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Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC Topical Insight | February 6, 2013 Bank Loans vs. Global High Yield Caveat Emptor vs. Carpe Diem The significant decline in nominal yields and commensurate decline in risk premiums of U.S. high yield bonds have forced those with an allocation to the asset class to reconsider current positioning. While an allocation to the U.S. high yield asset class has generated equity-like returns with significantly lower volatility1 since 2006, we expect U.S. high yield bond market returns over the next several years to be lower with higher volatility than the 2006-12 period, driven by several forces (see figure 1). Figure 1 Risk / Reward Characteristics of Various Assets December 2006 - December 2012 20 Gold Annualized Return (%) 15 JPM Emerging Markets 10 Barcap AAA Corp US IT ML Gvt Corp Gerhardt (Gary) Herbert, CFA Portfolio Manager Credit Suisse High Yield Index • US LT Gvt ML Mortgage FTSE NAREIT All REITs Barcap Agg Bd 5 ML ABS Master US Inflation US 30 Day TBill Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index Brian L. Kloss, JD, CPA Portfolio Manager Russell 2000 S&P 500 Joined the Firm in 2010, and has 20 years of investment experience • MSCI EAFE Joined the Firm in 2009, and has 17 years of investment experience 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Annualized Return Volatility (%) Source: Credit Suisse, The Bloomberg Professional Service, Datastream Chief among the concerns are the potential for higher U.S. interest rates due either to stronger-thanexpected U.S. economic growth or a surprise burst of inflation. Either outcome will likely cause an increase in short-term rates in the U.S. and, perhaps, the removal of unorthodox monetary policies. Many asset allocators are therefore considering other credit asset classes for their respective credit allocations. Assets with yields that “float” with changes in U.S. interest rates are viewed as providing a degree of protection that fixed rate U.S. bonds simply can’t provide. Asset allocators with an eye to U.S. credit markets view U.S. bank loans as a tidy solution to these concerns. U.S. bank loans are senior in the capital structure to high yield debt and offer floating rates. We believe conventional wisdom in this case is wrong! While the facts are true, an empirical analysis of long-term performance, recovery rates, and correlations with the U.S. high yield asset class highlight that investors are simply swapping one segment of the fairly to modestly overvalued credit sector for another. 1 See “Toward a Better Approach: Managing High Yield Credit through the Business Cycle” Regina G. Borromeo* Portfolio Manager • Joined Brandywine Global Investment Management (Europe) Limited in 2010, and has 12 years of investment experience * Employee Brandywine Global Investment Management (Europe) Limited. In rendering portfolio management services, Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC may use the portfolio management services, research, and other resources of its affiliates. For Institutional Investors Only Bank Loans vs. Global High Yield | p2 Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC Topical Insight | February 6, 2013 A review of historical performance of the U.S. loan sector shows correlations with high yield bonds above 80% for much of the prior five years; Since the early 1990s, the two asset classes’ respective yields have averaged a near 88% correlation (see figures 2 and 3). Figure 2 20 Month Rolling Return Correlation of Various Assets with Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index August 1993 - August 2012 Figure 3 Leveraged Loan Yield vs High Yield Bond Yield January 1992 - December 2012 20 100 HY Yield-to-Worst CS Lev Loan Index Yield (Assumes 3-yr Refi) 81.45% 80 17 40 Correlation = 0.88 30.20% 20 14 Yield (%) Correlation (%) 60 0 -20 11 -40 -60 -51.34 8 12/31/12 6.25% 5.93% -80 -100 5 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Treasury Avg = -25.81% Libor Avg = -2.02% 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Credit Suisse High Yield Index Avg = 51.10% Source: Credit Suisse, The Bloomberg Professional Service, LB Boston Associates Source: Credit Suisse More worryingly, past performance since the Great Recession highlights the inability of loans to keep pace with the performance offered by U.S. high yield bonds (see figure 4). Figure 4 Cumulative Returns of Bonds, Loans and Equities December 2006 - December 2012 70 Total Returns Since 12/31/2006 60 50 40 CS High Yield Index BarCap Agg Bond CS Leveraged Loan Index S&P 500 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 2006 2008 2010 2012 Source: Credit Suisse, The Bloomberg Professional Service While U.S. loans have not kept pace with U.S. high yield bonds in terms of performance, the conventional wisdom that because U.S. loan rates “float,” they will provide protection in a rising rate environment is simply not true. A historical review of return correlations highlights surprisingly, relative to conventional wisdom, no relationship exists (see figure 2). Bank Loans vs. Global High Yield | p3 Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC Topical Insight | February 6, 2013 While U.S. bank loans are senior in the capital structure, the downside economic sensitivity of the underlying assets that bank loans have claims on overwhelms the ability of the liabilities to re-price upwards—negative convexity in bond market parlance—especially given today’s premium prices to par and weaker covenant quality (see figures 5 and 6). Figure 5 Most Loans Trade At or Above Par2 Figure 6 Cov-Lite Issuance Near All-Time Highs 1997-2012 50% $120B 45% Broader Loan Universe Liquid Par Loans 40% Cov-Lite Volume (LS) % of All Institutional Loans (RS) $80B 28% 30% 97 $100B 40% 30% 35% 87 57 $60B $40B 14% 11% 10% 10% 9% 11% 3% 5% $20B 2 3 100-101 101-102 102-108 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 5% 0% 19 99-100 0 2 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 $0B 0% 98-99 10% 24 5% 0-98 20% 15% 19% 20% 25% Source: Morgan Stanley, Bloomberg Source: Morgan Stanley, S&P LCD Having established that the downside and upside of U.S. bank loans are in fact quite similar to U.S. high yield bonds, many U.S. bank loan managers assert higher recovery rates on loans. A careful review of the recent data reinforces the changing nature of the U.S. bank loan market. Smaller, less well-established enterprises are accessing the U.S. bank loan market with weaker covenants and at higher acquisition prices (see figures 6 and 7), which leads to recovery rates that are not significantly higher on loans than those on bonds (see figure 8). Figure 7 Leverage Metrics for Leveraged Loan Underwriting Total Debt to EBITDA Multiples, Avg. of Upper Quintile 2003 - 2012 Figure 8 Bank Loan Recovery Rates by Covenant and Lien 1995-2012 cov-Lite first lien (%) 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 12 20 20 11 Q4 11 12 Q4 20 20 10 20 09 08 20 20 07 20 06 05 20 20 04 20 20 03 4.0 Source: S&P LCD 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Avg. 48.21 40.79 77.13 69.77 58.98 full covenants first lien (%) 56.75 57.09 62.67 65.96 82.30 90.13 83.64 94.52 60.24 51.93 70.77 68.41 55.09 73.02 cov-lite second lien (%) 7.96 10.03 14.38 11.31 10.92 full covenants second lien overall (%) (%) 94.00 56.92 78.00 73.58 51.17 56.75 57.09 59.56 62.59 100.25 66.97 97.87 83.41 74.27 86.09 49.41 66.08 72.91 88.63 41.67 53.65 20.76 43.18 18.20 50.54 23.38 55.44 13.56 48.72 45.78 65.16 Source: Credit Suisse Bank Loans vs. Global High Yield | p4 Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC Topical Insight | February 6, 2013 A better approach to capturing yields and total returns associated with the leveraged finance sector is to go global. Although risk premiums are declining globally, not all international credit markets have experienced the magnitude of the spread compression seen in the U.S. high yield markets (see figure 9). In fact, most international markets are developing their belowinvestment credit markets out of necessity (as the U.S. did in the early 1990s). European financial institutions are shrinking their balance sheets, while Asian corporates are seeking diversified funding source (see figures 10 and 11). The trend toward disintermediating traditional banking channels in international markets will persist. The ability to capture these excess risk premiums outside U.S. credit markets will be dependent upon a manager that can identify value in an international high yield credit through traditional credit analysis, but also must be able to identify the value offered by the underlying country and currency fundamentals. These three factors determine returns in international high yield, and have been core competencies at Brandywine Global for two decades. Figure 9 European B-Rated Credits Trade Much Wider than US B-Rated Credits 2010 - 2012 (bp) 1300 1200 USD EUR 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 Jan 2010 Jul 2010 Jan 2011 Jul 2011 Jan 2012 Jul 2012 Source: Morgan Stanley, The Yield Book, iBoxx Astute investors are eschewing the more fully valued high yield bond and bank loan markets in the U.S. for the cheaper and safer valuations offered in international high yield bond markets. Carpe diem! Figure 10 European Banks Still Deleveraging Figure 11 Asian Disintermediation Continues: Estimated Breakdown of MSCI AJX Corporates’ Debt Funding3 2008-2013E 140 Japan (Peak = 1993) US (Peak = Q3 2007) W Europe (Peak = Q4 2008) UK 130 Loans / Deposits (%) 120 100% *Estimate 90% 110 80% 100 70% 60% 90 2008/09 represents low debt issuance volumes. 39% 66% 76% 69% 63% 82% 50% 80 40% 70 30% 60 20% Peak 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 Months After Peak Source: Morgan Stanley Research, SNL Financials 49% 17% 29% 10% 0% 2% 2008 17% 16% 17% 12% 2009 8% 2% 2010 2011 Bonds (US) Bonds (Local ccy) 17% 20% 2012 2013E* Loans Source: Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research The broader loan universe is based on a list of 305 leveraged loans (term loan tranches only) with pricing data, representing $304bn in par outstanding. Liquid par loans list based on a smaller set of liquid par (non-distressed) loans with $196bn outstanding. 2 3 The estimate is base on 100 corporates that make up about 67% of the total debt of the whole MSCI AXJ non-financial universe. The views expressed represent the opinions of Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC or any of its affiliates and are not intended as a forecast or guarantee of future results. Bank Loans vs. Global High Yield | p5 Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC Topical Insight | February 6, 2013 All information obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable. In rendering portfolio management services, Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC may use the portfolio management services, research and other resources of Brandywine Global Investment (Europe) Limited, an affiliate. Fixed income securities are subject to credit risk and interest rate risk. High yield, lower-rated, fixed income securities involve greater risk than investment-grade fixed income securities. The Barclays U.S. Aggregate represents securities that are SEC-registered, taxable, and dollar denominated. The index covers the U.S. investment grade fixed rate bond market, with index components for government and corporate securities, mortgage pass-through securities, and assetbacked securities. Characteristics, holdings and sector weightings are subject to change and should not be considered as investment recommendations. Indices are unmanaged and not available for direct investment. Unless otherwise noted, performance returns and other data are current as of December 31, 2012. Brandywine Global will not change the information at a later date. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. ©2013, Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC. All rights reserved.