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MARCH 2017 MARKET COMMENTARY ECONOMIC UPDATE March 6, 2017 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP [email protected] 800-752-4628 Robert Perry Principal, ALM & Investment Strategy 214-451-2432 [email protected] Jason Haley Managing Director, IMG 214-451-2395 [email protected] Hafizan Hamzah Director, IMG 214-451-2427 [email protected] Ryan Bridges Associate, IMG 214-451-3922 [email protected] Chris Eckhoff Senior Analyst, IMG 214-373-3481 [email protected] The political realm has monopolized the recent headlines from a financial markets perspective, particularly as it relates to the success of anti-establishment movements and the potential for significant policy changes. In the last 12 months, we’ve seen a successful Brexit vote and a Donald Trump victory; and in France, the anti-establishment Le Pen campaign is gaining momentum. All of these events present some degree of uncertainty as it relates to future economic growth and financial market stability. That said, monetary policy returned to the forefront in the last week of February, with even the most dovish Fed leaders publically stating that a March rate hike was a likely outcome. Prior to these statements, the markets were pricing just a 25% probability of such an action. In this economic overview, we will discuss tax reform proposals, the recent data trend, and the current tone from the Fed. U.S. Tax Reform President Trump made many promises on the campaign trail, and his administration seems motivated to move forward on many fronts, regardless of how ambitious the agenda may appear. The financial markets have been more concerned with tax reform, deregulation, and infrastructure spending, but there have been seemingly few details on each policy item. Additionally, the White House’s initial focus on controversial immigration issues left some market participants concerned that the aforementioned “big three” would be delayed indefinitely. However, President Trump’s address before Congress on February 28 appeared to reassure market participants that these issues were still very much a priority for the administration. One particular issue investors have been keenly focused on is U.S. tax reform, both corporate and individual. After reviewing the current drafts from Republican leaders, one commentator suggested that the proposed tax reforms would be far more comprehensive than those passed during the Reagan administration, and any substantial changes to U.S. tax policies could have far reaching implications for the global economy/markets, particularly as it relates to trade policies and currency valuations. As such, there would likely be counter measures enacted by other countries. Of course, the key word in all of this is “proposed.” What actually passes Congress may be a mere shell of the current Republican framework. That said, as it relates to the primary objective of tax reforms, all parties involved seem to be united in saying job creation, but the devil is always in the details. The most contentious item within the current tax reform proposed by House Republicans is the inclusion of a border-adjustment tax (BAT), which President Trump has publically criticized (he’s not alone). The significant tax reforms proposed would deeply cut the government’s aggregate tax revenue, depending on how the impact is scored (“static vs. dynamic” in political parlance). House Republican leaders know that any plan that materially worsens the deficit projections will be difficult to get passed through both houses of Congress, so the BAT is intended to be at least a partial revenue offset to the tax cuts. It would effectively be a 20% tariff on 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 1 imports. Businesses that import goods would not be able to deduct those costs, but companies that export goods would not have to count revenues received for those exports as income. This seems like a very reasonable way to incentivize more U.S. production and manufacturing, but it’s not so simple. Large U.S. retailers have naturally been critical of a BAT, given their reliance on imports, and these companies (Walmart, Amazon, etc.) are concerned that it would increase corporate taxes greatly. With lower earnings, these companies may have to reduce staffing, somewhat defeating the initial objective – job creation. One could argue that these workers could just go work for an exporter, but that would mean changing companies and may not be in the same geographic location (or even have the same skill requirements). However, House Republican leaders proposing the BAT would argue that such measures would narrow the trade deficit and boost the dollar, the latter largely nullifying the impact of import tariffs. But what is true in theory is not always so in practice and there are many assumptions in play here. In the end, there will have to be some form of compromise with the BAT, perhaps along the lines of gradually phasing it in down the road, which could still have the effect of a revenue offset in the long-run budget deficit forecasts and provide political cover for the proponents (lots of gamesmanship in budget calculations). Without such changes, it’s difficult to imagine the comprehensive tax reforms being passed by the Senate, particularly considering that Arkansas has two Republican senators (think Walmart). Data Trend The domestic economic data trend has been solid so Exhibit 1 far in 2017, with overall data surpassing expectations Citigroup Economic Surprise Index at an increasing rate in recent months. Exhibit 1 is the 80 Citigroup Economic Surprise Index, which measures 60 actual, reported economic data relative to 40 expectations. A positive index reading implies that the 20 actual data trend has exceeded expectations, as a 0 whole; and the higher the number, the greater the upside surprise. It is currently at the highest level -20 since early 2014, with the recent upswing beginning in -40 early November. Eventually, expectations will likely -60 catch up with the actual trend, and the index will -80 reverse for some period of time. Additionally, the overall data trend continues to be led heavily by survey-based measures of growth. Sentiment has Source: Citigroup Global Markets, Bloomberg been much improved post-election, particularly in the business sector amid the talk of tax reform and deregulation. Exhibit 2 NFIB Small Business Optimism Index 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 Source: NFIB, Bloomberg The Small Business Optimism Index is perhaps the clearest illustration of increased hopefulness postelection. As Exhibit 2 shows, the index surged in December to the highest level since 2004 and held steady in January, largely attributable to survey respondents’ expectations for better business conditions. These expectations are based on anticipation of business-friendly policy changes from the new administration and Republican-led Congress, and sustained optimism will require progress on that front. In other words, survey-based optimism must eventually translate into stronger hard (activity-based) data. January retail sales and CPI are recent examples of 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 2 hard data that did come in above expectations, but this was true for those two measures prior to the election and GDP growth is still trending at 2%. Real progress on the big three policy issues (tax reform, deregulation, and infrastructure spending) will be necessary, and all three face a tough battle in Congress. Fed Update Up until the week of February 27, nothing substantial had changed on the Fed front to start 2017. Most Fed speakers essentially repeated guidance from the December 2016 FOMC meeting, which called for three rate hikes this year. In her testimony before the Senate Banking Committee February 14, Fed Chair Janet Yellen did assert that a March rate hike is still on the table, reiterating that any future policy changes will be datadependent (March included). Her comments were largely balanced with regard to upside and downside risks; and regarding uncertainty in the Fed’s outlook, the Fed Chair acknowledged “possible changes in U.S. fiscal and other policies, the future path of productivity growth, and developments abroad.” Again, this was right in line with the Fed script for many months. If growth and inflation accelerated beyond the current trend, the Fed would have to be more aggressive. If not, it will continue normalization at a gradual pace, assuming the data doesn’t deteriorate going forward. Despite the consistent tone from Fed leaders, markets were still pricing in a less hawkish Fed, particularly as it relates to a March hike. Fed leaders apparently have something else in mind, though, and Vice Chair Bill Dudley granted an unexpected television interview February 28 that was notably hawkish. Dudley was asked specifically what “fairly soon” meant from the recent FOMC minutes regarding the timing of another hike. He responded, “It doesn’t say it’s a week, a month, a couple months. Fairly soon means in the relatively near future.” Within a matter of hours, the market pricing of a March rate hike went from a 35% probability to a 75% probability. This was no accident. It’s uncommon for the Fed to schedule an unexpected interview at the last second and have one of its most dovish leaders make such hawkish comments, and it was meant to forewarn the markets that a March hike was a near certainty, barring a major unexpected risk event. If the Fed decided to not hike at this point, it would be a major hit to the credibility of their guidance. While a March hike would be a modest surprise for the markets, it’s still within the Fed’s most recent guidance (December 2016 SEP). They have made it clear that a gradual normalization process is desired, and the only thing that would change this path would be some of the items Fed Chair Yellen mentioned above, assuming no major changes in Fed structure/leadership in 2018 (The Trump administration seemingly has bigger fish to fry at the moment). Regarding the Fed balance sheet, Yellen’s testimony also reiterated no desire for selling assets outright (Treasuries and MBS); and any shrinking of the balance sheet will be done in “an orderly and predictable way.” This suggests a desire to simply taper reinvestments at some point and gradually reach the previously-stated desire of holding only Treasuries on the balance sheet. Anticipation of MBS reinvestment tapering has weighed somewhat on MBS spreads to start the year, but slower-than-expected progress on the fiscal reform front will likely push the timing expectation of any such action further into the future. CURRENT MARKET THEMES Rates, Volatility and Spreads The rate trend for much of February was lower and flatter, with markets focused more on global political concerns; however, the trend began to reverse at the very end of the month. The hawkish comments from Dudley sparked a bear flattening of the yield curve, and front-end Treasury yields finished the month 6-11 basis points (bps) higher. On February 28, President Trump delivered his first address to Congress, which was well received by risk markets, and the sell-off in Treasury prices extended beyond the front-end of the curve. With the move in short Treasury yields at month-end, the slope of the curve (2-year/10-year spread) flattened 12 bps in February, to 1.12% (lowest since the day after the election), although half of that move has retraced in the first two days of March following Trump’s speech. 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 3 Short-term implied rate volatility (vol) fell further in the first two weeks of February to pre-election levels, but vol bounced higher in the second half of the month to finish the period essentially unchanged. Longer-dated implied vol (e.g., 5yr/5yr swaption) has trended sideways so far in 2017. Exhibit 3 10yr Swap Spread 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 Widening swap spreads has been a somewhat overlooked market theme so far in 2017, but it has had a discernible impact on fixed-income valuations, particularly securitized sectors that typically price/benchmark versus swaps. Year to date, swap rates are approximately 10 bps wider relative to Treasuries for 2-year and longer maturities, and the move has been a partial reversal of the late 2015/early 2016 trend that saw swap rates trade below Treasuries across much of the term structure. -15 The change in short-term repo rates relative to LIBOR has been a major driver of swap spreads during this timeframe. Short-term repo is largely a funding Source: Bloomberg vehicle for Treasuries, and new bank capital rules and regulations contributed to higher repo rates relative to LIBOR in the second half of 2015. One year later, new money market reforms pushed LIBOR higher; and for much of 2017 thus far, treasury repo rates have fallen. This has contributed to wider swap spreads, although spreads have tightened a bit in recent days, given the increase in short Treasury yields in anticipation of a March rate hike. Asset spreads were tighter in February for most investment-grade sectors relative to swaps, with much of the move attributable to tighter swap spreads. Floating-rate spreads have tightened even more due to a combination of both lighter supply and higher demand on expectations of an ongoing Fed tightening cycle. -20 Agency MBS/CMBS MBS spreads have trended sideways to be slightly wider since mid-January, and with rate volatility subsiding and prepays slowing, solid carry has offset any modest widening in the basis. Globally tight credit spreads and slower progress on reforms in Washington have contributed to the stabilization in MBS spreads despite relatively low demand from bank and overseas investors to start the year. The news from Washington becomes more relevant because it affects the market’s expectation for the timing of any Fed balance-sheet reduction. In that context, any good news on the economic or political front is potentially negative for Exhibit 4 MBS spreads, which is why ALM First (and most FNMA 30yr 3.5% MBS other sector participants) consider QE tapering the 40 biggest headwind for MBS performance in 2017. 30 The Fed’s MBS reinvestments have remained a major technical for MBS valuations, and the curve steepening also has impacted recent reinvestments due to slower prepayment speeds. For example, the Fed was reinvesting nearly $45 million per month in September and October due to higher refinance activity, and February purchases are projected to have fallen to $22 million in February. Of course, the reduction in refinance activity also affects the supply side of the equation (timing will differ); but some analysts are suggesting that the 20 10 0 -10 -20 OAS Swaps OAS Treasury Source: J.P. Morgan 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 4 Fed overbought in January, which will have to be offset in the near term with fewer purchases. This could be a “mini-taper” in the near term, but it could also be offset by more participation from banks and overseas investors, particularly if the political headlines slow. Widening swap spreads so far in 2017 have contributed to tightening in assets benchmarked versus the swap curve, including MBS and CMBS. As noted in the previous section, swap spreads are approximately 10 bps tighter year to date, which has pushed MBS spreads essentially equal relative to both swaps and Treasuries for the first time since Q4 2015 (see Exhibit 4). This means spread tightening in the MBS/CMBS sectors over the last two months is more attributable to higher swap rates than lower asset yields, and it’s important to keep swap spreads in mind when assessing cross-sector relative value, given that some sources will show sector spreads relative to Treasuries (corporate bonds) and others versus swaps (structured products). Agency CMBS (ACMBS) spreads have tightened significantly over the last 12 months and are now below 5year averages. That said, front-end ACMBS still trade 20-30 bps over duration-matched agency bullets. For longer ACMBS, Freddie K 10-year A2 spreads are now within 25 bps of non-agency CMBS counterparts, which is the tightest spread differential in three years. This could boost demand for ACMBS from non-agency conduit investors, given the relatively light new issuance pipeline in the non-agency space. ACMBS floater spreads have tightened significantly as well, particularly in recent months. For investors who already have adequate floater allocations, we generally wouldn’t recommend chasing spreads lower, as much of the recent demand is more of a “rates” play with the Fed shifting to a more hawkish bias. That said, investors may still need to use floaters for routine portfolio rebalancing, and we continue to favor ACMBS floaters versus similar alternatives at the moment. Sector Performance As shown in Exhibit 5, most investment-grade, fixed-income sectors performed reasonably well in February, particularly relative to duration-matched swaps. Agency MBS have started the year off strong, particularly the 15-year sector. The BAML 15-year MBS index posted a gross return of 0.43% in February; and for the first two Exhibit 5 Sector Returns February-17 Gross Net* 0.04 - Cash1 Year To Date Gross Net* 0.08 - 2016 0.25 2015 0.02 2014 0.03 Average Annual 0.10 Treasury 2 0.15 0.20 0.32 0.25 1.09 0.98 1.24 1.10 Agy Bullet & Callable3 0.17 0.21 0.36 0.30 1.12 0.97 1.30 1.13 CMO Floater 15 Year MBS 4 -0.18 -0.20 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.42 0.86 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.73 0.65 1.08 1.50 3.94 2.17 30 Year MBS 5 0.52 0.51 0.43 0.35 1.70 1.63 6.91 3.38 1-12 Year Muni AAA-AA 6 0.59 0.62 1.26 1.17 -0.15 2.20 3.72 1.91 3.5-6 Year ACMBS7 0.20 0.21 0.65 0.57 1.92 1.90 4.24 2.68 IG Credit 8 0.42 0.47 0.73 0.66 2.19 1.52 2.12 1.94 HY Credit 9 1.41 1.45 2.59 2.52 17.03 -5.23 0.76 3.77 S&P 500 3.97 - 5.94 - 11.96 1.38 13.69 8.87 KBW Bank Index 5.44 - 5.12 - 27.29 0.49 9.36 11.84 Sources: 1 2 3 4 5 BAML BAML BAML BAML BAML Treasury Bills 0-3 mo US Treasuries 1-5yr AAA US Agcy 1-5yr FNMA 15yr MBS FNMA 30yr MBS 6 7 8 9 BAML Muni 1-12 Yr AAA-AA Barclays Agency CMBS 3.5-6 Yr BAML US Corp A-AAA 1-5yr BAML US HY 1-5yr Constrained * Excess vs. duration-matched swap rate ladder 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 5 months of 2017, the index has bested duration-matched swaps by 65 bps. The relatively strong net performance of fixed-rate sectors is partly attributable to wider swap spreads, which is negative for the performance of the rates benchmark. The 30-year MBS index had a rough January but recovered nicely in February. The CMO floater return was negative in February, which was attributable to wider pricing spreads from the third-party pricing agent. However, for those actively trading the sector, spreads have not been widening for well-structured CMO floaters, when you can find them. Core Spread Portfolio Our Core Spread Portfolio had another solid month of performance, posting a 0.23% gross return in February and a 0.08% excess return over the BAML 1-5 Year Treasury/Agency Index. Exhibit 6 on the following page provides a breakdown of each sector represented in the portfolio, and MBS was the top performer for the month. Over a longer-time series, the strategy has bested the index by 55 bps over the last 12 months, and the 3-year average annual excess return is 54 bps. The portfolio’s OAS tightened by 12 bps in February; and given that we use a swaps benchmark, much of that was attributable to tighter swap spreads. The portfolio’s effective duration remains near the upper bound of its 2.25% to 2.75% target range, so our February reinvestments were directed to ACMBS floaters. Additionally, 15-year 3% dollar rolls have traded more special in recent weeks, with the Fed purchasing more of the coupon after the post-election curve steepening. As such, we delivered low-payup, 15-year pools in the portfolio into the February/March dollar roll. February trades: Reinvested principal paydowns into new issue ACMBS floater Delivered 15-year 3% MBS specified pools into February/March dollar roll Enhanced Liquidity Portfolio Exhibit 7 provides a snapshot of our Enhanced Liquidity Portfolio as of the end of February. The benchmark used for this strategy is a 50/50 blend of the BAML 6-month and 12-month Treasury Bill Indices, and the current portfolio duration is 0.95%. The portfolio’s return was essentially flat versus the benchmark in February, with the bear flattener at month-end weighing on short fixed-rate ACMBS performance. Additionally, the triparty repo holdings are structured as a 12-month ladder, and repo rates were higher across that term structure month over month. We are beginning to add floating-rate bank notes to this portfolio, with a neutral allocation range of 5-10% (currently 4%). This sector posted the highest gross return (0.22%) within the overall portfolio in February. February trades: Reinvested principal paydowns into new issue ACMBS floater Rebalanced triparty repo ladder 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 6 Exhibit 6 Core Spread Portfolio Allocation Agency MBS Fixed Agency CMBS Fixed CMO Fixed CMO/ACMBS Floaters Ex-Ante Analytics 1 Ex-Post Return 2 Neutral 25-35% 15-20% 5-10% 30-40% Current 29% 17% 8% 33% Duration 3.92% 5.23% 3.99% 0.13% OAS 15 34 5 29 Yield 2.44% 2.42% 2.44% 2.37% 2/17 Gross 0.48% 0.15% 0.26% 0.00% 5-10% 5-10% 8% 5% 100% 2.42% 2.52% 2.71% 30 44 25 2.54% 2.36% 2.42% 0.37% 0.35% 0.23% Agency MBS ARM Bank Notes Gross February 2017 0.23% Quarter To Date 0.46% Year To Date 0.46% Last 12 Months 0.65% Since Inception 10.99% 3 Yr Avg Annual 1.56% 5 Yr Avg Annual 1.33% 3 Index 0.15% 0.35% 0.35% 0.10% 7.91% 1.02% 0.87% Excess 0.08% 0.10% 0.10% 0.55% 2.83% 0.54% 0.46% Percent Return Return History 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Last 12 Months 3 Yr Avg Annual Core Spread 5 Yr Avg Annual BAML 1-5yr UST/Agy 1 As of February 28, 2017 2 Market yield utilizing forward rate curve (floaters/ARMs reset at forward rates) 3 Portfolio benchmark is BAML 1-5 Year Treasuries/Agencies Index Exhibit 7 Enhanced Liquidity Portfolio Allocation Agency MBS Fixed Agency CMBS Fixed CMO/ACMBS Floaters Agency MBS ARM Bank Notes Repo Neutral 5-10% 20-30% 20-30% 0-5% 5-10% 20-40% Current 9% 27% 27% 4% 4% 30% 100% Ex-Ante Analytics Duration 3.09% 1.66% 0.12% 0.59% 0.19% 0.55% 0.95% Gross February 2017 0.05% Quarter To Date 0.27% Year To Date 0.27% Last 12 Months 0.95% Since Inception 3.94% 3 Yr Avg Annual 0.65% 5 Yr Avg Annual 0.59% 3 Index 0.06% 0.17% 0.17% 0.71% 2.07% 0.39% 0.33% Excess -0.01% 0.09% 0.09% 0.23% 1.83% 0.26% 0.26% Percent Return Return History OAS 4 49 29 49 37 1 25 1 Ex-Post Return 2 2/17 Gross 0.31% 0.01% -0.01% 0.17% 0.22% 0.03% 0.05% 3 Yr Avg Annual 5 Yr Avg Annual Yield 2.17% 1.84% 2.36% 2.66% 2.17% 0.93% 1.78% 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 Last 12 Months Enhanced Liquidity 50/50 BAML 6 & 12 Month T-Bill 1 As of February 28, 2017 2 Market yield utilizing forward rate curve (floaters/ARMs reset at forward rates) 3 Portfolio benchmark is a 50/50 blend of the BAML 6-month and 12-month Treasury Bill Indices 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 500 | Dallas, TX 75219 | www.almfirst.com | 800.752.4628 7 DISCLAIMER: Returns are gross of fees, unaudited, and estimated using the Modified Dietz method. ALM First does not have complete discretionary trading authority over each account reflected in the performance discussed herein. Investments in securities are valued based on quotations obtained from independent pricing services or independent dealers. With respect to securities where independent valuations are not available on the valuation date, or where a valuation is not deemed reasonable by ALM First, ALM First will determine the fair value. The fair valuation process requires judgment and estimation by ALM First. Although ALM First uses its best judgment in estimating the fair value of investments, there are inherent limitations in any estimation technique. Future events may affect the estimates of fair value and the effect of such events on the estimates of fair value, including the ultimate liquidation of investments, could be material to returns. The production and delivery of this material to any investor/recipient does not establish any express or implied duty or obligation between ALM First and any such investor/recipient, including (without limitation) any duty to determine fair market value or update such material. Moreover, this report was prepared as of the date indicated herein. No representation or warranty is made by ALM First that any of the returns or financial metrics detailed herein will be achieved in the future, as past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Certain assumptions may have been made in preparing this material which have resulted in the returns and financial metrics detailed herein. Changes to the assumptions may have a material impact on any returns or financial metrics herein. Furthermore, ALM First gives no representation, warranty or undertaking, or accepts any liability, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained this report. This report was prepared for informational purposes only without regard to any particular user’s investment objectives, financial situation, or means, and ALM First is not soliciting any action based upon it. This material is not intended as, nor should it be construed in any way as accounting, tax, legal, or investment advice including within the meaning of Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Certain transactions give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. The strategies discussed herein can have volatile performance and may employ leverage. Moreover, investment advisory fees and expenses may offset trading gains. This report was prepared by ALM First Financial Advisors, LLC. The hereto mentioned report contains information which is confidential and may also be privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the intended recipient(s). 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