Download Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

北京师范大学研究生课程
教育研究的基础：方法论、知识论及本体论
Topic 5
Ontological Foundations of
Social and Educational Research
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The Critical Realist declarations:
“Since Descartes (1596-1650), it has been customary
first to ask how we can know, and only afterwards
what it is that we can know. But this Cartesian
ordering has been a contributory factor to prevalence
of epistemic fallacy: it is easy to let the question how
we can know determine our conception of what there
is. And if in a certain respect the epistemic question
does seem prior, in another it is secondary to the
ontological one.” (Collier, 1993, P. 137)
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The Critical Realist declarations:
“I shall concentrate first on the ontological question of
the properties that societies possess, before shift to
the epistemological question of these properties make
them possible objects of knowledge for use. This is
not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the
condition that …it is the nature of objects that
determines their cognitive possibilities for us.”
(Bhaskar, 1989)
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: Impasses in
ontological perspectives:
Centuries of controversies among social
researchers over epistemological and
methodological perspectives have created two
deeply divided definitions of the reality of the
social world, namely objectivism and
constructivism
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: Under the domination of the logicalpositivism and analytical-empirical science, the
prevailing social ontology, which has been
characterized as objectivism, stipulates the social
world as an objectively fixed and given reality as
reality of the natural world.
 In this ontological perspective, social reality is stipulated as
analytical and empirical in form, that is, the social world is
conceived as a composition of particles or elements, the
structures and operations of which are observable by human
senses.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: ….
 Moreover, the social reality has also been stipulated as
nomological and causal in structure, i.e. the constitutive
particles of social reality are presumed to be structured in
causal laws.
 The law-like structures of the social world can further be
defined in terms of their degree of universality and
permanence.
 Accordingly, the “strong” stance within the objectivism would
argue that the law-like structures of social realities are
universal across locations and permanent over time. Such an
ontological stance could be characterized as “objective
absolutism”.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: ….
 On the other hand, the “weak” stance of objectivism would
assume that the laws governing the social world are only
probabilistic laws and their universality and permanence are
limited in particular social and historical contexts.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: In opposite to objectivism and more
specifically in response to the domination and even
assault from the empirical positivists, the social
scientists in the historical-hermeneutic tradition have
turned to interpretivism and constructivism for
havens.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: ….
 By interpretivism, it refers to the research approach which
emphasizes on the meaning-laden and value-laden nature of
the social world. Accordingly, this group of social scientists
focuses on the interpretive (i.e. meaning attributing) features
embedded in social reality and stresses the uniqueness of
each interpretive communities involved as well as the
meanings they imputed to the social reality concerned.
Moreover, some of these interpretativists would even
advocate that the social reality is “a matter of interpretation”
and its features and structures are “open to interpretation” as
well.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: ….
 By constructivism, it refers to the research orientation which
underlines the essential roles of human ideas, believes, and
efforts in the constitution of the social world and more
specifically its social institutions. Accordingly, it is assumed
that realities of the social world are subject to construction by
different interpretive communities according to their own
ideas, believes or even vested interests. As a result, social
realities are conceived to be relative in nature, i.e. relative to
the subjectivities and intersubjectivities of the interpretive
communities that have power over the respective social
realities in point. Such a research approach can be
characterized as “constructive relativism”.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
The “paradigm war” between these two perspectives in
social ontology, especially the “dog fights” between
extremists of “objective absolutism” and those of
“constructive relativism” have left the field of social
ontology in complete disarrays if not chaos for
decades. On the one hand, there are advocates holding
the ontological perspective of “structural
determinism”, which insists on the definitude of causal
laws at work in social structures. And accordingly
human relationship and activities found in these social
structures are conceived to be deterministic in nature.
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…
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
…….On the other hand, there are proponents
promoting the ontological perspective of “constructive
voluntarism”, which emphasizes the intersubjectivity
and forgeability at work in social reality. Caught
between the crossfire of these two camps, most of the
students in social research are helpless at lost in these
ontological, epistemological and methodological
labyrinth.
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The Critical-Realist Movement
Since the second half of the 1970s, Roy Bhaskar, a
British philosopher, has produced a series of work on
philosophy of science and social sciences (1975, 1979,
1986, 1989). His work has motivated a line of academic
work in varieties of disciplines. As a result, they have
together triggered an intellectual movement now
known as Critical Realism.
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(194414
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The Critical-Realist Movement
In the past three decades Critical Realism has gained
significant recognition and development in socialscience researches; for examples economics (Lawson,
1997), social psychology (Greenwood, 1994), sociology
(Archer, 1995; Danermark et al., 2002), geography
(Sayer, 2000), management and organizational studies
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000), social research
methods (Sayer, 1992), policy studies (Henry, et al.
1998; Pawson, 2006, 2013; Mark et al., 2000), …
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The Critical-Realist Movement
and education (in particular sociology of education)
(Maton, 2014; Maton & Moore, 2010; Muller, 2000;
Moore, 2007, 2009; Scott, 2010; Shipway, 2012;
Wheelahan, 2010; Young, 2008a, 2008b).
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What is critical realism?
Realism as doctrine in philosophy or more specifically
in the philosophy of science “belief that there is a
world existing independently of our knowledge of it.”
(Sayer, 2000, P. 2). It assumes that the objects of study
in science “is ontologically independent of human
mind.” (Niiniluoto, 1990, P. 10)
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What is critical realism?....
Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism
makes several specific theoretical claims: (Collier,
1994, P.6-7)
 Objectivity: It refers to the ontological stance that “what is
known would be real whether or not it were known. Something
may be real without appearing at all.” (P. 6)
 Fallibility: It refers to the epistemological stance that
knowledge claims made by critical realists are “not about
some supposedly infallible or corrigible data of appearance.”
Instead, they “are always open to refutation by further
information.” (P. 6) Therefore, social researchers must always
be vigilant and critical to their research results and knowledge
claims.
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What is critical realism?....
 Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism
makes several specific theoretical claims: …
Transphenomenality (going beyond appearance): It indicates
that “knowledge may be not only of what appears, but of
underlying structures, which endure longer than those
appearances, and generate them or make them possible.” (P. 6)
Counter-phenomenallity: It refers to the epistemological stance
which claims that “knowledge of the deep structure of
something may not just go beyond, and not just explain, but
also contradict appears. …It is precisely the capacity of science
for counter-phenomenality which made it necessary: without
the contradiction between appearance and reality, science
would be redundant, and we could go by appearance.” (P.7)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
 Roy Basher starts his buildup of critical realism first
with the analysis of the work and enterprise of
natural sciences. One of his initial points of
departure is to criticize the validity of empirical
realism, which was the dominant approach in
scientific research. Instead Bhaskar proposes to
replace empirical realism with what he called
transcendental realism. It means that the reality of
the natural world is not confine its appearances or to
what we could have experienced. He claims that
there are deeper layers of mechanism and system at
work than the mere appearances that we could
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sensorily experience. (Collier, 1994, Pp. 25-29)
Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Concept of Depth Realism: The first conception
of Bhaskar’s Critical Realism is his distinction of
reality into three domains:
Empirical domain: It refers to the aspect of reality
which we have experienced with our senses.
Actual domain: It refers to events which have
occurred without our noticing, while we can infer from
their effects.
Real domain: It refers to the properties within entities,
which are able to triggers events to take place or to
constraint them from occurring.
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Bhaskar’s Depth Realism: Three Domains of Reality
Domain of
Real
Domain of
Actual
Mechanism
✓
Events
✓
✓
Experiences
✓
✓
Domain of
Empirical
✓
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Features of the domain of the Real: Bhaskar has
further differentiated the features of the reality
into levels:
Power and liability: Powers or emergent power (causal
power), in Bhaskar’s term, refers to the potentials
which are able trigger events to take place; while
liability are properties which can prevent or constraint
events from happening.
Mechanism: It refers to a set of powers working interconnectively to set off the occurrence an event or a
chain of events.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Features of the domain of the Real: ……
Structure of the system: It refers to the
interconnections among operative mechanisms, which
constitute the underlying structure against which
events are taking places.
Open/closed system: It refers the openness or closure
(i.e. boundary) of a given system. According to Critical
Realist conception, “no system in our universe is ever
perfectly closed.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) And
accordingly both our natural and social world are by
definition open systems.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Stratification of causation: Taking together these
conceptions of the natural world stipulated by
the Critical Realists, theories and models of
causal explanations formulated by scientists can
be categorized into several strata
 Cause-effect explanation
 Explanatory mechanism
 Explanatory structure
 Structure of closed system: Nomological/law-like
explanations
 Structure of open system: Theories of tendency or
emergency
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Tn
T2
Time1
Mx
Mx
Cx
Cx
Mx
Structure of
Open
System(S)
Cx
Cause(C)
Event
Sx
Cx
Sx
Mechanism(M)
Mx
Sx
Mx
Sx
Structure of
Closed
System(S)
Sx
Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science: Given all these
specifications of the operations of the natural
world, Critical Realists contend that the work of
natural science is in no way close to the
conceptions of experimental work stipulated by
empiricism (based solely on sensory
observation) and positivism (aimed solely at
verifying nomological explanations). Instead,
Critical Realists specify the features of the work
of experimental science as follows:
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Science as work: Science in essence “is work, not
contemplation, not observation, not taking up of some
kind of scientific attitude.” “It is an active intervention
into nature, made by people with acquired scientific
skills, usually using special equipment.” (Collier, 1993,
P. 50) And “the ‘product’ is not the new arrangement
of matter brought about by the experiment. …It is the
deepened knowledge of some mechanism of nature.”
(P.52)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Dr = Da = De coincide: Deepening of knowledge of
nature means to penetrate the empirical world and the
actual events and to obtain the mechanism and
structure underlying all human experiences. It is
through scientific experiment, “we can set up a
situation in which three domains (Dr, Da, De) coincide
— in which a mechanism is actualized, i.e. isolated
from its usual codeterminants, so that it can operate
as a closed system, and to manifested as an event
exemplifying the law to which it corresponds.” (Collier,
1994, P. 45)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Experiment as closure: “What the experiment does
…is to isolate one mechanism of nature from the effect
of others, to see what that mechanism does on its
own.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) It is “an attempt to trigger
or unleash a single kind of mechanism or process in
relative isolation, free from the interfering flux of the
open world, so as to observe its details workings or
record its characteristic mode of effect and/or to test
some hypothesis about them.” (Bhashar, 1986, P. 35;
quoted in Collier, 1994, P. 33)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Theory-led endeavor: “The classical sequence of
experimental science is…: first we construct a theory,
then we design an experiment to test it, then we
receive nature’s answer to our question.” (Collier,
1994, P. 40) This indicates that experimental practice
cannot replace theoretical thinking in the work of
science. Power of abstraction and theoretical
synthesizing is not only the initial point of departure
for formulation of problems but also the guiding
signposts throughout the path of scientific enquiry.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science:
In view of the distinct domains, levels and strata
specified by Critical Realists so far, the enterprise of
science itself can then be further differentiated into
“distinct sciences — physics, chemistry, biology,
economics etc. — which are mutually irreducible, but
which are ordered. Physics is in this sense more basic
than chemistry, which is more basic than biology,
which is more basic than the human sciences.”
(Collier, 1994, P. 107)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
For example, Benton and Craib proposed a hierarchy
of sciences as follows. (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 127)
social sciences
psychology
physiology/anatomy
organic chemistry/biological chemistry
physical chemistry
physics
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
Andrew Collier posposes another hierarchy, which he
calls “tree of science” (Collier, 1994, P. 132)
?
psychological and semiological sciences
social sciences
biological sciences
Molecular sciences
?
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
“This way of ordering the sciences could be justified
in terms of the mechanisms characteristic of each
level are explicable in terms of those of the nest one
below it. This corresponds to a view of science as
explaining wholes in terms of the parts of which they
are composed.” (Benton and Craib, 2011, Pp. 126-127)
However, it must be underlined that the causal flows
can be construed in both directions, that is, “causality
can flow down the hierarchy as well as up it.” (P. 128)
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Stratification of social-scientific explanation
Social system & social explanation
Psychological system & psychological explanation
Biological system & Biological explanation
Bio-chemical system & Bio-chemical explanation
Physical system & Physical explanation
Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
Intransitive dimension of science: According to the
basic tenet of Critical Realism, the natural world exists
independently of human minds and knowledge.
Hence, this object of science studies — the natural
world and with all its substances, mechanisms and
structures — constitute the intransitive dimension of
the work of science.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
…
Transitive dimension of science: Scientists, with their
concepts and theories, their skills and practices, as
well as their communities, associations and rival
schools of thought, they constitute the transitive
dimension of science. What scientists do is to strive to
deepen the existing scientific knowledge of the nature
world.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
…
Accordingly, “the ‘results’ of scientific inquiry at any
time are a set of theories about the nature of the world,
which are presumably our best approximation to truth
about the world….However much science deepens its
knowledge of its intransitive object, its product
remains a transitive object.” (Collier, 1994, P. 51)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive & transitive dimensions of science:…
 In light of these distinctions between intransitive and
transitive dimensions in science, we can see that
Critical Realists take on different stances for their
ontological and epistemological foundations.
Ontologically, Critical Realists assume its objects of
their enquiry are intransitive and real and the products
of their enquiry could be truth. However,
epistemological, Critical Realists admit that their
scientific work and practice at any given in time are
only relative to the material, social as well as
theoretical configuration of the scientific enterprise, in
which they find themselves.
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
The debate between the natural and the social
sciences has been raging on since the
nineteenth century around the issue of the unity
of scientific method. Recently Roy Bhaskar
reformulates the issue at the beginning of his
book The Possibility of Naturalism as follows.
“To what extent can society be studied in the
way as nature?” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 1) Two
conventional answers to this issue are
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
Naturalism: The positive answer to the issue can be
summarized under the doctrine, which Bhaskar called
naturalism. By naturalism, it refers to the doctrine
which asserts that there “is (or can be) an essential
unity of method between the natural and the social
sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) With this naturalist
camp, subdivisions can further be differentiated
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
Naturalism:…subdivisions can further be differentiated
 Reductionism, which claims that “there is an actual
identity of subject matter” between the two sciences.”
(Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2)
 Scientism, which “denies that there are any significant
differences in the methods appropriate to studying social
and natural subject.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) That
appropriate method is of course the scientific method.
 Positivism, which claims that the products of studies in
both the natural and social sciences are the same, that is,
to verify causal laws, which can account for the events
under study to the full. (Bhaskar, 1998; Collier, 1994, P.
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102-102)
Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
 Hermeneutics and interpretive theory: In opposite to
the naturalists positive answer to the issue, social
scientists in hermeneutic and interpretive tradition
insist that it is impossible to study society in the way
as nature! They have argued for centuries that human
and social sciences are essentially distinct from
natural sciences in terms of their methodology and
epistemology, but most importantly in their ontological
foundation. (These arguments have been explicate on
Topic 2 and 3 in this course)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science:
Critical Realists have distanced themselves from the
epistemological arguments between positivism and
hermeneutics and the methodological arguments
between quantitative and qualitative research
practitioners; they have chosen a different approach
to the issue, by looking into the ontological
differences between the natural world and the social
reality. They have synthesized a series of concepts,
which attempt to build a conceptual framework of
social ontology of critical realism.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Human agents and their agency: Critical Realists
assert that one of the major differences between
nature and society is that society is made up of human
agents, who would not act or behave mechanically to
antecedent causes or stimulus. Human beings are
“meaning making animals”, who forge ideas, hold
believes, adhere identities, plan intentional actions,
and carry out projects and agencies. ……
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Human agents and their agency: ……
As a result, in accounting for social events, social
scientists could not simply look for antecedent
causes, in the form of necessary and/or sufficient
conditions. They must dig deep into social reality and
look for “reasons”. In fact, Critical Realists have
argued at length that reasons, which include beliefs,
desires, ideas, intentions, should belong to the causal
orders in accounting for social events. (Bhaskar,
1998, Pp.80-119; Collier, 1994, Pp. 151-156)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): One of the
fundamental differences between structures of society
and nature is that “social structures are maintained in
existence only through the activities of agents
(activity-dependence), whereas this is not true of
structures of nature.” (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 135)
…..
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): …..
More specifically, the continuity and consistency of a
given social structure depends mainly on the
willingness and capacity of its members to participate
and carry out the obligations and duties prescribed to
their specific positions within the structure. Therefore,
the endurance of a social structure rely on the
efficacies of its institutions of production,
socialization, social control and reproduction.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): …..
Bhaskar has named this characteristic of social
structure as Transformation Model of Social Activity
(TMAS). That is, social structures are more likely to
transform than structures of nature and their
endurance are only relative in nature.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Concept-dependence and the cultural dimension of
social structure: Since the reproduction of social
structures are subject to human agents’ participations
and actions, they are therefore more fundamentally
depending on members’ impressions, perceptions,
beliefs, and conception about the respective
structures. As a result, social structures are not only
built on their material grounds same as the structures
of nature, but are also based on their cultural
resources, such as linguistic, cultural and social
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capitals.
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Space-time-dependent and context specific: Unlike the
structure of entities found in nature, which are
universal across both time and space; social
structures constituted by human agents are heavily
embedded in the specific contexts, in which particular
groups of human agents found themselves. These
contexts include historical contexts, socio-cultural
contexts, geo-political contexts, natural-ecological
contexts, etc.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Impossibility of experimental closure: Incomparable to
natural scientists, social scientists are practical
impossible to isolate any fragments of social reality
and to design an experimental closure, in which they
can test their hypothesis about specific causal
relations found in society. In fact the openness of the
social system is so immense that it is basically unable
to control and/or randomize all the other codeterminants confounding the specific cause-effect
explanatory models that social scientists are
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supposed to verify.
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Unsustainability of intransitive-transitive division in
knowledge of social science: Unlike knowledge of
natural science, in which the distinction between the
intransitivity of the natural world and the transitivity of
the knowledge produced by particular groups of
natural scientists is empirically definitive; the division
is practically indistinct. It is because social reality is
transitive in nature. They are subject to change with
the beliefs and ideas of human agents. Furthermore,
they may even transform themselves according to
findings and theories produced by social scientists.57
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
Given these essential distinctions between
natural and social reality, Critical Realists’
conception of social reality may be summarized
as follows:
Relational model of society: Bhaskar suggests that
“society does not consist of individuals (or we might
add, groups), but expresses the sum of relations
within which individuals (and groups) stand.”
(Bhaskar, 1998, P. 26)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Studying the persistence and endurance of relations:
Bhaskar further indicates that social sciences in
general and sociology in particular are
“concerned…with the persist relations between
individuals (and groups) and with relations between
these relations (and between such relation and nature
and the products of such relations).” (Bhaskar, 1998,
P. 28-29; my emphasis)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Duality of objectivity and subjectivity in social
structure:
Durkheimian objective-factual conception of social structure
Weberian subjective-meaningful conception of social
structure
Critical Realist synthesis: TMSA and M/M approach
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Duality of individualism and collectivism in social
structure:
Atomic reductionism and methodological individualism
Structuralism and methodological collectivism
Critical realist synthesis: SEPM and M/M/ Approach
Duality of stability and change in social structure
Conception of relativity of persistence and Morphostasis
Conception of Morphogenesis
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Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
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Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Meaning of morphogenesis:
The prefix ‘morpho’ refers to ‘of or pertaining to form’ and
‘genesis’ refers ‘mode of formation’. Hence, morphogenesis is
commonly in biology to mean formation of the structure
biological organisms, while in physical geography it refers
formation of landscapes or landforms. (Oxford English
Dictionary)
Margaret Archer uses the word in morphogenetic approach to
connote that “the ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement
that society has no pre-set form or preferred state; the
‘genetic’ part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and
is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and
unintended consequences of the activities.” (Archer, 1995, p.
63
5)
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Meaning of morphogenesis:
…
The approach can then be construed as an echo of the TMSA
in Critical Realism in sociological analysis. It emphasizes both
the possibility of transforming the social structure through
social actions of the agents, and at the same time underline
the relative endurance and resilience of social structures and
their conditioning (not determining) effects on the social
actions of human agents.
64
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Morphogenetic approach in structure-agency debate
in sociology: Archer allocates her morphogenetic
approach against the longstanding structure-agent in
the debate on social ontology in sociology. Archer
asserts that her approach can address three common
“conflations” found in the debate. They are …..
65
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 The downwards conflation: It refer to those theoretical stances
which put special emphasis on the determinacy of the social
structure over the agents and their plans of actions (i.e.
agencies). They includes “any uncompromising version of
technological determinism, economism, structuralism or
normative functionalism.” (Archer, 1995, P. 81) As a result, these
theoretical stances constitute a kind of “downwards conflation
where structure and agency are conflated because action is
treated as fundamentally epiphenomenal has many
variants….The bottom line is always that actors may be
indispensable for energizing the social system.” (Archer, 1995,
P. 81) The methodological ground grown out the social ontology
of structuralism is commonly known as methodological
66
collectivism.
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 The upwards conflation: It refers to the theoretical stances
which is argued for “the primacy of the agent” and underlines
that structure is but the creation of agency. Social structural are
hence reduced to “a series of intersubjectively negotiated
constructs”. (Archer, 1995, P. 84) The methodological ground
generated from such social ontology is called the
methodological individualism.
67
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 Central conflation: It is “an approach based upon the putative
mutual constitution of structure and agency and finds its most
sophisticated expression in modern ‘structuration theory’.”
(Archer, 1995, P. 87) The structuration theory is called made
well-known by the work of Anthony Giddens. However, Archer
argues that what has been suppressed (or conflated) in this
mutually constituting activity is the historical-temporal
thickness of society, more specifically, the enduring
institutional practices sedimented over time. .....
68
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 Central conflation:
…..In Archer’s own words, “structural properties (defined
reductively as rules and resources) are held to be outside time,
having a ‘virtual existence’ only when instantiated by actions.
In exact parallel, when actors produce social practices they
necessarily draw upon rules and resources and the inevitable
invoke the whole matrix of structural properties at that
instance.” (Archer, 1995, P. 87) Archer therefore criticizes that
Giddens has not given adequate treatment to the temporal
dimension in the structuration theory.
69
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: In rectifying
these conflations found in the structure-agency
debate, Archer formulated her theory of
morphogenesis by injecting a time dimension into the
framework. She underlines that “the distinctive feature
of the morphogenetic approach is its time dimension,
through which and in which structure and agency
shape one another.” (1995, P. 92)
70
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: …
Three-part cycles of the morphogenesis: “Morphogenetic
analysis, in contrast to the three foregoing approaches,
accords time a central place in social theory. By working in
terms od its three-part cycles composed of (a) structural
conditioning, (b) social interaction and (c) structure
elaboration, time is incorporated as sequential tract and
phases rather than simply as a medium through which events
take place.” (Archer, 1995, P. 89)
71
Source, Archer, 1995, p. 76
72
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: …
As a result, Archer claims that her analytical framework has
rectified the three prevailing approaches to structure-agency
debates in sociological theory.
73
Source, Archer, 1995,74P. 82.
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
 Structural condition: This part of the cycle represents
the structural properties accumulated and passed on
from past agencies. It also signifies that this structural
property could in fact assert “causal influences upon
subsequent interaction.” These influences are
working through facilitating the some types of
interactions but at the same time constraining some
others. In Critical Realists’ terms they impose
selectively either “powers” or “liabilities” on human
interactions. …..
75
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
 Structural condition: …..
By focusing mainly if not solely on this part of the
morphogenetic process, structuralists are of course
confident to endorse the dominance of the structure
on the agency and as a result have committed the
downwards conflation that Archer has aptly
highlighted.
76
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Social interaction: This tract of the cycle indicates that
the causal influences of structural properties on
agencies are never deterministic but only conditional
and interactive in nature. It is because Critical Realists
presume that “agents possess their own irreducible
emergent power”. Hence, structural properties and
agencies are engaging in mutually “structurating” and
“destructurating” interactions. This is the point in time
where Giddens theory of structuration comes in.
77
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Structural elaboration: After the social interactions
between the structure and agent in each generation
have played out, an elaborated structure-agency
relation will emerge. Analytically, this may take one of
the following outcomes:
Morphostasis: It refers to the outcome where the new
generation of human agents in a social system are socialized
and incorporated into the existing structure as well as culture.
And the system has practically “reproduced” itself.
Morphogenesis: It refers to the outcome where the prevailing
structure and culture of a given social system has been
elaborated, transformed and to the greatest extent revolted.
78
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
The integration of Morphogenetic approach into
the conceptions of Critical Realism:
79
80 160.
Source: Archer, 1995, P.
Institutional
level
System level
Structure
Time
Sector level
Organization level
Interaction level
Agent
Individual level
81
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
In order to eliminate these limitations, social
scientists must transcend the demarcations
between the empiricist-positivism and the
interpretive-hermeneutic tradition, more
specifically, between the quantitative and
qualitative methods. One of the cornerstones in
bridging these epistemological and
methodological chasms is the comparativehistorical method. …
82
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
The illustration of Morphostatic/Morphogenetic
approach into educational research
Margaret Archer, one of the leading sociologists in
Critical Realism, has demonstrated some convincingly
the validities of the comparative-historical method in
one of her early research work Social Origins of
Educational Systems (1979).
In the study, Archer traces the historical paths of
developments of modern educational systems in four
European countries in two pairs, namely
England and Denmark representing Substitutive Model
France and Russia representing Restrictive Model
83
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
84
85
Ray Pawson’s Theory of Complexity
Ray Pawson, in his recent works EvidenceBased Policy: A Realist Perspective (2006); and
The Science of Evaluation: A Realist Manifesto
(2013), has demonstrated how the CriticalRealist perspective can be applied in the field
of policy studies and more specifically policy
evaluation. He has formulated the theory of
complexity in policy reality
Ray Pawson’s Theory of Complexity
He has asserted that public policy and its
programs is complex entity, which can be
summarized by two conceptions:
The Context, Mechanism, Outcome
configurations (CMOc): The conception stipulates
that policy reality, more specifically policy
process and policy system, is not a closed
system based on law-like causation with definite
measurable output. Instead, Pawson asserts that
policy reality is
Ray Pawson’s Theory of Complexity
The CMOc: …
Context-dependent open system: The contributing
factors on the policy outcomes are inexhaustible and
they vary from different temporal, spatial and sociocultural contexts.
Multi-level causation: The policy system is operated not
according to a single-level causal law, but subject to
multiple levels of causations, such as cause-effect,
mechanism, structure and system levels.
Multiple outcomes: The outcomes of the policy are not
definitely confined to those designed and expected
outputs. There may be unexpected outcomes or even
counterfactual consequences. Furthermore, even the
designated output could still have been interpreted by
various stakeholders in many different ways.
Ray Pawson’s Theory of Complexity
A complexity checklist: Pawson further
elaborates the policy reality with seven
characteristics, which he summarizes as with an
acronym ─ VICTORE
Volition
Implementation
Contexts
Time
Outcomes
Rivalry
Emergence
Source: Pawson, 2013, Box 3.1
In Search of a Solid Footing in the Complex
& Transformational Social World: The New
Institutionalism
Confronted with these ontological
complexity, it is apparent that practitioners in
social and educational research are assigned
with a difficult task. They badly need a solid
footing to formulate their research questions
and set off their enquiries.
In Search of a Solid Footing …: The New
Institutionalism
New institutionalism: As a theoretical
perspective emerged in different disciplines in
fields of social sciences since the 1980s, new
institutionalists have rendered a system of
conceptual and theoretical apparatuses, which
seem to have laid a promising ground for
researchers to search for regularities in
complex and transformational social world.
Working Definitions Institution
 Douglass C. North stipulates that “institutions are
rules of the game in a society or more formally, are
the humanly devised constraint that shape human
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives
in human exchange, whether political, social or
economic.” (North, 1990, p. 3)
Conception of Institution: The Formal
Contextual Foundation of EAP
 Elinor Ostrom writes, “Broadly defined, institutions are
the prescriptions that humans use to organize all
forms of repetitive and structured interactions
including those within families, neighborhoods,
markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private
associations, and government at all scales. Individuals
interacting within rule-structured situations face
choices regarding the actions and strategies they take,
leading to consequences for themselves and for
others." (Ostrom, 2005, P.3)
Conception of Institution: The Formal
Contextual Foundation of EAP
 James March and Johan Olsen’s conception:
“An institution is a relatively enduring collection of
rules and organized practices, embedded in structures
of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant
in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and
expectations of individuals and changing external
circumstances.” (March and Olsen, 2006, p.1)
Conception of Institution: The Formal
Contextual Foundation of EAP
 James March and Johan Olsen’s conception:
According, in institutions
 “There are constitutive rules and practices prescribing
appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations.
 There are structures of meaning, embedded in identities and
belongings: common purposes and accounts that give
direction and meaning to behavior, and explain, justify and
legitimate behavioral codes.
 There are structures of resources that create capabilities for
action.” (ibid)
In Search of a Solid Footing …: The New
Institutionalism
“The external merge with the internal”
─Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
The academic origin of new institutionalism can
be traced to the work of Emile Durkheim, more
specifically, work The Rules of Sociological
Method (1895/1982).
1858-1917
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
 In the book, he defines the disciple of sociology as
follow:
 “Without doing violence to the meaning of the word,
one may term an institution all the beliefs and modes
of behaviour instituted by the collectivity; sociology
can then be defined as the science of institutions, their
genesis and their functioning. (1982, P. 45)
 He then stipulates the first rule of sociological method
as “The first and most basic rule is to consider social
facts as things.” (1982, P. 60)
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
“Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
 By “social fact”, Durkheim specifies it the following typical
realist terms:
“A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not,
capable of exerting over the individual an external
constraint;
or:
which is general over the whole of a given society whilst
having an existence of its own, independent of its individual
manifestations.” (1982, P. 59)
 By “as things”, Durkheim provides us with the following
typical realist specification. The debates around Durkheim’s
assertion about “studying social fact as thing” have troubled
so many generations of social researchers that it is really
worth to quote it at length as following:
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
“Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
 “Social phenomena must therefore be considered in
themselves, detached from the conscious beings who form
their own mental representations of them. They must be
studied from the outside, as external things, because it is in
this guise that they present themselves to us. If this quality
of externality proves to be only apparent, the illusion will be
dissipated as the science progresses and we will see, so to
speak, the external merge with the internal. But the outcome
cannot be anticipated, and even if in the end social
phenomena may not have all the features intrinsic to things,
they must at first be dealt with as if they had. This rule is
therefore applicable to the whole of social reality and there is
no reason for any exceptions to be made. …..
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
“Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
 “…... Even those phenomena which give the greatest
appearance of being artificial in their arrangement should be
considered from this viewpoint. The conventional character
of a practice or an institution should never be assumed in
advance. If, moreover, we are allowed to invoke personal
experience, we believe we can state with confidence that by
following this procedure one will often have the satisfaction
of seeing the apparently most arbitrary facts, after more
attentive observation, display features of constancy and
regularity symptomatic of their objectivity. In general,
moreover, what has been previously stated about the
distinctive features of the social fact gives us sufficient
reassurance about the nature of this objectivity to
demonstrate that it is not illusory. ….
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
“Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
 “….... A thing is principally recognisable by virtue of not
being capable of modification through a mere act of the will.
This is not because it is intractable to all modification. But to
effect change the will is not sufficient; it needs a degree of
arduous effort because of the strength of the resistance it
offers, which even then cannot always be overcome. We
have seen that social facts possess this property of
resistance. Far from their being a product of our will, they
determine it from without. They are like moulds into which
we are forced to cast our actions. The necessity is often
ineluctable. But even when we succeed in triumphing, the
opposition we have encountered suffices to alert us that we
are faced with something independent of ourselves. Thus in
considering facts as things we shall be merely conforming to
their nature.” (1982, P. 70)
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
“Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies:
Taken together Durkheim’s assertions, institution,
which has been identified by Durkheim as the primary
object of study for sociology, is in essence an
embodiment of both internal subjectivity and will of
individual human and external constraints with
objective constancy and resistance. And the main task
of sociological research is exactly to map out this very
“genesis”, in which “the external merge with the
internal”, in other words, the process of
institutionalization.
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?─The
social phenomenologists’ contributions:
In the 1960s, Alfred Schutz’s The
Phenomenology of the Social World was
translated and published in English (1967, the
German edition was published in 1933) and
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann also
published their work The Construction of
Reality (1966). These two works has elaborated
the conceptions of institution and
institutionalization significantly.
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
 The concept of institutionalization: Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann follow Schutz’s conceptions has
defines that “institutionalization occurs whenever
there is a reciprocal typiifcation of habitualized
actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such
typification is an institution. What must be stressed
is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the
typicality of not only the actions but the actors in
institution. The typifications of habitualized actions
that constitute institutions are always shared ones.
…..
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
 The concept of institutionalization: …
They are available to all members of the particular
social group in question, and the institution itself
typifies individual actors as well as individual
actions.” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 72)
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Externalization and objectivities of social
institutions: These typified and habitualized social
actions in the forms of social routines among
specific human groups will in time be externalized
and objectivated into “social facts”. They will in turn
impose social constraints upon the subjectivities and
agencies of individual, which were once the
“geneses” of the objective social facts. As a result,
social institutions gain their objectivity and become
the main parts of the social world.
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Formalization and regularization of social structure:
These objective social facts, in the forms of social
constraints, will in time be formalized and regularized
into social structure. They may be conceived as
social organizations, institutions, system, etc. These
objectively existing social structures will constitute
the main bloc of the social world.
Internalization of the social structure: The objective
social world with its social structure will in turn be
internalized by new members of the respective
human aggregates, by means of socialization, formal
education and social control.
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Reproduction of the social structure: The objectivity
of the social structure will gain its continuity and
consistence unless it can successfully reproduce
itself to the coming generations. In Berger and
luckmann’s own world, "One may further add that
only with the transmission of the social world to a
new generation … does the fundamental social
dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the
appearance of the new generation can one properly
speak of a social world." (Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p. 79)
Durkheim’s
conceptualization
Berger & Luckmann’s
conceptualization
Objectivity
Externality
Externality,
Objectivity
Methodological &
Epistemological
Impasses
Merge with
Dialectics
Internality
Internality,
Subjectivity
Subjectivity
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Legitimation: Apart from the formal structural aspect
of the institution and institutionalization, Berger and
Luckmann have also analyzed the normative base of
social institution. Berger and Luckmann build this
normative base on the conception of legitimation.
Accroding to Berger and Luckmann’s
conceptualization, legitimation is “best described as
a ’second-order’ objectivation of meaning.” (1967, p.
110) …
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Legitimation: …
That is, if meanings are externalized, objectivated
and typified through continuous human interactions
and practices in the first place, they further need the
“second” round of meaning-endowing efforts in
order to formally institutionalized within a given
society. Berger and Luckmann suggests that there
are mainly two way to establish legitimation in
institutional context:
In Search of a Solid Footing … : The New
Institutionalism
What is institutionalization and how?
Legitimation: …
Explanation of cognitive validity: “Legitimation ‘explains’ the
institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its
objectivated meaning. …It always implies ‘knowledge’. ”
(1967, p. 111)
Justification of normative dignity: “Legitimation justifies the
institutional order by given normative dignity to its practical
imperatives. ….Legitimation is …a matter of ‘value’.” (1967,
p. 111)
Sedimentation: The cultural legitimation constituted
with social institutions will accumulate its validity
and dignity over time. Berger and Luckmann has
called the process sedimentation.
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Since the 1980s, researchers from different
disciplines in social sciences have put forth
numbers of conceptual tools to account for the
institutional features of regularity, continuity,
persistence, resilience, and endurance found in
the social world. Taking together, they can
provide a useful conceptual framework in
guiding social and educational research. For
examples:
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of institutional order: It was in 1984,
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen published
an article entitled “The New Institutionalism:
Organizational Factors in Political Life” in The
American Political Science Review that the term
new institutionalism was coined. These two
political scientists have yet injected into the
conceptual building of the framework of social
institution the dimension of “order”. March and
Olsen attribute the enduring patterns of human
practices found in social institution to its
institutional orders. …
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of institutional order: …
Accordingly, they categorize them into: (March
& Olsen, 1984)
Symbolic orders: They refer to the patterns and
ordering of productions, circulations and
consumptions of meanings, ideas, concepts,
symbols, rituals, ceremonies, stories and drama in
social life.
Normative orders: They refer to the organizations
and practices of rights, duties, obligations, roles,
rules, norms and regulations in social life.
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of institutional order: …
Endogenous orders: They signify the internal
mechanism and processes, which affect things like
the power distribution, distribution, the distribution
of preferences, or the management of control” within
an institutions.
…
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of institutional order: …
….
Historical orders: They refer to the essential concept
of “the efficiency of historical processes” in new
institutionalism. By efficiency of historical efficiency,
it refers to the way in which history moves quickly
and inexorably to a unique outcome, normally in
some sense an optimum.” (March and Olsen, 1984, p.
743) Accordingly, the internal order of an institution
will be constrained by the particular period in history
and its condition of optimum within which the
institution operates.
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of pillars of institution: Richard Scott,
professor of sociology in Stanford university,
has published one of the most popular text on
social institutions. The book has extended to its
fourth edition since 1995 (1995; 2013) One of
the most oft-quoted conception is the three
pillars of institution. The concept has provided
a framework to account for the enduring order
constituted in institutional context.
Conceptual Apparatuses of New
Institutionalism: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of pillars of institution:
Scott defines institution that “Institutions consist of
cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and
activities that provide stability and meaning to social
behavior. Institutions are transported by various
carries ── cultures, structures, and routines ── and
they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.” (Scott,
1995, p.33)
Scott has summarized the differences between these
pillars as follows
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence: Apart from the
features of regularity and endurance,
institutionalists have also rendered explanation
for the continuity of institutional features over
time. Paul Pierson has put forth the concept of
path dependence
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence: …
Path dependence indicates that “once a country or
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal
are very high. There will be other choice points, but
the entrenchments of certain institutional
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial
choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather
than a path. From the same trunk, there are many
different branches and smaller branches. Although it
is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to
the other ─ and essential if the chosen branch dies ─
the branch on which a climber begins is the one she
tends to follow. (Levi, 1997; quoted in Pierson, 2004,
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence:
Simply put, path dependence refers “to social
possesses that exhibit positive feedback and thus
generate branching patterns of historical
development.” (ibid, p.21)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence:
Accounting for path dependence (ibid, p. 24)
 Large set-up or fixed cost: “When setup or fixed costs are
high, individuals and organizations have a strong incentive
identify and stick with a single option.”
 Learning effects: “Knowledge gained in the operation of
complex systems also leads to higher returns from
continuing use.”
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence:
Accounting for path dependence (ibid, p. 24)
…
 Coordination effects: “These occur when the benefits an
individual receives from a particular activity increase as other
adopt the option. If technologies embody positive network
externalities, a given technology will become more attractive
as more people use it. Coordination effects are especially
significant when a technology has to be compatible with an
infrastructure (e.g. software with hardware, automobiles with
an infrastructure of roads, repair facilities and fueling
stations).”
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
Concept of path dependence:
Accounting for path dependence (ibid, p. 24)
…
 Adaptive expectations: “It derives from the self-fulfilling
character of expectations. Projections about future aggregate
use pattern lead individuals to adapt their actions in way that
help to make those expectations come true.”
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism: Apart from
accounting for the feature of regularity,
endurance and continuity, institutionalists has
also provided explanatory account for the
institutional features of community, and to a less
extent standardization and formalization among
organizations in the same institutional context.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Concept of isomorphism: New institutionalists
stipulate that organizations in modern rational
institutional environment and/or organizational field
tend to develop similar structures, procedures and
practices (organizational elements in Meyer &
Rowan's terminology). They term this process of
homogenization of organization isomorphism.
"Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces
one unit in a population to resemble other units that
face the same set of environmental conditions."
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.66)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Distinction between competitive and institutional
isomorphism: DiMaggio & Powell (1991) and Meyer &
Rowan (1991) have made similar distinctions between
competitive and institutional isomorphism.
By competitive isomorphism, it refers to the process of
homogenization of organizations taken place in "those field
which free and open competition exists." (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991, p.66) Organizations in these fields usually possess
"clearly defined technologies to produce outputs" and
therefore those "outputs can be easily evaluated" (Meyer &
Rowan, 1991, p. 54) As a result, development of common
organizational elements, i.e. isomorphism, can be attained
through market competition, competitive niche, standardized
output performance and organizational efficiency. (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1991, p. 66)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Distinction between competitive and institutional
isomorphism:
By institutional isomorphism, it refers to the process of
homogenization of organizations invoked in the context of
"collective organized society" (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 49) in
which institutional environment of modern bureaucratic states
have replaced market mechanism to act as institutional rules
of the field. As a result, in institutional organizations, the
development of common organizational elements can not be
attain by market competition and internal efficiency, instead
"they incorporate elements which are legitimated externally"
and "they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria
to define the value of structural elements." (Meyer & Rowan,
1991, p. 49)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Distinction between competitive and institutional
isomorphism:
By institutional isomorphism….
"For example, American schools have evolved from producing
rather specific training that was evaluate according to strict
criteria of efficiency to producing ambiguously defined
services that are evaluated according to criteria of
certification." (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 55)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Mechanism of institutional isomorphism
DiMaggio & Powell identify three mechanism through
which institutional isomorphism are achieved,
maintained or changed. The thesis can be taken as
analysis apparatus to study how schools, as
institutional organization, adopt to education policy
changes.
Coercive isomorphism: "Coercive isomorphism results from
both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations
by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by
cultural expectations in the society within which
organizations function. Such pressures may be felt as force,
as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion."
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 67)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Mechanism of institutional isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism: ….
Organizational restructures undertaken by HK schools in
response to Quality-Assurance Inspection, School Self
Evaluation, External School Review, Senior-Secondary
Curriculum reform, School-based Management and
Incorporated Management Committee, etc. may be analyze in
light of the concept of coercive isomorphism.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Mechanism of institutional isomorphism
Mimetic isomorphism: Apart from coercive authority,
"uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation.
When organizational technologies are poorly understood,
when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on
other organization." (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 69)
Confronted by collective puzzlement in policy implementation,
such as those initiated by Senior-Secondary curriculum reform
or more specifically the teaching of Liberal Studies, or SchoolSelf Evaluation, most HK schools could only imitate, model or
simply copy from other schools.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
The concept of isomorphism:
Mechanism of institutional isomorphism
Normative isomorphism: Instead of compliance with modern
institutional environments of competitive market or
bureaucratic-rational state, isomorphism may take the form of
professionalization. Organizations and their operations, which
are predominately identified with a profession, such as
hospitals with doctors and schools with teachers, can
incorporate cognitive, normative and regulative bases of that
profession into their organizations and apply them as criteria
in assessing the performance as well and legitimation bases of
their organization.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
How can social choice be possible? The
contributions of the economists:
One of the classical scenarios in rational-choice
theory in economics is the tragedy of the common,
which stipulate that there will be detrimental effect for
all if every participants pursue their “rent-seeking”
project” and maximize that gains at the expenses of
the “common”. New-institutionalists in economics
have rendered a resolution, which Ostrom
characterizes “the governance of the commons” or
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
model.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
How can social choice be possible? …
Definition of institution: For economists in newinstitutionalist perspective, if the rules of the game
have been adequately stipulated the rent-seeking
actions and the tragedy of the commons could be
resolved. Accordingly, they define the rule of the
game as institution.
Douglas North, the Nobel Laureate in Economic Science in
1993, writes, “institutions are rules of the game in a society or
more formally, are the humanly devised constraint that shape
human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives
in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.”
(North, 1990, p. 3)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
How can social choice be possible? …
Definition of institution: …
Elinor Ostrom, the Nobel Laureate in Economic Science in
2009, also suggests, “Broadly defined, institutions are the
prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of
repetitive and structured interactions including those within
families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues,
churches, private associations, and government at all scales.
Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face
choices regarding the actions and strategies they take,
leading to consequences for themselves and for others."
(Ostrom, 2005, P.3)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
How can social choice be possible? …
Definition of institution: …
Accordingly, one of the primary focuses of
institutional analysis and development is to design
and implement the adequate kind of “rule
configuration”, which generally consists of seven
types of rules governing seven aspects of the IAD
model.
Taking together the economists contributions, they
have rendered yet another explanatory account for the
constitution of institutions in competitive situations
among rational actors or even rent seekers.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis: “Institutional
arrangements (i.e. elements) can be found at a variety of
levels in social system – in societies, in organizational
fields, in individual organizations, and in primary and
small groups” (Rowan & Miskel, 1999, p. 359; Scott,
1995, p. 55-60)
 System level – The conception of Institutional environment
 Institutional environment: “Institutional environments are, by
definition, those characterized by the elaboration of rules and
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if
they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer,
1991, p.123)
 Two of the most prominent institutional environments in modern
society are the nation-state and market, both of which share one
of the most salient features of modernity, namely, rationality.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis:
 Sector level – The conception of organizational fields
 Organizational field: It refers to “a community of
organizations that partakes of a common meanings
system and whose participants interact more frequently
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of
the field.” Hence, “fields are defined in terms of shared
cognitive or normative frameworks or a common
regulative system.” (Scott, 1995, p. 56)
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis:
 Sector level – The conception of organizational fields
 Isomorphism: Organizations in an a organization field
tends to become homogenous in terms of cognitive,
normative and regulative aspects of the organizations. The
concept best captures this process is isomorphism.
“Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one
unit in a population to resemble other units that face the
same set of environmental conditions.
 Two of the forces at work in modern society are efficiency
and legitimacy. The former is more likely to be related to
the competitiveness of the market, while the latter to the
state.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis:
 Organization level – The formal structure of the
organization
 To comply with the isomorphic constraints of the
organizational field and institutional environment,
individual organizations have to structure themselves in
regulative, normative and cognitive aspects to meet with
the institutional elements of the filed and environment.
 As a result, two of the ideal types of formal structure of the
organizations have constituted in modern society, the firm
and the bureaucracy of government agencies.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis:
 Human interaction level – “reciprocal typifications and
interpretations of habitualized actions”
 Members of an individual organization, organizational field,
or institutional environment will share many
commonalities in meanings, interpretations, and
typifications, i.e. common cognitive elements.
 They will institutionalize common languages, interacting
and communicating patterns, and routines in practices.
 They will also institute common “logic of appropriateness
and normative elements.
 Their interactions are also subjected to the regulative
elements of the institution in which they find themselves.
Conceptual Apparatuses in the Studies of
Institutional Effects: Why Institutions Endure?
 Levels of institutional analysis:
 Individual level - Internalization and Identity
 In reaction to rational choice theory, new institutionalism
perceives individuals not simply as actors governed by rational
calculus of preferences and self-interest, i.e. logic of
consequences (James, 1994, p.3) but as agent having
internalized set of norms, values and rules and their agency is
governed by the logic of appropriateness of particular
institutional settings.
 “When individuals and organizations fulfill identities, they follow
rules or procedures that they see as appropriate to the situation
in which they find themselves. Neither preference as they are
normally conceived nor expectations of future consequences
enter directly into the calculus.” (March, 1994, p. 57)
Conceptual Tools of New Institutionalism
Institution as patterned social actions
Regularity
Continuity
Multi-levels
Institutional orders
(March & Olsen);
Path of dependence
(Pierson)
System level
Sector level
Organizational level
Interaction level
Individual level
(DiMaggio & Powell)
Persistence,
Resilience
Pillars of institutions
(Scott);
Rules of the game
(North, Ostrom)
Standardization,
Universality
Institutional
Isomorphism
(DiMaggio & Powell)
Topic 5
Ontological Foundations of Educational Research
End