* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Network Access Control for Mobile Ad Hoc Network
Extensible Authentication Protocol wikipedia , lookup
Airborne Networking wikipedia , lookup
Wireless security wikipedia , lookup
Wake-on-LAN wikipedia , lookup
Piggybacking (Internet access) wikipedia , lookup
Deep packet inspection wikipedia , lookup
List of wireless community networks by region wikipedia , lookup
Network Access Control for Mobile Ad Hoc Network Pan Wang North Carolina State University Outline • • • • Background Problem statement Related work Proposed scheme – Key Synchronization – Packet Retransmission • Analysis, simulation and field test • Summary 2 Background • Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) – A MANET consists of mobile platforms (e.g., a router with multiple hosts and wireless communications devices), which are free to move about arbitrarily. -- IETF RFC2501 – Characteristics of MANET • • • • No pre-determined infrastructure Ease of deployment Dynamic topologies (e.g., mobility, network partition ) Constrained resources (e.g., bandwidth, energy ) 3 Background (Cont) • Network access control – Not media access control – Who has the right to access the network • Physical* • Technical * • Administrative * – Firewalls • Conventional network • Using network topology and service information * H. F. Tipton, Handbook of information security management 4 Problem Statement • An attacker may inject “bogus” packets to consume the network resources, or insert itself into critical routes • No mature access control scheme for MANET – more complicated due to open media and dynamic topology 5 Related Work • DHCP Access Control Gateway • Kerberos • Distributed firewall • Pebblenets • Distributed access control scheme for consumer operated MANET • LHAP 6 Related Work --Cont • LHAP: a lightweight hop-by-hop authentication protocol for ad-hoc networks – – – – Based on one-way key chain and TESLA Hop-by-hop authentication Each transmitted packet associated with a traffic key, Receiver (or intermediate node) verifies K FA (i) to decide whether forward (accept) the packet K F (i) A B C M, M, Cert &Commit KKFF(i) (I+1) A SS D 7 Proposed Scheme – cryptographic tools • Group key agreement • Group key distribution K1- – Controller chooses key – Stateful vs. Stateless 4 • Stateless key distribution – Each user is assigned an unique set of personal keys – New key is encrypted with the personal keys only known to the legitimate users – Nice stateless property K1- K3- 2 k1 M1 4 k2 M2 k3 k4 M3 8 M4 Proposed Scheme – underlying models • Network model – All nodes come from one domain – A node’s access to the network is controlled by a domain manager (i.e., key manager) – Each node has a unique ID and a set of personal secret keys • Attack model – Attackers inject packets to deplete the resources of node relaying the packets 9 •pan wang: Proposed Scheme - outline • Basic idea – Cryptography-oriented (using group key) – Authenticate all the packets with a networkwide access control (group session) key. – Any “bogus” packet that has incorrect authentication information will be filtered out immediately. – As a result, illegitimate nodes will be excluded from communication (routes). 10 Research challenges • Two critical challenges – Synchronization of network access control key – Interaction between data transmission and key distribution If these two challenges can be solved, the proposed group key based network access control scheme will be done. 11 Key Synchronization • Problem statement – A key update message may fail to propagate across MANET. Thus, two legitimate user may simultaneously hold different session key (lack of key synchronization) 12 Key Synchronization (Cont-1) • An example of lack of key synchronization F F* P1 D E P3 C P2 Key Manager B A 13 Key Synchronization (Cont-2) • Solution – Exploit the stateless feature of the proposed stateless group key distribution scheme – Each user buffers the key update message most recently received – Transmit the buffered message to the other users that are using old session keys 14 Key Synchronization (Cont-3) • Scheme details – Proactive part • Broadcast the buffered key update message every t time unites – Reactive part • Send a key synchronization request, if a received packet has higher session ID • Send the buffered key update message, if a received packet has a lower session ID 15 Key Synchronization (Cont-4) • Illustration of the proposed key synchronization scheme Broadcast S S S S S S B B B B B B A A A A A A E E E E E E C C C C C C H H H H H H F F F F F F G G G G G G II I III JJ J J J J K K K K K K M M M M M M D D D D D D L L L L L L N N N N NN Represents a node that has the most recent key 16 Key Synchronization (Cont-5) • Security analysis (possible attacks) – Resource consumption via forged key update message • Solution: lightweight authentication methods (Oneway key chain & Merkle hash tree) – Resource consumption via forged data packet • Constrained to one-hop • – Logically partition MANET via refusing forwarding key update message • Multiple paths, watchdog 17 Key Synchronization (Cont-6) One-way key chain k0=h(k1) k0 k1 kn-1=h(kn) ki=h(ki+1) kn ki ki+1 kn-1 18 Key Synchronization (Cont-7) Merkle hash tree m07=h(m03,m47) m07 m03=h(m01,m23) m03 m47 m01=h(m0,m1) m01 m23 m45 m67 m0=f(k0) m0 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 19 Key Synchronization (Cont-8) • Performance analysis – Rely on the adopted stateless group key distribution scheme – Storage • One message – Computation – Communication • Depends on t and number of users using an old key 20 Packet Retransmission • Problem statement – The interaction between data transmission and key distribution. That is, in the case of a lack of key synchronization, a user may receives some (unverified) packets authenticated with a different session key. 21 Packet Retransmission (Cont-1) • Possible options – Simply drop – Buffer and then verify – Synchronize the keys before sending every data packet • All of them have serious drawbacks 22 Packet Retransmission (Cont-2) • Proposed solution – Drop, synchronize keys, and then retransmit. – ACK mechanism – Unicast & broadcast S 1. Tx failed due to lack of key Syn 2. ReTx Request A 3. Key Syn B 4. ReTx Packet 5. ACK D 23 Algorithm of the proposed scheme 24 Packet Retransmission (Cont-3) • Security analysis (possible attacks) – Resource consumption attack – Forged ACK message – Packet modification 25 Packet Retransmission (Cont-4) • Performance analysis – Computation • Authentication & verification • Pentium 4 2.1 GHz processor * MD5 216.674 MB/s SHA-1 67.977 MB/s – Communication • Retransmission rate 26 Simulation Evaluation – 40/80 nodes randomly placed in a fixed area (a square of size 1km x 1km) – Random walk with a maximum speed 20m/s – Communication range 200m – 2000 simulations, using different random number seeds 100% Percentage of Reachable Nodes • The simulation modal 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 20 40 60 80 Number of Nodes 27 100 Simulation Evaluation (Cont-2) 100% 100% 80% 80% 60% 60% Stateful Scheme Stateless Scheme After 1 Cycle of K. Syn After 2 Cycles of K. Syn After 3 Cycles of K. Syn 40% 20% 20% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rounds of Key Update (P_lost=0, 40 nodes) Stateful Scheme Stateless Scheme After 1Cycle of K. Syn After 2 Cycles of K. Syn After 3 Cycles of K. Syn 40% 8 0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rounds of Key Update (P_lost=0.25, 40 nodes) Average percentage of nodes which got the latest session key 28 8 Simulation Evaluation (Cont-3) 100% 100% 95% 95% 90% 90% Stateful Scheme 85% 85% Stateless Scheme 80% After 1 Cycle of K. Syn 75% 75% After 2 Cycles of K. Syn 70% Stateful Scheme Stateless Scheme After 1 Cycle of K. Syn After 2 Cycles of K. Syn After 3 Cycles of K. Syn 80% 70% After 3 Cycles of K. Syn 65% 65% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rounds of Key Updaye (P_lost=0, 80 nodes) 8 1 3 5 7 Rounds of Key Updates (P_lost=0.25, 80 nodes) Average percentage of nodes which got the latest session key 29 Simulation Evaluation (Cont-4) 14% 40 nodes 80 nodes Retransmission Rate 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Packet Sending Rate (# packets per second ) 30 Implementation • Based on Netfilter • Two daemons – Adopt the stateless scheme proposed by Liu & Ning Verification PreRouting Authentication ROUTE Local In PostRouting Forward ROUTE Local Out 31 Field Test • Test bed – One Dell P4 laptop with Linux 9.0 (kernel 2.4.20) – Two Compaq iPAQ 3970 PDAs with Familiar v0.7.2 (kernel 2.4.19-rmk-pxal-hh30) – Lucent Orinoco wireless cards • Tests – – – – Key distribution User revocation Packet authentication and verification Key synchronization 32 Summary • Network access control is an important issue for MANET • Cryptography-oriented solution exploiting the stateless feature of stateless group key distribution scheme • Simulation as well as functioning prototype indicates it practical and effective 33 Question 34