Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Fuzzy Systems in Use for Human Reliability Analysis Myrto Konstandinidou Zoe Nivolianitou Nikolaos Markatos Christos Kyranoudis Loss Prevention Prague, June 2004 NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Outline Introduction The Fuzzy Logic as a modeling tool Methods for Human Reliability Analysis The CREAM methodology Development of the Fuzzy Classification System Results Conclusions NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Introduction HRA is a critical element for PRA Most important concerns: - the subjectivity of the methods - the uncertainty of data - the complexity of the human factor per se Fuzzy logic theory has had many relevant applications in the last years NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Fuzzy Logic as a modeling tool (1) Fuzzy logic (FL) is a very useful tool for modeling - complex systems - qualitative, inexact or uncertain information • FL resembles the way humans make inference and take decisions FL accommodates ambiguities of real world human language and logic NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Fuzzy Logic as a modeling tool (2) Applications - Automatic control - Data classification The most used fuzzy inference method: Mamdani’s method (1975) - Decision analysis - Computer Vision - Expert systems NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Fuzzy Logic as a modeling tool (3) Definitions FL allows an object to be a member of more that one sets and to partially belong to them. - Fuzzy set - Degree of membership - Partial membership NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Fuzzy Logic as a modeling tool (4) The 3 steps of a FL system Fuzzification Crisp Input Defuzzification Inference Crisp Output Fuzzification: the process of decomposing input variables to fuzzy sets Fuzzy Inference: a method to interpret the values of the input vectors Defuzzification: the process of weighting and averaging the outputs NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Methods of Human Reliability Analysis Fundamental Limitations – – – Insufficient data Methodological limitations Uncertainty Most important methods developed for HRA: – – – THERP CREAM ATHEANA NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering CREAM Methodology (1) The choice of CREAM was made because: 1) It is well structured and precise 2) It fits better in the general structure of FL 3) It presents a consistent error classification system 4) This system integrates individual, technological and organizational factors NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering CREAM Methodology (2) Control Modes 1. Scrambled 2. Opportunistic 3. Tactical 4. Strategic Definition of Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) to be used in FL model NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (1) Experience - Accident analysis - Risk assessment - Human reliability Data - Diagrams of CREAM - MARS Database - Incidents and accidents from the Greek Petrochemical Industry NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (2) The Development of the Fuzzy Classification System for Human Reliability Analysis STEP 1 Selection of input parameters NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection STEP 2 Development of the Fuzzy sets STEP 3 Development of the Fuzzy Rules NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (3) STEP 1: Selection of the input parameters Adequacy of organization Number of simultaneous goals Crew collaboration quality Working conditions Available time Adequacy of training Adequacy of maintenance & support Availability of procedures & plans Time of day (Circadian rhythm) NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (4) STEP 2: Development of the Fuzzy sets Each input is given a number based on its quality 0 (worst case) - 100 (best case) “Time of day” from 0:00 (midnight) to 24:00 Output scale 0.5*10-5 - 1.0*100 NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (5) CPCs INPUT Fuzzy sets Adequacy of organization 4 Working conditions 3 Availability of procedures 3 Adequacy of maintenance 4 No of simultaneous goals 3 Available time 3 Time of day 3 Adequacy of training 3 Crew collaboration quality 4 OUTPUT Probability of human erroneous action 4 NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (6) Output fuzzy sets: Probability of a human erroneous action Control mode Strategic Action failure probability 0.5*10-5<p<1.0*10-2 Tactical 1.0*10-3<p<1.0*10-1 Opportunistic 1.0*10-2<p<0.5*100 Scrambled 1.0*10-1<p<1.0*100 NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (7) Quality o f Working Con ditions 1 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 W orking conditions NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Input variable Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection 70 80 90 100 Incom patible Com patible NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Advantageous School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (8) Action Failure Probability 1 0 -5.30E+00 -4.30E+00 -3.30E+00 -2.30E+00 -1.30E+00 -3.00E-01 Strategic Probability interval Tactical Opportunistic Output NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” NATIONAL TECHNICAL Institute of Nuclear Technology UNIVERSITY OFScrambled ATHENS and Radiation Protection School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (9) STEP 3: Development of the fuzzy rules Based on CREAM basic diagram Simple linguistic terms Logical AND operation NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering CREAM basic diagram Σimproved reliability 7. 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Σreduced reliability Strategic Tactical NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection Opportunistic Scrambled NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Development of a Fuzzy Classifier (10) Fuzzy model operations Fuzzification Input values NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection Defuzzification Inference Probability that operator performs erroneous action NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Scenarios Five independent scenarios characterizing 5 different industrial contexts: Scenario 2 represents a best case scenario Scenario 4 represents a worst case scenario Scenarios 4 and 5 have slight differences in the values of input parameters NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Results of test runs Scenario Control Mode 1 Tactical Probability Fuzzy Model results interval 1.0*10-3<p<1.0*10-1 1.0*10-2 2 (Best case) 3 Strategic 0.5*10-5<p<1.0*10-2 9.81*10-4 Opportunistic 1.0*10-2<p<0.5*100 6.33*10-2 4 (Worst Scrambled case) 1.0*10-1<p<1.0*100 2.02*10-1 5 1.0*10-1<p<1.0*100 1.91*10-1 Scrambled NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Comments on the results All FL model results in accordance with CREAM Best case scenario probability Worst case scenario probability Small differences in input have impact to output The results can be used directly in PSA methods (event trees, fault trees, etc.) NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection very low action failure very high action failure NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Conclusions (1) FL system to estimate the probability of human erroneous action has been developed: Based on CREAM methodology 9 input variables 1 output parameter NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Conclusions (2) Test runs for 5 different scenarios Very satisfactory results Main difference between FL model and CREAM: probabilities estimation are exact numbers The results can and will be used in other PSA methods NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Further goals 1) Model calibration with data from the Greek Petrochemical Industry 2) Addition of other CPCs or PSFs 3) Expansion to other fields of the chemical industry 4) Application in other fields of technology (e.g aviation technology, maritime transports, etc…) NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering Acknowledgments The Financial support of the EU Commission through project “PRISM” GTC1-2000-28030 to this research is kindly acknowledged NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS School of Chemical Engineering