Download Paper-3.1-Landings-Obligation-Vision-6

The North Sea Regional Advisory Council
Landings Obligation Focus Group
8th April 2014, Paris
Paper 3.1
Draft (6)
For Discussion
Implementation of the EU Landings Obligation
Note that this paper is incomplete and requires further input and discussion by
the NSRAC
The task of preparing advice on the various elements of the landings obligation has been
divided into several work streams.
Those sections still to be prepared are those on:

Control issues, fully documented fisheries

Quota management and flexibilities, international swaps
New text is shown in colour.
development
Some of this new text may require comment and further
Note that where participants disagree with the text they should – if possible propose new replacement text, rather than simply stating their disagreement
with the existing text
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Table of Contents
1.
Background & Antecedents ................................................................................. 3
2.
A Vision for the North Sea Demersal Fisheries .................................................. 3
3.
The Priority Issues ................................................................................................ 6
Preparing the main elements of a Discard Plan: Meeting the EU Landings
Obligation in the North Sea ......................................................................................... 6
Changes to the Control Regime: Revision and Refocusing the Control Regulation .. 6
Developing Mixed Fishery Plans ................................................................................. 6
Achieving MSY for the Mixed Fisheries of the North Sea ........................................... 7
Meeting the requirements of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) ....... 7
4.
Implementing EU Landings Obligation in the North Sea .................................. 7
Mixed Fishery Management Plans .............................................................................. 7
A Discard Plan for the North Sea Demersal Fleets .................................................... 8
Control and Compliance ............................................................................................. 8
Technical measures .................................................................................................... 9
Selectivity .................................................................................................................... 9
Exemptions from the landings obligations ................................................................ 10
Survival ..................................................................................................................... 11
De Minimis Provisions ............................................................................................... 11
Inter-species flexibility ............................................................................................... 12
Governance ............................................................................................................... 12
The North Sea Advisory Council ............................................................................... 13
Norway ...................................................................................................................... 13
Engagement with the Scheveningen Group ............................................................. 15
Improving fisheries science ....................................................................................... 17
A Learning Process ................................................................................................... 17
Quota Management; Choke Species ........................................................................ 18
Minimum Landing Sizes ............................................................................................ 18
Reducing the Number of TACs ................................................................................. 19
Implications for Fishing Businesses .......................................................................... 19
MSY and the Landings Obligation ............................................................................ 20
Wider Ecosystem Considerations; MSFD ................................................................. 22
Convergence; Setting the Milestones ....................................................................... 23
5.
The way forward .................................................................................................. 23
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1. Background & Antecedents
A central objective of the proposed reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the
progressive elimination of discards in all EU fisheries through the introduction of an
obligation to land all catches. North Sea demersal fishing fleets will soon be operating within
a CFP transformed by the discard ban and other 2013 reforms. The landings obligation will
be applied to the demersal fisheries in the North Sea in January 2016 for some species.
Discard Plans will need to be developed and proposed by the NSRAC to cooperating
member states well before that target date. Such plans will require fundamental changes to
current management and control regimes, and will affect all aspects of the CFP.
The NSRAC Executive Committee has agreed that prompt and well thought-out advice on
the implementation of the discard ban must now be provided to the Commission and
member states. It is evident that STECF and others are struggling to provide advice. It was
time to produce its vision for the North Sea demersal fisheries, setting out a destination for
those fisheries in the context of introduction of the landings obligations. The next step was to
draft a paper setting out proposals for the NSRAC to consider further.
This is that paper. Many people have contributed to it, but not all the ideas presented have
been fully worked out and there are still some gaps. This version is put forward at this stage
for further comment and development. It will be discussed further at the Executive
Committee Meeting on the 25th February in London.
2. A Vision for the North Sea Demersal Fisheries
First we present a vision of the North Sea demersal fisheries in 2025, both as a destination
to strive for and as a guide to the practical implementation of the landings obligation.
Implementation of the actions to achieve this vision depends on the time scale. A target date
of 2025 would be realistic given all the challenges, and would prepare us for the next series
of reforms to the Common Fisheries Policy. However, 2020 also provides its own deadlines
in terms of implementing the provisions of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. But
there are other, much closer targets that need to be met on a shorter timescale. The vision
must therefore incorporate a series of milestones to meet a number of successive targets.
Our long-term vision includes the following for the North Sea Demersal Fisheries:
Higher Yields
Progress towards high yield fisheries, with low fishing mortality rates, will have been
maintained. International obligations for meeting Maximum Sustainable Yield objectives will
have been fully implemented.
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Higher Profitability
Fishing businesses will be operating in a stable resource environment, with predictable
fishing opportunities from one year to the next.
Better Food Security
Maintenance of food supplies will be a priority. Food security exists when all people, at all
times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for a healthy
and active life. Global demand for food is continuing to increase while production growth is
slowing, against a background of future climate change. The North Sea has provided an
important source of food in the past and must continue to do so. Assurances can and will be
provided on food quality, safety and traceability.
Improved Fisheries Management
Fisheries management in the North Sea will have the full support of fishers and other
stakeholders and management will be characterised by a high degree of professionalism,
with confident participation by fishers, and full compliance with regulations. Management will
operate at minimal cost to taxpayers.
Sustainable Ecosystems
Management objectives consistent with an ecosystem approach will guide fisheries policy.
Although these will be applied within the context of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive,
the detail will be determined largely at regional level, by cooperating member states working
closely with the North Sea Advisory Council.
Relevant Co-decision Taking
Co-decision at the European level, will be reserved for overarching, strategic, policy issues;
and auditing the functioning of the European fisheries management system as a whole. It
will not obstruct practical management of the fisheries.
Better Understanding of the Rules
There will be a high degree of comprehension about what compliance with the rules in force
involves; and there will be full internal consistency and coherence within those requirements.
Cooperation with Norway
There will be close cooperation and a high degree of mutual understanding between Norway
and EU on the application of the landings obligation in the North Sea.
Results-based Management, with Full Documentation of Catches
Input controls such as effort control, engine power and capacity constraints will have been
left behind, and replaced by a system of management focused on outputs and results. There
will be a high degree of transparency throughout the system, underpinned by full
documentation of catches and willing compliance. The resultant data will be used to
strengthen stock assessments within a streamlined and up-to date system of scientific
advice, with less pressure placed upon scientists.
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Mixed Fishery Management Plans
Most TACs will be set within the context of long term management plans applicable to mixed
fisheries rather than individual fish stocks, incorporating full consideration of interactions
between species. Those plans will not be based solely upon scientific considerations. They
will also take account of the characteristics and interests of the different fleets. Plans will be
approved on a regional basis by cooperating member states, working with the NSRAC and
scientific advisers.
Economic Incentives
Economic Incentives will be aligned with management objectives. Perverse incentives that
act against conservation interests will be identified swiftly, and removed promptly.
Improved Selectivity
Technical conservation rules will have been replaced by selectivity measures, determined at
vessel level by each skipper to achieve the optimum catch/ landings consistent with the
vessel’s quotas and with the requirements of the landings obligation.
Fewer TACs
TACs will be set for the main economic driver species with fewer TACS set overall in the
North Sea. TACs will, of course, be based on total catch. Alternatively, and where
appropriate, TACs may be grouped or combined in a similar way to the way in which the
“Norway Others” quota currently works. The resultant flexible management regime will
ensure that the problem of choke stocks will be avoided.
Less Emphasis on Micro-management
There will have been a decisive move away from prescriptive micro-management. This shift,
along with the other reforms, will provide the basis for a profitable sector in which fleet
renewal without subsidy is not only possible but the norm.
Delegated Responsibility
Various forms of delegated responsibility will be in evidence, within a framework of external
audits, incentives and sanctions.
High Survival Rates
Within the landings obligation, some quota species will continue to be returned to the sea,
when there is confidence that the level of survival of those species is consistent with
management objectives of high yield fisheries. A risk assessment approach will be adopted
in deciding whether to retain fish or release them to the sea, taking into account the gains or
losses to the ecosystem. A similar risk assessment approach will be taken in deciding
whether to retain or return by-catch species.
Self-auditing
Low-cost self-auditing will be common aboard fishing vessels and a range of remote sensing
technologies will be in use to provide confidence in the system, releasing resources formerly
expended on expensive but largely ineffective controls.
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Fishing Vessels as Research Platforms
Fishing vessels will routinely be employed under contract to provide a range of scientific
data, and to participate in reference fleets. Partnership agreements between scientists and
fishermen will be the basis for a highly effective information system on which management
decisions will be based. Fishers will be trained to deliver information through a process of
on-board, self-sampling
3. The Priority Issues
In preparing a roadmap with milestones to meet this vision it will be necessary to take
account of the whole series of parallel developments that are taking place as part of the
reforms to the CFP. Those issues include:
Preparing the main elements of a Discard Plan:
Obligation in the North Sea
Meeting the EU Landings
Discard Plans will need to be developed and proposed by the NSRAC to cooperating
member states well before that target date. Such plans will require fundamental changes to
the current management and control regimes and will affect all aspects of the CFP.
Changes to the Control Regime: Revision and Refocusing the Control
Regulation
Although the discard ban is not seen as a control issue in itself, the ban will require major
adjustments to the current control regulation. The implications of full documentation may
introduce proposals for new forms of control. Monitoring compliance with the discard ban
may raise problems. Remote monitoring of catches is one way to achieve compliance, but it
is not the only way. There will be a need for alignment and modernisation of the Control
Regulation.
Developing Mixed Fishery Plans
The Commission sees the development of mixed fisheries plans as the cornerstone of the
CFP reforms. That species are mixed within the catch is undoubtedly a factor that needs to
be considered, but there is scepticism amongst fishers whether true mixed fishery plans can
ever be developed successfully. Currently there are no examples of extant mixed fishery
plans that can serve as models, and in their absence there is a risk that simple and naïve
principles will be applied (such as stopping fishing when the catch for any one species meets
the single stock advice). New mixed fishery plans are required that properly integrate the
current single-TAC approach, take full account of the whole fishery system, and are suitably
precautionary. The plans must also take account of multi-species interactions and the need
to protect key commercial stocks, such as Nephrops, from high levels of natural mortality
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through increased predation. Trade-offs will be necessary between the interests of different
fleets. Some fleets may be targeting species that form part of the by-catch for other fleets.
Achieving MSY for the Mixed Fisheries of the North Sea
The EU is obliged by international agreements to maintain or restore fish stocks to maximum
sustainable yield; MSY. However, there can be no single value for MSY in an ecosystem
context, and there is a need to decide on an appropriate value in a multi-species context.
The interests of stakeholders must be considered in setting that value. Reaching biomass
targets, as some have suggested, is inappropriate in an ecosystem context, and any MSY
targets set must be in terms of fishing mortality.
Meeting the requirements of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD)
The MSFD defines environmental objectives for European seas, based on sustainable
development within healthy marine ecosystems. Individual sectors (e.g. fisheries) need to
comply with MSFD objectives.
4. Implementing EU Landings Obligation in the North Sea
Because the landings obligation reflects a high level political compromise, and the basic
regulation contains a degree of linguistic ambiguity, it is open to wide interpretation. In
addition, the co-legislators in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers envisage
that the landings obligation would generally be implemented through member states
cooperating at regional seas level. This means that there is currently a high degree of
uncertainty about how the landings obligation will be implemented. There are fears within the
fishing industry, scientific community and the control authorities that the gains of recent
years could be lost if this major change to the CFP is mishandled. Vessel operators have
anxieties about the economic viability of their operations under a landings obligation.
Although work on how the landings obligation will be applied to the demersal fisheries in the
North Sea is in its infancy, the timetable for its application is demanding – January 2016 for
the first species.
In view of the above, NSRAC outlines below how it considers that the new requirements
should be implemented, within the specific conditions of the North Sea fisheries, in order to
move towards the fulfilment of its vision, and perhaps more pertinently, to avoid the major
pitfalls associated with a mishandled implementation regime.
Mixed Fishery Management Plans
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With the implementation of a landings obligation in the North Sea it is envisaged by the
Commission that demersal fisheries will take place within the context of a multi-annual
management plan, developed at regional level, with close involvement of the NSRAC. We
recognise that this worthy ambition faces a number of hurdles, not least:

Issues relating to institutional competence within the European institutions but
also in relation to the EU Norway reciprocal agreement

The evolving science on mixed fishery, multi-species and ecosystem dimensions
to managing the fisheries in the North Sea

The need to consider differences between fishing fleets

The establishment of effective regional cooperation by North Sea member states
It may therefore be some time until a comprehensive multi-annual plan is agreed and
implemented for the North Sea demersal fisheries.
A Discard Plan for the North Sea Demersal Fleets
In the absence of a mixed fishery plan member states have the option/responsibility to
develop a discard plan. Failing this, the default position would be for the European
Commission to step in with their own discard plan which would apply for three years and
would set the terms for a de minimis for species for which selectivity is very difficult or the
costs of implementing the landings obligation are disproportionate.
Against this background, the NSRAC considers it important that North Sea member states,
working closely with the NSRAC, make a joint recommendation for a discard plan in good
time for the 1st January 2016, when the landing obligation will begin to be phased in across
the North Sea demersal stocks. This discard plan should:

Be consistent with articles 15, 21 and 22 of the new CFP basic regulation

Be implemented progressively, as mentioned in article 15

Take full advantage of the quota flexibilities that are available under the same
regulation

Learn the lessons from implementation of discard bans in other countries, not
least Norway, without following these blindly or slavishly

Adopt as far as possible an incremental and pragmatic approach to the
implementation of the new regime
Control and Compliance
The overarching policy objectives with regard to control and monitoring of the landings
obligation should be to:
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
Achieve a high degree of compliance, underpinned by a risk based enforcement
approach.

Ensure that additional costs associated with monitoring and compliance with the
landings obligation are proportionate to the revenue generated by that fleet
segment

Adopt pilot innovative approaches such as reference fleets/catch composition
checks/self-audit where possible to achieve a balance between assurance and
cost

Ensure complete removal of all regulatory requirements inconsistent with the
landings obligation

Apply an incremental approach linked to a high degree of pragmatic enforcement
in order to avoid the widespread criminalisation of fishermen overnight.
Technical measures
The introduction of a landings obligation renders many of the present regulations redundant.
It is the intention of the Commission that a new Technical Measures Framework Regulation
will be developed as part of the reforms that, over time, will facilitate full implementation of
the landing obligation. It will be essential, however, to adopt this regulation in time to allow
new selectivity and other measures to be put in place.
One particularly valuable first step would be to remove days-at-sea controls
The Minimum Landing Sizes (MLS) that are set by the Commission are said to be "technical
measures for the protection of juvenile fish." However, for many species there is no minimum
landing size and those that exist are often set below the age of sexual maturity. It is
proposed that Minimum Conservation Reference Sizes (MCRS) will now replace MLS and
that this will allow immature fish to be landed but not sold at market for human consumption.
This change from Minimum Landing Size (MLS) to MCRS will achieve very little. First, there
is little conservation value in regulating the use of dead fish. Second, it seems curious to
claim that it is a waste of resources to discard fish, but then prevent the use of that fish
through other regulations. Incentives to target larger fish could be made through applying a
“catch multiplier” to quantities of fish below a certain size. Then of course there is the
question of whether it is always better to target large fish. Some scientists have argued that
it may be better to harvest surplus small fish, leaving the larger fish to spawn.
Regulation on mesh sizes and catch composition should be abolished. As a consequence of
this, the one-net-rule should also be abolished.
Selectivity
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We anticipate that the requirement to land all quota species (which will then count against
quota) will provide a strong economic incentive to reduce unwanted catch. Disposal costs
associated with landing unwanted catch will provide an additional economic incentive.
The discard ban therefore provides an opportunity, as well as a strong imperative for a
decisive shift away from gear selectivity based on prescriptive legislation (which has not
been a notable success over the last 20 years) to a radically more flexible and adaptable
approach focused at individual vessel level.
This new approach should be embraced and supported by removing all residual technical
conservation controls simultaneously with the application of the landings obligation.
A protocol for vessels operating in the Norwegian zone of the North Sea needs to be
developed, so that vessels can operate their chosen technical solutions freely across
International boundaries.
Key selectivity issues include:

How can we achieve better selectivity - leading to better survival of both unwanted
fish and fisheries? Can incentives be provided?

Improvements in selectivity will require changes to the technical conservation rules
and regulations.

How can socio-economic benefits from reducing unwanted catches best be
achieved?

What benefits will there be to the ecosystem?

When will maximum selectivity be achieved?

Scientific work will be necessary, with the participation of fishers, to develop new
fishing gears; and new nets incorporating escape features of various kinds. The
results of pilot trials must then be implemented.
Exemptions from the landings obligations
Landing fish that would otherwise have survived and added to the stock biomass, is an
example of a potentially perverse outcome at odds with management objectives.
Determining what counts as a high survival rate poses a challenge to scientists. They may
not be able to deliver advice in a useable form because of the high level of variability in the
survival rate, reflecting ever-changing conditions (fishing gear, season, age, treatment on
deck etc.). A risk assessment approach is required. Will the release of particular fish benefit
the ecosystem, or would their retention and landing be more appropriate?
Frequently, survival rates can be improved by better on-board handling. For some species,
in which selectivity on the seabed is very difficult or impossible, improving the survival rate of
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returnees offers a viable and reasonable alternative to landing dead fish of limited
commercial value and with a negative impact on stock biomass. In some cases it may also
be better for the ecosystem to return fish to the sea, rather than retain them on board.
A pragmatic solution would be to provide an exemption for all species considered by risk
assessment to be capable of survival and to work at a fishery level to enhance the conditions
that contribute to survival.
Key issues on exemptions include:

The Commission can derogate landings obligation if needed to implement
international obligations into EU law.

There is a need to define those species for which fishing is prohibited.

There is a need to define those species for which scientific evidence demonstrates
high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of the gear, fishing
practices, and the state of the ecosystem.

How are the De Minimis provisions to be handled?

How can the latter two considerations be taken up in multi-annual plans or discard
plans?
Survival
The landings obligation should not lead to an increase in the actual mortality of fish. Which
fish can survive and how do we define a high level of survival? This is not entirely a
scientific issue. There is a need to collate the latest findings on survival rates in different
fleets, in different areas, at different times of the year. The ICES WGMEDS (Methods for
Estimating Discard Survival) is to meet on the 17-21 February and to report to ACOM by 14
April. STECF is also expected to produce guidance on experimental approaches to
determining survival rates. However, there will be a need for new experimental work to take
place to consider ways of optimising survival through gear modifications, different treatments
on deck, sorting methods etc. There will also be a need to analyse existing research on
discard survival.
De Minimis Provisions
In the new regulation up to 5% of the total annual catches of all species subject to landings
obligation can be exempt from the landings obligation. For a transitional period of four years,
the 5% shall increase by two percentage points in the first two years of application of the
landing obligation and by one percentage point in the subsequent two years. This provision
may operate when, within a multi-annual plan or discard plan:

Scientific evidence indicates that increases in selectivity are difficult to achieve
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
Disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches will be avoided

There are provisions for the documentation of catches

Minimum conservation reference sizes are set
The interpretation of ‘5% of total Annual Catches’ is not entirely clear. Is this to be based on
the TACs, member state alocations, vessel quotas, aggregate regional quota shares?
STECF guidance is being provided to member states for De Minimis provisions in multiannual plans or discard plans. However the following questions must be asked::

What catch records are required to justify a De Minimis exemption (by species)?

What additional costs will be involved (additional labour for sorting catch)?

What level of aggregation?

What level of applicability?

Which fleet segments/gears?
Note: Interquota flexibilities in article 15 of the basic regulation deal with choke species
issues and may not be relevant to issues of selectivity and exemptions.
Inter-species flexibility
Concrete modalities for applying inter-species flexibility should be defined fishery by fishery.
It does not make always sense to count the catches of one species against the quotas of
other species, irrespective of the state of conservation of the different species or irrespective
of the level of mortality induced by a particular fishery.
Governance

Experience over the last 20 years tells us that governance structures are
absolutely central to the success of fisheries management measures in the North
Sea.

Past failures in governance and specifically, micro-management by over use of
overly-prescriptive legislation, was identified in the CFP Reform Green Paper, as
one of the main reasons fisheries policy in the EU had frequently failed to meet
its objectives.

This analysis and conclusion provided the main reasons why CFP reform has
now moved some way towards a decentralised approach to policy formulation in
fisheries.

Scope for policy formulation by member states cooperating at the regional seas
level, in ways that are consistent with EU treaty obligations, is an integral part of
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the reformed CFP, and by extension to the implementation of the landings
obligation.

Within parameters laid down by the European institutions, member states now
have the option to develop regionally focussed discard plans, or more
ambitiously, full multi-annual management plans for their fisheries.
Recommendations for discard plans will normally be adopted as proposals by the
Commission as a delegated act, whilst full multi-annual management plans will
be subject to full co-decision procedure.

The CFP basic regulation also makes provision for a default mechanism through
which implementing legislation will applied by the Commission if member states
fail to deliver discard plans in a timely manner.

Learning especially from the shortcomings of the Cod Recovery Plan, and its
successor the Cod Management Plan, the reformed CFP contains important
elements of a results-based approach.

The adoption of an outcomes-focused approach contrasts starkly with
prescriptive legislation and micro-management that formerly characterised the
CFP, and which resulted in its underlying inability to deliver effective fisheries
policy.
The North Sea Advisory Council
The direction of travel reflected in the current legislative changes are very much in line with
the advice provided by the North Sea Regional Advisory Council since its establishment in
2004. We recognise however, that notwithstanding the central importance of having the right
governance structures in place, decentralised policy formulation provides the preconditions
for success, not success itself. The focus must now shift to the content of fisheries policy and
specifically the implementation of the landings obligation.
Norway
Geography and shared fish resources make it inevitable that the EU and Norway are
compelled to find ways of working together to jointly manage shared fish stocks. The annual
reciprocal fisheries agreement between EU and Norway is the principal instrument through
which this cooperation is achieved. It is however a complex, multi-faceted agreement, in
which negotiating leverage in one part of the agreement can create obstacles to a
straightforward management approach in another.
Despite the negotiating complexities of the relationship between EU/ Norway, in the joint
conference on long term management plans held in Svalbard in May 2012, both parties
spoke strongly in favour of management plans which:
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
Are developed with a high degree of transparency and participation by
stakeholders

Focused on long term objectives

Provide for high and stable yields

Provide a firm framework for TAC decisions and other harvest control rules, whist
retaining sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and scientific advice
Agreed EU/Norway management plans do not mean identical management measures in EU
and Norway waters but do suggest a commitment to achieve as much harmonisation and
coordination as possible.
The EU landings obligation poses many challenges to the EU Norway agreement. Equally,
the EU Norway agreement will inevitably be an essential element in implementing the
discard ban in EU waters. Agreement at EU/Norway level will be required on:

TAC uplift to accommodate the landing of fish that would otherwise have been
discarded

Inter-annual quota flexibility

Inter-species flexibility

Reducing the number of TACs or grouping TACs for jointly managed stocks

Additional quota to incentivise cod avoidance and trial CCTV
Some of these may be regarded as potential showstoppers because, along with the de
minimis provision, they are the means by which flexibility is introduced by the EU into an
otherwise absolute prohibition on discarding of quota species. Norway has its own way of
applying its discard ban in a pliable and pragmatic fashion, mainly through its move-on/Real
Time Closure approach to the protection of juveniles and through the significant discretion
allowed to its coastguard. This approach appears to work for Norway, a single country with
exclusive control over its own fisheries. A direct application of the Norwegian system to EU
fisheries would be unworkable because of the different and more complex species-mix in EU
waters and the realities of shared jurisdiction.
The imminent arrival of the landings obligation in the demersal fisheries in the North Sea will
add a significant pressure to the EU Norway agreement to develop solutions through
practical and workable flexibilities. What is certain is that it will not be possible to apply the
landings obligation without those flexibilities, whilst retaining an economically viable fleet.
Against this background, the North Sea RAC advocates:
1) The early introduction of pilot projects to trial the application of the landings
obligation with and without:
-
Quota uplift
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-
Inter-species flexibility
-
Grouped quotas for non-target stocks
The pilot studies that have been undertaken so far have raised serious concerns
about the ability of vessels subject to a landing obligation, with quota uplift, to
average estimated discard levels in the previous year, to fish their quota
allocations because of choke stocks. The results of the pilots should inform the
EU/ Norway negotiations
2) The closest cooperation between EU and Norway in the implementation of a
practical and workable landings obligation. The NSRAC met with the Norwegian
Fishermen’s Association in Trondheim in April 2013 to foster the kind of
cooperative relationships and mutual understanding that will be essential in the
context of the development of multi-annual management plans at a regional-seas
level.
3) The avoidance of paper solutions (such as the 2011 high grading ban, which may
have worked at the level of public relations but had absolutely no effect at vessel
level and in fact was legally unenforceable in the EU)
4) Minimising the scope for perverse outcomes. In applying an instrument as broad
in potential effect as the landings obligation there is enormous scope for
unintended consequences. The best way to guard against perverse outcomes is
to move forward through trial and error (what in some circles is referred to as an
adaptive approach). The challenging timetable for implementation and the limited
funds available for trials and pilots are undoubted constraints. But it is difficult to
see how a workable approach to the landings obligation will evolve without an
extensive programme of pilots and trials. The application of a big bang approach
with minimum preparation is not one that we wish to contemplate.
5) Dialogue at vessel level: Port level dialogue is going to be essential if the
practical implications of the landings obligation are to be understood fully. The
difficulties encountered in the EU/Norway discussions over the application of the
landings obligation in the Skagerrak has provided some insight into the issues
that are likely to be encountered in the North Sea.
Engagement with the Scheveningen Group
Within the new CFP basic regulation there is an obligation on member states to consult with
the relevant advisory council(s) in the development of their discard plans (article 14a.)
The advisory councils’ privileged status, reflecting their expertise and composition as
stakeholders, and their enhanced role within the reformed CFP, would lead us to expect an
obligation for them to be consulted. However, it is the NSRAC’s ambition and we believe the
North Sea member states’ also, to move beyond formal consultation towards a more
embedded and pervasive partnership approach - without however, compromising the
respective competencies. Engagement of this sort has already begun through the
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involvement of the NSRAC in the development of a discard “atlas” for the North Sea
demersal fisheries, under the framework of the Scheveningen Group of cooperating member
states.
A partnership approach relies less on formal governance structures and the production of
advice in relative isolation from each other and more on developing ways of cooperating that
build mutual trust and confidence. Much has already been done to integrate stakeholders
into the production of fisheries science at a formative stage, where it matters (STECF expert
working groups, ICES benchmark and data compilation meetings) and now the task in hand
is how this evolution can be extended to the policy sphere. Despite some initial concerns and
reservations, the integration of stakeholders into the key scientific deliberations is regarded
by almost everyone involved as a wholly successful and positive development. Although
there are logistical, practical and resource implications, we see no reason why the
integration of AC stakeholders into policy formulation should not follow a similar trajectory. In
terms of a comparable model of engagement to that which has evolved between scientists
and stakeholders, an annual meeting between ICES and the RACs (MIRAC) is held each
January to discuss high level strategic issues, whilst the main engagement comes through a
series of different benchmark meetings, workshops, briefings and fisheries science projects
throughout the year, at which a range of stakeholders attend, dependent on their experience,
interests and availability.
Accepting the reality of constraints associated with the EU/Norway agreement, the
advantages of transparency and shared knowledge, leading to legitimacy and shared
understanding, is such that the NSAC considers that the highest priority should be afforded
to achieving a similar kind of arrangement in the policy realm.
At a practical level this will mean:

Using available opportunities to develop a continuous constructive dialogue
between member states and the North Sea Advisory Council

Developing collaborative initiatives to trial untested aspects of the landings
obligation

Finding new ways of sharing information

Defining ways in which the Scheveningen group and the NSAC can jointly
develop a shared strategic vision for the implementation of the landings
obligation and multi-annual management plans

Avoiding duplication in favour of transparency and cooperation

Working jointly with the European Fisheries Control Agency to:
-
Strike the right balance between an even playing field and regional
distinctiveness
-
Deal with trans-boundary issues
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-
Develop a low-cost, risk-based approach to monitoring and enforcement
Improving fisheries science
There is always a need to collect more scientific information to aid stock assessment. There
has been a problem with the long time lag in collecting scientific data and applying them to
fish stock assessments. There is a particular problem when the stock assessments do not
accurately reflect the actual state of the stocks - discarding then becomes inevitable. There
is strong danger of particular species becoming choke species if their TACs are not set at
realistic levels. Fishing fleets are able to assist with the collection of relevant real time data.
They are, for example, able to collect up to date data on the physical and biological
conditions on the fishing grounds. These data from the fishing fleet should be used
systematically in the future to improve fish stock assessments, and to ensure that the
assessments reflect the actual conditions on the fishing grounds.
On board sampling of length distributions, together with and electronic logbook data will
enable fast track updates of assessments. Real time monitoring and fast track procedures
are essential if we are to align the fishing regulations and fishery measures with the actual
abundance of fish.
A Learning Process
It is important to recognise that for all involved, the transition from a top-down, command and
control approach to managing the North Sea demersal fisheries and implementing the
landings obligation will be a learning process. The experience of the regional advisory
councils in providing the foundations for trans-national dialogue within the fishing industry
and also with other stakeholders, including the e-NGOs has been quite remarkable. Member
states have always communicated with each other to some degree or other but the kind of
close collaborative work which is now expected of them was not required, or not even
considered decent within the previous more hierarchical CFP regime, in which member
states were as often as not supplicants rather than equals.
The undoubted opportunities that regional cooperation brings also carry serious challenges.
Member states are finding modus operandi amongst themselves at regional level, whilst at
the same time there is an expectation that they should engage more closely with the
advisory councils. And then there are the Norwegian and other Third Country dimensions to
manage successfully.
The truncated timetable for implementing the discard ban is a less than helpful context in
which to develop these new and hopefully positive relationships. Nevertheless that is the
reality and it is the NSAC’s aspiration that a quickly establish a working relationship will
quickly be established. It is certainly the NSAC’s intention to accept any invitation to
participate in this process at every level.
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Quota Management; Choke Species
Within the context of a landings obligation, flexible and adaptable management
arrangements are required to prevent the exhaustion of quota of minor by-catch species
from preventing the uptake of the major economic species. These should be agreed at
regional level but might include:

Quota Flexibility

Maximum scope for quota swaps and transfers

Vessel to vessel,

Producer organisation to producer organisation

Member state to member state,

Member state to Third Country (this would not be favoured by all parties)
Two different scenarios may avoid problems with choke species:

Ensure that all TACs are set in good agreement with the occurrence of each species
in the catches within the fisheries. The use of real-time data from fishing vessels will
assist in improving stock assessments. It should be remembered, however, that even
if sufficient resources were allocated to collect the data needed in order to perform
analytical assessments for all stocks in the catches, there is no guarantee that these
assessments would be “right”. Analytical assessments may allow actual numerical
values to be assigned to F, SSB and TSB, but this does not necessarily mean that
the estimated values are correct.

There is a need to avoid setting TACs for non-target species. This is simply not
realistic and the setting of inappropriate TACs can lead to major problems with
discarding.
Estimates of discards are at best highly uncertain and for many species they are often
wrong. There is a need to establish the “true” catch figures – for example by allowing fishers
to land all catches (i.e. through a dispensation from the catch composition rules) in a period
before the new regulation is enforced.
Quota uplifts should not be limited by stability clauses within long-term management plans
e.g. 15 % for year-to-year changes.
Minimum Landing Sizes
Text to be developed
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Reducing the Number of TACs
We are open for discussion on the suggestion that reducing the number of TACs set and
confining TACs to the main economic driver species would make application of the landings
obligation very much easier. By-catch species or “associated stocks” do not generally
influence fishing behaviours or patterns. They are caught (and within a landings obligation,
landed) in proportion to which they appear in the nets. Whilst it is true that some targeting of
what are generally considered by-catch species can take place, one would have to examine
the respective costs and benefits of, on the one hand substantially removing the potential for
choke stocks and on the other lifting quota constraints on a minor species. We note that
fewer quotas are imposed upon Norwegian vessels than upon EU vessels.
Thus, we believe that the idea that TACs should be set for groups of target species should
be considered further. Primary TACs might be set for the gadoid round fish (excluding ling,
blue ling and tusk), monkfish, Nephrops, and flatfish such as plaice, sole and megrim. MSY
targets for these primary species should be set as ranges in order to enable maximal yields
for fisheries, rather than for single species. Transfer of TAC between species, as well as
between years might be allowed – as long as the range of acceptable Fmsy values for the
species is not compromised.
If the idea of fewer TACs is not accepted then there is a need to discuss what to do with:

Two species TACs?

Zero TACs for skates, rays, dogfish, spur dog?
Implications for Fishing Businesses
Fishers will view success of the landings obligation not in term of its effectiveness, or
whether it delivers wider societal confidence, but in terms of how the fishing business fairs
during the transition phase and beyond. Fishers will be exposed to new pressures as the
business of fishing tranforms. It will be extremely important, therefore, to understand the
speed and depth at which change should be delivered if we are to protect fishers from any
unnceccassry financial pressures or business failure.
The obligation to land all catches will mean that fishers will be allowed to land for commercial
purposes part of the weight of fish previously discarded. This would present great potential
for fishers to improve economic performance were it not for obvous hurdles, such as
selectivity and choke species, which form a significant barrier to transforming potential for
gain into actual economic benefit.
The opportunity to land more commercially marketable fish will act as a stimuls for fishers
to put in place appropriate measures to maximise opportunity; it is natural for business to
move to the point of maximum efficiency which, in the case of the landing obligation, means
ensuring as far as possible that all fish landed is of commercially marketable size. This will
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mean the introduction of the best possible selectivity married with improved temporal and
spatial awareness.
The cost to fishers of providing improved selectivity will not be insignificant, given that most
solutions will be at the individual vessel level, although some solutions will undoubtedly
come at the metier level with groups of similar vessels finding common solutions. The cost
entailed in creating, building and trialling new ideas and concepts can be extensive; down
time and periods of low revenue during any trial phase add significant costs to business and,
whereas some trials will be funded or part funded, there will be a vast number that receive
zero or very little funding.
There will be an additional cost to fishers associated with the landing of low value, regulated
species, below the MCRS. It has yet to be tested whether the level of value returned from
such landings will come close to the cost of returning them to shore. There will also be
cases where vessels will be forced to return to port prematurely due to the pressures of
stowage. Similarly, it is unclear how this will affect vessel profitability. However, it is clear that
in almost all cases it will lead to reduced income and may even lead to gradual business
failure.
The biggest threat to the fishing business is the premature cessation of fishing activity which
will occur in situations where a mismatch exists between the abundance of a particular stock
and the available opportunity to catch it (the choke species situation). The legislative
requirement for a vessel to have in place fish quota to cover expected catches before it puts
to sea dictates that many vessel operators will be faced with the choice of either paying the
high cost of leasing quota (where the option of leasing exists) to gain continued access to
the fishery for other species, or lay up the vessel in port. Both courses of action have a
similar effect on business although the latter has a higher probability of being terminal.
MSY and the Landings Obligation
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) was developed as a scientific concept in fisheries
management in the 1970s. Its utility for mixed and multi-species fisheries was almost
immediately challenged within the scientific community. However, the concept gained
political and legal (as opposed to scientific) traction during the Johannesburg World Summit
on Sustainable Development in 2002. MSY has now taken the form of legal obligations
within the CFP Basic Regulation.
Leaving aside arid disputes about the relevance of MSY to multi-species fisheries, the
practical challenge facing fisheries managers and fisheries stakeholders is how to maintain
the progress that has been made over the last decade towards stable high yield fisheries in
the North Sea, whilst:

Simultaneously maintaining the economic viability of the fleets

Implementing the landings obligation.

Taking account of the multi-gear character of our demersal fisheries
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
Taking account of multi-species interactions
The European institutions have chosen to use the concept of fishing mortality at maximum
sustainable yield (Fmsy) as the legally required benchmark for the achieving low mortality,
generally regarded as a precondition for high yields. This is wise, as the alternative, using
biomass MSY, would be to assume control over natural processes, such as recruitment over
which humans have fact at best, limited influence.
The elimination, as far as possible, of unwanted mortality, is a key objective of the landings
obligation. Nevertheless, implementation of the landings obligation has itself the potential to
generate unwanted mortality, which has implications for achieving and maintaining MSY:

By preventing the return to the sea species that would otherwise have survived
and contributed to the biomass

By shifting mortality to older (more valuable) year classes, thereby increasing the
average mortality across the stock

By destabilising current quota allocations and fishing patterns that appear to be
consistent with a trajectory to MSY
These risks must be managed as far as possible.
It is clear therefore that future management measures must negotiate both the legal realities
enshrined in the CFP basic regulation and also the biological realities in the North Sea
marine ecosystem, and in particular species interactions through various predation patterns.
Whilst inadequate data and questionable assumptions on actual, current predation patterns
create significant challenges for the implementation of management decisions based on
multi-species advice, it is clear that ignoring multi species interactions would be the greater
error. Clearly, this is a complex arena in which the evolution of practical scientific and
management advice is most definitely work in progress
Against this background, maintaining progress towards MSY in the North Sea demersal
fisheries, whilst implementing the landings obligation requires both flexibility and caution. In
order therefore not to lose the gains made in recent years we advocate:

An adaptive step-wise approach which carefully balances the competing priorities
described above and provides for adjustments to take account of new
information

Making TAC decisions on the basis of both biological and economic advice and
phasing progress towards MSY to take account of the latter

Progressively building multi-species considerations into management decisions
as the quality of scientific advice on species interactions strengthens

Learning from but not necessarily slavishly following the Norwegian experience
of implementing a discard ban, and in particular the incremental and pragmatic
features of the Norwegian approach
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
Understanding MSY as a range of fishing mortalities on the effort/yield curve
rather than an individual fixed point, as outlined in the North Sea RAC’s 2006
Report on the Long Term Management of North Sea Fisheries

Ensuring that the high levels of compliance experienced in recent years and
which are an intrinsic aspect of progress to MSY, are maintained by:

Securing and maintaining the support of resource users through their close
involvement in management decisions

Ensuring high levels of clarity about requirements

Aligning economic incentives with management objectives as far as possible

Ensuring that fleet profitability is not dramatically undermined by management
decisions

The use of management plans to secure incremental, step-wise progress
towards high yield fisheries without destabilising the economic viability of the
fleets
Wider Ecosystem Considerations; MSFD
In 2008 the European Parliament has adopted the Marine Strategy Framework Directive
(MSDF) with the aim of reaching Good Environmental Status (GES) for European marine
waters by 2020. Each Member State is expected to take the necessary measures to achieve
GES, being defined as maintaining or restoring marine waters to a healthy status, while
maintaining an efficient and economically viable fishing industry. Most Member States have
acknowledged that the use of existing management measures, including the reformed
Common Fishery Policy (CFP) are the main drivers to achieve GES.
The landing obligation is one of the new regulations included in the reformed CFP that is a
cause of concern for both fishing industry and environmental NGOs, given the many
uncertainties about its exact implementation and potential loopholes. In addition, the MSFD
requires the achievement of GES for 11 descriptors, of which 4 are most relevant from a
fisheries perspective. Of major influence for the industry will be the aim of the MSFD to
achieve GES for descriptors 1 (biodiversity), 4 (food webs) and 6 (seafloor integrity), which
cover impacts on the wider ecosystem, and descriptor 3 which addresses the status of
exploited fish and shellfish stocks according to three criteria: fishing mortality, stock biomass
and size and age structure. The necessity of reaching GES for these 4 descriptors in
combination with implementation of a landing obligation requires evaluation of possible
implications for the fishing industry in the North Sea.
A key element in achieving GES for these 4 descriptors is selectivity. The fishing industry
has substantially invested to promote selectivity. This process must be maintained and aided
by incentives to further reduce discards. Financial aids should be given to fishermen
investing in selective gears. Further incentives could be priority access for fishermen using
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selective gear, additional quota for fishermen using CCTV cameras, as well as additional
measures, such as temporal and spatial closures; as well as moving on incentives.
A main source of concern is uncertainty over how TACs and quotas will be adjusted under a
landing obligation, or in relation to achieving GES for commercial fish and shellfish. The
mixed nature of the catches of most fisheries requires a move from single species advice to
mixed fisheries advice. This move however requires knowledge about multispecies
interactions within the ecosystem, which is currently still lacking. Also in question is the
decision making process to define the priorities for mixed fisheries advice, as currently ICES
provides a set of models all based on different potential scenarios. One solution would be a
list of priority species to achieve GES on which the choice of model could be based, such as
cod. In addition, limiting quota for by-catch species can result in choke species if selectivity
does not increase substantially. Species such as dab or ray especially could lead to an early
cessation of fishing activities due to quota being fully utilised before the end of the year. The
occurrence of choke species, however, remains difficult to predict because this depends
heavily on the definition of by-catch species, the adjustments of quota and possible
innovations in fishing methods.
Another aspect of uncertainty is the determination of the survival percentages for commercial
and by-catch species. A high survival rate of a species implies that it can be discarded. This
raises the question of who determines the threshold of a high survival rate. If the estimated
survival rate is below this threshold all catches must be landed resulting in a 100% mortality
of the catch.
While recent scientific studies on the use of indicator based assessments have been
published, it is important to think carefully about the meaning of GES and how the indicator
species and criteria chosen can be brought into line with given policy measures, such as the
landing obligation. One example could be the use of the status of certain seabird species as
an indicator of GES, as their survival depends on discards. Another might be to define a
healthy size structure for a fish stock.
Convergence; Setting the Milestones
Text on the timetable to implementation to be developed
5. The way forward
There is little doubt that the transition from the current arrangements to a fully-fledged
landings obligation will be complex, difficult and even painful. It will result in changes to the
ecosystem that are only dimly perceived and difficult to predict. It will require behavioural and
institutional change, not only from the fishing sector but from fisheries managers, control
authorities and fisheries scientists.
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However as our vision statement makes clear, if handled well, the landing obligation also has
the capacity to be the catalyst that brings profound and positive change to the North Sea
demersal fisheries.
There is much to be gained by the NSRAC continuing to engage with implementation of all
the reforms to the Common Fisheries Policy.
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