhyamika [voidness])—so as to realize that the double-directed negation is a seemingly paradox that not only marks the fact that everything is “devoid of an intrinsic nature” but also brings about a resolution of its self-contradictory proposition: If my statement does not exist in the combination of the cause and the conditions, or independently of them, then the voidness of the things is established because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. If my statement does not exist in its cause and in its conditions . . .[a restatement of the above objection statement], it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of min is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. (Vigrahavyāvartani: II, xxi).4 Viewed from the above Buddhist reasoning argumentation on voidness, Nietzsche happens to echo the discourses of nihilism/voidness proposed by one of the most distinguished Buddhist theoreticians—Nāgājuna. According to Nāgājuna, this kind of negation of negation is not selfcontradictory at all. Rather, it serves to verify the voidness of things in that “all things are devoid of 3 an intrinsic nature,” because Nāgājuna’s Absolute refers to neither the world nor outside the world. It is the “intrinsic nature of the world.” According to Bhattacharya, the translator of Vigrahavyāvartani, Nāgājuna’s view of things is not nothingness but that “the things in the world are not as they appear to us” (91).5 Besides, a dilemma of the modern man emerges after we deconstruct/murder God, as Kulananda indicates—“having wiped away the horizon between God and Man, we have also begun to lose the distinction between certainty and bigotry, conviction and prejudice” (82). Just like the madman that is embodied in Nietzsche, we are all greatly bothered by a strong sense of loss after we choose to deny the existence of God and his Law/Morality: Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: ‘I seek God!’ . . . ‘Where is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? . . . who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? . . . God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. (The Gay Science: 125 ) This is a widely and frequently quoted passage. Truly, we can hardly deny that Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God is the most significant and controversial issue in Western history. Almost every aspect has been influenced by it. Consequently, a human dilemma thus comes into being, as Kulananda rightly puts it, “although we may not mourn God’s passing, perhaps we can see that with his death we have lost something else as well” (81), namely, we have thus wiped away “the entire horizon”—the foundation of faith and criteria of moral judgment that we have been attached to for thousands of years. And this happens to be an irresolvable contradictory phenomenon that is characteristic of postmodernism. From then on, man has been adopting an even more skeptical attitude toward moral judgment, for if there is no God, who has the right to “stand in judgement over anyone else” (Kulananda 83). Moreover, if there is no Creator of the Universe who watches over all and thus manipulates everything (Logos), what is the Universal Law? In Nietzsche’s view, a radical nihilist even denies the necessity of logic in the “world of becoming”—“That is, if you will, illogical; but the nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being logical” (WP: 24). Further, Nietzsche points out the absurdity and uselessness of logic/meaning: The “meaninglessness of events”: belief in this is the consequence of an insight into the falsity of previous interpretations, generalization of discouragement and weakness—not a necessary belief. The immodesty of man: to deny meaning where he sees none. (WP: 599) In fact, Nietzsche’s argument about the “the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence” and denial of any Absolute certainty/truth (“That the highest values devaluate themselves”) happens to correspond to Buddhist view of the world of becoming, since the core of the Dharma (or doctrine, as taught by the Buddha Shakyamuni ) lies in the belief that everything is void because of its lack of an intrinsic nature in itself and thus is always transient and changing. Consequently, Nietzschean nihilism bears a great deal of “ironic/paradoxical affinities” with Buddhist nihilism, 4 though Nietzsche keeps devaluating Buddhism. The correspondence between their theories of nihilism reveals a universal impermanent impulse that will be further explored in the next section in the illumination of Buddhist voidness/nihilism. Anatta/Selflessness ( )/Buddhist Voidness (Nihilism ): The Impermanent Impulse ( ) Obviously, just like many people, Nietzsche has been wrongly interpreting Buddhist voidness/nihilism as a kind of pessimistic view of the world as nothingness: Buddhistic tendency, yearning for Nothing. . . . A certain spiritual weariness . . . has reached the most hopeless skepticism regarding all philosophy, is another sign of the by no means low position of these nihilists. Consider the situation in which the Buddha appeared. Chief symptoms of pessimism . . . the ‘religion of pity,’ Buddhistic premovement . . . (WP: 1, 55, 82). In fact, the Buddha always holds a realistic and objective view of the nature of all things: Buddhism is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. If anything at all, it is realistic, for it takes a realistic view of life and of the world. It looks at things objectively. . . . It does not falsely lull you into living in a fool’s paradise, nor does it frighten and agonize you with all kinds of imaginary fears and sins. It tells you exactly and objectively what you are and the world around you is. (Rahula 17) The reason for Nietzsche’s misunderstanding of Buddhism may be due to the Buddha’s emphasis of dukkha (literally means “suffering”). It is generally admitted that the term dukkha in the First Noble Truth (the first principle of the Four Noble Truths [ ]—the heart of Buddhism)6 bears an apparent meaning of ordinary suffering. But in addition it also includes “imperfection,” “impermanence,” “emptiness,” or “insubstantiality” (Rahula 17). The Buddha argues in the First Noble Truth (Dukkaariyasacca) that in our world, all physical and spiritual phenomena are no more than the conditioned “combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies, which may be divided into five groups or aggregates”—the Five Aggregates ( )—Aggregates of Matter , Sensation ( ), Perceptions , Mental Formations , and Consciousness ( ). The Buddha insists that any being or an individual or “I” is only a “convenient name or a label given to the combination of these five groups” (Samyutta-nikaya 421). The five aggregates are impermanent. The Buddha thus claims, in his very first sermon, that “Whatever is impermanent is dukkha . . . In brief the five Aggregates of Attachment are dukkha . . . They are in a flux of momentary arising and disappearing” (Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta 9). Consequently, the statements regarding nihilism that Nietzsche uses to defy Buddhism [based on his wrong conception of Buddhism as “endless nothingness”—“the most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the “meaningless”) eternally! The European form of Buddhism . . .” (WP: 55)] happen to correspond to Buddhism’s nihilistic view of reality as impermanency, for instance, Nietzsche’s remark about the “uncertainty” of his time: Disintegration characterizes this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing stands firmly on its feet or on a hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow is dubious. (WP: 57) 5 The Buddha maintains that all things in the world are conditioned, relative, and interdependent because of their lack of an intrinsic nature—the Buddhist theory of relativity—and are thus transient. The Buddhist Theory of Relativity is the principle of “Dependent/Relative Origination” ( which could be illustrated in “a short formula of four lines”7: ), When this is, that is; (When A is, B is; ) This arising, that arises; (A arising, B arises; ) When this is not, that is not; (When A is not, B is not; ) This ceasing, that ceases. (A Ceasing, B ceases. ) (Rahula 53) With this formula, we can judge that the Buddha strongly denies the existence of an omnipresent or omnipotent God, the Supreme Creator/Ruler of the Universe and the Ultimate Truth, let alone an individual, independent Soul, Self, or Ego, for all of them refer to “a permanent everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world” (Rahula 51). All things in the world are just not what they appear to us. In the godless universe, the only temporary “certainty” is the assertion or functioning of our “will.” In next section, while defining will to power, I will elaborate on the correspondences between Nietzsche’s will to power and Buddhist Theory of Relativity—Dependent Origination. The Will to Power versus Aggregate of Mental Formations “Will” and “Will to Power” are both ambiguous and complicated ideas. Nietzsche also elaborates enormously on how the will to power works in the godless cosmos. Despite Nietzsche’s varied definitions of will to power, Morrison argues that there are correspondences between Nietzschean ideas concerning the will to power and self-overcoming and the Buddhist notions of desire (tanhā) and mind cultivation (bhāvanā) (154). On the other hand, however, many scholars, just like Heidegger, maintain that willing is a dominating force—“to will is to will-to-be-master” (Heidegger 107), which is verified in Nietzsche’s own definition: “Willing” is not “desiring,” striving, demanding: it is distinguished from these by the affect of commanding [my italics]. There is no such thing as “willing” but only a willing something . . . It is part of willing that something is commanded (—which naturally does not mean the will is “effected”). That state of tension by virtue of which a force seeks to discharge itself—is not an example of “willing.” (WP: 668) This can be considered as one of the most important discourses of the Nietzschean will to power. Based on this proposition that willing is always “commanding something,” then we can compare it to the Buddhist notion of the Aggregate of Mental Formations, which are characterized by all volitional activities both good and bad. And “what is generally known as karma (or kamma) comes under this group” (Rahula 22). To illustrate, I have to re-mention the Five Aggregates: Aggregates of Matter, Sensations, Perceptions, Mental Formations, and Consciousness. Except the Aggregate of Matter, which belongs to both internal and external realm of materials/matter, the other four aggregates are about the functioning of mental activities (sensations, perceptions, or responses of/to things that 6 correspond to our internal faculties). In general terms, the Aggregate of Mental Formations, however, sometimes include the other four: ‘Mental Formations’ is a term now generally used to represent the wide meaning of the word samkhāra in the list of Five Aggregates. Samkhāra in other contexts may mean anything conditioned, anything in the world, in which sense all the Five Aggregates are samkhāra. (Rahula 22) The Buddha’s own definition of karma (out of Mental Formations) happens to agree with Nietzsche’s willing: O bhikkhus, it is volition (cetanā) that I call karma. Having willed [my italics], one acts through body, speech and mind. (Anguttara-nikaya: 590, quoted in Rahula 22). Volition is a mental construction, mental activity. Its function is to direct the mind in the sphere of good, bad or neutral activities. (Abhidharma-samuccaya: 6) In addition, Lingis also points out the conditional nature of Nietzsche’s will to power: will is a kind of force that commands and it “exists originally in relationship” (41), which corresponds to Buddhist view of the law of the cosmos as “Dependent Origination”—all things, inanimate or sentient, are relativistic (conditioned), impermanent, and ever-changing. Furthermore, as the Will to Power is a commanding force exercised against another force, at the same time of commanding it also achieves “self-affirmation,” by which, Lingis argues, is “the feeling of distinction—the pathos of distance—is the fundamental affect of power” (41). In other words, while willing something, the will in the Will to Power is “the differential element of force . . . that does not mean that it comprehends the other, assimilates, appropriates the non-self [my italics]” (Lingis 41). Therefore, Nietzsche’s Will to Power presupposes and strengthens the notion of a self on which the will is based, and this kind of egocentric volition is denied by the Buddha as the false self-reflexive notion of a stable “I”— ignorance—through which dukkha/karma arises. For the aggregates of mental formations are in a “flux of momentary arising and disappearing.” Consequently, will to power commands and thus affirms its difference from other forces. Since will to power affirms the notion of a willing self, it makes people just concern more about themselves (self-centered). As the Buddha puts it, willing (mental volition) is “the will to live, to exist, to continue, to become more and more. It creates the root of existence and continuity, striving forward . . .” (Majjhima-nikayattakatha: I, 210). To the Buddha, willing is ignorance ( ) that generates karmic vicious cycle and thus is the cause/origin of suffering—“Dependent Origination” (chain of causation)—which consists of twelve factors (desire/tanhā is not the first or only cause of the arising of dukkha[causation] but the proximate cause of causation; therefore, Morrison’s comparing will to power to desire is misleading.): 1. Through ignorance are conditioned volitional actions or karma-formations. 2. Through volitional actions is conditioned consciousness. 3. 4. Through consciousness are conditioned mental and physical phenomena. Through mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six faculties (i.e., five physical sense-organs and mind). 5. Through the six faculties is conditioned (sensorial and mental) contact. 7 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Through (sensorial and mental) contact is conditioned sensation. Through sensation is conditioned desire, ‘thirst.’ Through desire (‘thirst’) is conditioned clinging. Through clinging is conditioned the process of becoming. Through the process of becoming is conditioned birth. Through birth are conditioned (12) decay, death, lamentation, pain, etc. (Rahula 53-54) Based on the above-mentioned, we can easily detect that the subtlety of the Buddha’s insight into the Law of the Universe happens to be a theory of relativity. What we call a “self” or any being is composed of the Five Aggregates and thus there is nothing that can be retrieved from them that could be taken as “I.” The combination of those aggregates is impermanent because their “will”/ignorance is constantly changing. This is the origin of man’s suffering in the karmic vicious cycle, which could only be terminated through enlightenment—nirvana ( )—the state of non-self or the death of craving (volition), the ultimate goal for Buddhist mind cultivation (meditation). To be more specific, the only path to liberate oneself from the karmic transmigration (samsara) is through asceticism; that is, to lead a life that is “completely detached from social ties and indifferent to the body” (Lowenstein 16). Anyone who has consummated nirvana can get a perfect state of mental health, equilibrium and tranquility and thus cease the vicious cycle of willing/desiring. Conclusion To conclude my argument, I have to point out the fact that Nietzsche’s endeavors to overcome the sense of loss in the abyss of the godless cosmos/nihilistic world are doomed to failure. Although he gets the vision of reality as nihilism, Nietzsche’s will to power, nonetheless, brings man more suffering/duhhka, for our mind is so unsteady that it is always changing. The Will to Power is a mental force that “desires” more force to assure its existence as an “entity,” which, in the Buddha’s eyes, a false conception that is so unrealistic and unstable. The only redemption that humanity can get out of the nihilistic world is to terminate our volitional activities/willing (ignorance) and thus could cease the karmic vicious cycle. To sum up, regardless of some details of differences (Nietzsche emphasizes willing for more power whereas Buddhism focuses on the termination of egotistic willing), early Buddhism (with its central tenets of karma—the fundamental Buddhist concepts that are free from denominational dispute) and Nietzsche’s thought reveal a common tendency to shift focus away from speculative metaphysics to a practical ethic of man’s selfredemption from the abyss of godless cosmos/nihilism. In other words, neither looks to any external being or power for their respective solutions to the problems of existence.” 8 Notes 1 About 2500 years after the Buddha deceased, Buddhism has been developed and divided into several denominations due to different perspectives of the Dharma. Two mainstream schools are Hinayana and the Mahayana. The former is prevalent in Southeast Asia, the latter in China, Japan, and Korea. There are always a lot of dispute and arguments among those denominations regarding the meanings of the Dharma and paths leading to enlightenment. 2 WP: 23. Nietzsche categorizes nihilism into several groups, the most frequently discussed grouping among which is the pairing of “active/passive” nihilism. He defines active nihilism as “a violent force of destruction,” and passive nihilism as its opposite—“the weary nihilism that no loner attacks; its most famous form, Buddhism; a passive nihilism, a sign of weakness.” 3 Here Nietzsche is talking about the pessimism resulting from the wake of the Enlightenment in the 18th century, and he believes that at that time he is “a few centuries ahead in Enlightenment not only of Voltaire but even of Galiani” (WP: 91). 4 Actually this is the central idea of Vigrahavyāvartani. It has been repeatedly explored and discussed through many kinds of dialectical reasoning. Though only a “minor work” in form, regarding its contents Vigrahavyāvartani would be called “a fundamental text of Madyamaka, as well as of the early Indian dialectical tradition. Not only does it admirably illustrate the dialectical method followed by Nāgājuna . . . but it also clarifies the idea of Voidness which has been so often misunderstood, not only in modern times and abroad, but in India itself, and in Nāgājuna’s own time” (Bhattacharya, Introduction, The Dialectical Method of Nāgājuna: Vigrahavyāvartani). 5 Introduction to Vigrahavyāvartani, and this view is taken from a German scholar—Jaspers, Philosophie III, P.234. 6 The Four Noble Truths are the heart of the Buddha’s teaching which he expounded in his very first sermon to his colleagues—the five ascetics—soon after he was enlightened to the Ultimate Truth. The four Truths are: (1) Dukkha, (2) the arising or origin of Dukkha, (3) the cessation of Dukkha, (4) the way leading to the cessation of Dukkha. 7 These four lines are translated from the Pali text by the Rev. Dr. W. Rahula, a learned Buddhist monk in Ceylon. And he also creates the version in a modern form of logic argumentation, as presented in the parenthesis. 20