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Competition Directorate-General 23 February 2006 Sector Inquiry on the gas and electricity markets Dominik Schnichels, DG COMP Inquiry under Art. 17 Regulation 1/2003 • Launched June 2005 • 3000 questionnaires sent • One of the most extensive investigations under EU competition law • Issues Paper Preliminary Report • • • • • Market concentration Vertical foreclosure Market Integration Transparency Price formation Preliminary Report - Gas Introduction Price (€/MWh) Hub Prices 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 NBP Day ahead Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Zeebrugge Day ahead Jan-05 Jul-05 TTF day ahead Price (€/MWh) Border Prices 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan-02 Jul-02 Waidhaus Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 EmdenTroll Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Baumgarten Concentration • High levels of concentration at wholesale level • Incumbents largely control imports and domestic production • Traded markets dominated by incumbents Incumbent share of imports Incumbent share of domestic production Austria 80-90% - Belgium 90-100% - Czech Republic 90-100% - - 80-90% France 90-100% - Great Britain 20-30% 40-50% Germany 90-100% 80-90% Hungary 90-100% 90-100% Italy 60-70% 80-90% Netherlands 50-60% 90-100% Poland 90-100% 90-100% Slovakia 90-100% - Denmark Vertical foreclosure – infrastructure • Gas infrastructure remains mostly owned by incumbents and not sufficiently unbundled • Long-term capacity reservations in “transit” pipelines and storage Excluded from TPA booked capacity: between 1 and 5 years length not specified Country I Country H Country G Country F Country E Country D Country C Country B 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Country A % of total storage capacity Storage capacity booked long term booked capacity: less than 1 year booked capacity: 5 years and more available capacity Transit capacity– East/West axis East/West axis: largely sold out until 2015 Primary capacity reserved / utilised (% of maximum technical capacity) Maximum utilisation 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Less than 2 years Incumbent-affiliate Btwn 2 and 5 years Producer Btwn 5 and 10 years Without contract More than 10 years Average unsold Prices – indexation Western Europe UK Eastern Europe 0,8% 16,5% 0,6% 14,6% 2,9% 1,1% 1,1% 7% 0,7% 5,2% 2%4,6% 2,6% 2,1% 1,1% 30% 0,6% 4,9% 16,2% 47,2% 40,1% Heavy fuel oil Light fuel oil and gasoil Gas price 50,1% Electricity price Coal price Other Fixed General inflation Crude oil 48,1% Conclusions • Wholesale markets in the EU generally maintain the high level of concentration of the pre-liberalisation period • Lack of liquidity and limited access to infrastructure prevent new entrant suppliers from offering their services to the consumer • Transit capacity, crucial for market integration, could be used much more efficiently • There is a lack of reliable and timely information on the markets, essential for healthy competition Preliminary Report - Electricity Introduction • Prices increase significantly since 2003 • Prices differ significantly between Member States Electricity prices on the rise all over Europe Wholesale electricity price developments 2000-2005 year-ahead base load in €/MWh 90 Germany 80 The Netherlands 70 UK UK France 60 Nord Pool €/MWh France The Netherlands 50 40 30 Germany Nord Pool 20 10 0 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Concentration • Incumbents control generation assets giving them scope to exercise market power by France Available installed capacity 0,5% 8,2% 2,2% 2,5% Undertaking A Undertaking B Undertaking C Undertaking D – withdrawing capacity or – increasing prices Other undertakings 86,7% Belgium Available installed capacity 17% • Scope for influencing prices exists at a number of power exchanges (examples: I, E, DK) Undertaking A Other undertakings 83% Vertical foreclosure • Many market participants complain about inadequate unbundling of network and supply activities • TSO level: – Grid connection for new power plants – Interconnectors – Transparency • DSO level: – Inappropriate switching procedures – Lack of ‘Chinese walls’ – Discriminatory access tariffs Market Integration • Competition from imports is insufficient to erode market power of incumbents • More interconnector capacity is needed • Many interconnectors are chronically congested • Long term capacity reservations reduce capacity available for new entrants • Revenues from auctions not used for interconnector expansions Transparency • The level of transparency varies widely between Member States • 83% of market participants are not content with current levels of transparency Im p o rtan ce o f in fo rm a tio n a cc o rd in g to s u p p lie rs in d isp en sab le im p o rtan t o r u sefu l n o t u sefu l T S O netw ork 95.2% 4.8% Interc onnectors 91.8% 8.2% Load 94.6% 5.5% B alancing 90.7% 9.3% G eneration (production) 86.2% 13.8% G eneration (c apacity ) 94.1% 5.9% Conclusions • Markets remain highly concentrated giving incumbent operators scope for exercising market power/influencing prices • Competition from cross-border trade does not so far reduce incumbents’ market power • Market participants complain about insufficient unbundling of network and supply activities which calls for further reflection • There is a general consensus that more transparency is needed urgently Closing remarks Context • Growth and Jobs strategy (Lisbon) • Green Paper on energy announced • High Level Group Way forward for discussion • Competition case priorities • Review of regulation • Unbundling H