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UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
“THEY SHALL BEAT THEIR SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES:”1 THE FAILURE
OF EARLY SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO REACH AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
ON DISARMAMENT (1948-1964)
HI367: HISTORY OF IMPERIAL AND SOVIET RUSSIA
HOUR J
PROFESSOR GRETA BUCHER
BY
CADET ANDREW S. GLENN ’04, COMPANY B-1
12 MARCH 2003
WEST POINT NEW YORK
GLENN 1
Following the end of the Second World War, the world entered the final phase of what
Philip Bobbitt has coined “The Long War,”2 lasting from 1949 until 1990. This phase of
the war was fought between the two remaining constitutional systems, communism and
parliamentarianism, and their respective champions, the Soviet Union and the United
States. Two overriding strategic objectives of both states were nuclear deterrence and
compellance. As early as the 1950s, however, the Soviet Union had proposed talks on
disarmament. If both countries feared mutual annihilation, then history must beg the
question, “Why did early attempts made by the Soviet Union to disarm fail?” The Soviet
Union’s vision of a more peaceful world, void of the fear of nuclear annihilation, was
shattered by the threats, hostilities, and unwillingness to cooperate of the Western
powers—led by the United States.
In deciding that it was indeed the West that propagated the arms race, destroying
Soviet attempts to reduce arms and promote peace, we must first determine that the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) made an honest bid for disarmament.
Disarmament comprised a vast portion of Soviet foreign policy from the founding to the
dissolution of the USSR. In a letter to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy,
the United States, China, and Japan, the Russian government declared its position on
disarmament, stating that it [the Government of Russia] “can only welcome any
disarmament or reduction of military expenditures, a heavy burden for the working
people in all countries.”3 It is in keeping with this tradition that, following the end of the
Second World War, the Soviet government submitted multiple resolutions and proposed
drafts of treaties outlining plans for disarmament and for control of weapons
developments by an international organization.
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Beginning with the proliferation of atomic weaponry in the United States, the USSR
began—with renewed vigor—her push for international controls and disarmament. In
1946, the USSR proposed to the United Nations a draft, the first made by the Soviet
government, on prohibition of atomic weapons. The First Article of this draft espoused
that no signatory was to use atomic weapons—under any circumstance. It espoused the
prohibition of production and storage of atomic weapons within all signing states, and the
destruction of all stockpiled atomic weapons. The Second Article declares that any
violation of the First shall be considered “a very grave international crime against
humanity.”4 With this strong rhetoric, the Soviet Union entered the second half of the
Long War with a policy marked by the paradoxical duality of preaching disarmament but
practicing proliferation and development. Eight days shy of a year later, the USSR
delegation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission submitted a follow-on proposal. This
proposal outlined the necessity for and means of creating an International Control
Commission to monitor the development of atomic energy programs and ensure that no
new weapons were developed.5 These two documents show the crux of the Soviet
strategy for reaching the peaceful solution of disarmament. The government sought
prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons and an international organization to
oversee the process.
Further Soviet proposals followed the two aforementioned drafts for the next decade
and a half. In 1948, the USSR Delegation to the UN General Assembly submitted a
scathing resolution decrying the inactivity of the United Nations regarding previous
resolutions on arms reductions. Again, this proposal sought to destroy atomic weapons.
It also proposed to reduce conventional forces (by one-third).6 In November 1952, the
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United States tested the prototype hydrogen bomb on the Pacific island Elugelab. August
12, 1953, the Soviet government tested its first thermonuclear device, which Honoré M.
Catudal tells us that the Soviet authorities claimed was the first real test of a hydrogen
bomb, as “the November 1952 U.S. test of a 60-ton thermonuclear device was not a
deliverable weapon.”7 Nonetheless, the USSR kept up with the United States as both
states continued the arms race. Despite their commitment to preserving the existing
international structure and balance of power, the Soviet government maintained its stance
on disarmament.
On 20 August 1953, the Soviet Union put forth a declaration
reaffirming their policy of disarmament and encouraging other countries to accept their
proposals on arms limitations and reductions.8 The Soviet government continued its
efforts, publishing proposals similar to previous ones in 19549, 195710, and 195811.
Perhaps the USSR’s strongest bid for disarmament during this early stage came in
1959 with the “Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete
Disarmament.”12 The declaration uses powerful language to promote its strong message:
“General and complete disarmament is the way to save mankind from the scourge of
war.”13
The authors of the declaration reassert their foreign policy, based on the
assumption that it was possible to prevent similar developments to those that had
previously led to the First and Second World Wars.14 The declaration also continues to
propose steps to be taken in order to reach general and complete disarmament over a
period of time.15 Finally, the distinct characteristic that sets this declaration apart from all
previous attempts by the Soviet Union to find an agreement on disarmament is the partial
disarmament clause. This clause, not found in any other document prior to this, made
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provisions for a partial disarmament—should the West prove unwilling and refuse
complete disarmament.16
The period following the end of the Second World War until 1964 was filled with
Soviet measures to limit the arms race and reach an agreement on general and complete
disarmament. Nikita Khrushchev, following in the footsteps of Josef Stalin, championed
the ideas of a world free from weapons.17 Under these two men’s administrations, the
West was faced with a great number of proposals, declarations, and treaties attempting to
reach an agreement on complete and general disarmament. It was a standard in Soviet
foreign policy, during this time, to seek the end of war through the above-stated means.
Despite their repeated and strong attempts at reaching international agreements, the
Soviet Union failed to see the actualization of the complete and general disarmament.
Not only did the USSR fail in disarmament, but the Soviet Union continued to proliferate
many conventional and mass annihilation weapons during the height of her power.
Gary Bertsch and William Potter wrote, in their introduction to Dangerous Weapons,
Desperate States, about the threat posed by the inheritance of nuclear weapons that the
new independent states received from the crumbling Soviet Union.18 Bertsch and Potter
continued: “Russia alone inherited approximately 30,000 nuclear weapons, hundreds of
tons of fissile material, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, significant biological weapons
capability.”19 Obviously, the USSR proliferated these weapons prior to the 1990 Peace
of Paris.
Dallin reported more examples of the proliferation of weapons. In 1953, the Soviet
Union tested their first thermonuclear device.20
In 1957, the first Sputnik satellite
rocketed from Baikonur Cosmodrome (97). In 1961, the USSR began a “massive series
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of nuclear weapons tests,” including the detonation of a 58-Megaton device (98). A year
later, the Soviet government positioned nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba, igniting the
Cuban missile crisis (98). Dallin’s estimates state that by 1964, the Soviet Union had
around 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (100).21 Each of these actions are
a step along the path of militarism and proliferation—the “arms’ race” as it became
known.
The Soviet Union was not alone in continuing proliferation and build-ups of
conventional as well as mass destruction weapons; The United States matched in some
areas and led in others, the race for weaponry. In Dallin’s side-by-side comparison of
capabilities in 1964, the United States led in numbers of ICBMs, naval ballistic missiles,
and long-range bombers.22
Both superpowers continued to research and develop
weapons.
Proliferation was a global phenomenon, not limited to only the two superpowers.
Britain, France, and China all developed nuclear capabilities by 1964. 23 This global
proliferation, or arms’ race, is indicative of the Soviet government’s failure to reach
international agreements.
These efforts failed primarily as a result of the Western world’s posture, held most
notably by the United States. The United States assumed a hawkish stance and pushed
the Soviet Union towards war. Malenkov, during his premiership and short tenure as
party secretary, responded to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan declaring that
“the ruling clique of the American imperialists… has chosen the path of hatching new
war plans against the Soviet Union and the new democracies.”24 This statement was not
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overly outlandish.
The United States, and the rest of the parliamentarianist West,
launched a war against the USSR on politico-diplomatic, economic, and military fronts.
The first engagement of the Cold War occurred by 1947. Communist governments
had been set up in Eastern European countries including Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary. Furthermore, the Soviet occupied zone of Germany saw increased socialist and
communist activities. In 1948, an internal coup d’état allowed for communists to gain
control of Czechoslovakia. In response to the growing political influence of the Soviet
Union, the Western allies refused to allow for the reunification of Germany as originally
intended. Instead, the Allies set up parliamentary institutions in the western zones of
Germany, essentially creating a new state. The Cold War would have ended with the
reunification of Germany and the United States’ acceptance of Communism as a
legitimate constitutional order in Europe, but the United States chose at this pivotal
moment to pressure the USSR. 25
Germany proved to be a hotbed for conflict and crises during the Cold War. While
engaged in the Korean War, the United States sought to actively rearm the Federal
Republic of Germany. The United States took the role of the hawk pressing the Soviet
government. The Paris protocols of 1954, between the Federal Republic and the Western
allies, allowed for the rearmament of West Germany with conventional weapons. The
USSR dodged conflict by proposing peaceful settlements. The Soviets responded
seeking the disarmament and creation of neutral buffer states in both the German
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.26
Germany did not sit alone as the sole place where the West tried to push the Soviet
government. Truman supported militants in Turkey and Greece, creating the precedent
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that would be legitimized, ex post facto, by the Truman Doctrine. In 1962, a United
States U-2 spy plane was shot down in the Soviet Union. The Marshall plan provided for
the economic recovery, and subsequent economic closeness, of many European states—
to prevent the Soviet sphere of influence from expanding.
Militarism and the push for war resounded in the voices of America’s leaders. George
Keenan, “Mr. X,” served as a diplomatic envoy to Moscow in 1945 and 1946. During
this time, he provided the State Department with long correspondence outlining his
analysis of the Soviet government. Kennan declared that the combination of Stalinist
politics and Marxist ideology created a dangerous state that could not be trusted. Kennan
proposed the implementation of containment and greatly shaped American foreign policy
during this time.27 Truman, influenced by Kennan, issued the Truman Doctrine in a style
reflecting the ideas of his mentor. Truman announced that it would be the policy of the
United States government to assist revolutionary movements that supported
parliamentarianism. In essence, he declared war on Communism sans war declarations.28
Senator Barry Goldwater stated that the United States needed to be stronger militarily.
On 23 September 1964, he pushed for this saying that should the Federal Government
continue to spend less than half the budget on defense, or should it cut spending (as
proposed by the contemporary administration), that the United States would wither to
second-rate status and that the Communist forces would then be able to threaten peace
across the globe with impunity.29
Perhaps the most important voice opposing Soviet attempts at disarmament was
Bernard Baruch, the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission. Baruch pierced the Soviet’s efforts when he declared: “Don’t let us be the
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first to disarm!… We must be strong.”30 The Baruch Plan envisaged an international
commission that would put the development and production of nuclear energy programs
as well as nuclear weapons under United States’ control.31 Baruch called for a world
under the domination of United States’ military power.
The voices of these political leaders resonated with the political ideology of militarism
and war, not of peace. The actions of the United States government, similar to the voices
of its leaders, depicted an aura of distrust, fear, and warmongering. The extremism of the
West, represented and led by the United States, sought to push the Soviet government
when possible and desired to continue building up war arsenals. The United States
government had no desire to disarm and consequently rejected Soviet proposals on
disarmament.
The Soviet Union made multiple efforts to reach an international agreement on
disarmament between 1945 and 1964, which all met with the same disastrous fate. They
failed, as evidenced by the continued military build-ups in Soviet, American, secondworld, and eventually third-world countries. The were not successful because the
Western parliamentarianists, under the tutelage and direction of the United States,
rejected such possible agreements instead favoring a push for war, albeit a cold war.
Therefore, it may be said that during this time period the United States’ foreign policy
prohibited the passage of any Soviet document that would make serious strides towards
disarmament.
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NOTES
1. Isaiah 2:4, The Bible, King James Version.
2. Bobbitt asserts that the Long War began in 1914 and lasted until 1990, ending with the Peace of
Paris. The Long War was an epochal war, similar to the Thirty Years’ War and the Peloponnesian War,
fought between three constitutional orders (Parliamentarianism, Communism, and Fascism) that sought to
replace the Imperialist constitutional order of the nineteenth century. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles:
War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), Part I.
3. “Excerpt from the Note by the Government of the RSFSR to the Governments of Great Britain,
France, Italy, the United States, China and Japan,” 19 July 1921, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 30.
4. “Draft International Convention on the Prohibition of the Production and Use of Weapons Based on
Employing Atomic Energy for Mass Destruction,” 19 June 1946, The USSR Proposes Disarmament
(1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 106.
5. “Proposals Concerning Atomic Energy Controls,” 11 June 1947, The USSR Proposes Disarmament
(1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 109112.
6. “Proposal Banning Atomic Weapons and Reducing by One-Third the Armaments and Armed Forces
of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR, France and China, the Permanent Members of
the Security Council,” 25 September 1948, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by
Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 113-114.
7. Honoré M. Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: A Revolution in Soviet
Military and Political Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, INC., 1989), 36.
8. “The USSR Government’s Statement on the Testing of a Hydrogen Bomb in the Soviet Union,” 20
August 1953, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S.
Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 115-116.
9. In 1954, the USSR submitted this declaration seeking a very broad consensus among the five
countries comprising the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council renouncing all
weapons of mass destruction. “Draft Declaration by the Governments of the United States, Britain, France,
the People’s Republic of China and the USSR on the Unconditional Renunciation of the Use of Atomic,
Hydrogen, and Other Kinds of Mass Destruction Weapons,” 30 January 1954, The USSR Proposes
Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1986), 117.
10. The Soviet Union proposed a complete end to testing atomic and hydrogen weapons. “Draft
Resolution on the Cessation of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests,” 17 January 1957, The USSR
Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1986), 118.
11. The Soviet government offered several ideas in this document: (1) U.S. President Eisenhower’s
proposal to end ICBMs was not sufficient, (2) A ban on using space for weapons testing was needed, (3) A
need for the elimination of foreign bases, (4) and (5) discuss the need for, and practical implementation, of
control measures. “Proposal by the Soviet Government on the Question of the Banning of the Use of Outer
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Space for Military Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign Bases on the Territories of Other Countries, and
International Co-operation in the Exploration of Outer Space,” 15 March 1958, The USSR Proposes
Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1986), 119-124.
12. “Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” 18 September
1959, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 128-144.
13. Ibid., 128.
14. Ibid., 131.
15. Ibid., 139-142.
16. Ibid., 143.
17. Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964-1968, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, INC., 1969), 1-5.
18. Gary K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, ed., “The Challenge of NIS Export Control Development,”
Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States, (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament: an Appraisal of Soviet Attitudes and
Intentions, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), 105.
21. Dallin also provided a chart of comparative military strength between the Western Alliances and the
Communist Bloc, as of 1964. Ibid., 101.
22. The United States possessed 800 ICBMs, 250 naval ballistic missiles, and 700 long-range bombers.
Compare to the USSR’s 200 ICBMs, 100 naval ballistic missiles, and 200 long-range bombers. Ibid., 101.
23. These three states developed and tested atomic weapons in 1952, 1960, and 1964 respectively.
24. G. M. Malenkov, September 22, 194, quoted in Bobbitt, 47.
25. Bobbitt, 46.
26. Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1962, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1971), 3.
27. George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, July 1947, pp.
566-582, reprinted in Walter Lafeber, America in the Cold War: Twenty Years of Revolutions and
Response, 1947-1967, (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, INC., 1969), 35-48.
28. Public Papers of the Presidents… Harry S. Truman… 1947, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963), 176-180. Reprinted in Lafeber, 49-55.
29. Barry Goldwater, Speech of September 23, 1964, in Walter Lafeber, America in the Cold War:
Twenty Years of Revolutions and Response, 1947-1967, (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons,
INC., 1969), 8-10.
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30. Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years, (New York: Pocket Books, INC., 1962), 363. Reprinted in
The USSR Proposes Disarmament, 100.
31. Ibid., 100; see also Morris V. Rosenbloom, Peace through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a
Blueprint for Security, (Washington, D.C. and New York: American Surveys in association with Farrar,
Straus and Young, 1953), 257-291.