Download Justification of violence by terrorist organizations

JOURNAL OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND TERRORISM
STUDIES
Justification of violence by terrorist
organisations: Comparing ISIS and PKK
Emin Daskin
Original article
Article history:
Received: 28 February 2016
Accepted: 4 May 2016
Published: 8 August 2016
Correspondence:
Emin Daskin: [email protected]
Peer review:
Double blind
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Veruscript, Unit 41, Pall Mall Deposit, 124-128 Barlby Road, London, W10 6BL, UK
Copyright:
© 2016 Daskin. c This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC‑BY 4.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited and its authors credited.
Keywords:
terrorism; PKK; ISIS; justification of violence
Citation:
Emin Daskin, “Justification of violence by terrorist organisations: Comparing ISIS and PKK,” Journal of Intelligence and
Terrorism Studies, 2016, 1: #PLV6PE, https://doi.org/10.22261/PLV6PE
Link to this article:
http://www.veruscript.com/a/PLV6PE/
JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM STUDIES
www.veruscript.com/jits
Justification of violence by terrorist
organisations: Comparing ISIS and PKK
Emin Daskin1
1
Independent researcher, Istanbul, Turkey
Abstract
The question of whether or not violence is an acceptable form of action to achieve social, political and
economic goals is still an important topic of discussion for intellectuals. Analogous to this debate, another
issue exists: the question of how groups relying on violence justify their actions. This article discusses the
doctrinal and utilitarian justification of violence by terrorist organisations by examining and comparing two
internationally recognised terrorist organisations — ISIS and PKK — directly and indirectly threatening the
security of many states and destabilising international efforts to counterterrorism in Syria. In normal circumstances, the use of violence results in self-condemnation and self-sanction. However, terrorist
organisations try to make their violent acts personally and socially acceptable by using diverse methods.
Greater justification is needed in order to achieve “aggressive intentions.” The main division made in the
literature is the distinction between normative and utilitarian justifications. Ideology and doctrine play the
key roles in normative justification, whereas value-based calculations are at the core of utilitarian justification. Differences and similarities in the doctrines, the process of enemy creation, identity politics and
rational calculations of violence are examined for both organisations. This discussion should not be
confused either with discussions on the causes of existence or the goals of these terrorist organisations, or
with the debate on the status of these groups. However, when trying to justify their acts, these organisations do make use of certain extant but latent discontent and deprivation that form a breeding ground
for violent political action.
Let the goal of Jihad be that the word of Allah becomes the highest
—Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir1
We will also give our lives to the cause you have fallen for
Every time we look at the black barrel [of our gun] we will remember you guerrilla
—PKK propaganda song “Delîla - Ha Gerîla”2
Introduction
The question of whether or not violence is an acceptable form of action to achieve social, political
and economic goals is still an important topic of discussion for intellectuals.3 Simultaneously,
political discussions take place on the listing of various groups under the category of terrorist
organisation. The main deficiency in the fields of terrorism studies and counterterrorism is the lack
of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and the political drive behind many of the
1 Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, “Advice for the soldiers of the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 2014, 6:6.
2 PKK propaganda song “Delîla - Ha Gerîla,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbWwYHLyeRI.
3 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011).
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debates on the subject. Therefore, the author chooses to focus on violent acts, which are more
concrete and internationally defined, and justification attempts. Building international counterterrorism strategies on concrete criminal and violent acts instead of endless political discussions
on “terrorists” and “freedom fighters” can increase the effectiveness of these strategies.
This article discusses the doctrinal and utilitarian justification of violence by terrorist organisations by examining and comparing two internationally recognised terrorist organisations with a
significant support base — ISIS4 and PKK5 — directly and indirectly threatening the security of
many states and destabilising international efforts to counterterrorism in Syria. It is important for
scholars, counterterrorism specialists and policymakers to understand the rational background of
terrorist violence and of attempts to make violent acts acceptable, in order to develop policies to
lower support for terrorist attacks. This will in turn lower the possibility of terrorist attacks due to
the decrease of monetary, human and logistical support for terrorist organisations.
Many of the readers will remember the footages of people from Middle Eastern countries celebrating 9/11. This trend of support and acceptance of violence is expanding increasingly to the
West. Recent incidents, such as the increasing tensions in Parisian “banlieues” after the Charlie
Hebdo and November 2015 attacks, public discussions on celebrations and protection of suspects
by ISIS sympathisers in Brussels after the Zaventem and Maelbeek attacks (March 2016), and the
making of heroes of the suicide terrorists who committed the Merasim Sokak and Güven Park
attacks (February and March 2016) by PKK sympathisers, clearly show the importance of this topic
and emphasize that this aspect of terrorism studies will need more attention in the near future.6
The focus of this article should not be confused with discussions on the reasons for the existence
of or the goals of these organisations. Nor should it be confused with discussions on the status
of PKK or ISIS, as there are different references in the literature to both groups (e.g., terrorist
organisation, insurgent movement, guerrilla force or rogue state). This article refers to both
organisations as terrorist in character, as they are listed as terrorist organisations by many states
and are referred to as such in the literature of terrorism studies7, as a result of their extensive
involvement in terrorist activities.
The research consists of an analysis of academic literature on terrorism and justification of violence and an analysis of publications, video messages, and existing research on these groups. In
addition to abstract academic works, the main sources of information on the terrorist organisations were collected from journals, magazines and newspapers, including Dar Al Islam, Konstantiniyye, Dabiq and ISIS’s Al-Hayat media, Speckhard and Yayla’s study,8 Holbrook’s research
(on the use of Quran to justify terrorist violence),9 ISIS propaganda videos, PKK’s official website
PKK Online, Abdullah Öcalan’s writings, interviews with PKK executive committee members and
PKK publications such as Serxwebûn.
Whilst the analysed texts did also include messages of utopian peace (to be reached by armed
battle), this article focuses exclusively on doctrinal and utilitarian messages concerning legitimisation and endorsement of violent activities.
4 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
5 Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdistan Workers Party.
6 Lauren Williams, “The other side of Paris: Islamist attacks fuelling tensions in outer suburbs known for drugs, crime,” ABC, 4
December 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-04/saint-denis'-fuelled-tensions-after-paris-attacks/6997698 [accessed 27
April 2016].
7 For example, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and international journals on
terrorism studies.
8 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Sait Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State: why they joined, what they saw,
why they quit,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2015, 9 (6): 95–118, available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/475.
9 Donald Holbrook, “Using the Qur’an to justify terrorist violence: analysing selective application of the Qur’an in English-Language
militant islamist discourse,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2010, 4 (3): 17–28, available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.
php/pot/article/view/104.
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Terrorism and justification
In the past few decades, terrorism has become one of the principal forms of violent political
action.10 Despite the fact that there are not many examples in history whereby terrorism brought
solution to a conflict, many groups still see the use of violence as an effective and legitimate tool to
achieve their political objectives. The definition of what terrorism is and the discussion on the
legitimacy of violence has an important impact on the success of national and international
counterterrorism efforts.11 Attempts to exempt certain types of political violence from the definition of terrorism — mostly under the influence of lobbies acting according to their own interests
— or to palliatively relabel terrorists as “challengers of power” and “rebels for change” result in
the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”12 Many academics and counterterrorism experts have claimed that the use of violence for political purposes should be dealt
with by ignoring the identity of those resorting to violence and their political, religious or ideological motivations and by only considering the acts and their consequences.13 There is a risk that
attempts to legitimise terrorist organisations can result in passive sponsorship of terrorism.14
The main efforts to legitimise terrorist groups are still made by the groups themselves. This is done
through the justification of their existence, actions, and goals. Justification is defined as “a positive
evaluation of an action for which the subject is responsible” and where “the justification itself
consists of giving reasons that are meant to outweigh the violations in question.”15 This does not
incorporate any apologies; however, it is an indirect acceptance of wrong behaviour and an
attempt to defeat any reputational damage.
The justification of violent acts by terrorist groups — especially when civilians fall victim — is vital
mainly because of their need to convince group members, sympathisers, potential recruits and,
sometimes, the broader public of the rightfulness of their acts and to retain their commitment to
the cause. Several factors such as politicisation of discontent, the (perceived) legitimacy of the
political system, psychocultural aspects of political violence, ideology and doctrine, communication and utilitarian aspects play a role in the justification of political violence.16
In normal circumstances, the use of violence will result in self-condemnation and self-sanction.17
However, by cognitive restructuring of behaviour through propaganda and indoctrination, people
are transformed into members or sympathisers who personally and socially accept violence
without self-censuring restraints due to the selective activation and disengagement of internal
control.18 In extreme cases, taking human life can be perceived as something right and honourable.
The intensity and the scope of justification have a direct effect on the potential for political
violence. Greater justification is needed in order to achieve aggressive intentions. The literature
10 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
11 Boaz Ganor, “Defining terrorism: is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?,” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 2002, 3 (4), 287–304, https://doi.org/10.1080/1561426022000032060; Belgin San Akça, “Supporting non-state
armed groups: a resort to illegality?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2009, 32 (4), 589–613, https://doi.org/10.1080/
01402390902987012.
12 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,
States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–191; Virginia Held, “Terrorism and war,” The
Journal of Ethics, 2004, 8 (1): 59–75, https://doi.org/10.1023/b:joet.0000012252.68332.ff; Ben Saul, “Two justifications for terrorism: a moral legal response,” Alternative Law Journal, 2005, 30 (5): 219–221.
13 Ercan Çitlioğlu, Gri Tehdit Terörizm (Istanbul: Destek Yayinlari, 2008); Igor Primoratz, Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
14 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daniel Byman,
“The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” analysis paper number 16 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/5/terrorism-byman/05_terrorism_byman.pdf.
15 Erich H. Witte, and Susanne Halverscheid, “Justification of war and terrorism: a comparative case study examining ethical positions
based on prescriptive attribution theory,” Hamburger Forschungsbericht zur Sozialpsychologie, 2006, Nr 70: 3.
16 Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
17 Bandura, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism.”
18 Bandura, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism”; Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, FL: University of
South Florida, 2004); Çitlioğlu, Gri Tehdit Terörizm.
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makes a main distinction between normative and utilitarian justifications. Ideology and doctrine
play the key roles in normative justification, whereas value-based calculations are at the core of
utilitarian justification.19
The intensity of justification is directly affected by, on the one hand, the number and reach of
communication channels and, on the other hand, the content of the message.20 Different communication techniques, varying from mass media to face-to-face agitation, are used to facilitate
ideological conversion and the implementation of new norms and values. As terrorism propaganda
is outlawed, terrorist groups tend to set up their own communication channels. However, access to
mainstream media is a priority to reach out to a broader public.21 This brings states fighting
terrorism into a delicate situation in which a healthy balance between security and the freedoms of
expression and information has to be found.
Another delicate issue is the weaponisation of language. Language shapes the apprehensions and
beliefs of the people using it and has an impact on their behaviour. Terrorists make extensive use
of this. Euphemisms, metaphors, rumours, conspiracy theories, manipulation, deception, relabelling and minimisation of consequences are just a few of these. An interesting occurrence is the
self-deception paradox, whereby the deceiver starts believing the messages he knows to be contradicting the factual situation. This can be because accepting the factual situation can challenge
the group’s doctrine or damage the utilitarian objectives, self-esteem and organisational discipline.22 Subsequently, as a defence mechanism, the biased agent will search for additional biased
theories that support the former’s desired objectives. Any other evidence contradicting their beliefs
will be ignored or assessed with less care and rejected with a hypercritical prejudiced stance.23
Doctrinal justification of violence
Doctrines are codifications of principles, rules, norms and values of a certain political or religious
entity, which shape interpretations and actions. In terms of violence, doctrines of terrorist
organisations serve as moral anaesthesia to help shape the acceptance of violence based on a
political prepossession by playing upon social tensions. The ideology and messages from leading
cadres are communicated to lower classes in a simplified form of symbols, vague ideas, slogans and
rumours.24 Receptivity to these messages is higher when intense discontent, relative deprivation
and propaganda channels exist. Doctrinal explanations of the sources of relative deprivation are
communicated through communication channels in order to transform passive discontent into an
active sentiment of hate wherein violence becomes an acceptable option.
The identification of sources of deprivation is the first step of doctrinal justification (Figure 1). The
next step is a process of enemy creation, whereby political agents are identified, blamed to be
responsible for the deprivation and perceived oppression and then subsequently demonised and
targeted (symbolic violence). Thereafter, this enmity is generalised to policies and the actors
executing these policies. The desired goal is the rejection of the whole system by the target
audiences.
Simultaneously, with enemy creation, identity creation takes places. A new sense of community is
created for the discontented group, in which the opponent is used to provide counteraction.
Dramatised glorification and references to myths, legends and made-up communal history are
19 Gurr, Why Men Rebel.
20 Ibid.
21 Bandura, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism.”
22 John T. Saunders, “The paradox of self-deception,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1975, 35 (4), 559–570, https://doi.org/
10.2307/2106755.
23 Alfred R. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Bandura, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism.”
24 Gurr, Why Men Rebel.
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Figure 1. The process of ideological development
Reproduced with permission from Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004), 29.
commonly used to create a feeling of historical pride, on the one hand, and guilt and responsibility
towards past and future generations on the other. With new identity creation, the group focuses on
the construction of a different type of communal awareness, new norms and moral standards that
are believed to be higher than those of others and have new semantic connotations. The more a
discontented group loses connection and grows enmity towards the system and society, the higher
would be the likelihood of tolerating violence against this system and society.25 The enemy is
blamed for all manner of evil, including acts such as occupation of territories, oppression of
people, massacres and genocide, whereas the group itself is pictured as having the responsibility to
rebel, defend and reclaim what is theirs, as well as fight for the right cause and a peaceful future.
Use of violence is portrayed as a sine qua non.
Utilitarian justification of violence
Utilitarian justification has as its source the value-enhancing potential of violence. The likelihood,
frequency and intensity of utilitarian violence depend on the gap between the costs and benefits
and the gap between desired value position and actual value position.26 This facet shows that
besides terrorism being fed by emotional incentives, it also has rationality in its own terms to
improve value position by altering the psychological coercive balance and asymmetric power
balance.
On the strategic level, the logic of utilitarian violence is based on the assumption that violence has
a deterrent effect and the exaggerated conviction that the use of violence has been the decisive
factor in past events.27 At lower tactical levels, violence can be executed to reduce the opponent’s
capacity to act and react, weaken the opponent by causing economic damage, seize weapons and
other resources, punish, prevent the opponent's implementation of policies that can damage the
organisation, create an atmosphere of polarisation and create or intensify social tension to achieve
“propaganda by deed.”28
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Thomas P. Thornton, “Terror as a weapon of political agitation,” in Internal War: Problems and Approaches,
ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 82–88; Saul, “Two justifications for terrorism.”
28 Saul, “Two justifications for terrorism”; Türkiye Barolar Birliği, Türkiye ve Terörizm (Ankara: Türkiye Barolar Birliği, 2006); Ekaterina
Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Unlike messages of doctrinal justification, utilitarian justification is communicated to the broader
public to a lesser extent and is mostly limited to members and sympathisers, as it could get
undesired reactions. This makes it more difficult for scholars to investigate utilitarian justification,
but still not impossible. Interviews with defectors or arrested terrorists give important insights
into the internal working and reasoning of these organisations. Moreover, seized organisational
documentation can be valuable if accessible.
Comparing ISIS and PKK
When comparing PKK and ISIS, we see that these two groups, although totally different ideologically, use similar rhetoric in terms of doctrinal and utilitarian justification of their violent acts.
PKK is an internationally recognised terrorist organisation based on Marxist–Leninist ideology
coupled with a separatist agenda. It has several subgroups and affiliated groups under the names
of Hêzên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Forces), Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection
Units), Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl (Civil Protection Units), Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons), Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth
Movement), and many others loyal to the same leader Abdullah Öcalan. In addition to these armed
affiliated groups, PKK has, under its structure, several political constructions, including the
political party Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party), nongovernmental
organisations and activist groups. It has to be noted that a dichotomy exists inside these groups,
with both advocates and opponents of violence. Believers of a solution without use of force are
referred as “doves,” whereas the devotees of violence are called “hawks.” Despite efforts for peace
talk and critique by Kurdish intellectuals that weapons are not an option anymore, PKK did not
change its discourse on using armed violence.29 This division is discussed further in this article.
In contrast to PKK, ISIS has a radical Islamist ideology based on Wahhabi and Salafi practices that
refutes any form of ethnic discrimination.30 ISIS has affiliated groups in many countries31 loyal to
its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.32 Similar to the PKK case, ISIS’s brutal acts are denounced by
Muslims and the Islamic scholarly community (ahl al- ‘ilm).33 The contrast with PKK is that the
dichotomy observed in the PKK (doves and hawks) does not exist within ISIS. Despite the fact that
this does not change anything about the cruelty of violent acts by both groups, it creates the image
that PKK includes also “good guys.” This is enforced by a selective perception of events. An
example where this selective perception is visible is the following: mass executions and exposition
of dead bodies by ISIS are rightfully referred to as barbaric; similar executions and the celebration
of exposing dead bodies in the middle of cities by PKK are less known and still less denounced.34
29 “Zana: Silah Kürtlerin Sigortası,” interview of Leyla Zana, NTV News, 9 January 2012, http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/zana-silahkurtlerin-sigortasi,ED8VcVlWuUi5DHuyCHBggw [accessed 13 February 2016]; Günışığı Suh, “PKK İdeoloji, Şiddet ve Meşruiyet,”
Zivistan, 26 August 2015, http://zivistan.com/?p=747.
30 Robert Spencer, “Harvard prof and Kerry adviser explains how Islamic State distorts traditional teachings of Islam,” Jihad Watch, 11
February 2015, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/02/harvard-prof-and-kerry-adviser-explains-how-islamic-state-distorts-traditionalteachings-of-islam [accessed 18 February 2016]; Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State.”
31 Such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS-Caucasus Province in the Caucasus.
32 Jim Hoft, “ISIS Goes Global: Releases Map of Affiliated Islamic State Groups in 17 Countries,” Gateway Pundit, 10 December 2015,
http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2015/12/isis-goes-global-releases-map-of-affiliated-islamic-state-groups-in-17-countries/
[accessed 27 April 2016].
33 Spencer, “Harvard prof and Kerry adviser.”
34 “PKK/YPG exposes dead bodies of 83 FSA fighters on trucks,” [Video] Released 30 April 2016, http://video.haberiyakala.com/201604-30-pkk-ypgli-teroristler-katlettikleri-oso-askerlerini-tirin-uzerinde-sergiledi-v1014276.video.
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Weapons as a doctrinal sine qua non
PKK sees armed combat as the centre of its existence and as the only method to achieve its
objectives.35 PKK sources cite this belief as follows: “the only way to liberation is to organise and
enlarge the fire-power of guerrilla corps and orientate them towards almost all targets.”36 In a
recent interview, Cemil Bayik stated that the fight will be taken to all Turkish cities. In another
video message, PKK/YPG militants threaten to “attack the institutions of the Turkish state all over
the world.”37 Despite peace talks in the past decade, interviews with PKK leaders and leaked
records of the meetings between PKK and Turkish National Intelligence Agency (Millî İstihbarat
Teşkilatı, MIT) show that PKK continued building weapon stocks and preparing militants for
attacks in the main Turkish cities.38 This situation contradicts the messages by PKK’s leader
Abdullah Öcalan during peace negotiations and the “Kurdish opening/democratisation process”
started by the Turkish state. In his 2013 Nevruz message, Öcalan gave the clear message that
weapons should be abandoned and legal politics should be the preferred modus operandi.39 This
was reintroduced in the Dolmabahçe Meetings and Öcalan’s 2015 Nevruz message in which he
proposed PKK to abandon its decades-old armed struggle and continue with political and social
activities.40 Contrary to PKK’s original ideal of an independent Kurdish state, both messages did
also include a future for Kurds as part of a more democratic Turkey. Nevertheless, these messages
were not echoed in the decisions and behaviour of leading cadres at Qandil, which shows the
division inside the PKK structure.41
PKK’s conviction regarding the power of weapons is based on Marxist thinking that physical power
(military power of the state) cannot be persuaded by words, but needs a counterforce (armed
rebellion). ISIS propagates a similar message through the slogan “who needs words when you
have deeds.” Besides that, PKK builds its normative justification of violence on the Marxist
rhetoric that sets violence as a primary condition for the development of a new society. The head of
PKK’s executive committee, Duran Kalkan, supports this in an interview with the following words:
“Freedom will be achieved by resisting and fighting.”42 Use of violence is also explicitly justified in
the PKK and Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Group of Communities in Kurdistan, umbrella organisation of PKK) charters under several articles. These are indoctrinated at PKK’s so-called “academies” in the first stage and in training camps in the Qandil mountains afterward. Adapted
doctrinal trainings are given according to grade in hierarchy.
35 Ismail Beşikçi, PKK Üzerine Düşünçeler, Özgürlüğün Bedeli (İstanbul: Melsa Yayınları, 1992); Gülsen Güner, “PKK’nın Devrimci
Şiddetinin Kürt Ezilenlerini Kazanması Üzerine,” Teori ve Politika, 2014, issue 63, http://www.teorivepolitika.net/index.php/okunabilir-yazilar/item/489-pkknin-devrimci-siddeti.
36 Ali Kemal Özcan, A theoretical analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan (Milton Park: Routledge, 2006), 91.
37 PKK/PYG, PYD instructions to attack Turkey [Video], 20 February 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6vJTPNH5BU
[accessed 25 April 2016].
38 “PKK-MİT GİZLİ GÖRÜŞMELERİ TAM METİN” [Full text of secret PKK-MIT meeting], Taraf, 14 September 2011, http://arsiv.taraf.
com.tr/haber-pkk-mit-gizli-gorusmeleri-tam-metin-78057/ [accessed 28 April 2016].
39 “İşte Öcalan’ın Nevruz mesajı,” Sabah, 21 March 2013, http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/03/21/iste-ocalanin-nevruz-mesaji
[accessed 29 April 2016].
40 AFP, “Jailed Kurdish leader in Turkey urges PKK to lay down arms,” Telegraph, 28 February 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/turkey/11442065/Jailed-Kurdish-leader-in-Turkey-urges-PKK-to-lay-down-arms.html; “İşte Öcalan’ın nevruz
mesajı,” Cumhuriyet, 20 March 2015, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/232961/iste_Ocalan_in_nevruz_mesaji.html
[accessed 29 April 2016].
41 Francesco F. Milan, “PKK Commanders Split with Imprisoned Kurdish Leader on Reconciliation with Ankara,” [blog] 22 April 2013,
https://ffmilan.wordpress.com/2013/04/22/terrorism-monitor-jamestown-foundation-pkk-commanders-split-with-imprisonedkurdish-leader-on-reconciliation-with-ankara/ [accessed 26 April 2016].
42 “Duran Kalkan: Öz savunma kazanacak, hem de çok büyük kazanacak,” Insan Haber, 29 December 2015, http://www.insanhaber.
com/guncel/duran-kalkan-oz-savunma-kazanacak-hem-de-cok-buyuk-kazanacak-62773 [accessed 12 February 2016].
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Where PKK adopts a Marxist view on violence, ISIS’s primary justification is a distorted version of
the concept of jihad. Its doctrine is based on extreme interpretations43 of selected parts of Quranic
verses and hadiths, ignoring Islamic protocols and limits to violence.44 Despite claiming that its
acts are based on Shariah law, the investigation-and-trial procedure is ignored and execution takes
place immediately. The current situation is interpreted as dar el-harb (state of war) and thus no
trial or discussion is believed necessary.45 The ultimate aim is a self-proclaimed caliphate which
will dominate the world.46 Slogans like “Respond to Allah and His Messenger” are used to try and
convince Muslims to respond to ISIS’s call for Jihad.47 The stages for founding a caliphate applied
by ISIS are based on that of al-Zarqawi and include the following steps: hijrah (attract migration),
jam’ah (group formation), taghut (rebellion), tamkin (consolidate territory) and finally khilafa or
the caliphate.48 Fighting is central to this process, wherein during every stage, shahadath or
martyrdom is possible and desired.
Indoctrination starts before joining ISIS, mostly online and through mosques, schools, conversation groups and even penitentiary institutions. After joining ISIS, obligatory courses on
radical Islamic thought, Shariah Law, and military training are provided depending on the recruit’s
background. The emphasis is on the “hear and obey” rule, which is formulated as follows: “the
caliphate of ISIS is not only a legitimate claim of political governance that all Muslims must
obey, but that it is a confirmation of the ‘glad things’ predicted by the Prophet of a system of rule
that will be based upon the ‘methodology of prophet hood (khilafa ‘ala minhaj al-nubuwaa)
towards the end of times.”49 These lines show that ISIS tries to push a political agenda by backing
it with religious arguments. Former Central Intelligence Agency operations officer and academic
Marc Sageman supports this finding with the following words: “Religion has a role but it is a role of
justification. To give themselves a bit more legitimacy, they use Islam as their justification. It’s not
about religion, it’s about identity.”50
Enemy creation
Whereas PKK uses distrust towards the Turkish government caused by human rights abuses
during the 1980s and 1990s and the lack of certain social rights, ISIS plays on the disgruntlement
of young discontent Muslims from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, including Europe.51
One of PKK’s main arguments for defending its reliance on arms is that there is a so-called
genocide going on against Kurds.52 However, it is the Turkish counterterrorism operations tar-
43 By radical clerics such as Sheikh Hussein bin Mahmoud.
44 Holbrook, “Using the Qur’an”; Mona Siddiqui, “Isis: a contrived ideology justifying barbarism and sexual control,” Guardian, 24
August 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/24/isis-ideology-islamic-militants-british-appeal-iraq-syria
[accessed 17 February 2016]; Ahmad Chehab, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (‘ISIS’) and the discourse of violence: justifying
beheadings,” preprint, submitted 15 December 2014, https://www.academia.edu/10100864/THE_ISLAMIC_STATE_OF_IRAQ_AND_SYRIA_ISIS_AND_THE_DISCOURSE_OF_VIOLENCE_JUSTIFYING_THE_ACT_OF_BEHEADING_UNDER_QURAN_AND_SUNNAH_PROOFS?auto=download; Spencer, “Harvard prof and Kerry
adviser.”
45 Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State.”
46 ISIS, “There is no Life Without Jihad” [Film], published 12 June 2014, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6a5_1403639105 [accessed 10
February 2016].
47 Anne Speckhard, “The Hypnotic Power of ISIS Imagery in Recruiting Western Youth,” International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism, 20 October 2015, http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-hypnotic-power-of-isis-imagery-in-recruiting-westernyouth/.
48 Ahmad Chehab, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: The Return of the Khilafa (Caliphate)?”, preprint, submitted 20 May 2015,
https://www.academia.edu/12782943/The_Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_Syria_ISIS_The_Return_of_the_Khilafa_Caliphate_
[accessed 19 February 2016].
49 Ibid. 9.
50 Mehdi Hasan, “How Islamic is Islamic State,” New Statesman, 10 March 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/
03/mehdi-hasan-how-islamic-islamic-state [accessed 22 February 2016].
51 Siddiqui, “Isis: a contrived ideology.”; “Wala’ and Bara versus American Racism,” Dabiq, August 2015, issue 11: 18–22.
52 Rêzan Çıyayî, “Ateşle Sınanmış Tarihten önemli Bir Sayfa: 30 Temmuz,” PKK Online, n.d., http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?
sys=article&artID=1198 [accessed 15 February 2016]; “Demokratik Özerklik ve Öz Savunma,” PKK Online, n.d., http://pkkonline.com/
tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=613 [accessed 10 February 2016].
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geting PKK structures, training camps, weapon depots and safe houses that are seen as genocide
against Kurds, as PKK sees itself as the embodiment of Kurds. Education is branded as “white
genocide,” where the attacks against schools and libraries are propagated as protection against
cultural rape and social genocide.53 These attacks against educational institutions will be mentioned further under utilitarian violence. The Turkish state is seen as colonial, and the legality of
the system is rejected.54 Where the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
government is blamed for being responsible for all evil, the security forces are pictured as “the
palace’s fighters” and counterterrorism operations as “Erdogan’s dirty war.” The use of “imperialist fascist TC”55 instead of referring to it as the Turkish state or security forces is an example of
how language is used to change perception, create enmity and facilitate the rejection of the
political system.
Besides genocide accusations, PKK also believes that there is an international conspiracy going on
against them.56 Members and sympathisers are indoctrinated to believe that this conspiracy is
organised by the “Turkish deep state” and the “imperialist powers” of the UK, Germany, the USA
and “NATO’s secret army Gladio.”57 Özcan58 cites the following from a Serxwebun article from
December 1999 related to the perceived international conspiracy: “America, England, Turkey,
Germany sat down, investigated, explored: ‘these humans [PKK activists] are like this...a person
[Öcalan] does everything, let’s catch him, then they grapple with one another. No sense of
executing party, politics, struggle, anything amongst them’ they said. Namely, they diagnosed all
these features of us, and dared to launch such an offensive against us, and by the strength, selfconfidence acquired from this [our state] they effected this fearless aggression against the
Leadership.”59 Öcalan, referring to the Vietnamese revolutionaries, states that the Kurdish revolution and PKK will play the leading role in the fight against capitalist imperialist Western powers
and the liberation of the Middle East.60
ISIS uses a similar semantic as PKK by portraying the operations against ISIS as a crusade against
Islam.61 It claims to use defensive jihad because the current conditions are seen as a threat for the
existence of Islam.62 Moreover, the bloody and barbaric actions are defended as a necessary evil
for the foundation of the new caliphate.63 Countries such as the USA, the UK, France, Israel and
Turkey are blamed for the collapse of the previous caliphate and as being the cause of all problems
in Muslim countries. Turkey is specifically seen as a Trojan horse and is blamed for the deformation of Islam and of Muslim identity.64 This enmity against these states is extrapolated to their
citizens, who are seen as guilty by association. In targeting these states, ISIS explicitly refers to the
Sykes-Picot Agreement that has shaped the region and, thus, the consequent problems. In a video
message, an ISIS militant states the following: “This is the so-called border of Sykes-Picot.
Alhamdulillah, we don’t recognise it and will never recognise it. Insha-Allah, this is not the first
border we will break; Insha-Allah, we will break all the borders also. As Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi
used to say, He is the breaker of barriers. Insha-Allah, we’ll break the barrier of Iraq, Jordan,
53 “Duran Kalkan: Öz savunma kazanacak, hem de çok büyük kazanacak.”
54 Suh, “PKK İdeoloji, Şiddet ve Meşruiyet.”
55 TC is used as an abbreviation for Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, Republic of Turkey.
56 Atakan Mahir, “Uluslararası Komplo Karşısında Direnen Önderlik Gerçeği Kazanmıştır,” PKK Online, n.d., http://www.pkkonline.
com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=231 [accessed 21 February 2016]; Feride Alkan, “PKK, Insanligin Kurtulus Umutlarini Buyutuyor,” PKK Online, n.d., http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=642 [accessed 14 February 2016].
57 Abdullah Öcalan, Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu (Manifestosu) (Cologne: Weşanen Serxwebun, 1993); Özcan, A theoretical analysis of
the PKK.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. 192.
60 Beşikçi, PKK Üzerine Düşünçeler.
61 “Reflection on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq, October 2014, issue 4; “Conspiracy theory Shirk,” Dabiq, May 2015, issue 9.
62 Spencer, “Harvard prof and Kerry adviser”; Speckhard, “The Hypnotic Power.”
63 Ibid.
64 Al Hayat Media Centre, “Turkey and the Fire of Nationalism” [Film], 2015, https://videos.files.wordpress.com/G3jijkH9/the-islamicstate-22turkey-and-the-fire-of-nationalism22_dvd.mp4 [accessed 10 February 2016].
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Lebanon, all the countries, Insha-Allah. Until we reach Quds [Jeruzalem], Insha-Allah.” “We’re
going to come to Quds, and pray in the Masjid [Al-Aqsa Mosque] Insha-Allah, the first Qibla of
the Muslims.”65 Likewise, PKK declares that it does not recognise the current borders in the
following message: “Our people are the same, we do not recognise any borders or boundaries.
Amude is Nusaybin, Cizre, Diyarbakir. We will abolish the rotten borders.”66
Besides enmity against non-Muslims, ISIS is also engaged in takfiri practices, which includes “the
right to label other Muslims, to whom they object, ‘unbelievers’ and exterminate all those who do
not adhere to their own extremist ideology.”67 Muslims opposing ISIS are labelled as infidels and
apostates, whereas non-Muslims are branded as khafirs. This classification is based on the concept
of “al-wala wal bara” (loyalty and disavowal), which is interpreted by ISIS as “all Muslims are
required to exclusively ally themselves only with other Muslims and thereby disassociate from
others (with failure to do so constituting disbelief), a strong rejection of nationalism and the idea
of territorial boundaries; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes disbelief
(kufr).”68
Similar to ISIS’s position against oppositional Muslims, PKK sees Kurds who do not support PKK
as a threat. Kurdish and leftist groups not supporting PKK are marked as agent provocateurs,
collaborators, traitors, and thus as legitimate targets.69 PKK blocks all forms of opposition and
critique by stating that “The Leadership [Öcalan] is a proven and real fact that cannot be questioned.”70 Violence against opponents is enforced by sloganised sentences such as “Punishing
traitors is a responsibility towards martyrs” and “They died because of their betrayal.”
A critical remark concerning the Syrian conflict where both groups are involved is that both PKK
and ISIS build upon each other through a protagonist-antagonist relation. Both organisations
benefit from depicting each other as an enemy. Where PKK gains support in the international
arena for its fight against ISIS,71 ISIS gains support in local circles and Muslim communities for its
fight against the Marxist–Leninist PKK depicted as atheist.72 This complicates the situation where
supporting and/or fighting one of these organisations always enforces the other side.
Identity politics
Where PKK tries to create an identity primarily based on revolutionary resistance, ISIS spotlights
the Muslim collective identity and the honour of fighting for Islam and to fall martyr on the path of
Allah.73
Identity and identification with a mysterious and powerful imagined political community plays a
major role for ISIS recruits.74 Religion and the individual obligation to help fellow Muslims has a
marking role that defines their identity. Lost individuals become one community bound with
religious ties fighting for a higher cause, reaching the highest religious level possible if they fall
during battle. Recruits vary from local discontented civilians and military to foreign converts to
65 Al-Hayat, “End of the Sykes-Picot Agreement” [Film], added 29 June 2014, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d43_1404046312
[accessed 10 February 2016].
66 “PYD/YPG declaring war on Turkey in Syria’s Amude, hometown of Ankara bomber” [Film], YouTube, added 19 February 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yob0N6GCKIc.
67 Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State.”
68 Chehab, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: The Return of the Khilafa (Caliphate)?.” 9; “Wala’ and Bara versus American Racism.”
69 Çıyayî, “Ateşle Sınanmış Tarihten Önemli Bir Sayfa.”
70 “34. PKK Yılında Parti Tarihinden Dersler -2-”, PKK Online, n.d., http://www.pkkonline.net/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=1348
[accessed 13 February 2016].
71 “Cemil Bayik: an interview with Turkey’s most wanted man” [Film], BBC News, 25 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-36081182, [accessed 25 March 2016].
72 “You think they are together, but their hearts are divided,” Dabiq, November 2015, issue 12.
73 Speckhard, “The Hypnotic Power.”
74 Hasan, “How Islamic is Islamic State.”
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Islam or radicalised young people with a criminal background. ISIS promises them a new life with
the slogan “Sometimes people with the worst pasts create the best future.”
Similar to Sageman, former MI6 officer Richard Barrett says that the primary motive for joining
ISIS has “mostly to do with the search for identity coupled with a search for belonging and
purpose. The Islamic State offers all that and empowers the individual within a collective. It does
not judge and accepts all with no concern about their past. This can be very appealing for people
who think they washed up on the wrong shore.”75
In contrast to ISIS, PKK bases its identity creation primarily on Marxist rhetoric and secondarily
as a reaction to the oppression of the Kurdish identity. This process starts with PKK defining itself.
Reber Apo (leader Apo) is given a messianic role where “PKK — in the personification of the
Leader [Öcalan] — is a spirit, a consciousness, an identity, perseverance to fight, to unveil its
own values and live up freely to all sorts of genocide and assimilation” and “a new way of life
and the representation of morality,”76 according to which “All weaknesses and obscurantisms can
only be overcome by internalising PKK’s identity and the Apocu morality.”77 Öcalan claims that
“the first bullet shot by a militant is symbol for the rebirth as a heroic warrior” and that “it ends
the enslavement, meek character and loss of identity” of that person.78
Another aspect that plays a role in identity politics used by both organisations is the responsibility
argument towards past and future generations. In his earlier writings, Öcalan wrote that rebellion
is one of the inheritances of Kurds since history. Support for PKK’s acts is seen as a responsibility
for the legacy of martyrs and a debt to future generations formulated as “the martyrs have showed
and taught us how we must fight” and as “a debt to the Kemal Pir’s, Beritan’s, Agit’s and Zilan’s,
Andrea Wolf’s and other heroes who are the pride of Kurdish people.”79 The suicide terrorists of
the Ankara attacks, Seher Cagla Demir and Abdulkadir Somer, who killed 67 and injured 186
people, were commemorated in PKK’s so-called cultural centres in European states and autonomous regions in Syria.80 ISIS makes similar references to numerous Mujahidin killed in action or
attacks, from Afghanistan and Iraq to the suicide terrorists who died in the Paris and Brussels
attacks. Imagery of martyrs with added slogans such as “We haven’t forgotten” are published
regularly on ISIS magazines and social media. The terrorists of the Paris and Brussels attacks were
glorified in many videos and ISIS magazines.81 Special editions were printed to propagandise these
last attacks.
Rational use
Examination of PKK and ISIS shows that the use of violence has also a utilitarian facet. Members
are convinced by rational argumentation that violence is necessary to satisfy organisational needs,
achieve tactical and strategic objectives or block the adversary from implementing certain policies.
This section briefly discusses the needs, objectives and methods used related to utilitarian justification.
First, there is the aspect of satisfying certain feelings such as revenge and anger. For ISIS, this is
specifically the case for the execution of hostages and ISIS militants accused of espionage. Additionally, former ISIS members state that brutal violence is believed to be necessary in order to
75 Ibid.
76 Alkan, “PKK, Insanligin Kurtulus Umutlarini Buyutuyor”; Özcan, A theoretical analysis of the PKK.
77 Duran Kalkan, “Parti Demek…,” PKK Online, n.d., http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=637 [accessed 13
February 2016].
78 Beşikçi, PKK Üzerine Düşünçeler.
79 Alkan, “PKK, Insanligin Kurtulus Umutlarini Buyutuyor.”
80 “PYD Ankara katliamcisini poster yapti,” Günes, 7 April 2016, http://www.gunes.com/Gundem/pyd-ankara-katliamcisini-posteryapti-677794 [accessed 29 April 2016].
81 “Isis releases propaganda video celebrating the Brussels attacks,” Independent, 25 March 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/isis-releases-propaganda-video-celebrating-brussels-attacks-terror-terrorism-bombings-a6952791.html [accessed 29
April 2016].
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minimise casualties later.82 Besides that, the show-off of violence and power has a deterrent effect
and thus makes it easier to control local populations and encourages them to join ISIS for protection and to keep life bearable.83 Furthermore, it makes it easier to quickly gain control of
political, economic and social infrastructures.84 They sloganise this as “When deeds speak, words
are nothing” and “As soon as we picked up the gun, they started to listen.”85 Economic needs are
partly satisfied by robbing victims, seizing materials and ransoming money for hostages, where
using violence is a normal way of working.86 Video messages show ISIS militants showing off with
seized weapons, vehicles and other materials, whilst stating that they are “waiting to take more
ganimeh [captured materials from the enemy]. We have helicopters, we have planes, we have
cameras.”87 Besides direct plundering, violence is also used as deterrence to get ransom money for
hostages. ISIS magazines such as Dabiq and Konstantiniyye are used to offer hostages “for sale.”88
The brutal killings of previous hostages are used as a trump card during possible negotiations. The
same magazines also include references to the necessity of armed control of regions for food
security and availability of commodities.
Similar to ISIS’s robberies, PKK’s attack preparation reports and articles concerning PKK actions
show that attacks also have the aim of plundering and stealing weapons, equipment and valuable
possessions such as jewellery, money, medications, and vehicles. A tragic example is the carjacking
attempt by PKK on 20 September 2011, in Siirt, where four Kurdish young women were executed
because they refused to stop. Weapons are also used for the extortion of civilians to provide money
and support. The so-called “revolutionary taxes” are not limited to Turkey only but are collected in
Europe. Many examples of court proceedings in European countries and a Stratfor (Strategic
Forecasting, Inc., USA) report leaked on Wikileaks89 show that, furthermore, PKK is also involved
in narcotics, blackmailing and arms smuggling where the possession of weapons and use of violence plays to their advantage.
Besides using violence for their own economic benefits, these groups see the use of violence as a
legitimate tool to create economic damage.90 This damage is not limited to the victim countries but
affects the whole region.91 The Paris and Brussels attacks have cost millions of euros in losses for
the local and regional economies, as well as in investments in new security measures.92 Corresponding damage to communal psychology has more dramatic consequences.
Additionally, analysis of ISIS and PKK attacks shows that these groups aim to provoke
overreaction of security forces, create polarisation in the community and intensify tensions.
Whether they are successful or not in achieving these objectives is a matter that needs further
82 Pamela Engel, “How ISIS fighters justify their brutal tactics,” Business Insider UK, 23 November 2015, http://uk.businessinsider.com/
how-isis-fighters-justify-brutality-2015-11?r=US&IR=T.
83 Engel, “How ISIS fighters justify their brutal tactics”; Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic
State.”
84 Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State.”
85 Speckhard, “The Hypnotic Power.”
86 Speckhard and Yayla, “Eyewitness accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State.”
87 Al-Hayat, “End of the Sykes-Picot Agreement”.
88 Nicole Rojas, “Isis magazine Dabiq offers Norwegian and Chinese prisoners ‘for sale,’” International Business Times, 10 September
2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-magazine-dabiq-offers-norwegian-chinese-prisoners-sale-1519150 [accessed 1 May 2016].
89 “PKK’s funding operation and methods,” Stratfor document released on WikiLeaks on 15 November 2013, https://wikileaks.org/
gifiles/docs/62/62532_pkk-document-.html [accessed 1 May 2016].
90 Andrew R. Sorkin, “The Hidden Costs of Terrorism,” New York Times, 16 November 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/
business/dealbook/the-fallout-from-attacks-is-measured-in-more-than-stock-markets.html?_r=0 [accessed 2 May 2016]; Sadi Özdemir, “Terror costs 1.2 trillion liras to Turkish economy,” Daily News, 1 March 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/terror-costs12-trillion-liras-to-turkish-economy.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79019&NewsCatID=344 [accessed 1 May 2016].
91 Tom DiChristopher, “Brussels attack could affect cross-border commerce, Brexit,” CNBC, 22 March 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/
03/22/brussels-attack-could-affect-cross-border-commerce-brexit.html [accessed 1 May 2016]; “Pipeline sabotaged by PKK costing
KRG $14m a day in losses: minister,” Rudaw, 23 February 2016, http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/230220165 [accessed 1 May
2016].
92 Andrew Walker, “Paris attacks: Assessing the economic impact,” BBC News, 2 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business34965000 [accessed 1 May 2016].
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exploration. However, certain trends of polarisation and overreaction are observable in European
states and Turkey.
It is generally known that one of the main objectives of terrorists is propaganda. PKK attack
evaluation reports show that attacks are organised in such a way so that propaganda can be made
at the maximum level.93 In line with that, both ISIS and PKK members tell in their own publications that the application and participation of new recruits is at its highest when violent attacks
take place.94 The capability and the actual use of violence is also seen as a way of showing force and
humiliating the opponent. Exhibition of dead bodies and destructed enemy assets serves this goal
partially.
Besides these, PKK has a more particular utilitarian tactic of damaging infrastructure with specific
objectives. There are thousands of examples in which PKK tries to disrupt daily life and the
implementation of government policies by damaging infrastructure such as schools, hospitals,
roads, energy infrastructure, factories and work sites.95 PKK members believe that by targeting
these infrastructures, they can convince the public that the state has no control over certain areas
and create the impression that the government is not providing basic needs. Another reason why
hospitals are targeted is to provide injured PKK militants with medical care. Disrupting education
by attacking schools makes it easier for PKK to recruit new members and prevent the government
from implementing antiradicalisation policies.96
Conclusion
This brief analysis shows how even ideologically different organisations can have quite similar
features in their justification of their use of violence. Most terrorist organisations accept violence
as the only reliable option to push their political agenda. This can be because of the lack of
democratic representation or the lack of public support for the cause and, in extreme situations,
even the rejection of the democratic governance system. The two organisations analysed reject the
Western model of the nation-state and democratic governance and opt for an independent state
under their total control, namely, the Islamic State under the control of the caliphate and an
independent Marxist–Leninist state, Kurdistan, under the total control of PKK.
The need for justification arises from the fact that most people have to be persuaded to accept the
use of violence as an acceptable method. In these days especially when Muslim scholars and
Kurdish intellectuals reject violence, both organisations feel the need for a stronger justification of
their acts.
Doctrinal justification plays a crucial role in shaping the opinions of members, sympathisers and
the broader public, and makes the rightfulness of violence unquestionable. Remarkably, where the
internal and external communication of doctrinal justifications by ISIS is the same, PKK —
depending on the situation — prefers to make a distinction. Certain aspects are concealed from the
broader public where others, such as the “victim/self-defence” arguments are highlighted.
Fundamental to doctrinal justification for both organisations is the enemy creation aspect,
according to which an external enemy is blamed for everything, put forward in the form of
conspiracy theories. Simultaneously, a process of identity creation takes place, enabling a new
93 Mahsum Korkmaz, “Eruh Baskını ve HRK’nin İlanı: Yeni Bir Dönemin Başlangıcı,” PKK Online, n.d., 22 August 1984, http://
pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=508 [accessed 14 February 2016].
94 Güner, “PKK’nın Devrimci Şiddetinin Kürt Ezilenlerini Kazanması Üzerine.”
95 “PKK hits hospital again in mortar attack in Turkey’s southeastern town of Cizre,” Daily Sabah, 9 November 2015, http://www.
dailysabah.com/nation/2015/11/09/pkk-hits-hospital-again-in-mortar-attack-in-turkeys-southeastern-town-of-cizre [accessed 2 May
2016]; “PKK terrorists burn down public school in Turkey’s southeastern Van,” Daily Sabah, 10 April 2016, http://www.dailysabah.
com/nation/2016/04/10/pkk-terrorists-burn-down-public-school-in-turkeys-southeastern-van [accessed 2 May 2016].
96 Bünyamin Atıcı and Çetin Gümüş, “Bireylerin teror hareketlerine katilim durumlari ile egitim duzeyleri arasindaki iliski,” presented at
Turkiye’nin guvenligi sempozyumu (Firat Universitesi Elazig, 17-19 October 2001).
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group identity to be created by the organisation, in order to hold people together and to make them
more susceptible to justify violence. During both processes, existing social, economic, and political
disgruntlement is utilised.
Additionally, in-group justification for utilitarian purposes takes place, mainly in the form of
economic damage and disruption of daily life in order to damage and block the implementation of
government policies.
The danger of accepting the justification of violence for a certain purpose is that it increases the
susceptibility to enlarge the scope of justification. This brings us to the current situation wherein
ISIS justifies sexual violence and slavery and PKK sees drug trafficking and providing illegal
weapons to other terrorist groups as acceptable. Keeping this in mind, lobbying attempts to
tolerate certain types of violence or exempt certain organisations from the definition of terrorism
should be dealt cautiously, as it will have a much larger effect than intended on the likelihood of
terrorist attacks and international counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, it could give the wrong
message that some political objectives can justify the killing of innocents, whereas others do not.
Funding sources
Not applicable.
Conflict of Interests
Emin Daskin declares that he has no conflict of interest.
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