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國立中山大學外國語文所
碩士論文
Department of Foreign Languages and Literature
National Sun Yat-sen University
Master Thesis
神權的確立：一窺改革派作者的論點
Setting the Foundations of Divine Right: The Arguments of the
Reformation Writers
研究生：何香凝
Shannon Alyesha Howatt
指導教授：王 儀 君 教授
Professor I-chun Wang
中華民國101年5月
May 2012
Howatt ii
Howatt iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my advisor, I-chun Wang, whose guidance and feedback was
invaluable. I would also like to thank Jocelyn Huang for her help; you are an irreplaceable
friend. Lastly I would like to thank Chad Gemmell and my family, for without your support
and encouragement this thesis would never have been possible. To all of you I am very
grateful.
Howatt iv
君權神授：宗教改革者的辯論
宗教改革是一項非常重要的分水嶺，切割了中古世紀和早期現代時期。 中世紀的英國已有君
權神授的概念，在這樣的概念中，在位者擁有絕對的權力，一神之下，萬人之上；這樣的議題在早期現
代政治理論中廣受討論，尤其在尚·博丹(Jean
Bodin)所著的《國家論》充分定義了君王的權限。君權的核心意義在於屬下或子民對君主絕對的遵從、
不容許越權，然而在宗教改革者如馬丁路德(Martin Luther)和威廉丁道爾(William
Tyndale)的作品中，他們的理論卻呈現出這種服從和零反抗的文化現象對君權神授所可能導致的後果。
此篇論文將自文化史上中古世紀的反教廷運動至博丹對權力完整的解釋追溯君權神授理論的脈絡。
本論文是從文化研究和歷史學的角度切入君權神授主題並且探討此ㄧ理論的興起，並且找出在
歷史洪流的情況下所影響的重要作品，如:博丹、馬丁路德和丁道爾的作品，更進而嘗試在不同歷史年
代中詮釋君權作品中的共通點。除此之外，此論文也會探討每部作品對當代和新世代的影響。
論文的第一部份藉由博丹的《國家論》檢視十六世紀的知識份子：博丹如何剖析絕對君權。值
得注意的是，博丹並未全然支持絕對君權，但就如同其他的政治思想家一樣，面對法國內戰的紛亂，不
得不承認唯有足夠權威的帝王才有能力整頓國家。博丹在《國家論》中清楚的定義了王權的意義和義務
，闡明了王權至高、不容共享的特質。並且強調王權是除了神以外「唯一」的最高統治者。因此，透過
君權神授，博丹維護絕對的君權，並且透過絕對的反抵抗、反革命和反謀害暴君傳達其論點。
本論文試圖比較《國家論》和義大利學者帕多瓦的馬西利亞斯在《和平的防禦者》所呈現的哲
學思想。 雖然馬西利亞斯的思想博丹的《國家論》頗為相異，因為馬西利亞斯十分厭惡絕對王權，然
而教宗干預世俗事務，促使他掀起反教宗逾權的論戰，因此他的論點在君權神授的基礎中扮演了不可或
缺的要素。
本篇論文中，中古和近代對於宗教改革者的論點將一併討論、比較。尤其是，如同馬西利亞斯
，路德和威廉‧丁道爾也支持反教宗論述。路德在促進德國為基督教國家請願書〈An Appeal to the
Ruling Class of German Nationality as to the Amelioration of the State of
Christendom (1520)〉文中批判了掩蓋教宗錯誤行為的三道保護牆； 在《俗世權威》一書中，路德同
意馬西利亞斯的論點認為，教宗並未擁有世俗事務中強制的力量或司法權，並指出國王才是上帝最佳代
言人，因此一個好基督徒就必須臣服在國王之下，不可違抗其命令。丁道爾的 《基督徒的順服》進一
步發展了路德的政治理論，特別是在「順服」觀念中，丁道爾強調君權神授，並指出侵奪掌權者的權力
相等於侵奪上帝的意志。他相信，不順服只會萌生更多的違抗，最後導致的就是混亂。同樣奠基於神學
，在純反教宗和透過歷史和民法所辯護而成的精密政治哲學中，路德和丁道爾的政治思維在以上二者中
搭起了橋梁。
總的來說，關於世俗對權力的掌控，服從和零反抗，在亨利八世和羅馬教廷的決裂中，宗教改
革派作家特別提供了相當實用的知識性支持。宗教改革中因中古世紀反教宗論戰而生的「順從」教義深
刻影響了現代早期的政治思維。服從和零反抗也使十六世紀和十七世紀建構了君權神授理論支持下的統
治模式。
Howatt v
Abstract– Setting the Foundations of Divine Right: The Arguments of the Reformation
Writers
The Reformation was a period of change in which there was a distinct break between
the medieval tradition and the Early Modern Period. Divine Right to Rule, the doctrine that
states monarchs derive their right to rule from and are only answerable to God, became a
central point in Early Modern political theories, such as in The Six Bookes of the
Commonwealth by Jean Bodin. Sovereignty was described in absolutist terms that stressed
obedience to the ruler and denied resistance under any circumstances. The cultural
phenomenon of obedience and non-resistance largely emerged through the doctrines of
Reformation writers such as Martin Luther and William Tyndale. This thesis attempts to
trace the intellectual origins of the Divine Right theory from the medieval antipapal polemics
to Bodin’s concrete definition of sovereignty.
This thesis uses a cultural studies approach to trace the ideas which eventually led to
the emergence of the Divine Right theory. It finds similarities in the historical circumstance,
which influenced the production of each, individual work, and finds similarities between the
texts of different historical periods. It also explores the influence each text had on its
contemporaries and on later generations.
To start, Bodin’s The Six Bookes of the Common-Weale will be examined to
determine the definition of absolutism defined by divine right as seen by sixteenth century
intellectuals. It is important to note that Bodin did not always support royal absolutism, but
like many other political thinkers, the chaos of the French Civil Wars led him to the
conclusion that only a strong king has the ability to unify a country. Bodin’s Six Bookes set
out to clearly define the meaning of sovereignty and the obligations of the sovereign. He
determined a sovereign has to have supreme, unshared power that is not limited by any
subject. Moreover, a sovereign ruler recognizes no higher authority, save God. Therefore,
Howatt vi
Bodin justifies royal absolutism through Divine Right. This becomes clear through his stance
on resistance—active resistance, rebellion and tyrannicide are forbidden under all
circumstances.
The ideas highlighted in Six Bookes will be compared with the philosophy presented
by Marsilius of Padua in Defensor Pacis. It may seem strange to compare thought of
Marsilius against that of Bodin, for Marsilius actually had a profound dislike of absolutism
(Copleston 310), however Marsilius’ doctrine plays a crucial role in the foundations of divine
right. Appalled by papal interference into secular affairs, Marsilius created an antipapal
polemic, which attempts to destroy the papacy’s claims on temporal power and places the
state above the church in earthly affairs.
Both the medieval and modern standpoints will then be compared with the ideas of
Reformers. Like Marsilius, both Luther and William Tyndale begin their respective works
with antipapal rhetoric. Luther’s An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to
the Amelioration of the State of Christendom (1520) attacks the “three walls” he felt protected
the pope’s erroneous actions. In Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,
Luther agrees with Marsilius’ opinion that the pope had no coercive power or jurisdiction in
earthly affairs, and identifies the king as God’s representative on earth. Thus a good
Christian has the duty to obey the king and not resist his orders. Tyndale’s The Obedience of
a Christian Man further developed Luther’s political theory, in particular with the idea of
obedience. Tyndale emphasizes the divine right to rule and that usurping a sovereign ruler is
equivalent to usurping the will of God. In his eyes, disobedience breeds disobedience and the
result of rebellion is chaos. While still based on theology, the political thinking of both
Luther and Tyndale act as a bridge between merely attacks against the pope and the
sophisticated political philosophies justified by history and civil law.
Howatt vii
In conclusion, Reformation writers were immeasurably useful in providing
intellectual support for secular claims for supremacy, obedience and non-resistance,
particularly in the ecclesiastical split between Henry VIII and Rome. The Reformation
doctrine of obedience developed from the antipapal polemics of the medieval period and
become a defining point in Early Modern political tracts. Obedience and non-resistance also
enabled the claim of Divine Right to Rule by sixteenth and seventeenth century rulers.
Keywords: Divine Right of Kings, Royal Absolutism, Early Modern England, Reformation,
Church and State
Howatt viii
Contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ ii
君權神授：宗教改革者的辯論............................................................................................................ iv
Abstract– Setting the Foundations of Divine Right: The Arguments of the Reformation Writers ................... v
Table of Figures .................................................................................................................................... ix
Note on the Text ................................................................................................................................... ix
Introduction: The Reformation Revolution and Impact of Divine Right of Kings ......................................... 1
Jean Bodin’s Political Thoughts: Absolutism and Divine Right in The Six Bookes of the Common-Weale .. 11
Medieval Foundations: The Anti-Papal Polemic of Marsilius of Padua ..................................................... 29
Royal Supremacy and the Reformation: Martin Luther and William Tyndale ............................................ 49
Divine Right of Kings: A Reflection of History ...................................................................................... 81
Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................ 88
Howatt ix
Table of Figures
Papal versus Marsilius’ Views on the Chain of Being………………………………………38
Luther’s View on the Chain of Being………………………………………………………..62
Note on the Text
This work followed the style of MLA 7th Edition for all citations and references.
Introduction: The Reformation Revolution and Impact of Divine Right of Kings
History tends to follow trends on intellectual thinking. Most of the time there is a
slow progression in the evolution of ideologies until there is a sudden rupture, a revolution of
ideas, which cast all previous assumptions into question and forces even the everyman to
question traditional customs and beliefs. The Reformation, along with the Renaissance, was
the revolutionary moment which marked the transition from the medieval period to the
modern era. These movements left no ideas unchallenged and, along with the religious
implications of the movement, specifically cast the role of the ruler and role of the subjects
into the spotlight. This period influenced the minds of people from all levels of society and
changed the way they regarded the world, human activity and the afterlife.
At a time of wars, terrible epidemics such as the bubonic plague, and the general
feeling of uncertainty, the promise of a peaceful afterlife gave hope to the people. Thus, in
the Early Modern Era, the papacy and the Roman Catholic Church held immense power in
Europe. This power was not limited to religion but included a monopoly in literacy and
ensuring social cohesion through Catholicism, and this power extended over political rulers
as well; excommunication of rulers and interdicts over their countries were powerful tools.
Daniel Philpott discusses the importance of the Reformation,
Without the Reformation, history would have looked different. In essence,
medieval impediments to a sovereign state system would not have disappeared
when they did by only much late...Protestant ideas—continental in geography and
encompassing in their content—challenged all temporal powers of the church and
empire. (215)
The Reformation raised new issues, particularly relationship between church and state and
the right of resistance (Copleston 313). The theology of the Reformers generally stated how
the Roman Catholic Church and papacy had erred, which included the confiscation of Church
Howatt 2
property, ending the emperor’s right to enforce religious uniformity, denying ecclesiastical
participation in temporal offices and politics and eliminating the ecclesiastical powers of the
pope and emperor (Philpott 222-23). Since Rome appeared to be more concerned with secular
political power, it influenced many men into thinking that the Word of God was safer under
the authority of a strong, national sovereign than in the hands of an errant Pope (Whitney
388). The implication of this was drastic for the void left by these relinquished powers was
assumed by the secular authorities (Philpott 223). Furthermore, medieval political
theologians allowed the right to resist a tyrant through a strong sense of law, but Reformation
made this problematic as many Protestant leaders disagreed with their predecessors on this
matter (Copleston 313).
The Divine Right of Kings theory offered rulers the ability to legitimately place
themselves and their policies ahead of those of the papacy. Reformation writing clearly
states that Princes were placed by God to rule a land and no one on Earth has a higher
authority than them. While English kings had been linked with divinity since the Middle
Ages (Cooper 213), the actions of Henry VIII cemented the concept of divine right when he
declared himself the head of the Anglican Church. While English kings established technical
supremacy over the Church in 1517, the Roman Catholic Church was still a formidable foe,
for it possessed vast holdings of land and wealth, archbishops and bishops occupied political
offices, managed education and poor relief (Philpott 210). However after passing the Act of
Supremacy (1534), to defy the King would be to defy God. It is generally accepted that royal
absolutism, justified by Divine Right of Kings, was a viable political policy by the
seventeenth century, but by examining the literature of the Reformation it is apparent the
foundations of divine right emerge from the Reformation.
The success of this thesis requires the clear definitions of two important concepts:
first, Royal Absolutism; and second, Divine Right of Kings. Royal Absolutism can be
Howatt 3
difficult to define since by the seventeenth century various, competing definitions existed, not
just between different writers, but even in the different political writings of the thinker (Daly
228). Moreover, real governments of the time, while absolute in name, were in actuality a
mixture of the classical governing elements: monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy (Daly
228). Nonetheless, absolutism essentially requires the ruler to have the ability to impose laws
on all his subjects without requiring consultation (Burgess 842). The ruling power must not
have any checks or challenges on his power from other agencies, such as judicial, legislative,
religious, economic, or electoral (“Absolutism”). In England, a king could do this, without
being labelled as a tyrant, as long as he adhered to the moral guidelines stipulated by natural
and divine law in using absolute authority (Burgess 843).
Often royal absolutism is defended by the Divine Right of Kings (“Absolutism”). The
essential idea is that the ruler derives his power solely from God, not the people or the pope
(Burgess 841). As kings derived their authority from God, no earthly authority could hold
the ruler accountable to his actions (“Divine Right of Kings”). This theory did not forbid the
election of the king by the people; however the people could not resist or actively disobey
their king (Burgess 841). This theory potentially justifies tyrannical rule as divinely ordained
punishment, or divine retribution for humanity’s sins, which was administered by rulers
(“Absolutism”). So, while Divine Right of Kings and Royal Absolutism were not the same
thing, most theories of Royal Absolutism incorporated Divine Right into their political theory
(Burgess 841).
The Renaissance period marks the rise of royal absolutism though not all political
theories of the period supported it (Copleston 310). Despite having a limited reach in
England, divine right theory has an important place in intellectual history. England first
witnessed the rise of Tudor absolutism with Henry VII (1485-1509) when he centralized the
monarchic power by ending the war of the Roses (Copleston 310). Henry VIII (1509-47) was
Howatt 4
one of many new national monarchs to assert his authority in matters of both church and
state. James I (1603-25) was the foremost proponent of divine right; however the theory
largely disappeared from English politics after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 (“Divine
Right of Kings”). The brief appeal of divine right has led Frederick Copleston to conclude
that it “was not really a philosophical theory at all…Indeed, the theory of divine right of
kings was a passing phenomenon...” (Copleston 311).
While absolutism in England was relatively short-lived, the rising class of merchants
preferred the centralization of power under the king and were willing to support it at the
expense of the feudal lords (Copleston 310). Absolutism in sovereignty, defended by divine
right theory, acted as a reflection of the centralization of power in the early modern era. The
growth of political absolutism seen throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were
reflected in political theory (Copleston 310).
By the latter half of the fifteenth century, national leaders had achieved supremacy
within their country, by securing internal loyalties at a national, rather than regional level,
maintained standing armies and had unified a larger part of the bureaucratic administration
(Ozment 182). The rise of centralization was matched by the decay of the feudal system and
also marked the transition between the medieval and modern concept of state and sovereignty
(Copleston 310). While the consolidation of centralized power under the ruler matched by
the growth of royal absolutism did not necessarily mean the general acceptance of absolutism
in the political philosophy sphere, rather these two phenomena reflected the “felt need for
unity” in the rapidly changing times (Copleston 311). Copleston argues that even Niccolò
Machiavelli’s emphasis on “monarchic absolutism, the emphasis was due, not to any illusions
about the divine right of kings, but to his conviction that a strong and stable political unity
could only be secured in this way,” (Copleston 311). Many early modern philosophers
Howatt 5
agreed that the nation is best protected against foreign threats by offering absolute authority
to the ruling monarch.
Likewise, Royal Absolutism arose in reaction to growth of national consciousness
(Copleston 312). It is accepted among scholars that the divine right theory in England was
designed to deny Presbyterian and Catholic resistance theories (Burgess 840). Although
there are many versions of church and state relations in the writings of the Reformers, the two
main leaders of the Reformation, Martin Luther and John Calvin, clearly condemned
resistance to the sovereign (Copleston 313). The main function of the divine right theory in
post-Reformation thought was to forbid the people to resist, or disobey their ruler (Burgess
842)
Some also argue that the theory was also designed to magnify their authority of the
king by stating their source of power was directly from God, however unless otherwise
explicitly stated by divine right theorist, this did not mean the sovereign was above the law
(Burgess 840). Originally, the divine right theory was rooted in the medieval conception of
two separate, but parallel worlds, in which temporal power was bestowed to the secular ruler
and the spiritual authority to the Pope (“Absolutism”). The new national monarchs, however,
asserted their authority over both secular and spiritual realms, and so their power was
absolute, in particular against the rival power of the papacy in Rome (“Absolutism”).
Though not the sole cause, the Reformation’s insistence on supporting the national
leader was the central reason modern sovereign states appear in the way they did at the time
they did (Philpott 214). This consolidation of power under an absolute monarch is a crucial
step in developing into a sovereign state as it demolished medieval features of Europe; for
instance the formidable powers of the Holy Roman Emperor and its emperor, the extensive
temporal powers of the papacy and the Roman Catholic Church, religious uniformity, and the
curtailing of sovereign powers of secular rulers (Philpott 214).
Howatt 6
Despite endowing secular leaders with immense powers, divine right was an
uncontroversial theory, since it did not appear to threaten customary practices (Burgess 857).
Certainly the extent of royal power defined by absolutism could be greatly extended, so in
England “for example, [while] the two houses of parliament had to consent to legislation, it
was the king’s le Roi le vault which actually changed a bill into law. It was natural enough to
describe this life-giving legal power as an attribute of royal absolutism, another expression of
sole superiority” (Daly 232). Even so, absolutism and divine right to rule never intended to
strip subjects of their natural, inalienable human rights. On the contrary, the rise of
absolutism also led to philosophical reflection on an unchangeable natural law and natural
rights that bind even sovereign rulers (Copleston 312). Supporters of divine right, including
Jean Bodin, strongly insisted upon defining natural rights, laws and the rights of private
property (Copleston 313).
Lastly, the divine right and absolutism theories of the Reformation greatly influenced
many later thinkers. William Barclay’s De regno et regali potestate (1600), James I’s Trew
Law of Free Monarchies (1598) and Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha (1680) all put forth works
defending absolutism (Copleston 311). More importantly, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan
endorses a more sophisticated version of divine right.
Hobbes employs the idea of divine right to link the church and state, and he maintains
that the clergy’s duty is to simply preach civil obedience (Whitney 384). He supported the
rule of absolute monarchies, not because he profoundly believed in divine right theory, but
rather because he felt royal absolutism best achieves social cohesion, which is continually
challenged by individual egoism (Copleston 312). Hobbes maintains the conviction that
“only a strong and unfettered central power is capable of restraining and overcoming then
centrifugal forces which tend to the dissolution of society” (Copleston 312).
Howatt 7
To summarize, while divine right and royal absolutism lasted less than two hundred
years in England and was limited in practice, its brief history does not overlook the
importance they maintain in the history of philosophical thought. These theories were the
reflections in political thought of the historical circumstances of the Early Modern period, in
which as the powers of the state were being consolidated under a single ruler, the idea of
absolute power was formed into a political ideology. Divine right’s emphasis on nonresistance and obedience to the ruler was seen as the best defense against foreign menaces
that threatened the social cohesion of the new nations and was greatly influenced by the rise
of national consciousness. Royal absolutism encouraged inquiries into natural rights and
laws, as well as into property rights, which even the sovereign ruler could not transgress.
Finally, divine right and royal absolutism theories influenced seventeenth century thinkers,
such as Barclay and Hobbes to further develop the ideas into sophisticated political
philosophies.
Naturally, this work is not the first study into the ideas of divine right of kings. John
Neville Figgis’ The Divine Right of Kings (1896) argues divine right is deeply rooted in
medieval theory that was developed to cope with the political consequences of the
Reformation (Figgis 262). He argues that the theory of divine right ceases to be useful after
the Restoration when it became clear Presbyterianism would never become the dominant
religion in England (262). As he states,
The Theory of Divine Right did not lose its popularity because it was absurd, but
because its work was done…The Divine Right of Kings ceased to have practical
importance, not because its doctrine were untrue but because its teaching had
become unnecessary. The transition stage had passed. The independence of the
state had been attained. (263)
Howatt 8
Figgis concludes that divine right enabled the development of the idea of sovereignty and
thus played an integral role in the development of Western political theory (Burgess 838).
Edward Allen Whitney also studies divine right theory in England with his article
“Erastianism and Divine Right” (1939). Whitney argues that divine right is connected to the
Reformation through Erastianism, which acquired its present meaning through Richard
Hooker’s work (381). Erastianism certainly promotes the supremacy of the state over the
church on the grounds of divine right; however, this intellectual ideology was developed in
the final decade of the sixteenth century and this thesis maintains divine right influenced
English politics much earlier.
This thesis argues that divine right and royal absolutism were embodied in English
politics during the reign of Henry VIII. More importantly this work will trace the evolution
of divine right through the samples of works from the medieval era, the Reformation period,
and the modern era to examine how the idea of divine right developed through the period. It
will also examine the defining documents of the English Reformation, such as the Act of
Supremacy, to find similarities and differences with the writers of the Reformers. This will
illuminate how the theory of divine right was shaped by Reformation.
This work will use a cultural studies approach to examine the historical circumstances
and cultural phenomena that influenced each philosopher. It will then compare and contrast
both the surrounding intellectual environment of each philosopher. Additionally, it will trace
how the ideas transformed.
To start, Bodin’s The Six Bookes of the Common-Weale will be examined to
determine the definition of absolutism defined by divine right as seen by sixteenth century
intellectuals. It is important to note that Bodin did not always support royal absolutism, but
like many other political thinkers, the chaos of the French Civil Wars led him to the
conclusion that only a strong king has the ability to unify a country. Bodin’s Six Bookes set
Howatt 9
out to clearly define the meaning of sovereignty and the obligations of the sovereign. He
determined a sovereign has to have supreme, unshared power that is not limited by any
subject. Moreover, a sovereign ruler recognizes no higher authority, save God. Therefore,
Bodin justifies royal absolutism through Divine Right. This becomes clear through his stance
on resistance—active resistance, rebellion and tyrannicide are forbidden under all
circumstances.
The ideas highlighted in Six Bookes will be compared with the philosophy presented
by Marsilius of Padua in Defensor Pacis. It may seem strange to compare the thought of
Marsilius against that of Bodin, for Marsilius actually had a profound dislike of absolutism
(Copleston 310), however Marsilius’ doctrine plays a crucial role in the foundations of divine
right. Appalled by papal interference into secular affairs, Marsilius created an antipapal
polemic, which attempts to destroy the papacy’s claims on temporal power and places the
state above the church in earthly affairs.
Both the medieval and modern standpoints will then be compared with the ideas of
Reformers. Like Marsilius, both Luther and William Tyndale begin their respective works
with antipapal rhetoric. Luther’s An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to
the Amelioration of the State of Christendom (1520) attacks the “three walls” he felt protected
the pope’s erroneous actions. In Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,
Luther agrees with Marsilius’ opinion that the pope had no coercive power or jurisdiction in
earthly affairs, and identifies the king as God’s representative on earth. Thus a good
Christian has the duty to obey the king and not resist his orders. Tyndale’s The Obedience of
a Christian Man further developed Luther’s political theory, in particular with the idea of
obedience. Tyndale emphasizes the divine right to rule and that usurping a sovereign ruler is
equivalent to usurping the will of God. In his eyes, disobedience breeds disobedience and the
result of rebellion is chaos. While still based on theology, the political thinking of both
Howatt 10
Luther and Tyndale act as a bridge between merely attacks against the pope and the
sophisticated political philosophies justified by history and civil law.
Using this organization of the chapters will clearly show the progression of political
theories predominantly based on theology, as found in Marsilius’, Luther’s and Tyndale’s
works, to one based mainly upon history and law, as seen in Bodin’s text. Furthermore this
organization shows how medieval antipapal tracts were transformed to doctrines professing
the supremacy of the state over the church and absolutism. Finally it will show how divine
right theory preaches obedience and non-resistance to support the sovereign ruler against
threat to society.
Howatt 11
Jean Bodin’s Political Thoughts: Absolutism and Divine Right in The Six Bookes of the
Common-Weale
The Early Modern Period was an era of great change. Lacking the concept of a
supreme law-making authority, in the Middle Ages, there was no concept of “state” (Henshall
122). Nicholas Henshall argues that the concept of state centralizes individual interests to a
single authority which maintains power over collective affairs (122). During the late Middle
Ages national dynasties began to emerge in Europe and this new rise of the king, nation and
secular values begins to replace religious ones (Ozment 4). In France, for instance, the
centralization of the French monarchy begins with the Carpetian kings, and by the thirteenth
century, authorities of all levels answered to the king (Franklin 2). By the fifteen century,
France was arguably the most united country in Europe and strong enough for Francis I to
negotiate the Concordat of Bologna in 1516,1 which allowed the French king to tithe vast
sums of money from ecclesiastical estates, restrict the clergies’ appeals to Rome and to
nominate appointments to benefices of all levels (King 48).
In face of the centralization of state in monarchies during the late Medieval and early
Renaissance periods, the rule of consent was refocused (Franklin 1). While political writings
of the period exhibit prominent absolutist rhetoric, the new administrative positions expected
the king to consult them and would serve to check the monarch’s power (Franklin 1).
However, by the sixteenth century, the Gallican Church2 depended on royal patronage, as did
high aristocrats for administrative posts, the lesser nobility for military poses and the
educated bourgeoisie for jobs in the administration; thus authorities of all levels were too
dependant upon royal favours to seriously challenge the monarchy (Franklin 2).
1
The Concordat of Bologna effectively gave French monarchs control over the Church. It permitted monarchs
to appoint bishops and abbots, thereby ensuring the loyalty of ambitious nobles, as well as giving the monarchy
the right to regulate religious church policies and limit the power of the pope in France (“France”)
2
The Gallican Church is the Roman Catholic Church in France which follows the “Four Gallican Articles”: 1)
The pope has supreme spiritual authority but no secular power; 2) the pope is subject to ecclesiastical councils;
3) the pope must not challenge the accepted customs of the French Church, such as those stipulated in the
Concordat of Bologna, and; 4) papal infallibility in matters of Scripture require confirmation of the Church
(“Gallicanism”).
Howatt 12
The rediscovery of Roman law writers, such as Irnerius3 and Ulpian,4 marked an
important moment for kings to consolidate and legitimatize their power over the papacy and
the Holy Roman Emperor (Ozment 5). Ulpian’s lex regia asserts two important statements.
The first argues that it is royal prerogative to determine law and the second that this
prerogative is supreme and recognizes no higher power (Henshall 123). As Henshall states,
“This made available the notion that somewhere in the community, whether in the people or
in the prince is located the ultimate will, which is the essence of state, and that law-making in
the creative sense was the expression of its power” (123). Julian H. Franklin also notes, in
the late thirteenth century, French kings stated independence from Pope and German
Emperor by comparing the king to Roman princeps (6). And so, that comparison became the
starting point of all political reflections and the roman legal concepts were generally accepted
by French jurists (Franklin 6).
The religious turmoil which affected France in the sixteenth century had a profound
effect, not only on the country, but on the political thought of the epoch. The confusion and
instability of the religious wars led Jean Bodin to create a theory of state which saw
undivided sovereignty to ensure stability (Harding 67). To many, a constitutional approach
and shared rule no longer seemed secure against the threat of rebellion and civil war.
Sixteenth century France was quite unique in that it already experienced its
reformation with the Concordat of Bologna (King 48). Nonetheless, Calvinist influence was
enormous and Huguenots, as French Calvinist called themselves, were present at all levels of
society. The Estates in the 1560s appeared to be in favour of religious toleration and, despite
voting for Catholic religious uniformity, refused to supply the subsidies to enforce it
(Franklin 41). With the accidental death of King Henri II, the French monarchy drastically
3
Irnerius was an eleventh century scholar, who revived Roman legal studies, is best known for his Corpus juris
civilis, also known as the Code of Justinian (“Irnerius”).
4
Ulpian, born Gnaeus Domitius Annius Ulpianus, was a second century Roman jurist who wrote for the
Byzantine emperor Justinian I (“Ulpian”).
Howatt 13
weakened with child kings Francis II and Charles IX under the regency of their mother
Catherine de Medici,5 not only a woman but also a foreigner, who sided with an increasingly
influential Catholic faction, led by the powerful and influential Guise family (King 50).
The intensification of Protestant persecution radicalized the Huguenots and inspired
the Monarchomachs or “Kingkillers.” A number of protestant writers produced antimonarchical texts as early as 1564, including Calvin himself with Institution of the Christian
Religion (Holt 78). These authors openly argue the king only retains his authority as long as
his subjects love him (Holt 78). The Saint Bartholomew Day’s Massacre intensified debate
over the limits of civil authority and the right of resistance on the basis of defending natural
rights (Linder 49).
By 1572, open confrontation between the Catholics and the Protestants could no
longer be avoided. The massacre occurred in response to the royal wedding between the
Catholic Marguerite de Valois (the King’s sister) and the Protestant Henry of Navarre, which
heightened Catholic fears and escalated religious tensions (Holt 81). Catherine also believed
Huguenot opposition to her poorly constructed political policies was treasonous and felt the
Huguenots could be eliminated with force (Franklin 43). Consequently, a weak and
incompetent government resorted to criminal actions to solve their political difficulties,
holding the belief the Huguenot movement could be eliminated through the assassinations of
its leaders (Franklin 43).
The massacre is comprised of four separate but interrelated events that happened over
a course of six weeks following the wedding on 18 August 1572: first was the attempted
assassination of Gaspard de Coligny, a Protestant General, on 22 August; the failure of the
assassination plot, and fearing Protestant retaliation, directed Catherine to order the
coordinated murder of several dozen Huguenot leaders in the early morning hours of 24
5
Catherine de Medici, born to Lorenzo de Medici in Florence, acted as regent for her son Charles IX from 1559
to 1563. During this time, Catherine, a Roman Catholic, attempted to maintain a balance between the warring
Protestant and Catholic factions, while striving to promote the independence of the French royalty (Larsen 66).
Howatt 14
August, or Saint Bartholmew Day; the murders quickly sparked a new resurgence of popular
killings in Paris; and finally the popular violence in Paris spawned a wave of provincial
massacres lasting from late August to early October 1572 (Holt 82). Mack P. Holt
comments,
Viewed by Catholics as threats to the social and political order, Huguenots not
only had to be exterminated—that is, killed—they also had to be humiliated,
dishonoured, and shamed as the inhuman beasts they were perceived to be.
The victims had to be dehumanized---slaughtered like animals—since they
had violated all the sacred laws of humanity in Catholic culture. (87)
While the king and many other notables attempted to stop the popular violence, they were
unable to curb the fire they had sparked (Holt 88). Furthermore, Huguenot survival required
meeting force with force (Franklin 39).
Bodin was born and received his early education in Angers, France (Spellman 40).
He later studied law, history, astronomy, languages and law at Toulouse (Spellman 40-41).
Bodin continued his studies to become a French jurist, earning a professorship in law at
Toulouse and eventually becoming the procureur du roi (Harding 67). Bodin and his
counterparts in France and England were greatly influenced by Machiavellian ideals of a
strong ruling regime (Harding 70). But most of Bodin’s adulthood was marred by civil war
and religious strife due to the rulers of the nation being weak and ineffectual (Spellman 41).
Seeing the atrocities of the civil war led Bodin to believe that only a single, strong, supreme
ruler, wielding undivided and absolute power, could ensure lasting peace and prosperity for
the state.
Bodin’s belief system was quite aligned with conventional thought of the sixteenth
century; he, himself, was even a witch-hunter (Sol 300). Despite maintaining the typical
belief system of his day, “his methods of historical proof were revolutionary” (Sol 300).
Howatt 15
Bodin sought to understand the nature of different types of state in order to conceive of a
clear understanding of sovereignty and through examining the transformations of the state, be
capable of understanding the best form to ensure stability (Franklin 23). Bodin belonged to a
new school of French antiquarian writers, who, rather than rest on the premise that the French
King was the equivalent of the Roman princeps, took custom and the history of custom as
their starting point, therefore methodologically dedicated to finding deviations from Roman
principles (Franklin 6,17).
In 1566, Bodin published a study of history entitled Methodus ad facile historiarum
cognitionem6 (or Method for the Better Understanding of History). This work, published in
Latin, wanted to explain the state and its transformations (Harding 67). Bodin believed that
one could use history to learn the truths and patterns of the lifetimes of cities, such as
patterning the birth, prime, and death of the city (Harding 68). His method, greatly
influenced by the Roman historian Tacitus,7 exemplified the pragmatism of historical
accuracy over Ciceronian eloquence, which threatened to obstruct the Truth (Sol 300).
Bodin created criteria to assess historical accuracy. First, he stressed that merely
accepting commonly held truths about Rome could lead to fallacies (Franklin 25). Second,
he suggested that bias could be avoided if historians wrote about other time periods or
geographical location, and that uncensored historians should be trusted over censored ones
(Sol 300-01). Third, Bodin argued that newer sources should be trusted over older ones, as
the latter may be corrupt or impossible to substantiate (Sol 301). Finally, historical works
derived from original documents should be trusted over ones created from second-hand
accounts (Sol 301). Using accurate accounts, Bodin thought, would find Truth and allow for
the creation of political maxims. Jacob Sol states, “For Bodin the exposition of the truth was
attached to the systematic research and presentation of sources” (301). And so, Bodin studied
6
Henceforth referred to as Methodus.
Tacitus, a first century Roman historian, wrote in a concise style, emphasizing Roman values, such as strength,
rhythm and colour, but avoiding aritificial smoothness (“Tacitus”).
7
Howatt 16
the histories of Roman state, Britain, Jewish Rule, Swiss, Ancient Athens, Venice, Florence,
Genoa, Lucca and Nuremburg (Harding 68). He offers numerous citations of historical proof,
Roman and Canon law for his political theory.
Perhaps surprisingly, Methodus rejects absolutist elements and promotes a limited
monarchy. Franklin notes of Bodin’s early work, “Limited supremacy, subject to law and
procedures of consent; is not only admitted as a proper form of sovereignty but described and
recommended as the normal form of monarchy in Europe” (23). Methodus, does however,
assert the indivisibility of sovereignty. Bodin concludes that if a sovereign prince shares his
power with a subject, the status of a sovereign does not apply to the prince (Franklin 28).
Bodin restates this idea in The Six Books of the Republic,8
It is also by the common opinion of the lawyers manifest, that those royall
rights cannot by the soueraigne be yielded vp, distracted, or any otherwise
alienated…And if it chance a soueraigne prince to communicate them with his
subiect, he shall make him of his seruant, his companion in the empire: in
which doing he shall loose his soueraigntie, and be no more a soueraign….
(Bk.1, Ch.10, 155)
While many of his contemporary political scientists were writing of mixed constitutions,
Bodin studied history and did not find and examples of shared power (Franklin 31). He
concluded, then, that shared power was a logical absurdity.
Absolutist tendencies were not present in the Latin Methodus published in 1566,
however, they saturate the political thought of the French Six Books published in 1576. The
question remains, what influenced such a drastic reversal in Bodin’s theories?
Catherine’s and Charles IX’s decisions about the St Bartholomew Day’s Massacre
radicalized the Huguenots. The king and queen mother, if they had not devised the plan
8
The Six Books of the Republic, also known as The Six Bookes of a Common-Weale, will henceforth be referred
to as Six Books.
Howatt 17
themselves, openly supported the massacre of Protestants (Holt 84). Their fear of Protestant
reprisal against them for the attempt on Coligny’s life led them to quickly strike against the
remaining Protestant leaders and it is this decision that is principally responsible for the
escalation of violence (Holt 84). Royal endorsement of the murder of Coligny was
misunderstood as endorsement of all anti-Protestant violence, and consequently, the belief
Charles IX had commanded to kill any and all Huguenots spread throughout Paris, turning
popular violence into a duty (Holt 88).
With Charles IX’s public approval, the massacre could not be blamed on a usurper,
Guise, but his illegal actions turned the king into a tyrant, against whom the Protestants took
arms (Franklin 43). After 1572, the Huguenot’s political rhetoric publicly proposed popular
sovereignty (Holt 96). Protestants organized themselves into councils and as Holt says,
“Many had always suspected the Huguenots intended to overthrow the traditional political
and social order; now [after 1574] they were openly advocating it” (99).
The massacre also inspired tracts stating the right of resistance on the basis of
protecting natural rights. François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573) suggested the French
Monarchy was elective rather than hereditary and he allowed Protestants to not only disobey
a king who threatened them but they could also depose him (Holt 100). He stated that the
contract between the people and the king was renewed with the ascension of each new king
and therefore concludes that “the obligation of the kings to remain within the law could then
be understood as the condition of his elevation” (Franklin 45). Theodore Beza also argued it
was the duty of inferior magistrates, such as those in the Estates, to overthrow a king who has
offended God and Christianity (Holt 100). Bodin’s Six Bookes responds to Huguenot writers
that advocate this resistance to king (Henshall 126).
Bodin, a Roman Catholic, felt religion was a personal choice, however he saw the
persecution of religious minorities as not only divisive but counter-productive (Spellman 41).
Howatt 18
He argued that in places where religious homogeny was present, it should be preserved by
law to avoid the faction of the state, however if minority religions could not be eradicated
without threatening the well-being of the state, toleration would be the better course (Franklin
48). It was this belief that influenced Bodin to adamantly oppose war with the Huguenots in
the Estates of Blois (Franklin 49).
Interestingly, Bodin shared many of the same political, economic and religious
policies as Huguenot writers and he even seemed to accept the Huguenots’ accounts of the
Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (49). Regardless of Bodin’s emphasis on toleration, he
continued to forbid the right to resist the supreme ruler, as to do so would admit that there
existed some higher power in society over the ruler (Spellman 41). In fact, Franklin argues
Bodin’s shift to absolutism was a consequence of his “profound unwillingness to
acknowledge legitimate resistance” (50).
While Bodin radically shifts from promoting constitutionalism in Methodus to
advocating absolutism in Six Books, his method remains that same (Sol 300). Six Bookes
uses many of the same examples as Methodus however the former is written in the vernacular
so all could understand and restore France from barbarous civil war (Harding 68). Bodin also
continues his system of source-referencing (Sol 302).
Medieval political writings left the roles of the rulers and subjects ambiguous. Bodin
felt “the formal state was distinct from the style of government” (Harding 68). The modern
state did not exist in medieval period as the power was spread out at the base of a pyramid
upon which the king held a nominal title (Henshall 122-23). Bodin’s Six Books intended to
clearly define what sovereignty meant and the obligations of the sovereign. Henshall argues
that Bodin defined absolutism with the intention to protect the ruler and the state from the
Roman Catholic Church and The Holy Roman Emperor, but in codifying the rights of the
monarch, it summarized the obligations of the subjects (Henshall 125).
Howatt 19
Bodin asked what defined or marked sovereignty? Bodin asserts “Maiestie or
Soueraigntie is the most high, absolute, and perpetuall power ouer the citizens and subiects in
a Commonweale…that is to say, The greatest power to command” (Bk.1, Ch.8, 84). Six
Books ultimately defines sovereignty as an undivided, irresistible and absolute power, with
the ability to bind the entire nation to a law, and that supersedes all other traditions and
customs (Spellman 41). Through analyzing how sovereigns act, Bodin determined that
sovereign power was distinct and could not be shared with his subjects (King 126-27). In any
cases where power was shared with subjects, such as in the administration of justice, the
appointment or dismissal of officials, giving rewards or punishments, debating the affairs of
the state and making laws, those powers were not supreme and therefore not absolute (Bodin
Bk.1, Ch.10, 155; King 127). The king, in the image of God who could make no other equal
to himself, needs to have the supreme power to “giue laws vnto their subjects, without
exception, be it in generall or in particular” (Bodin Bk.1, Ch.10, 157). As Preston King
summarizes, “Sovereign power, for Bodin, was in effect the supreme power of command.
But this implied command equally over every department of government...The sovereign’s
command directed the general affairs of state” (130). To be sovereign a ruler could not be
restricted by any subject. Following this line of thought, Bodin professed that a sovereign
was not required to consult the parliaments or the Estates.
While a sovereign prince was not required to consult the people, Bodin was by-nomeans suggesting that a sovereign prince was not supposed to consult the Estates. Bodin
conceived of absolutism to offer protection; he certainly did not intend to enslave people.
Henshall notes,
By 1500 England, France and Spain had all emerged from civil wars incited
by overmighty subjects. The absolute authority of the crown was seen as a
liberating and not a repressive force. It was preferable to the tyranny of the
Howatt 20
local magnate...Many historians have mistaken the objective of the theory of
absolute power. It targeted those who threatened royal authority, both
internally and externally. It was not a conspiracy to enslave the people. (124)
In an effort to make the monarch independent of challenges from the Church and nobility,
Bodin gives only the sovereign the ability of law making, on the premise that since this
power is not shared, the sovereign is not obligated to receive consent (Henshall 125-26).
Bodin argued that since the Estates assemble at the will of the king and not on their own
initiative, and because the Estates do not speak in the language of demand, rather they ask for
humble supplications, which offers the king the right to accept or refuse, then logically, the
Estates have no power (Bodin Bk.1, Ch.8, 95; Franklin 67-68). Nonetheless, Bodin thought
the best commonwealth was balanced and included Estates of people, communities,
corporations and colleges, however every commonwealth needed a sovereign whose laws are
obeyed by subjects and who is bound to only the law of nature and God (Harding 69).
Six Books encourages consultation, but it does not bind rulers to it. Bodin expected
kings would continue the tradition of consultation because he could not believe that any
intelligent king would choose to rule without advice (Franklin 100). Bodin states,
Wherfore we conclude the maiesstie of a prince to be in nothing altered or
diminished by the calling together or presence of the state: but to the contrarie
his maiestie thereby to bee much the greater, & the more honourable, seeing
all his people to acknowledge him for their soueraigne…the prince at other
times commonly vseth to see but by other mens eyes and to heare but by other
mens eares and reports: whereas in parliament hee seeth and heareth his
people himself, and so enforced with shame, the fear of religion, or his owne
good disposition, admitteth their iust requests. (Bk.1, Ch.10, 98)
Howatt 21
Bodin regards the parliament as a way to reinforce the authority of the sovereign and as a
useful tool for rulers to hear directly from the people. Henshall agrees noting the more
powerful a monarch became, the more important it was to have the support of parliament to
approve, implement and uphold laws (135). Franklin clearly summarizes Bodin’s thought,
“For Bodin, therefore, the Estates are a desirable and even indispensible institution. So long
as it is understood that they do not have to be assembled in order for the king to act, and that
there is no obligation on the king to give a satisfactory reply to their petitions, there is no
reason for a king to overlook them, and he does so only at his peril” (101). The Estates, in
Bodin’s philosophy, were a useful apparatus for rulers, but one that held no binding power.
A monarchy could be tyrannical or democratic depending on the actions of the rulers,
acting selfishly or benevolent respectively, however it was always still a sovereign (Harding
68). Being a sovereign, it held absolute and supreme power over its realm and subjects. But
this absolute nature was questioned by coronation oaths, specifically those that promised to
maintain the laws of the ruler’s predecessors. Since Bodin determines a sovereign recognizes
no higher authority, save God (Bk.1,Ch.8, 87), a prince who follows all the laws set by
himself and his predecessors is no sovereign and a commonwealth without a sovereign prince
will continually remain in a state of instability (Bk.1, Ch.8, 100-01). A prince who vows to
follow all laws is not a sovereign because he cannot change a law without consulting a
council, on the other hand if he does not consult the prince then perjures himself (Bk.1, Ch.8,
100). Binding the ruler to all the laws ever implemented also creates administrative and
legislative nightmares when dealing with a changing world.
Bodin’s solution to this issue was to condition the fulfillment of the king’s promise
with the utility of the law in question (Franklin 55). As Franklin states, “If this utility and
justice [of laws] cease with a change of circumstances, the king’s obligation also ceases”
(55). In fact, Bodin implies that a ruler is not merely allowed to overturn the law, but it is the
Howatt 22
king’s duty to nullify the law (King 135). King states, “And the sovereign cannot suffer the
continued application of a law which is unjust. The sovereign prince must break, change or
correct positive laws according to the demands of the particular time and circumstance,” (135
emphasis added). On the other hand, Bodin notes if the community benefits from a law or
contract, the King should continue to uphold it (Bodin Bk.1, Ch.8, 113; Franklin 55). Of
course, Bodin leaves to the discretion of the sovereign whether a law is beneficial or not
(Franklin 62). Even in cases where the king has overstepped his place, Bodin stresses that the
ruler is accountable to God alone (Franklin 62).
According to Six Bookes, an absolute sovereign has no higher authority than God.
Bodin, however, certainly was not arguing that the ruler could indulge in his every whim.
Quite the contrary, Bodin argues “It is [the customs of tyrants] to take away the goods of their
subiects, and to dispose of them at their pleasure; to take the tenth of their labours, to rauish
other mens wiues, to take from them their children to abuse them, or to make of them their
slaues” (Bk.1, Ch.10, 153). Franklin argues Bodin’s political theory was so appealing
because it respected the legitimacy of fundamental laws (69). A ruler, to avoid being titled a
despot, must respect fundamental laws and property rights (Henshall 126).
One of the most important of the fundamental laws was the right of succession. A
ruler could not rule beyond his lifetime, and thus could not infringe upon the rights of his
successor. Bodin argues,
But touching the laws which concerne the state of the realme, and the
establishing thereof; forasmuch as they are annexed & vnited to the crowne,
the prince cannot derogate from them, such as the law Salique: & albeit that he
so do, the successor may always disanull that which hath bene done vnto the
preiudice of the laws royall; vpon which the soueraigne maiestie is stayed &
grounded. (Bk.1, Ch.8, 95)
Howatt 23
The laws of succession ground the commonwealth and so any law that discriminated the
succession could be thrown out by the latter (King 134). A stable continuity could only be
established through a clear law that distinguishes between legitimate successor and usurper
(Franklin 70). Consequently Franklin notes, “Once an order of succession has been fixed by
custom, and in so far as it is firmly fixed, it is beyond the reach of each incumbent and
beyond the reach of royal power generally” (71). In fact, the unalterable right of succession
is a key point to the idea of divine right. Henshall says, “[T]oo many subjects were
attempting to exchange their monarch for one of their own religious persuasion, an
indefeasible hereditary succession gave divine right tighter definition. Title to rule was
deemed to adhere inseparably to one family rather than to anyone who happened to wear the
crown” (142). With divine right, the obligations of the subject due to the crown remained
unchanged, but the candidates were limited (Henshall 142). Furthermore under the customs
of succession, the king inherits the kingdom, and thus the king never dies nor should be
considered elected9 (Bodin Bk.1, Ch.8, 112; Franklin 72).
The second fundamental law rulers must respect is the inalienability of domain. The
ruler could not do irreparable harm to the successor’s ability to rule. While king, the ruler
could use the entire domain and leave it in the hands of whomever he wanted, however he
could not transfer the right to the domain beyond his lifetime (Bodin Bk.1, Ch.10, 160;
Franklin 73-74). Generally speaking, to transfer a vassal, without his consent, to the rule of
another would breach the king’s duty to protect him; this protected the public against the
hasty decisions of monarchs and gave a reason to kings to reclaim lands ceded by
predecessors (Franklin76-77). One significant exception to this rule was the sale of domain
to raise money for a war emergency (Franklin 75).
9
Franklin considers this to be an argument directed against the Huguenot’s perception of elected kingship (72).
Bodin strongly felt this idea of elected kingship was too dangerous to society (Franklin 72).
Howatt 24
While the king was above civil law, the ruler must obey the laws of Nature and God.
As Bodin professed, “This so great a power giuen by the people vnto the king, may wel be
called absolute and soueraigne, for that it hath no condition annexed thereunto, other than is
by the law of God and nature commanded” (Bk.1, Ch.8, 89). For Bodin, the ruler is the
source of all civil law, and therefore could not bind himself to it (King 138). The law of
Nature, however, protected the rights of individuals, and is derived from God himself (King
138). Nonetheless, as Franklin points out, Bodin feels the law of Nature is a moral
obligation, rather than a binding one; “The law of natures…was not regarded by Bodin as an
obligation of the ruler which the community was entitled to enforce. It was essentially a
moral obligation binding solely on the ruler’s conscience” (Franklin 79). Bodin did feel that
the law of Nature was institutionally protected through magistrates and judges, without open
defiance which would invite armed resistance (Franklin 79). Ultimately, Bodin felt the laws
of Nature and Divine Reason acted as a guide for rulers, which blurs the distinction between
the will of God and the will of the Sovereign, and consequently bestows far more power on
the sovereign than Bodin intended (King 139).
The sovereign’s ability to impose taxation is one clear limitation of Bodin’s doctrine.
Bodin obstinately denounces taxation without consent (Henshall 129). In examining the
perceived limitations on England kings,10 Bodin argues that all kings are in the same position,
“That other kings haue in this point no more power than the kings of England: for that it is
not in the power of any prince in the world, at his pleasure to rayse taxes vpon the people, no
more than to take another mans goods from him” (Bk.1, Ch.8, 97). Historically speaking, by
the sixteenth century all European kingship had private property rights that protected
landowners from confiscation11 (Franklin 85). Henshall states, “[Bodin] was adamant that
property rights were not subject to the ruler’s will…It is the crux of his distinction between
10
Since England monarchs needed the consent of Parliament to raise taxes.
Property would be protected with the exceptions of confiscation due to crime and seizing property for public
use, but only when fair compensation was given.
11
Howatt 25
monarchy and despotism. Subjects who could be robbed of their property were not subjects
but slaves. Rulers who could do it were not monarchs but thieves” (129). The failure to
respect property rights turned rulers into tyrants.
Bodin recognized that high taxation led to discontent and revolutions, so he makes it
as difficult as possible for rulers to tax, while not making it impossible (Franklin 89-90).
Bodin felt that rulers could learn to live within their means by abstaining from showering
gifts on favourites, ridding the unnecessary offices, creating an honest and efficient system of
collecting his income, and renting out the domain at fair market rates, which would lead to
the gradual reduction of taxes (Franklin 89). Consent of the Estates in matters of taxes was
therefore intended to be a limitation on the fiscal power of state, but not proposed to bind the
king (Franklin 90).
An important and distinctive feature of Bodin’s absolutist theory is his stance on
resistance. Even in cases when the sovereign prince blatantly violates the laws of God and
nature, Bodin stressed, it was not the place of his subjects to correct him. Bodin’s argument
goes as follows, “A limited authority may be resisted; A supreme authority acknowledges no
superior or equal; An authority which may be judges and deposed by its subjects
acknowledges a superior; Therefore, a limited authority cannot be supreme; Supreme
authority is absolute” (Franklin 51). Bodin’s logic could not allow a supreme power that can
be resisted (Henshall 126). For him, it is impossible to punish a wayward supreme king,
since there is nobody with the power to restrain him,
But if the prince be an absolute Soueraigne…where the kings themselues haue
the soueraigntie without all doubt or question; not diuided with their subiects:
in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the subiects in particular, or all of
them in generall, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of iustice
against the honour, life, or dignitie of the soueraigne: albeit that he had
Howatt 26
committed all the wickednes, impietie, and crueltie that could be spoken; For
as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subiect hath no such
iurisdiction ouer his Soueraigne prince: of whom dependeth all power and
authoritie to commaund…Now if it be not lawfull for the subiect by way of
justice to proceed against his prince; the vassall against his lord; nor the slaue
against his master; and in briefe, if it be not lawfull, by way and course of
iustice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawfull to proceed
against him by way of fact, or force. (Bk.2, Ch.5, 222)
Since nobody is empowered to correct the king, if a subject were to take arms against the
sovereign ruler, the former would be guilty of treason (Bodin Bk.2, Ch.5, 222). Civil laws of
most commonwealths condemned and punished resistance to supreme authority which
corresponds with the law of God that forbids resistance to higher power (Franklin 94).
Considering the backdrop of the French Religious wars, Bodin recognized the very
real dangers of propagating the legitimate right of resistance. The denial of the right to resist
a ruler appears as a cultural phenomenon of this period and often emerges as a reaction to
violent civil strife. Bodin correctly points out that if it is legitimate to oppose a tyrant, many
sovereign princes would be label as such for political motives. He questions,
O how many Tirants should there be; if it should be lawfull for subiects to kill
Tirants? how many good and innocent princes should as Tirants perish, by the
conspiracie of their subiects against them? He that should of his subiects exact
subsidies, should be then…a Tirant: he that should rule and commaund
contrarie to the good liking of the people, should be a Tirant:…he that should
keepe strong gardes and garrisons for the safetie of his person, should be a
Tirant: he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state
should be also counted a Tirant. And in deed how should good princes be
Howatt 27
assured of their liues, if vnder the colour of tirannie they might bee slaine of
their subiects, by whom they ought to be defended? (Bk.2, Ch.5, 225)
Because of the high risk of abuse, Bodin forbids armed resistance for subjects, but he allows
for foreign princes to correct tyrants (Bk.2, Ch.5, 255). He asserts civil unity is best
preserved through obedience to the king and thus justifies this duty to obey through Divine
Right to Rule.
Bodin always denies armed rebellion and tyrannicide, but if a king repeatedly violates
the laws of Nature or God, Bodin did allow magistrates to partake in passive disobedience
(King 78). While subjects sometimes disobeyed their ruler because of a promise to God, it
was generally wrong since the prince ruled because it was God’s will and thus the vassals
owed their allegiance to their ruler (King 137; Bodin Bk.1, Ch.8, 106). Passive disobedience
was only allowed in repeated violations of higher laws and if the consequences of the
violation were morally unacceptable for the magistrate (Franklin 97). Bodin cautioned
magistrates to use passive disobedience sparingly, for a true tyrant may punish their
insubordination, and therefore the act may harm the magistrate more than help the public
(Franklin 97). Furthermore, while magistrates could protest, to avoid confrontation, they
must yield to the will of the king should he insist on an issue (Franklin 99).
Bodin’s theory of absolutist authority had a profound impact on European politics and
other political writers. While the divine right claim did not start with Bodin’s new concept of
sovereignty, it certainly limited the candidates to the throne (Henshall 141-42). He clearly
states, “Good it is not to be ruled by many, One king, one lord, if there be any” (Bk.1, Ch.8,
100). His theory creates an ideology of order, in which Bodin determines, a single absolute
power it best suited to ensure long-term stability (King 139, 255).
Bodin’s theory dominated the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because the
doctrine offered steadiness in face of the radical reactions of both the Catholic and Protestant
Howatt 28
reactions in the Religious civil war (Franklin 104-05). The dominant strata in French were
weary of the civil war and thus were inclined to follow the political passivity Bodin offered,
rather than to question monarchical authority (Franklin 105). The religious wars created such
chaos that it was preferable to support a doctrine which stripped royal power of medieval
checks, but that also allowed resistance, than to encourage constitutionalism and shared
power that could lead to continued opposition and strife.
Howatt 29
Medieval Foundations: The Anti-Papal Polemic of Marsilius of Padua
Bodin was certainly not the first to comment on the ideal supreme sovereign in order
to maintain peace. While Bodin was trying to calm the warring factions in France, the
Protestants and the Catholics, by establishing an absolute monarch as a supreme authority,
other philosophers in Europe argue for alternative forms of sovereignty in face of other
threats to peace. Marsilius12 of Padua, a medieval philosopher, looked at European
communities in an attempt to find the societal formula to sustain peace and ensure human
happiness. Unable to find a lasting peaceful society, Marsilius blames the papacy for
disrupting communal unity.
Marsilio dei Mainardini was born sometime between 1275 and 1280 (Gewirth xix).
Since professional guilds associated with law greatly influence the government of Padua, and
Marsilius’ immediate relatives were lawyers, judges, and notaries, Marsilius was directly
exposed to political culture from an early age (Nederman, Community 10). He was trained as
a physician and associated with many civic leaders, such as Albertino Mussato and both the
della Scala family and the Visconti family13 (Nederman, Community 10). In 1313, Marsilius
was named rector of the University of Paris, an institution strongly influenced by Aristotle’s
political and moral writings (Nederman, Community 10). There is very little else known
about Marsilius’ life, but it is known that Marsilius completed his revolutionary Defensor
Pacis on the Feast of Saint John the Baptist Day, or June 24th 1324 (Gewirth xix).
Marsilius’ grudge against the papacy is not unfounded. The medieval era saw
numerous clashes between popes and secular leaders, each trying to establish their dominance
over the other. The basic argument occurred over which power, the spiritual or temporal,
enjoyed supreme authority, the one that answered to none, in the earthly world (Lee 29).
12
13
Marsilius of Padua is also often referred to as Marsiglio.
Both families supported the cause of Ludwig of Bavaria.
Howatt 30
The predominant theory of the later Middle Ages was the Gelsian definition that
popes and kings are supreme rulers of their separate spheres. Pope Gelasius14 recognized a
“dual vicariate of Christ,” that of the spiritual sword (the Church) and that of the temporal
one (the secular state), and, with both realms of power recognized, it was understood
temporal matters belong to the empire whereas spiritual matters belong to the church,
however it always assumed that the responsibility of the priest is greater than the king (Lee
50).
As time passed, the ecclesiopolitical tradition changed and in order for protection the
Roman Catholic Church began to assert itself as the higher authority across both temporal
and spiritual jurisdictions (Ozment 138). While the Bible offered support for the Gelsian
definition, popes argued differently. They used the historical examples of popes crowning
kings as support for papal superiority (Ozment 140). Arguments for papal superiority
progressed rapidly under popes Innocent III, Innocent IV and Boniface VIII. Despite
recognizing two distinct powers, Pope Innocent III denied the equality of the powers and
clearly asserted papal superiority over the emperor (Lee 51). He asserted in Venerabilem that
it was necessary for the pope to subject imperial candidates to an assessment of their
orthodoxy (Garnett 178). Innocent III maintained that the papacy held the final judgement in
all matters, including secular ones (Lee 51). Innocent IV furthered the doctrine of
omnipotence (Lee 52). Boniface VIII’s Unam Sanctum is the full expression of papal
plenitude of power, arguing the salvation of every Christian soul depended upon papal
superiority and threatened excommunication and interdiction for any secular leader who
challenges that dominance (Garnett 163-74).
Steven Ozment notes, “Many of the papacy’s problems in the late Middle Ages
stemmed directly from the pope’s continuing conception of himself as more politically
14
Pope from 492-96 A.D.
Howatt 31
powerful than he could be in the new world of ascendant secular nation-states” (144). As the
monarchs of Europe became stronger, the actual authority of the pope diminished in an equal
amount. However, the popes continued to promote an image of papacy with the vast
authority they enjoyed in previous years. There were many direct confrontations between
popes and kings in the Middle Ages. The investiture contest of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries debating whether or not secular rulers could appoint bishops is one such example.
In 1075, Pope Gregory VII argued the pope alone had universal power and only the pope
could appoint bishops. When the Holy Roman Emperor disagreed with the papacy’s policy,
he was excommunicated (Ozment 143). A similar contest occurred between Innocent III in
the 1202 imperial election (Ozment 144).
Papal interference was not limited to appointments of ecclesiastical offices. A quarrel
also erupted between popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV and the Holy Roman Emperor
Frederick II, when the emperor wanted to incorporate the kingdom of Sicily into his already
powerful empire (Lee 52). The popes, wishing to maintain a balance of power in Europe,15
forbid this. When Frederick II disobeyed them, the popes excommunicated him, ruled to
depose him and even plotted against him (Lee 52).16
The pope’s refusal to allow secular leaders to tax the clergy was another medieval
point of contention. When Philip the Fair17 attempted to tax the clergy to help fund war
against England, Pope Boniface VIII, who viewed universal taxation as an affront on clerical
rights, responded by issuing Clericis laicos, which threatened excommunication for rulers
that taxed the clergy without papal permission (Ozment 145). Philip immediately forbid the
exportation of the French bullion from French territory, thus denying the Pope of important
15
Frederick II easily conquered Southern Germany and was crowned King in December 1212 by German
Princes (“Frederick II). When Frederick sought to bring territories on the Italian peninsula into his already vast
empire, the Pope believed he had become too powerful (Lee 52).
16
See the Council of Lyon (1245) for more information.
17
Philip IV of France
Howatt 32
revenue (Ozment 145). After further disagreements, Boniface VIII issued Unam sanctum
arguing the supremacy of the pope over kings (Ozment 145).
The papacy also had a history of interfering with the election of the Holy Roman
Emperor, as was the case in the disagreement between Pope John XXII and Ludwig of
Bavaria. The dispute debated whether the election of the Roman emperor required the
confirmation of the pope. John XXII refused to confirm Ludwig’s ascension to the crown,
asking him to refrain from exercising royal power even after Ludwig defeated other claimants
of the throne (Nederman, Community 11). Ludwig refused John XXII’s order and was
excommunicated in 1324 (Lee 48). Despite attempts at reconciliation on behalf of Ludwig in
later years, the Church and emperor remained separated (Lee 48).
The distinction between secular and ecclesiastical power was a controversial issue in
Marsilius’ time, as exemplified by the conflict between John XXII and Ludwig. This conflict
may well have been the spark for Marsilius to write Defensor Pacis (Lee 48).18 By the
fourteenth century, leaders often asked the advice of university masters on political affairs
(Price 152). Marsilius, in a scholarly quest, wanted to find peace and truth that could lead to
salvation, but he was unable to find it at a local, national or imperial level; for this, Marsilius
blamed the Roman Catholic Church (Ozment 150). Defensor Pacis is a tract mainly against
papal intrusion into secular affairs, which Marsilius saw served only to prevent peace and
human happiness (Nederman, Community 15; Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect.7, 7). This central
theme of the danger the pope poses to human happiness binds the three discourses of
Defensor Pacis together (Nederman, Lineages 163). Marsilius sees papal intrusions as
destroying peace and endangering salvation (Garnett 163).
18
Defensor Pacis was published the same year that Ludwig was excommunicated by Louis XXII and the text is
dedicated to Ludwig of Bavaria (Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect. 6, 6-7).
Howatt 33
Defensor Pacis uses the example of papal interference in the Italian Peninsula and
warns that all Christendom risk facing the same interference (Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect2-3,
4-5; Nederman, Community 15-16). Marsilius argues that the popes’
[P]erverted desire for rulership, which they assert is owed to them because of
the plenitude of power given to them…is that singular cause which we have
said produces the intranquility or discord of the city or state. For it is prone to
creep up on all states…and by its hateful action it has for a long time
distressed the Italian state, and has kept and still keeps it from tranquility or
peace, by preventing with all its force the appointment or institution of the
ruler, the Roman emperor, and his functioning in the said empire. (Bk.1,
Ch.19, Sect.12, 95)
In the quest for political and temporal power, the pope, in general, prevents secular leaders
from claiming their proper position ruling the Italian states. This interference causes
lawlessness and general disorder, which in turn prevents human happiness. Furthermore,
popes often target those who are least able to resist (Nederman, Community 15). Marsilius
argues that popes first infiltrate communities under the guise of seeking peace, but soon begin
their quest for power:
[Popes] impose on them penalties both real and personal, more harshly against
those who are less able to resist their power, such as communities and
individuals among the Italians, whose state, divided and wounded in almost all
its parts, can more easily be oppressed; but more mildly against those, like
kings and rulers, whose resistance and coercive power they fear. (Bk.1, Ch.19,
Sect.11, 95)
Divided communities, such as those found in the Italian peninsula, face more severe
punishments for disobeying the rule of the pope than consolidated powers who have more
Howatt 34
power to resist. Nonetheless, Marsilius warns that stronger powers are also at risk of being
deposed by conniving popes seeking power (Bk.1, Ch.19, Sect.11, 95).
Divided into three discourses, Defensor Pacis first examines the nature of political
authority, then refutes the claims of power made by the Church, especially those made by the
pope and finally summarizes and emphasizes the important aspects from the first two parts
(Nederman, Lineages 163). Throughout the three discourses, Marsilius continually places
secular power above the Church (Price 157). Furthermore, Marsilius intended Defensor
Pacis to be a call to secular authorities to rise up against the pope (Nederman, Lineages 16465; Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.19, Sect. 4-13, 91-96). As Marsilius himself proclaims in his opening
passages, “This sophistic opinion [that of the pope], wearing the guise of the honourable and
beneficial, is utterly pernicious to the human race and, if unchecked, will eventually bring
unbearable harm to every city and country” (Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect.3, 5). In other words, secular
leaders must confront the pope or be consumed by the destruction the latter will bring.
The goal of Defensor Pacis is to establish and maintain lasting peace. With this goal
in mind, the first discourse specifies the required conditions, such as laws and consent of the
people, to create stable and unified communities and thereby enable those communities to
resist the interference of the pope (Nederman, Community 15). As Cary J. Nederman argues,
“[Marsilius] concentrates on the mechanisms (whatever they are) by which the good order of
the community (regardless of the organization of its ruling part) is most effectively achieved
and most reliably maintained” (Community 23).
Seeking to understand the necessary stipulations for a stable society, Marsilius first
considers what is political association (Lee 99). Following Aristotle’s theories, Marsilius
believed the nature of men was to associate, that is, the natural inclination which causes men
to come together as a community (Nederman, Community 32). As more associations formed,
a standard of justice was required to maintain peace in the community. Marsilius based the
Howatt 35
formation of a peaceful society on human and earthly devices, rather than divine grace, and
believes one of the effective devices is laws (Lee 104).
Laws according to Marsilius are intellectually superior to any single individual and
protect against human weakness, such as greed and self-interest. He says, “The primary
necessity of the law then is as follows: It is necessary to establish in the polity that without
which civil judgements cannot be made with complete rightness, and through which these
judgements are properly made and preserved from defect so far as it is humanly possible”
(Bk.1, Ch.11, Sect.1, 37). Laws allow for the resolution of conflicts that arise when men
gather in communities and thereby enables the continuation of political association enriching
individuals’ lives (Lee 105). For a law to be considered a law, however, it requires coercive
force to enforce it (Condren 211).19 As Marsilius argues, “[Law] may be considered
according as with regard to its observance there is given a command coercive through
punishment or reward to be distributed in the present world…considered in this way it most
properly is called, and is, a law” (Bk.1, Ch.10, Sect.4, 36). Without a compelling force to
implement the law and punish transgressors, the law could not be effective.
Most importantly, Marsilius insisted that only secular leaders had the right to coercive
power. Marsilius was adamant that only the secular ruler has the authority to judge any
matter, including spiritual issues, and impose their decisions with coercive force (Lee 108).
Priests, on the other hand, could only advise in matters relating to faith and under no
circumstances could they wield coercive power (Lee 108).
Although the secular leader had the ability to punish deviants and reward citizens who
obeyed the laws, it was the legislator humanus that created those laws. Marsilius clearly
states that the legislator humanus refers to the entire body of citizens in society or its
weightier part, the valentior pars (Bk.1, Ch.12, Sect.3, 45). The idea that the human
19
Law must also be prudent and reasonable in order to act for the human good (Lee 108).
Howatt 36
legislator is sovereign in society and that it includes all citizens is central to Marsilius’
philosophy. His argument rests upon the notion that the collective power of a community is
stronger and better than a smaller faction, as the whole is better able to create and reject laws
suitable for their community (Lee 110-11). In fact, Marsilius notes the hazards of entrusting
supreme power into a single individual, as the power could corrupt him and law would
become tyrannical (Lee 113). He says,
That law is better observed by every citizen which each one seems to impose
upon himself…every citizen must be free, and not undergo another’s
despotism, that is slavish dominion. But this would not be the case if one or a
few citizens by their own authority made the law over the whole body of
citizens. For those who thus made the law would be despots over the others,
and hence such a law, however good it was, would be endured only with
reluctance, or not at all, by the rest of the citizens…they would protest against
it, and not having been called upon to make it, they would not observe it.
(Bk.1, Ch.12, Sect.6, 47)
Lack of collaboration for the creation of laws causes despotism and embitters the rest of
society. The sentiments of hostility cause citizens to disobey the law and thus the
effectiveness of this standard of justice is lost.
With this in mind, Marsilius empowers the legislator humanus, or the entire body of
citizens, with supreme authority and the sole source of coercive force (Bk.1, Ch.12, Sect. 3,6,
45-46). He accentuates consensus, giving each and every citizen the right to consent to,
modify or disapprove of legislation (Nederman, Lineages 165). Moreover, Marsilius offers
the human legislator absolute sovereignty, as what it wills is law and it has no superior (Lee
109).
Howatt 37
Sovereignty empowers the human legislator against the interference by the papacy.
As Ozment summarizes, “Marsilius’s fundamental notion was that all coercive power on
earth lay with ‘the people’; the people, as ‘human legislator,’ were the source of all worldly
authority. It was not the ‘head bishop’ in Rome, but the people who were judged by none
save God; the people were lower than God but greater than man” (151). In other words, the
papacy and clergy could never hold more authority than the entire collective body of citizens.
The legislator humanus holds sovereign authority, however it also requires a ruling
part, or pars principans, to represent it mainly for matters of convenience and since not all
men will agree; the citizens need a pars principans to ensure civil acts are aligned with the
laws (Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.15, Sect.4, 62-63; Lee 124-26). Marsilius outlines the leader’s role,
“[T]he ruler, by his authority in accordance with the law, must command the just and the
honourable and prohibit their contraries, both in word and in deed, by affecting with rewards
or punishments the merits or demerits of those who observe or transgress his legal
commands” (Bk.1, Ch.15, Sect.11, 66). The task of the ruler is to rule according to the law
and to enforce the law when needed.
Marsilius recognizes the necessity for governance and the advantages of empowering
a secular leader with coercive force to uphold the laws, however he maintains that peace and
human happiness rely on the ability for the entire community to consent. Consent, for
Marsilius, acts as a balance between will and reason (Nederman, Community 46). Consent
protects citizens from the private interests’ of the law makers and makes laws suitable for all
people’s interests (Lee 113). It is the distinguishing factor between citizens, and non-citizens,
as the former have the ability to approve or refuse to the laws that govern them (Nederman,
Lineages 165). Consent is the only legitimate expression of political authority (Nederman,
Lineages 168).
Howatt 38
The notion of consent reorganizes the papal Chain of Being to one with ascending
sovereignty (Ozment 153). Marsilius maintained all power, political and ecclesiastic, derived
from the will and consent of the people (Ozment 151). Sovereignty rests in the legislator
humanus, and although they then elect a representative, rulers act with the authority the entire
community has bestowed upon them (Lee 124). As Hwa-Yong Lee states, “What allows the
ruler or secondary judge to have the power of executing law—the power which makes him
the first part of a state—is the sovereign legislator or the prime judge [the legislator
humanus]” (126). Secular power came from the universitas civium, or the citizenry as a
whole; ecclesiastic power from the universitas fidelium, or the faithful as a whole (Ozment
151). The people, according to Marsilius, are the source of all legitimate political authority.
Papal Position versus Marsilius’ Views of the Chain of Being
Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250-1550 (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1980) 153. Print.
Marsilius developed his political philosophy with the main purpose of empowering
secular leaders against the papacy. The second discourse is Marsilius’ anti-papal polemic in
Howatt 39
which he replaces papal monarchy with conciliar ecclesiology (Nederman, Community 15).
Lindberg notes about Marsilius’ revolutionary tract, “Marsiglio not only stressed the principle
of popular consent as the basis of legitimate government but also denied that the papacy was
divinely established” (43). Marsilius exposes, what he believes, are the corrupt practices of
the church and applies his ascending political theory to the Church as well.
The pope, in Marsilius’ eyes, was corrupted and marked a threat to temporal leaders.
In the second discourse, it is easy to find passages blasting the actions of the papacy, as it
tries to gain political power in the modern world (Lee 47). Marsilius often censures
ecclesiastical despotism; he claims the pope’s power was extended through fraud and the
deliberate distortion of documents (Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect.16, 309) and he accuses the pope of
calculatingly disturbing the peace, “[S]eeking the highest degree of secular power, contrary
to the command or counsel of Christ and the apostles, these bishops [the popes] have rushed
forth to make laws distinct from those of the whole body of citizens, decreeing that all
clergymen are of supreme government” (Bk.2, Ch.23, Sect.11, 319). The pope is willing to
sacrifice general human happiness in order to gain political power.
The pope and clergy strayed from their spiritual mission and believe they are immune
from civil laws. Marsilius states, “Again, and even more improperly, these men extend the
same word to signify their possessions and temporal goods, mobile and immobile, as well as
certain proceeds of these which they call tithes, so that under cover of this word they may be
exempted from the regulation of the civil laws an rulers” (Bk.2, Ch.2, Sect.5, 106). The
priests see protection from civil laws as a spiritual right. The eleventh and twelfth century
bishops of Rome, Marsilius says, claim supreme coercive authority and forbid temporal rulers
to exercise their power without papal support (Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect. 20, 312). Furthermore,
popes threaten excommunication and interdiction to those rulers who challenge papal
proclamations of sovereignty (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect.20, 312).
Howatt 40
Excommunication and interdiction, or papal exertions of plenitude of power, are signs
of the Church straying from its spiritual mission. George Garnett says that Marsilius not only
denies papal rights of punishing heretics, but the clergy had specifically been forbidden to
judge contentious acts by the Bible (101). Marsilius argues, “For the Apostle did not wish
that the judging of such acts be the function of any priest or bishop or particular group of
them” (Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect.17, 310). This fall from their spiritual mission began with Popes
Simplicius I and Pelagius I (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch.25, Sect.7, 336). Despite not having
authority to judge, the Roman Catholic Church and the bishop of Rome began to enforce
commands with the threat of excommunication, a practice that Marsilius contends
transgresses the bounds of priesthood, which only include participating in ecclesiastical ritual
and interpreting Scripture (Garnett 101). In fact, Marsilius reasons that only temporal rulers
have the right to punish heretics in the earthly world, but only on the condition that the
heretic had broken a human law (Bk.2, Ch.5, Sect.7, 136; Ozment 151-52).
Marsilius bases many of his opinions of the proper place of priests in relation to the
example of Jesus Christ. Christ taught his followers to acquiesce in secular principles,
regardless of their status (Garnett 76). Marsilius cites a biblical example,
[A]ll men, of whatever status or condition they may be, must be subject in
property and in person to the jurisdiction of the secular rulers, and must obey
them in all things which do no contradict the law of eternal salvation,
especially when they are in accordance with human laws or honourable and
approved customs. (Bk.2, Ch.5, Sect.5, 133).
If all people, even priests and clergymen, are subject to the laws of the secular ruler,
Marsilius believes this voids ecclesiastical claims to coercive power. Marsilius asserts,
“Coercive power does not, therefore, belong to any priest or bishop, but they as well as the
rest must in this respect be subordinate to the secular judges” (Bk.2, Ch.5, Sect. 7, 136). Lee
Howatt 41
declares, “Marsilius insists that while secular rulers can regulate all matters (including
matters relating to faith) in a civil community with a coercive force according to the laws, the
priests, having no such force, only guide matters relating to faith” (108). Not only does
Marsilius insist the papacy be limited by temporal laws (Lindberg 43), he interprets the Bible
to say that the clergy have no reason to interfere in secular business (Bk.2, Ch.4, Sect.1, 113).
Marsilius avers a much limited role of priesthood compared to the one put for but the
church polity. He offers the clergy the ability to use the essential powers of priesthood, that
is to perform the sacrament, as well as the ability to bind or release men from their sins; these
powers are bestowed upon priests directly from God (Bk.2, Ch.15, Sect.2-4, 234-35). In his
perspective, regardless of whether Christ gave these essential powers of priesthood to Peter
first, or if he gave all the apostles theses powers at once, Peter had no more authority to any
other apostle; all priests are equal (Garnett 93). Marsilius states,
Now with reference to the power of the sacrament of the eucharist, no one
contends that every priest does not have it equally with the Roman bishop.
And hence it is to be wondered why some men obstinately but unreasonable
assert that the Roman pontiff has from Christ a greater power of the keys than
have the other priests for this cannot be proved from Scripture, but rather the
opposite. (Bk.2, Ch.15, Sect.4, 235-36).
There is no Scriptural evidence of Peter’s greater authority over the rest of the apostles, and
so, Marsilius professes the pope should not have more authority over the rest of the clergy.
All priests hold the same “essential priestly authority” (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch.15, Sect.7, 238).
Marsilius does acknowledge that the number of priests has exponentially increased
since the days of the apostles, and thus, to avoid faction and schisms, some priest were
elected to guide and direct the work of the clergy (Bk.2, Ch.15, Sect.6, 237). Regardless, this
Howatt 42
does not mean the elected position holds greater priestly authority than the others. Marsilius
professes,
But the aforesaid election or appointment made by man does not give to the
person thus elected any greater essential merit or priestly authority or power,
but only a certain power with regard to the ordering of the household in God’s
house or temple…This power is not coercive unless the authority for such
coercion shall have been granted by the human legislator to the person thus
elected…. (Bk.2, Ch.15, Sect.7, 237)
Marsilius highlights that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is man-made, not divinely appointed,
and thus, despite the hierarchy, all priests remain equal and none have coercive power, unless
the human legislator has granted it. The papacy is a product of Church history and these
historical reasons are not enough to recognize the institution as legitimate (Price 156).
Marsilius further compared all clergy, including the pope, against the example of
Jesus and the apostles and contends, since Jesus and the apostles renounced all worldly
possessions, the clergy and pope should forsake all political authority, including the ability to
collect tithes and other temporal goods (Ozment 153). Marsilius challenges the papal bull
Cum inter nonnullos,20 which denied Christ and the apostles lived in absolute poverty
(Ozment 153). Marsilius maintains that it is admirable to live in poverty like the apostles and
that all clergy should be content with nothing more than food (Bk.2, Ch.13, Sect.6-38, 199215). Marsilius even says,
Therefore, the Roman bishop, or any other single bishop, whether alone or
with his college of clergymen, must not be permitted to have the power to
distribute ecclesiastic temporal goods, lest by such power he be able to acquire
20
Issued by Pope John XXII (1323).
Howatt 43
secular influence to the detriment of rulers and peoples, and to stir up strife
among Christian believers. (Bk.2, Ch.21, Sect.14, 297)
The people should prevent the ecclesiastical order from obtaining worldly goods, as it leads
the pope to usurping coercive power and enables him to disrupt the peace of the community.
In Defensor Pacis Marsilius both challenges the philosophical foundations of papal
supremacy in his blast against ecclesiastical corruption and offers secular leaders a theoretical
base upon which to support temporal claims of supremacy. The human legislator empowers
a ruler to make and enforce laws, to which the former offer their consent. This contributes to
a balanced and peaceful society. By fraudulently claiming supreme authority and coercive
power, the clergy and especially the papacy, disrupt the balance of communities. There
selfish behaviour prevents human happiness.
Much of Marsilius anti-papal remonstrance was closely related to the issues addressed
by Protestant reformers. In fact, William Marshall’s abridged translation, The Defence of
Peace Lately Translated out of Laten in to Englysshe, with the Kynges Moste Gracyous
Privilege (1535), became part of Thomas Cromwell’s program that enlisted English
humanists to provide theoretical support for Henry VIII’s break with Rome (Ozment 155). In
this fashion, Marsilius is incorporated into Henry VIII’s propaganda against the Roman
Catholic Church (Lindberg 318). However Marshall modified and amended Marsilius’ work
in his unsolicited translation (Lockwood 89).21
Alan Gewirth accuses Marshall of omitting approximately one fifth of Marsilius’
work (xvii). Marshall, in his preface, admits to leaving parts out, “And of this I do warne the,
that in the translacyon of this boke dyuerse thynges ben omytted, and lefte out, as maters, not
so moche profytable, as longe and tedyous…” (fol. 1v). Shelly Lockwood asserts that there
are many more omissions, adjustments and manipulations of Marsilius’ text than Marshall
21
Marshall’s translation was a part of Cromwell’s program of anti-pope propaganda; however Marshall
completed the translation first and later asked for compensation (Lockwood 90).
Howatt 44
would admit (Lockwood 90). So the question that should be asked is, with such strong
assertions of consent and community participation in governance, why would Marshall
choose to translate Defensor Pacis?
Marsilius was good raw material because of his belief of pope as a usurper a despot
and a mastermind of sedition (Rex 882). Marsilius was a staunch believer the pope and the
clergy had betrayed their spiritual mission, which was precisely the focus of Henry VIII’s
antipapal rhetoric (Rex 882). Marsilius’ emphasis on secular supremacy also attracted
Henrican reformers (Stout 310). Cromwell knew the plurality of governments of church
polity had to be denied coercive force in order for the unity of England to prevail (Stout 313).
Even though Marsilius’ contention with the pope was applicable and useful for
sixteenth century reformers, much of Marsilius’ philosophy was incompatible with Henry
VIII’s rule. This is particularly true of Marsilius’ emphasis on shared power. Thus in
Marshall’s translation of Defensor Pacis, there are a number of notable deviation’s from
Marsilius’ text.
First of all, Marshall stresses obedience to the king, a notion that was a prerogative of
Henrican political philosophers (Rex 882). The case for royal supremacy needed to regain
the obedience to the king and increase supreme royal authority to include church and all
ecclesiastical things (Lockwood 91). Resistance is forbidden on the grounds that there is no
higher authority than the king on Earth. Marshall then changes the foundation of Marsilius’
philosophy, the Aristotelian notion of natural association, to becoming a community under
the obedience to the king (Rex 882). Marsilius’ emphasis on consent was too extreme to be
acceptable in England at the time, and so it is not seen in a positive light or left out entirely
(Lockwood 93-94).
Furthermore the discussion in chapter nine of the first discourse, concluding an
elected monarchy is the best form of ruler, is nearly entirely left out (Lockwood 94).
Howatt 45
Marshall replaces the original title of chapter sixteen from “Whether it is More Expedient for
the Polity to Appoint Each Monarch Individually by a New Election, or to Elect One
Monarch Alone with All His Posterity, Which is Usually Called Hereditary Succession” to
“That is most expedyent to the commune weale, to haue onely one certayne man to be prynce
or gouernour, hym selfe with all his posteryte / whiche they call communelye the successyon
of kynred or blode.” In this chapter he retains the eleven reasons given in the original, but
leaves out the rest of the chapter in which these reasons are disproven and an elected
monarchy is favoured (Lockwood 94).
Marshall did not leave out the idea of representation entirely. He translates Marsilius’
people to mean the Parliament, rather than all men (Stout 312). Marshall’s Parliament serves
the community by representing the citizens by making laws, however he refuses to give
Parliament coercive power to punish transgressors, bestowing that solely to the ruler, and he
refuses Parliament full legislative autonomy, as that may limit the will of the king (Lockwood
96-97). Although Parliament theoretically represents the people, its existence depended upon
the will of the king and its purpose was to serve the king (Lockwood 97). Furthermore the
king had the right to veto and amend laws, as well as to call and dissolve Parliament
(Lockwood 98). Unsurprisingly, Marshall omits the concept of punishing an unjust king
(Lockwood 99). Lockwood states, “Supreme coercive jurisdiction is given to the king, not to
the people nor to Parliament…Since Marshall had already given sole coercive power to
punish transgressors of the law to the king, there exists no mechanism for curbing and
punishing [the king]” (98-99). Like Bodin’s theory of authority, Marshall’s ruler has no
higher authority that could punish it. Since Cromwell knew that to succeed against the
Roman Catholic Church, the king needed extraordinary power (Stout 314).
Marsilius’ legislator humanus is Marshall’s prince, king or governor (Lockwood 99).
Harry S. Stouts declares, “Although Marsilius was hesitant to endorse a numerically single
Howatt 46
ruler in the state, he did see that in certain situations a single ruler would be preferable.
Cromwell and the royal apologist enthusiastically seized upon the approbation that Marsilius
exhibited for a single ruler” (313). Marshall’s prince has absolute sovereignty.
Marsilius knew of the dangers, both to body and soul, of challenging the pope. In
1325, when it was revealed that he was the author of Defensor Pacis, Marsilius fled France
for the protection of Ludwig of Bavaria (Nederman, Lineages 160). Pope John XXII
excommunicated Marsilius on October 27th 1327 for teaching heresies (Ozment 154). Papal
bull Licit iuxta specifies five heresies:
1) that Christ, in surrendering tribute to Roman authorities, did so because he
was subject to the coercive power of the temporal ruler; 2) that the apostle
Peter enjoyed no special authority over the other apostles or the church as a
whole; 3) that the emperor can appoint, remove, and punish the pope; 4) that
all priests, regardless of title or rank, are equal in spiritual authority, so that
distinctions within the clergy are entirely a matter of imperial concession; and
5) that the church can punish no person coercively without the grant of the
emperor. (Nederman, Community 12).
Even though Marsilius faced certain excommunication and threats on his life for writing
Defensor Pacis, he felt that to see the wrongs of the papacy and do nothing about it would be
a betrayal of the Christian virtue of charity (Nederman, Community 17).
While Defensor Pacis was directly linked with the conflict between Ludwig and John
XXII, especially through the reasons given for Marsilius’ excommunication (Nederman,
Community 12), Marsilius intended his work to have a universal appeal. Marsilius, in his
quest for a generic political theory and thus maintain the broadest audience possible, refuses
to declare one system of governance better than another (Nederman, Lineages 164).
Marsilius refutes the importance of making such a declaration, “As to which of the temperate
Howatt 47
governments is best or which of the diseased governments is worst, and the relative goodness
or badness of the other species, the discussion of these points is not part of our present
concern” (Bk.1, Ch.8, Sect.4, p.28 emphasis added). Knowing that to advocate one type of
government over another would alienate certain secular leaders or groups, Marsilius resists
and instead creates a theory in which the legislator, that counterbalances the power of the
church, is flexible enough to apply to any society (Condren 212). Conal Condren states, “As
Marsilius developed his concepts little more than was necessary to make his more or less
ambiguous masters serve him, so, in their turn, these concepts are often open-ended or
ambiguous” (214). In other words, Marsilius’ ambiguous ideas allow any society, regardless
of the type of government it uses, to employ his framework against the papacy.
The generic quality of Marsilius’ philosophy makes it particularly suitable for
appropriation by later writers and even allows similarities to be found between Defensor
Pacis and Bodin’s Six Bookes of the Common Weale, despite a two hundred year gap existing
between the two works. Both philosophers try to entrench supreme authority into the part of
society they each feel best suited to combat divisive and threatening forces. The later
medieval society was organized in a feudal structure where tangible power resides at the base
and the kings were rulers in title only (Henshall 123). Public authority was spread out
through feudal ties, which bonded lord and vassal in mutual obligation (Henshall 122). As
the power is located at the base of the hierarchy, it is this section of society that Marsilius
empowers. With this in mind, Marsilius believes giving sovereign authority to the entire
body of the people was the best course in opposing the papacy. Bodin’s society already
fractured into many different sects and these factions were now fighting against each other.
Bodin’s France did not have one clear enemy, like Marsilius did. So, instead of unifying all
people against one enemy, Bodin’s political theory attempted to unify all people under one
ruler.
Howatt 48
Regardless of their framework, Marsilius and Bodin put the “sovereign” body above
all else. Marsilius’ human legislator wielded absolute authority, decided to give or deny
consent and offered coercive power to the ruler they chose. Bodin’s sovereign prince had the
same characteristics. Despite Marsilius’ accentuation of shared power among all people and
Bodin’s concentration of power in the ruler, they both empower their sovereign with absolute
authority to protect society against enemies. Both were seeking a way in which to establish
lasting peace and human happiness.
Furthermore, Marshall’s translation of Marsilius’ text closely resembles Bodin’s Six
Bookes. Like Bodin’s sovereign, Marshall’s king has absolute authority with no higher being
that could punish him. Marshall’s king also has the ability to call or dismiss Parliament and
accept, amend or reject laws the Parliament proposes. Parliament cannot limit the will of the
king. Additionally, both works stress the importance of obedience to the king.
Marsilius was not a Reformation thinker as he sought to correct the Church rather
than divide it (Ozment 155). Nonetheless, his attack on the pope contributed to the
foundations of the movement. Arguments against the Pope and supporting royal prerogative,
generally influenced by Aristotle and Roman law, weakened the legitimacy of the Roman
Catholic Church (Lindberg 43). As Ozment asserts, “Even if it did not directly influence
them, Marsilius’ teaching clearly anticipated and assisted major developments in sixteenth
century political thought that were favourable to the Reformation” (155). Marsilius’ warning
of popes interfering in all countries resonated in Henrican England in the sixteenth century.
Marsilius anticipated many of the issues of the Reformation, namely the papacy straying from
its original mission and papal interference in political affairs. Marsilius also aided the
Reformation by stressing the authority of secular leaders over the Pope.
Howatt 49
Royal Supremacy and the Reformation: Martin Luther and William Tyndale
By the latter half of the fifteenth century European rulers had resolved two problems
that enabled the success of the Reformation: first, secular rulers maintained military
supremacy within their countries, especially in the sense that the military’s loyalties were to
the nation instead of the regional leader; and, second, the nation was relatively secured from
outside foreign aggression and influence, since with the replacement of clergy with secular
administrators within the royal bureaucracies, the loyalty of the bureaucrats was also to the
secular leader (Ozment 182). Political unity at home often permitted more foreign
endeavours, which led to instability at home—a process that increased the ruler’s ability to
impose their rule, but was occasionally resisted by citizens as well (Ozment 190). Rising
urban centers felt independent from feudal lords and dissatisfied peasants were ready to
revolt (Dillenberger xi). It is against this background of national leaders consolidating their
power that the Reformation occurred.
Various intellectual movements also greatly influenced the Reformation and the
emergence of modern states. The mysticism movement prized direct encounters with the
divine and humanism, with its emphasis on classical learning, treasured the cultures of
Ancient Greece and Rome (Dillenberger xi). These movements more subtly undermined the
rigid hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church.
It is important to note that early reformers wanted to reform the Church, not to
abolish it, but papal reaction to challenges made this impossible (Lindberg 43-44). Like
Marsilius of Padua, many reformers sought to return the Roman Catholic Church to the older
days and do away with many of the recent ecclesiastical laws and traditions. Papists rejected
these reforms and attacked any who appeared to challenge papal authority. The reformers
turned to secular leaders to achieve reform in the Roman Catholic Church after the bishop
and the pope refused (Estes 1). It could very well be this appeal to secular authority that
Howatt 50
creates the cultural phenomenon of non-resistance and obedience to the head of state found in
Protestant doctrines.
Unlike the Reformation movements on the continent, the English Reformation was an
act of state, with Henry Tudor acting as the main factor in the ecclesiastical Reformation
(Lindberg 309). Of course, Henry Tudor was not the sole cause of the English Reformation;
the movement also was highly influenced by the theology of the European Reformation
(Lindberg 309). There were also strong anticlerical sentiments in England, particularly
against the greed of Thomas Wolsey and other clergy members (Lindberg 310-11).
However, without Henry VIII’s divorce, the English Reformation would likely never have
happened, since the powerful intervention of the crown would not have supported the
movement (Lindberg 319). Nevertheless, Henry VIII’s break with Rome was entirely
personal and political not theological (Lindberg 316).
Henry VIII was an unlikely champion of the Reformation, as he once wrote Defence
of the Seven Sacraments which supported the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church
(Thackeray 97). It was a combination of concern of succession and infatuation that changed
Henry VIII into a champion of the Reformation. By 1525, Queen Katherine was forty and
there was little hope she would produce a male heir (Lindberg 316). Henry was deeply
concerned about succession because Katherine and Henry’s only surviving child was a girl,
Mary22 (Haigh 89). As Christopher Haigh explains, “For a king to have but one heir was
worry enough; for that heir to be female was, given patriarchal and feudal concepts of
competence and authority, a national nightmare” (89). Furthermore, Henry VIII was
infatuated with his mistress, Anne Boleyn (Lindberg 316). Henry wished to marry Anne to
provide stability to the Tudor line and England, as he needed a son to prevent a civil war, but
22
The previous attempt to have a female successor, Mathilda, daughter of Henry I, in 1135 resulted in a
nineteen year civil war (Lindberg 317)
Howatt 51
Pope Clement VII refused to annul his marriage23 (Lindberg 316-17). Without a divorce,
Henry lost the hope of a male heir and national stability after his death.
Failure to obtain the divorce encouraged Henry VIII’s close confidants, Thomas
Cranmer and Thomas Cromwell, to develop a doctrine stating the king is both the secular and
spiritual head of state (Thackeray 97). Parliament approved the Act of Supremacy stating the
king was the head of church and a treason bill, which demanded the death penalty for any
person who denied Henry’s authority as the head of the Anglican Church (Thackeray 97). Of
course, Henry faced opposition, such as being excommunicated by the pope (Haigh 117), and
so Henry needed a theological basis for his actions. Divine Right to Rule is an integral part
in assuring the obedience and non-resistance Henry VIII sought. This theory was already
widely available in the texts of Protestant writers such as Martin Luther and William
Tyndale.
Martin Luther was born in 1483 to Hans Luther, a peasant turned copper miner, and
Margaret Ziegler, a daughter to a well-off family (Dillenberger xiv). Like other reformers,
Luther was the first in his family to get an education (Lindberg 56). Hans Luther wanted him
to study law, and so Luther earned a BA and MA at the University of Erfurt, where he studied
Latin and humanism, and participated in weekly disputations, before becoming a priest
following a near-death experience (Lindberg 57-58). 24
The Church had adopted a “do your best” philosophy to ease anxieties surrounding
salvation, that is to say, do as many good works as you can, confess as much as you can, and
so forth. However, this left many Christians uncertain, as one could never determine if it was
23
Henry sought to have his marriage annulled, justifying the move by citing the book of Leviticus, which stated
a man could not marry his brothers widow (Thackeray 97). The Pope was in an awkward situation doctrinally
because a previous pope had given special permission for them to marry, thus Clement VII would have to
contradict that rule and thus admit papal fallibility—an issue Reformers were already attacking (Lindberg 317).
The Pope would not willingly declare that a predecessor had gone against divine law (Haigh 92). Furthermore,
Rome and the Pope were prisoners of the Emperor Charles V, Katherine’s nephew, since the 1527 sack of Rome
(Haigh 90). The Pope could not embarrass the Emperor’s aunt.
24
Luther was struck by lightning returning to Erfurt from a visit to his family and promised St. Anne, the patron
saint of miners, that he would become a monk if she would help him (Dillenberger xiv). He entered an
Augustinian monastery approximately two weeks later to fulfill his vow (Dillenberger xiv).
Howatt 52
good enough and if they had achieved salvation. Carter Lindberg explains, “The Church
exacerbated these insecurities by promoting a type of pastoral care designed to make people
uncertain about their salvation and thus more dependent upon the intercessions of the church”
(58). By never outlining what needed to be done to achieve salvation, people were constantly
dependent on the church and eagerly sought all the offerings of salvation provided by the
church, such as purchasing indulgences. It was Luther’s personal anxiety that sprouted his
theological movement and his popularity reveals that this anxiety was prevalent throughout
Europe (Lindberg 62).
Luther’s conception of salvation through Justification or faith alone25 greatly
influenced his political thought. By spring 1520, Luther gave up hope of reform coming
from Rome, and turned to secular leaders (Estes 7). Like other reformers, Luther directed
reform appeals to the secular territorial leaders after the emperor and imperial diet
condemned him in 1520 (Estes 1). 26 It is likely because of the interference of secular leaders
that Luther did not become a martyr. Luther knew that effective reform was only possible
with cooperation of secular leaders, but felt ecclesiastical reform needed to be done by the
clergy, the spiritual leaders (Estes 7). In appealing to the rulers, he offers them two doctrines
that the papacy refused; divine right to rule and obedience to secular rulers.
Luther’s conception of the role of the church was quite different from the role
propagated by the pope, and thus he inadvertently challenged the idea of papal supremacy.
Luther set out to correct and return the policies of the church back to the pre-Medieval role in
the Ninety-Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences, published 31 October
1517. The sale of indulgences instigated Luther’s list of ninety-five things that needed to be
25
According to Luther, human nature is corrupted by the original sin and there is nothing any man could do to
achieve salvation (Cargill Thompson 20). Salvation is an unmerited gift given freely by God simply for
believing in him (Cargill Thompson 20). As Lindberg says, “So Luther turned the medieval piety of
achievement on its head. We do not do goods works in order to become acceptable to God; rather because God
accepts us we do good works,” (70). Contrary to the message of the Roman Catholic Church, good works do
not save souls; instead they reveal the souls have already been saved.
26
Following the Ninety-Five Theses uproar Luther accepted the protection of his territorial prince, the Elector of
Saxony (Estes 7)
Howatt 53
reformed in the Church. He was appalled when the parishioners of Wittenberg returned from
buying indulgences and proclaimed they no longer needed to confess and do penance since
they had bought their ticket to heaven (Lindberg 75). Lindberg explains the original intent of
the indulgences and how it was corrupted, “Although the intent of the indulgence system was
to adjust satisfaction for sins to changing social conditions (a developing urban environment
made certain penances difficult), by the late Middle Ages it was becoming an abused
instrument for clerical social control and revenue raising” (Lindberg 74). Indulgences
became a main source of revenue for the Church, but Luther felt it sent the wrong message to
Christians.
Luther believes the Papacy is confusing its spiritual mission by treating it politically,
particularly in “the sale of indulgences, the annates, the proliferation of papal bureaucracy,
and the control over ecclesiastical appointments had as their objective, not religious
considerations, but the enhancement of the political power of the Papacy” (Wolin 27). Luther
sees the function of a preacher as one to offer a spiritual guide to proper conduct, by
encouraging people and civil leaders to teach their conscience of how they ought to act and to
reprove them for abusing their position; but never to tell secular rulers how to act or rise
against them (Cargill Thompson 5). This notion directly contradicts the political and
coercive activity partaken by the papacy and Rome.
Luther simply saw his Ninety-Five Theses as questioning indulgences in an academic
discussion that he could do because of his doctoral oath, but Luther had unknowingly
contested papal authority (Lindberg 77-78). The reaction of papal supporters was to label
anyone who questioned the pope a heretic. Critics of the Ninety-Five Theses tended to focus
on Luther’s challenge to papal authority rather than the issues that inspired the work:
justification and penance (Estes 8). As James M. Estes explains,
Howatt 54
Luther’s critics…identified the true church with the Roman church and the
Roman church with the pope; elevated the authority of the pope above that of
Scripture; asserted that popes and papally sanctioned councils cannot err;
equated the practice of the church (e.g., the sale of indulgences) with the law
of the church; and concluded that anyone who criticized any aspect of the
church’s teaching and practice with respect to indulgences had attacked the
authority of the pope and was ipso facto a heretic. (8)
Instead of the discussion Luther expected, they argued the pope is the supreme authority of
the church, even over Scripture, the pope could not err, and anyone who disagreed is a
heretic—thereby closing any chance for negotiation or debate before it began.
In the face of the resolute arguments of papal supporters, Luther became increasingly
in favour of placing Scripture over the erroneous teachings of the pope and by July 1519,
after studying Scripture and Church history,27 Luther came to believe the Roman Church was
just one of many possibilities of the true church, that papal authority was not divinely
ordained but a human manifestation, and that ultimate authority in the church lay in Scripture,
not with popes, councils or Fathers (Estes 8). Moreover, Luther rejects the post-Augustinian
tradition of medieval political thought, and in particular he opposed the papal claims to
supremacy which, he feels, damnably overthrow God’s divinely appointed order of
government, which places the king at the head of the Chain of Being (Cargill Thompson 3).
Luther determines papal supremacy rested on human ecclesiastical law, not divine law
(Cargill Thompson 31). Luther’s opinion of the papacy worsened after reading Lorenzo
Vallas’ work exposing of The Donation of Constantine as a forgery, leading Luther to believe
the ecclesiastical hierarchy was tyranny, and he lost hope in Roman-led reform (Estes 8).
27
Which he studied for his famous debate with Johann Eck at the University of Leipzig.
Howatt 55
Luther sought to restore older beliefs that had been obscured by papal tyranny, particularly
over the past four centuries (Cargill Thompson 4).
Luther’s 1520 work, An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to the
Amelioration of the State of Christendom,28 set out to attack the three walls he identified as
protecting the papacy from reform. It was a response to Dominican Sylvester Prierias’
Epitoma responsionis ad Martinum Luther, who defended papal absolutism with arguments
that offended Luther (Estes 17). Luther accused the papacy of “ecclesiastical tyranny”
because whenever “its authority had been challenged, it had sought refuge in the argument
that papal power was unbound by any law” (Wolin 26). He felt that authentic religious
experiences were a deeply personal interaction between the believer and God, with only
Christ and Scripture to act as intermediaries (Wolin 29). All other intermediaries, such as the
church hierarchy and the sacrament system, were useless and dangerous and thus needed to
be destroyed, which Luther attempted by attacking the “three walls” (Wolin 30). In addition,
Luther incorporated the grievances and concerns of the German nation with his proposed
reforms, thereby uniting his cause with the German nation and its objections against Rome
(Estes 20). In Appeal, Luther argues the Emperor should call a church council, and then
provides the theoretical justification and limits for secular action (Estes 20).
The first wall argues that the spiritual order is superior to the secular, and
consequently this wall protects the Church from being punished by secular authorities for
ecclesiastical abuses, which are in actuality worldly crimes (Luther, “Appeal” 406). Luther
argues that through baptism, all Christians are equal and are different only by the work they
are called to do (“Appeal” 407). Luther states, “[W]e have one baptism, one gospel, one
faith, and are all equally Christian…The fact is that our baptism consecrates us all without
exception, and makes us all priests” (408). In terms of Christian status, there is no difference
28
Forthwith referred to as Appeal.
Howatt 56
between anyone. Estes interprets this concept by saying, “In other words, emperors, princes,
and other secular rulers have, by virtue of their baptism, exactly the same authority in the
church as other Christians, no less than the others, but also no more” (Estes 22). Therefore
the claim that priests are somehow superior to princes is invalid. While the community can
elect one person to exercise authority over them on their behalf, no one can spiritually rule
over others without consent (“Appeal” 408-09). The clergy is therefore no more or less
Christian than anyone else in the community and the same applies to princes (Estes 22).
With equality established, it is imperative that the clergy and the bishop must not
interfere with the secular authority’s ability to complete its duties,
Therefore, I maintain, that since the secular authorities are ordained by God to
punish evil-doers and to protect the law-abiding …Hence secular Christian
authorities should exercise their office freely and unhindered and without fear,
whether it be pope, bishop, or priest with whom they are dealing; if a man is
guilty let him pay the penalty. What canon law says to the contrary is Romish
presumptuousness and pure invention. (Luther, “Appeal” 410-11)
In other words, secular authorities are divinely ordained, and there is no Scriptural basis that
supports papal supremacy or that the spiritual order is exempt from secular laws, thus being
exempt from civil law is unjustified (Estes 22). Consequently, since the clergy and pope are
guilty of robbing and defrauding Christians through abuses, such as indulgences, then the
secular leaders are free to prosecute them (Estes 23).
Luther continues his attack on the pope by labelling him the Antichrist, as only the
devil would promote a law that states the Pope, even an evil one, cannot be punished by
secular authorities, since both God and the apostles subjected themselves to the secular
“sword” (“Appeal” 412). Papal political involvement has endangered the spiritual mission of
the church and, by confusing spiritual and temporal jurisdictions, greatly hindered the ability
Howatt 57
of secular authorities to rule effectively (Wolin 26). It is the unjustified temporal pretensions
of the Romanists to which Luther objects. With the first wall destroyed, he hopes secular
authorities will confidently punish wayward clergy.
The second wall the Romanists use to prevent reform is the belief that only the Pope
has the capabilities to interpret Scripture (Luther, “Appeal” 407). Not only can only the Pope
interpret Scripture but the papists further argue that the Pope cannot err in his interpretations
(Luther, “Appeal” 412). Luther refutes this claim stating there is no Scriptural basis for their
claim (“Appeal” 413).
According to Luther, all Christians are equal, through their baptism, and thus all
Christians have the ability to interpret Scripture (“Appeal” 414). Since the whole Christian
community has the right to interpret Scripture, they have a duty to judge the pope’s
interpretations of it, and to reject that interpretation if it is heretical or false. When the pope
errs in his interpretation of Scripture, the Christian community must correct him, since
Christians care for their neighbours (Estes 24).
The third wall claims that only the Pope can call councils (Luther, “Appeal” 407).
Once again Luther claims there is no Scriptural basis for their claim and this claim is
detrimental to the Faith (“Appeal” 415). Scripture states Christians must correct their
neighbours, so a council ought to be called to correct the corrupt nature of the Roman
Catholic Church (Luther, “Appeal” 415). Spiritual government is too important to blindly
obey and thus when the spiritual authorities err, people must resist (Estes 12). Therefore,
when the pope refuses to call a council, any Christian should be able to do so (Estes 25).
Logistically, princes are in the best position to call a council, and so, Luther feels they
should not be prevented from so doing (“Appeal” 416). However, he limits the prince’s
intervention in the Faith. Secular authority has no spiritual function, and while it should call
the council it should not interfere in it (Estes 6-7). When secular leaders call a council, they
Howatt 58
do so as Christians, not princes (because princes have nothing to do with preaching the gospel
or the Faith), but he offers them a special responsibility as secular rulers to act on behalf of
the community (Estes 26). Luther intends the power to interfere to be used in emergencies
and only to call the council, not to take over governance of the church. (Estes 27).
After these three walls fall, Luther believes the Church would be open to reform.
Appeal follows the medieval tradition of attacking the pope and placing the secular authority
about the Roman Catholic Church, however in 1523 Luther becomes more radical. Luther
reiterates the equality of all Christians, priests and laymen, and that the bishops and popes
cannot impose laws without their consent in Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be
Obeyed (392). Luther’s doctrine revolutionarily claims the Priesthood of All Believers
developed in Appeal that states that there is an equality between laity and clergy, and denies
that priests are a separate spiritual estate (Cargill Thompson 27). Furthermore, Luther, like
Marsilius of Padua, argues the clergy should have no hand in coercive power, and that papacy
wielding coercive power turns the world upside-down—that is the work of the devil
(“Secular Authority” 390). W.D.J. Cargill Thompson asserts, “The papacy flaunts the
principle of distinction of the regiments in a variety of ways—most conspicuously by its
claim that temporal rulers derive their authority from it and not directly from God, but also by
introducing the method of temporal government into the spiritual sphere,” (55). Rome
confuses the two distinct governments by asserting royal authority is rooted in their
coronation by the pope and by using coercive power to enforce spiritual matters. Confusing
the two regiments brings chaos through undermining the divine order, and it is against this
that secular leaders must rise against.
Luther was often consulted on political problems by secular rulers, and outside events
often forced him to work out various aspects of his theory, but the fundamentals were always
taken from his theology (Cargill Thompson 10, 13). Although most German governments
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resented Rome and were hesitant to enforce the Edict of Worms,29 they were undecided on
Luther’s theology and were nervous about the socio-political repercussions of supporting his
movement (Estes 32). Other princes, such as Duke George of Albertine Saxony, were openly
hostile to him and actively attempted to prevent Luther’s reform message from being spread
through the countryside by talented preachers and pamphleteers (Estes 32). Luther, thus,
wrote Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,30 published in 1523, in
response to Christians being forced to hand over their New Testaments (Cargill Thompson
13). Seeing the unjust actions of secular authorities, Luther uses Justification and his
theology to create a political theory outlining the obedience owed to rulers.
Secular Authority begins by saying how Appeal was misinterpreted. In particular,
princes believed that they have the ability to order subjects to worship the religion in which
the ruler believes. Luther claims,
[Rulers] actually think they have the power to do and command their subjects
to do, whatever they please. And the subjects are led astray and believe they
are bound to obey them in everything. It has gone so far that the rulers have
ordered the people to put away books, and to believe and keep what they
prescribe. In this way they presumptuously set themselves in God’s place.
(“Secular Authority” 365)
In an attempt to rule over spiritual issues, princes have usurped God’s position. They are to
rule over worldly matters, but the reach of their sword extends only to the temporal world
(Luther, “Secular Authority” 383).
A key part of Luther’s political theory is his notion of the “Two Kingdoms.” Luther
envisions a spiritual order for salvation and a temporal order for the natural world (Cargill
29
30
The Edict of Worms labelled Luther a heretic and banned reading or possessing his works.
Forthwith referred to as Secular Authority.
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Thompson 42). 31 Furthermore, there are two classes of man. The people in the first
category are the true believers, who belong to the kingdom of God and are subject to Christ
(Luther, “Secular Authority” 368). The true believers do not need the secular sword or law,
for as Luther says, “And if all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true
believers, no prince, king, lord, sword or law would be needed” (“Secular Authority” 369).
The true believers govern themselves better than law could, however the unrighteous have
evil natures that need laws to resist doing evil deeds and to teach what sins are (Luther,
“Secular Authority” 369-70).
The unrighteous are the second category of men. The majority men are not true
believers and require the law to prevent them from doing sinful deeds. As Luther proclaims,
Since few believe and still fewer live a Christian life, do not resist evil, and
themselves do no evil, God has provided for non-Christians a different
government outside the Christian estate and God’s kingdom, and has subjected
them to the sword, so that, even though they would do so, they cannot practice
their wickedness, and that, if they do, they may not do so without fear nor in
peace and prosperity. (“Secular Authority” 370)
Since most men are not true believers, without the temporal sword, man would fall into a
Hobbesian State of Nature, where every man must fight for his existence (“Secular
Authority” 370).
The “Two Kingdoms” are distinct, but parallel; both have their duties and neither one
on its own is sufficient (“Secular Authority” 371). Cargill Thompson argues that the notion
that temporal and spiritual governments are distinct and could not be confused was one of
Luther’s revolutionary ideas (Cargill Thompson 7). The “Two Kingdoms” is not a new idea,
but what is new is Luther seeing the two orders existing parallel to each other, rather than
31
The “Two Kingdoms” concept is derived from Luther’s Justification theory, as he sees a Christian as having
two natures: one is a special, personal relationship with God, and the other is man as a creature of sin, who
exists in relation to other people (Cargill Thompson 42-43).
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hierarchical, whereas the older medieval conception of the two kingdoms views the temporal
order as lower than the spiritual (Cargill Thompson 44). Cargill Thompson illustrates the
distinctive way the two orders coexist, “They represent distinct and parallel modes of man’s
existence, corresponding to his dual nature. In one he works out his salvation; in the other he
lives his natural life in the world” (Cargill Thompson 44). While the spiritual order may
seem superior to the secular order in terms of man’s existence on earth, the two governments
are parallel, since the former brought salvation and was eternal, whereas the latter ensured
earthly peace and lasted only a lifetime, (Cargill Thompson 44).
Both kingdoms are needed and are sanctioned by God. As Estes summarizes,
“Secular government cannot make anyone righteous in the eyes of God, and spiritual
government cannot maintain external peace and order in human affairs” (39). It is
impossible to rule the earthly world without the sword, and it would need a world full of true
Christians before ruling it with the word, but the law cannot lead to salvation (Luther,
“Secular Authority” 370-71).
Christ never wields the temporal sword and thus neither should the clergy (Luther,
“Secular Authority” 372). Luther agrees with Marsilius’ belief that the ecclesiastical order
had no right to exercising coercive power. Coercive authority rested with the temporal
magistrate, whereas preaching Scripture and administering sacraments was in the hands of
the spiritual ministers. Additionally, a true Christian submits himself to the sword and obeys
secular authority for the good of his neighbour, even though he himself does not need the law
(Luther, “Secular Authority” 373).
After justifying the need for law and coercive force on earth, and limiting the use of
that force to secular authorities, Luther creates a theory supporting royal supremacy over
Rome. Early on, Luther professes that kings get their power directly from God, not from the
pope and in 1520 he denies the pope any involvement in the source of temporal authority
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(Cargill Thompson 63). This revolutionary principle asserts “the belief that secular authority
was instituted by God. Therefore, rulers derived their authority directly from God, not
mediately through the Pope” (Cargill Thompson 7). God’s will is the reason for the existence
of secular law, and it is created for the punishment of evil and protection of the righteous
(Luther, “Secular Authority” 366-67). Luther clearly states, “We must firmly establish
secular law and the sword, that no one may doubt that it is in the world by God’s will and
ordinance…it is sufficiently clear and certain that it is God’s will that the sword and secular
law be used for the punishment of the wicked and the protection of the upright” (“Secular
Authority” 366-67). Moreover, Christ’s words are not more important than other laws, and
thus he does not prohibit secular power ( “Secular Authority” 380). In fact, a prince must be
able to set, modify and nullify laws without hindrance ( “Secular Authority” 393). Kings are
God’s ministers of the world—they wield the shield on behalf of God; this prevents man
from falling into a Hobbesian state of nature, which he is bound to do due to the original sin
(Cargill Thompson 63).
Luther sees secular authority and ruling institutions as gifts from God. As Cargill
Thompson explains “Luther took the existing political institutions of his own day for granted:
he accepted them as God-given and he is rarely tempted to compare one kind of constitution
with another, to suggest that monarchy is superior to republican city governments or vice-
Howatt 63
versa” (5). Consequently, Luther demands subjects’ obey their ruler. He believes subjects are
to obey secular authority based on the texts of Matthew, Paul and Peter,32 all of whom preach
non-resistance (“Secular Authority” 367-68). To Luther, rebellion is not just a crime against
the state but a moral sin, as it is contrary to God’s will and disrupts order in society (Cargill
Thompson 5-6). 33 As Luther firmly states, “No Christian shall wield or invoke the sword for
himself and for his cause” (“Secular Authority” 381). The philosophy of non-resistance is his
final revolutionary idea. It was the “belief that rebellion against established authority was
forbidden by God in all circumstances and was always wrong, indeed, that was the worst of
all possible sins” (Cargill Thompson 7). This idea became ingrained in the protestant
movement. This Protestant cultural phenomenon was important for denying pro-Catholic
claims that the reform movement was inciting rebellion and for contrasting Protestantism
against Catholicism, as Protestant leaders demand obedience to rulers and Catholic leaders
demand believers rise against heathen and heretical princes.
In the second part of Secular Authority, Luther comments on the limits of temporal
laws.
According to him, temporal laws extend only to earthly matters and not inward
beliefs, such as matters of conscience, because secular laws on Faith may misled the subjects.
He declares,
Every kingdom must have its own laws and regulation, and without law no
kingdom or government can exist…Worldly government has laws which
extend no farther than to life and property and what is external upon earth.
For over the soul God can and will let no one rule but Himself. Therefore
where temporal power presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches
upon God’s government and only misleads and destroys the souls. (382-83)
32
Matthew 5; Romans 12; I Peter 3
Luther frequently attacks the selfish, tyrannical behaviour of German princes and expresses sympathy for the
plight of the peasants in the first of his Peasants’ War articles, however he remain uninterested in reforming the
political institution—Luther faulted the moral failings of individuals for oppressive governments rather than
recognizing flaws in the political establishment (Cargill Thompson 69).
33
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Accordingly, laws prohibiting believing in a certain Faith, such as laws against Protestantism,
are overstepping the limits of a prince’s authority. Luther further notes, it is impossible to
force someone’s belief in something, so leaders should let subjects believe what they want
because martyrdom only strengthens beliefs (“Secular Authority” 385, 389). As Sheldon S.
Wolin maintains, “Faith could not be created or instilled by an external agency, whether
sacerdotal or political; it was an inward disposition of the individual inclining him towards
God” (31). Faith is a personal experience. It is a bishop’s job to guide a heretic straight by
preaching the word, not through threats of excommunication or other uses of coercive force
(Luther, “Secular Authority” 389).
Luther stresses that the spiritual government and the temporal government are
separate and neither should interfere with the other. He claims, “That is, over what is one
earth and belongs to the temporal, earthly kingdom, man has authority from God, but that
which belongs to the heavenly eternal kingdom is entirely under the heavenly Lord”
(“Secular Authority” 387). However, even if the prince were to overstep, with the exception
of a command clearly contrary to the law of God, a subject is bound to give them
unquestioning obedience and is forbidden to resist (Estes 11). So, if Christians are ordered
by the secular authorities to surrender their New Testaments in the vernacular, they were to
employ passive disobedience—refuse and passively accept their punishment34 (Luther,
“Secular Authority” 388; Estes 40). Secular leaders, even tyrants who issue laws opposing
Scripture, are incapable of harming true believers, because temporal laws touch earthly
goods, but can never penetrate into souls (Wolin 38).
34
Ironically, this part of Secular Authority was used by both supporters and opponents to the evangelical cause.
For example, after John the Steadfast outlawed the mass in Altenburg, Catholics used Luther’s work to claim the
prince had overstepped his limits and made a law forcing people to believe in Protestantism (Estes 44). Luther
clarified his position, saying the prince had only forbidden public exhibitions of blasphemy, but left the canons
untouched and believers free to practice the religion they wanted in private (Estes 44). In 1526, Luther further
added that rulers should forbid incongruous preaching from causing disunity, potentially causing turmoil and
faction (Estes 44).
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The third section of Secular Authority is a “mirror for princes” and Luther states, that
while a prince has the power, he should rule to satisfy the needs of his people. He stresses,
“[A] prince should in his heart empty himself of his power and authority, and interest himself
in the need of his subjects, dealing with it as though it were his own need” (“Secular
Authority” 394). While subjects have no right to resist their ruler, it does not end the moral
obligation of the prince to his people (Cargill Thompson 69). A prince should rule in the
image of God and follow His word (Luther, “Secular Authority” 395). A minister should
help guide the prince to make the right, moral decisions, and since the former is no longer
representing the powerful ecclesiastical hierarchy, the advice would be pure (Wolin 38).
While a prince should consult wise men, he must not fully trust them, for it is his calling to
control government, not theirs (Luther, “Secular Authority” 395).
Luther extends his theory of non-resistance, stating that subjects must not wage war
with their superiors, even between a prince and his overlord (“Secular Authority” 398). He
stresses,
To act here as a Christian, I say, a prince should not wage war against his
overlord—the king, emperor or other liege—but should let him who takes
take…But if your opponents is your equal, your inferior, or of a foreign
government, you should first offer him justice and peace…If he is unwilling,
then use your best strategy and defend yourself by force against force…In
doing this you must not consider your own interests and how you may remain
lord, but your subjects, to whom you owe help and protection, that all may be
done in love. (398)
Luther permits conflict with equals, inferior lords or foreigners, but it must be done for the
good of the subjects and only after diplomatic efforts have failed.
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Luther’s political theory has much in common with the works of both Marsilius of
Padua and Jean Bodin. Marsilius and Luther share many of the same complaints against the
papacy, whereas Bodin and Luther have a similar conception of the absolute nature of
sovereignty. While Bodin’s idea of sovereignty is a secular tract, without calling on theology
to support his absolutist sentiments, it appears as though Luther is a work that bridges the gap
between Marsilius’ polemic against the pope and Bodin’s political theory.
Both Marsilius and Luther agree that the papacy is corrupt and is thus a threat to
temporal leaders (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch. 22, Sect. 14-20, 308-13; Luther, “Secular Authority”
390). They feel the power of the papacy was extended through fraudulent claims and
preaching falsehoods (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect.16, 309; Luther, “Appeal” 406-07). They
note the pope and clergy view immunity from civil law as a “spiritual right,” but both
thinkers deny scriptural evidence for this an insist the papacy should be limited by temporal
laws (Marsilius Bk.2, Ch.4, Sect. 1, 113; Luther, “Appeal” 410-11). Additionally, they both
see the ecclesiastical hierarchy as a human invention, not a divine institution (Marsilius Bk.2,
Ch.15, Sect.6-7, 237-38; Luther, “Appeal” 407-08). Again, both men agree that papal
coercive power, such as excommunication and interdiction, is a sign of the Church straying
from its spiritual mission, as Christ taught followers to obey secular authority (Marsilius
Bk.2, Ch.22, Sect.17, 310; Luther, “Appeal” 412). Then they determine papal intrusion of
secular affairs hinders peace (Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect.7, 7; Luther, “Appeal” 410).
After identifying the pope as the Antichrist, both Marsilius and Luther placed secular
power above the church and appealed to secular leaders to rise against the pope (Marsilius
Bk.1, Ch.1, Sect. 2, 4; Luther “Appeal” 405-06). However, they justify the authority of the
prince to take action against the Romanists quite differently. Marsilius insists on an
ascending conception of sovereign authority, in which the legislator humanus is the supreme
Howatt 67
authority (Bk.1, Ch.12, Sect.3, 45). The only way to achieve peace and human happiness is
to gain the consent of the whole community (Marsilius Bk.1, Ch.3, Sect.3-5, 10-12).
On the other hand, Luther maintains a descending notion of sovereignty, in which the
ruler holds supreme authority directly from God; a prince is God’s vicar on earth and rules in
His stead (“Secular Authority” 366-67). Rather than emphasizing consent, as Marsilius does,
Luther avers the necessity of obedience to one’s ruler. In accordance with Luther’s theory,
there is never justifiable resistance (“Secular Authority” 381). Luther upholds the king’s
divine right to rule.
Luther’s obedience theory is much more akin to Bodin’s absolutist doctrine. Bodin
actually borrows Luther’s non-resistance theory and cites him in Six Books (Franklin 94).
Bodin also rejects a subject’s right to resist offering the same explanation as Luther: there is
no higher authority on earth than the king—the king answers only to God (Bodin 301). They
also only allow passive disobedience if the sovereign rules against the law of God, although
Luther requires subjects to speak against the prince’s errors, whereas Bodin cautions them for
their efforts may be futile (Luther, “Secular Authority” 388; Bodin 106). Furthermore both
Luther and Bodin use their absolutist theories to offer theoretical support for the authority of
the ruler against competing factions, rather than with the intent of repressing the subjects.
The greatest difference between to two doctrines is the foundations. Luther’s political theory
is rooted in his theology, although Bodin’s is grounded in historical accounts. With this in
mind, much of Bodin’s work focuses on practical political matters, such as the practical limits
of a sovereign’s power, whereas Luther vaguely states a secular ruler is limited only by the
temporal world.
To summarize Luther’s ideas, Luther did not begin his reform movement by objecting
to the need of a church hierarchy to manage religion, even if he did disagree with the papal
supporters over the nature of that office; however his philosophy advanced to a complete
Howatt 68
rejection of the Church and its corresponding hierarchy (Wolin 29). Luther’s adamant
position on obedience is a direct reaction to papal claims on temporal power. As Cargill
Thompson affirms, “The emphasis on non-resistance and the divine right of temporal
authority involved the rejection of papal claims to be the ultimate source of all secular
authority, as well as the rejection of the late medieval doctrine that tyrants might lawfully be
resisted, since a ruler who became a tyrant ipso facto forfeited his authority” (Cargill
Thompson 8). Contrary to late medieval doctrines, the ruler was supreme because God put
him in that position, and thus one opposes God’s will in resisting the leader’s will. Luther’s
government theory basically stated secular authorities insures temporal peace, though for the
true believer it never compromises his internal virtue (Wolin 39). While the secular order
could never instil internal virtue for the non-believer it provides external peace and external
virtue (Wolin 39).
All Luther’s revolutionary ideas about Divine Right of Kings, non-resistance and the
“Two Kingdoms” had long medieval, even pre-medieval, histories; for example, the principle
of divine right to rule, derived from belief in the New Testament, extended back to the
Carolingians (Cargill Thompson 7-8). Although the ideas were not new, Luther renewed
interest in them; “As a result of his teaching they re-entered the mainstream of European
political thought, becoming for a time the staple of protestant political theory,” (Cargill
Thompson 8). This renewed interest is what revolutionized political thinking. Protestant
thinkers, such as William Tyndale, developed and solidified Luther’s often abstract ideas
(Daniells xxv). Of utmost importance, it was Tyndale who ushered in the Lutheran
obedience doctrine to England, which became an integral part of the English Reformation
movement (Rex 864-65).
Tyndale was born in Gloucestershire, England in 1494, and was educated in
humanism and languages at Oxford (Daniell xvii). Tyndale, a linguistic genius, appears to
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have set upon the road to Reformation after the Bishop of London, Cuthbert Tunstall, rejected
Tyndale’s request to translate the Bible into English in 1522 (Lindberg 313). Leaving
England around 1524, he first attempted to publish an English translation of the New
Testament, referring to the original Greek version instead of the church’s Latin Vulgate, in
1525 in Cologne (Daniell viii). While that work was stopped by city officials, he
successfully printed his complete translation a year later in Worms (Daniell viii). Tyndale
traveled to Hamburg and Wittenberg, then to Antwerp (Lindberg 314). There, Tyndale was
arrested in May 1535 after being betrayed to imperial authorities, and died 6 October 1536
after sixteen months of interrogation (Daniell xix).
Luther had a profound influence on Tyndale. Luther was the source, either directly or
indirectly, of Tyndale’s ideas, in particular the idea of obedience (Rex 866). Tyndale also
translated all of Luther’s writings but did not present them as Luther’s because they were
banned in England (Lindberg 314). Instead, Tyndale presented Luther’s work as Preface to
the Romans and published it separately, and therefore Catholics were unknowingly influence
by Luther (Lindberg 315).
Tyndale believes the New Testament preaches faith alone as the route to salvation
(Daniell xi). As David Daniell contends, “For Tyndale and all the Reformers, the Bible—the
whole Bible—was the first and only authority for belief and practice” (xii). To them, the
Bible was the authority of the Faith, not the unwritten traditions of the Roman Catholic
Church, and so Reformers believed all should read the Bible (Daniell xiii).
Reformers were able to use the Greek New Testament, widely available after
Erasmus’ Bible translation,35 to make vernacular translations, which Luther did in 1522 and
Tyndale in 1526 (Daniell xvii). Tyndale’s bible translations were quite influential and
35
In 1516, Erasmus challenged the Roman Catholic Church’s Latin Vulgate, the official Bible of the Church,
with a Latin translation of the Bible of his own. Of equal importance is that when Erasmus printed his Latin
translation, he included the original Greek beside it (Daniell xvii). Although he refused the Reformer label, by
providing the original text, Erasmus is arguably the single, most important figure of the Reformation (Whitney
378).
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continue to influence modern English translations of Bibles (Lindberg 314). Tyndale used
the English translation of the Bible to challenge the Pope (Daniell xi). He argued that the
pope’s falsehoods and distortions derive from reading Scripture allegorically and then using it
to prove what he wanted (Daniell xi). The Church prizes ignorance so people will blindly
follow their teachings of Christ and not know the clergy preach falsehoods; they use their
position to usurp Emperors and Kings (Tyndale 73). As long as the Bible remained in Latin,
few could object to the clergy’s teachings, but that could change with Bibles in the vernacular
(Daniell xi). Tyndale believed there had been mistranslations in the Latin Vulgate such as:
repent instead of do penance; congregation or community instead of church and; elders
instead of priests (Lindberg 314). In translating the Bible, Tyndale revealed that the Roman
Catholic Church could err (Daniell xv). After Tyndale’s death, John Rogers, Chaplain to the
English House, collected Tyndale’s works and printed the Bible in 1537 under license of
King Henry VIII (Daniell xix). Eventually, Thomas Cromwell and Thomas Crammer
persuaded King Henry to put the Bible in all English Churches—a step which could never be
reversed (Lindberg 315).
Tyndale’s The obedience of a Christian man and how Christian rulers ought to
govern, wherein also (if thou mark diligently) thou shalt find eyes to perceive the crafty
conveyance of all jugglers36 was first printed on 2 October 1528 in Antwerp, in the aftermath
of the German Peasants’ Revolt (Eppley 19). While officially banned, the text was well
received in England (Daniell xxiii). It is said Queen Anne encouraged Henry VIII to read the
work and that he approved of its obedience message (Eppley 19). The immediate cause for
writing Obedience was to refute Catholic claims that the reformers were teaching the people
disobedience and causing rebellions (Rex 866).
36
Forthwith referred to as Obedience.
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The initial two sections of Obedience act as introductions: the first discusses
Tyndale’s central philosophy of experiencing God through Scripture,37 and the second
describes the abuses of the Church by preaching ecclesiastical law rather than Scripture.38
Obedience is divided into three sections. It discusses God’s laws of obedience, how one
should rule and obey according to one’s callings and a discussion of the literal interpretation
of Scripture. As Richard Rex claims,
The first [on God’s laws of obedience] is a crisp presentation of Lutheran
obedience doctrine…And the third is a statement of the main lines of Lutheran
doctrine, covering justification, the identification of the pope as Antichrist, the
reduction of the sacraments to two, a polemic against the cult of the saints, and
a defence of the authority of the literal sense of scripture. (Rex 865)
The Lutheran obedience doctrine and labelling the pope as the Antichrist emerge as
fundamental notions within Protestant thought.
Tyndale immediately begins the Prologue by attacking the Pope (Tyndale 26). He
outlines how the clergy blame the reformers when God punishes them (Tyndale 27). He
defends the Protestant cause and states that rebellion is caused actually by the clergy
preaching falsehoods (Tyndale 28). Despite the fact that Christ taught obedience, Catholics
preach that rulers must lead according to Rome’s stipulations, and should the leaders reject it,
they are tyrants and oppressors (Tyndale 28). As tyrants, Rome permits the people to rise
against their ruler (Tyndale 28). Tyndale says,
This seest thou, that it is the bloody doctrine of the Pope which causeth
disobedience, rebellion and insurrection. For he teacheth to fight and defend
his traditions whatsoever he dreameth with fire, water and sword and to
37
38
Tyndale’s message to the reader.
The Prologue to the book.
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disobey father, mother, master, lord, king and emperor: yea and to invade
whatsoever land or nation that will not receive and admit his godhead. (29-30)
It is the teaching of the papacy that leads to ruin, not the so-called new learning propagated
by the reformers.
Tyndale continues his attack on the papacy within the main sections of Obedience as
well. He believes that Spiritual leaders had been corrupted by power and material goods, and
thus were acting politically for their own gain (Daniell xiv). He stresses how Rome preaches
falsehoods, particularly that it is acceptable to oppose and resist a heathen prince (40). While
few would see this as sinful, Christ condemned these deeds (40). A true Christian is humble
and subservient (Tyndale 50). The king, good or bad, answers only to God and no one, not
even the clergy are exempt from God if they break the law (Tyndale 40-41).
God ordains kings to fight evil, but the pope usurped the right of the Emperor
(Tyndale 47). Tyndale states, “The Pope contrary unto all conscience and against all doctrine
of Christ, which saith my kingdom is not of the world (John 18), hath usurped the right of the
Emperor,” (47). As Tyndale points out both Peter and Christ submitted themselves to the
temporal sword (Tyndale 49). But the pope does not. Papal policies undermine secular
authority by trying to remove the obligation of the clergy to obey the king, however the
subservient position is where God has placed them (Eppley 20). Thus, Tyndale argues, that
there is an alien structure (the Roman Catholic Church) that rules over England, which causes
two issues: first, kings are incapable of ruling effectively and; second church-state relations
split the nation—the pope has created a situation where it can interfere with the ruling of the
nation but not be challenged (Daniell x).
Maintaining earthly peace and leading man to salvation are such important jobs that it
is impossible for one man to perform both. Tyndale argues, “To preach God’s word is too
much for half a man. And to minister a temporal kingdom is too much for half a man also.
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Either other requireth an whole man. One therefore cannot well do both” (Tyndale 68). The
clergy exist to provide spiritual guidance and thus the pope only has the authority to preach
(Tyndale 67). In usurping the Emperor, the Church has robbed the earth of the true spiritual
message and peace in the land (Tyndale 51).
The period in which Tyndale writes marks the emergence of the modern conception
of state. The dual, parallel kingdoms are essential because, as Daniel Philpott says, “In
separating the two realms, Reformation poltical theology essentially prescribed
sovereignty…” (223). Daniell insists that, “Tyndale’s book came at a time when what we
understand as modern political thought was first becoming visible. It is a central document in
that process” (xxv). This claim gains validity in the examination of Tyndale’s justification
for sovereignty—that is, Divine Right to Rule.
While Luther took for granted the established political systems and from that
developed his obedience doctrine, Tyndale emphasizes that the secular ruler is God’s
representative on earth. Tyndale continually stresses the Bible states the king is God’s vicar
on earth, regardless if he is benevolent or malevolent, and therefore all subjects must submit
to his authority (Eppley 20). God is the source of all power and He will take vengeance on
those who disobey; “There is no power but of God. The powers that be are of God.
Whosoever therefore resisteth that power resisteth the ordinance of God. They that resist,
shall receive to them self damnation” (Tyndale 36). That is to say, God is all powerful and
has ordained secular authority to exercise power in His place. Disobedience of that power is
disobedience of God, and so any who resist are damned.
To illustrate his point even more clearly, Tyndale contends, “God therefore hath given
laws unto nations and in all lands hath put kings, governors and rulers in his own stead, to
rule the world through them” (37, emphasis added). The sovereign is an agent of God put on
Howatt 74
earth to rule through him. The king protects people from the chaos of a lawless land, so even
if he is a tyrant, he is a gift from God (Tyndale 41). Tyndale clearly says,
For [the king] is a minister of God for thy wealth: to defend thee from a
thousand inconvenient, from thieves, murderers and them that would defile thy
wife, thy daughter and take from thee all that thou hast: yea life and all, if thou
did resist. Furthermore though he be the greatest tyrant in the world, yet is he
unto thee a great benefit of God and a thing wherefore thou oughtest to thank
God highly. (41)
Sovereigns, even ones malevolently inclined, bring order to the land and uphold the law.
Therefore life with a sovereign is significantly better than without one.
Tyndale also points out that there is no judge of a sovereign leader but God. He
maintains, “For God hath made the king in every realm judge over all, and over him there is
no judge. He that judgeth the king judgeth God and he that layeth hands on the king layeth
hand on God, and he that resisteth the king resisteth God and damneth God’s law and
ordinance” (39). Any person presumptuous enough to judge the king is judging God. Any
action taken against the king is akin to taking that same action against God.
God forbids men from avenging themselves, and they must take issues to the authority
(Tyndale 37). Furthermore, nobody can avenge oneself against a superior, for even if the
outcome is positive, the act itself leads to damnation (Tyndale 38). To avenge oneself is
sinful, for it prevents God from being the judge (Tyndale 38). Tyndale also avers that
rebellion only worsens the situation because the new ruler has no right to the crown (57).
Obedience is a matter of conscience, first because resisting is going against God’s will and
second because it might encourage others to be discontent and rebel (Tyndale 50-51).
Rebellion merely encourages others to also take action for themselves,
Howatt 75
For though through craft and violence thou mightiest escape and obtain liberty
or privilege to be free from all manner of duties, yet oughtest thou neither to
sue or seek for any such thing, neither yet admit or accept, if it were proffered
lest thy freedom make thy weak brother to grudge and rebel, in that he seeth
thee go empty and he himself more laden, thy part also laid on his shoulders.
(Tyndale 51).
Seeing a neighbour achieve liberty and take action against a superior persuades others to do
the same. Then the world falls into ruin for all are violently taking their desires—the very
state of nature that God gave kings to man to prevent.
Tyndale argues that there is one social structure that you must obey simply because
you are in it (Daniell ix-x). God makes man through parents, even though He could directly
create man, and since man is created through his parents, he must obey them or it would be
an affront to God (Tyndale 31). Paternal authority in the family was a common metaphor to
support the authority of a king over his land (Rex 866).
Obedience leads to a long, happy life, whereas disobedience leads to death (Tyndale
32). Disobedience never goes unpunished (Tyndale 32). Even if no man punishes
disobedience, God will curse them (Tyndale 38). In this way, Tyndale inserts the idea of
divine retribution into his obedience doctrine. He says, “Likewise though no man punish the
breakers of the law, yet shall God send his curses upon them till they be utterly brought to
nought as thou readest most terribly even in the said place” (38). One should always fear the
punishment for resistance.
Obedience has many warnings for kings to rule their kingdoms appropriately (Eppley
24). Following Luther’s example, Tyndale declares the reach of the secular sword is to the
temporal world. Daniel Eppley maintains, “While Tyndale denounces active resistance to
royal policies, he is equally clear that, as the king is God’s vicar, so his authority is naught
Howatt 76
when opposed to the divine will” (Eppley 21). The king is a representative, and therefore
cannot oppose that which he represents: God. Similar to Luther, Tyndale says that when a
king rules contrary to God’s will, a subject must not only disobey but raise awareness of the
mistake to the king (Eppley 22; Tyndale 181). As Rex mentions, “And Tyndale, for all his
doctrine of obedience, was never an establishment figure, and thus gave more attention than
the Henrician propagandists to the occasions on which obedience to God might entail
disobedience to man” (Rex 892). Henry VIII certainly would not have appreciated Tyndale’s
insistence on speaking out against the ruler when he erred and overstepped. Nonetheless,
Tyndale forbids violent risings against the king, for any reason (Eppley 24; Tyndale 29).
That is one aspect of Tyndale’s writings certainly appealed to the Henrican reformers.
To conclude this section on Tyndale’s work, it is important to remember that
anticlerical sentiments had a long history in England (Daniell xiv). 39 The works of Tyndale,
and other Reformers, goes beyond the medieval tradition of antipapal polemics and arguing
for royal supremacy. Philpott argues, “Importantly pre-Reformation movements, the Lollard
movement and the Hussites, did not imply the same political implications; they challenged
church doctrines but did not propose the arguments that undermined the church’s hierarchical
or temporal powers” (224). That is, the notion of obedience to the ruler, rather than the pope,
challenges the foundations of support for the Roman Catholic Church while equally
empowering the secular leader, as the coercive power of Rome is only effective if a ruler’s
subject will rise against him. Furthermore, Daniel Eppley points out, “Obedience champions
a defence of royal absolutism in both Church and state affairs, which acts as an ideal
instrument for promotion of unqualified obedience to the king” (20). The king maintains
nearly unlimited power (Eppley 21). However Tyndale did not allow kings free reign to do
39
John Wycliffe (1320-1384) was an English priest who taught the spiritual relationship was between God and
the faithful, and the relationship did not need any intermediaries—the pope and the bishops (Varickayil 17). He
was angry about the corruption and sexual lapses of the clergy, which inspired the unsuccessful Lollard
movement (Lindberg 310).
Howatt 77
what they wanted. Kings ought to rule in the example of Christ. The king is God’s
representative but he should work for the wealth of all his people (Tyndale 63). As Tyndale
explains, “Though that the king in the temporal regiment be in the room of God and represent
God himself and is without all comparison better than his subjects: yet let him put off that
and become a brother, doing and leaving undone all things in respect of the commonwealth,
that all men may see that he seeketh nothing, but the profit of his subjects” (63). This notion
is nearly identical to Bodin’s absolutist theory. For both Bodin and Tyndale state, although
the king is absolute and can be judged by no earthly man, he is to rule on behalf of his people,
not for his own gains.
Significantly, Tyndale influenced many groups of people, not just intellectuals and
theologians. Daniell claims, “It is commonly said that William Tyndale’s The Obedience of a
Christian Man…was the first, most important, book in the earliest phase of the English
Reformation” (viii). Although regularly appearing on the official list of banned books,
Obedience was well received in Britain (Daniell xxiii). Furthermore, Tyndale’s message of
obedience was disseminated to Englishmen of all classes through the arts, for example
through William Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew (1592). After Petruccio has
“tamed” Katherine, she gives a speech detailing the duty of a wife and a subject of obedience
to her lord. She states,
Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper,
Thy head, thy sovereign, one that cares for thee,
And for thy maintenance commits his body
To painful labour both by sea and land…
Whilst thou liest warm at home, secure and safe,
And craves no other tribute at thy hands
But love, fair looks, and true obedience…
Howatt 78
Such a duty as the subject owes the prince… (5.2.150-53, 155-57, 159)
Katherine clearly speaks Tyndale’s theory of obedience. Just as a wife owes her obedience to
her husband, a subject owes obedience to the prince because the prince keeps the land safe.
Katherine then voices the inappropriateness of rebellion, “I am ashamed that women are so
simple/ To offer war where they should kneel for peace,/ Or seek for rule, supremacy, and
sway/ When they are bound to serve, love, and obey” (5.2.165-68). Katherine distinguishes
the foolishness of refusing to obey, and it is easy to associate the duty of a wife to a subject,
since she has previously directly compared the two statuses. And so, the Shakespearean
audience is being influenced by Tyndale’s obedience doctrine.
There is a great historical significance to Obedience because, “For the first time it
stated two great principles of the English Reformation: the supreme authority of scripture in
the church, and the supreme authority of the king in the state” (Daniell xxix). Tyndale’s
work offers English Reformers a comprehensive ideology to aid the transfer of obedience
from the papacy to the monarchy, which occurred as a consequence of Henrican antipapal
policies (Rex 873). Edward Allen Whitney notes,
[N]early all men in England, whatever their particular shade of religious
belief, were unanimous in feeling that disobedience to constituted authority
was not only among the most heinous crimes which mortal man could commit
but, so far as the well-being of the state was concerned, was even more
disastrous than any other crime. (390)
This attitude, that disobedience is a dire sin, is voiced repeatedly in Tyndale’s writing and
was invaluable to the English king.
Henry VIII’s goal was to secure the succession of the Tudor line and, to obtain a
divorce from Katherine; for this he needed the devout obedience of his subjects. The English
Reformation was unique in that it “was taken over by the central government, controlled by
Howatt 79
it, and, one can say without much exaggeration, manipulated to its own advantage” (Whitney
379). Despite disagreeing with much of the Protestant theology,40 Henry VIII found the
antipapal sentiments and the obedience doctrine of Protestant writers to help his cause.
The Submission of the Clergy Act made ecclesiastical legislation dependent on the
king (Varickayil 25). This Act also declares it is no longer a heresy to deny the superiority of
the pope (Haigh 117). It was also ruled that the pope had no more authority in England than
any other foreign bishop (Haigh 117). After taking many antipapal steps, the English courts
granted Henry VIII an annulment in 1533, to which the pope predictably responded by
annulling the annulment and excommunicating the king (Lindberg 317). Henry VIII replied
with the Act of Supremacy, which declares the king and his successors as “the onely supreme
hede in erthe of the Churche of England” (“Act of Supremacy”). Christopher Haigh notes,
even though the session when the bill passed is ill-recorded, there does not appear to be much
resistance to the Act, largely because the clergy had already accepted the king as the head of
their order (119). The Act of Supremacy unites church and state, and demands the obedience
of his subjects. Also by uniting the two governments, Henry VIII links heresy with treason.
The Act in Restraint of Appeals, also issued in 1533, is also essential in affirming the English
national identity for it defines the limits of England and rejects foreign interference by
asserting that English civil laws are more important than Canonical laws (Shrank 8-9). The
new ideas, championed by the Reformation and laws enacted by Henry VIII, led to a change
in identity, one surrounded by a national consciousness (Philpott 218).
The key cultural phenomenon of the Protestant writings is the insistence upon
obedience to the secular ruler. This trend emerges largely as a consequence to antipapal
sentiments. It is then justified theoretically through the notion of Divine Right to Rule—that
40
This is evident by the Six Articles Act (1539), which reaffirms Roman Catholic dogma and enforcing it more
sternly than before (Lindberg 313). The Six Articles maintained transubstantiation, separate communication for
the laity, clerical celibacy, the sanctity of monastic vows, the necessity of auricular confession and permitting
private masses—denial of these matters of faith is considered heresy, for which the punishment is death
(Lindberg 318).
Howatt 80
is the sovereign is God’s representative on earth and God will punish any who attempt to
usurp that position.
The English Reformation was not the Protestant revolution that Luther and Tyndale
envisioned. The surprising aspect of the English Reformation is that, under Henry VIII, it
experienced virtually no doctrinal changes, except of course replacing the pope as the head of
the Church (Whitney 379). Henry VIII disagreed with their theology, and thus maintained
much of the Catholic dogma. Nonetheless the king found Luther and Tyndale’s writings
incalculably useful in establishing the supreme nature of the king, particularly their doctrine
of obedience. Henry VIII adopted the Divine Right to Rule and obedience doctrines to justify
his position, spiritually superior to the pope, in the Church of England, as well as to ensure
social stability at home.
Howatt 81
Divine Right of Kings: A Reflection of History
Divine Right Theory, the idea that kings and rulers derive their authority from God
Himself and thus cannot be resisted by any earthly being, certainly did not cause the
European monarchs of the Early Modern Era to favor an absolute form of government over
the feudal system. Rather this theory justified the pre-existing movement towards
Absolutism. Divine right is a reflection of a changing time; it did not foreshadow a
movement. Divine right is particularly suited to defend a centralized government against
divisive factions and encourages the unification of the people against foreign threats,
particularly the secular intrusions of the Roman Catholic Church.
The main principles of obedience and the denial of legitimate rebellion are essential,
defining aspects of divine right of kings and these thoughts are deeply rooted in the Protestant
writings of the Reformation. Indeed these concepts are what set Protestant writings apart
from Catholic and medieval philosophies that permitted rebellions against rulers deemed to
be tyrants. These protestant ideals were disseminated in England through Thomas
Cromwell’s propaganda program41 and to the populous through the arts, such as in William
Shakespeare’s play The Taming of the Shrew,42 to garner support for Henry VIII’s departure
from Rome and his adoption of Anglicanism, despite the fact that Henry forbid any major
Scriptural chances in the new religion save declaring the King of England as the Head of the
Anglican Church.
Some scholars, such as J.W. Allen’s English Political Thought, 1603-1660 (1938),
argue that the theory of obedience, rather than the theory of divine right itself, was the
important aspect in the development of a clearly defined sovereignty (Burgess 839). These
scholars maintain that obedience and non-resistance are more important to the success of the
English Reformation, however those scholars neglect to notice that those protestant ideals
41
42
See Richard Rex’s work “The Crisis of Obedience: God’s Word and Henry’s Reformation.”
See “Royal Supremacy and the Reformation: Martin Luther and William Tyndale.”
Howatt 82
were conceived of under the assumption that to partake in such behaviour would equal a
direct affront to God. It is impossible to isolate Protestant obedience from divine right
because at the basis of Luther and Tyndale’s philosophies is the assumption that the ruler’s
authority was deliberately and directly given to him by God, and consequently all
governments were gifts from God. Obedience is owed because to obey the ruler is to obey
God. Divine right, obedience and non-resistance are inseparable.
Jean Bodin’s political philosophy shows the interconnectivity of these three concepts.
His promotion of absolutism in The Six Bookes of the Common-Weal is justified, like many
others, by the belief that God has bestowed the king with His authority to wield on earth.
Despite discussing property rights and natural laws, which Bodin remains adamant even the
king cannot justly violate, he nonetheless is insistent that even the abuse of these rights does
not justify rebellion or action against the sovereign. To Bodin, sovereignty means the ruler is
absolute; there are no limits on a true sovereign’s power. A limited sovereign is, in effect,
not a sovereign at all.
Although Bodin was the first to express his ideas in a complete political tract, his
ideas were derived from earlier conceptions. In fact, Bodin cites Martin Luther’s work as
influencing his philosopy, particularly Luther’s notion of obedience. Luther’s political ideas
are deeply set in obedience and this fundamental concept served a dual function: first, it set
Protestantism apart from the medieval and Catholic doctrines permitting active resistance and
raising arms against a tyrant, and; second the Christian obedience factor of Protestantism was
very attractive to secular rulers who had clashes with Rome. The origins of the Reformation
rest in the issue of papal authority: the reformers maintain the plenitude of power asserted by
the pope were destructive to both temporal and spiritual worlds and founded upon lies
(Lindberg 78-79). Likewise, Luther feels the papacy and Rome had strayed from their
spiritual mission by involving the Church in temporal matters and trying to achieve political
Howatt 83
supremacy over secular rulers through the use of coercive force, such as excommunication
and interdiction. To confront this, he attempts to destroy the protective devices of the Roman
Catholic Church, what he terms “the three walls,” and to empower the secular leader with the
authority, Luther believes, God intended. To Luther, a good Christian shows his gratitude of
God’s gifts by revering and obeying his sovereign.
Of course, as John Dillenberger states, “It would be as wrong to attribute the break up
of the medieval world and its consequent course to the genius of Luther as it would be to
interpret Luther himself as just a product of the forces then bringing a new world into being”
(xi). Luther’s concepts were not new, but he revives these ideas, which took on new,
revolutionary meanings in the Early Modern period. Kings were stronger and the Church
was weaker in the fifteenth century than in earlier times. Luther’s ideas reflect the needs of
the society surrounding him. The wellbeing of his society was constantly threatened and
attacked by an overambitious papacy, who failed to recognize the recent redistribution of
power. The society needed protection against the foreign threat of Church manipulation that
was constantly interfering with secular affairs. Luther offers the society an intellectual theory
in which the secular leader was supported against the unjust coercive powers of Rome.
The English reformer, William Tyndale, was greatly influence by Luther and he
elaborated the latter’s ideas to clarify them into a comprehensive philosophy in his The
Obedience of a Christian Man. Like Luther, Tyndale emphasizes the importance of
obedience among Christians. Obedience to a ruler, which is owed because God has endowed
the king with the authority of wielding coercive power thus ensuring peace on earth, is a
cornerstone of Tyndale’s philosophy. Obedience leads to a long and happy life, whereas
rebellion leads to death, since disobedience is always punished and even leads the world to
ruin as men start avenging themselves.
Howatt 84
Tyndale also reiterates Luther’s attack against Rome, averring the Church prizes
ignorance so they can easily assert false claims to power. He argues that all have their role to
play in the temporal world and that no one should attempt to assume another’s calling, as
Rome had tried with sovereign rulers for example. The ecclesiastical order is in charge of
leading man to salvation, and the rulers’ job is to ensure earthly peace—both are such
important jobs one man could not perform both well.
There is certainly a long history of antipapal polemics which Luther and Tyndale
follow with their attacks against the Church. Unable to find a lasting, peaceful society, the
medieval philosopher Marsilius of Padua, accuses the papacy for disrupting communal unity.
Marsilius sees thirteenth century popes oppressing secular rulers through the use of coercive
power, and this intervention led to civil disorder, which was predominantly apparent in the
Italian peninsula among divided communities. Marsilius searched Scripture to find
contradictions between the Bible and the preaching of the papacy. Of particular offense to
Marsilius is the ecclesiastical assertion that they are immune to civil laws and that secular
leaders require the support of the clergy to wield their temporal authority. In exerting
coercive power, the clergy had strayed from its spiritual mission, which Marsilius greatly
limited.
Unlike the reformers and Bodin, Marsilius argues the sovereign’s authority is derived
from the will of the people. It is on behalf of the people that the sovereign creates laws and
punishes transgressors with coercive powers; however he was against secular leaders
claiming supreme authority. Nonetheless, Marsilius’ work was good raw material for English
reformers because of his allegation that the pope is a usurper, which was precisely the
message of Henry VIII. William Marshall’s translation of The Defence of Peace (1535),
utilizes the antipapal sentiments and accentuates the necessity of obedience to the king from
Howatt 85
Marsilius’ work. Nevertheless, Marshall drastically revised the more controversial issues, by
Henrican standards, such as consent. Marshall’s works thus promotes absolute sovereigns.
All the writers that have been discussed appear to form their ideas as a reflection to
the environment surrounding them. Bodin empowered the king with absolute authority
because he feels it was the best way to ensure societal unity in face of the French Civil War.
Confronted with an interfering pope, who refuses to change and return to the original mission
of the church, Luther, Tyndale and Marshall charge Christians with the duty of obedience, for
the secular authority is in the best position to oppose the overreaching ambition of the Roman
Catholic Church. As strong monarchs with centralized governments did not yet exist in the
thirteenth century, Marsilius empowers the people with sovereignty to defend society against
the divisive powers of the ecclesiastical message.
Similarly, divine right to rule is a reflection of the historical circumstances of the
fifteenth century. During the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries royal political autonomy
was realized and royal arguments were put into law (Ozment 187). Arguing the ruler’s power
was given directly from God, and therefore not intermediately through the Pope as the clergy
had previously championed, denies the papal assertions of immunity from civil laws and
justified use of coercive power. As Steven Ozment claims, the papacy’s problems stem from
the belief they remained as powerful and influential as they had been, in the medieval era, in
the new era of modern states (144). Divine right to rule is the intellectual justifications for
the newly centralized nation states to be employed against the claims of the Church. Royal
pamphleteers succeeded in championing the rights of the secular community, with the help of
the major religious reformers, over papal pretensions of a plenitude of power which had a
tendency to intrude into the temporal political sphere (Ozment 187). Reformers helped
establish support for this in the theological sphere, specifically by confining religion to a
spiritual world which on earth, remain subordinate to the sovereign’s will.
Howatt 86
Absolutism, certainly, was never intended to empower the sovereign by effectively
enslaving the power. The discussion of natural rights, laws and property rights was also
encouraged as a by-product of absolutism, justified by divine right. In discussing the rights
and powers of the ruler, the question of the rights and powers of the subject also are cast into
focus. Luther suggests that kings rule in the image of God and rule according to the Bible.
Bodin and Tyndale argue that since the sovereign derives his authority from God, the
sovereign cannot go against the laws of God. As Bodin argues, the law of Nature is dictated
by God himself, and while the king is the source of civil law and therefore above it, the king
remains subject to the laws of God. Furthermore, Bodin insisted upon the consent of the
people for taxation and private property be protected from illegal confiscation.
Consequently, the subjects have protected inalienable natural rights as dictated by the laws of
God. Absolute sovereigns are not limited by earthly powers, but early modern political
thinkers never believed that natural rights or the laws of God contradicted that definition.
This work set out to trace the development of the myth of Divine Right to Rule in
England. While this work only examined a sample of writings, it is clear the writers of the
Reformation played an integral role in not only the re-emergence of the Divine Right myth,
but also influenced the evolution of that myth to Bodin’s definite assertion of sovereign
supremacy. Furthermore the Reformation’s antipapal tracts and doctrine of obedience
appears to bridge the gap between medieval thought and late-sixteenth century political
thought.
The study of divine right theory is important because of its place in the development
of modern states. It is a theoretical device, specifically formulated to reject papal claims to
temporal power. It denied the Church any role in the authority of the temporal sovereign.
God authorized the king’s exercise of power; the pope was not an intermediary.
Howatt 87
Divine right theory also reflects the historical centralization of power. Most other
aspects of the modern state, such as the military and the bureaucracy, answered directly to the
king, and divine right theory made the church answer to, rather than challenge, the king as
well, such as in the case of Henry VIII and the Church of England. This has the added
consequence of insisting on the obedience to the ruler. The king is linked with divinity. He
is the vicar of God on Earth. The king’s will is God’s will. Therefore, a Christian man owes
his obedience to the king. The notion of obedience is a useful defense against foreign threats
and encouraged social unity. In this way, divine right to rule marks the transition point
between the medieval and modern eras.
Howatt 88
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