Download Themistocles - long essay

To what extent was Themistocles responsible for the Greek victory in the
Persian Wars?
Themsitocles played a crucial role in securing victory for the Greeks in the Second Persian
War. Politically, he persuaded his countrymen to build a fleet, then helped form the Hellenic
League to face the Pesians. Militarily, he made a series of strategic and tactical decisions
that turned the war in the Greeks’ favour – particularly at Salamis, where the Persian navy
was routed. Even so, other factors were also important in securing victory in that two year
conflict.
Following Darius’ unsuccessful invasion of 490 BC, Themistocles was one of the few Greek
leaders who feared that that the threat had not entirely gone away. He realised that if the
Persians came again they would do so with a much larger force, and that this would be
impossible to stop on land. The only hope of stopping it would be by cutting its supply lines,
which would require a strong navy. Themistocles cleverly persuaded the Athenian Assembly
to build 200 triremes, financing the project with money from a silver mine in Attica.
When it became clear that Persians were indeed mounting a new attack, Themistocles
played a key role in forming the Hellenic League – a grouping of 31 city states, to defend
Greece. The Spartans were given command of the League’s forces, with King Leonidas in
charge of the army and Eurybiades the navy. Themistocles wisely ceded authority to both
men, knowing that the other Greek states would not accept Athenian leadership. He would
exercise power through force of his arguments, with the odd bit of threatmaking thrown in.
This helped forge a unity among the Greek states that would be crucial in securing victory.
One of the League’s first acts was to consult the Oracle of Delphi, but the verdict was dire:
the war would end in disaster. The Athenians insisted on a second consultation, but this was
ambiguous – asserting merely that Athens’ wooden walls would not fall. Some interpreted
the wooden walls as meaning the palisade around the Acropolis, but Themistocles insisted
that they referred to the hulls of Athens’ ships. This brilliant piece of reasoning persuaded
the Assembly, which endorsed Themistocles’ strategy.
Themistocles now persuaded the League to make use of Greece’s narrow mountain passes
and waterways to block the Persians and negate their numerical superiority. It was decided
to defend the mountain pass at Thermopylae and the nearby Straits of Skiathos.
Themistocles believed that if the Greeks could keep the Persian army separated from its
fleet, it would eventually run short of supplies and be forced to retreat.
This strategy failed when a Greek traitor helped the Persians outflank Leonidas’ force at
Thermopylae and wipe it out. However, the naval campaign was more effective. The
Greeksheld off the Persian navy long enough for storms to wreak terrible damage on it. By
the time the Battle of Artemisium was fought, it was too weak to achieve a decisive
breakthrough. It was only the defeat at Thermopylae that forced Themistocles to order a
retreat.
The Persians marched south, ravaging Attica as they went. Meanwhile their navy formed
up off the coast of Salamis.
The Greek commanders now debated what to do. Eurybiades wanted to sail for the
Isthmus of Corinth and defend it against attack by the Persians. However, Themistocles
convinced him that Salamis was the best place to make a stand. His reasoning was that the
narrow strait would restrict the larger, less manoeuvrable Persian ships, and give the Greeks
an advantage. He also argued that if the Greeks won, the Persians would be unable to
advance on the Peloponnese. Plutarch says that Themistocles only got Eurybiades to agree
to this strategy by threatening to withdraw Athens’ ships from any defence of the
Peloponnese.
The Persians appeared to have all the advantages in the upcoming battle. Their ships
outnumbered those of the Greeks and they had them bottled up in the narrow straits. All
they had to do was wait for them to emerge, and they could wipe them out. However,
Themistocles used a clever trick to deceive Xerxes. He sent a trusted slave into the Persian
camp, claiming that the Greek navy was in disarray and was planning to abandon its
position. Hungry for what A.T Olmstead calls a “spectacular victory”, Xerxes believed this
story and sent his Egyptian squadron around the south of Salamis to block the Greek navy’s
escape. Then he ordered his remaining ships into the strait. However, the Greeks were
waiting in ambush, and anihilated the Persian fleet.
Salamis was a decisive victory, thanks in large part to the generalship of Themistocles.
However, it did not bring an end to the war, as Xerxes still had enough ships to attack the
Peloponnese.What denied him his chance was a second crucial mistake on his part. The
Great King was so incensed by the outcome at Salamis that he executed some of the
Phoenician captains of his fleet. This incensed many of the remaining captains, and they
sailed their ships home. According to Olmstead it was this, rather than the defeat at Salamis,
that deprived Xerxes of his last chance to invade the Peloponnese. Fearing the Greeks might
now destroy the bridges at the Hellespont, he decided to withdraw from Greece. He left
Mardonius and a handpicked force behind, then sent the remnants of his navy back to Asia
Minor.
The Greeks went on to defeat Mardonius’ army at Plataea, thanks to their superior
weaponry and the superior leadership of Pausanias, then to destroy the Persian navy at
Mycale. The Second Persian War was over.
Hence it can be seen that Themistocles’ role in defeating the Persians was second to none.
He devised the strategy that ultimately won the war – defeating the Persians at sea rather
than on land. He persuaded his countrymen to build a navy, then trained it for the task. He
chose the location for the decisive battle, then led the Greek navy to victory. In Thucydides’
words, “Through force of genius and by rapidity of action, this man was supreme at doing
precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment.”
Even so, victory in the war was a consequence of more than just Themistocles’ brilliance.
The Greeks also relied on their superior armour and weaponry, on their generals’ better
leadership, and on their greater unity and sense of purpose. They were also aided by
Xerxes’s mistakes, by the peculiar geography of their homeland, and by a couple of storms
that struck at opportune moments.