Download UK and Multi-track Europe - International

The New Europe / European Union
R. James Ferguson © 2004
Week 8:
The United Kingdom: Atlantic and European Orientations
Topics: -
1. Great Britain: Partial Engagement in the Continental System
2. The British Political Comprise: The Evolution of Parliamentary
Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy
3. Changing Status: the End of Empire and the Welfare State
4. Cautious Engagement of the Common Market: Moving Beyond Euroscepticism
5. Blair and the ‘Third Way’
6. The Three Stages: UK's Global Role, the Special Atlantic Relationship,
and Deepening European Engagement
7. Future Challenges: The Pound, the Euro, Identity Politics, Balancing the
Atlantic Division
8. Bibliography and Resources
1. Great Britain: Partial Engagement in the Continental System
One of the most fascinating aspects of the United Kingdom has been her evolution
into an imperial great power and then her re-adjustment as one important state among
many within Europe and the global order. In the past this was done through the
parallel trends of a strong industrial revolution, a growing naval power, the economic
resources of empire (see Brewer 1989), and the ability to selectively distance herself
from affairs on the Continent. At the same time, in spite of the effort to view herself
as an island kingdom cut off of the troubles of continental Europe, the UK could
never safely ignore events in Europe. The threats of invasion (by Spain, by
Jacobites in 1745, then by France in the late 18th and early 19th century, then by
Germany in World War II) remained very real (Langford 1991, p376, p434), while as
a matter of policy the UK moved to limit the power of any state that looked like it
might dominate European affairs (Spain, France, Germany, and for a time the Soviet
Union). Thus, for example, British policy swung against France in its policies from
1688, trying to limit its influence in the Low Countries, and leading to a major
conflict in the Americas (the Seven Years War with France, largely fought out in
France and India), eventually reducing French influence there (Langford 1991, pp355356, p400), a policy of competition which was only reversed in the early 19 th century.
This trend towards seeing herself as partially protected from the turbulence of
European affairs deepened in the 19th century once Napoleon's effort to build a
European 'empire' was defeated (Harvie 1991, p436).
Thus British policy tended toward reducing European commitments, and the use of
balance of power to counter any rising state, e.g. British willingness to balance the
growth of Russian influence in the mid-19th century (Harvie 1991, p457), followed by
an effort to keep Turkey intact to avoid too strong a Russian influence in east
(Matthew 1991, p507). Later on, Britain would also maintain strong interests in the
stability of the eastern Mediterranean, in the politics of Egypt (which was eventually
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occupied in 1882) after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870, and then in the
stability of Persian and the Middle East as a whole (Matthew 1991, pp507-508).
One of the great turning points in world affairs during the 20th century has been the
refocusing of British attention from its world role, sustained briefly through her power
status was one of the 'Great Three' (U.S., USSR and UK) at the end of World War II,
back towards Europe and engagement with a rapidly integrating EU. In part, this
was driven by simple economic needs (the need to join the Common Market), with
Britain being termed in many other areas the 'reluctant European' (see European
Update 2002), a term also applied to cautions on European integration expressed by
Scandinavian countries. Through the late 1990s the UK accepted that it would need to
be involved more closely in the political integration of Europe unless its influence was
to rapidly decline. However, the weight of British history, its unique (and slow)
evolution towards parliamentary democracy, and its sense of 'difference' from
European cultural and political life meant that the UK has been slow to cede key areas
of sovereignty to European institutions. This was especially true of Conservative
governments, but remains a real issue for the UK through 2002-2003. In effect,
British concerns helped create a multi-track, multi-speed European integration
path, an issue of interest to countries such as Sweden and Denmark, which have
concerns over rapid institutionalisation and the impact of the euro (Toynbee & Walker
2001, p147; a referendum in Sweden in September went against joining the eurozone, with clear lessons for the UK, see Naughtie 2003). However, the speed of the
EU's integration and expansion plans through 2000-2004 has meant that a horizon on
the 'British exceptionalism' may soon emerge, with British leaders needing to
choose between relative independence from, and relative influence on, European
affairs. This process has been accelerated by the need to make a real choice in
relation as to whether or not to join the euro zone, and by the issue of whether British
citizens in the end will support the European Constitution being negotiated through
2003-2004.
At the same time, Britain has sought to maintain its special relationship with the
United States, an important linkage that has been controversially sustained through
2001-2004. The Blair government, in particular, has sought to deepen political and
military cooperation with the European Union (pushing forward both the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Defence Initiative). However, the issue
of economic integration and national sovereignty remains highly controversial,
with both issues likely to come to the fore again in the 2004-2006 as the UK considers
whether to adopt to euro. The outcome of a possible forthcoming referendum, delayed
through 2003 on the basis of the economic case for the euro not yet having been made
in the UK (Daily Mail 2003; BBC 2002b), could strongly influence the direction UK
takes in the short and medium term. Through June 2003, PM Tony Blair made the
case for having a referendum before the next national elections, but argued that the
case for the euro would need to be made more fully to the British public first (BBC
2003). Here, the timing the such a referendum in relationship to both economic issues,
the ongoing strength of the pound and the euro, and in relation to 2004 elections. One
view has suggested that the pound needs to sit at a certain level against the euro
(approximately 1.4859 euro) for a beneficial transfer to monetary union that would
keep British exports attractive (BBC 2001a; see further below). Through March 2004
Chancellor Gordon Brown ruled out re-assessment of the euro option on economic
grounds until 2005, as well as attacking the stringent limits of the EU Stability and
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Growth Pact and arguing for greater flexibility (see HM Treasury 2004), with some
sources a possible delay in a euro referendum until as late as 2008 (BBC 2004a). This
issue has now been complicated by the issue of whether the UK should have a
referendum on the proposed EU Constitution, on the which the Blair government
has decided there should be a referendum, but only after national elections, perhaps
after Spring 2005. In effect, it has been suggested that the Labour government
wishes to ‘prepare’ the country for a yes vote over a longer time frame, making
the tie of elections and referenda crucial (BBC 2004b). In such as setting, the
relatively strong performance of Euro-sceptic parties during 2004 EU
parliamentary elections sent a strong signal that pro-EU policies may rebound on the
labour government unless carefully explained and managed.
United Kingdom (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)
In broader terms, it is possible to suggest that current British policy has sought to gain
the 'best of all possible worlds' by engaging in its special Atlantic relationship
with the US, by gaining more influence on European affairs, and by retaining until
the last minute some independent control monetary and financial policy. In terms of
foreign and security policy, Britain in the 1997-2004 has played a very active role in
world affairs, engaged militarily in the Gulf War, in Yugoslavia, in interventions in
Sierra Leone (1998-2000), in Afghanistan (2001-2002), and a major player in the
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invasion and governance of Iraq. In combination with a new ideology called the 'Third
Way' (see below) and its effort to balance German and French influence, it is possible
to see some strengthening of British diplomacy through this period. There have been
costs to this process: Blair’s statements on WMD in Iraq and his engagement in the
war has cost him considerably in terms of increased criticism within his party,
reduced his electoral popularity, subjected UK intelligences services to close scrutiny
via the Butler Inquiry, and placed clear tensions on relations with several EU states,
Germany, France, Belgium Greece, Austria, Sweden and Finland, while EU
populations as a whole were sceptical of the US and EU position (Lundestad 2003,
p276, p286). Indeed, France, Germany and Russia for a time aligned themselves into a
very critical joint statement on Iraq and the need to continue inspections and use war
only as a last resort (Wilson 2003). European tensions with the US over missile
defence systems, the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as issues
such as the ICC (International Criminal Court) landmines and small weapons
agreements made this a difficult breach in policy for the UK to bridge (see Lundestad
2003, pp270-271). In turn, some 52% of American want the U.S. to be the ‘only
major force in the world’, and only 33% would want to allow EU superpower status
(Lundestad 2003, pp288-289). Although through mid-2004 British media are turning
more towards health, employment and economic issues, these factors have placed
serious pressure on the Labour government and its future.
In this lecture there will not be time to look at British history in detail, nor the
complex issues of Celtic nationalism as it has effected English relations with
Scotland (Union with Scotland occurred in 1708, but devolution has recreated a
Scottish Parliament with local powers, accomplished through 1997-1999; for
controversial views see Wheatcroft 2003; Curtice and Canavan 2003), Wales (also
now with a local Assembly), future referenda on other local assemblies in England
through 2004 (designed in part to bridge the economic gap between the south and
north in England, with three regions, the North-East, North-West and Yorkshire and
the Humber, being offered this option, see Wheeler 2003); and the Irish peace
processes (these issues would make good topics for essays and seminars). Table 1
provides a timeline of some key events in the 20th century.
Table 1: Selected UK Timeline 1914 - June 2003 (after BBC 2002c-2004)
1914 - Outbreak of World War I. UK enters hostilities against Germany. Gruelling trench warfare in
Belgium and France.
1918 - War ends in November with armistice. The number of UK war dead runs to several hundred
thousand.
1921 - UK agrees to the foundation of the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland remains part of the UK.
1924 - First UK government led by the Labour party under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.
1926 - General Strike arising from coal dispute.
1929 - World stock market crash. Unemployment begins to rise in UK.
1931 - Economic crisis. Millions are unemployed. National Government coalition formed.
1936 - King Edward VIII abdicates over relationship with an American divorcee, Wallis Simpson.
1938 - Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain meets the leader of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, in
Munich. Chamberlain says he has averted war with Germany.
1939 - Germany invades Poland. UK declares war on Germany.
1940 - Winston Churchill becomes prime minister. British fighter pilots repel German air attacks in the
Battle of Britain. London and other cities badly damaged in German bombing raids.
1944 - Allied troops invade France from Britain on D-Day (6th June) and begin to fight their way
towards Germany.
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1945 - Germany surrenders on 8 May. Labour leader Clement Atlee is elected prime minister to replace
Winston Churchill. The new Labour government introduces the welfare state.
1945 - The UK becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
1947 - The former colony India wins independence.
1948 - National Health Service is established.
1949 - The UK becomes a founder member of NATO
1953 - Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.
1956 - UK intervenes in Suez Canal Zone, but withdraws under pressure from the US.
1961 - UK application to join European Economic Community vetoed by French President Charles de
Gaulle.
1969 - British troops sent to quell unrest in Northern Ireland.
1973 - The UK joins the European Economic Community.
1975 - EEC membership is endorsed in a referendum. North Sea oil begins to be pumped ashore.
1979 - The Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher becomes prime minister. She begins to
introduce free-market policies.
1981 - Thatcher government begins programme of privatisation of state-run industries.
1982 - Argentina invades the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in the South Atlantic. The UK dispatches a
task force, which re-takes them.
1983 - High unemployment, unrest in UK inner cities, continuing violence in Northern Ireland.
Thatcher re-elected.
1984 - The IRA attempts to assassinate Margaret Thatcher in her hotel in Brighton. Several killed and
injured by a bomb blast, but the prime minister escapes unhurt.
1987 - Thatcher re-elected with a slightly reduced majority.
1990 - Thatcher resigns as prime minister after she fails to defeat a challenge to her leadership of the
Conservative party. John Major becomes prime minister.
1991 - UK takes part in US-led military campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.
1992 - Major re-elected as prime minister. Labour party chooses John Smith as its leader.
1993 - Downing Street declaration on northern Ireland - a peace proposal issued jointly with the Irish
government.
1994 - John Smith dies. Tony Blair becomes Labour leader.
1996 - The British government announces that BSE, or 'mad cow disease', can be transmitted to
humans. A crisis for the British beef industry follows, with mass slaughtering of animals, the collapse
of markets, and bans on exports. Many beef farmers face financial ruin.
1997 - The Conservatives under Major are deeply divided over policy towards Europe. Labour under
Blair wins landslide election victory in May.
1997 - August: Diana, Princess of Wales, is killed in a car crash in Paris.
1997 - September: Referenda in Scotland and Wales back the creation of separate assemblies in
Edinburgh and Cardiff.
1998 - The Good Friday Agreement on a political settlement for Northern Ireland is approved by voters
in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland.
1999 - UK forces take part in the air war with Yugoslavia and the consequent multinational force in
Kosovo.
1999 - Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly inaugurated. Blair government begins to tackle reform
of the House of Lords by limiting the number of hereditary peers who can vote in debates on
legislation.
2000 - UK forces intervene in Sierra Leone to protect and evacuate foreign citizens caught up in the
civil war. They subsequently stay on to help train the government army.
2001 April - Blair postpones country-wide municipal elections due in May as an outbreak of foot and
mouth disease amongst cattle, sheep and pigs continues to spread.
2001 June - Blair's Labour party wins a second successive general election victory, with a majority
almost as large as that of May 1997. The leader of the opposition Conservative party, William Hague,
resigns in the wake of his party's defeat.
2001 September/November - Following devastating attacks on targets in the USA, PM Tony Blair
offers strong support for US-led campaign against international terrorism.
2002 January - Following overthrow of Taleban, UK peacekeepers lead International Security
Asistance Force (ISAF) in Afghan capital, Kabul.
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2002 March - UK sends 1,700 Royal Marines to Afghanistan to help US and Afghan forces in fight
against Taleban and al-Qaeda remnants.
2002 June - UK hands over command of ISAF in Afghanistan to Turkey.
2003 March - UK joins US-led military campaign against Iraq after UN-based diplomatic efforts to
ensure Baghdad has no weapons of mass destruction are perceived to have failed.
2003 August - Prime minister, defence secretary, government officials and aides, BBC managers and
journalists testify at inquiry into death of Dr David Kelly, government scientist at centre of row over
claims government embellished case for Iraq war.
2. The British Political Comprise: The Evolution of Parliamentary Democracy
and Constitutional Monarchy
Britain has long viewed itself as having a special role in world affairs, based on a
special political deal that has led to a relatively stable social system. In large
measure, this has been based on the evolution of the British Parliamentary system.
The type of democracy that evolved in Britain has strongly influenced democracy in
ex-colonies and former dominions such as Canada, Australia and South Africa, as
well as legal system in countries as diverse as India, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. This
model has been viewed as several features which distinguish it sharply from
Republican or Presidential systems. These include the notions of constitutional
monarchy, the emphasis on the parliamentary system, with the head of government
being the leader of the dominant party in the lower house, and choosing a cabinet
from members of parliament.
In large measure, the British system emerged out of a series of contests for political
power which structure compromises that have limited armed conflict between major
interest groups and classes in British society. This trend of compromise between
interests, which leads to a rather evolutionary approach towards full democracy (in
the sense of full enfranchisement, this did not occur until after World War I), has
often been heralded as the basis of Britain's relative social stability. However, there
is also a certain conservatism within the main structures of British government which
seek a balance between the interest of the 'people' and elite groups, whether these are
conceived of the as the tradition aristocracy or the new industrial rich. In this context
Winston Churchill's joke, that 'Democracy is the worst form of government in the
world - except for all the other forms' has its serious aspect. This system, with its
strengths and limitations, was born out of a civil war and revolution (see Richardson
1977), and evolved alongside a series of major social changes (industrial revolution,
emergence of capitalism, urbanisation, emergence of a literate working class, the
Union movement) during the 18th and 19th centuries.
The early Saxon 'local moots' had features of an early participatory system, while the
Althing of Iceland has been discussed as the earliest parliament (established circa 930
A.D.). These institutions, however, only represented free men, and effective power
was retained by a tribal aristocracy of earls. Likewise, the Magna Carta (1215) has
often been viewed as a proto-liberal or proto-democratic document. It clauses, once
again, only limited the King's arbitrary actions in relation to free men, and in effect it
protected the privileges of the powerful nobles rather than those of ordinary people. It
was significant, however, in that it placed the king's actions under the control of the
law. This restriction on the authority of the King, however, was later on eroded as
royal powers grew, and by the Tudor period (16th century) the kings and queens of
England came to view themselves as absolute representatives of the nation. This trend
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found fruition in the doctrines of kingship based on divine right, a tradition
exemplified most strongly by James I (Wootton 1986, pp28-9).
However, several other trends already existed. As early as 1381 in the Peasants'
Revolts, large segments of English Society could rally around the cry of 'With King
Richard and the true-hearted Commons', indicating that a notion of two sources of
authority, Crown and Parliament, was already emerging in everyday thought (Watson
& Barba 1990, pp30-1; Cheyney 1962, pp132-3). From the 16th century there also
emerged an account of England as a mixed constitution, with authority (and therefore
effective power) shared between the king, Lords and Commons (Wootton 1986, p30).
As such, a contract was implied between the king and the people, and the king was
therefore at some level accountable by the people. By the period of the Civil War
(1642-9), radical thought had emerged in England, e.g. the idea of inalienable rights
held by all men, supported by the Levellers, and the first communist movement with
'a strategy for effective social action', the Diggers (Wootton 1986, p9). It was these
conflicts over the powers of the Crown which helped cause the Civil War, one which
Charles I lost, and which led to his dethronement and then his execution (in 1649).
Interestingly enough, even a thinker such as Thomas Hobbes, who supported the idea
of an absolute view of sovereignty, did not support Charles I at this stage - by loosing
the war, he had shown that he could not provide an effective and stable government
for the land. Ironically, the government of Charles I had shown that it was 'weak and
yet was capable of acting in an arbitrary and tyrannical fashion' (Wootton 1986, p27).
From 1649-60 England was a Commonwealth (i.e. a republic), though largely guided
by its Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell. Nonetheless, the republican movement itself,
i.e. those who wished to do without kingship altogether, was very weak in England,
partly because of unique relationship of the Crown to the Church of England, and the
perception that most Republics of the contemporary world were small city-states or
Federal alliances (as in Switzerland). In the future, the gradual evolution of
democracy and parliamentary power would moderate any impulse towards radical
revolutions. Nonetheless, this would be a very slow process. The basic 'Leveller'
argument that the vote should be extended to all English male residents was ahead of
its time, and would only find fruition in universal male enfranchisement 1918,
while women would not receive the vote until 1928. It is important to note,
however, that for this period, the issue was not only voting, but the right to revolt
against the arbitrary power of kings - it was then, largely a question 'not of
democracy, but of popular sovereignty' (Wootton 1986, p41). It was for this reason
that Parliamentary rights were viewed as essential. No matter how poorly, it could
at least be a focus for power and authority of the people, and therefore counterbalance
tyrannical, and later on aristocratic, privileges.
These issues would be resurrected again under the rule of James II, who was himself
a Catholic, and although he supported the rights of Church of England, was suspected
of wishing to open the way for Catholics to enter government, and in the long run to
overturn to the Protestant revolution in England. This began with the admission of
Catholic officers into the army, a move which alienated from the Parliament he had
convened in 1685, and which in November 1685 caused the king to prorogue both
houses (discontinue meetings, without formally dissolving them; Jones 1990, pxii).
More importantly, however, James II in April 1687 tried to proclaim a Declaration of
Indulgence which would suspend 'test and penal laws' (Jones 1990, p7), thereby
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allowing Catholics not to be barred from offices in the realm. He had hoped this
policy would gain support among the Dissenters, i.e. those Protestants who still had
problems with the structure and authority of the Church of England (Jones 1990,
pxvi). From a modern point of view, this Declaration was enlightened. However, at
the time it was taken as a clear attack on the nature of Protestantism in England,
and the 'thin edge of the wedge' for further reform. James II ordered that his
'Declaration of Liberty and Conscience' be read in all churches in May 1687, most of
whose churchmen refused to do so (perhaps 400 out of 7,000 ministers, see Jones
1990, p19).
These and other fears, combined with James II's attempt to raise a large army, literally
forced the hand of his son-in-law William III of Orange, who was the Stadholder
(chief of state) of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. He was able to organise a
sizeable force for the invasion of England. When it became apparent that an
agreement could not be made with William, James II was forced to withdraw to
prepare for the invasion (Jones 1990, p90). As it turned out, little force was required,
for once William landed at Devon with 14,000 Dutch and expatriate British troops,
opposition soon collapsed. James II fled to France, but even with French help was
unable to regain the throne, in spite of activities in Ireland. The revolution of 1688
changed the nature of British monarchy, setting on a new path for the next three
centuries.
In 1688 William and Mary of Orange had been invited to England, on the first
occasion, by a small number of Englishmen due to the fear that the birth of James II's
first son (the Prince of Wales) would lead to the recreation of a Roman Catholic
monarchy (Jones 1990, p63, p85). Prior to that birth, Princess Mary of Orange, of
course, had been 'heiress presumptive' (Jones 1990, p119). She was obedient to her
husband and would allow him to take the throne - William had the reputation of being
a fairly tolerant but firm Protestant (Jones 1990, p120). William may have been
motivated by personal ambition, by the desire to support a different form of political
kingship in England, but also by the very fact that he now had no choice but to aim at
the English Crown if he wished to limit the power of France.
In 1689 the Convention Parliament offered William and Mary jointly the throne, but
this was done alongside a Bill of Rights which assured parliamentary superiority.
This was the basis of what has been seen as a sense of compromise that limited
political violence, but not protest, in later centuries (Langford 1991, p352). The
Crown could no longer dismiss the parliament at will for unspecified periods, and it
was Parliament, not the crown, which made the laws and controlled taxes. Nor could
the monarch raise an army without the consent of the Parliament. This system was
thus a constitutional monarchy, and although rulers like George III (second half of
18th century) would attempt to maintain the initiative in military and foreign affairs,
this fact could never be undone. In large measure this was a victory for Parliament as
the centre of real power (Langford 1991, pp356-358), and Parliament also became the
final house of review for all laws (not a High or Supreme Court with powers of
constitutional interpretation, as in the U.S.A., see Steiner 1986, p152). It was must be
remembered, of course, that the electoral base of this parliament was extremely
narrow at that time: it represented men of wealth, property, and a small number of free
town citizens. At the very best it represented at that time only 1/6 of the households of
England (Wootton 1986, p23), and probably much less (see further Jones 1990, p76).
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In large measure certain key tensions and conceptions had already been established by
the Civil War and the 'Glorious Revolution' (see Webb 1980). These included the idea
of a limited, Constitutional Monarchy, the primacy of people's sovereignty as
expressed through the centrality of Parliament, and the idea of the rule of law. In the
late 19th century and early 20th, new trends towards the dominance of Cabinet
Government (first established under the 'prime minister' Robert Walpole in the early
18th century) and the slow evolution toward universal enfranchisement brought the
British system more recognisably towards a full democratic system. We can see how
limited the democratic element was in the early 19th century by the fact that in 1815
only some quarter of a million voted out of a total population of 11 million in Wales
and England (Walshe 1967, p137). Likewise, there was a strong imbalance between
country and city voting areas through the late 18 th century, giving the 'better' classer
strong representation per vote (Harvie 1991, p430). In 1837-1848 period the Chartist
movement, based on the London Workingmen's Association, drew up a democratic
People's Charter which they presented to parliament, demanding universal manhood
suffrage, equal electorates and payment for members of parliament: in spite of three
petitions including 1.2 to 3.3 million signatures, the demands were rejected (Walshe
1967, p139; Harvie 1991, pp443-444). Although not immediately successful, the aims
of the Chartists would be gradually fulfilled in the next century (voters rose from 717
thousand in 1833 to 6.7 million in 1900, then 21.3 million in 1918, see Mackintosh
1970, p21).
Likewise, the 'house of privilege', that is the House of Lords, which had at first been
the most powerful element of Parliament, comprising many hereditary members, had
its ability to check and reject legislation from the lower house strongly limited in 1911
and 1949. In effect, power now resides in the House of Commons, with the House
of Lords providing a review and temporary checking procedure only (through the late
1990s there was some further reduction of the voting powers of the House of Lords
for hereditary peers). The political trends underlying these events have been suggested
as comprising several key phases of parliamentary and government evolution.
Five Phases of Parliamentary Development (adapted from Verney 1971, p15; Kavanagh
2001, p10)
1265-1603
1603-1688
1688-1914
1914-1997
1997-2002
Monarch governs and Parliament supplies money
Dispute of Parliament with King over supreme power
Evolution of parliamentary system
Cabinet government
Partial Decline of Cabinet system ('neo-Presidential' style?)
One aspect of main stream British system is that it tends to favour a two party
system. i.e. government verses opposition. The parliament came to be dominated by
the Whigs (originally an anti-Catholic party of the late 17th century, later on their
support for moderate democratic reform leads them to be called the Liberals) and the
Tories (originally Anglican defenders of James II right to succeed to the throne, they
are viewed as the more 'Conservative' party, see Jones 1990, p130; Walshe 1967,
p140). The British system acknowledges and institutionalises this system by the way
the House of Commons is organised, with the government on one side, facing the
'royal opposition' on the other (officially recognised in 1937). Furthermore, the
opposition is allowed to utilise about one third of the parliamentary agenda to field its
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ideas and propose legislation, once again emphasising a dialogue between two groups.
At present, Labour and Conservatives are the two main parties, with a weaker Liberal
Democratic party.
As we can see, with the development of the powers of the Parliament and the
executive functions of the Cabinet, real royal power was steadily reduced
(Mackintosh 1970, p18). One of the interesting aspects of British history is that in
spite of the effective reductions of royal power since 1642, the notion of royalty has
at various times retained great popularity in Britain. This was at first sustained by
a royalist idea, developed by Hobbes, that in some sense in a monarchy 'the king is the
people' (in Wootton 1986, p46), literally embodying their needs, wishes and
aspirations. For much of the 19th and early 20th century it was true to say that: The monarchy represented the timeless quality of what was taken to be a preindustrial order. In an increasingly urbanized society, it balanced the Industrial
Revolution: the more urban Britain became, the more stylized, ritualized, and popular
became its monarchy, for the values which it claimed to personify stood outside the
competitive egalitarianism of capitalist society. (Matthew 1991, p496).
In large measure this popularity was maintained by the fact that the Crown sometimes
supported popular measures, e.g. the extension of the franchise. In the late 20th
century this was harder to sustain, especially with ongoing criticism of the royal
family within the popular British press. The traditions of the British government
abound in symbolic displays, e.g. the invitation to the leader of winning party to
come to Buckingham Palace and then create 'Her Majesty's' government, the opening
of the first session of Parliament by the Queen with a speech usually written by the
prime minister (Steiner 1986, p136), and the annual address to the public. It is
possible to regard this all as a kind of 'public theatre' ensuring a sense of stability
and allowing a kind of vicarious involvement by the people in the life of the nation.
The height of theatre was reached with the crowning of a young and beautiful Queen
(Elizabeth II) in 1952, for the first time broadcast by the BBC, and many members of
the Commonwealth thought that a new Elizabethan age might return in which Britain,
if not a superpower, would at least retain a Great Power status. Since then the royal
family has had to suffer serious scandals in the younger generation and within 'the
household' and its management. Even the greatly popularity of Princess Diana, and
her rise to almost saintly status after her death in a car crash in 1997, has not solved
this problem. It is precisely the symbolic aspect of the monarchy is vulnerable to such
attacks, and which makes the future of a charismatic monarchy problematic.
3. Changing Status: the End of Empire and the Welfare State
In the eighteenth century, the benefits of empire in part began to be seen through
mercantilist terms, i.e. how could they benefit the wealth and power of England: Colonies still tended to be seen primarily as valuable sources of raw materials, as
dumping grounds for surplus population, or as means of adding to the nation's stock
of bullion. The jewels in the imperial crown were the West Indies, with their sugar
plantations; the Anglo-Spanish War of 1739, like its predecessors, like its
predecessors was seen as a means of breaking into the eldorado of South America,
with enticing prospects of gold, silver, and tropical products. Yet in retrospect it is
clear that Britain's overseas trade was being recast in the direction of quite a new
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kind of empire. The dynamic export markets lay increasingly outside Europe, notably
in North America. Textiles, the traditional staple, benefited by this redirection, but the
growth was still more marked in the newest manufacturing sectors associated
particularly with the metal industries, in the production of household commodities,
tools, weapons, and all kinds of utensils - in short in the vastly expanding demand for
'Birmingham goods'. (Langford 1991, p376).
In short, as the weight of the global economy shifted from Europe towards an
Atlantic system, embracing the Americas and Europe in trade networks (see
Braudel 1986), Britain benefited from extensive trade, investment and market access
in both North and South America, with strong financial interests in Cuba, Mexico and
Brazil. In the 19th century, through deepening trade and investment in Africa and
Asia, Britain emerged as a dominant economic as well as geostrategic power. It
was no accident that by 1815 Britain had 'annexed something like 20 per cent of
world trade, and probably about half the trade in manufactured goods' (Harvie 1991,
p422). In large measure 'trade preceded the flag', and British economic interests
extended well beyond areas directly annexed (Matthew 1991, p505). However, the
political and military cost of empire could be very high: in the early 19 th century up to
one-sixth of the adult male population had been drafted under arms (Harvie 1991,
p435).
It is no accident that these viewpoints led into a period where there was strong support
for free trade and laissez-faire economic and political policies, i.e. limited role for
government and the abolition of protective tariffs (Matthew 1991, p466). This was
based on the relative strength of British trade and industry as it developed through the
second half of the 19th century: Compared with any other country, the British economy in the period 1850-70 was
extraordinary in its complexity and in the range of its products and activities. It was
strong in the basic raw materials of an early of an early industrial economy - coal and
iron - and it increased its world ascendancy in these two commodities as Continental
countries imported British coal and iron to supply the basic materials for their own
industrialization. An energetic manufacturing sector pressed forward with a huge
range of items, from ships and steam engines through textiles to the enormous
variety of small manufactured goods which adorned Victorian houses and, by their
export in British ships, 'Victorianized' the whole trading world. This intense industrial
activity rested on a sound currency and on a banking system which, though it had its
failures, was comparative stable and was, especially from the 1870s, gaining an
increasingly important role in the economy. (Matthew 1991, p473).
However, after the economic pressures of World War I and the disaster of the
depression period of the early 1930s, Britain began to turn away from this free trade
agenda (for earlier controversies, see Meyer 2000). It turned to the empire and
dominions as the source of economic stability: A century of free trade was buried at the Ottawa conference in 1932 when a new
commercial system of tariffs and imperial preference, due to last until the 1970s, was
inaugurated. The effect of tariffs upon the British economy was deeply controversial,
but the cartelized steel industry was one industrial giant that appeared to show some
benefit. (Morgan 1991, p547)
It was this system if imperial preferences in trade which allowed countries such as
Australia to benefit greatly from export of primary resources into a guaranteed
11
market. Yet it was precisely this system that would need to be dismantled as Britain
moved in the early 1970s to enter the European Common Market.
During the post-World War II period the Labour government also moved towards a
new policy of comprehensive social security, based on part on the egalitarian
sentiments of the war period (Morgan 1991, p562-565). It developed a
comprehensive system of social security, full employment, health care,
unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and death benefits funded from
government taxation (Morgan 1991, p563). These policies, the basis of the welfare
state, gained strong support down until the 1970s, even under Conservative
governments from 1951-1964, an agenda that provided hard to sustain with the huge
post-war debt that Britain faced (Morgan 1991, p568-570; see further Lewis 1995). In
the 1970s, with a changing global economy, this policy would be greatly reduced.
Likewise, from the 1950s Britain found that she had to withdraw from the direct
control of empire (Morgan 1991, p573), whether through the voluntary release of
states (as in the case of India), complex processes of decolonisation (as in Kenya), or
the limited ability to project power into East Asian and the Middle East. One event
which symbolises this decline of British imperial reach was the effort to directly
occupy the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, a covert plan developed with French and Israeli
support. However, the United States strongly opposed the plan, as did much of world
opinion, and Egyptian nationalism proved durable - in the end Britain had to withdraw
her forces (Morgan 1991, 574-576). Britain was thenceforth at best a circumscribed
great power, who now had to deal with the new economic realities of North
American dominance and a growing European potential. The Commonwealth, which
still exists as a useful organisation for north-south dialogue and human rights (see
Hain 2002), was no longer a forum for the projection of unilateral British power.
4. Cautious Engagement of the Common Market: Moving Beyond Euroscepticism
Even as Europe began to move towards cautious integration from 1951 onwards,
Britain was prepared to stand aloof, expecting that her great power status, special
relationship with the United States, and preferential trade network would be sufficient
to maintain her national power. There may also have been a sense that Britain had
been able to stand alone as a European democracy that had not been invaded by
Germany (Morgan 1991, p559) - a sense of residual greatness that was not well suited
to the realities of the following decades. Furthermore, the first British effort to join the
European Union was rebuffed by France through the 1962-1963 period, but the
British as a whole were not certain that their future lay with the European Economic
Community in any case (Morgan 1991, p576).
However, through the early 1970s inflation began to rise seriously, as did
unemployment, followed by a decline in traditional industrial areas in north-east
England, Scotland, and Wales (Morgan 1991, p578). By 1973, it seemed that the
'nation's capacity to generate wealth, along with its share of world trade and
production, were in serious, perhaps terminal, decline.' (Morgan 1991, p578). After
much 'diplomatic infighting', Britain entered the EEC in 1973 under the
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, a move that was ratified by a two-thirds
12
majority in the referendum of 1975 (Morgan 1991, p584). However, British opinion
remained critical of Europe, and the British were viewed at best as 'reluctant
Europeans' (Morgan 1991, p584).
British caution of the European system became even more marked under the
early period of the Conservative government of Prime Minister Thatcher, a
stance made easier while the national economy was boosted by North Sea oil revenues
(Morgan 1991, p586). Although Britain benefited from access to the Common Market
(Europe by the late 1990s comprised the destination of over 50% of UK exports),
growth was relatively slow until 1983, in part due to the impact of the Common
Agricultural Market on British farmers. Thatcher in particular was highly critical of
cross-funding within the CAP, and argued that it effectively penalised efficient
farming nations such as the UK, Germany and Holland, though the position of British
farmer began to improve from 1982 (Jones 1984, pp225-226). With about half of the
EU budget (circa 44.5 billion euros) spent on various forms of agricultural subsidies,
the pattern of this spending in the 21st century remains a sensitive issue as the EU
expands, e.g. of concern to Welsh and France farmers (Thomas 2004). There had also
been early disputes with the Danes over EEC fishery policies (Jones 1984, p226). At
the same, ongoing privatisation, though it made sense to the markets, also led to a
further 'hollowing' out of state power (Kavanagh 2001, p5). It was through the early
and mid-1990s that the Conservative Party's formula for government, as represented
by Prime Minister John Major (see Major 1999), began to wear thin, paving the way
for a triumphant return of what came to be called the 'New Labour'.
5. Blair and the Third Way
The government of Prime Minister Tony Blair swept into office in 1997, partly on
the basis of poor Conservative electoral performance, and on the promise of
generating a more caring government (better education, hospitals, youth centres,
strong anti-poverty policies) and society without increasing taxation (Toynbee &
Walker 2001, pp1-2, pp10-11). In general terms, New Labour sought to make neoliberal capitalism compatible with the need of a centre-left socialism, almost a 'new
social contract between "comfortable Britain" and the poor' (Toynbee & Walker 2001,
p10). It must be remembered that through the mid-1990s Britain had some 8 million
people in relative poverty (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p12), with a greater gap between
rich and poor than most EU countries.
In this context, the concept of a 'Third Way' was invoked. In usual European
parlance, this was the idea of a better alternative to rampant capitalism or
authoritarian communism. The idea was applied to the strong role of government in
social programs in Scandinavia and Germany, and for a time it seemed that
Gorbachev might be steering the Soviet Union in this direction (see Dallago et al
1992).
13
Tony Blair on the Move
(Photo courtesy Felix Clay/Wirepix 1999)
In the context of the late 1990s, the Third Way took on a new spin: The Third Way is a new buzzword that captures the common elements of still
inchoate paradigm assigning welfare functions to families, markets and states. The
"old" welfare model, constructed between the 1930s and the 1970s, emphasized
protecting people from the market. Social Security, unemployment insurance, and
disability insurance provided income for individuals who could not work, because of
old age, poor health, or fluctuations in the business cycle. "Third Way" solutions, by
contrast, emphasize programs that help people to participate and succeed in the
market through education, training, and programs that sustain labor force
participation. Third Wayism comes in many variants. Its common features include a
commitment to globalization, flexible labor markets, and fiscal rectitude; it also aims to
provide people with the means to prosper in such an environment through education
and training, family support systems (to help people enter the labor market), and
wage and tax incentives (to keep them there). (Myles & Quadagno 2000).
In such policies there is also a strong emphasis on women in the workforce, and in
investing in the educational and health care of children, viewed as the formation
of social capital (Myles & Quadagno 2000). The Third Way became even more
deeply entrenched through 1999-2000, in part under the influence of Anthony
Giddens (director of the London School of Economics) work (e.g. The Third Way:
The Renewal of Social Democracy, 1999) and became a core part of the rhetoric of the
British government, formally enshrined in Labour's National Policy Forum of 2000
(Toynbee & Walker 2001, p6; see further Giddens 2001). New Labour also held out
the surprising promise of full employment (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp6-7).
There are, however, limitations to this approach: The main Achilles heel of the Third Way Scenario is its silence on the fate of those
most disadvantaged by a strategy that relies on the labor market as the primary
source of welfare: working-age adults who have no labor to sell. Even under the most
optimistic conditions, a significant minority of adults, young and old, who come into
the world with (or acquire), physical, mental, personal, and other impairments will
never be able to find their welfare in the market. Third Way strategies are sensitive
not only to the distribution of incentives but also to the distribution of capacities;
hence the emphasis on education and training, especially for those with limited jobs
skills. But even the most ambitious program of education and training will not provide
14
Rawlsian justice for those most disadvantaged by the initial distribution of
endowments. Third Wayers will have to work harder. (Myles & Quadagno 2000)
However, the Blair government was able to reduce poverty in some key areas, e.g.
among children and pensioners (Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp23-24). By 2000, the
poorest one tenth of the population were estimated to be 8.8% better of 'in real terms'
(Toynbee & Walker 2001, p40). Through 1997-2001 some 1 million new jobs had
been created, but unemployment ranged between 5-6% in 1998-2003 period (Toynbee
& Walker 2001, p14’ DFAT 2003). Estimates of 2004 GDP growth of circa 3.5% may
help slightly reduce this to around 4.9% (DFAT 2004). Likewise, women had gained
some increased representation: 120 Labour MPs were women out of a total of 659
(Milne 1997), while 34% of public appointments are held by females (Toynbee &
Walker 2001, p29). Labour also spend 800 million pounds on the 'New Deal for
Communities' project, helping projects in old or deprived local communities (Toynbee
& Walker 2001, p38).
With these modest but real social gains, combined with a fairly robust foreign policy,
it was not surprising that Blair had a strong victory in general elections in 2001.
The final results, with all 659 seats declared include (Field 2001; BBC 2001b): Labour = 413
Conservative = 166
Liberal Democrats = 52
Others = 28
However, the turnout was only 58% compared with 71.5% in 1997 elections, lower
than at any time since 1918 (Field 2001). In part this may be due to a certain
disillusionment from the left (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p230), who may have
expected more radical policies from Blair. In the past, the labour might have been
compared to mild Social Democratic in Europe (see Jahn & Henn 2000) parties, but in
recent years New Labour government, ironically, in many ways retains much of the
business-friendly, great-power rhetoric common to centre-right politicians.
In the aftermath of another election defeat in 1992, Labour, under the stewardship of
Tony Blair, has become 'New' Labour, and continued the modernisation process with
the rejection of traditional socialist priorities, and the adoption of a more social
democratic, and increasingly neo-liberal, orientation. . . . It is generally agreed that
this 'New Labour' project is one which has gained increased momentum, and now
dominates the Labour Party. As a consequence, there has been a qualitative change
in the political, organisational and ideological orientation of the party. In many ways,
the party elite may consider that they have been vindicated with the direction in which
they have steered Labour following its landslide general election victory in l997. (Jahn
& Henn 2000)
Indeed, it is possible to argue that by this move to the right Labour has stolen much
of the ground from the conservatives, and in doing so made it hard for leaders such
as Michael Howard to distinguish their own policies, since Blair in effect has moved
to right on a number of issues including crime, social welfare and immigration issues
(Lyall 2003).
15
6. The Three Stages: UK's Global Role, the Special Atlantic Relationship, and
Deepening European Engagement
One of the great ironies of history has been the benefits the UK gained from
surrendering its colonies. This greatly reduced the political and economic pressures on
Britain through the 20th century, for a time gave her privileged access to resources in
former colonies, access to growing markets and trade within the major dominions
(Australia, Canada, South Africa), and increased her prestige politically in parts of
Asia and Africa. Ironically, the United States (formed in part via rebellion from the
UK), would end up as the major ally of Britain through two World Wars, and through
the NATO alliance, a major partner for the UK strategically. Yet by the 1980s
Britain struggled to maintain its image as a great power, a factor made clear by
the enormous effort the UK had to undertake in order to re-take the Falkland
(Malvinas) Island back from Argentina in 1982. In this context, the turn towards
sustained cooperation with both the European Union and the United States (the
Atlanticism and the Atlantic Alliance) would be the basis of sustaining Britain’s
international prestige.
From 1997, Labour sought to develop a stronger projection of foreign policy,
working in the global arena, e.g. a pragmatic if selective support for human rights
(for the mixed report card here, see Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp125-126), through
maintaining special cooperation with the U.S., and via cautious convergence with
the EU in some areas. Prime Tony Minister Blair, as a leader of 'New Labour', was
willing to turn more towards European integration, willing to present himself as a
centre-left leader able to communicate easily with the German, Dutch, Swedish and
French leaderships (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p137). Blair, for example, soon agreed
to sign onto the Social Chapter, designed to ensure employment, improved working
conditions, and developing human resources, (which Britain had opted out of in 1994
under the Conservative Major government), though still remaining outside the
Schengen agreement on open borders (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p148; Bainbridge
1998, p449). The Labour government has also resisted the harmonisation of taxation
on savings, a factor negotiated through 2003-2004 in relation to the emerging EU
constitution, and did not want qualified majority voting within the EU extended to
issues such as security, border control and defence areas (Toynbee & Walker 2001,
pp148-151).
However, reality would prove more complex as Tony Blair had to negotiate the
thorny issue of monetary union, as well as maintaining special relations with the U.S.
and manoeuvre towards a heightened role for after the somewhat negative legacies of
the Thatcher and Major years. Blair was willing to speak of Europe as a 'superpower,
not a superstate' (Walker 2000-2001), terminology that seemed to offer the prospect
of greater cooperation with Europe without the loss of British policy independence.
One way this was done was through the strong support that Blair gave to the
project of a European Defence Initiative (EDI) that could be developed into the
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), leading to the creation of the
European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). Britain has a relatively large and modern
defence force, and even under the Labour government retained strong defence
spending, a surprise to many in the European Union (Freedman 2001). The Strategic
Defence Review in Britain during 1998, for example, argued a new role for the armed
forces, in which the sustained cutting edge would be maintained even as some
16
administrative cuts were made (Freedman 2001). It was also able to deploy sizeable
forces overseas, e.g. the deployment of 25,000 troops, 100 aircraft, and 30 ships to
Oman in Operation Safe Sword, a training exercise that few nations outside of the
U.S. could have mobilised (Walker 2000-2001). It able to deploy sizeable forces in
Afghanistan and then in Iraq, leading to an ongoing burden through 2004, with some
13,000 troops deployed in Iraq from early 2004.
Support for the European Defence Initiative may have had several political motives: The idea for a European force began in Britain in the course of 1998, as a means for
the new government of Tony Blair to demonstrate its strongly pro-European
credentials despite its refusal to join Europe's single currency. The project emerged
from a paper written by Roger Cooper, a fast-rising civil servant in the Foreign Office,
who suggested that Britain's impressive military capabilities were an underused asset
available to the British government in its European diplomacy. Cooper argued that
Britain's tradition reluctance to embrace any European military formation that might
challenge or weaken the NATO alliance and its commitment to the United States had
become outdated with the end of the Cold War. With careful drafting, a European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) could be concocted that would reinforce, rather
than weaken, NATO. It could, for example, be presented as a way to meet
longstanding U.S. complaints that the European allies were not adequately sharing
the burden of joint defense. The financial strength and existing military resources of
the 15 EU nations could be far more effectively deployed. (Walker 2000-2001)
. . . But fundamentally, his decision to commit Britain to an EU force was
based on the view that this could serve British interests in Brussels without damaging
them in Washington!
Thus, British support for ESDI was rather different from the French push for more
strategic independence from the United States (Walker 2000-2001). In general terms,
Blair has suggested that the European force would only be used if no NATO force
was sent, or in conjunction with NATO operations. Blair's support for ESDI
increased after the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, especially once the real limits of
British and French airpower emerged in the NATO bombing campaign against
Yugoslavia. Blair's support in fact held the allies together during the air war (Toynbee
& Walker 2001, p130), in spite of growing criticism over civilian casualties and the
impact on refugees flows.
In general terms, Blair has sought to maintaining or regaining influence via
Security issue run through UN, via NATO, via European Institutions, and via the
US alliance or US-led coalitions. The UK thus has considerable policy flexibility if
it can keep these options open. This has led to a certain activism, combined with
pragmatism in foreign affairs, even as Tony Blair claims his actions are
grounded on strong principles (see Bentley 2003). For example, Britain was critical
of human rights in Iraq and Nigeria, but was relatively silent on human rights issues in
Tibet, China and Kashmir (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p126). Likewise, certain tests
were applied by UK policy as to whether NATO should act in a given case,
including a strong moral case for intervention, failure of diplomatic options, the
existence of realistic military options, the ability to maintain a long-term commitment,
and a link to traditional national interests. On this basis the UK was willing to
intervene in Kosovo, but was not willing to militarily intervene over Russian
suppression of Chechnya (Freedman 2001, p299).
17
Likewise, the UK gave increased support to some UN programs and support for
poverty relief (greater funding, totalling 35 and 15 million pounds per year for the
UNDP and UNICEF), but was critical of others such as UNESCO (Toynbee &
Walker 2001, p139; Bentley 2003). Likewise, Britain was willing to support German
and Japanese bids for reform in the UN Security Council (Toynbee & Walker 2001,
p139). The UK has also wiped out the debt owed to it by the least developed countries
that could apply through the High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Trust Fund,
though the 5 billion pounds involved had to be invested into 'social priorities'
(Toynbee & Walker 2001, p140). On this basis it might be only a slight exaggeration
to suggest that 'Realpolitik trumped Blairite idealism' (modifying the view of Toynbee
& Walker 2001, p126; see further Lloyd 1998). Likewise, the UK was willing to
operate through the UN Security Council its deployment of troops to the International
Security Assistance Force ISAF in Afghanistan (through mid-2002), but chose to part
a U.S.-led coalition invading and controlling Iraq through 2003-2004, a move that
could not be supported at the NATO level. Likewise, though European nations were
happy to invoke Article 5 of the NATO agreement on collective defence, the U.S.
soon became reluctant to allow the ‘war on terror’ to be run through a multilateral
alliance which was partly out of its direct control (see Lundestad 2003, pp273-274).
Indeed, through 2002-2004, the UK has trouble maintaining its role as an ‘Atlantic
bridge’ for the EU-UK, with difference emerging over future NATO roles in Iraq
and the level of pre-emptive intervention that is legally permissive and positive in
global terms (see further Lundestad 2003). Tensions here have been driven in part by
ongoing economic competition and trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU,
including disputes over bananas, hormone-treated beef, anti-trust legislation,
competitiveness issues in the face of major mergers, e.g. the Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas merger, and disputes over steel tariffs (see Lundestad 2003, ppp272-273,
p289).
7. Future Challenges: The Pound, the Euro, Identity Politics, and Balancing the
Atlantic Division
The United Kingdom has moved slowly towards deepening engagement in the
European project. However, there are a number of issues where there are potentials
for tension to slow this process (Field 1996a; 1996b; Field 2001), including 1) Family law, e.g. differences with Germany over child custody and rights.
2) Desires for financial control of currency to support national economic
growth, leading to calls for review of the Stability and Growth Pact and
criticisms of EU financial institutions (see HM Treasury 2004)
3) Limited influence of UK within EU structures due to prior institutional rules
worked out with limited consultation with Britain due to late entry.
4) Relative early dominance of partnership of France and Germany, within
European processes.
5) Budgetary and CAP support for small states with relatively strong qualified
majority voting rights compared to population, a trend which will continue to
some degree after 2004 as the EU expands.
6) In past, the UK had relatively less nationals as officials in the EU (11%
verses 16% in relation to France).
18
7) Problems in allowing the advanced UK steel industry to complete and export
into Europe.
8) Many in UK are against 'Open-Ended Integration'. Here Blair initially
opposed any integrated 'Federal' model, as has been suggested by Germany
(Toynbee & Walker 2001, pp143-144), unless there were clear safeguards. Thus in
the 2002-2003 European Convention on a future constitutions there was serious
debate on use of voting verses national veto rights: One of the toughest battles will be over attempts gradually to eradicate
national vetoes and make qualified majority voting the norm for all EU
policymaking.
Yesterday's proposals state - in a nod to Euro federalists - that European
leaders can, by unanimity, decide which policy areas would move from
unanimity to majority voting.
Britain vehemently opposes that clause because it makes constitutional
reform a continuous exercise. At least 15 other countries, including Spain,
Ireland, the Nordic states and many new members, will join Britain in fighting
to remove it.
Britain will also oppose moves to introduce majority voting on taxation
matters. (Times 2003)
This opposition by the Blair government has partly softened, but still faces a
gradual tack in winning support with British voters. This is part of the broader
debate on the constitution, with the reality that all 25 member states will need to
support it for it to take hold. This will be a slow and difficult process, with
referenda likely in several countries: Only four countries are absolutely certain to have referendums: Denmark, Ireland,
the Netherlands and now Britain. Another four seem almost certain to: the Czech
Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Poland seems likely to join them, and
France may yet follow; others are still considering the matter. Yet a pan-European
debate is unlikely. The votes will take place at different times, and different aspects
of the long and complex constitutional text will prove controversial in different
countries. (Economist 2004a)
9) A better balance of power among major powers within the EU is needed,
especially the emerging triangular relationship of the big three (UK, France and
Germany), an issue partly moderated via regular conferences held several times
each year through late 2003-2004 (see lectures 6 and 7).
10) Continuing pressure on UK policies from eurosceptics and europessimists, which also includes a very critical conservative press. This trend will
deepen in future elections and become important in future referenda.
11) The strong alignment of the UK with the US on the Iraq led to strong
tensions with Russia, France and Germany, suggesting a possible split within EU
defence and foreign policy orientations. Thus President Chirac of France has
spoken of the U.S. as a ‘hyperpower’ that needs restraint and balancing from
European powers (Lundestad 2003, pp277-280). Although Britain tried to
smooth this division from mid-2003, there is no guarantee that the UK can act
as a strong facilitator between divergent European and US orientations in
the future. This might undermine some the UK’s new foreign policy agenda (see
above). Likewise, British involvement in the Iraq war was unpopular with many
Labour supporters, leading to a crisis through early 2003 in which there was a real
possibility that Tony Blair might lose the confidence of his own party, while
ongoing controversy about a possible ‘beat-up’ of the weapons- of-mass-
19
destruction (WMD) issue continues to plague the government through 20032004.
The euro also represents a major challenge to British policy. There are several
major issues, some economic, some political, that impact on British attitudes in this
area. In brief, they include: 1). The possibility that a pound, if too strong in relation to euro, will be bad
for exports. On this basis, entry into the euro would also depend in locking in a
suitable exchange rate for transition, and therefore picking a right time for joining
the monetary union. As the euro began to strengthen against the dollar through
mid-2002, this was viewed as good for those who wished to join the monetary
union (BBC 2002d).
2) Through 1997-2004, the Blair government has remained somewhat
ambiguous on the euro, hedging on the issue (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p145)
of whether it really supported the idea by involving the notion of economic tests
and a future referendum as deciding issues. The government had failed to run a
positive campaign on the euro, thereby allowing a strong ground for critics and
eurosceptics. In 2000, 64% of Britons polled remained against the euro (Toynbee
& Walker 2001, p143), though this has begun to change somewhat through 2002.
By mid-2003, Tony Blair was stating that he and the government would
need to run a strong campaign to sell the euro to Britons, and even to
elements within his own party. At the same time, Chancellor Gordon Brown
that the economic benefits of the euro for the UK had yet to be fully
established at the present time but that there might be progress over the
following year – this same claim was repeated 2004, with delays on the issue till
2005 and perhaps as late as 2008 (BBC 2003; BBC 2004a). If delayed too long,
however, the UK may be viewed as outside a core integrating group in the
EU, and lose some influence on economic and financial issues as the European
agenda pushes forward.
3) The tests proposed for euro were designed to insure that it would make
economic sense for Britain to join, with the status of these tests being assessed by
the UK government in early June 2003 as either met or not met: that it would
be good for jobs (not met), beneficial for foreign investment (not met),
whether there was sufficient convergence between the economies (not
met), whether there was flexibility for adjust (not met), that it would not
undermine the role of London as a major financial centre and on financial
services generally (met) (BBC 2002d; BBC 2003). In other words, adopting the
euro would have to further British national interests. Yet through 1999 it seemed
that there was indeed some convergence in many areas of UK and Euroland
economies, e.g. in areas such as interest rates (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p145). In
fact, some studies, e.g. by Ian Begg would argue that in the main the tests have
been met, while those commissioned by the 'no' campaign still suggest a certain
divergence between the British and Euroland economies (BBC 2002d). In reality,
adopting the euro will be a political, national and economic decision. In the
past, the government has said it would decide whether the tests had been met by
June 2003, and on this basis it might then proceed to a referendum (BBC 2002e).
At present, these tests may be re-assessed in 2005, and a referendum would only
20
occur after that time. The Blair government also knows that losing the pound
remains unpopular for a majority of voters through 2004.
4) Partial interdependency already exists between the UK and EU
economies, indicating that uncontrolled currency fluctuations will not only
impose transaction costs on many British firms, but that the relative success of
exports and long-term investments in industry could be negatively affected. From
the late 1990s through 2003 Euroland was absorbing up to 48% of UK
exports, compared to the US's 16% (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p146). The tourist
industry, and some companies that deal intensely with European firms, have
already had to become able to denominate in euro notes and coins, involving
them in small but real extra costs (Rickard 2002). Many unions in the UK also
want to join the euro at the right time in order to boost manufacturing and jobs
(see Gallagher 2000). The positive transfer to the euro in Ireland has also been
closely watched by analysts (Stewart 2000). At the same time, the US remained
UK’s strongest single national trading partner, with 17-18% of trade (stronger
than Germany or France, with 10-12% of trade each, see DFAT 2004), and some
argued that the pound fluctuated more closely with the U.S. dollar than the euro,
since ‘the pound has hovered about 10 cents above or below a somewhat stable
rate of $1.55 for five years’ (Travel Weekly 2003).
5) The sovereignty issue is regularly raised by Eurosceptics, with the view of the
pound as a strong symbol of national identity. Although not decisive, this
argument will be one of the factors in any future referendum. Countries such as
Denmark would watching the outcome for British policy very closely. Not only is
European identity relatively weak in British identity constructions, the
reality is that differential Welsh, Scottish and English affiliations makes this
a complex task for governments seeking a positive tilt towards Europe (see
further below).
Numerous small areas of divergence can still create ongoing tensions between the
European process of deepening integration and the sense of Great Britain as having a
unique place in world affairs. Practical differences in policy between the UK and
different European governments also emerge on a regular basis. These included,
for example: 1) The crushing impact of 'mad-cow-disease' (BSE in cows, and related in
humans CJD) and the later 'foot-and-mouth' outbreaks had a crushing impact on
the British beef industry, as well as causing severe tensions with the EU and
France in particular over sustained bans on imports (Toynbee & Walker 2001,
p147). For a short time Britain was even willing to use the 'empty chair' approach
of not participating in some EU meetings, slowing down integration processes
through the use of a kind of de fact veto. In large measure, the British
government in 1996, under then Prime Minister Major, viewed the EU initial ban
in 1996 as a mixture of hysteria and a cynical protection of the beef market of
other producers (Major 1999, p651). However, the poor handling of the problem
by the Conservative government may have helped contribute to its collapse in the
elections of 1997 (see Shaw 2001).
2) Britain and France have had recurring tensions through 2001-2002 over
asylum policies and the handling of refuge and immigration issues (see
21
earlier lectures). One sore point has been the Sangatte refugee camp, not far
from the Eurotunnel that links Britain with the continent. One a nightly basis,
refugees sought to leave Sangatte and enter the UK, leading to mutual
complaints: "France has complained that Britain is a tempting destination for
refugees because of the generous assistance it offers them. Britain protests that
France does little to stop refugees making their way illegally through France and
is only too happy to see them move to the UK." (Mallet 2002). With a new
centre-right government in Paris, France agreed to close Sangatte in return for
tighter British asylum laws (Mallet 2002). However, in the broader context of
Europe, it is still clear that real consensus on asylum and refugee issues is unlikely
in the short term. Some ongoing EU and British sensitivity to migration issues
has been experienced over the UK’s minority of 200,000 Roma people (‘gypsies’)
and fears of increased Roma migration from Eastern Europe, while in 2000
Britain was cited by the European Commission Against Racism as having
engaged in forced evictions of this minority group from common land and
caravan sites (Este 2003).
3) The status of the British colony of Gibraltar, which has been claimed by
Spain as its sovereign territory, has also been a focus of recent controversy (see
lecture 4). In early July 2002 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told 'MPs that London
and Madrid had reached a broad agreement of the future of the Rock' in which
sovereignty is shared, a policy not very popular with its 27,000 inhabitants (BBC
2002a). The Conservative opposition has made it clear that it would not feel
bound by any such deal (BBC 2002a), suggesting that the issue of Gibraltar could
provide the basis of nagging tensions between the UK and Spain in the future.
Local feeling also ran against Spanish rule, with ‘a November 2002 referendum
where 99 percent of Gibraltarians rejected joint-sovereignty’ (Ho 2004). One
view puts this issue in the context of wider European concerns, but may be
drawing too much on parallels with Hong Kong: In light of the future of Europe and the eventual political integration into the
European Union, it seems to be in Britain's best interest to push for jointsovereignty and for Spain to accept. The importance of Anglo-Spanish
relations can not be undervalued, however, as a diplomatic lever against a
possible Franco-German alliance in the European Union. Nonetheless,
provisions must be made--albeit gradual ones--for the return of Gibraltar to
the sovereignty of Spain with specific timetables and under UN auspices. (Ho
2004)
4) These factors, combined with the more serious issues of the UK still being
outside of the euro zone, and the continued special relationship with the U.S.,
have fed into the debate concerning British and European identity
structures. In general terms, the sense of being European or sharing in a
European identity remains relatively low in Britain. British identity remains
strong compared to the sense of EU identity, with the EU being among the least
attached in Europe in affiliation terms, with only 37% fairly attached to EU
(Field 1996a; Field 1996b; Field 2001). Fears continued that European unification
could lead to a loss of identity and culture (hight levels of 68% in some surveys,
Field 2001). Likewise, the images of Europe in British television coverage (as well
as in mainstream papers and journals) tends to send mixed about Europe that
does not bode well for UK solidarity with a any emerging European identity
(Gavin 2000).
22
5) In the medium term, the UK is still faced with bridging the gap between
major European orientations and US policies driven by security needs,
including the following factors (Lundestad 2003, p281): 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The Cold War is over.
Unilateralism is growing stronger in the United States.
The EU is slowly but steadily taking on an ever stronger role.
Out-of-area disputes are becoming increasing frequent and they have been
notoriously difficult to handle for the two sides of the Atlantic.
Redefinitions of leadership and burdens are always difficult to do.
Economic disputes are proliferating.
Even cultural disputes are becoming increasingly numerous. (This cultural
dispute includes the idea that through 2001-2004, the ‘Americans feel they are
engaged in a war, the Europeans feel they are engaged in preventing one’,
Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev in Lundestad 2003, p282). In this
context, U.S. defence budgets are about 40% of the world total, with EU
spending at a much lower proportional level (Lundestad 2003, pp283-285).
Finally, demographic changes are taking place, particularly on the American
side of the Atlantic, that in the long run are likely to challenge the existing
relationship. (Lundestad, 2003, p281; the latter includes a larger, more
conservative voting body in the south of the U.S.)
On this basis it is possible to speak at least of a ‘transatlantic drift’, if not yet a
post-Atlanticist period (see Lundestad 2003; Steinberg 2003).
In the long run, the failure of the UK to more fully enter the EU process (e.g. the euro,
the EU Constitution, the Schengen agreement) would be a considerable disability for a
Europe that is converging among its older members, and now rapidly enlarging as
well. On this basis, a British 'opt-out' could well signal a track towards a two tier
Europe - a core of close integration surrounded by a looser group of states with less
influence on central EU policies (Toynbee & Walker 2001, p148). It is not certain that
this would be stable in the long run. Likewise, serious opposition to the EU
Constitution could reverse the trend for ongoing integration in an expanding Europe.
Through 2003-2005 it is clear that British policy will strongly affect the
European process as a whole. The Blair government will need to make serious and
difficult decisions in the 2004-2006 period – further delay will already have had a
serious impact on European processes.
8. References and Resources:
Resources: Quite good European, British and world coverage of news will be found in the
Financial Times (London), located on the Web at http://news.ft.com/home/rw/
BBC News on the Web has a wide range of resources on the UK and Europe,
accessible via http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Numerous UK controversies are discussed each week in The Guardian,
accessible via www.guardianweekly.co.uk
23
The
United
Kingdom
government
webpage
is
located
at
http://www.ukonline.gov.uk
Further Reading
BENTLEY, Tom “Tony Blair, Issue by Issue”, Le Monde diplomatique, February 2003
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FIELD, Heather “Creating a European Identity”, Paper presented at the
Regulating Identities Conference, Surfers Paradise, QLD, 3-4 October,
1996b (Vertical File)
GIDDENS, Anthony "Just Carry on Being New", New Statesman, June 11, 2001
[Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
LUNDESTAD, Geir The United States and Western Europe Since 1945, Oxford,
OUP, 2003
STEINBERG, James B. “An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic
Relations”, Survival, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp113-146 [Access via BU
Library Catalogue]
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