Download Country Report South Korea - V-Dem

INSTITUTE
COUNTRY BRIEF
South Korea
Frida Andersson
Valeriya Mechkova
June 2016
Country Brief
SERIES 2016:10
THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE
Please address comments and/or queries for information to:
V-Dem Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711
SE 40530 Gothenburg
Sweden
E-mail: [email protected]
V-Dem Country Briefs are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.
Copyright © 2016 University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.
V-Dem Data Brief
South Korea
About V-Dem
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing andmeasuring
democracy. V-Dem’s multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges the
complexityoftheconceptofdemocracy.TheV-Demprojectdistinguishesamongfivehigh-level
principlesofdemocracy:electoral,liberal,participatory,deliberative,andegalitarian,whichare
disaggregatedintolower-levelcomponentsandspecificindicators.
KeyfeaturesofV-Dem:
•
•
•
Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-level components of
democracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, and
genderequality,consistingofmorethan400distinctandpreciseindicators;
Coversallcountriesanddependentterritoriesfrom1900tothepresentandprovidesan
estimateofmeasurementreliabilityforeachrating;
Makesallratingspublic,freeofcharge,throughauser-friendlyinterface.
WithfourPrincipalInvestigators,twoProjectCoordinators,fifteenProjectManagers,morethan
thirtyRegionalManagers,almost200CountryCoordinators,severalAssistantResearchers,and
approximately2,600CountryExperts,theV-Demprojectisoneofthelargest-eversocialscience
data collection projects with a database of over 15 million data points. The database makes
highlydetailedanalysisofvirtuallyallaspectsofdemocracyinacountry,whilealsoallowingfor
summarycomparisonsbetweencountriesbasedonaggregatedindicesfordifferentdimensions
ofdemocracy.UsersfromanywhereareabletousetheV-Demonlineanalysistoolswhichcan
be found at the project’s website. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can benefit
from the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such as
selectingcountryprogrampriorities,informingprogramdesignsandmonitoringimpactoftheir
programs.
Methodology:
Unlikeextantdatacollectionprojects,whichtypicallyuseasmallgroupofexpertswhorateall
countriesoraskasingleexperttocodeonecountry,theV-Demprojecthasrecruitedover2,600
localandcross-nationalexpertstoprovidejudgmentsonvariousindicatorsaboutdemocracy.
The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sources
about constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions that
require evaluation.Experts’ratingsareaggregatedthroughanadvancedstatisticalmodelthat
takesintoaccountthepossibilitiesthatexpertsmaymakemistakesandhavedifferentscalesin
mind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - are
recruitedtocalibratethescalesofestimatescross-nationally1.
1ForfurtherdetailsandinformationabouttheV-Demmethodology,seehttp://v-dem.net.
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V-Dem Data Brief
South Korea
South Korea
Introduction
This V-Dem data brief illustrates the democratic development of South Korea from 1900 to
2014.ThepurposeistoprovideaconciseoverviewoftheV-DemdatacollectedforSouthKorea.
The historical development of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - electoral, liberal,
egalitarian, deliberative and participatory – is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the
female rights index. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components and
detailedindicatorsofthemainprinciplesofdemocracy2.Weanticipatethatthisbriefwillbea
usefulresourceforpolicy-makers,practitionersandcitizen-leddemocracyassessments.
South Korea officially declared its independence on 13 August 1948, and two days later the
countrywasformallyestablished.ThecountrywasunderJapaneserulefrom1910until1945
whenJapanwasdefeatedinWorldWarII.FollowingtheJapaneseoccupation,thecountrywas
dividedwiththeUnitedStatesadministeringinthesouthandtheSovietUnioninthenorth,in
accordance with a United Nations arrangement. Due to disagreement between the two
countries,twoseparategovernmentswereestablishedin1948andbothgovernmentsdeclared
themselves as the legitimate and true government over the whole country. Following the
KoreanWar,thetwogovernmentsturnedintowhatweconsidertobeNorthandSouthKorea
today.
ThehistoryofSouthKoreaischaracterizedbyalternatingdemocraticandautocraticperiodsof
rule. The country’s governments are numbered from the First Republic to the current Sixth
Republicandvarygreatlyintheirlevelsofdemocracy.
The First Republic was initially largely democratic, but became increasingly autocratic over
time.
TheSecondRepublicofferedahighlevelofdemocracy,butwasoverthrownbytheautocratic
militaryregimewithinayearoftakingpower.ThefollowingThird,Fourth,andFifthRepublics
were seemingly democratic, but they were generally regarded as extensions of military rule.
AgradualdemocraticstabilizationistakingplaceduringthecurrentruleoftheSixthRepublic.
Principles of Democracy
The radar chart below in Figure 1, offers a quick overview of the five V-Dem indices of
democracy in South Korea at four different points in time: 1905, 1950, 1995 and 2014. All
indicesinthefigurerangefrom0to1,whereascoreof0suggeststhatacountrydidnotevince
thecharacteristicsofdemocracyrelevanttothisparticularindexatthispointintime,while1
correspondstothebestpossiblesituationforthisindex,accordingtotheV-Demmeasures.
In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental and
understood as an essential element of the other principles of representative democracy –
liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian; without it, we cannot call a regime
“democratic”. However, we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”, without
being democracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for all high-level principles of
democracy include the measure of electoral democracy. Thus, for example, “Participatory
Democracy”isacompositescoreoftheelectoralandtheparticipatorycomponents.
Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices
2AllindicatorsandindicescanbefoundinGlossaryofTermsinAppendixI.Foranoverviewofthestructureofthe
indices,pleaseseeAppendixII.
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South Korea
Electoral
Democracy
Egalitarian
Democracy
1
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0
Liberal
Democracy
1905
1950
Deliberative
Democracy
Participatory
Democracy
1995
2014
20th
In the beginning of the
century, the level of democracy in South Korea is nearly nonexistent with scores of 0 on all five high-level indices. A certain degree of democratic
development, mainly in terms of the electoral aspect, takes place between 1905 and 1950.
Deliberative and participatory democracy, on the other hand, have not experienced much
change when one looks at the scores in 1905 and 1950. The largest democratic enhancement
acrossallindicescanbenotedwhencomparing1950to1995.Thecountryachievesscoresof
almost .8 in terms of electoral and egalitarian democracy, suggesting that rulers are generally
being held responsible by their citizens through electoral competition, that political and civil
society organizations are able to operate freely, and that there is freedom of expression. In
addition,thedistributionofpoliticalpoweracrosssocialgroupsislargelyequal.
The liberal democracy score increases from .2 in 1950 to.6 in 1995, and the deliberative
democracy score from around 0 to .6. Hence, the protection of individual and minority rights
against the “tyranny of the state” and public deliberation between political elites and the
citizens have advanced, although there is still room for improvement. The country is least
democratic in the participatory sense, where a score of only .5 is achieved in 1995. The
participatoryprincipleofdemocracyreflectstheactiveparticipationbycitizensinallpolitical
processes,electoralandnon-electoral.Nosubstantialimprovementshavetakenplacebetween
1995and2014.
InFigure2below,welookfurtherintotheaforementionedindicesandgraphthecomponents
that go into the five higher level principles indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal,
egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The development of these components in
South Korea over more than one hundred years is displayed together with the female rights
index3.
3Thescaleofeachindexandindicatorisspecifiedwithinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.Inallindicators
and indices graphed, a lower score corresponds to a less democratic level, while a higher score suggests a more
democraticlevel.PleaseseeAppendixIformoreinformationoneachoftheindicatorsandindices.
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The democracy components in Figure 2, reflect a rather volatile development in South Korea
overtime.However,afewgeneraltrendsareevident.Thefirstlargeimprovementintermsof
democraticdevelopmenttakesplaceinrelationtoindependencefromJapanin1948,wherea
significant improvement is noticed among the different components, although to varying
extents.Thelargestchangetakesplaceintermsofegalitarian,electoralandliberaldemocracy.
Great enhancement in terms of female rights is also evident. Improvements in terms of public
deliberationandpoliticalparticipationaremoregradualovertime.
Anotherspike,reflectedinmanyofthecomponents,takesplacein1959-1960,markingtheend
of the First Republic and the beginning of the Second Republic. The more democratic Second
Republicisonlyinplaceforlessthanayear,explainingthedropthatfollowedforthecountry
acrossmanyofthecomponents.
Inthemid-tolate1980sasteepdemocraticimprovementcanbeseenacrossallcomponents.
This reflects a period in which millions of citizens, mainly students, carried out massive antigovernment protests as part of the June Democracy Movement in 1987. This was the same
monththatthegovernmentannouncedtheDeclarationofPoliticalReforms,includingacallfor
direct presidential elections and a respect of civil rights. Later that same year a referendum
approvedarevisedconstitutionanddirectpresidentialelectionswereheld.Atthispoint,andin
thefewyearsthatfollowed,evenintothe90s,SouthKoreareached.8oraboveinalldemocracy
components,exceptfortheparticipatorywhichpresentsascoreof.6.Sincetheendofthe90s,
thecountryhasremainedonapproximatelythesamelevelsacrossallcomponents.
Inordertotrackdownmorespecificaspectswithinthesevariousdemocraticdevelopments,we
furtherexploreeachofthesixcomponentsofdemocracytotakeacloserlookattheindicators
andindicesconstitutingthem.
The Electoral Component
The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of making rulers
responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during
periodicelections;whetherpoliticalandcivilsocietyorganizationscanoperatefreely;whether
electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;andwhetherthechief
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executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections. Figure 3 displays
thefoursub-indicesthatconstitutetheelectoralcomponentindex.
The indices in Figure 3, display a volatile development over time during a period of political
instabilityreflectedinthedata.
Thefirstgeneralelections,bothtotheConstitutionalAssemblyandtothepresidentialpostafter
theJapanesecolonization,areheldin1948.Asreflectedabove,theelectionsintroduceuniversal
suffrageandthedirectelectionofapresidentbythepeople.Thecleanelectionsindex,however,
suggeststhattheseelections,andtheonesthatfollowedoverthenext30years,wereplagued
byregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,governmentintimidationoftheopposition,vote
buying, and election violence. Just before and during independence, a substantial increase
occurredintermsofextendedfreedomofassociation,indicatingthatparties,includingparties
oftheopposition,wereallowedtoorganizeandtoparticipateinelectionstoalargerextentthan
before, and that civil society organizations could organize and operate more freely within the
society.
For the 1960 presidential election allegations were made that the election results had been
manipulated and that widespread corruption was occurring. This led to the protests that
developed into the April Revolution. The election was annulled, and the incumbent president
went into exile while the First Republic collapsed. Although the Second Republic was more
democraticinnature,itwasshort-livedandfollowedbymilitaryrulebetween1961and1963.
Theeventsofpoliticalinstabilityaredisplayedinthefreedomofassociationindex,whichshows
a significant drop before bouncing back to the middle of the scale. Further political turmoil
followed the 1971 elections, in which the re-elected incumbent president Park Chung-hee
declaredastateofemergencypartlyduetothethreatoftheoppositiongainingthemostseats.
He further opened up for a reunification with North Korea, which was never implemented,
dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the country’s constitution. When this kind of
periodofinstabilityoccurs,itdecreasesthequalityofelections,freedomofassociationandthe
directelectionoftheexecutive.
After1980,stabilityandasharpimprovementintermsoffreedomofassociationtakeplaceand
thecountryreachesascoreofover.8.Since1980,theexecutivehasalsobeendirectlyelected.
Duringthe90s,electionsbecameincreasinglyfreeandfair,andbytheturnofthecentury,the
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countryhadreachedascoreof.9onthescale.Aslightdownwardtrendhastakenplaceplacein
recentyearsandcouldbesomethingtokeepaneyeoninthefuture.
The Liberal Component
The liberal dimension of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and
minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the state.” This is achieved through
constitutionally protected civil liberties and strong rule of law, and effective checks and
balancesbythejudiciaryandthelegislaturewhichlimittheuseofexecutivepower.
Theliberaldemocracycomponent,displayedinFigure4,includesthreeindices:equalitybefore
thelawandindividualliberty,legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive,andjudicialconstraintson
theexecutive.Thethreeindicesfollowasimilardevelopmentovertime,yetondifferentlevels.
Following independence, the judicial equality and individual liberty for South Korean citizens
have increased substantially. Laws have become increasingly transparent and rigorously
enforced,publicadministrationhasbecomemoreimpartial,andcitizensenjoyalargerdegree
of access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement,
physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. Similarly, the executive respects the
constitutionmore,andcomplieswithcourtrulingstoalargerextent,andthejudiciaryisableto
act
in
a
more
independent
fashion.
The legislative constraints on the executive captures the extent to which it is capable of
questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive. Data exists from 1948
whenthelegislaturewasestablished.
The country experiences an increase in all three indices in 1960, marking the transition from
the First Republic to the Second Republic. The drop right afterwards is a consequence of the
militaryrulewhichfollowedtheshortlivedSecondRepublic.Atthatpoint,theconstraintonthe
executivebythelegislativeandjudiciarywasbasicallynon-existent.
Following the efforts towards democratizations by the June Democracy Movement during the
late 1980s, the country experienced great improvements in all three aspects of liberal
democracy.Sincethen,thecountryhasscoredabove.8onallindices.
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The Participatory Component
The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and active
participationbycitizensinallpoliticalprocesses;itemphasizesnon-electoralformsofpolitical
participationthroughsuchchannelsascivilsocietyorganizationsandthroughthemechanism
of direct democracy. Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that compose the participatory
democracycomponent.
Figure 5 displays the indices that make up the participatory democracy component, which
scoresthelowestcomparedtotheotherdimensionsinthefirsttwofigures.Forparticipatory
democracy,thescoresofthedifferentindicatorsvaryfromnearthebottomofthescaletothe
top,indicatingthat,inSouthKorea,someparticipatoryaspectsofdemocracyaremuchstronger
thanothers.
The country has received low scores on the direct popular vote index throughout the century,
suggestingthatinstitutionalizedprocessesbywhichcitizensregistertheirchoiceoropinionon
specificissuesintheformofreferendumsandplebiscitesarenearlynon-existent.
Civilsocietyparticipationhasbeenverylimited,historically,evenafterindependence.Notuntil
thelate80sdidthecitizensofSouthKoreabecomeinvolvedincivilsocietyorganizations.After
the June Democracy Movement an increase in participation followed, leading almost to a top
scoreof1.
The country’s historically low scores on the local government and the regional government
indicessuggestthattheidealofdirectlyelectedsub-nationalbodiesautonomousfromunelected
actors was far from achieved prior to the 90s. However, today it has been partly attained,
althoughcertainlimitationsoftheirautonomypersist.
The Deliberative Component
The deliberative component of democracy captures the core value that political decisions are
guidedbythepursuitofthepublicgoodandshouldbeinformedbyrespectfulandreasonable
dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial
interests,orcoercion.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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Note, that the indicators displayed in Figures 6, 7 and 8 have different scales, which are
specifiedinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.
Public deliberation in South Korea, presented in Figure 6, has been very limited historically,
andwhenthecountrygainedindependencethisdidnotchange.Thewaveofdemocratizationin
the late 80s, however, did indeed have positive effects on the quality and inclusiveness of the
publicdialogueofthecountry.
Oneofthelargestimprovementstakesplaceintermsofthebreadthoftherangeofconsultation
whenimportantdecisionsaremadeatelitelevels.Beforethechange,consultationincludedonly
groupsloyaltotherulingelite,whereaslater,italsobegantoincludeaselectrangeofsociety,
laborandbusinessrepresentatives.
Anotherchangeoccurssurroundingtheextenttowhichpoliticalelitesjustifytheirpositionsin
terms of the common good when important policy changes are discussed. Prior to the 1980s
justifications were offered in terms of specific business, party or constituency interests rather
than in terms of the common good. Since then, justifications have been based on explicit
statements of the common good, for the most part, which benefit society as a whole. This is
indicatedbyascoreofcloseto4forthecommongoodmeasure.
A crucial aspect of public deliberation is the engagement of the society. Before the revolution,
thepublicbelowtheelitelevelswerealmostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesor
unabletotakepartinthem.Followingthemovementtowardsdemocratization,deliberationhas
becomeactivelyencouraged.Arelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elitegroupsoftenparticipatein
thediscussions,asreflectedbytheengagedsocietyindicator.
Assuggestedbytherespectforcounterargumentsindicator,thedevelopmenthasbeenslowerin
terms of political elites acknowledging and respecting counterarguments, since they tend to
acknowledge the arguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about
them.
ThelowestscoreforSouthKoreaintermsofpublicdeliberationisforthereasonedjustification
indicator,reflectingthatelitestendtoofferonesinglesimplereasonwhenjustifyingwhythey
expect proposed policies to have positive outcomes, rather than offering a more nuanced and
completejustificationfortheirdecisions.Itisinterestingthatthehighestlevelofdeliberationis
reached around the turn of the century, whereas public deliberation actually decreases a few
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V-Dem Data Brief
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years later. This suggests the possibility that the country could be facing some challenges in
termsofdeliberativedemocracy.
The Egalitarian Component
The egalitarian idea is one in which material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual
exerciseofformalrightsandliberties;henceamoreequaldistributionofresources,education,
andhealthacrosssocioeconomicgroupsshouldenhancepoliticalequality.
Figure7showstheeightindicatorswhichcomposetheegalitariandemocracycomponent.Asis
evidentfromthefigure,thedevelopmentsofthedifferentegalitarianindicatorsinSouthKorea
varygreatlyovertime.
Socialgroupequalityforcivilliberties(orangeline)ishistoricallyhighand,accordingtoitsscore
ofcloseto4,membersofallsocialgroupshaveenjoyedthesamelevelofcivillibertiessincethe
late1980s.
The country experienced significant improvements in power distributed by social group (black
line)andeducationalequality(blueline)followingtheendoftheJapaneseoccupationandthe
move towards independence in the mid-40s. The country achieved the highest level of
educationalequalityin1990,asthedatasuggeststhatlessthanfivepercentofSouthKoreans
facechallengesinexercisingtheirbasicrightsasadultcitizensduetoalowqualityofeducation.
The country reached a score above three in the power distributed by social group indicator,
which indicates that either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups
havingmorepowerthanothers,orthatdifferentsocialgroupsalternateinpower.
Equality in terms of health develops more gradually over time, as is evident in the health
equality indicator (purple line). In the 90s the country reached a level of equal healthcare
quality. The score of 4 indicates that the share of South Korean citizens who cannot exercise
theirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensduetoalackofaccesstogood,qualityhealthcareis
lessthanfivepercent.
The end of the more autocratic First Republic in 1960 seems to have had the largest positive
influenceonpowerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(redline)andparticularisticorpublic
goods(yellowline).Thedevelopmentofamoreequalpowerdistributionbetweenthewealthy
andthepoor,however,slowsdownandendsupwithascorebelow3in2014,suggestingthat
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wealthy people still enjoy much more political power than the average citizen or the poorer
population.
Aquitediscretedownwardtrendcanbeseeninthefigure,suggestingthatthecountrymightbe
movingtowardsaslightlylessequalpowerdistributioninthisaspect.
Theparticularisticorpublicgoodsindicatormeasureswhethermostpublicexpenditurestarget
specificgroups,partiesorcorporations,orthesocietyasawhole.Accordingtothefigure,social
and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods
programs.Sincetheturnofthecentury,mostsocialandinfrastructureexpenditureshavebeen
public-goodsbutasignificantportionisparticularistic.
Acloselyrelatedaspectofequalityismeasuredbytheindicatormeans-testedvs.universalistic
(light blue line). It captures whether welfare programs are means-tested (e.g. cash-transfer
programs) or benefit all members of society (e.g education, national healthcare schemes, and
retirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefit
everyone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged groups, such as poor people, are more
democratic from an egalitarian perspective than means-tested programs which only target
these
particular
groups.
ThedevelopmenttowardsmoreuniversalisticwelfareprogramsinSouthKoreahasbeenrather
sluggish,withthegreatestenhancementtakingplacefollowingtherevolution.Inrecentyears,
the country has received a score of close to 4, suggesting that most welfare state policies are
universalistic,althoughasignificantportionisstillmeans-tested.
Thedistributionofpowerbygender(greenline)istheaspectofequalityinwhichSouthKorea
performs the worst, reflected by a score between 2 and 3 which indicates that men still have
morepoliticalpowerthanwomen.
Female Rights
Equality between women and men is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadly
recognizedasapre-conditionfortrulyrepresentativeandresponsivegovernments.TheV-Dem
female rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in the open discussion of
politicalissues,toparticipateincivilsocietyorganizations,thefreedomofmovement,theright
toprivateproperty,theaccesstojustice,thefreedomfromforcedlabor,andanequalsharein
the overall distribution of power. Figure 8 displays the seven indicators that constitute this
indexforSweden.
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The female rights index is comprised of seven distinct indicators, included in Figure 8.
The different aspects of female rights are strengthened at different points in time.
The independence from Japan resulted in top level scores in terms of property rights (yellow
line) and the freedom from forced labor for women (orange line). Virtually all women have
enjoyedbothrightseversince.
SouthKoreanwomenreachfullfreedomofdomesticmovement(blackline)tenyearslater,with
ascoreof4ontheindicator.Women’saccesstojustice(greenline)expandsmoregraduallyover
time,butsincetheJuneDemocracyMovementin1987,secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticefor
thewomenofSouthKoreahasalmostalwaysobserved.
Thedevelopmentoffreedomofdiscussionforwomen(purpleline)followsasimilarpath,except
for a drop in 1970. Since the late 1980s, however, women’s right to discuss is virtually fully
respected, meaning that freedom of speech by South Korean women in their homes and in
publicspacesisnotrestricted.Femalerightshavebeenfullyachievedinalmostallaspectssince
therevolution,althoughwomenarestillstrugglingtoachievethesamepoliticalpowerthatmen
have(lightblueline).
Concluding Remarks
ThisdatabriefdepictsthedemocraticdevelopmentofSouthKoreafrom1900to2014,basedon
data from key V-Dem indices and indicators. Overall, the data reflect the volatile history of
SouthKoreawithalternationsbetweenmoreandlessdemocraticgovernments.Themajorityof
theindicesandindicatorsreflectindependencein1948andtheJuneDemocracyMovementin
1987,aswellasthedemocraticreformswhichfollowedtheseevents.Sincethelate1980s,the
country has had scores between .8 and 1 in all democracy components, except for the
participatoryaspectwhichhasreachedascoreof.6.
The history of less democratic regimes is captured by the low level of the clean election
indicator,whichachievesjustabove.2upuntilthedemocracymovementinthe80s.Hence,the
country struggled with serious electoral challenges of registration fraud, systematic
irregularities,governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectoralviolencefor
a large part of the 20th century. The score of above .8 since the 90s, however, reflects South
Korea’sgreatimprovementsovertimeinthisregard.
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Thecountryalsoshowedhighscoresinsomeaspectsofdemocracyevenbeforethedemocracy
waveduringthelate80s.Theequalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertiesshowsscoresof.6
inthebeginningof1950sandsocialgroupequalityforcivillibertiesascoreof3outof4in1910.
Sincethe1980s,femalerightshasadvancedtoveryhighlevels,withtheexceptionthatwomen
ofSouthKoreastilldonotholdasmuchpoliticalpowerastheirmalecounterparts.
Appendix I. List of variables.
Thisisalistofalltheindicesandindicatorsincludedinthecountrybrief.
Itcontainsthequestionandthequestionalternativesaswellasinformationofaggregation,
scale,datareleaseandcitation.ThesecanalsobefoundintheV-Demcodebook.
VariablesincludedinFigure1.
Electoraldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_polyarchy)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheidealofelectoraldemocracyinitsfullestsenseachieved?
Clarifications:Theelectoralprincipleofdemocracyseekstoembodythecorevalueofmaking
rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society
organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic
irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In
between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of
presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual
scheme,electoraldemocracyisunderstoodasanessentialelementofanyotherconception
of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some
other.
Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the
indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr),
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clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of
expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those
indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the
averageofthetwo.Itisthusacompromisebetweenthetwomostwellknownaggregation
formulas in the literature, both allowing "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of
polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component
accordingtothe"weakestlink"argument.TheaggregationisdoneatthelevelofDahlssubcomponents (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is
aggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_polyarchy=
.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex + .1*v2x_frassoc_thick + .1*v2x_freexp_thick +
.5*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex*v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_freexp_thick.
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_freexp_thickv2x_EDcomp_thick
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Liberaldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_libdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheidealofliberaldemocracyachieved?
Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the
majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe
qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks
andbalancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.Tomakethisameasureof
liberaldemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_libdem=
.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_liberal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_liberal
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_liberalv2x_polyarchy
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Participatorydemocracyindex(D)(v2x_partipdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheidealofparticipatorydemocracyachieved?
Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by
citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness
about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.
Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy
thustakessuffrageforgranted,emphasizingengagementincivilsocietyorganizations,direct
democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory
democracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_partipdem=
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.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_partip+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_partip
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_polyarchyv2x_partip
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Deliberativedemocracyindex(D)(v2x_delibdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheidealofdeliberativedemocracyachieved?
Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which
decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning
focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional
appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle,
democracyrequiresmorethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsobe
respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among
informedandcompetentparticipantswhoareopentopersuasion.Tomakeitameasureof
not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of
electoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_delibdem=
.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_delib+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_delib
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2xdl_delibv2x_polyarchy
Datarelease:4,5.
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Egalitariandemocracyindex(D)(v2x_egaldem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheidealofegalitariandemocracyachieved?
Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political
power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This
perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil
libertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhave
approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under
the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does
not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and
healthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.Tomakeitameasureofegalitariandemocracy,the
indexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_egaldem=
.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_egal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_egal
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_egalv2x_polyarchy
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
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VariablesincludedinFigure2.
Electoralcomponentindex(D)(v2x_EDcomp_thick)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheelectoralprincipleofdemocracyachieved?
Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and
accountabilitybetweenleadersandcitizensthroughthemechanismofcompetitiveelections.
This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society
organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic
irregularities;andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)through
elections.
Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its
weakestlinkoffreedomofassociation,suffrage,cleanelections,andelectedexecutive. The
indexisthusaggregatedusingthisformula:
v2x_EDcomp_thick=
v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex.
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_frassoc_thickv2x_suffrv2xel_frefairv2x_accex
Datarelease:3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Participatorycomponentindex(D)(v2x_partip)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheparticipatoryprincipleachieved?
Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by
citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness
about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.
Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy
thustakessuffrageforgranted,emphasizingengagementincivilsocietyorganizations,direct
democracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.
Aggregation:Thisindexisformedbyaveragingthefollowingindices:civilsocietyparticipation
(v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power
(v2xel_locelec),andelectedregionalgovernmentpower(v2xel_regelec).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2x_iccpartv2xdd_ddv2xel_locelecv2xel_regelec
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Egalitariancomponentindex(D)(v2x_egal)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheegalitarianprincipleachieved?
Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political
power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This
perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil
libertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhave
approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under
the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does
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not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and
healthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.
Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis
model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position
(v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group
equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq),
equalaccesstohealth(v2pehealth),powerdistributionaccordingtogender(v2pepwrgen),
share of budget allocated to public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare
programsthatprovideuniversalratherthanmeans-testedbenefits(v2dlunivl).
Scale:Interval
Sources: v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgen
v2dlencmpsv2dlunivl
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Liberalcomponentindex(D)(v2x_liberal)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentistheliberalprincipleofdemocracyachieved?
Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the
majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe
qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks
andbalancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.
Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law
and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and
legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive(v2xlg_legcon).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2xcl_rolv2x_juconv2xlg_legcon
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Deliberativecomponentindex(D)(v2xdl_delib)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentisthedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyachieved?
Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which
decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning
focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional
appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle,
democracyrequiresmorethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsobe
respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among
informedandcompetentparticipantswhoareopentopersuasion.
Tomeasurethesefeaturesofapolitywetrytodeterminetheextenttowhichpoliticalelites
givepublicjustificationsfortheirpositionsonmattersofpublicpolicy,justifytheirpositions
intermsofthepublicgood,acknowledgeandrespectcounter-arguments;andhowwidethe
rangeofconsultationisatelitelevels.
Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis
modelincludingthefollowingindicators:reasonedjustification(v2dlreason),commongood
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justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of
consultation(v2dlconslt),andengagedsociety(v2dlengage).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2dlreasonv2dlcommonv2dlcountrv2dlconsltv2dlengage
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Femalerightsindex(D)(v2x_gender)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring
Question:Towhatextentarewoman’spoliticalrightsprotected?
Clarifications:Politicalrightsindexfocusesontheabilityofwomentoparticipateindiscussions
ofpoliticalissues,participationincivilsocietyorganizations,freedomofmovement,theright
toprivateproperty,accesstojustice,freedomfromforcedlabor,representationintheranks
ofjournalists,andanequalshareintheoveralldistributionofpower.
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists
(v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom of
discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef),
property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and
powerdistributedbygender(v2pepwrgen).
Scale:Interval
Sources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw
v2pepwrgen
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure3.
Freedomofassociation(thick)index(D)(v2x_frassoc_thick)
Projectmanager:AllenHicken,MichaelBernhard,JanTeorell
Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to
participateinelections,andtowhatextentarecivilsocietyorganizationsabletoformandto
operatefreely?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars),
opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry
and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections
indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within
electionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2psparbanv2psbarsv2psoppautv2elmulparv2cseeorgsv2csreprss
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferentaggregationformulaforthethinnerindex
v2x_frassoc)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Cleanelectionsindex(D)(v2xel_frefair)
Projectmanagers:StaffanLindberg,JanTeorell
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Question:Towhatextentareelectionsfreeandfair?
Clarifications:Freeandfairconnotesanabsenceofregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,
governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectionviolence.
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap),
electionvoterregistry(v2elrgstry),electionvotebuying(v2elvotbuy),electionothervoting
irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other
electoralviolence(v2elpeace),andelectionfreeandfair(v2elfrfair).Sincethebulkofthese
indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated
withinelectionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg)
Scale:Interval
Sources: v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace
v2elfrfair
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Shareofpopulationwithsuffrage(D)(v2x_suffr)
Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in
nationalelections?
Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,
residence,havingbeenconvictedforcrime,orbeinglegallyincompetent.Itcoverslegal(de
jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores
reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of
January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by
citizensinthecaseofindependentcountriesorthepeoplelivingintheterritorialentityin
the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is
codedas50%.Yearsbeforeelectoralprovisionsareintroducedarescored0%.Thescoresdo
not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions,
electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were
adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than
gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity,
religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combining
informationontherestrictionswithdifferentkindsofstatisticalinformation(onpopulation
size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.),
secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – the
conditionsinsimilarcountriesorcolonies.
Aggregation:v2elsuffrage/100
Responses:Percent
Scale:Interval
Source:v2elsuffrage
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Electedexecutiveindex(dejure)(D)(v2x_accex)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or
indirectly)?
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Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either
directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected
legislaturethatthenappointsthechiefexecutive.
Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with
limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies
selectionand/orapproval,notthepowertodismiss.
This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be
interpretedasanimportantelementofdemocracyinitsownright.
Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in
constructingthisindex,allofwhicharescaledtovaryfrom0to1.First,whethertheheadof
state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the extent to which the legislature is
popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is
unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the
weightdefinedbywhichhouseisdominant(iflegislatureisbicameral).Third,whetherthe
headofstateisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessary
for the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of
governmentisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor
theappointmentoftheheadofgovernment(c2=1,otherwise0).Fifth,whethertheheadof
governmentisappointedbytheheadofstate(d=1)ornot(d=0).Sixth,whethertheheadof
governmentisdirectlyelected(e=1)ornot(e=0).Definehoswastheweightfortheheadof
state.Iftheheadofstateisalsoheadofgovernment(v2exhoshog==1),hosw=1.Iftheheadof
state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of
cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal power,
hosw=.5.Definetheweightfortheheadofgovernmentashogw=1-hosw.Theformulais:
v2x_accex=
hosw*[max(a1,b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d,b*c1*d,a2,b*c2)]
Scale:Interval
Sources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg
v2exdfcbhsv2exdjcbhgv2exdfdmhsv2exdfdshgv2exhoshog
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure4.
Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex(D)(v2xcl_rol)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public
administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure
propertyrights,freedomfromforcedlabor,freedomofmovement,physicalintegrityrights,
andfreedomofreligion?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct),
transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for
men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym,
v2clprptyw),freedomfromtorture(v2cltort),freedomfrompoliticalkillings(v2clkill),from
forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig),
freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for
men/women(v2cldmovem,v2cldmovew).
Scale:Interval
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Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill
v2clslavemv2clslavefv2clreligv2clfmovev2cldmovemv2cldmovew
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Legislativeconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2xlg_legcon)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question:Towhatextentisthelegislatureandgovernmentagencies(e.g.,comptrollergeneral,
general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising
oversightovertheexecutive?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
modeloftheindicatorsforlegislaturequestionsofficialsinpractice(v2lgqstexp),executive
oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature
oppositionparties(v2lgoppart).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2lgqstexpv2lgotovstv2lginvstpv2lgoppart
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2x_jucon)
Projectmanager:JanTeorell
Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court
rulings,andtowhatextentisthejudiciaryabletoactinanindependentfashion?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with
judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence
(v2juhcind),andlowercourtindependence(v2juncind).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2exresconv2jucompv2juhccompv2juhcindv2juncind
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure5.
Civilsocietyparticipationindex(D)(v2x_cspart)
Projectmanager:MichaelBernhard
Question:AremajorCSOsroutinelyconsultedbypolicymaker;howlargeistheinvolvementof
people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate
nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party
primaries?
Clarifications:Thesphereofcivilsocietyliesinthepublicspacebetweentheprivatesphereand
thestate.Here,citizensorganizeingroupstopursuetheircollectiveinterestsandideals.We
call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means
limitedto,interestgroups,laborunions,spiritualorganizations(iftheyareengagedincivic
orpoliticalactivities),socialmovements,professionalassociations,charities,andothernongovernmentalorganizations.
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Thecorecivilsocietyindex(CCSI)isdesignedtoprovideameasureofarobustcivilsociety,
understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and
activelypursuetheirpoliticalandcivicgoals,howeverconceived.
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for candidate selection –national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO
consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’s
participation(v2csgender).
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2pscnslnlv2cscnsultv2csprtcptv2csgender
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Localgovernment(D)(v2xel_locelec)
Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorell
Question: Are there elected local governments, and –if so – to what extent can they operate
withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesatthelocallevel?
Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local
governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local
governmentsbutwherethosegovernmentsaresubordinatetounelectedofficialsatthelocal
level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a
countryinwhichlocalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfrom
unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local
governmentsremainsubordinatetotheregionalandnationalgovernments.)
Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected,
1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructis
then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)
scaledtovaryfrom0-1.
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2ellocelcv2ellocpwr
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Directpopularvoteindex(D)(v2xdd_dd)
Projectmanager:DavidAltman
Question:Towhatextentisthedirectpopularvoteutilized?
Clarification:Directpopularvotingrefersheretoaninstitutionalizedprocessbywhichcitizens
ofaregionorcountryregistertheirchoiceoropiniononspecificissuesthroughaballot.Itis
intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually
understood.Itcapturessomeaspectsofthemoregeneralconceptofdirectdemocracy.
Thetermdoesnotencompassrecallelections,deliberativeassemblies,orsettingsinwhich
thevoteisnotsecretorthepurviewisrestricted.Likewise,itdoesnotapplytoelectionsfor
representatives.
Aggregation:Thisindexmeasureshoweasyitistoinitiateandapproveadirectpopularvote
andhowconsequentialthatvoteis(ifapproved)?Easeofinitiationismeasuredby(a)the
existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed
(v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level of
government (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorums
pertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority
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(v2ddspmjci),and(d)districtmajority(v2dddistci).Consequencesaremeasuredby(a)the
legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlegci),
and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past
(v2ddciniyr).
Scale:Interval
Sources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci
v2ddspmjciv2dddistciv2ddlegciv2ddciniyr
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Regionalgovernment(D)(v2xel_regelec)
Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorell
Question:Arethereelectedregionalgovernments,and–ifso–towhatextentcantheyoperate
withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesattheregionallevel?
Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional
governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional
governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the
regionallevel(perhapsappointedbyahigher-levelbody).Ahighscorewouldbeaccordedto
acountryinwhichregionalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictions
fromunelectedactorsattheregionallevel(withtheexceptionofjudicialbodies).(Naturally,
regionalgovernmentsremainsubordinatetothenationalgovernment.)
Aggregation:First,regionalgovernmentelected(v2elsrgel)isrecodedsothat0=noneelected,
1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructis
then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr)
scaledtovaryfrom0-1.
Scale:Interval
Sources:v2elsrgelv2elrgpwr
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure6.
Reasonedjustification(C)(v2dlreason,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,i.e.beforeadecisionhasbeen
made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their
positions?
Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe
stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.
Responses:
0:Nojustification.Elitesalmostalwaysonlydictatethatsomethingshouldorshouldnot
be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cut
spending.”
1:Inferiorjustification.Elitestendtogivereasonswhysomeoneshouldorshouldnotbe
fordoingornotdoingsomething,butthereasonstendtobeillogicalorfalse,although
they may appeal to many voters. For example, “We must cut spending. The state is
inefficient.”[Theinferenceisincompletebecauseaddressinginefficiencieswouldnot
necessarilyreducespendinganditmightundermineessentialservices.]
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2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the
proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, “We must
cutspendingbecausetaxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentprograms.”
3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex,
nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because
taxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentgovernmentprograms.Raisingtaxeswould
hurteconomicgrowth,anddeficitspendingwouldleadtoinflation.”
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Respectcounterarguments(C)(v2dlcountr,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political
elitesacknowledgeandrespectcounterarguments?
Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe
stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.
Responses:
0:Counterargumentsarenotallowedorifarticulated,punished.
1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are
ignored.
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by
makinganegativestatementaboutthemortheindividualsandgroupsthatpropose
them.
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or
positivestatementsaboutthem.
4:Elitesalmostalwaysacknowledgecounterargumentsandexplicitlyvaluethem,evenif
theyultimatelyrejectthemforthemostpart.
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and
frequentlyalsoevenacceptthemandchangetheirposition.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Engagedsociety(C)(v2dlengage,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how
independentarepublicdeliberations?
Clarification:Thisquestionreferstodeliberationasmanifestedindiscussion,debate,andother
publicforumssuchaspopularmedia.
Responses:
0:Publicdeliberationisnever,oralmostneverallowed.
1:Somelimitedpublicdeliberationsareallowedbutthepublicbelowtheelitelevelsis
almostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesorunabletotakepartinthem.
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2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors
aretypicallycontrolledand/orconstrainedbytheelites.
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups
participate,butitisconfinedtoasmallsliceofspecializedgroupsthattendstobethe
sameacrossissue-areas.
4:Publicdeliberationisactivelyencouragedandarelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elite
groupsoftenparticipateandvarywithdifferentissue-areas.
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major
policiesamongthemselves,inthemedia,inassociationsorneighborhoods,orinthe
streets.Grass-rootsdeliberationiscommonandunconstrained.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Commongood(C)(v2dlcommon,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political
elitesjustifytheirpositionsintermsofthecommongood?
Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe
stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.
Responses:
0:Littleornojustificationintermsofthecommongoodisusuallyoffered.
1:Specificbusiness,geographic,group,party,orconstituencyinterestsareforthemost
partofferedasjustifications.
2:Justificationsareforthemostpartamixofspecificinterestsandthecommongoodand
itisimpossibletosaywhichjustificationismorecommonthantheother.
3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group
interestsandonappealstothecommongood.
4:Justificationsareforthemostpartalmostalwaysbasedonexplicitstatementsofthe
common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest
numberorashelpingtheleastadvantagedinasociety.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Rangeofconsultation(C)(v2dlconslt,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of
consultationatelitelevels?
Clarification:Becausepracticesvarygreatlyfrompolicytopolicy,baseyouransweronthestyle
thatismosttypicalofpolicymaking.
Responses:
0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes
authoritativedecisionsontheirown.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling
elites.
2:Consultationincludestheformerplusalargergroupthatisloyaltothegovernment,
suchastherulingparty’sorparties’localexecutivesand/orwomen,youthandother
branches.
3:Consultationincludestheformerplusleadersofotherparties.
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business
representatives.
5:Consultationengageselitesfromessentiallyallpartsofthepoliticalspectrumandall
politicallyrelevantsectorsofsocietyandbusiness.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure7.
Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(C)(v2pepwrses,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring
Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocioeconomicposition?
Clarification:Allsocietiesarecharacterizedbysomedegreeofeconomic(wealthandincome)
inequality.Insomesocieties,incomeandwealtharedistributedinagrosslyunequalfashion.
Inothers,thedifferencebetweenrichandpoorisnotsogreat.Here,weareconcernednot
with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality.
Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into
politicalpower.
Responses:
0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer
peoplehavealmostnoinfluence.
1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income
havelittlesay.Poorerpeoplehaveessentiallynoinfluence.
2:Wealthypeoplehaveaverystrongholdonpoliticalpower.Peopleofaverageorpoorer
incomehavesomedegreeofinfluencebutonlyonissuesthatmatterlessforwealthy
people.
3:Wealthypeoplehavemorepoliticalpowerthanothers.Butpeopleofaverageincome
have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of
politicalpower.
4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is
average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic
groups.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties(C)(v2clsocgrp,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaning
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V-Dem Data Brief
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Question:Doallsocialgroups,asdistinguishedbylanguage,ethnicity,religion,race,region,or
caste,enjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties,oraresomegroupsgenerallyinamorefavorable
position?
Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property
rights,freedomofmovement,andfreedomfromforcedlabor.
Responses:
0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the
generalpopulation.
2:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoymoderatelyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneral
population.
3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
4:Membersofallsalientsocialgroupsenjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Healthequality(C)(v2pehealth,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question:Towhatextentishighqualitybasichealthcareguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable
themtoexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens?
Clarification:Poor-qualityhealthcarecanmakecitizensunabletoexercisetheirbasicrightsas
adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render
themunabletowork,participateinsocialorpoliticalorganizations,orvote(wherevotingis
allowed).
Responses:
0:Extreme.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast75percent(%)ofcitizens’ability
toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.
1:Unequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast25percent(%)ofcitizens’ability
toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.
2:Somewhatequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,tento25percent(%)ofcitizens’
abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.
3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poorqualityhealthcare,fivetotenpercent(%)ofcitizens’abilitytoexercisetheirpolitical
rightsasadultcitizensisundermined.
4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens
cannotexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Particularisticorpublicgoods(C)(v2dlencmps)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
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V-Dem Data Brief
South Korea
Question:Consideringtheprofileofsocialandinfrastructuralspendinginthenationalbudget,
how“particularistic”or“publicgoods”aremostexpenditures?
Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector,
socialgroup,region,party,orsetofconstituents.Suchspendingmaybereferredtoas“pork,”
“clientelistic,”or“privategoods.”
Public-goodsspendingisintendedtobenefitallcommunitieswithinasociety,thoughitmay
bemeans-testedsoastotargetpoor,needy,orotherwiseunderprivilegedconstituents.The
keypointisthatallwhosatisfythemeans-testareallowedtoreceivethebenefit.
Youranswershouldconsidertheentirebudgetofsocialandinfrastructuralspending.Weare
interestedintherelativevalueofparticularisticandpublic-goodsspending,notthenumber
ofbillsorprogramsthatfallintoeithercategory.
Responses:
0:Almostallofthesocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic.
1:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic,butasignificantportion
(e.g.¼or1/3)ispublic-goods.
2:Socialandinfrastructureexpendituresareevenlydividedbetweenparticularisticand
public-goodsprograms.
3:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsbutasignificantportion
(e.g.,¼or1/3)isparticularistic.
4:Almostallsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsincharacter.Onlya
smallportionisparticularistic.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbysocialgroup(C)(v2pepwrsoc,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring
Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocialgroups?
Clarification:Asocialgroupisdifferentiatedwithinacountrybycaste,ethnicity,language,race,
region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in
sexualorientationorsocioeconomicstatus.)Socialgroupidentityiscontextuallydefinedand
islikelytovaryacrosscountriesandthroughtime.Socialgroupidentitiesarealsolikelyto
cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple
groups.Nonetheless,atanygivenpointintimetherearesocialgroupswithinasocietythat
areunderstood-bythoseresidingwithinthatsociety–tobedifferent,inwaysthatmaybe
politicallyrelevant.
Responses:
0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.
1:Politicalpowerismonopolizedbyseveralsocialgroupscomprisingaminorityofthe
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.
2:Politicalpoweris monopolizedbyseveral socialgroupscomprising amajorityofthe
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.
3:Eitherallsocialgroupspossesssomepoliticalpower,withsomegroupshavingmore
power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group
controllingmuchofthepoliticalpowerforaperiodoftime,followedbyanother–but
allsignificantgroupshaveaturnattheseatofpower.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic,
caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group
characteristicsarenotrelevanttopolitics.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Educationalequality(C)(v2peedueq,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question:Towhatextentishighqualitybasiceducationguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable
themtoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens?
Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this
variesslightlyamongcountries.
Responses:
0:Extreme.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast75
percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their
abilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
1:Unequal.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast25
percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their
abilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent
(%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to
exercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
3:Relativelyequal.Basiceducationisoverallequalinqualitybutfivetotenpercent(%)
ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirability
toexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children
receivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercise
theirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring
Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?
Responses:
0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.
1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.
2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.
3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.
4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
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V-Dem Data Brief
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Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Means-testedv.universalisticpolicy(C)(v2dlunivl,*_dos,*_ord,*_meanl)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
Question:Howmanywelfareprogramsaremeans-testedandhowmanybenefitall(orvirtually
all)membersofthepolity?
Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged
constituents.Cash-transferprogramsarenormallymeans-tested.
A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free
education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may
benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get
higherunemploymentbenefits).Thekeypointisthatpracticallyeveryoneisabeneficiary,or
potentialbeneficiary.
Thepurposeofthisquestionisnottogaugethesizeofthewelfarestatebutratheritsquality.
So,youranswershouldbebasedonwhateverprogramsexist.
Responses:
0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health,
retirement,unemployment,povertyprograms).
1:Almostallofthewelfarestatepoliciesaremeans-tested.
2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is
universalisticandpotentiallybenefitseveryoneinthepopulation.
3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and
universalistic.
4:Mostwelfarestatepoliciesareuniversalistic,butasignificantportion(e.g.,¼or1/3)
aremeans-tested.
5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is
means-tested.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure8.
CSOwomen’sparticipation(C)(v2csgender,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:MichaelBernhard
Question:Arewomenpreventedfromparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)?
Clarification:Pleasepayattentiontoboth(A)whetherwomenarepreventedfromparticipating
incivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)becauseoftheirgenderand(B)whetherCSOspursuing
women’sinterestsarepreventedfromtakingpartinassociationallife.
Responses:
0:Almostalways.
1:Frequently.
2:Abouthalfthetime.
3:Rarely.
4:Almostnever.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomofdiscussionforwomen(C)(v2cldiscw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public
spaces?
Clarification:Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichwomenareabletoengageinprivate
discussions,particularlyonpoliticalissues,inprivatehomesandpublicspaces(restaurants,
public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other
members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the
governmentanditsagentsbutalsoculturalrestrictionsorcustomarylawsthatareenforced
byothermembersofthepolity,sometimesininformalways.
Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itis
possibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal
–andextremelylow–rightstofreedomofdiscussion.
Responses:
0:Notrespected.Hardlyanyfreedomofexpressionexistsforwomen.Womenaresubject
to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political
opinion.
1:Weaklyrespected.Expressionsofpoliticalopinionsbywomenarefrequentlyexposed
tointerventionandharassment.
2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally
exposedtointerventionandharassment.
3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the
private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft
sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make
politicalstatements.
4:Fullyrespected.Freedomofspeechbywomenintheirhomesandinpublicspacesis
notrestricted.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Propertyrightsforwomen(C)(v2clprptyw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question:Dowomenenjoytherighttoprivateproperty?
Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private
property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may
legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or
socialnorms.Thisquestionconcernstherighttoprivateproperty,notactualownershipof
property.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is
possibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal
–andveryminimal–propertyrights.
Responses:
0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyprivatepropertyrightsofanykind.
1:Somewomenenjoysomeprivatepropertyrights,butmosthavenone.
2:Manywomenenjoymanyprivatepropertyrights,butasmallerproportionenjoysfew
ornone.
3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of
womenhavemuchmorerestrictedrights.
4:Mostwomenenjoymostprivatepropertyrightsbutasmallminoritydoesnot.
5:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyall,oralmostall,propertyrights.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring
Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?
Responses:
0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.
1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.
2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.
3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.
4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen(C)(v2cldmovew,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question:Dowomenenjoyfreedomofmovementwithinthecountry?
Clarification:Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichallwomenareabletomovefreely,in
daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to
establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might
be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions
sometimesfallonruralresidents,onspecificsocialgroups,orondissidents.
Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itis
possibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal
–andextremelylow–freedomofmovement.
Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political)
criminals.Donotconsiderrestrictionsinmovementthatresultfromcrimeorunrest.
Responses:
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V-Dem Data Brief
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0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement(e.g.,NorthKoreaorAfghanistan
undertheTaliban).
1:Somewomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement,butmostdonot(e.g.,ApartheidSouth
Africa).
2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not.
Alternativelyallwomenenjoypartialfreedomofmovement.
3:Mostwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovementbutasmallminoritydoesnot.
4:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen(C)(v2clslavef,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question:Areadultwomenfreefromservitudeandotherkindsofforcedlabor?
Clarification:Involuntaryservitudeoccurswhenanadultisunabletoquitajobs/hedesiresto
leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion.
This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligationssuchasconscriptionoremploymentincommandeconomies.
Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomenfromforced
labor.Thus,acountryinwhichbothmenandwomensufferthesameconditionsofservitude
mightbecodeda(0)forwomen,eventhoughthereisequalityacrossthesexes.
Responses:
0:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaboriswidespreadandaccepted(perhaps
evenorganized)bythestate.
1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially
opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively
containthepractice.
2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and
usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular
areasoramongparticularsocialgroups.
3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the
criminalunderground.Itisactivelyandsincerelyopposedbythepublicauthorities.
4:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborisvirtuallynon-existent.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Accesstojusticeforwomen(C)(v2clacjstw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaning
Question:Dowomenenjoyequal,secure,andeffectiveaccesstojustice?
Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the
courtswithoutrisktotheirpersonalsafety,trialsarefair,andwomenhaveeffectiveability
to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel,
defense,andappeal.
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V-Dem Data Brief
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Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativeaccesstojusticemenandwomen.Thus,
itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoy
equal–andextremelylimited–accesstojustice.
Responses:
0:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisnon-existent.
1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely
respected.
2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor
problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of
thecountry.
3:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisusuallyobserved.
4:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisalmostalwaysobserved.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedat
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.
Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
33
V-Dem Data Brief
South Korea
Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.
StructureofAggregation–IndicesandIndicators
Democracy
Mid-Level
IndicesNames
Democracyand
Governance
IndicesNames
Lower-Level
NamesIndicators
Democracy
and
Governance
IndicesNames
v2_tagIndices
andIndicators
Electoral
DemocracyIndex
v2x_polyarchy
v2x_freexp
Freedomof
expressionindex
Governmentcensorship v2mecenefm
effort-Media
Harassmentofjournalists v2meharjrn
Mediaself-censorship
v2meslfcen
v2cldiscm
Alternativesource
informationindex
Freedomofdiscussion
formen
Freedomofdiscussion
forwomen
Freedomofacademicand
culturalexpression
Mediabias
v2mebias
v2mecrit
Print/broadcastmedia
critical
Print/broadcastmedia
perspectives
v2x_EDcomp_thick
ElectoralComponent Index
Freedomof
associationindex
(thick)
PartyBan
Barrierstoparties
v2psbars
v2psoppaut
Oppositionparties
autonomy
Electionsmultiparty
CSOentryandexit
v2cseeorgs
CSOrepression
v2csreprss
v2cldiscw
v2clacfree
v2xme_altinf
v2merange
v2x_frassoc_thick
v2psparban
v2elmulpar
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Shareof
populationwith
suffrage
v2x_suffr
Percentofpopulation
withsuffrage
v2elsuffrage
Cleanelections
index
EMBautonomy
v2elembaut
EMBcapacity
v2elembcap
Electionvoterregistry
v2elrgstry
Electionvotebuying
v2elvotbuy
v2elirreg
Electionothervoting
irregularities
Electiongovernment
intimidation
Electionotherelectoral
violence
Electionfreeandfair
v2x_accex
Electedexecutive index(dejure)
Lowerchamberelected
Upperchamberelected
v2lgelecup
v2lgdomchm
Legislaturedominant
chamber
HOSselectionby
legislatureinpractice
HOSappointmentin
practice
HOGselectionby
legislatureinpractice
HOGappointmentin
practice
HOSappointscabinetin
practice
HOGappointscabinetin
practice
HOSdismissesministers
inpractice
HOGdismissesministers
inpractice
HOSappointscabinetin
practice
LiberalDemocracy Index
ElectoralDemocracy
Index
LiberalComponent
Index
v2x_libdem
v2x_polyarchy
v2x_liberal
Equalitybefore
thelawand
individualliberty
index
v2xel_frefair
v2elintim
v2elpeace
v2elfrfair
v2lgello
v2exaphos
v2expathhs
v2exaphogp
v2expathhg
v2exdfcbhs
v2exdjcbhg
v2exdfdmhs
v2exdfdshg
v2exdfcbhs
v2xcl_rol
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Judicial
constraintson
theexecutive
index
Rigorousandimpartial
v2clrspct
publicadministration
Transparentlawswith
v2cltrnslw
predictableenforcement
Accesstojusticeformen v2clacjstm
Accesstojusticefor
women
Propertyrightsformen
v2clacjstw
Propertyrightsfor
women
Freedomfromtorture
v2clprptyw
Freedomfrompolitical
killings
Freedomfromforced
laborformen
Freedomfromforced
laborforwomen
Freedomofreligion
v2clkill
Freedomofforeign
movement
Freedomofdomestic
movementformen
Freedomofdomestic
movementforwomen
v2clfmove
v2exrescon
Executiverespects
constitution
Compliancewith
judiciary
Compliancewithhigh
court
Highcourtindependence
Lowercourtindependence v2juncind
v2xlg_legcon
Legislative
constraintson
theexecutive
index
v2lgqstexp
Legislaturequestions
officialsinpractice
Executiveoversight
v2lginvstp
Legislatureinvestigates
inpractice
Legislatureopposition
parties
Deliberative
DemocracyIndex
v2x_delibdem
ElectoralDemocracy Index
v2x_polyarchy
v2clprptym
v2cltort
v2clslavem
v2clslavef
v2clrelig
v2cldmovem
v2cldmovew
v2x_jucon
v2jucomp
v2juhccomp
v2juhcind
v2lgotovst
v2lgoppart
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v2xdl_delib
Deliberative
ComponentIndex
Reasonedjustification
v2dlreason
Commongood
v2dlcommon
v2dlcountr
Respect
counterarguments
Rangeofconsultation
Engagedsociety
v2dlengage
Egalitarian
democracyIndex
v2x_egaldem
v2x_polyarchy
v2x_egal
ElectoralDemocracy Index
Egalitarian
ComponentIndex
v2pepwrses
Powerdistributedby
socioeconomicposition
Powerdistributedby
socialgroup
Socialgroupequalityin
respectforcivilliberties
Educationalequality
Healthequality
v2pehealth
v2pepwrgen
Powerdistributedby
gender
Encompassing-ness
v2dlunivl
Means-testedvs.
universalistic
Participatory
DemocracyIndex
v2x_partipdem
v2x_polyarchy
v2x_partip
v2x_cspart
Candidateselection-National/local
CSOconsultation
v2pscnslnl
CSOparticipatory
environment
CSOwomens
participation
v2csprtcpt
Initiativespermitted
v2ddlegci
v2dlconslt
v2pepwrsoc
v2clsocgrp
v2peedueq
v2dlencmps
ElectoralDemocracy Index
Participatory
ComponentIndex
Civilsociety
participation
index
DirectPopular
VoteIndex
Initiativessignatures%
v2ddsigcip
Initiativessignaturegatheringtimelimit
v2ddgrtlci
v2cscnsult
v2csgender
v2xdd_dd
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Local
government
index
Regional
government
index
Initiativessignaturegatheringperiod
Initiativeslevel
v2ddgrgpci
Initiativesparticipation
threshold
Initiativesapproval
threshold
Initiativesadministrative
threshold
Initiativessupermajority
v2ddbindci
Occurrenceofcitizeninitiativethisyear
v2ddciniyr
v2ddlevci
v2ddthreci
v2dddistci
v2ddspmjci
v2xel_locelec
Localgovernmentelected v2ellocelc
Localofficesrelative
power
Localgovernmentexists
v2ellocpwr
v2xel_regelec
v2elsrgel
Regionalgovernment
elected
Regionalofficesrelative
power
Regionalgovernment
exists
v2xcs_ccsi
CoreCivilSociety
Index
CSOentryandexit
v2cseeorgs
CSOrepression
v2csreprss
v2csprtcpt
CSOparticipatory
environment
v2xps_party
Party
Institutionalization
index
Partyorganizations
v2psorgs
PartyBranches
v2psprbrch
Partylinkages
v2psprlnks
Distinctpartyplatforms
v2psplats
v2pscohesv
Legislativeparty
cohesion
Femalerightsindex
v2x_gender
v2csgender
CSOwomens
participation
Percent(%)Female
Journalists
v2ellocgov
v2elrgpwr
v2elreggov
v2mefemjrn
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v2cldmovew
Freedomofdomestic
movementforwomen
Freedomofdiscussion
forwomen
Freedomfromforced
laborforwomen
Propertyrightsfor
women
Accesstojusticefor
women
Powerdistributedby
gender
v2x_elecreg
ElectoralRegime
Index
Legislativeor
constituent
assemblyelection
v2xel_elecparl
v2eltype
v2eltype_0
v2eltype
v2eltype_1
v2eltype
v2eltype_4
v2eltype
v2eltype_5
v2xlg_leginter
Legislature
closeddownor
aborted
Legislaturebicameral
v2lgbicam
v2xel_elecpres
Presidential
election
v2eltype
v2eltype_6
v2eltype
v2eltype_7
v2x_hosinter
Chiefexecutive
nolongerelected
HOS=HOG?
v2expathhg
HOGappointmentin
practice
HOSappointmentin
practice
v2cldiscw
v2clslavef
v2clprptyw
v2clacjstw
v2pepwrgen
v2exhoshog
v2expathhs
39