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Transcript
In Focus: Markets as we see them
Goldilocks won’t leave?
28 July 2017
For EMEA and Asia distribution only
Inside (click to jump to sections)
Trump and inflation A lull in inflation
combined with this US administration’s
agenda running into the congressional
sludge has prompted a rethink. Is
Goldilocks here to stay?
Structural disinflation? There are many
arguing that inflation will be durably
lower for a range of reasons. Global trade,
the spread of the internet, and wider
technological advances are the three that
we tackle here
“It was obvious that he was a man who marched through life to the rhythms of
some drum I would never hear.”
(Hunter S. Thompson, Hell's Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga)
Trump and inflation
The US election prompted many in the market to dramatically reassess their inflation
expectations. Large chunks of President Trump’s legislative agenda were deemed
inflationary – from the renegotiation of NAFTA to the proposed infrastructure
package – sending many in the bond market running scared (Figure 1). Since then, a
lull in inflation (Figure 2) combined with this US administration’s agenda running into
the congressional sludge has prompted a rethink. Is Goldilocks here to stay?
Cyclical pressures While there are
reasons to suggest that structural forces
are keeping inflation low, certain one-off
factors are also helping to cyclically
depress prices in the US in particular
Investment conclusion We see the forces
of inflation slowly gathering in coming
years, amidst diminishing economic slack
Market calls – summary
Structural disinflation?
Selected risks to our views
There are many arguing that inflation will be durably lower for a range of reasons.
Global trade, the spread of the internet, and wider technological advances are the
three that we tackle here.
Asset class summary
The case for investing
That global trade has brought down prices around the world is intuitive. Increasingly
available cheap imports from less developed economies with competitive labour
forces have not only allowed developed world consumers to buy cheaper goods and
services, but the extra competition has also forced developed world producer prices
down over time. The fact that import price inflation tended to be systematically
lower than actual CPI inflation during the 1990s in particular, a period of rapid
growth in global trade, may hint at these effects (Figure 3).
The Internet has also surely exerted downward pressure on prices, as, similar to the
global trade story, lower cost producers have given customers cheaper alternatives
whilst also forcing the surviving offline competition to adapt. However, the most
pronounced effects may well be in the past. Recent research by Alberto Cavallo – one
of the architects of the Billion Prices Project – found that online and offline prices are
now identical about 70% of the time in the US and almost always in the other
Figure 1: Bond yields spiked after Trump’s electoral victory
200
Figure 2: Inflation has slowed over the past months
3.0
US government bond yield (%)
Year-on-year growth (%)
2.5
180
US core CPI
US headline CPI
2.0
160
1.5
140
100
80
Jul-16
1.0
US Presidential Election
2 year
5 year
10 year
120
Sep-16
Nov-16
Source: Datastream, Barclays
1 | In Focus | 28 July 2017
Jan-17
Mar-17
May-17
0.5
0.0
Jul-17
-0.5
Jan-14
Jul-14
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Jan-15
Jul-15
Jan-16
Jul-16
Jan-17
Figure 3: US import price inflation lower than CPI inflation
10 Year-on-year change (%)
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
1989
1994
1999
US core CPI
Figure 4: Services are an increasing proportion of the economy
100%
Share of US GDP (%)
80%
60%
40%
20%
2004
2009
0%
1947
2014
1967
Primary industry
US import prices excl. petroleum
Source: Datastream, Barclays
1957
1977
1987
Secondary industry
1997
2007
Tertiary industry
Source: Datastream, Barclays
developed economies examined1.
Technological advances
have also surely
contributed to this era of
low inflation
Technological advances have also surely contributed to this era of low inflation. The
growth of the sharing economy is just one of the areas cited by those puzzled at the
low levels of measured productivity in this current cycle. There may well be some
degree of mis-measurement; the statistical framework we use to measure the modern
economy was, after all, designed to capture post-war production – the steel and wheat
economy, not an economy where many of the services we receive, we now get for free.
However, there has always been a degree of mis-measurement, as persuasively argued
by Nordhaus in his study on the price of lighting over the centuries 2. Here, the difficult
question is whether this mis-measurement is larger today, since the service sector
(whose production is inherently harder to measure) has come to play a larger role in
developed economies (Figure 4).
Cyclical pressures
There are some one-off
factors helping to
cyclically depress prices in
the US
While there are reasons to suggest that structural forces are keeping inflation low,
certain one-off factors are also helping to cyclically depress prices in the US in particular
– one such area is the much-talked-about step change in the competitive backdrop
within US mobile phones, which in itself is likely to continue to exert a drag on overall
price pressures until the first quarter of next year (Figure 5). More broadly, with the
prospects for healthcare and shelter inflation looking moderate (Figure 6), it seems wise
to expect prices to trend unevenly higher rather than soar.
Similarly, wages, which generally sit at the nexus of inflationary pressures, should
continue to trend unevenly upwards. History tells us nonetheless that the relationship
between growth and wages is a loose one (Figure 7), prone to defying the texbooks.
Furthermore, compositional factors likely explain much of the slower than expected
trajectory so far in this economic cycle – the unemployment axe fell hardest on the
lowest income segments in the Great Financial Crisis and their gradual re-entry into the
Figure 5: US inflation boosted by medical services and shelter
6
Year-on-year change (%)
2
Month-on-month change (%)
1
5
0
4
-1
3
-2
2
-3
US core CPI - wireless telephone services
-4
1
-5
0
US core CPI
US core CPI - medical care services
US core CPI - shelter
-1
-2
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Datastream, Barclays
1.
2.
Figure 6: Wireless service deflation exerting one-off effect
-6
-7
-8
Jan-12
Jan-13
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Are Online and Offline Prices Similar? Evidence from Large Multi-Channel Retailers – Cavallo, 2016
Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not – Nordhaus, 1996
2 | In Focus | 28 July 2017
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Figure 7: The Phillips Curve changes over time
5
US average hourly earnings growth (%)
Figure 8: Wages being held down by compositional effects
(2017-2007)
(2006-1996)
(1995-1985)
4
6
Year-on-year change (%)
5
4
3
(2017-2007)
3
2
2
(1995-1985)
1
(2006-1996)
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
US unemployment rate (%)
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker
US average hourly earnings
0
1997
2002
2007
2012
2017
Source: Datastream, Barclays
labour market has kept aggregate wages low on the measures that fail to adjust for this
compositional effect (Figure 8).
Investment conclusion
We see the forces of
inflation slowly gathering
in coming years, amidst
diminishing economic
slack
Putting this all together, we see the forces of inflation slowly gathering in coming years,
amidst diminishing economic slack. If this US administration can figure out how to work
productively with Congress, then there are certainly upside risks to that benign forecast.
However, that remains a big “if”. Nonetheless, even moderate inflationary pressure is
likely sufficient to allow the various central banks in the developed world to slowly but
surely remove their patients from the monetary intensive care unit. As we’ve said
before, it is time for monetary policy to begin to reflect the fact that the global private
sector’s attitude to risk seems finally to have normalised after a long and
understandable hiatus.
William Hobbs
Head of Investment Strategy, UK and Europe
[email protected]
3 | In Focus | 28 July 2017
Market calls – summary
Christian Theis, CFA +44 (0)20 3555 8409
[email protected]
Macro economy summary

Evidence that we are entering what tends to be known as the ‘high
conviction’ phase of the economic recovery is building. The globally
synchronised economic pick up long predicted by the private sector
surveys is now starting to unevenly appear in the hard economic data –
from corporate earnings to trade statistics.

Despite a tight labour market, characterised by multiplying shortages of
labour, inflationary pressures in the US remain benign so far. We see no
cause for alarm however – the relationship between demand and
inflation has always been looser than the textbooks imply. Meanwhile,
transitory factors have again contributed to the weakness in recent
inflation data. For our part, we still see inflation picking up from here.

Central banks across the developed economies have become more
comfortable with the gradual removal of monetary accommodation.
Here, any tightening in monetary policy will be undertaken on a stepby-step basis, and therefore unlikely to threaten the strengthening
recovery.

For now, China remains lower down our global list of concerns.
Authorities have been tightening monetary policy in order to contain
systemic financial risks and asset bubbles. China’s banking sector
remains well capitalised, and the state’s tight control over the financial
sector suggests that a 2008 Lehman-style crisis is unlikely.

More broadly, we believe the world economy will continue to grow and
still see the cycle end as a relatively distant prospect. We are
nonetheless on the look out for signs of cyclical excess. In such a
context we welcome moves towards a more normal monetary
backdrop in the developed world.
Investment conclusions
Strategically: corporate securities preferred
to government, and stocks to bonds
Valuations are high in the US stock market,
but more normal elsewhere. Even assuming
some medium term headwind from
valuations, the excess returns available from
stocks look attractive in a strategic context
relative to high quality bonds.
Tactically: we remain overweight equities
Our current moderate pro risk tactical
posture is consistent with our belief that the
world economy remains in good and
improving health, but likely entering the last,
potentially multi-year, phase of this
elongated economic cycle.
Total returns across key asset classes
Cash & Short-maturity Bonds
0.4%
Developed Government Bonds
0.4%
1.0%
2016
2017 (through 27 Jul)
3.9%
6.2%
3.8%
Investment Grade Bonds
High Yield and Emerging Markets Bonds
8.3%
7.5%
Developed Markets Equities
Real Estate
Alternative Trading Strategies*
13.4%
11.2%
Emerging Markets Equities
Commodities
12.2%
25.8%
11.8%
-3.3%
4.1%
6.8%
2.5%
3.7%
*As of 26th July; Source: FactSet, Barclays. List of indices used: Cash & Short-Maturity Bonds: Barclays US T-Bills (USD); Developed Government Bonds: Barclays Global Treasury (USD Hgd);
Investment Grade Bonds: Barclays Global Aggregate - Corporates (USD Hgd); High Yield & Emerging Market Bonds: 40% BAML US High Yield Master II Constrained TR (USD Hgd), 30% JPM
EMBI Global Diversified TR, 30% JPM GBI-EM Global Diversified TR; Developed Market Equities: MSCI World Net TR (USD); Emerging Market Equities: MSCI EM Net TR (USD); Commodities:
Bloomberg Commodity TR (USD); Real Estate: FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Net TR (USD); ATS: HFRX Global Hedge Fund (USD). 2016 performance data for High Yield and Emerging Market Bonds
calculated based on 40% Barclays Global HY (USD Hgd), 30% Barclays EM Hard Currency Aggregate (USD Hgd), 30% Barclays EM Local Currency Government (USD).
4 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
Selected risks to our views
US economic slowdown?
14
year on year growth (%)
12
10

A slowdown in US economic activity poses the greatest risk to our
investment outlook.

The current US economic expansion is now in its eighth year, a year
longer than the average post-War cycle. This has led many to call,
somewhat mechanically, for an imminent recession.

However, such claims are based on misguided notions about the
fundamental drivers of the business cycle. Business cycles usually
end because of some exogenous shock that causes firms and
individuals to alter their planned expenditures and expectations of
future incomes. They do not die of old age.

So far, lead indicators for the US economy still indicate decent
growth prospects for the US economy. In particular, trend readings
in the ISM Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing indices are still
hovering well above their expansion thresholds.

While a US slowdown is certainly one key risk to look out for, the
risks of an overheating economy should not be discounted either.

With labour markets continuing to tighten under historically loose
monetary policy, there is a risk for inflationary pressures to rise
faster than policymakers anticipate.

In such a scenario, the Fed would likely drive up interest rates to
avoid falling further behind the curve, possibly causing the multidecade bond bull market to unwind chaotically.

For the moment, central bank ownership and historic precedent
suggest to us that the bond market will remain more or less orderly,
even with the return of more inflation. However, this is certainly a
risk worth keeping an eye on.

The extraordinarily rapid rise of debt in China, particularly in the
corporate sector, has given rise to fears that the country may be
long overdue for a banking crisis.

Despite its vulnerabilities, China’s financial system has several
features that reduce the risks of a Lehman-style crisis.

China’s credit growth has been funded primarily by high domestic
savings, of which bank deposits are the vast majority.

Besides that, Chinese banks are mainly reliant on stable customer
deposits rather than interbank markets for short-term funding,
making the risk of a liquidity crunch lower.

Finally, the central government has substantial fiscal resources to
address losses in its financial system and among troubled stateowned debtors.
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Jan-50
US real GDP
Jan-60
Jan-70
Jan-80
Jan-90
Jan-00
Jan-10
Source: Datastream, Barclays
A messy end of the bond bull market?
18
(%)
16
14
12
10 year US treasury yield
10
8
6
4
2
0
Jan-80
Jan-90
Jan-00
Jan-10
Source: Datastream, Barclays
China financial meltdown?
340
(%)
trillions, CNY
320
25
300
20
280
260
15
240
10
220
5
200
180
2004
30
0
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Total banking assets (rhs)
Total banking assets as % of GDP (lhs)
Source: Datastream, Barclays
5 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
Asset class summary
We maintain a Strategic Asset Allocation for five risk profiles, based on our outlook for
each asset class. Our Asset Allocation Forum (AAF), made up of our senior investment
strategists and portfolio managers, regularly assesses the need for tactical adjustments
to those allocations, based on our shorter-term (three to six month) outlook. Here, we
share our latest thinking on our key tactical tilts.
Developed Market Equities: Overweight (increased 23 March 2017)
Our favoured developed
equity regions remain the
US and Europe ex-UK
The latest congressional failure to reform healthcare has further dimmed the likelihood
of this US administration’s pro-business agenda seeing the light of day. In the
meantime, leading indicators for the world economy continue to point to brighter times
ahead, independent of those policy proposals. These firming prospects for global
growth and inflation are what matter for trends in corporate earnings and therefore
prospective equity market returns. With stock market valuations much less remarkable
than the caricature, prospective returns are likely dominated by those aforementioned
global growth prospects rather than valuation multiple expansion. The current yield
available from developed world stocks (dividends plus net buybacks), allied to a
conservative assessment of prospective dividend growth suggests mid to high single
digit annualised returns are still well within reach from current levels.
We remain overweight US stocks, thanks to a domestic economy that is furthest along
the recovery path and a dominant share of a technology sector enjoying both cyclical
and structural growth tailwinds. We do not see the proposed tax cuts having a material
effect on trend economic growth and so would advise viewing their effects as similar to
that inflicted by the oil price plunge of 2014/15 – a temporary phenomenon that has
scant impact on already healthy trends.
The gradual reduction in domestic economic slack should lead to better pricing and
higher profit margins for continental European corporations, a key reason for our
continued overweight on the region.
Emerging Market Equities: Overweight (increased 23 November 2016)
The backdrop for
Emerging Market
corporate profitability has
turned more positive...
We moved our recommended tactical position in Emerging Market Equities up to
Overweight from Neutral in November 2016. The emerging market business cycle is
firming, as evidenced by business confidence surveys and trade data. The recent
performance of Korean exports – a timely lead indicator for the direction of regional
exports – suggest that global trade volumes have further room to pick up, a positive
sign for the broader Emerging Market universe. The prospects for US consumption also
look healthy, with both real income growth and consumer confidence still consistent
with robust consumption spending. This suggests to us that the fundamental
macroeconomic backdrop has turned more positive for emerging market corporate
profitability.
Within Emerging Market Equities, Asia remains our preferred region, with Korea, Taiwan
and China (offshore) our highest conviction country bets on a strategic basis. With the
regions’ earnings sensitive to the trade cycle, what President Trump decides to
implement in regards to trade policy is important. Here, we suspect that economic selfinterest will ultimately triumph over some of the president’s more populist trade
threats.
Cash & Short-Maturity Bonds: Underweight (decreased 23 November 2016)
While cash continues to play a pivotal portfolio insulation role, the rising appeal from
Emerging Market Equities has led the Tactical Allocation Committee to deploy our cash
holdings into the former, bringing our position in Cash & Short-Maturity Bonds from
neutral to underweight.
6 | In Focus | 28 July 2017
Developed Government Bonds: Underweight (decreased 13 October 2016)
Some returning inflation is
central to our current
tactical posture
Nominal yields offered by large chunks of the government bond universe are still
negligible. Investors will likely have to work hard to make real returns from these levels
over the next several years. Our view remains that such valuations underestimate the
underlying inflationary pressures within the US economy in particular, something that
should eventually strengthen as the labour market continues to tighten. For us, the
level of (returns insensitive) central bank ownership probably suggests that the bond
market will remain more or less orderly and may lag a pick-up in inflation. Nonetheless,
our continuing small strategic and tactical allocation to the area suggests that higher
real returns lie elsewhere.
Investment Grade Bonds: Underweight
The spread of investment grade credit over government bond yields has held more or
less firm. Nominal yields in high quality corporate credit remain low in absolute terms
and may make the job of those trying to make positive real returns difficult.
High Yield & Emerging Market Bonds: Overweight (decreased 23 March 2017)
High Yield spreads have compressed significantly relative to levels seen last year, and
we see further – but limited – upside for junk credit over coming quarters. As a result,
we took profit on our overweight position in High Yield Bonds, opting to use those
proceeds to close our underweight position in Developed Asia equities. Given our more
sanguine take on the various risks to global growth and inflation, yields on junk credit
and emerging market debt remain attractive on a risk-reward basis.
Commodities: Neutral (Increased 13 May 2016)
Investors are likely best
served by tilting their
exposure away from gold
where possible
We closed our long-held underweight in the commodity complex last May. US
monetary normalisation will likely provide a headwind, but the stabilisation in Chinese
growth looks sufficient to offset this for the moment. Although the prospects for
greater US infrastructure spending have increased a little in the wake of the US
elections, we would still take some of the more grandiose claims with a pinch of salt,
especially given the inherent difficulties in getting major legislation passed through
today’s hyper-partisan Congress.
Investors are likely best served by tilting their commodity exposure away from gold
where possible, with the non-yielding commodity still particularly vulnerable to further
US interest rate rises. Despite the recent slump in oil prices, we remain moderately
positive on the sub-asset class over the medium-term horizon as OPEC supply cuts
and demand growth see growing inventory draws.
Real Estate: Neutral
Recent volatility has served as a timely reminder of the importance of maintaining a
diversified portfolio with the ability to weather a number of market environments, and
we continue to encourage clients to ensure that they are fully allocated to Real Estate.
Alternative Trading Strategies: Underweight (decreased 13 May)
We shifted our previous tactical underweight in Commodities to Alternative Trading
Strategies (ATS). This is primarily a function of the difference in volatilities for the two
asset classes. There is less risk being underweight the lower volatility ATS in the current
market environment in our opinion. Alongside this, regulation and lower leverage leave
this diversifying asset class without much tactical appeal at the moment.
7 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
The case for investing
Global real GDP
140 Real GDP (Index of logarithm, 1960=100)

Growth is the norm, not the exception.

Most years, world output grows
because of the simple interaction of
new technology and the learning
curve.

The inference is that you have to find
good reasons for betting against that
trend and not with it, as has been the
prevailing wisdom in the aftermath of
the great financial crisis.

The future is of course unknowable.
However, in addition to being able to
suggest that it is more likely that the
world will grow than not, we can also
point to historic performance of the
major asset classes relative to cash
and both nominal and real GDP as an
argument for both diversification and
being invested in the first place.

As our colleagues in Behavioural
Finance are regularly at pains to point
out, it is not so much about timing the
market but time in the market.
130
120
Global
110
100
1970-'79
1980-'89
1990-'99
2000-'09
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Growth of global GDP and asset classes
180
Index (USD, logarithm,1973=100)
160
Real GDP
Nominal GDP
140
120
Equities
Bonds
Cash
100
80
1970-'79
1980-'89
1990-'99
2000-'09
Source: Datastream, Barclays. List of indices used: Equities MSCI World (USD) until 2001, MSCI AC World (USD) from 2001 onwards; Bonds Merrill Lynch US Treasury 7-10 years until 1980, Datastream
10 year US treasuries from 1980 onwards; Cash Federal Reserve US treasury bill 3 month
Historical frequency of equity market gains/losses
100%
80%
60%
40%
Historical frequency of MSCI World gains/losses in USD since end of 1969/1971
(start of monthly/daily data respectively)
89%
78%
53%
56%

Historically, equity market returns
have been positive a lot more than
50% of the time over the long term.

Although equity markets are not the
only source of investor returns, it is
stocks that are going to provide the
bulk of the long-term returns to
investment portfolios.

This ultimately means that an investor
looking to grow assets above inflation
will likely have to accept an
investment portfolio that will be
reasonably correlated to equity
markets over time.
61%
20%
0%
-22%
-20%
-40%
-47%
-44%
1 Day
1 Week
-11%
-39%
Losses
Gains
-60%
Source: Datastream, Barclays
8 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
1 Month
1 Year
5 Years
The case for investing
Minimum/maximum real return of US assets
US assets: annualised
maximum and minimum
real returns over various
periods (%)
20 year
Cash
Bonds
10 year

Those able to buy and hold for longer
periods may have a different
perspective on the risks inherent in the
major asset classes anyway.

Deeper real annualised losses have
come from bonds and cash when the
holding period is extended to 10 years
or more.

The profile of real returns and losses is
significantly more attractive for stocks
over 10 and 20 year holding periods.

Avoiding bear markets is an industry
obsession. Understandably so – the
work of Nobel laureate Daniel
Kahneman and his colleague Amos
Tversky tells us that ‘losses loom larger
than gains’ for the average investor.

However, the fact that most bear
markets are preceded by a rush of
blood that tends to outweigh the
bloodletting that inevitably follows
should temper how carefully we listen
to the more persistent doomsayers.

Being too early to call the end of the
cycle tends to be more costly than
missing the bear market altogether
Equities
5 year
1 year
-50
-25
0
25
50
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Median equity returns around market peaks
60
Median S&P 500 total returns around market peaks (%, 1937-2007)
50
54
45
40
30
20
21
6 months
12 months
24 months
14
6
10
0
-1
-10
-12
-20
Before
Source: FactSet, Barclays
9 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
-15
After
-2
Net
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purposes only. Barclays does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of information which is contained in this document and which is
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or will receive compensation from the companies that are the subject of this publication (“Researched Companies”), such as underwriting,
advising, and lending – as such, it is possible that Barclays Capital Inc., Barclays Bank plc or their affiliated companies may have managed or
co-managed a public offering of securities for any issuer mentioned in this document within the last three years.; (ii) have an interest in the
Researched Companies by acting making a market or dealing as principal in securities issued by Researched Companies or in options or
other derivatives based thereon, or otherwise hold personal interests in the Research Companies; (iii) appoint employees or associates as
directors or officers of the Researched Companies; (iv) act upon the contents of this publication prior to your having received it; (v) effect
transactions which are not consistent with the recommendations given herein.
Barclays offers wealth and investment management products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary
companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No. 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP.
Cyprus – Barclays offers banking, wealth and investment management products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its
subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No. 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14
5HP. Barclays Bank PLC is regulated by the Central Bank of Cyprus in the conduct of its banking and investment business in Cyprus. France –
Barclays Bank PLC, Succursale en France - Principal établissement : 32 avenue George V - 75008 Paris - RCS Paris B 381 066 281 - C.C.P. 6207 Paris - Siège social à Londres E14 5HP, Angleterre, 1, Churchill Place - Reg N° 1026167 - Capital autorisé 3 040 001 000 de Livres
Sterling. BARCLAYS BANK PLC est un établissement de crédit, intermédiaire en assurance (l'immatriculation auprès du FCA peut être
contrôlée sur le site internet www.orias.fr ), prestataire de service d’investissement de droit anglais agréé par the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA), autorité de tutelle britannique qui a son siège social 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, Londres E14 5HS. (www.fca.org.uk), FCA
register n° 122702 La Succursale française de Barclays Bank PLC, est autorisée par le FCA à recourir à un Agent lié, Barclays Patrimoine SCS.
Gibraltar – Barclays offers banking, wealth and investment management products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and
its subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the
Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No. 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London
E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC is authorised by the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission to conduct banking and investment business in
Gibraltar. Guernsey – Barclays offers wealth and investment products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary
companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered Number: 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14
5HP. Barclays Bank PLC, Guernsey Branch is licensed by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission under the Banking Supervision
(Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1994, as amended, and the Protection of Investors (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1987, as amended. Barclays
Bank PLC, Guernsey Branch has its principal place of business at Le Marchant House, St Peter Port, Guernsey, GY1 3BE. Ireland – Barclays
Bank Ireland PLC is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Registered in Ireland. Registered Number: 396330. Registered Office: Two Park
Place, Hatch Street, Dublin 2. Calls may be recorded for security and other purposes. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and
authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.
Registered No. 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Isle of Man – Barclays offers wealth and investment products
and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised
by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered
Number: 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC, Isle of Man Branch is licensed by the Isle of Man
Financial Services Authority. Barclays Bank PLC, Isle of Man Branch has its principal business address in the Isle of Man at Barclays House,
Victoria Street, Douglas, Isle of Man, IM99 1AJ. Italy – Barclays offers wealth and investment management products and services to its
clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential
10 | In Focus | 9 June 2017
Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No.
1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC – Via della Moscova. 18 – 20121 Milan – Italy, is a branch
of Barclays Bank PLC and is registered with the Register of Banks Milan n° 4862. Company Register Milan n° 80123490155 – R.E.A. Milan
1040254 – Fiscal Code n° 80123490155 – Registered VAT n° 04826660153. Jersey – Barclays offers wealth and investment products and
services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by
the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered
Number: 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC, Jersey Branch is regulated by the Jersey Financial
Services Commission. Barclays Bank PLC, Jersey Branch is regulated by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission under the Protection of
Investors (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1987 as amended. Barclays Bank PLC. Jersey Branch has its principal business address in Jersey at 13
Library Place, St Helier, Jersey JE4 8NE, Channel Islands. Monaco – Barclays Bank PLC – Monaco is a branch of Barclays Bank PLC with its
offices in the Principality of Monaco at 31 Avenue de la Costa, MC 98000 Monaco – Tel. +377 93 15 35 35. Registered with the Monaco
Chamber of Commerce and Industry under No° 68 S 01191. Registered VAT No° FR 40 00002674 9. Nigeria – Barclays offers wealth and
investment management products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiaries. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in
England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential
Regulation Authority. Registered No.1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Group Representative Office
(NIG) Ltd. Registered Company No: RC41757 and its mailing address is Barclays Group Representative Office (NIG) Ltd, Courier Department,
3rd Floor, 1 Churchill Place, London, E14 5HP. Portugal – Barclays offers wealth and investment management products and services to its
clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential
Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No.
1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC activity in Portugal is supervised by Banco de Portugal
(BoP) and Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). Qatar – Barclays offers wealth and investment management products and
services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and is authorised by
the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No.
1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays Bank PLC in the Qatar Financial Centre (Registered No. 00018) is
authorised by the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. Barclays Bank PLC QFC Branch may only undertake the regulated activities
that fall within the scope of its existing QFCRA authorisation. Principal place of business in Qatar: Qatar Financial Centre, Office 1002, 10th
Floor, QFC Tower, Diplomatic Area, West Bay, PO Box 15891, Doha, Qatar. This information has been distributed by Barclays Bank
PLC. Related financial products or services are only available to Business Customers as defined by the QFCRA. Switzerland – Barclays Bank
(Suisse) SA is a Bank registered in Switzerland and regulated and supervised by FINMA. Registered No. CH-660.0.118.986-6. Registered
Office: Chemin de Grange-Canal 18-20, P.O. Box 3941, 1211 Geneva 3, Switzerland. Registered branch: Beethovenstrasse 19, P.O. Box, 8027
Zurich. Registered VAT No. CHE-106.002.386. Barclays Bank (Suisse) SA is a subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC registered in England,
authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.
It is registered under No. 1026167 and its registered office is 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. United Arab Emirates (Dubai) – Barclays
offers wealth and investment management products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC and its subsidiary companies.
Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct
Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered No. 1026167. Registered Office: 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP. Barclays
Bank PLC (DIFC Branch) (Registered No. 0060) is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Barclays Bank PLC (DIFC Branch) may
only undertake the financial services activities that fall within the scope of its existing DFSA licence. Related financial products or services are
only available to Professional Clients as defined by the DFSA. Principal place of business in the DIFC: Dubai International Financial Centre, The
Gate Village Building No. 10, Level 6, PO Box 506674, Dubai, U.A.E.
11 | In Focus | 9 June 2017