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Darkness loomed over the patch of wood, punctuated by sporadic muzzle flashes
aimed into the nothingness of the night. In their breastworks, the federals sat and waited
for an onslaught. Tired with the day’s work at digging in and fortifying, and equally as
tired from the long fight of that evening, they had once again been placed in their
trenches. A little less than twelve hours before, they had been asked to leave the position
for other ground, but their old commander refused to yield and protested the order. Now,
they were plunged once again into the rarest of the engagements of the war: a night fight.
It was 4:00 am. With scarcely enough time to settle into their position, the enemy
charged the works. The rebel onslaught slammed into the face of the works. Two feet
separated the rebels from the muzzles of the 149th NYSV. As they struggled and strove
on toward the works, their lead drove home toward the pride of the regiment: the colors.
Eighty-one shots shredded the stars and stripes of the regiment, while seven balls lodged
themselves in the standard’s shaft. Twice the colors fell from the deadly hailstorm of
lead. Each time, Color Sergeant William C. Lilly repaired the colors under fire and
righted them, using naught but a rifle sling and slats from a cracker ration box.1
Courage under fire. It is a common trait for most Civil War soldiers. Each shared
his story of courage, bravery and gallantry. But William C. Lilly is a forgotten hero. As
people traverse the fields of Gettysburg, nary a word is spoken of the brave actions
undertaken on the small hill on the Union’s right flank. Visitors hear of the defense in
depth employed by the First Corps cavalry on July 1st. Historians proselytize the masses
to the worship of the Round Tops as the paramount position on the field. Filmmakers
and authors fictionalize accounts of great heroism across the field. But, the farm of
Henry Culp, and the series of two hills bearing his name, are oft left out of the prevalent
interpretation of Gettysburg. They become an afterthought. For five small regiments of
Union infantry from the Empire State, the hill was far more than an afterthought. The
struggle for the Union, for the entire war and for their very lives, culminated for the men
of the Third Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac
behind wood and earth shelters on a small patch of ground jutting up from Pennsylvanian
farm fields.
As the first shots were being fired on the fields of Gettysburg, the Army of the
Potomac’s Twelfth Corps was continuing the march it had commenced six days previous.
On June 26th, 1863, the northward movements of Robert E. Lee had become clear to then
Army of the Potomac commander Joseph Hooker, to the point that the union column,
including the Twelfth corps, had begun crossing the Potomac River for points north. This
would not be a repeat of the travesty that had been Chancellorsville, the travesty that
would get Hooker fired in the end. Eager for action and to prove themselves better than
they had in recent battles, James S. Hyde of the 137th NYSV bragged of the move that the
unit’s, “turn had come at last….We crossed the river and were again in Maryland.” In
spite of the excitement and doom which hung over the horizon just north of the MasonDixon line, Hyde still found time to go “out to a house and [get] all the cherries [he]
could eat. Cherries were very thick all along the road.” General Lee’s strategy to come
1
Col. Henry A. Barnum. "No. 313. -- Report of Col. Henry A. Barnum, One hundred and fortyninth New York Infantry.." in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. Vol. XXVII, No. 1.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889) 868-869; 149th National Colors. (Syracuse, NY:
Collections of the Onondaga County Clerk’s Office).
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north to feed a much wearied army was proven by Hyde, in that both armies undoubtedly
found the fruits of the relatively unravaged Maryland ripe for the picking2
By July 1st, the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of
Northern Virginia had both crossed the Mason-Dixon Line and were marching well
beyond the borders of the Federally aligned lands. The Confederates had burned key rail
bridges at Harrisburg, the Barracks at Carlisle and raided stores of supplies in towns and
villages stretching from Chambersburg to York. As the Battle of Gettysburg began,
Confederate and Union forces converged on the small town in the south of Pennsylvania,
not knowing the extent to which the bloody conflict would grow. Marching north, one
soldier of the 137th NYSV, Corporal James S. Hyde, remarked that, “this was a real union
place.” The men, both Union and Confederate, were given or bought (bought is a loose
term, as the Confederate currency used was good for nothing but sentiment in the North,
and the buying was more condoned theft) supplies and rations, bountiful in the lands
heretofore untouched by total war.3
In the town of Two Taverns, about 5 miles south-east of the town of Gettysburg
proper, the Third Brigade paused for the night, garnering supplies and joviality before the
rush into battle of the next day. Corporal Hyde remarked on one exploit that he, “and a
friend went to a house and stayed all night. We got some bread (and) milk, had a very
good supper. [Greene’s Third] Brigade might move at any moment but there was a very
pretty girl there and we concluded to run the risk. The old folks were nearly scared to
death, Hannah was brave as a lion.” Moving on the word that General Reynolds was
dead, Twelfth Corps commander Henry W. Slocum pushed a portion of his force
forward, up the Baltimore Pike to a position along Rock Creek, very close to the southern
tip of Culp’s Hill. Meanwhile, another portion of the brigade appears to have camped
very near what is now called Little Round Top, but which at the time was equally as often
referred to as Sugar Loaf.4
By the end of the first day of battle, Union forces, performing what started as a
brilliant defense in depth and fighting retreat designed by General John Buford, but
moving on to what became a rout as troops from the First and Eleventh Corps ran through
the streets of town. Pockets of men would pause to fight for a street or an ally, but the
true objective lie just to the south of the town’s limits: the heights. These hills, Cemetery
and Culp’s, comprised the core of the Union position on the field for the next two days.
Here, Meade constructed the famed Union fishhook line, with shank stretching down
Cemetery Ridge and barb curving round to Culp’s Hill, the entire hook hinging on
Cemetery Hill.5
As the dawn broke on July 2nd, orders were being issued to prepare General
Meade’s planned line of battle. The Twelfth Corps was to change their position from the
far left of the army, in the vicinity of the Round Tops, to the far right of the army, in the
vicinity of Culp’s Hill. They were to be the barb anchored on the wooded hill. Drawing
2
James S. Hyde. The Gettysburg Campaign of the 137th New York. Military History Institute
(Carlisle, PA) Manuscript Archive. June 26th Entry.
3
Ibid. June 30th Entry.
4
Ibid. July 1st Entry; Major Henry M Macguire. “102d Regiment Infantry Historical Sketch” in
Monuments Commission for the Battlefields of Gettysburg and Chattanooga [commonly and henceforth
referred to as New York at Gettysburg]. Vol 2. (Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon, 1900) 631-639.
5
Noah Andre Trudeau. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. (New York: HarperCollins, 2002)
221-250.
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their left flank off of the First Corps line and running at a rough ninety degree angle to it,
the Twelfth corps ran around and down the military crest of the large, northern summit of
Culp’s Hill, into a swale, then again up and over the smaller of the two summits. Slocum
arrayed his line with Geary’s Second Division running along a serrated front, following
the contour of the land. Greene’s Brigade would form the left anchor with the First
Corps, followed by Candy and Kane to their right, extending the full length of the two
hills. The hill boded nothing of the terror to come. “It was a bright and pleasant morning
when they arrived upon the site, and the soldiers felt restful under the shade of the
magnificent trees.” This rest, however, would be short-lived, as, “an order came to build
breastworks.” The order, reportedly rescinded by Geary and only carried out following
much protest from General Greene, would prove a deciding factor on the hill. “The
breastworks were simple, composed of logs, rocks, cordwood, fence rails and earth; but
they were formidable, and when finished there was a feeling of satisfaction among men
and officers. There was a possibility of their use, and if so, there they were, ready.” To
construct breastworks during the first years of the war was a rarity. Colonel Lewis R.
Stegman of the 102nd NYSV noted that, “It was only the second time in their history that
the regiments of the brigade had built entrenchments, and the first trial of their merits had
not proven fortunate, as the heavy death-roll of the One hundred and forty-ninth, and the
flanking at Chancellorsville gives evidence. Yet they built these works willingly and
with heartiness, only hoping that they might prove serviceable.” In spite of their
misgivings, the men of created formidable breastworks. “Right and left, the men felled
the trees, and blocked them up into a close log fence. Piles of cordwood which lay
nearby were quickly appropriate…. All along the rest of the line of the corps a similar
defense was constructed.” The works weren’t necessarily hasty, either. The unit history
of the 149th NYSV reports that, “a log was blocked up on top of the works to permit a
musket to be fired under it, while the log was intended to protect the head.” This head
log evidences the care that went into these breastworks, not just hastily thrown together
piles of fence rails, as had been used by the First Corps on the previous day’s retreat, but
instead well planned, well thought-out and formidable defenses. 6
The Twelfth Corps line was arrayed with Greene’s five regiments to the north,
abutting the First Corps and running southward, while Kane’s men resumed this line at
the right flank Greene’s line, near the dip or saddle between the two hills. The line ran
north to south as follows. Northmost on Culp’s Hill was the 78th NYSV. Hailing from
the New York City area, the 78th was mustered into service in April of 1862, promptly
moved to the seat of war, then shuffled from corps to corps, seemingly an orphan
regiment. They finally settle in with the New York Brigade, Greene’s Brigade, as do all
of the members of the Brigade at Gettysburg, with whom they will remain for the war’s
duration (in spite of being moved between the twelfth and the twentieth corps). Each of
the other regiments in the brigade have similar histories. The next most northerly unit
was the 60th NYSV, recruited and mustered at Ogdensburg, New York. In the army since
October of 1861, the 60th’s veteran status was well attained through fights at Second
6
Colonel Lewis R. Stegman. “Dedication of the 149th Monument at Gettysburg: Oration by
Colonel Lewis R. Stegman, 102nd NY Volunteers” in New York at Gettysburg. Vol 3. (Albany, NY: J.B.
Lyon, 1900) 1013; Captain Jesse H. Jones, “The Breastworks at Culp’s Hill,” vol. 3 of Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War (New York: Century Printing Co., 1888), 316; Captain George K. Collins. Memoirs of the
149th NYV. 2nd ed. (Hamilton: Edmonston Publishing, 1995. Original Syracuse, G.K. Collins, 1891), 144.
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Manassas, Antietam, Winchester, Fredericksburg, and varied and sundry other
engagements. On the right of the 60th lay the 102nd NYSV, recruited in New York City as
well. They were mustered in March of 1862. To their south was the 149th NYSV.
Recruited in Syracuse, New York, and its county of Onondaga, the 149th had mustered in
early in September of 1862. Finally, anchoring Greene’s right, and adjoining Kane’s men
on the southern, smaller summit, the 137th NYSV was the baby of the Brigade, having
been mustered and sent to war in late September of 1862. To the south of these troops
lay Kane’s men, to their rear lay Candy in support.7
With a full corps in place, Culp’s Hill was in good tactical shape. This, however,
would change by the late afternoon. As the battle raged in other fronts, “the troops which
had arrived [on Culp’s Hill] were resting quietly, and all was as peaceful and serene as
though there were no war in the land.” Suddenly, near 4 o’clock, a fierce artillery duel
struck up between the guns of Knap's Independent Battery "E", Pennsylvania Light
Artillery and the Confederate artillery on Benner’s Hill, directly opposite. Knap’s guns
were positioned near the north end of Greene’s line, close to the 78th and 60th NYSV. As
the fight drove on, Knap’s guns, positioned near the hill’s crest and therefore more
vulnerable, began taking heavy casualties. “The batteries lost several gunners and
drivers. The men of the Seventy-eight volunteered to supply their places, and assisted
during the entire engagement in carrying ammunition from caissons to the guns. While
engaged in this work, one of the regiment was killed and another wounded.” The 78th
wasn’t alone in their assistance. The men of the 60th noted as well that “some of the
cannoneers [sic] having been wounded were replaced by men from the Sixtieth who
understood artillery practice.” The counter battery fire, lasting a little more than an hour,
threw these infantrymen into the fray in a decidedly unorthodox manner: doing another
branch of the army’s work. This would be far from the last unconventional practice on
the field that day.8
As the hill once again cooled, a new threat was imminent. In the south of the
field, on the Union left flank, a Confederate force under James Longstreet had massed
an attack and was pressing General Daniel Sickle’s line of Third corps troops off of
their exposed and untenable position in the peach orchard and wheatfield. The left
flank of the army was under extreme pressure and it looked as though the amount of
troops being thrown into the fray wouldn’t hold the Confederate advance. Meade
decided to utilize his interior lines to his advantage, and called upon the right flank
troops, the entire Twelfth Corps under Slocum, to vacate their newly entrenched
positions, cede the hill and support the left flank. To the commanders on the right,
this was leaving the entire Union position in a parlous state. The right wing of the
army would hang, undefended on Cemetery Hill: open to enfilade fire and attack.
General Greene took issue with the command passed on to him from his
superiors and decided it imprudent to leave such a large gap in defense.
Circumventing his immediate commander, Geary, whose orders and personal wishes
were to move to the south end of the field, Greene turned to Henry W. Slocum, corps
7
Dyer, Frederick H. A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. Vol. 2. (Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1979) 1426-1427, 1435, 1445, 1457, 1461.
8
Brevet Captain John W. Peck. “78th Regiment Infantry Historical Sketch” Vol 2. (Albany, NY:
J.B. Lyon, 1900) 629; Lieutenant Edwin A Merritt. “Dedication of Monument. 60 th Regiment Infantry,
July 2, 1888” in New York at Gettysburg. Vol 2. (Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon, 1900) 450.
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commander and head of the Union right wing on the field. With Slocum’s permission
and thereby the permission of General Meade, Greene was allowed to stay in place to
hold the Union right. Greene’s new orders were to, “occupy the whole of the
intrenchments [sic] previously occupied by the Twelfth Army Corps with [his]
brigade.” As the line began to stretch, the Confederate troops were fording Rock
Creek at the base of the hill, and as the Union line was falling into position in single
rank, each man separated by some distance, the Confederates were reaching the 78th
NYSV, who had just been rushed in to support the skirmish line. It is roughly 6:00
pm and hell is about to break loose across the entire front of Culp’s Hill as an entire
Confederate division, with three brigades, was crashing through the woods at
breakneck speed, aimed directly at Greene’s line.9
“The Seventy-eighth [NY] made a stubborn resistance on the skirmish line,
and as the shadows of evening deepened in the forest defiles of Rock Creek, the
flashes from their rifles glowed with an angry light.” The stand at the creek was a
prelude to the battle to come. The Third Brigade was about to show the effectiveness
of proper leadership, training, preparation and technological utilization. As they
fought their way back, the “Confederate advance was close behind; but as the men of
the Seventy-eighth, leaping over the works on their return, uncovered their front, a
line of fire ran across the whole front of Greene’s Brigade.” This quick retaliation on
the Federals’ part was facilitated by the breastworks’ construction. They were
“covered with an abattis [spikes or poles carved from branches], heavy boughs and
logs, [and] could not be distinguished fifty yards to the front.” With cover so well
constructed, all the units behind the works need do was to have the “colors…dropped
behind the works and the men closely concealed.” When in range, the Brigade poured
in a heavy volley, then, “colors were flung out, and with three hearty cheers on [the
Brigade’s] part, the action commenced in earnest.” 10
What thereon raged was some of the hottest fighting of the entire war. As the
Confederates made their advance along the front, the 137th NY refused the flank of the
Union army, falling back into a traverse cut at a perpendicular to the main line of
entrenchments. “About 8 p.m. the enemy appeared on our right flank, in the
intrenchments [sic] (which were thrown back perpendicularly to Kane's line, occupied by
Colonel Ireland with the One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment New York
Volunteers) from which Williams' division had been withdrawn, and attacked the right
flank of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment New York Volunteers. Colonel
Ireland withdrew his right, throwing back his line perpendicular to the intrenchments
[sic] in which he had been in position, and presenting his front to the enemy in their
[n]ew position.” Ireland’s refusal was more forced by enemy tactics than Greene lets on
in his official report, however. James Hyde, himself of the 137th, writes of the tactic that
the Confederates, “succeeded in flanking past [their] right, and the 137th Regt. had to fall
back as the balls were coming in their rear.” Regardless, Colonel Ireland’s refusal on the
9
Brigadier General George S. Greene. " No. 307. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene,
U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade." in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. Vol. XXVII,
No. 1. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889) 856-857;
10
Brevet Captain John W. Peck. 629; Captain Charles P Horton to John B. Bachelder, The
Bachelder Papers: Gettysburg in Their Own Words, Vol 1. (Dayton, Ohio; Morningside, 1994-95), 293294.
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right, much like Chamberlain’s similar action on the left, protects a much threatened
flank by rendering the actual end of the army less accessible.11
As fighting continued, the darkness began taking its toll. The Confederate
advance began falling into disarray, with Confederate troops falling out of line-of-battle
and seeking shelter behind “the trees and large stones or rocks which covered the
ground.” The organization of the Federals was not faring much better, compounded by
the scattered array of men in single file with great spaces in-between. “It was so dark I
could not see a man who belonged to our brigade and did not know where they were,
only by the firing,” James Hyde remarked. “So I retreated for a short time.” The 149th
had a similar, albeit more general incident. George Collins recollected that, “about 9
o’clock, in the midst of a hot fire, an order came from some source to retreat; for what
purpose no one could tell and it was suspected that the enemy was in the rear. The
regiment commenced falling back in good order and had gone several rods when it was
directed by Col. Randall to return, which it did with a cheer.” Here, a small movement,
one of “a small detachment of the 3d Brigade,” rushed to the rear for support and reserve,
with “the other men observing the movement, and not understanding its purpose, mistook
the order for one to retreat and so passed it along the line.”12
Heroic deeds, such as Lilly’s mending of the flag under fire weren’t as rare as
would have been expected. The 60th NY, during a slight lull in the fighting, found
themselves “ordered forward. The men eagerly leaped the works and surrounded fiftysix of the enemy, including two officers, whom they brought in as prisoners. They also
captured a brigade-flag, said to belong to Jones’s brigade, and one regimental banner,
which, as we learned from one of our prisoners, was a present from the ladies of the
district in which the companies were organized.” The flags, however, weren’t standing
when captured. On the contrary, the charging force found, “seven Rebel
officers…covered by the colors and guard…The effect of our fire was so terrible that the
flags were abandoned, and the prisoners were afraid to either advance or retreat.” Later
in the battle, as units began running low on ammunition, bayonets were readied and all
intent to perform a charge was intimated, but none happened because of swift resupply.
Fighting again picked up around 4:00 am, when the remaining troops of the
Twelfth Corps arrived to retake their trenches. These reinforcements, later accompanied
by men of various regiments, including those of the Sixth Corps, provided a much needed
chance for the Third Brigade to clean their weapons and resupply their cartridge boxes.
The arrival of reinforcements also sparked one of the greatest cases of serendipity on the
battlefield at Gettysburg. By complete chance, the unit which joins the One-hundred and
forty-ninth was the 122nd NYSV, also raised in Onondaga County. The Sixth Corps
arrived, “about eleven o’clock in the forenoon.” The sense of relief was great throughout
the line. “The men were surprised and delighted to learn that the 122nd N. Y. joined them
in the trenches on the right. No sooner was it known to the two regiments that they were
in such close proximity to each other than the woods rang with cheers that drowned even
the din of battle. Those cheers did more to turn the tide of battle than has been credited to
them, for soon after the enemy gave way and did not renew the attack during the day.”13
11
Brigadier General George S. Greene. 856; James S. Hyde. July 2nd Entry.
James S. Hyde. July 2nd Entry; Captain George K. Collins. 139.
13
Captain George K. Collins. 141-142.
12
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By noon of July 3rd, both the lower and upper summits of Culp’s Hill had been
secured for the Union. Greene’s men, for the most part, still retained their original line of
battle from the night before, with individual units from other Corps and Brigades
plugging gaps or switching out during resupply periods. The New York Brigade retained
the overall control of their works through all: a testament to their tenacity and resilience.
The men were quick to point out the superiority of the New York Brigade’s heroism.
One of Collins’s most striking vignettes is that of a “ninety day Maryland regiment
[which] was sent to relieve the 149th in the trenches. It came within four or five rods and
fired in the backs of the men and scampered away.” Collins is quick to point out that the
149th got the last laugh in the affair, as they later served as bayonet wielding file closers
for the same Maryland short timers. Actions often speak louder than words ever could,
and one anecdotal account strikes at the spirit of the New York Brigade. “Major Watkins
Leigh of Virginia dashed out on horseback and with drawn sword attempted to [rally his
troops]. He fell almost immediately, his horse and himself pierced with many bullets.
Struck with admiration at his gallantry…after conclusion of the action, [the Brigade]
gave him, by Gen. Greene’s orders, a soldier’s burial in rear of our line, and near the
graves of our own officers and men.”14
The men of the units themselves weren’t the only ones to crow of their
achievements. Their peers were oft their champions. One soldier of the 66th Ohio,
who returned to the field on July 3rd to support the Third Brigade wrote that “Greens
[sic] little command although overpowered were not dismayed, and although crowded
up towards the foot of Culps Hill, most heroically kept up the fight and held on to a
part of the works….” But, there is one notable omission in the acknowledgement of
the Third Brigade’s bravery on Culp’s Hill. In his original official report on the battle
of Gettysburg, Meade mentions naught of the Third Brigade, as adeptly pointed out by
Brigadier General Alpheus Williams. The passage of the Official Record reads as
such,
“During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth Corps
were sent as re-enforcements. During their absence, the line on the extreme
right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by
the enemy, who, during the absence of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps,
advanced and occupied a part of his line.”
With no mention of the valiant defense of the hill, Williams notes that Greene’s fate
has been sealed, and the importance of Culp’s Hill to the annals of history has been
lost forever.15
14
Captain George K. Collins. 143; Captain Charles P Horton to John B. Bachelder, 297.
Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Powell to John B. Bachelder, The Bachelder Papers: Gettysburg in
Their Own Words, Vol 1. (Dayton, Ohio; Morningside, 1994-95), 585-586; Major General George G.
Meade. “No. 6. -- Reports of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the
Potomac, of operations June 28-August 3, and correspondence with the authorities in Washington, &c.” in
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. Vol. XXVII, No. 1. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1889) 117; Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams to John B. Bachelder, The Bachelder Papers:
Gettysburg in Their Own Words, Vol 1. (Dayton, Ohio; Morningside, 1994-95), 64-66.
15
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George K. Collins didn’t see the fate of the Third Brigade as sealed, however.
All it would take to ensure the rightful place in history for the unit’s actions was a
series of monuments. “Every one we met was talking about the ‘Bloody Angle,’
‘Pickett’s Charge,’ ‘Little Round Top,’ ‘Devil’s Den,’ and the ‘Railroad Cut’ back of
Seminary Ridge.…Culp's Hill was little known and seldom visited, except by those
who had been engaged there. This state of affairs was deplored by our party, and
before we separated we pledged ourselves, to another, that we would see a monument
erected in honor of our beloved regiment on this spot.” All it would take was
memorialization, according to Collins. His theory never worked, however. Each of
the units of the Third Brigade has a monument, yet their place in history and their
importance in the battle is nary discussed. History truly has little noted nor long
remembered what they did here. For a few hours in July, on the right end of the line,
a small force held off a superior force in a David and Goliath struggle for dominance
of a hill beyond which lay the rear of the entire Union army. The struggle they placed
on the hill, Greene’s “fight in the evening of 2nd ought to be more conspicuously
remembered. You know that,” Henry Barnum concluded in 1891, “that sturdy
brigade saved the army and the battle, in the evening of the 2d.”16
16
Captain George K. Collins. “149th Monument at Gettysburg: Transfer of Monument” in New
York at Gettysburg. Vol 3. (Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon, 1900) 1018; Colonel Henry A. Barnum to John B.
Bachelder, The Bachelder Papers: Gettysburg in Their Own Words, Vol 3. (Dayton, Ohio; Morningside,
1994-95), 1793.