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The
Age of
uncertainty
The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle
from Tiananmen (1989)
to 9/11 (2001)
Edited by
Ezra F. Vogel
Yuan Ming
Akihiko Tanaka
This on-line text published by the Harvard University Asia Center
The Age of Uncertainty
The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle from
Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001)
Harvard East Asian Monographs Online
The Age of Uncertainty
The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle from
Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001)
Edited by
Ezra F. Vogel
Yuan Ming
Akihiko Tanaka
Published by the
Harvard University Asia Center
Cambridge, Massachusetts 2004
© 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Printed in the United States of America
The Harvard University Asia Center publishes a monograph series and, in coordination with the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, the Korea Institute, the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, and other faculties and institutes, administers research projects designed to further scholarly understanding of China, Japan, Vietnam,
Korea, and other Asian countries. The Center also sponsors projects addressing multidisciplinary and regional issues in Asia.
Contents
Introduction
Ezra Vogel, “The United States Perspective”
3
Yuan Ming, “The Chinese Perspective”
18
Akihiko Tanaka, “The Japanese Perspective”
23
Part I
Domestic Politics
Michael Nacht, “Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy (with
Thoughts on Japan) from Clinton Through 2001
39
Zhang Baijia, “Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies
in the 1990s”
61
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya, “Japanese Politics
and Security Policy, 1990–2001” (preliminary version)
82
Part II U.S.-China Relations
Robert Ross, “From Denial to Leadership:The Clinton
Administration and China”
125
Jia Qingguo, “Narrowing Differences but Diverging
Priorities: Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000”
154
vi
Contents
Part III
U.S.-Japanese Relations
Gerald Curtis, “U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s”
Koji Murata, “Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During
the 1990s”
Part IV
185
204
Sino-Japanese Relations
Zhang Tuosheng, “Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of
the Century”
227
Akio Takahara, “Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s”
254
The Age of Uncertainty
The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle from
Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001)
Introduction
The United States Perspective
Ezra F. Vogel
How did the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region—the United
States, China, and Japan—adjust their relations in the uncertain environment after Tiananmen ( June 4, 1989) and the end of the Cold
War? We approach these questions from both a domestic and a foreign policy perspective. Three scholars describe the domestic context
in each of the three countries. Each of the three bilateral relationships
is examined by two scholars, one from each country involved.
The essays in this volume were first presented at the third conference on the relationship between the United States, China, and Japan
from the end of World War II to the close of the twentieth century.
The papers from the first conference, held at Harvard in May 1998,
are available on a web site: http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/
sino-Japanese/index.htm. Those from the second conference, held in
Tokyo in January 2000, are available in The Golden Age of the U.S.China-Japan Triangle, 1972–1989 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002). The third conference, on which the chapters
in this volume are based, was held in Beijing in April 2001; the chapter were subsequently revised to take into account the impact of September 11.
—————
Ezra F. Vogel is Henry Ford II Research Professor at Harvard University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
3
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Ezra F. Vogel
The editors, who were also the organizers of the three conferences, believe that in the twenty-first century peace and security, not
only in Asia but in the entire world, require effective working relationships between the three great powers of the Asia-Pacific region.
The conferences were organized so that scholars from the United
States, China, and Japan might contribute to the goal of constructive
cooperation by seeking a common understanding of the forces that
have affected relations between their three countries in recent decades. At the time the conferences were launched, Yuan Ming was the
director of the International Relations program at Peking University,
and Ezra Vogel was the director of the Asia Center and the Fairbank
Center for East Asian Research at Harvard. Tanaka Akihito became
the director of the Institute of Oriental Culture at the University of
Tokyo in April 2002. Each in turn drew on leading specialists in his
own country.
***
The years 1972–89, leading up to the period covered by this volume,
were not easy, as China turned against its former ally, the Soviet Union, and began working with the United States and Japan. But, although the process was complex, the three nations’ common strategic interests gave them a positive basis for cooperation. This strategic
rationale, bringing together China, Japan, and the United States
against their mutual enemy, the Soviet Union, ended abruptly in
1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ensuring breakup of
the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Communist Party. The result was
a new period of great uncertainty, with many ups and downs. Despite the increased tensions, however, in the 1990s the level of mutual economic activity, exchange of people, and communication between the three countries continued to grow. In the period from 1972
to 1989, interactions between China and the other two powers were
very limited, and the relationships could be managed by a small
number of people who were concerned with national strategy. In the
1990s these relations, now greatly expanded, became more enmeshed in domestic concerns and domestic politics and were more
difficult for a small group of leaders to control.
U.S.-China Relations
By 1989 it was clear that Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of opening and reform, launched a decade earlier, was enormously successful, and the
nation’s GDP was beginning to grow at a rate exceeding 10 percent a
year. With China’s population surpassing that of Europe and North
The United States Perspective
5
America combined, a major global change was taking place. China
was starting from a very low base, but it was modernizing not only
its industry and infrastructure but also its military. The rise of any
country creates anxieties in its neighbors, and China, with its long
history, rich civilization, and huge population, naturally provoked
new concerns in Southeast Asia, in Japan, and in the United States.
The United States’ foreign policy, as Henry Kissinger and others
have pointed out, has long been composed of two pillars: one flows
from a realistic assessment of national power and interests, the other
from a desire to affirm the values for which America stands. During
the Cold War, with the perceived dangers from the Soviet bloc, the
balance between these two pillars shifted toward a realistic concern
with national power and interests. With the Cold War over, it
seemed to many Americans that the United States no longer needed
to support dictatorships that had allied with it against the Soviets.
The United States’ foreign policy therefore had more leeway to demonstrate support for American values.
There are many countries in the world that do not behave in accord with U.S. standards of human rights. But the drama of the
crackdown around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, vividly conveyed by television around the world, occurred just at the time that
the balance of concerns in U.S. foreign policy began to shirt more
toward affirming the country’s values than looking after its strategic
interests. China, with its size and sense of grandeur, and now the
dramatic Tiananmen Incident, immediately became a major symbol
for many Americans concerned with human rights. This concern was
vigorously put forward by Chinese students in the United States
whose friends were among those demonstrators, and their voices
were reinforced by continued numbers of political dissidents within
China who found refuge in the United States. Soon other U.S.
groups, including those opposed to abortion, those concerned with
strengthening the military, and those supporting propagation of religious faith, also made China the focus of their efforts.
Some of the most influential critics of China either were from
Taiwan or were Taiwanese who had immigrated to the United
States. In 1947, within Taiwan, the KMT (Kuomintang), in retreat
from the mainland, had brutally cracked down on local Taiwanese.
From then on the KMT relied heavily on military rule and the secret
police to maintain discipline—until 1987, when Taiwan ended military rule and lifted the ban on opposition parties. Thus two years
later, when the Tiananmen Incident occurred, Taiwan authorities
trying to win American support could contrast their democracy with
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Ezra F. Vogel
the brutal totalitarian crackdown of June 4, 1989, in Beijing. And the
Taiwanese who had come to the United States could, like other
American ethnic groups, use the American political process to gain
public support. Since the executive branch had been more concerned
with strategic and other international issues that required cooperation with China, Taiwan and its U.S. supporters took their case to
Congress. The Tibetan exile community, led by the marvelously
charismatic Dalai Lama, also pleaded its case before U.S. public
opinion and Congress.
After 1989, therefore, the United States’ China policy became a
contested issue, as critics of China, strange bedfellows from the right
and left, were balanced by pragmatists, business people, and political leaders who realized that the pursuit of U.S. interests required
cooperation with China; by Chinese Americans; and by those who
took part in cultural and academic exchanges with China.1
Changes in Taiwan led to a questioning of the agreements between the United States and China that had been made in 1972, 1978,
and 1982. At the time of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, both the
KMT in Taiwan and the Communists on the mainland claimed that
they represented the mainland. The KMT was still proclaiming its intention of retaking the mainland. In 1972 in the Shanghai Communiqué, therefore, the United States had acknowledged that both sides
of the Taiwan Strait claimed that Taiwan was part of China and that
the United States did not contest that view. In the normalization of
relations between China and the United States, negotiated in 1978,
the United States ended formal government-to-government relations
with Taiwan and replaced those with formal government relations
with the mainland. In 1982 the United States announced that it
would gradually reduce weapons sales to Taiwan.
But by the end of the 1980s, the issue of Taiwan had become much
more complicated. Leaders in Taiwan, aware that they had no
chance of retaking the mainland, hoped that by renouncing their unrealistic claims to the mainland they would become more accepted in
international organizations. Their reorganized government claimed
to represent only the people of Taiwan. Once democracy took root in
Taiwan after 1987, the “local” people whose ancestors had been in
—————
1. Two excellent books on U.S.-China relations in this period are: Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations. 1989–2000 (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003); and David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams:
Managing U.S. China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2001).
The United States Perspective
7
Taiwan for centuries gained relative to the “mainlanders,” the 15
percent of the population that had fled the mainland in the late 1940s
when the KMT lost the civil war. Many local people had less interest
in the mainland, and President Lee Teng Hui, who was born in Taiwan, tried in the 1990s to lay the basis for increasing independence
by stressing local culture, the local language, and local history. Relations between Beijing, trying to restrain the Taiwan efforts toward
independence, and Washington, more sympathetic to Taiwan than in
1978, grew very tense.
From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan had for centuries been
part of China, even before the 1680s when it became a prefecture of
China. In 1949, as the KMT army was retreating from its defeats in
the civil war, the KMT government and army fled to Taiwan as their
last holdout. It was then widely expected that Communist troops
would invade Taiwan within a year or two, to complete the civil
war. But in 1950 when the Korean War broke out, the United States,
concerned about possible Communist Chinese aid to North Korea,
blockaded the Taiwan Strait. Thus in Chinese eyes, the United States
had interfered in the completion of the Chinese civil war.
In 1978 in the normalization of relations with China, the United
States had agreed not to maintain government relations with top officials in Taiwan, and there had been an understanding that highlevel Taiwan officials would not be allowed to visit the United
States. When Lee Teng Hui was allowed to visit the United States in
1995, China voiced strong objections.
Tensions between the United States and China reached a peak in
1996 when China, concerned about increasing efforts for independence by Lee Teng Hui, fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan. The
United States then sent carrier task forces near Taiwan. The tensions
forced both sides to consider more deeply the costs of confrontation,
and both countries began working together to maintain a better relationship. The Clinton administration, which had taken office in 1993
determined to carry out its policy of pushing China much harder on
human rights, thus developed much closer ties with China from 1996
to 2001.
American voices critical of China continued to make themselves
heard, and the Chinese press publicized them to the Chinese people,
creating a strong popular reaction. When the United States bombed
the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1998, Chinese criticisms grew
furious. Most Chinese leaders and the concerned public firmly believed the bombing had been intentional. And yet Chinese leaders,
like their U.S. counterparts, felt it was necessary for Chinese interests
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Ezra F. Vogel
to continue to work with the United States in world affairs. In short,
after 1996, in both countries popular criticisms of the other country
were kept under control by pragmatic leaders who believed that it
was in their national interest to work with the other power.
The Reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
What role should the U.S.-Japan alliance play once the Cold War was
over and the Soviet Union, the main target of the alliance, was no
longer a threat? Was the alliance still necessary? Could the U.S. military in Japan be greatly reduced?2
After 1989 Japan’s basic political structure, which had developed in
the context of the Cold War, began to collapse. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had come together in 1955 to respond to the union of
the socialists that occurred earlier in the year. From then until 1993,
the LDP, which embraced capitalism and the alliance with the capitalist West, had ruled Japan. The opposition, composed of the progressive parties, the Socialists and Communists, had never been strong
enough to take power. But supported by labor, the opposition’s presence was significant enough to force the LDP to remain united. The
LDP, which had drawn heavily on its rural constituency, was gradually weakened by the massive migration to the cities, but the Socialist
Party offered voters few viable alternatives since it had difficulty
maintaining its commitment to radical change when the livelihood of
the working class was improving so rapidly. By the time that the Soviet Union collapsed, it was clear to most Japanese that the open market countries were doing much better than the communist countries,
and with the collapse of the communist world structure, the domestic
support for Japan’s Socialist Party also collapsed. But once the LDP
was no longer bound together by a strong opposition, the LDP members who lost out in intra-LDP battles felt no pressure to stay in the
party. They split off. After 1993 the LDP no longer had the coherence
to maintain power. Since then Japanese politics have been in constant
turmoil, as all administrations have been composed of fleeting coali—————
2. The Edwin O. Reischauer Center of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C., publishes an annual volume entitled The United States and Japan. It is a very useful way to track the relationship during
this time period. See also Ralph Cossa, ed., Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997); and Michael J.
Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
The United States Perspective
9
tions that have lacked the basis for sustained power and the ability to
pursue a coherent foreign policy.
And yet, although the uncertainties made forceful action difficult,
the overall consensus in Japanese society supporting the U.S.-Japan
alliance and the consistency of leadership within the bureaucracy
managed to continue the basic direction of foreign policy. Even the
remnants of the Socialist Party found it difficult to continue to object
to the alliance with the United States.
Within the United States, the end of the Cold War unleashed longsuppressed U.S. business frustrations over the difficulty of breaking
into the Japanese markets. These frustrations had grown in the late
1980s, when the Japanese economy seemed so strong and powerful
in its heavy industry, particularly steel and automobiles, and high
technology. At the time these frustrations had been kept under control by high U.S. officials who felt that the pressures on Japan should
be muted because of the importance of maintaining the military alliance against communism. With the end of the Cold War, it was hard
to argue that the United States should moderate its efforts to open
further the Japanese market. Thus when the Clinton administration
took office in 1993, it let loose powerful pressures on Japan to set
targets for importing U.S. goods. The Japanese, however, with the
increasing importance of multilateral resolution of trade disputes
and with a strong economy, no longer felt they had to yield to pressure, and when top Japanese and American leaders met in February
1994, for the first time there was no agreement on trade issues. This
mood dampened but did not destroy the basis for cooperation on security matters.
From the U.S. point of view, the Gulf War was a turning point in
its expectations of Japan, which it felt should make a greater contribution to global security. After global public opinion criticized Japan
for sending only money to help with the Gulf War, Japan began
moving, albeit slowly, to send forces to international peacekeeping
operations and to consider responsibilities for defending not only the
Japanese islands but the region around Japan.
In the early 1990s the United States began to reduce its forces in
East Asia, and by 1994 Japanese defense planners, uncertain as to
what role the United States might play in the future in Asia, began to
wonder how to draw up their next five-year defense plan. In response to these great uncertainties, in 1994 the U.S. and Japanese
governments undertook a series of broad, multilevel discussions
about security. There was a strong momentum in the relationship
among officials on both sides who had worked together for some
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Ezra F. Vogel
time to maintain stability in the region. The tension on the Korean
Peninsula in 1993–95, when the United States was pressuring North
Korea to stop its production of plutonium and North Korea was
threatening aggression, created a sense of urgency and demonstrated
to many the necessity for close cooperation even after the Soviet Union had collapsed.
The wide-ranging discussions among current and former officials
in the United States and Japan led to a basic consensus on continuing
the alliance, with some modifications. Officials on both sides were
convinced that even without an enemy, the alliance was important
for maintaining stability in the region and for cooperating in responding to emergencies. The rationale was harder to explain to the
U.S. public than the threat of a communist enemy, but the issues
were not highly politicized and the discussions went relatively
smoothly. The agreements were affirmed by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto when they met in Japan in early
1996. Although the Chinese were suspicious that the alliance was
anti-Chinese, China was not an issue for those involved in the discussions. In fact, they wanted to increase cooperation with China to
help maintain stability in the region.
Japan and the United States worked together to develop more detailed guidelines for cooperation, but many issues remained to be
dealt with and many contingencies required continued cooperation in
planning. How would the two nations respond to various kinds of
emergencies? How large a role should Japan play in the region? How
far could it go in becoming a “normal” country without causing
strained relations with its neighbors? How much could Japan contribute to international peacekeeping efforts? And how could popular
opposition to the heavy concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa be
managed while doing what was necessary to respond to emergencies?
Issues became much more complex than in the simpler days of the
Cold War, but the long years of cooperation among security officials
on the two sides of the Pacific and the many linkages between Japan
and the Untied States at all levels of society provided a strong basis
for continued cooperation in dealing with these complex issues.
Relations Between Japan and China
As the previous volume in this series makes clear, the Japanese response to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident was different from that of the
United States. Although the Japanese were horrified at the crackdown and the Japanese government was sensitive to the reactions of
The United States Perspective
11
the United States and Europe, Japan was more willing to maintain
good relations with China. Japan had never made morality such a
key to its foreign policy. With the memory of widespread Japanese
atrocities against the Chinese from 1931 to 1945, the Japanese did not
feel in a strong position to lecture Chinese leaders. They also put a
high priority on restoring and maintaining good relations with their
neighbors. Therefore Japan played a special role among the industrialized countries of the world in 1989–92 in maintaining relatively
good relations with China. It was in this context that President Jiang
Zemin visited Japan and the emperor of Japan, for the first time in
history, visited China. There was hope that the two nations were
embarking on a road of positive cooperation when for the first time
in centuries both China and Japan were strong countries.
By 1993 Europe and North American countries were resuming
their pre-1989 level of activity with China, and the Chinese no longer
felt that Japan had the unique importance in further opening the
window to the outside that it had immediately after the Tiananmen
Incident. The Chinese were therefore less constrained by their concerns about Japan. At the same time, they were disturbed by the extension of Japanese security planning from the islands of Japan to the
surrounding region. China’s firsthand contact with Japan in 1931–45
had left a powerful image of a militaristic people, and the low level
of contact between China and Japan after 1945 gave few Chinese an
understanding of how deep the Japanese revulsion to militarism had
become.
The Chinese had many suspicions of Japan. Was the extension of
the defense perimeter to the areas surrounding Japan the first step
toward the revival of militarism? Japan had maintained especially
close ties with Taiwan, which had been a Japanese colony for fifty
years, and Taiwan’s president Lee Teng Hui spoke Japanese more
naturally than he spoke Chinese. Was Japan plotting to do what it
could to prevent China from retaking Taiwan?
In 1995, on the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II,
Chinese media were filled with the horrible memories of the war and
with warnings about the importance of remaining vigilant with regard to Japanese intentions. Why were the Japanese rewriting their
textbooks, and why were Japanese politicians visiting the Yasukuni
Shrine commemorating the war dead and making statements that
understated the horrors of what Japan had done in World War II?
Many Japanese, who had felt quite guilty about their role in China
in World War II and had since then been willing to be generous
when China seemed weak, became increasingly concerned about
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Chinese criticisms of Japan as the prospects of China’s becoming a
great economic power and possibly a great military power grew
stronger. If China harbored such hatred of Japan, how would China
behave when it became more powerful? Would it not be better for
Japan to stop yielding to Chinese pressure and to show China that it
could not continue to make Japan bend to its demands?
Tensions between Japan and China thus grew strong in the mid1990s. Japanese public reactions perhaps reached a height in 1998,
when President Jiang Zemin visited Japan and repeatedly demanded
that the Japanese apologize more deeply and express this in a written apology. The Japanese public became incensed and supported
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s decision not to make a written statement. Yet both Japanese and Chinese leaders recognized the dangers
of confrontation and began after 1998 to make an effort to control the
mutual tensions and to manage the relationship so that the two nations could avoid conflict and cooperate on their many common interests.
Post-9/11 (2001): U.S.–East Asia
Relations Stabilize, Sino-Japanese Tensions Continue
In the first months of 2001, after he came to office, President George
W. Bush announced that he would “do whatever it takes to support
Taiwan.” Chinese were concerned that his support for Taiwan might
indicate a fundamental change in U.S. policy and encourage politicians in Taiwan seeking independence. Beijing dispatched Vice Premier Qian Qichen to discuss these and other issues relating to U.S.China relations, but the new administration’s policies had not yet
been clarified, and the visit was less than satisfactory.
Then at the end of March a U.S. reconnaissance plane collided
with a Chinese plane off the coast of Hainan. American ambassador
Joseph Pruher in Beijing and administration officials in Washington
attempted to establish early contact with the Chinese, but the Chinese did not respond immediately. Meanwhile U.S. airmen were being held in Hainan, pending resolution of the issues. Since the U.S.
administration did not yet have a full team of specialists in place at
the time, top Department of Defense officials were personally involved in dealing with the issue and came to believe that high-level
Chinese officials were initially not being forthright about the events.
Strong statements from Washington were matched by strong state-
The United States Perspective
13
ments from Beijing. But within eleven days a statement by President
Bush which the Chinese could take as an apology was issued, and
within two weeks the issue was resolved, with the release of airmen.
China also released the airplane to the United States.
The resolution of this issue, and discussions that followed stabilized the Taiwan issue and reduced U.S.-Chinese tensions. The visits
of State Department Policy Planning Director Richard Haas in June
2001, followed by the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell, helped
improve the atmosphere between the two countries.
When 9/11 occurred, a few weeks after Secretary Powell’s visit to
Beijing, the Chinese quickly responded with condolences and expressions of support for U.S. efforts to deal with terrorism. Chinese,
long concerned with terrorist attacks by Uighurs in Xinjiang and
long apprehensive that human rights activists in other countries
might regard the Uighurs as freedom fighters, were quick to stress
that China stood with the United States in addressing their common
effort to combat terrorism. China, which had long maintained a close
relationship with Pakistan, encouraged Pakistan president Pervez
Musharraf to cooperate with the United States against the Taliban,
and U.S. officials appreciated this assistance. In this context, the
United States reaffirmed its commitment to the one-China policy and
cautioned Taiwan to avoid provoking mainland China, indicating
that if provocations caused Chinese reactions, the United States
would not necessarily support Taiwan.
A meeting between President Bush and Chairman Jiang Zemin at
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shanghai,
President Bush’s later visit to Beijing, Hu Jintao’s visit to the United
States, and Jiang Zemin’s visit to President Bush in Crawford, Texas,
were opportunities that were used by both sides to strengthen the
U.S.-China relationship. In short, although U.S.-China relations had
begun to improve, the events of 9/11 helped to strengthen and consolidate better U.S.-China relations.
Relations between Japan and the United States have remained
relatively stable since 9/11. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro responded promptly to the terrorists acts of 9/11 with declarations of
support for the United States’ campaign against terrorism. The Japanese government was quick to offer to send ships to the Indian
Ocean to assist U.S. efforts in the region. The Japanese Diet passed
new legislation to support the sending of Self-Defense Forces abroad,
and the Japanese government has been playing a central role in assisting the reconstruction of Afghanistan. After the United States
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invaded Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi, despite public opinion polls
opposing the U.S. attack and despite the lack of a U.N. resolution to
support the U.S. action, expressed positive support for President
Bush’s efforts in Iraq.
Prime Minister Koizumi took the initiative of visiting North Korea and initially the Japanese public was very enthusiastic about his
visit, especially since North Korea agreed to return Japanese hostages. But when North Korea announced that a large number of
hostages had died in North Korea and that other hostages were still
unaccounted for, the Japanese public became furious. The hostage
issue has continued to dominate Japanese policy toward North Korea, but still many Japanese were very concerned when American
officials talked about the axis of evil and implied that the United
States might take military action against North Korea. The fear of
being dragged into a conflict by the United States has led Japan to
want more room for independent maneuver, such as expanding its
own intelligence capacities, strengthening military-to-military contacts with other countries, and promoting multilateral activities
among Asians. China also opposed any U.S. military action against
North Korea but strongly supported coercive diplomacy and made
it clear to North Korea that it firmly opposed North Korea’s becoming a nuclear power.
Although U.S. relations with China and Japan have thus become
quite stable since 9/11, relations between China and Japan have
remained tense and awkward. Shortly after the Sixteenth Party
Congress in late 2002, People’s Daily commentator Ma Licheng published an article in an influential Chinese journal, Strategy and Management, advocating the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. He
argued that Chinese had not adequately recognized antimilitarist
trends in Japan and suggested that China and Japan should embark
on a more cooperative path. His article stirred a great deal of interest in both China and Japan, but in China the government has not
taken any important initiatives to improve the relationship. Although trade, Japanese industrial investment in China, and twoway tourism have grown rapidly, public opinion in both countries
is critical of the other country, and the governments have done little
to improve the relationship. Businesses and governments in both
countries have managed to maintain reasonable working relationships but at a deep emotional level, mutual antagonism remains
strong, and the relationship between the two countries remains
fragile.
The United States Perspective
15
The Search for Explanation
What explains the changing relations between the countries since
1989? The key factors at the beginning of the period of uncertain relations between China and the United States were anti-Chinese opinion in the United States following the Tiananmen Incident and the
loss of the strategic rationale for the relationship after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party.
Since the Tiananmen Incident, in U.S. presidential election campaigns, the challenger has capitalized on the anti-Chinese mood of the
U.S. public to criticize the incumbent president for being soft on
China. But within a year or two after the new president is elected, the
advantages of working with China to avoid confrontation over the
Taiwan Straits and to deal with a host of international issues where
Chinese cooperation is needed have led the newly elected president to
develop a more cooperative relationship with China. The growing
importance of China as an important trading nation with a growing
global political role has made it increasingly important for the United
States to maintain good working relations with China.
Historically, some combination of strategic interests and U.S. values have always played a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. At
times of crisis, the strategic concerns dominate, and at times of reduced international risks, values tend to gain in importance. The
concerns with terrorism after 9/11 have elevated strategic concerns
to a greater height.
On the Chinese side, the experience with two periods of great tension with the United States, over the U.S. bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia and the airplane accident off Hainan, apparently led Chinese leaders to conclude that even if they consider
China to be the victim, they have a strong national interest in maintaining good relations with the United States. They apparently concluded that these broad national interests were more important than
making a strong response to the incidents. The political structure of
China is such that the Chinese have a core of leaders, partially insulated from public opinion, able to focus on what they consider key
national interests.
The relationship between Japan and the United States has now
developed into a stable alliance based on overall interests between
the two largest economies in the world. Both countries have democratic processes and a high level of interaction in all major sectors that
serves to stabilize the relationship. Given the problems that would
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Ezra F. Vogel
be created if Japan were to aim to become an independent military
power—problems with neighbors, problems with the budget in a
stagnant economy, problems of recruitment into the military—
Japanese officials have concluded that it is in Japan’s interest to
maintain a strong alliance with the United States, with perhaps a little more room for independent action.
Why have China and Japan been unable to resolve their underlying emotional antagonism despite their high level of economic interaction? It is not only the history of conflict. The United States and Japan as well as France and Germany began working more closely
after World War II despite the history of hostility. The continuing
emotional mood reflects an underlying rivalry as well as Chinese
fear of an independent Japanese military and the appeal in China of
anti-Japanese sentiment in enhancing national unity. And the Japanese public mood is such that Japan will not automatically do what
China asks it to do.
The Proto-Triangle
At the time of the reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in
1995–96, Beijing became concerned that the strengthened U.S.-Japan
alliance, no longer aimed at the Soviet Union, was now aimed elsewhere, at China. The Chinese worried that Japan, with new military
technology from the United States, might pursue a more independent
foreign policy. These fears were heightened as a result of Clinton’s
visit to Japan in early 1996, during which he reaffirmed the alliance.
After the 1996 confrontation between China and the United States
over Taiwan, U.S. and Chinese leaders began working together to
reduce the risks of conflict. This led to a series of consultations that
culminated in Clinton’s nine-day visit to China in 1998, when he did
not mention Japan. Moreover, his failure to stop in Japan on the way
to or from China, as leaders had done in the past, gave rise to enormous anxieties in Japan that the United States was abandoning Japan
for China.
Yet today, China’s level of involvement in the economy of the region and the world is too great for stability to be achieved by a
strong alliance between the United States and Japan against China.
As a neighbor to China, Japan’s economy will increasingly be linked
to that of the mainland, and Japan must accommodate itself to the
realities of Chinese power, even while it maintains an alliance with
the United States that may help make it clear to China that military
aggression against any country in the region is unacceptable. And
The United States Perspective
17
both China and Japan have relationships with the United States that
are too significant to allow them to make an alliance against the
United States. Nor can the three countries create a condominium of
power without considering the interests and views of other
neighbors, including Korea, Russia, and the Southeast Asian countries. It is therefore the task of leaders of these three countries to find
ways in which all three powers can cooperate in responding to issues
like the future of the Korean Peninsula and to see that in bilateral relations the interests and concerns of the third are fully considered
and dealt with.
The Chinese Perspective
Yuan Ming
There are many triangles in international relations. But “strategic triangle” carries special weight. Here “strategic” refers not to the overall foreign policy goals of one country but to the structure of a relationship among countries with special strengths and influences, in
either global or regional affairs. By working together, this configuration of countries may bring peace and prosperity. But conflicts
among them may also lead to disaster. Whether positive or negative,
the influences of the relationship are profound, both internationally
and domestically. U.S.-China-Japan relations belong to this category.
The past 150 years have witnessed many changes in the relationship,
and we will doubtless see more in the years ahead. The primary
geographical stage for U.S.-China-Japan relations is East Asia, a region that took no part in the Westphalia settlement inaugurating the
modern European state system. The region’s indigenous political
concepts and practices differ greatly from the European and American experience. Its mainstream culture, however, has over time exhibited great flexibility. In modern times this attribute has helped
both China and Japan to learn from the West. The process of learning
—————
Yuan Ming is Professor of International Relations and Director of the
American Center at Peking University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
18
The Chinese Perspective
19
has lasted for more than a century, and so far there is no sign of a
change in the direction of the tide.
Ironically, in a region that produced neither the Westphalia system nor concepts such as raison d’état, people are now talking increasingly about their “national interest.” A more interesting phenomenon is that when people think about their own national
interest, the other main international players are often regarded as
troublemakers rather than as supporters. This was particularly evident in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended. Rhetoric in Japan, joined
by voices in the United States, lobbied against the so-called China
threat. Some extreme rightists even won reputations by saying “no”
to China to show their “patriotism.” The “no” fashion quickly spread
to China. The mid-1990s saw numerous Chinese publications with
titles carrying a big “no” to both the Americans and the Japanese. In
the United States, the nationalistic mood also remained high. Many
Americans believed that the Cold War was won by their value system as well as by their political and economic systems. This sense of
superiority led them to look at everything in the world primarily
through an American lens. Not only the United States but also Japan
and China became increasingly inward-looking in this decade; politicians talked about “threats,” “rivals,” “competitors,” and even
“enemies.” The mass media in each country created negative stories
and images of the other two. None of this was encouraging.
However, as our previous volume The Golden Age of the U.S.China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989, shows, the United States, China, and
Japan enjoyed positive relations with one another during that earlier
period. These positive relations not only helped the three states to
survive their own respective domestic difficulties but also contributed a great deal to the peace and development of East Asia overall.
The biggest troublemaker, at that time, was the Soviet Union.
Then the Soviet Union collapsed. The “golden age” of the triangle
ended. The inner logic seems to be that there must be an external
threat for the parties involved to enjoy positive relations.
But this logic is wrong. Things are much more complicated. The
main historical force behind the collapse of the Soviet Union was
not the U.S.-China-Japan triangle but the strong course of globalization. The forces of globalization are so deeply rooted in history that
they cannot be stopped by any simple exercise of power by individuals or states. As Thomas Friedman argued in The Lexus and the
Olive Tree—Understanding Globalization: “Globalization is not the
only thing influencing events in the world today, but to the extent
that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping force, it is the
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Yuan Ming
system.” Friedman calls this system the “One Big Thing.” Having
analyzed the economic, environmental, military, social, and political
dimensions of the deepening process of globalization, Joseph Nye
reaches this conclusion: “Globalization at its core refers to worldwide networks of interdependence.” In his speech to hundreds of
students at the School of International Studies of Peking University
in 2000, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, also the dean of the school, reminded the audience to be sensitive to the main features of our
time: economic integration, the information revolution, the resurgence of religious fundamentalism, and so on. In the meantime,
many observers in Japan have also shared their insights on various
aspects of globalization.
Unfortunately the need for global integration is always forgotten
when people talk about “national interests.” In many cases, emotions
prevail over knowledge. The vision of the complex of globalization is
overshadowed by much more simplistic nationalistic suspicions and
distrust. This can be seen in each of the three countries examined in
this volume.
Globalization in its modern form began in the Enlightenment in
eighteenth-century Europe and was then followed by the Industrial
Revolution and the European expansion around the world. Through
the nineteenth century, it was characterized by widespread materialism, which was certainly not the dream of the Enlightenment thinkers. Modern materialism calls attention to everything visible and
powerful, with military might as its highest symbol. There is no
doubt that it contributed enormously to the improvement in the
quality of people’s lives. Materialism did not offer enough room for
those reaching for higher ideals who were often marginalized in the
pursuit of materialism and “national interests.”
After three hundred years of development, the Western world
now finds itself in a great dilemma brought on by the double-edged
sword of globalization. On the one hand, the West has to continue its
efforts to keep itself on the frontiers of modern science and technology and maintain its basic political institutions and values. On the
other hand, it is facing unexpected difficulties and challenges. One of
the major challenges may come not from the outside but from
within. As Robert Scalapino once noted: “At this moment when almost the whole world is paying respect to democracy, democracy itself is falling deeply into jeopardy. This is true even in countries that
created democratic systems. The central issue is this: what kind of relation in the current era should we maintain between freedom and
authority, right and responsibility?” If this is an issue for the West-
The Chinese Perspective
21
ern world, especially the United States, it is even more so in Japan
and China. That is, people in this region are far from a real understanding of the essence of democracy and the balance of freedom
and responsibility.
Globalization has made three Asia-Pacific powers, especially their
leaders, realize that there is no way to keep themselves totally out of
the world. We are now living in an era when domestic issues are internationalized while international issues extend to the domestic
scene. The United States, Japan, and China are now at quite different
stages of development. All of them, however, are facing the common
challenge of maintaining the stability and order of the world, not to
mention East Asia. And the basis for reaching that goal is the proper
balance of freedom and responsibility. It should start on the individual level, but it is more crucial on the state level. Major powers must
take on major responsibilities. The U.S.-China-Japan triangle belongs
in this category.
September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call not only for Americans
but for the whole world. It revealed the dark side of globalization. It
also set an ominous model for those who fail to adapt to global
changes. Its negative influences are still unfolding. There are many
reasons for people to work together against this global threat.
In the introduction for the Golden Age volume, Ezra Vogel used
the word “constructive” to describe the relationship enjoyed by the
United States, China, and Japan during the period 1972–89. In the
post–September 11 period, we should borrow his term. To deal with
the dark side of globalization is not an easy job. It must be a joint,
long-lasting, and constructive effort.
The current agenda for the United States, China, and Japan already seems quite full. The premier task is to stabilize the world
economy. Second, the three countries have to mobilize the necessary
resources to fight terrorism. Third, the three countries should take
joint steps against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Fourth is the energy issue, especially as the Gulf situation undergoes
critical changes. Fifth, the three countries, joined by others, should
give more attention to “nontraditional” security issues: drug dealing,
illegal immigration, HIV, smuggling, and so on. The most urgent
common concern at this moment is the situation in the Korean Peninsula. More constructive ideas are needed to quiet the mood there
and make it a truly nuclear-free area.
Thanks to the hard work of scholars from the United States,
China, and Japan, and especially thanks to Ezra Vogel’s insight and
enormous organizing work, we have completed a series of confer-
22
Yuan Ming
ences on the U.S.-China-Japan triangle from World War II to the contemporary period and published the Golden Age volume. We hope
that volume and this one will remind our readers, especially the
younger generation of the three countries, that we must learn from
history while keeping an eye on the future.
The Japanese Perspective
Akihiko Tanaka
The triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Japan has been important since the end of World War II, but it is becoming more so as the twenty-first century begins. As our project has
demonstrated, the wider strategic environment has dominated the relations of the three nations. Initially, the early Cold War period provided the context within which the Tokyo-Washington alliance was
formed and China joined the Soviet bloc. When the Korean War broke
out, normal relations between Washington and Beijing became impossible. In the Cold War strategic environment, the United States
deemed a military presence in Japan essential. In Japan, the Yoshida
Shigeru administration also found it in Japan’s interest to allow the
American bases; this course appeared to be Japan’s only means of
preserving its security without a full-blown remilitarization. Rearming was an impossible option given domestic opposition and the
country’s need to focus on economic recovery. The tradeoff of American bases for Japanese security was Japan’s strategic calculation behind both the San Francisco Peace Treaty, concluding World War II,
and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Tokyo, under these circumstances,
could not delay choosing between Beijing and Taipei; John Foster
—————
Akihiko Tanaka is a Professor at the University of Tokyo.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
23
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Akihiko Tanaka
Dulles told Yoshida that unless Japan chose Taipei, ratification of the
San Francisco Treaty by the U.S. Congress might be difficult. Japan
concluded a treaty with the Republic of China in 1952.
The change of strategic environment in the late 1950s and early
1960s seems to have prompted Mao Zedong to reconsider the validity of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Khrushchev refused to give China the
nuclear technology it wanted in the late 1950s and did not appear to
Mao to be dependable in incidents such as the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. In the 1960s the Soviet military along the Sino-Soviet border became increasingly menacing. China was not able to cope with this
threat, as demonstrated in the 1969 military clashes over Chenbao/Damansky Island. As Mao Zedong came to believe that the Soviet Union now constituted China’s number-one enemy, Mao and
Richard Nixon found a new strategic context and in the early 1970s
formed a united front against their common enemy. The Japanese
desire to normalize relations with Beijing would have been impossible to carry out without this strategic change.
The strategic environment thus created was the basis of what
might be termed the “golden age of the U.S.-China-Japan triangle.”
A series of events—the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty
(August 1978), the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (November 1978), the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia
(December 1978), the normalization of relations between the United
States and China (January 1979), the Sino-Vietnamese war (February
1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)—created
an impression that China, the United States, and Japan formed a virtual alliance against the Soviet Union (and Vietnam). Partly because
of tensions with the United States over Taiwan after the election of
Ronald Reagan as U.S. president, China reassessed its close ties with
the United States and in September 1982 announced its “independent and peaceful foreign policy.” Thus the virtual alliance among the
three did not last long. But the existence of the Soviet Union as the
major and common concern during the 1980s nevertheless prevented
relations among the three from deteriorating to any great extent.
The Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 and the end of the Cold War
dealt strong blows to the triangular relationship. The image of China
as a country in gross violation of human rights became widespread,
especially as the Cold War came to an end and communist regimes
in Eastern Europe were replaced by newly emerging democracies.
But although the United States, Japan, and other countries applied
sanctions against China, the first Bush administration and the Uno
Sosuke and Kaifu Toshiki administrations in Japan remained rather
The Japanese Perspective
25
cautious. Observing the large-scale protests, they were more concerned about possible chaos and instability in China than about human rights violations there. Virtually all important sanctions were
lifted by the Houston G7 summit the following year. By 1992 Deng
Xiaoping had reiterated the importance of the policy of “reform and
open door” (gaige kaifang), and China was able to restore normal relations with the rest of the world. The Japanese emperor made a state
visit to China in the autumn of 1992, the first such visit in history.
The impact of the Tiananmen Incident, in this sense, was limited.
The implications of the end of the Cold War were far more wideranging. The disappearance of the common enemy created a situation in which strategic calculations became unstable and the real
threat unclear. The first candidate to replace the Soviet Union was
Japan. This perception of Japan threatening the outside world became most apparent in the United States during the late 1980s, even
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War was
not quite over, some suggested that economic power was more important than military power in the measurement of national power
and that the rise of Japanese economic power therefore constituted a
threat. By the end of the 1980s, articles and book with titles like Containing Japan or The Coming War with Japan became popular in the
United States. A similar perception of Japan was rising in some quarters in China as well. In the view of some Chinese, Japan, now that it
had attained a position of economic power, was contemplating becoming a political power, then a military power. In the United States,
the basis of this perspective was the so-called revisionist view of Japan that considered the political-economic system of Japan intrinsically different from that of the United States and other Western
countries. According to this understanding, in order to resolve economic issues with Japan, a simple resort to policies based upon market mechanisms would not work and some kind of coercive diplomacy to impose “numerical targets” was needed. The Clinton
administration’s negotiation with Japan in the Framework talks
(1993–95) was largely based on this thinking. Ironically, by the time
the Clinton administration started its negotiations, the bubble had
already burst, and the foundation of the “threat from Japan” had
largely evaporated.
As the perception of the threat from Japan receded in the United
States, the “threat from China” attracted the attention of not only the
media but also decision-making circles in Washington, Tokyo, and
elsewhere. This view coalesced sometime in 1992, when China reemerged as an economic dynamo from its near isolation after the
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Akihiko Tanaka
Tiananmen Incident of 1989. After Deng Xiaoping’s call for the reactivation of an open-door policy in 1992, China resumed its doubledigit economic growth. The World Bank and the IMF’s estimates of
GDP of countries of the world in terms of purchasing power parity
(PPP) had a significant impact on people’s perceptions: a World
Bank report predicted that the combined economic power of China,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan might surpass that of the United States in
the early years of the twenty-first century. The growth of China’s defense budget appeared less reassuring; its growth rate was nearly 15
percent, higher than the GDP growth rate. The purchase of military
equipment, mainly from the former Soviet Union, became a source
of concern among neighboring countries. A rumor that China might
be buying a full-fledged aircraft carrier persisted for several years.
Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea were a further concern; China constructed permanent facilities on the Mischief Reef,
which the Philippines also claimed, in 1995. Statements by People’s
Liberation Army admirals and Chinese publications were not reassuring, either; they emphasized Chinese maritime interests and the
new role of the PLA navy as the protector of these interests. Chinese
military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 added further
concerns.
As a result, lively debates occurred in Washington, Tokyo, and
various capitals of Asia. A book entitled The Coming Conflict with
China was published in the United States in 1996, and the journal
Foreign Affairs featured the pros and cons of the China threat thesis;
the debate between “engagement” and “containment” was waged in
Washington, especially after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. In Japan,
too, various articles were written emphasizing the potential power of
China. The rise of the “China threat” thesis evoked a strong reaction
from China; Chinese officials pointed out that many of the arguments of the thesis were exaggerated. In addition, unofficial and often quite emotional antiforeign publications appeared in China, including a book entitled China Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu).
Although the Chinese did not frame their views in terms of an
“America threat” thesis, China has long described the United States
as the source of international problems. Two waves of books and articles have pointed out the “hegemonism” (banquan zhuyi) and
“power politics” (qiangquan zhengzhi) of the United States. The first
wave came in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident
and the Gulf War, and the second came in 1998, especially after the
Kosovo crisis and the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade. The basic perception common to these two waves was the
The Japanese Perspective
27
current dominance of American power in the post–Cold War period.
While Chinese leaders often emphasized that the basic trend of the
post–Cold War period was one of “multipolarization” (duojihua) and
that this trend was desirable, they also noted that the United States
was the only superpower (zhaoji daguo). Sometimes the Chinese analysts described this combination as a system composed one superpower and many strong powers (yizhao duoqiang). This dominant
superpower was perceived in China to be threatening in at least two
ways: first, in its perceived intention and, second, in its military capability. Chinese concerns about U.S. intentions were most acute in
the years immediately following Tiananmen. In Chinese eyes, the
United States was plotting a conspiracy of “peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian)—a conspiracy to topple communist governments by
nonmilitary means—just as the United States was perceived to have
done in Eastern Europe. In the late 1990s, the Chinese stressed not
the intention of toppling the communist governments but the intention of interfering in internal affairs, most notably in Taiwan as well
as in Tibet. U.S. military might was demonstrated to Chinese eyes
first and most vividly by the Gulf War and then by the NATO bombing in Kosovo in the late 1990s. The Chinese did not oppose the Gulf
War per se. China was critical of Saddam Hussein; what worried Beijing was the sheer military might displayed through CNN. The Kosovo intervention, in contrast, was doubly threatening; it indicated
the U.S. intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries as well as its ability to conduct highly sophisticated warfare
with pinpoint bombing on its military targets. The somewhat paranoiac reaction against NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade was understandable from this perspective. The bombing fit
nicely with the perception of U.S. hegemonism threatening China.
The period after the end of the Cold War, however, also coincided
with the period of “globalization.” On the one hand, the disappearance of the Soviet threat deprived the United States, China, and Japan
of their common enemy and created a heated debate regarding who
was to replace it. These conditions produced much mutual suspicion
and friction. On the other hand, the increasing globalization and
deepening interdependence of the 1990s connected the three economies and societies to an unprecedented degree. The rapid and impressive economic growth of China, which caused the perception of
threat from China, was possible only with the influx of massive foreign capital from abroad, mostly from the United States and Japan.
This increasing interdependence now constitutes another aspect of
the strategic environment of the triangular relationship. Despite the
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Akihiko Tanaka
fluctuating sense of mutual threat among the three, they also found it
in their mutual interest to preserve and develop their increasingly interdependent economic relationship, the source of their mutual economic gains. As the triangular relationship enters the twenty-first
century, its management has become more complex than before.
Domestic politics are another factor in the triangular relationship.
The strong anticommunist sentiment in the United States in the early
1950s clearly reinforced its hostile attitudes toward Beijing while
making it easier for Taiwan to conduct its lobbying activities in
Washington. In Japan anticommunism sentiment was not as strong
as in the United States, while consciousness of guilt toward the Chinese and pragmatic economic concerns mitigated the hostile nature
of Japan’s policy toward China in the same period. Despite Japan’s
strategic decision to ally with the United States, domestic pressures
to open and broaden unofficial ties with mainland China continued
to exist in Japan in the 1950s. In China, unexpected radicalization
and changes in its external posture, especially toward Japan, could
be explained only by the country’s domestic changes. China’s abrupt
termination of its unofficial trade relationship with Japan in May
1958 and its willingness to resume these unofficial trade ties in 1962
were closely connected with the coming of the Great Leap Forward
and its disastrous consequences. The rise of Chinese hostility toward
Moscow can be explained not only by the changing strategic context
but also by Mao’s personal idiosyncrasies as well as the domestic political turmoil created by his behavior. Domestic politics also shook
the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States. The
turmoil in Japan surrounding the revision of the security treaty in
1960, which forced President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel his trip
there, was largely caused by Japan’s domestic politics; Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s domestic policies, rather than the content of the
revised security treaty, prompted Japanese youth to take to the
streets in protest. The beginning of the perennial trade frictions between Japan and the United States can also be traced back to the late
1950s, when Japan’s textile exports created strong reactions in the
U.S. textile industries.
Richard Nixon’s decision to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough
with Beijing, a highly strategic move, was also motivated by domestic concerns; in order for him to secure re-election in 1972, it was
necessary for him to show the Americans that he was making progress to end the country’s disastrous involvement in Vietnam. In Japan, although Tanaka Kakuei’s decision to go to China to normalize
relations with Beijing was made possible with the changing strategic
The Japanese Perspective
29
context, it should not be forgotten that there were persistent and increasing Japanese calls for official ties with Beijing in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.
The 1970s and 1980s were the “golden age” of the triangle largely
because of the strategic environment. But its stability was reinforced
by the Chinese domestic context as well. The comeback and the subsequent reign of Deng Xiaoping in China formed one of the foundations of the stable triangular relationship. His commitment to reform
and to an open-door policy came as China no longer felt it wise to
maintain a united front against the Soviet Union after 1982. In the
Japan-U.S. relationship of the 1980s, the combination of Ronald
Reagan in Washington and Nakasone Yasuhiro in Japan (the RonYasu relationship) was a clearly stabilizing element. Nakasone tried
to create a similar personal relationship with Hu Yaobang in China
but failed as Hu lost power in the late 1990s.
On the other hand, the “golden age” was not devoid of conflicts
or strain. Although no conflicts during these years did lasting damage to the triangular relationship, they were nevertheless troublesome and becoming more serious by the end of the 1980s. In many
ways, domestic politics was the source of these frictions among the
three countries.
A typical case was the controversies over “history” between Japan
and China. One should not forget that it was not until 1982 that the
controversies emerged as diplomatic issues between Tokyo and Beijing. The content of middle school and high school textbooks had been
the subject of politically charged domestic debate in Japan since the
1950s, especially regarding how to interpret the Japanese wars in the
modern period. But until 1982, China had not initiated any criticism. It
is not clear why China did not do so earlier; the details of the Japanese
textbook screening process may not have been well understood by
Chinese specialists until the 1970s. In any case, the content of Japanese
textbooks has been a source of controversy between Beijing and Tokyo since then, as the Japanese domestic controversy spilt over into
Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. The left-wing advocates in Tokyo
use Chinese criticism as evidence of their argument, while the rightwing advocates fan nationalistic sentiment in Japan by citing Chinese
opposition as undue interference into Japanese domestic affairs.
The prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to
Japan’s war dead, is another aspect of the Sino-Japanese ‘history”
controversies. As in the case of the textbook issue, the Yasukuni
Shrine had been controversial in domestic politics long before it became controversial in Sino-Japanese relations. Despite significant
30
Akihiko Tanaka
domestic opposition, largely based on the imperative of the separation of church and state, to the prime ministers’ visits to the shrine,
many prime ministers have visited the shrine since the 1950s. Chinese criticism was first made on the occasion of Prime Minister
Nakasone’s “official” visit to the shrine on August 15, 1985. China’s
objections stemmed from the fact that the shrine is the site where the
“Class A” war criminals of the Tokyo Military Tribunal such as Tojo
Hideki are enshrined and deified. These “Class A” criminals were
enshrined in the shrine in 1978, but the Chinese did not raise the issue until 1985. Probably the Chinese specialists again were not very
familiar with the issue until the middle 1980s. As a result of the
strong criticism from China, Prime Minister Nakasone decided not to
visit the shrine, the criticism was interpreted in Japan as closely related to Chinese internal politics, where Hu Yaobang was being criticized for his pro-Japanese posture as well as for his liberal policies in
other areas. Nakasone, in order to avoid damaging his friend Hu,
decided not to visit the shrine. Subsequent prime ministers of Japan
in the late 1980s and the early 1990s also did not visit the shrine, but
this created frustration among some Japanese nationalists and the
veterans’ association (izokukai); why, they asked, was it necessary for
Japanese prime ministers to kowtow to foreign pressure and to stop
paying respect to those who had contributed to the nation? What
was the motivation of China and other countries that started criticizing only in the 1980s? These questions constituted the backdrop for
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s visit to the shrine in 1996 on his
birthday and Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro’s visit to the shrine
in August 2001.
After the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold war, two issues loomed large in the triangular relationship: human rights and
Taiwan. Human rights, though a universal concern, are in practice in
the triangular relationship a matter of contention largely between the
United States and China. As already noted, the Bush administration
was rather reluctant to apply strong sanctions against China after
Tiananmen, which caused domestic controversy. For several years
after Tiananmen, controversies over the awarding of most-favored
nation status to China became an annual ritual in the U.S. Congress.
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton openly criticized President Bush
for not taking human rights seriously and promised to use the MFN
process to influence Chinese human rights behavior once he assumed the presidency. As it turned out, it became very difficult to
fine-tune economic means to change what the Chinese leaders believed to be strictly domestic concerns. The Clinton administration
The Japanese Perspective
31
had to return to the attitude of the Bush administration with respect
to human rights issues in China: the MFN was not the right vehicle
with which to affect human rights conditions in China.
The case of Taiwan involves both international and domestic issues for all three countries. Beijing has insisted on its domestic nature; because Taiwan is an integral part of China, it feels that China
alone is entitled to be involved in its resolution. But because Taiwan
has strong lobbies in Washington and in Tokyo, the Taiwan issue is
also a matter of domestic concern in both capitals. The Taiwan Relations Act, which defined U.S. relations with Taiwan, was made possible because of Taiwan’s strong support in Congress. After the democratization of Taiwan, however, pro-Taiwan sentiment in
Washington and Tokyo became much more broadly shared than before. Previously, anticommunism had been the ideological basis for
supporting Taiwan. After democratization, increasing numbers of
liberal politicians discovered in Taiwan new political trends they
were in sympathy with; now, for example, there are as many Taiwan
supporters in the Democratic Party of Japan as in the Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo. There may be some sentimental factors involved in the friction between Japan and China over Taiwan. A typical case in point is Lee Teng-hui, the first democratically elected
president of the Republic of China. In China, Lee has been depicted
as a notorious troublemaker. But to many Japanese visitors to Taipei,
especially young politicians, Lee, a graduate of Kyoto Imperial University who speaks flawless Japanese, has been a grandfatherly wise
man. It is hard for them to understand why the Chinese denounce
him as a treacherous figure.
As international politics evolve in the twenty-first century, the triangular relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo becomes critical, especially with regard to the future of East Asia.
There are at least three challenges that the three countries need to
consider: new international politics after September 11, the Korean
Peninsula, and the emerging new regionalism in East Asia.
Although not totally unpredicted, the terrorist attacks on the Untied States on September 11, 2001, changed many aspects of international politics. The rise of nonstate actors in general and the emergence of “new terrorism” in particular introduced still another
element in strategic calculations in international politics. On the one
hand, it necessitated more cooperation among sovereign states;
transnational terrorists with apocalyptic and fundamentalist worldviews are common enemies of most states. Without cooperation, it is
difficult to cope with nonstate, nonterritorial networks. It is no acci-
32
Akihiko Tanaka
dent that many countries, including China and Japan, are willing to
cooperate with the United States in the “war against terrorism.” On
the other hand, it may be difficult to agree on approaches and strategies to cope with this new situation. As the new national security
strategy of the United States indicates, deterrence may not work
against transnational terrorists; pre-emptive action may be needed in
certain circumstances. But there may be some areas of disagreement
with respect to the strategy toward “rogue states.” Does deterrence
not work against them? Is pre-emptive action needed or justified
against them? These differences emerged when the United States decided to attack Iraq in March 2003. France, Germany, and Russia expressed their open opposition to U.S. logic. In this instance, Japan
supported the United States. China expressed an attitude similar to
that of France, Germany, and Russia but refrained from making its
opposition very visible. In this sense, the cleavage across the Atlantic
appeared more visible than that across the Pacific. But the question
of how to cope with transnational terrorism, especially the possible
connection between transnational terrorism and “rogue states,” is a
serious and potentially divisive issue for the triangular relationship.
The second and related challenge is the Korean Peninsula. It is
true that the Korean Peninsula has always been an important issue
for the triangular relationship; the Korean War was critical in shaping the relationship in the period after World War II. However, during the Cold War, though dangerous, the relationship between
North Korea and South Korea was militarily balanced; both were
supported by their respective allies, but at the same time they were
restrained by these allies from launching dangerous attacks. Domestically, the governments of both North and South Korea were stable
and in no likelihood of collapse. This condition changed with the
end of the Cold War. With the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, North
Korea lost the critical support of both its security and its material resources. China has continued to support North Korea to some extent,
but its support has not been sufficient. North Korea may have had
intentions of developing nuclear weapons without such strategic
changes, but with the end of the Cold War, it accelerated its nuclear
programs as well as its ballistic missile development programs. Pyongyang refused to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspectors and threatened to withdraw from the
nonproliferation treaty. Serious economic sanctions were about to be
imposed in the summer of 1994 by the United Nations when Kim Il
Sung and Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. president, agreed to defuse
the crisis. The United States and North Korea concluded the Agreed
The Japanese Perspective
33
Framework in late 1994, the terms of which became the basis of international relations between North Korea, on the one hand, and the
United States, South Korea, Japan, and the other neighboring countries, on the other.
As Kim Jong Il solidified his regime after the three-year mourning
period for the Great Leader, he took initiatives to improve his country’s relationship with the outside world. One such attempt was his
invitation of South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung to visit Pyongyang in June
2000. Another was his invitation of Prime Minister Koizumi in September 2002. Unfortunately, the initiatives, which first appeared to
be positive, ended in disappointment in the former case and near
disaster in the latter. To Koizumi, contrary to previous persistent denials, Kim candidly confessed that North Korea had in fact abducted
many Japanese, some of whom were already dead. Immediately after Kim Jong Il signed the Japan–North Korea Pyongyang declaration, in which the North agreed to abide by all international agreements, Pyongyang confessed to Jim Kelly, assistant secretary of state
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, that North Korea was engaged in a
uranium enrichment program. Because the United States did not accept the North Korean demand to conclude a nonaggression pact,
Pyongyang declared its intention to resume its nuclear programs,
frozen under the Agreed Framework, thus endangering the structure
that had maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula since 1994.
Although North Korea is one of the countries that President
George W. Bush included in his “axis of evil,” it is not a suitable
country against which to contemplate a pre-emptive military action.
As of 2003, consensus appears to exist that diplomatic approaches
should be taken to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. However, the challenges are formidable. If North Korea does not listen and continues to engage in a dangerous game of
brinkmanship, the risk of war increases despite the current reluctance of all parties concerned to engage in military action. Close coordination among the triangular countries as well as South Korea
and Moscow is essential.
The third challenge that faces the triangular countries in the long
term is the future of East Asian regionalism. If wars on the Korean
Peninsula and over the Taiwan Strait are to be avoided in coming
decades, a significant diplomatic challenge for countries in East Asia
is to create what Prime Minister Koizumi calls a “community that
acts together and advances together.” Because current attempts at
such community making in East Asia do not assume the participation of the United States, this situation should be monitored carefully
34
Akihiko Tanaka
and wisely by Japan, China, and the United States. It is well known
that the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), which Malaysia’s
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed in the early 1990s, attracted strong criticism from the first Bush administration. Mahathir’s scheme, as a result, failed to materialize. But the current
framework, ASEAN+3, that emerged in late 1997 has the same
membership that Mahathir envisioned—the ASEAN countries plus
China, South Korea, and Japan. ASEAN+3 summits are now convened annually, and numerous functional meetings—finance ministers’ meetings, economic ministers’ meetings, lower-level meetings
of various bureaucratic echelons—are now held frequently. One of
reasons for the success of ASEAN+3 has been the lack of U.S. opposition; the Clinton administration had a more relaxed attitude toward
regional and multilateral activities in East Asia. At the same time,
ASEAN+3 countries have taken pains that this framework not become unfriendly to the United States.
In other words, the ASEAN+3 process has so far developed without creating much friction with the United States. But part of the
reason for the smooth development may well be the group’s insignificant substance; because ASEAN+3 has not achieved much substantive agreement, it may not have attracted much criticism from
nonmembers. Washington may not care as long as the ASEAN+3
remains a “talk shop.” After six years of existence, however, the
ASEAN+3 process is entering into a substantive period. In 2002
China concluded an agreement with the ASEAN countries for establishing a free trade area, while Japan also reached an agreement in
principle with ASEAN to form a “comprehensive economic partnership” with free trade agreements. Both China and Japan now consider an increasingly integrated East Asia to be an essential factor in
their respective economic development. Because the U.S. economy
continues to be critical to the Japanese, the Chinese, and, for that
matter, the entire East Asian economy, the growth of the regional
framework in East Asia cannot and should not be hostile to the
United States. Furthermore, in the security and political arenas, at
least for Japan, the alliance with the Untied States continues to be
critical. In these senses, the formation of an East Asian community
should be compatible with continuing friendship and, for the traditional U.S. allies, security ties with Washington. As East Asian regionalism increases its substance and institutionalization, care
should be taken so as not to damage the relationship between the
United States and the East Asian countries. In this critical and potentially very constructive area of regional development, the triangular
The Japanese Perspective
35
relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo could become
even more important in the coming decades.
The future of East Asia as well as the world is becoming more
opaque as the world becomes more complex after September 11. The
task of conducting the war against terrorism is daunting. Management of unstable regions in the world, including the Korean Peninsula, continues to be at least as difficult as before. With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the situation may become even
more difficult. To preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and over
the Taiwan Strait, cooperation among the United States, China, and
Japan is now more important than ever. The triangular relationship
will be judged successful if it achieves this. But it will be evaluated
even more positively if it contributes to the formation of an East
Asian community friendly to the United States, a historically unprecedented achievement in the long history of East Asia.
Part I
Domestic Politics
Domestic Roots of U.S. China
Policy (with Thoughts on Japan)
from Clinton Through 2001
Michael Nacht
In examining the complexities of the U.S.-China-Japan triangular relationship, one can easily fall into the trap of considering each government’s policies as though they were the product of a rational calculus reflecting strengths and weaknesses relevant to the national
interest that were generated by a tiny group of leaders in Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. This “black box” approach to foreign policy
analysis was espoused by the eminent scholar Hans Morgenthau in
the late 1940s when he articulated the “realist school” of international relations, declaring that interaction among sovereign states
was all about a struggle for power among them.1
—————
Michael Nacht is Aaron Wildavsky Dean and Professor of Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
1. Morgenthau’s ideas were articulated in The Power of Nations (New York: Knopf,
1948) and in numerous subsequent editions and related writings. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), for a modern interpretation of realism.
39
40
Michael Nacht
It is not that Morgenthau was wrong but that his analysis was incomplete, especially with reference to contemporary times. Fifty years
of careful scholarship by many with access to primary documents has
revealed that a large number of other considerations frequently help
shape foreign policy. These include historical perspectives and the
“analogies” learned by leaders from these experiences; the ideological
framework that leaders bring to their responsibilities as well as their
perceptions of what is and is not important; the competition among
and within government agencies over policy formulation, including
clashes between the executive and legislative branches; the influence
of public opinion—both “elites” with special knowledge and interests, including representatives of the private sector, and the mass public; and the role of nongovernmental groups including the press,
members of the academic community, and “think tanks.”2
This paper is intended to disaggregate the elements that influenced U.S. policy toward China from 1992 to the fall of 2001 to better
understand one leg of the vital U.S.-China-Japan triangle. It focuses
on the players, their interactions and their motivations in the policy
process, rather than an analysis of the course of the Sino-American
bilateral relationship during this period. This disaggregated approach is also applied briefly to an examination of U.S. policy toward Japan during the 1990s as well as reflections on the early Bush
administration approach.
Historical Legacies
Morgenthau may have had it about right in the days before American policymaking became complex. In the early phases of the American democracy and, indeed, through the days of Woodrow Wilson
and into the Great Depression, foreign policy issues were indeed
handled by the president and a small group of his advisors. The
number of influential players inside the government was indeed
—————
2. There is a vast literature now in each of these subfields. To begin, the reader might
refer to the following: Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) for an analysis of the influence of historical reasoning on decision-making; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976) for the application of psychological
concepts; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) and the revised edition in 1999, for the definitive account of bureaucratic politics; the voluminous
writings of Ole Holsti for the influence and limitations of public opinion on policymaking; and Craufurd Goodwin and Michael Nacht, eds., Beyond Government (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1995), for many examples of the influence of nongovernmental actors,
including the press and think tanks, on the policymaking process.
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
41
very small. But U.S. policymaking was altered fundamentally when
the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 ushered in the age of big
government. Executive branch agencies proliferated during Roosevelt’s twelve years in office, and the policymaking process became
far more fluid, subject not only to compromises within and across
agencies but to the views of special interest groups in different sectors of American society. This was far more the case in domestic than
in foreign policy, but the Roosevelt experience set the stage for what
was to follow.
In the national security field, the Truman administration created
the modern architecture that is still largely in place today (although
it has since been modified in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon).
The 1947 National Security Act established the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The Cold War stimulated a proliferation of agencies and specialists in all fields and subfields of America’s foreign relations, reflecting the fact that for the first time in its
history, the United States had become a “superpower” with interests
throughout the world.3
The Truman years were also crucial because it was during this period that a critical aspect of American domestic thought toward
China became a permanent fixture of the political landscape. Prior to
this period, American perceptions of China were influenced by the
few who had had economic contact with Chinese or who had participated in acts of religious proselytizing. Indeed, some of the most
prominent early U.S. scholarly specialists on China were themselves
offspring of these religious missionaries (John Fairbank and Lucian
Pye, for example).4 However, when Mao Zedong successfully completed the Chinese communist revolution in 1949, and Chiang Kaishek and the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan, an enormous domestic debate arose about “who lost China.” This debate, somewhat silly
—————
3. The term “superpower” was coined by Professor William T. R. Fox, who, for
more than three decades, directed Columbia University’s Institute of War and Peace
Studies.
4. It has been observed that one clear difference between the evolution of Chinese
studies and Soviet/Russian studies in the United States is that many China specialists
came to their subject with intrinsic respect, admiration, and even warmth for China.
By contrast, many of the most prominent American Soviet specialists—Richard Pipes,
Adam Ulam, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example—were natives of Poland who
held deeply skeptical and even antagonistic perspectives of Mother Russia as well as
Soviet communism.
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Michael Nacht
in retrospect (since the United States never had any realistic prospect
of influencing decisively the outcome of the Chinese revolution),
nonetheless left an indelible mark on the internal character of American thinking about its China policy.
What is the nature of this mark? Truman and his top lieutenants,
especially former Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were blamed primarily by Republican
critics for “permitting” the Chinese communists to succeed and for
failing to back at crucial moments Chiang Kai-shek and his associates. Consider the context in which these allegations were advanced.
By 1949, the United States and the Soviet Union were deeply embedded in the Cold War. The Berlin airlift had only recently been
used to avert a conflict over that divided city. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization had been established, as had the Marshall
Plan—a concerted effort to bolster Western Europe militarily and
economically. Mao and his colleagues were linked, at least in the
American mind, with Stalin and the spread of communism, which
was perceived as posing a fundamental threat to the survival of
Western democracy. Not long thereafter, the Korean War began,
which led to the first armed conflict between Chinese and American
forces. These were dangerous times indeed.
The lessons learned by the Democrats from this searing experience was that it was politically dangerous to be “soft” or “moderate”
toward China.5 So even when Washington began to appreciate that a
genuine Sino-Soviet rift had taken place in the early 1960s, neither
the Kennedy nor Johnson administrations could reach out to China
for fear of again being chastised as “soft on communism.” Indeed,
the escalation of the Vietnam War during this time seemed only to
validate the judgment that China and the United States were on a
collision course, in a deadly “zero-sum game.”
The Nixon-Kissinger opening to China, culminating in the spectacular February 1972 visit and the Shanghai communiqué, was
made possible not only because Mao and Nixon calculated that each
had much to gain from this rapprochement. On the American side, it
—————
5. Some claim that the “loss of China” allegation against the Democrats lost its
clout over time and that it was not a serious consideration during the Clinton years.
But this author is skeptical of such criticism. Indeed, in a discussion of Clinton’s approach to China, the journalist Patrick Tyler noted that after the deep unhappiness of
Beijing with Clinton’s linking of human rights to economic policy, the influential Li
Peng claimed that Clinton and Christopher would be blamed for “losing China.” See
Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), p. 408 and the footnote on
that page.
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
43
was feasible only because Nixon had staked out such an unassailable
record as an anticommunist that he could not be attacked from the
political right as Truman had been more than two decades earlier.6
The Nixon initiative definitely made it easier for a Democratic
president to work with China, but only up to a point. The Carter/
Brzezinski movement to complete normalization of relations with
China in 1979 was made possible only by Nixon’s earlier move. It
was greatly enhanced by the ascendancy in Beijing of Deng Xiaoping
and his commitment to economic modernization. Yet President
Carter and his national security advisor still had to make the case for
this normalization in terms of balancing Soviet power in order to
win Congressional approval.7
The Reagan/Bush years were relatively crisis-free in terms of relations with Beijing except for the 1989 Tianamen Square episode that
mesmerized millions of American television watchers for two weeks
in June of that year. The brutality with which the PLA put down the
student revolt, while understandable to some realpolitik proponents,
was widely condemned throughout the U.S. body politic. When
President Bush sent his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to
Beijing shortly after the incident to ensure communication between
the two governments would stay on a sound footing, his move was
broadly criticized.
Ironically, the growth of Chinese economic power in the 1980s
and beyond produced a dilemma among Republicans in fashioning a
China policy that claimed broad support within their political base.
On the one hand, the large and influential U.S. corporate community, overwhelming supporters of the Republican Party, increasingly
saw trade and investment in the vast Chinese market as vitally important. Corporate leaders and their representatives became powerful advocates for moderate U.S. policies toward China that would facilitate closer bilateral economic and political relations. On the other,
those influenced primarily by a deep anticommunist ideology or by
a threat assessment that yielded China as America’s primary adversary after the collapse of the Soviet Union, also strong supporters of
Republican political philosophy, consistently argued for a hard-line
policy toward Beijing, irrespective of the deleterious consequences to
the bilateral economic relationship. It was this tension that marked
—————
6. See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 1049–96.
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
1983), pp. 196–233.
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Michael Nacht
the challenge for President George Herbert Walker Bush in fashioning his China policy from 1989 to 1992.
Candidate Clinton, a “new Democrat,” sought to position himself
in the middle of the American political spectrum after the humiliating electoral defeats of Carter in 1980, Mondale in 1984, and Dukakis
in 1988. By the time of the 1992 presidential election, the Cold War
was over, the Soviet Union had disappeared, and foreign policy issues were largely nonexistent during a campaign dominated by
Clinton’s phrase “It’s the economy, stupid.” The United States was
mired in a deep economic recession, and domestic issues were virtually all that Bush and Clinton debated. But Clinton did accuse Bush
of “coddling dictators,” an explicit critique of how the Bush administration handled or, rather, did not handle the Tianamen crisis.
This was the political and intellectual inheritance handed to Clinton when he entered the White House in January 1993.
How Clinton Dealt with Multiple Constituencies
President Clinton was focused “like a laser beam” on the economy
during his first year in office and also had to deal with the debacle
over Hillary’s failed efforts to gain congressional support for a national health care system. He established a National Economic Council (NEC) on a par with the National Security Council (NSC), with
the talented Wall Street financier Robert Rubin in charge. Not only
did Rubin range widely over issues both foreign and domestic, but
he helped shape Clinton’s thinking that in the “post–Cold War
world” foreign policy is economic policy.
Not a single member of the Clinton policy hierarchy was a specialist on China (or Japan for that matter). Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, a lawyer who sought to focus on mediation, quickly
turned to the Middle East as the region where he thought he could
make his mark. Strobe Talbott, who became deputy secretary of
state after the first year, was Clinton’s roommate at Oxford when
both were Rhodes scholars, and a lifelong student of the Soviet Union and Russian affairs. National Security Advisor Tony Lake, a
diplomatic veteran with Vietnam experience, was interested primarily in developing countries, especially Africa, and conflict resolution
in small countries such as Ireland, Somalia, and Haiti. He became
increasingly focused on the Balkans and issues of ethnic cleansing
during the first Clinton term. His deputy, Sandy Berger, who succeeded Lake in the second Clinton term, was a political associate of
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
45
the president from their days together in the 1972 McGovern presidential campaign. He was a Washington, D.C., trade lawyer with a
substantial practice representing the Japanese auto industry. Les
Aspin, the first secretary of defense, was a defense intellectual with
many years of congressional experience, who became embroiled in
and lost his job after the first year over the failed military intervention in Somalia. His successor, Bill Perry, a veteran of the Carter
Department of Defense with deep ties to the defense industry, focused primarily on the denuclearization of the former Soviet Union,
where he made great strides. He had, however, visited China on
several occasions under the guidance of Stanford sinologist John
Lewis. The secretary of the treasury, former senator Lloyd Bentsen,
was a political veteran who became fatigued with the job and resigned after two years. The director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Jim Woolsey, a prominent defense intellectual who had
held posts in several administrations, paid some attention to Chinese military developments. However, he became frustrated over
his lack of access to the president and to key decision-making venues and also resigned after two years.
The U.S. special trade representative (USTR), Clinton’s friend
Mickey Kantor in the first term, Washington attorney Charlene
Barshevsky in the second, was consistently engaged in the key elements of U.S. economic policy toward China and Japan. Most of the
time, the job of the USTR is to gain concessions from other governments concerning such issues as the reduction of nontariff trade barriers and compliance with trading norms embraced by the international community. Their experiences with Chinese officials were, not
surprisingly, often tension-filled. But the net effect of their prodigious efforts was to pave the way for congressional support for
China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
Permanent Normal Trade Relations bill that eliminated the need for
annual congressional review of the status of the bilateral SinoAmerican trade relationship.
The main responsibility for development of China policy rested
initially with Winston Lord on the diplomatic/political side and
Rubin on the economic. Lord had been with Nixon and Kissinger in
the breakthrough 1972 visit. Married to a noted author, Betty Bao
Lord, and a Republican, Lord was appointed assistant secretary of
state for East Asian and Pacific affairs after he had publicly criticized
the Bush administration for its seeming disregard for the abuse of
human rights in China during the Tianamen crisis.
46
Michael Nacht
Unlike Russia policy, which benefited through the vetting of a
continuous and elaborate interagency process led by Strobe Talbott,8
China policy was largely promulgated in small groups, with Lord
playing a key leadership role.
The U.S. orientation began with an overarching theme and a set of
grievances. The theme was the promotion of China as a member of
the international community, especially with respect to multilateral
economic institutions. This approach, later termed “engagement,”
was part of the overall Clinton policy goal of promoting democracy
and market economies worldwide.9 The grievance list included Chinese violations of the human rights of its own citizens; the abuse of
intellectual property rights, including international copyright laws,
that permitted China to reproduce many goods cheaply and sell
them well below world market prices; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including M-11 medium-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. The “linkage”
policy that was initially tried explicitly connected Clinton administration support for “most-favored nation” (MFN) status for China
with improved human rights policies. The limitations and the abandonment of this approach are discussed in detail in Robert Ross’s
chapter in this volume. Suffice it to say that the dual approach met
important domestic needs for the president. On the one hand, as a
“new Democrat,” Clinton wished to demonstrate his support for
American business promoting trade with and foreign direct investment in China. This would also please moderate Democrats and
many Republicans. At the same time, he would take a tough line on
human rights, a position supported strongly by liberal Democrats
such as California Representative Nancy Pelosi and many nongovernmental organizations. However, after Christopher and Lord were
rebuffed on their trip to Beijing in the spring of 1994, Clinton’s enthusiasm for this approach waned, as did Christopher’s interest in
and Lord’s influence on U.S. China policy.10
—————
8. This author, assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency from 1994 to 1997, participated regularly in this process. He also had episodic
interactions with a number of players who helped shape the administration’s China
policy, although he was not one of them.
9. Anthony Lake first articulated the overall Clinton strategy in “From Containment to Enlargement,” an address delivered at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, Washington, D.C., Sept. 23, 1993.
10. Christopher only made one more trip to China during his four-year tenure. By
contrast he made more than two dozen trips to Syria as part of his efforts to mediate a
peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The substantive details of the failed
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
47
On the proliferation issue, Clinton was ultimately persuaded that
only engagement might change China’s behavior. Therefore, he approved a visit by Secretary of Defense Perry to China in October
1994. The trip had two main purposes: the first was to re-establish
military-to-military ties between the two armed forces, including
port visits, the sending of officers to their respective war colleges,
and the commencement of a “defense conversion” program funded
by the United States; the second was to enlist Chinese support to
persuade North Korea to accept economic and energy assistance in
return for a cessation of the operation of nuclear reactors whose
spent fuel could be utilized to obtain weapons-grade material.
This visit produced tangible results. Port visits commenced between the respective navies. Each side sent senior military officers to
the war colleges in Beijing and Washington, D.C. A “defense conversion commission” was established whereby U.S. funds were ostensibly to be used to convert aging Chinese military facilities into more
productive agents for civilian purposes. And, with respect to the
very dangerous situation involving North Korea, the Chinese leadership professed to Perry an inability to influence Pyongyang. Yet
shortly after the Perry trip, North Korea changed its negotiating position with the United States in Geneva that led to the “Agreed
Framework,” diffusing the crisis.11
The Congress Takes Control
Non-Americans have a difficult time believing that the U.S. Congress
can block executive branch initiatives and can have great influence
over aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Anyone who doubts the validity
of this judgment need only examine the record after the Republicans
took control of both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in the November 1994 elections.
This was nothing less than a political earthquake in Washington.
Led by Georgia Representative Newt Gingrich, the Republicans es—————
Christopher/Lord approach are offered in Tyler, A Great Wall, pp. 393–412. One of the
chief skeptics of this strategy from the beginning was Stapleton Roy, among the most
senior sinologists in the U.S. Foreign Service and U.S. ambassador to China from 1991
to 1995.
11. The author of this chapter was a member of the Perry delegation to China. The
agreement with North Korea was the product of work primarily by the chief U.S. negotiator, Robert Gallucci. Perry’s views on how to engage China and simultaneously
strengthen U.S.-Japan relations are contained in Ashton Carter and William Perry,
Preventive Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 92–122.
48
Michael Nacht
sentially declared political war on all of Clinton’s major policy initiatives and sought to thwart him at every turn. Gingrich proclaimed in
1995 that Clinton was no longer relevant to the making of policy,
foreign or domestic. This was an extraordinary assertion, that nonetheless carried sufficient political weight that Clinton was forced to
make a statement that he was indeed “still relevant.” At this time
Clinton surely seemed to political observers as a one-term president.
It was during this period that Clinton turned to former political
adviser Dick Morris for guidance. Morris developed a strategy of
“triangulation” where Clinton would do enough for the Democrats
to hold his political base while taking over many Republican issues
(such as reducing crime by placing many more cops on the beat) and
co-opting more conservative voters.
On China, Clinton had little room for maneuver. Two of the key
committee chairs in the Senate, Foreign Relations and Armed Services, were now headed by Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond, respectively, two of the most conservative southern senators. Whereas
many Republicans represented strong business interests that endorsed continued economic ties with China, Helms and Thurmond
were from the ideological right wing of the party. They saw China
as the final communist threat and were interested in promoting
containment, not engagement, in U.S. China policy. In short order,
the defense conversion program with China was denied further
funding, and a spate of congressional hearings documented the
spread of Chinese missile and weapons technology to other states.
Clinton’s overall engagement philosophy was frequently challenged
by a coalition of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats
(personified by criticism from both Jesse Helms and Nancy Pelosi).
Clinton simply could not appear too “forward leaning” toward
China to have any hope of support on Capitol Hill or for his reelection prospects.
The absence of an offsetting Russia also weakened Clinton’s hand
on China. Recall that Democrats in particular had to justify their
moving closer to China as part of an anti-Soviet strategy. But with
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Clinton’s embrace of Yeltsin,
this assertion was now vacuous. Maintaining stronger ties with
China now had to be defined on their own terms. This was very hard
to do in front of a skeptical and often hostile Congress, whose members continued to harp about Beijing’s policies on human rights, intellectual property, and weapons proliferation.
Congressional attitudes on China, of course, cannot be understood without taking into account the importance of Taiwan. Ini-
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
49
tially, in the 1950s, Taiwan’s leadership was linked to the conservative wing of the Republican Party. This was slowly but steadily revised as representatives of Taiwan began to broaden their contacts
and linkages with senators and representatives virtually across the
U.S. political spectrum. It is widely felt that Israel and Taiwan have
the two most effective lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill.
And, by the mid-1990s, the Taiwanese had a great deal to discuss.
They had made the transition form a poverty-stricken economy run
by an austere and authoritarian regime to one of the “tigers” of East
Asia with a very high per capita income and over $100 billion in currency reserves. Taiwan had become the focus of some of the most
sophisticated computer chip manufacturing in the world, and its
firms were closely linked to Apple Computer and many of the most
noted firms in Silicon Valley. And, in political terms, Taiwan had
made the full transition to a working democracy, holding free elections and sustaining a free and critical press. While some in Congress
argued that the “Taiwanese tail shouldn’t wag the Chinese dog” in
U.S. policy, others pointed to Taiwan’s political and economic characteristics as the basis for supporting Taipei and opposing Beijing.
Nonetheless the Congress each year continued to approve mostfavored nation status for China, and the majority of the legislative
body tended to support the engagement strategy with China and a
cautious approach to Taiwan.
This bifurcation in Congressional attitudes toward China was reflected in nongovernmental groups. Take the press, for example. The
more liberal major newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, generally endorsed Clinton’s engagement policy. The more
conservative Wall Street Journal was far more critical, although still
supportive of business-to-business ties. And the highly conservative
Washington Times consistently ran articles and opinion pieces denouncing Clinton’s approach.
This spectrum of views was reflected in the think-tank community as well. The more liberal Brookings Institution pushed for a
closer U.S.-China arms control dialogue. The right-of-center American Enterprise Institute was far more skeptical, although still supportive of American corporate trade with and direct foreign investment in China. And the highly conservative Heritage Foundation
called for an unambiguous U.S. alliance with Taiwan.12
—————
12. It is no wonder that in the first recent book by an “insider” in U.S. China policymaking, the author concludes that after Tiananmen, “the bilateral relationship lost
its insulation from domestic politics” and that the relationship was driven by events
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Michael Nacht
A Shift in U.S. China Policy, the
Key Players, and the Connection to Japan Policy
By 1995, Clinton had begun to make notable policy shifts on several
fronts with respect to East Asia. With the decline of Christopher’s
interest and the downgrading of Lord’s influence, Deputy National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger began to assume greater responsibility for restoring a stable Sino-American relationship in which economic relations would remain productive without the president being vulnerable to criticisms of being “soft” on China. Clinton might
not have any longer been concerned about “losing China,” but he
could not afford to be seen as “soft,” especially in light of his 1992
presidential campaign criticism of President Bush for “coddling
dictators.”
At the same time Robert Rubin replaced Bentsen as secretary of
the treasury and became the chief architect of managing U.S. macroeconomic and international economic policies so that Clinton would
be in the strongest possible position to run for re-election on the basis of economic prosperity during the 1996 presidential race. Increasingly, Rubin was seen as one of the most important—if not the most
important—of Clinton’s policy lieutenants. Also, U.S. Japan policy
surfaced for the first time in a way that impacted directly on China.
In the fall of 1994, Joseph Nye, who had begun in the administration
as director of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) within the Intelligence Community Staff, assumed the post of assistant secretary
of defense for international security affairs.13 Together with his for—————
“without unifying principles or concord.” See Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen:
The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003).
Chinese reactions to the shifts in U.S. China policy are analyzed in Edward Friedman,
“Lone Eagle, Lone Dragon?” in Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the
Century, ed. Robert J. Lieber (New York: Longman, 1997).
13. Even some of those attentive to foreign policy are confused about the organizational structure of the U.S. intelligence community. The director of central intelligence
(DCI) is the nation’s chief intelligence officer. Historically he has also been director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, although this is not required. In addition to having all
the organizational elements of the intelligence structure reporting to him—including
the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency—the DCI has his own staff that reports directly to him. This unit,
the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), has within it the NIC that produces numerous
and frequent National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on countries and subjects vital to
American national security. The production of each NIE is the responsibility of a national intelligence officer (NIO) who serves on the NIC. Vogel, therefore, was the NIO
responsible for producing the NIE on East Asia for the NIC.
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
51
mer Harvard colleague Ezra Vogel, who was the national intelligence officer for East Asia on the NIC, Nye fashioned a rethinking
and restatement of the U.S.-Japan security relationship with the support of the “principals” in the administration.14
Recall that progressively through the 1980s, the major concern
about Tokyo among the American political and business elite was
that Japan was an economic giant that posed a potential threat to
American economic supremacy. Japanese financial interests had
purchased icons of the American business and cultural scene—from
Rockefeller Center in New York City to the Dunes Hotel in Las Vegas to Pebble Beach Golf Course in northern California.
Continuing tensions over reducing Japanese nontariff trade barriers was the hallmark of the bilateral relationship for many years. It is
no wonder that reaching agreements to facilitate the smooth exporting of U.S. auto parts into Japan, for example, were at the center of
bilateral trade negotiations.
But by the mid-1990s, it became increasingly clear that Japan was
in the throes of a deep economic recession. Slowly but surely the
view changed in the White House and the Treasury Department that
Japanese economic weakness was more the problem than Japanese
economic strength (a view that persisted at the start of the George W.
Bush administration).
Both Tokyo and Washington had for decades sought to insulate
the bilateral security relationship from the vicissitudes of economic
relations and trade tensions between the two. This was largely successful. But by the mid-1990s, with China beginning to loom as a
threat to American national interests for the first time since the
Nixon opening in the early 1970s, and with some believing that
America’s tough China policy was leading Tokyo to move closer to
Beijing, Nye and Vogel, with approval of their superiors, thought it
propitious to clarify Japan’s security commitment.
—————
14. In U.S. governmental parlance, the term “principals” carries significant weight.
The main mode of interagency deliberation is the Principals Committee, which includes the secretaries of state and defense, the director of central intelligence, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of the treasury. In Clinton’s first
term, other members included the U.S. representative to the United Nations and the
national security advisor to the vice president. The committee was chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs. Actions unanimously approved by
the Principals Committee were usually routinely approved by the president. If the
committee was divided, the president, with the advice of the vice president, would
make the final determination. A clarification of the security relationship with Japan
would surely have been authorized by the Principals Committee.
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Michael Nacht
This bilateral security arrangement has been asymmetric from its
inception. The Security Treaty, signed in 1951 and revised in 1960,
calls for the United States to come to the aid of Japan in the event the
Japanese territories are attacked. Given that this agreement was
originally a product of U.S. Cold War, anti-communist strategy created in the aftermath of Japan’s complete devastation during World
War II, there was never any consideration given to articulating a
Japanese commitment to similarly assist the United States in the
event the latter was attacked.
The key point of the Nye/Vogel effort relevant to U.S.-China relations was to leave open the possibility that Japan would use its military forces to assist the United States in the event of American defense of Taiwan in the aftermath of a Chinese attack on the islandnation. This commitment was not explicitly spelled out, but it left
open the possibility of such assistance, the first time Japan had even
hinted in writing to such involvement.
This rhetorical revision not surprisingly inflamed senior officials
in Beijing, who accused Washington of constructing an explicit antiChinese U.S.-Japan alliance. While this allegation was denied on
numerous occasions by senior American and Japanese officials, the
net effect was to introduce into Chinese thinking the need to take
Japanese involvement into account in any contingency planning it
was developing with regard to military action against Taiwan.
The period 1995-96 was a high watermark in U.S.-Japan relations
during the Clinton years. Until this time, it was common to observe
that U.S. policy had shifted from “Japan bashing” to “Japan passing.” Except for the irritations over trade policy, Japan barely
seemed to register as an element of American foreign policy. And
there was no overt evidence of a purposeful American triangular
strategy with a careful modulation of Washington’s relations with
Tokyo and Beijing. The Nye/Vogel initiative, however, sandwiched
between a visit by the Japanese emperor to Washington in 1994 and
Clinton’s visit to Tokyo in 1996, was the one tangible manifestation
of an American initiative toward Japan motivated in part to alter policy thinking in China.
Three Jolts to the Bilateral Relationship
Clinton had to manage three jolts to his engagement strategy with
China: one before his re-election and two afterward. The first was
the missile crisis of March 1996. This crisis was precipitated by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University to obtain an
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
53
honorary degree in June 1995 and his subsequent statements suggesting a possible shift by his government toward a declaration of
independence from China. After China fired missiles over Taiwan,
Clinton had no choice but to respond in a muscular fashion. To be
sure, since the Shanghai communiqué, American policy toward Taiwan’s security has been ambiguous: a strongly stated desire for a
peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan dispute, but silence about
U.S. actions in the event armed conflict begins.
The missile crisis produced a huge Taiwan stock market drop
and a temporary flight of capital. Under these circumstances, Clinton’s deployment of two carrier battle groups in or near the Taiwan
Straits was intended to signal the U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan
from attack. And, in a U.S. presidential election year, it was also intended to demonstrate to the Republicans and to the general electorate that Clinton would not stand by and “lose Taiwan” as Truman had “lost China.”
The missile crisis also provided additional political support for
American missile defense programs that in turn introduced new tensions in the bilateral relationship. Clinton had entered office and
quickly came to the conclusion that theater missile defenses (TMD)
were needed to defend U.S. forces stationed abroad and key American allies from short- and intermediate-range missile attack. The
vulnerability of U.S. forces and Israel to such attacks from Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 had stimulated the Congress to
pass the Missile Defense Act of 1991 and every year thereafter in
support of such systems. Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and Democratic Congressman Les Aspin were the original proponents of this
legislation, and only a few liberal Democrats opposed appropriations for these systems.
National missile defense (NMD) was another matter, however.
Clinton sought throughout his administration to keep open the option of deploying an NMD system by reaching an agreement with
Russia to permit such measures under a modification of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that had been originally signed by
the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. This treaty limited
to negligible amounts the missile defense interceptors each side
could deploy.
But an NMD system, even if designed to defend the United States
against small numbers of attacking missiles from so-called rogue
states (e.g., North Korea, Iraq or Iran) could, according to the Chinese, seriously degrade the Chinese nuclear deterrent against a U.S.
nuclear attack. China mounted a serious and sustained diplomatic
54
Michael Nacht
and political effort to dissuade the United States from moving ahead
with such system.
What was actually behind this difference on missile defense had
to do with concerns about a Taiwan scenario. According to reasoning
often invoked, Chinese military planners were mapping out strategies and tactics to wage war against Taiwan. As part of these plans
they had to assume that the United States would come to the military aid of Taiwan. In order to deter U.S. conventional force intervention, China might threaten to attack American West Coast targets
with its intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, threatening the
United States with “the loss of Los Angeles to save Taipei,” as was
stated at one point by a senior Chinese official during the 1996 missile crisis. The rationale behind a combination of U.S. TMD systems
that could protect Japan and Taiwan coupled with a U.S. NMD program is that this “layered defense system” could be a credible
counter to such a Chinese nuclear threat. In sum, U.S. missile defense
systems are proposed in part to support credible conventional force
intervention to defend Taiwan.15
The second jolt came after the 1996 election when a Taiwan-born,
Los Alamos nuclear physicist, Wan Ho Lee, was arrested for espionage. The case is a long and complex one and ended with the U.S.
government, in a plea bargain, dropping all but one of the 59 felony
counts against Lee in exchange for his pleading guilty to one count
of mishandling classified information and “time served.” Lee never
revealed why he had downloaded to unclassified computer systems
more than 400,000 pages of classified information on U.S. nuclear
weapons.
Speculation abounds as to Lee’s motivations. Some claim he was
spying for China. Others believe that he was spying for Taiwan. Still
others judge that he was just accumulating sensitive information that
he hoped to sell to the highest bidder. And a few support Lee’s own
contention that he transferred the information merely for the ease of
working at home. But whatever the truth, the net effect was to fuel
suspicion among the public and some elite groups that China was in
fact an adversary of the United States, not the “strategic partner”
that had become Clinton’s characterization of the relationship.
The Cox Commission Report, issued by California Republican
Congressman Chris Cox after Lee was arrested, was deeply critical
of Clinton China policy, the lax security procedures at the U.S.
—————
15. For more on these issues, see Michael Nacht, “Ballistic Missile Defenses: An
American Perspective,” French Institute of International Relations, Nov. 2001.
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
55
weapons laboratories, and pointed to the alleged willingness of the
Clinton administration to “look the other way” about China’s proliferation assistance to Pakistan and Iran.
The third jolt began to build after the 1996 election and surfaced
in the 2000 Bush-Gore campaign concerning Chinese government financial support for Clinton’s 1996 re-election campaign. Although
hard, detailed evidence was lacking, there were circumstantial
claims repeatedly offered by the Republicans that Clinton (and Gore)
purposefully refused to invoke sanctions required by law against
China for its proliferatory activities toward Pakistan and perhaps
Iran and North Korea because of the financial support they received
for their political activities. These persistent allegations undercut
Clinton’s ability to promote U.S. China policies that would claim
widespread support.
The net effect of these jolts was to heighten the sense of threat
posed by China to Americans. In a public opinion poll taken in the
spring of 1998, for example, Americans feared a nuclear attack from
China more than from Russia or any other sovereign state and second only to nuclear attack from terrorist groups.16
Ending on a Relatively High Note
The schizophrenia within the Congress, and the broader body politic, toward China was reflected in two of Clinton’s final initiatives:
endorsing China’s membership in the WTO and securing congressional approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with
China. In the last portion of Clinton’s second term, despite all the obstacles cited above, the president continued to drive for greater Chinese engagement in the international economic community. He devoted enormous personal attention to achieving both objectives and
was successful on both counts.17
Clinton also directed a great deal of energy in his final days to
reaching an agreement with North Korea to suspend its ballistic
—————
16. See Bill Gertz, “Americans Fear China More than Russia,” Washington Times,
May 9, 1998. The polling data was accurate, although the Washington Times may have
sought to use its results to support its political perspective emphasizing the Chinese
threat.
17. In 1998 Clinton adopted the “three Nos” toward Taiwan—no support for Taiwan independence, no support for a two-China policy, no support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations on the basis of statehood. Yet China perceived a
strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan ties! See Bates Gill, “Limited Engagement,” Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 65–76.
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Michael Nacht
missile development programs. He sought Chinese support for
these efforts but was not able to put all the pieces together before
leaving office.
Of course, these actions were not goals but means to broader
ends. Clinton in his final day in office retained his overarching view
that the more China is engaged in the international community and
the more it prospers economically, the more likely it will evolve into
a pluralistic democracy with a capitalist economy. This is the proposition he has left to his successor.
Domestic Challenges for President Bush
The election of President George W. Bush returned to the White
House a conservative Republican with a razor-thin majority in both
houses of Congress, who lost control of the Senate in the summer of
2001 when Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords shifted his allegiance from
the Republican Party to “independent.” Bush was immediately torn
between the two roots of Republican attitudes toward China: the
pro-business, pragmatic wing and the ideological, conservative
wing. The former has sought to have Bush pursue policies not very
different from Clinton’s. The latter has sought to have Bush pursue a
much tougher line than Clinton.
Although Bush visited China when his father served there as the
U.S. representative, he assumed his position with limited knowledge
of foreign policy. In his first year in office, prior to September 11,
several points became clear:
1. During the presidential campaign, Bush claimed that Clinton’s
characterization of China as a “strategic partner” should be replaced
by “strategic competitor.” Except, however, for one explicit statement supporting the U.S. defense of Taiwan in case it was attacked
by China, which he then sought to soft-pedal, Bush, in office, has not
rhetorically challenged China or fundamentally altered U.S. declaratory policy toward the People’s Republic. This approach flies in the
face of commentary by National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice
and others during the 2000 presidential campaign that Bush would
return to great power politics and address the Russian and Chinese
rivalries with the United States rather than emulate Clinton’s ostensible emphasis on secondary concerns in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
2. Bush decided to begin his foreign policy meetings with the
leaders of America’s neighbors (Mexico and Canada), then U.S. allies
(Europe and Japan/Korea), and only then with the heads of Russia
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
57
and China. He ultimately met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at
the fall 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Council meetings.
3. Tensions with China surfaced quickly over U.S. missile defense
programs that could degrade the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Chinese
detention of several U.S. academics as intelligence operatives and
Beijing’s crackdown on members of the Falun Gong movement exacerbated matters.
4. The premier issue between the United States and China, as it
has been for five decades, remained Taiwan. Bush made decisions on
arms sales to Taiwan but chose not to approve the sale of advanced
Aegis ships to Taiwan that could be deployed with missiles to defend the island against an attack from the mainland. Meanwhile,
China continued to vastly increase the number of short-range missiles deployed in southeast China within easy range of Taiwan.
5. Bush’s major foreign policy appointees did not include China
specialists, and most were not considered supporters of Clinton’s
approach. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
were all in an ideological camp supportive of a tougher line toward
Beijing. Moreover, there were some in the Department of Defense
who seemed to see China as the next enemy, in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union. They were also wary of closer RussiaChina military cooperation. The views of Secretary of State Colin
Powell and National Security Advisor Rice were less certain. Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage has long had close ties with
Taiwan and has been notable in pressing Japan to increase its military capabilities. USTR Robert B. Zoellick, on the other hand, despite
writing some tough articles about China when out of office, was a
fierce advocate of free trade, a position that might place him closer to
the Clinton engagement position. Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O’Neill spoke out early against further aid to Russia but did not discuss China publicly. He was replaced after two years by John Snow,
ostensibly for articulating views publicly at odds with administration policy. Snow has sought only to encourage U.S.-China economic
relations.
6. Published accounts claim that Bush has learned from his father’s experience to be more attentive to the conservative wing of the
Republican Party. The son seems generally more comfortable with
this wing than his father, which could mean tougher times ahead in
U.S.-China relations. Yet, even in the aftermath of the forced landing
of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft by Chinese military aircraft on
Hainan Island in April 2001, Bush seemed squarely on the engage-
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Michael Nacht
ment course with the People’s Republic. He and his colleagues resolved the issue quickly and quietly.
In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States, President Bush has proclaimed that fighting terrorism is by
far his top priority. Working with Secretary of State Powell, he has
worked assiduously to forge a global antiterrorism coalition. Since
China itself faces a serious problem with Muslim separatists in its
western Xinjiang province, China and the United States have found a
powerful common interest that might trump continued differences
over economic, human rights, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan
policies. The admission of China into the WTO and U.S. support that
led to the selection of Beijing as host for the Olympics in 2008 have
been important positive elements in the bilateral relationship during
Bush’s initial period in office. Some Americans speculate that
China’s adherence to the requirements of WTO membership and the
inevitable societal opening required in hosting the Olympics place
Beijing on an inexorable course toward greater political pluralism
and economic entrepreneurship that should integrate it further into
the community of nations.
Nonetheless there is also evidence of a subtle containment policy
being practiced by the Bush administration toward China, with notable improved U.S. strategic relations with India, Pakistan, and Russia. It is plausible that should the war on terrorism recede in importance, tensions between Beijing and Washington could once again
resurface at significant levels.
Some General Conclusions
There are deep inconsistencies in the domestic roots of U.S. policy toward China. There appears to be a broad consensus in the middle of
both major political parties, reflected in successive Democratic and
Republican administrations, the Congress, public opinion, pressure
groups, and the scholarly community. This consensus holds that engagement with China and a concerted effort to promote economic, political, cultural, scientific, and, in some cases, military ties are in the
U.S. national interest and are likely, over a very long period of time, to
strengthen forces for moderation and pluralism in the People’s Republic. The main issues between Beijing and Washington—Taiwan,
weapons proliferation, human rights, missile defense, intellectual
property rights—all remain unresolved but can best be “worked” by
patient incremental measures sustained over many years.
Domestic Roots of U.S. China Policy
59
Extremes on the right in the Republican Party and on the left in
the Democratic Party remain allied in opposition to this approach,
and they have adherents throughout the major institutions of American society. Many of these individuals represent small, dedicated,
single-issue pressure groups. Some see China as the successor to the
Soviet Union in the capacity of the chief enemy or rival of the United
States. Others focus on human rights violations and/or the denial of
religious freedoms in China, pointing to the oppression of the Falun
Gong or to Tibet. Still others point to the issue of Taiwan as central to
the impending conflict between the two countries.
In “working” the American political process, there are notable
asymmetries between Beijing and Taipei. The former has dealt in a
formal manner with administration officials in the U.S. executive
branch. Literalness, an “official quality,” and remoteness characterize many of these interactions. The latter has dealt in a far more sophisticated manner, more with the Congress than with the executive.
There is a flexibility, a more nuanced approach, to these often unofficial interactions.
There appears to be less room for maneuver toward China with
Democratic administrations. It could be argued, for example, that
even with respect to the sensitive matter of dealing with North Korea in the late 1990s, Clinton needed to call on former Secretary of
Defense Perry to develop a credible game plan for the administration
because he alone had the knowledge and bipartisan respect to resolve the issue. This experience was a two-sided political coin: it
demonstrated the constraints that Clinton had to endure, but it also
illustrated how flexible, American-style policy development can finesse a deeply divided government.
Striking during the Clinton years is the relative absence of an
overt triangular strategy by Washington seeking to work with both
Beijing and Tokyo to further American national interests with both.
Relations with China fluctuated from periods of normal productivity
to sporadic crises. Relations with Japan generally captured far less
high-level attention, except for brief spurts over trade frictions and
the overhaul of the security treaty. It may be, however, that if the
Bush administration decides to pursue a China policy predicated
more on containment than engagement, then a more aggressive approach to encouraging greater Japanese military capability will be an
element of this strategy. This approach, however, is not in the political cards so long as the global war on terrorism dominates U.S. national security decision-making.
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Michael Nacht
Another way to judge the American mood about China is that
there is a relatively broad consensus on the goals of U.S. policy—
improve human rights, promote democracy, enhance economic relations and openness, and mute the threatening aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Where there are deep differences, however, is about the
means required to achieve these goals.
Henry Kissinger and others have noted that, at its root, American
foreign policy is a mixture of tough-minded realpolitik in pursuit of
the national interest, exemplified by the policies of Theodore Roosevelt, and high-minded idealism about human liberties and the virtues of the individual as personified by the views of Woodrow Wilson. These tensions are readily apparent in the domestic roots of U.S.
China policy. They are not likely to disappear anytime soon.
Chinese Domestic and
Foreign Policies in the 1990s
Zhang Baijia
This chapter examines the relationship between Chinese domestic
politics and foreign policy in the 1990s by analyzing three issues:
(1) how China overcame the shocks of domestic and foreign events
in the late 1980s and early 1990s; (2) the process leading to the establishment of the socialist market economy and its impact on the reform of the political system; and (3) China’s diplomacy after 1992.
Emerging from the Shadow of
June 4, 1989, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union
The year 1989 was the tenth year of China’s reform and opening. Although there were tremendous achievements in the first ten years,
there were also mounting social problems. The serious inflation in
1988 and the political turbulence in1989 were explosions resulting
from these problems. After taking strong measures to suppress the
turbulence, China faced the trials and tribulations of sanctions
—————
Zhang Baijia is a Researcher at the Central Party School of the
Chinese Communist Party.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
61
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Zhang Baijia
imposed by the West, sudden changes in the East European countries, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. China thus entered the
1990s under very difficult circumstances.
In June 23, 1989, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened the Fourth Plenary of the Thirteenth Party Congress, some
personnel changes were made at the top. In this complicated situation, the new group of collective leadership followed the domestic
and foreign policies set by Deng Xiaoping, which were guided by the
principles of maintaining domestic stability and upholding reform
and opening.1 In foreign relations, Deng wanted to resist Western
pressure and suggested a guiding principle of “observing with cool
objectivity, firmly maintaining one’s position, responding with confidence, hiding one’s ambition, and never taking the lead.”2 When
Jiang Zemin was chosen party general secretary, he immediately
gave reassurances about the continuity of party line and basic policy
on reform and opening upheld after the Third Plenary of the Eleventh Party Congress, and promised to carry them out completely.3 In
November of the same year, Deng resigned from his last position of
the chairman of the CCP Military Committee. The power transfer
was basically completed.
The new CCP leadership, in addition to stabilizing the political
situation, focused on straightening out the economy, lowering inflation, improving the budget balance, and strengthening and implementing various reforms. In order to overcome the political instabilities of the late 1980s, it was obviously necessary first to stabilize the
economy. This task, begun in fall 1988, was almost completed by the
end of 1991. During this period, 1988–91, the growth rate of the Chinese economy experienced a U curve.4 Although there were many
unresolved problems in implementation and in the economic system,
the momentum of economic development was restored.
The new leadership also attached importance to foreign relations.
This was not only because of the need to break the sanctions imposed by the West in order to continue the reform and opening, it
—————
1. For details, see my chapter covering 1972–89 in The Golden Age of the U.S.-JapanChina Triangle, 1972-1989, ed. by Ezra F. Vogel et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), pp. 38–51.
2. Historical Events of the New Period in CPC History, ed. Party History Research
Center, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: CPC History
Publishing House, 1998), pp. 284, 315.
3. Ibid., p. 280.
4. According to the figures from the State Statistical Bureau, the GDP growth rate
was 11.3 percent in 1988, 4.1 percent in 1989, 3.8 percent in 1990, and 9.2 percent in 1991.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
63
was also due to the fundamental changes in the international systems that resulted from a series of major events.
In August of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and early the next year,
the crisis in the Persian Gulf turned into the Gulf War. As a result,
the multinational forces headed by the United States achieved an
overwhelming victory. Chinese scholars and officials almost unanimously believed that the war broke out at the moment when one
side of the bipolar world collapsed, creating an imbalance among the
powers of the world. Beyond the apparent relaxation of tensions,
various kinds of power politics as well as hegemony continued to
threaten world peace and stability. The international situation was in
fact unstable. It was important, in Chinese views, to maintain peace
and resist the dangers of hegemony.
In early 1990, the Chinese leadership paid particular attention to
the changing situation of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet
Union sent shockwaves to the CCP. As the Soviet Union was dismembered, there was a debate among the CCP on what lessons to
draw from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to prevent
“peaceful evolution” in China. During spring 1989, many young
students and some intellectuals demonstrated a fanatic worship of
the Western democratic political system and a desire to destroy the
political system as Mikhail Gorbachev had done. Considering these
factors, the CCP leadership was naturally concerned. In the course of
debate, some people advanced the priority of preventing peaceful
evolution that could lead to collapse in China, as in the Soviet Union.
Some even suggested renewing the ideological debate with the Soviets. However, this suggestion was not adopted. The principle set by
Deng Xiaoping was to stabilize relations with Russia, no matter what
happened there, and to avoid debate.5 When the issue was resolved,
Jiang Zemin summarized the debate by pointing out that there were
many factors that had led to the change in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. Although there were Western efforts pushing
for peaceful evolution, domestic factors in these countries played the
decisive role. Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union had become seriously detached from the masses, pursued a wrong policy, and, most important, failed to handle the economy well. He believed that China should draw several lessons from
this: never give up the ruling position of the communist party, retain
the socialist economic system with public ownership as the main
part of the economy, and never lessen the absolute control of the
—————
5. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993), p. 353.
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Zhang Baijia
army by the party. The best way to prevent collapse from peaceful
evolution was to handle domestic matters well and to uphold reform
and openness. There should not be two central tasks; there should be
only one—development.6 The result of this debate was very significant in helping to stabilize China and in shaping domestic and foreign policies.
After two years of observation, the new leadership in Beijing
formed their view of the international situation. They believed that
the old world order of the preceding forty years was broken, and a
new one was being formed in which multipolarity was strong. Although there was regional turbulence, Deng Xiaoping’s characterization in mid-1980s of peace and development as the two main themes
of international relations still held true. This judgment made the new
leadership believe that China should not change the basic principles
of foreign policy set in the 1980s. In 1991, both Jiang and Li Peng
stressed repeatedly that the basic task and fundamental goal of foreign policy was to serve China’s agenda of reform and openness and
economic construction. They should strive to maintain a peaceful international environment. For that purpose, China’s basic foreign policy would not change. It would continue to carry out an independent
and peaceful foreign policy, improving relations with all countries in
the world on the basis of five principles of peaceful co-existence.
China would not use differing ideologies or political systems as the
rationale in managing relations with foreign countries. It would oppose hegemony and consolidate political and economic cooperation
with the developing world.7
From the end of 1989 to the beginning of 1992, there were two
priorities in Chinese foreign relations: first, to pursue a “good
neighbor” policy, to develop and consolidate relations with the
neighboring countries, and to unite with the countries in the Third
World; and second, to use the conflicts and contradictions among the
West to break Western sanctions, restoring and stabilizing relationships with the developed countries. The achievements in Chinese
foreign relations proved better than expected.
These two years constituted one of the best periods in history for
Chinese relations with neighboring countries. Relations with the
Third World also improved substantially. China resumed diplomatic
—————
6. Jiang’s several speeches and instructions, June 10, July 24, July 31, and Dec. 7,
1991.
7. Li Peng’s speeches on Mar. 23 and July 24, 1991, and Jiang Zemin’s speech on
July 24, 1991.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
65
relations with Indonesia; normalized diplomatic relations with Singapore, Brunei, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel; improved relations with India and Vietnam; and established diplomatic relations
with every newly born state from the former Soviet Union.
After the Beijing storms of 1989, the Chinese political situation
also stabilized rapidly, and the economy continued to develop. This
exceeded the expectations of Western politicians. China played a
pivotal role in resolving the Cambodian issue. The Gulf War of 1990
also provided China with an opportunity to increase its role in the
international arena. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for
Western sanctions against China to have much impact.
To end the Western sanctions as quickly as possible, China pushed
for the improvement of relations with Japan as the first step, combining both political and economic means. Meanwhile, China also used
both official and unofficial channels to invite various Japanese groups
to China. As a second step, China tried to normalize relations with
Western European countries. As a result, Japan was the first to end
sanctions against China in the G-7 summit in 1990, resuming the third
governmental loan to Beijing. In 1991, some other Western countries
and some international organizations quietly reduced or eliminated
sanctions. Head-of-state visits were also resumed in 1991. In August,
the Japanese prime minister visited China, and in September, the British prime minister also paid a formal visit to Beijing. Although SinoAmerican relations were still at a low ebb, high-level contacts were retained. And, of greatest concern to Chinese leaders, U.S. normal trade
relations with China were never revoked.
The improvements in the domestic economic situation and in foreign relations provided Deng with a new opportunity. Deng was not
content with the pace of economic system reform at home. Now, he
was determined to use his great personal authority to give China’s
reform a big push forward. In January and February 1992, Deng visited Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai, making his famous
“southern talks” that severely criticized the “leftist” and conservative ideas then fashionable in China.8 His talks got a quick response
from the new leadership. On March 9, Jiang Zemin convened a Politburo meeting, during which he gave full support to Deng’s “southern talks.” China’s reform process resumed its momentum.
From the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, China experienced the most severe tests since reforms began. The shocks
from both internal and external sources might have caused a devia—————
8. For details, see the next section of this chapter.
66
Zhang Baijia
tion from the reform course. Fortunately, Deng Xiaoping was still in
control of the rudder. The Chinese masses became dissatisfied with
the increasing corruption and a level of inflation they had not experienced for thirty years. But they had also tasted the fruits of reform and were willing to go ahead with this hopeful direction.
Therefore China was able to regain stability quickly. With three
years of effort, China overcame various difficulties and gradually
emerged from the shadow of the 1989 Tiananmin Square event.
Economic and Political System Reform in the 1990s
China’s economic reform entered a new era, while political reform,
after a severe setback, resumed.
CONFIRMING THE GOAL OF A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY AND
OF IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM
What was the goal of Chinese economic system reform? Was it to
perfect the planned economy? Or to establish a new market economy? This debate continued throughout the whole process of reform
and opening. It is both an economic issue and a political one. In fall
1992, the Fourteenth Party Congress decided on the goal of establishing a socialist market economy. This decision influenced domestic
developments in China, but it also meant a closer link between
China and the world.
According to the Soviet model and Stalinist theory, the planned
economy is a feature of socialism, and the market economy is associated with capitalism. This view also had significant influence in
China. But after almost thirty years of experience, Chinese leaders
deeply felt the need not to eliminate markets entirely. By the end of
1970s, at the beginning of reform, the guiding principle of leaders in
charge of economic work like Chen Yun and Li Xiannian was to
combine the plan and the market, relying primarily on planning and
secondarily on markets that would adapt and complement the
planned economy.9 Although in concept planning was to play the
main role, it left a space for the market to develop. This made it possible for Chinese reform of the economic structure to take quite a different road.
Contrary to the impression of most people, China’s reform initially started in urban rather than in rural areas. The method
—————
9. Historical Events in the New Period of the CCP, p. 12.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
67
adopted was to improve enterprise management and to give more
power to the enterprises. However, that kind of reform of state enterprises lacked a new perspective and, constrained by various factors, brought few results. Meanwhile, reform in some rural areas
achieved obvious results when peasants initiated the “contract down
to the household” as the main system of responsibility for production. This won the support of reform-minded officials. Thus the
structural reform of the economy achieved its first breakthrough in
the countryside.
The important issue in the Chinese reform of the economic structure was whether it was necessary to break through the traditional
view that planning should play the main role in the economy. Some
economists involved in decision-making realized the importance of
this issue. In the early 1980s, they advocated the eventual abandonment of the planned economy and the transformation of Chinese
economy into a market one with the state providing macro-level
guidance. But a majority did not accept this idea at the time, partly
because of the constraints in peoples’ minds and partly because of
the practical difficulties. The old system had to continue for a while.
If the old system were suddenly abandoned, the economy might collapse, which might lead to chaos. Putting the economic system on a
new track would inevitably create new problems, and Chinese cadres, workers, and the masses were neither psychologically nor economically ready to accept the change. China had lacked the competition mechanism for a long time, as well as the insurance and welfare
systems found in Western societies.
With the support of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese economic reformers
adopted a strategy of what economists called “reforms to increase
quantity,” first carrying on reforms “outside the formal structure.”
This meant that reform would focus not on state-owned enterprises
but on the nonstate sector instead, creating market-oriented enterprises and relying on them for economic growth. The collectively
owned town and village (TV) enterprises then achieved a vigorous
takeoff. After the strategy to increase quantity achieved obvious success in the rural areas, reform-minded leaders quickly extended it to
other areas. The establishment of joint ventures and foreign-owned
and private enterprises in the coastal cities promoted growth in the
nonstate sectors.10 This strategy broke through the bottlenecks in the
—————
10. Wu Jinglian, Economic Reform Strategy and Practice in Contemporary China
(Shanghai: Far East Publishing House 1999), pp. 74–80.
68
Zhang Baijia
system reform and greatly increased the market sector of the Chinese
economy.
However, the problem of which part, the market or the plan,
should be dominant in the Chinese economy was still not resolved.
China’s reform in the 1980s was a matter of “groping for stones to
cross the river,” that is, solving the problem case by case. When they
temporarily encountered problems that were hard to resolve, the
leaders would take a detour. As reform deepened, it became more
difficult to achieve results this way, especially in the mid-1980s,
when the plan and markets co-existed. The two–track system created
many new problems, such the increasingly bad balance sheets of
state enterprises, inflation, and corruption among some officials.
Chinese reformers realized that they had to push for comprehensive
reform, including in the state sector, to achieve a market economy
for the entire economic system.
In the mid-1980s, the CCP gradually abandoned the idea of “relying primarily on planning and secondarily on markets” in its push
for comprehensive reform. The party resolution stressed “the need to
break the traditional concept that the planned economy and the
commodity economy are opposed to each other” and the need to
“speed up the development of a socialist market economy and
gradually develop a basic framework for a planned commodity
economy.”11 Meanwhile, proposals for comprehensive reform were
under discussion. In April 1986, the State Council created the Economic System Reform Office, and in the following months, it designed a set of reform plans for the next two to three years in the key
areas of prices, taxation, budget, finance, and trade. Although Deng
Xiaoping supported this plan, in the end it was not possible to implement it,12 apparently because China’s political and economic
situation entered a sensitive period.
After the hyperinflation and political turbulence of 1988 and 1989,
the idea of “relying primarily on planning, secondarily on markets”
became more popular again, triggering heated debate in theoretical
circles. People who were “planning oriented” believed that the serious economic and political problems of the previous two years had
resulted because the reforms had taken the wrong direction. They
believed that “market orientation was equivalent to capitalism” and
—————
11. Party History Research Center, Important Documents Since the Twelfth Party Congress (1986), p. 586; Important Documents Since the Thirteenth Party Congress (1991),
p. 26.
12. Wu Jinglian, Economic Reform Strategy and Practice in Contemporary China, p. 90.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
69
that a market economy would eventually lead to “capitalism, the rejection of communist leadership and the socialist system.” In their
view, the basic content of “marketization” was “capitalism and
peaceful evolution.”13
When reform was on the verge of possibly losing its direction,
Deng Xiaoping again played an important role. In fact, he was always doubtful about the necessity of linking the planned economy
with socialism. Early in 1979, he suggested, “Socialism can also have
a market economy.”14 In the early 1990s, when theoretical circles
were locked in debate between the two views, he made several
speeches about market economics reiterating that “the distinction between socialism and capitalism should not be judged by planning or
marketing. Socialism can also have some markets while capitalism
can have some planning and control.”15 In early 1992, in his famous
“southern talks,” Deng put it even more sharply, “the pace of reform
and openness is not fast enough. The main reason is the fear of being
called ‘capitalist,’ or talking the capitalist road. The key in determining what should be called ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’; the main criteria of judgment should be whether it can promote the development
of socialist production force, enhance the overall power of the socialist state, and raise the people’s standard of living.” Deng said, “In
China we should be vigilant against rightists, but our main vigilance
should be against the leftists.” 16
Encouraged by Deng Xiaoping, on May 16, 1992, the Central Politburo passed a plan to hasten the achievement of a new stage by
speeding up reform and expanding opening. On June 9, Jiang Zeming, in a speech at the CCP Central Party School, expressed his deep
support for the spirit of Deng’s “southern talks” and supported the
use of Deng’s term “socialist market economy.”17 In October, at the
Fourteenth Party Congress, the CCP officially proclaimed that the
“goal of economic system reform is to establish a socialist market
economy.” In the fall of 1993, the CCP passed “a decision on some
problems of establishing a socialist market economy” in the Third
Plenum of Fourteenth Party Congress, establishing the overall guidelines and program for implementation of economic reform.
—————
13. Xie Chuntiao, “Debates over the Planned Economy and or the Market Economy—An interview with Wu Jinglian,” Bainianchao 1998, no. 2.
14. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 2: 236.
15. Ibid., 3: 364, 373.
16. Ibid., pp. 372, 375
17. Historical Events of the New Period in CCP History, p. 363.
70
Zhang Baijia
For the course of Chinese reform and openness, setting a clear
goal of establishing a socialist market economy had deep meaning. It
ended the period of “groping for rocks to cross the river” and ushered in a new stage of comprehensive systematic reform. At the
same time, it also eliminated the political uncertainty that resulted
from differences of opinion and whittled away the influence of the
conservatives. In retrospect, it was a good thing to have gone
through ten years of exploration and practice before specifying the
goals of economic system reform. The ambiguity of the goals helped
China avoid the trauma that Russia suffered from its “shock therapy,” which had a clearly defined goal.
From 1993 on, centering around central responsibility for establishing the socialist economic market reform, China systematically
pushed for a series of reforms, including the change of the operation
of state-owned enterprises and the change from command planning
to indicative planning. Meanwhile, China also pushed through reforms in areas such as prices, taxation, finance, foreign trade, social
welfare, housing, and land use to accord with the overall socialist
market. In pushing for these reforms, the Chinese government
learned from the lessons of the late 1980s, paying special attention to
the establishment of the government’s macro-economic controls.
From 1993 to 1995, again facing inflationary pressures, the Chinese
government adopted a series of powerful measures to clean up and
restore order in the financial sector. In 1996, the Chinese economy
made a “soft landing.” In 1997, China also successfully handled the
shock of the Asian financial crisis and then the unprecedented deflationary pressures. In the complicated environment of the second half
of the 1990s, China maintained steady and rapid growth and has
gradually developed a market-oriented economic system with macro
state control. Although China in the 1990s achieved significant progress in its economic system reform, the reform was not yet completed, and it is continuing.
THE GRADUAL REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Compared to economic reform, the pace of political reform was
much slower. Although Deng’s initial reform plan included “reform
of the political system,”18 this clearly encountered many more difficulties. The constraints came from two sides: on the one side, largescale economic reform needed a relatively stable political environ—————
18. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 176.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
71
ment; on the other side, political reform encountered enormous pressures from both the left and the right wing, even though the goal of
reform was very limited. Overall, economic reform was the leading
and driving force of reform, as well as a drag on political reform.
In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping advocated reform of the party
and state leadership structure. The main issues were to advance democracy, to separate the party from government administration, and
to end the tenure system for party and state leaders.19 These concepts
require some explanation. First, what Deng said about advancing
democracy was aimed at breaking down rigid views that might hinder reform. He thus allowed different opinions to be expressed both
within the party and in society at large. But the purpose was to
strengthen rather than weaken the party’s ruling position. Second,
the separation of the party and government administration was to
avoid overlapping and duplication in the party’s and the state’s jurisdictions. The role of the party should be to provide the general
policy line in order to guarantee the political and economic direction
of the state, while the role of the state was to administer and implement the policy line. The party should not interfere in the detailed
affairs of government administration.
In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping tried to accelerate the pace of political reform. He set three goals: (1) to maintain the vitality of the
party and the state; (2) to overcome bureaucratism and raise efficiency; and (3) to increase the enthusiasm of basic-level workers,
peasants, and intellectuals.20 By then Deng had realized that political
reform in China was still too difficult. He said, “The country is so
large and things are so complicated, it is not easy to reform. Therefore
in determining policies we must be cautious, and resolve issues only
when we are likely to succeed.”21 The Tiananmen Square event of
1989 frustrated the efforts for political reform. After that, especially
when the failure of Soviet reform led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders strongly felt the need to be extremely cautious in
political reform. At the same time, young Chinese students and intellectuals also realized from the chaotic situation in Russia that the ordinary people would be the ones to pay the painful costs of failure.
This caused them to see radical reform as less attractive.
In 1992, the efforts to establish market-oriented economic system
gave a new push to political reform. In the next eight years, the
—————
19. Ibid., 2: 320, 3: 116.
20. Ibid., 3: 179–80.
21. Ibid., pp. 176–77.
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Zhang Baijia
clearest advance was made in governmental readjustment, the purpose of which was to adapt the role of the government function to
the transformation from a planned economy to a market one. At the
same time, there were changes that were not easy for the outside
world to notice: (1) the Chinese political system has gradually been
transformed from a highly centralized system to a less centralized
system in which the local governments gained certain powers. The
local governments now have more power than at any time since
1949, including the power to manage their finances and appoint local
bureaucrats. Provinces have been granted the power to pass legislation alongside the national government. (2) Policymaking procedures at the center have also undergone certain changes. The decision-making group and the circles from which opinions are solicited
before decisions are made has been expanded. The highest-level decision-makers must consider and balance the opinions and interests
of each of the institutions. The making of “the tenth five-year plan”
was the classic case. When making the plan, the government not
only solicited the opinions of various economic departments of the
government and of economists but also announced the draft plan on
the Internet and sought the responses of ordinary people. Early decisions of this sort had previously been kept absolutely confidential
before they were finally completed. (3) The Chinese government began to reform the cadre system by enhancing supervision of cadres
and increasing the role of democracy in their selection. In the process
of promoting cadres, the candidates’ names were announced and put
to the test of public opinion before the final decision was made.
Higher-level leaders and supervisors sought different opinions. In
selecting lower-level people and some middle- and high-level cadre
positions, openings were publicly announced and competitions were
used. (4) To broaden low-level democracy, village committees were
directly elected in rural areas. According to preliminary estimates,
by now almost 600 million peasants have taken part in grass-root
elections, with participation rates as high as 80 percent. For a country
lacking democratic traditions, this from-the-ground-up democratic
reform may have significant impact in improving society.
At this time, it might be still too early to assess the results of political reform. From an optimistic perspective, China’s political reform still resembles the period of China’s economic reform in the
early 1980s, when China was still groping for the right system. In the
1990s, Chinese leaders gave greater weight to the maintenance of political balance and stability. With political stability, they could devote
more attention to the resolution of issues they regard as more urgent.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
73
China’s Diplomacy After 1992
Beginning in the 1980s, the nature of the interaction between Chinese
domestic politics and foreign relations was different from before. In
the 1990s, these features became even more striking. First, foreign
policy was even more intertwined with domestic goals. When considering foreign relations issues, Chinese leaders consciously put
them into the context of domestic economics and politics. Foreign
policies became more pragmatic. Second, the foreign policy–making
process became more complicated, with more factors and more
groups being considered. Now, not only do government departments in foreign, economic, and military affairs provide information
and suggestions to the top decision-makers through direct channels,
but top leaders also give more attention to the opinions of scholars
and specialists. Chinese political reform has had a subtle and profound impact on Chinese foreign policy–making.
In the last few years of the twentieth century, China’s diplomacy
revolved around three tasks: (1) supporting the development of the
socialist market economy and negotiating for entrance into World
Trade Organization (WTO); (2) assuring the smooth return of Hong
Kong and Macao; and (3) stabilizing relations with the big powers
and neighboring countries and taking new initiatives to lay the structure for foreign relations in the new century.
ENTRANCE INTO WTO
Efforts to enter the WTO were closely related to Chinese economic
reform. When China announced that it wanted to establish a socialist
market economy, the pace of these efforts accelerated and Chinese
leaders began to pay more attention to them.
China was a founding member of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1948. For various internal and external
reasons, Beijing did not participate in the GATT after the establishment of the PRC. In July 1986, after the policy of reform and opening, the CCP decided to submit an application to resume China’s position as a founding member. In 1988, the GATT began to review
China’s application, but the negotiations with China over this matter
were soon halted by the United States and other countries because of
the 1989 Tiananmen incident and were not resumed until the end of
1991. In early 1992, China’s reform and opening got a second start. In
May, the leadership decided to take active steps to regain China’s
membership in GATT as quickly as possible. In October, the CCP
74
Zhang Baijia
announced the establishment of the socialist market economy as the
goal of economic reform. After that, GATT set up a working group to
deliberate and decide when the negotiations with China were completed. Thus China and the GATT entered into a stage of substantive
negotiations over market entry.
China decided upon three principles to guide its negotiations over
market access:
1. The GATT was an international organization, and without
China, the largest developing country in the world, GATT was incomplete.
2. China should enter as a developing country.
3. There should be a balance between China’s rights and obligations in this organization.22
In the ensuing negotiations, China held consistently to these three
principles.
The negotiations were difficult and tortuous. In order to enter the
WTO as a founding member in January 1995, China entered into intensive negotiations with various GATT member-countries at the
end of 1994. Since China could not accept the demands of the United
States and other Western countries, agreement was not reached. In
July 1995, China’ resumed negotiations for entry into WTO. In the
next two years, each party stuck to its position, negotiations were periodically interrupted, and progress was slow. Since China had already missed its chance of becoming a founding member, and because of domestic resistance, especially from those sectors and
enterprises that had reservations about entering into WTO so soon,
the Chinese government was not in a hurry to enter and took a relaxed attitude. The 1997 Asian financial crisis made Chinese leaders
more determined to maintain autonomy, to control the pace of opening, and to be more cautious about joining WTO. In winter 1998, the
chance came when Bill Clinton sent a letter to Jiang Zemin on November 6, proposing to end the negotiations between China and the
United States in the first quarter of 1999. In the April 1999, when
Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visited America, although no agreement
was reached, the United States affirmed its support for China’s entrance in 1999. However, the following month, the U.S. bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade interrupted the negotiations, which
were not reopened until after the Jiang-Clinton meeting in Auckland,
—————
22. Jiang Zemin first enunciated these three principles in his meeting with President Clinton at the APEC Leaders Meeting in Seattle in November 1993.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
75
New Zealand, on September 11. In Beijing in mid-November, SinoAmerican agreement was reached after heated bargaining. Both
sides call it a “win-win” result. After that, China’s negotiations with
other member-countries went smoothly.
In the process of several years’ negotiation, the goal of China’s entrance became clearer than before. From the government’s perspective, there were three main goals. First, entry will help create a more
favorable external environment for China’s domestic economic reform and development; it will also be an important link in China’s
integration into the world. By complying with widely practiced rules
of international trade, increasing the transparency of its trade policy
and management, and participating in the making of new rules,
China could be seen as a responsible economic power. This could be
helpful in the effort to eliminate the “China threat” argument. At the
same time, China needs a stable, transparent. and predictable institutional mechanism, which includes unconditional most-favorablenation treatment to protect it and help China resist other countries’
discriminatory constraints. The WTO framework could help China
resolve trade disputes and further reduce the government’s role in
trade. Second, entrance into WTO will further domestic economic
system reform. External pressure will hasten the readjustment of the
domestic production structure, promote the development of modern
management systems, and increase the competitive power of Chinese enterprises. Third, it would help strengthen economic ties and
trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, maintain state sovereignty, and contribute to the completion of the great task of national
unification. China wanted to avoid a situation in which Taiwan
would enter the WTO ahead of China.23
The views in Chinese business circles toward WTO entry thus
underwent a change. Generally speaking, in the first half of the
1990s, the business community, especially the large state-owned enterprises (SOE) had misgivings about immediate entrance into the
WTO. But by the end of the 1990s, this attitude had clearly changed.
Two factors led to this change. First, after two decades of reform and
opening, it was evident that those industrial sectors that the country
opened first, such as textiles, machinery, and electronics, developed
the quickest and were the first to become competitive in international markets. Those industries continuously protected by state de—————
23. These views were first expressed in internal discussions in Chinese academic
circle and in internal documents. They were then revealed to the public in newspapers
and journals.
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Zhang Baijia
veloped very slowly and remain uncompetitive. Second, a large
number of enterprises, especially those large enterprises that succeeded in the market economy, began to view WTO as a guarantee
for the state to implement further economic and political reform.
They hope China’s entrance into WTO will reduce governmental interference, increase their autonomy obtained from two decades of reform and opening, and make the domestic economic system more
subject to standards and more transparent. Thus, entrance into the
WTO has not only become the goal of the government but has also
increasingly gained more powerful support from the business community.
China was finally gained membership in the organization at the
end of 2001. However, neither the Chinese government nor the business community was fully prepared for admission. Therefore, the
period immediately after China’s entry into the WTO will provide
both opportunities and challenges.
THE RETURN OF HONG KONG AND MACAO
In the 1990s, the return of Hong Kong and Macao had been an important item on the agenda of the Chinese government. As a foreign
policy issue, the return of these two territories is unique and separate
from other issues, but it also has profound implications because it is
an important component of China’s effort to stabilize the domestic
political situation and overall foreign relations.
Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government has consistently held the position that both Hong Kong and Macao are Chinese territories and that the unequal treaties imposed on China
should be null and void. These two historical inherited problems
should be resolved through peaceful negotiations when the situation
was ripe. Until that time, the status quo would be maintained. In
fact, all along—from the 1950s to the 1970s, Macao and, especially,
Hong Kong have been bases for China to make connections with foreign economic activities. China’s policy was to “utilize Hong Kong
and Macao for a long period of time,” and for of this reason, the CCP
did not take the initiative to take them back. At the beginning of the
1980s, the British became anxious about determining the future of
Hong Kong, but the CCP had not yet made up its mind whether to
regain Hong Kong or not.24 In mid-1981, Deng asked Liao Chengzhi
—————
24. On March 29, 1979, Deng Xiaoping met with Hong Kong Governor McElhose
and indicated that in 1997, China would resolve the situation either by resuming con-
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
77
to form a small group to study the Hong Kong issue. In the fall of
1981, Deng Xiaoping gradually came up with the idea of “one country, two systems.” Although this idea was originally proposed to resolve the Taiwan issue, it was quickly applied to resolve the Hong
Kong issue. In December, a conference of the CCP Secretariat decided that on July 1, 1997, China would resume sovereignty over
Hong Kong.25 In June 1982, Deng Xiaoping, announced that China’s
policy in handling the Hong Kong issue was to “resume sovereignty,
maintain prosperity, keep the system unchanged, and let the Hong
Kong people rule Hong Kong.”26
In September 1982, China and Great Britain began their two yearlong negotiations over Hong Kong and in December 1984 signed the
joint statement. In the next thirteen years of transition, Sino-British
relations suffered ups and downs over the issue of Hong Kong. During the first five years, the two sides basically maintained cooperative relations. After 1989, the British began to take an uncooperative
attitude toward China. The stance of Christopher Patten, appointed
governor of Hong Kong in July 1992, was more confrontational. He
tried to use Britain’s power of governance to decide unilaterally the
future of Hong Kong after 1997 and present China with a fait accompli, in the hope of maintaining the long-term British influence over
Hong Kong. The Chinese government responded with an equally
strong stance and established a preparatory committee for the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region to plan independently for
China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and to work out
the details for the establishment of the Hong Kong administrative
government. Since the British had few cards to play, it was difficult
for them to maintain their confrontational policy. In summer 1994,
London readjusted its policy toward China and Hong Kong, softening its attitude. In the last three years before 1997, Sino-British relations were characterized both by cooperation and by struggle.
In comparison, the return of Macao was much easier. In April
1974, the Portuguese government, newly established after a coup,
announced that Portugal would renounce all its overseas colonies
and recognized that Macao was not a colony but a territory of China.
On February 8, 1979, the two countries normalized diplomatic rela—————
trol of Hong Kong or maintaining the status quo. See the Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s
Thought, 1998, p. 114.
25. Jin Zhong, “The Decision Making Process for Resuming Sovereignty over Hong
Kong” Openness 1997, no. 1.
26. Party History Research Center, Third Department, The History of 20 Years Reform and Openness in China (Liaoning Publishing House, 1998), pp. 171–72.
78
Zhang Baijia
tions. Although there was no mention of Macao in the joint communiqué, the two governments reached a “secret agreement over the
status of Macao,” which clearly defined Macao as a Chinese territory
currently under the administration of Portugal that would be returned to China. As for the time and manner of the return, it would
be settled by negotiation between the two governments at the appropriate time.27 In April 1987, the governments of China and Portugal formally signed a “joint communiqué.” After that, both sides
maintained smooth cooperative relations for the next twelve years of
transition.
On July 1, 1997, the Chinese government resumed sovereignty
over Hong Kong and, on December 20, 1999, resumed sovereignty
over Macao. In general, the process went smoothly. China had originally prepared for medium-scale chaos, but not only was there no
large-scale chaos, there was not even small-scale chaos. In the eyes of
Chinese, the return of Hong Kong and Macao was a major event,
wiping out a century of national humiliation. It greatly enhanced
Chinese national confidence. Naturally, after the return of Hong
Kong and Macao, the Taiwan problem became more prominent. The
resolution of the Taiwan Strait problem has become the final critical
step for national unification.
BUILDING A NEW FOREIGN RELATIONS
FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEW CENTURY
By the late 1990s, an important responsibility in Chinese foreign relations was to establish a framework of foreign relations for the new
century. In the new century, the domestic tasks China confronts are
clear, that is, to continue modernization and development and to
complete national unification. For this, China needs a peaceful, stable
external environment; favorable to development. At the same time it
must reduce or eliminate any possible interference with Chinese unification. In building the future framework, the Chinese leadership
needs to consider these basic elements. At the same time, they must
also realize the challenge imposed by the economic globalization and
the inevitability of China’s integration into the world economy.
In the late 1980s, when looking forward at the prospects for the
1990s, the Chinese leadership was relatively optimistic. At the time,
international relations were heading toward détente and the possibility of multipolarity with the powers relatively balanced. With this
—————
27. Wang Junyan, The Story of Macao (World Knowledge Press, 1999), p. 487.
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
79
hope, Chinese leaders advocated a new international political order
based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and a new international economic order based on equality and mutual benefit.28
Throughout the 1990s, Chinese leaders reiterated this stance in various international meetings and publicly advocated a multipolar
world. However, as a matter of fact, the post–Cold War world was
seriously unbalanced, unstable, and more complicated, with frequent changes. The multipolar world that China anticipated was still
a remote picture. In the decade of 1990s, although the Chinese security environment was relatively sound, shocks and interference from
the outside were more frequent than in the 1980s. This has gradually
made the Chinese leadership more cool-headed and pragmatic in its
handling of international affairs.
For a long time, Chinese foreign relations have been divided into
three levels: relations with big powers, relations with neighboring
countries, and relations with Third World countries. Chinese leaders
also began the new foreign relations framework from these three
levels. Yet, in the past ten years, we have witnessed some new
trends.
In dealing with the big powers, Chinese leaders stressed the importance of developing new kinds of relations characterized as nonaligned, nonconfrontational, and not aimed at a third country. For
this purpose, China developed a new basic framework for the
twenty-first century in its relations with the United States, Russia,
France, Great Britain, Canada, and Japan.
In these ten years, China had undoubtedly put the stability and
expansion of Sino-American relations at the top of its agenda. In November 1993, Jiang Zemin met with U.S. President Clinton in Seattle,
the first summit since February 1989. Jiang Zemin suggested that
both countries should aim to “increase trust, reduce troubles, expand
cooperation, and avoid confrontation,” emphasizing the importance
of putting the bilateral relationship in a worldwide context looking
toward the next century. The top leaders exchanged state visits in
October 1997 and June 1998, putting the bilateral relationship back
on a normal track. In April 1999, when there was an anti-China
mood in the United States and different opinions within China about
the United States, the CCP Central Committee decided to send Pre—————
28. Deng Xiaoping originally raised this idea at the time when he met with visiting
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on Dec. 12, 1988. Three days later, it was confirmed at CCP Politburo meeting. See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 281; and Historical Events of the New Period in the CCP History, pp. 263–64.
80
Zhang Baijia
mier Zhu Rongji to visit the United States as scheduled, hoping to
maintain the basic framework of the Sino-American relations. However, the efforts to stabilize Sino-American relations were not very
effective. In May 1995, the U.S. government allowed Taiwan leader
Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. In May 1999, the American
Air Force bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia during the
war in Kosovo, which caused a severe shock to China. In April 2001,
just as Sino-U.S. relations took a turn for the better, the EP-3 incident
happened. Although China had become accustomed to the ups and
downs of Sino-American relations, Chinese leaders became increasingly concerned. This concern led the Chinese leadership to pay
more attention to the significance of multipolarity and even to advocate democracy in international politics, trying to balance U.S. efforts
toward unilateralism. The uncertain years end with September 11.
By the end of 2001, Sino-American relations appeared to stabilize.
By the end of the twentieth century, China’s relations with the
other great powers had developed to varying degrees. First, SinoRussian relations had developed quite smoothly. Unlike the SinoSoviet alignment against the United States in the 1950s, both China
and Russia had no intention of aligning with each other. Each side
wanted only to rely on the other to increase its leverage in dealing
with the United States. Both China and Russia are against U.S. hegemony, but both try to improve and stabilize their relations with
the United States. With the gradual return of social stability and economic recovery in Russia, Sino-Russian relations have a bright future
with great potential. Since the attitudes of European countries toward China have been rational, China decided that in the future it
would devote more attention to developing better relations with
European countries. Not only have Sino-German and Sino-French relations advanced, but Sino-British relations have also improved rapidly since the Hong Kong issue was resolved. During this period,
Sino-Japanese relations were basically stable. One trend worth noting is that China, in carrying out its economic and political reform,
began increasingly to pay more attention to European experiences.
In the 1990s China gave importance to stabilizing and developing
relations with neighboring countries. The new and important development was the establishment of the summit mechanism among
China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan, forming the
“Shanghai Five Group.” This mechanism helps to maintain stability
and tranquility on China’s northwest frontier. With Vietnam, North
Korea, Laos, South Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, and Pakistan, China extended and improved harmonious relations. China
Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s
81
also endeavored to improve relations with India. With the principle
of “claiming sovereignty while shelving disputes and promoting
common development,” China improved relations in the disputed
areas of south China and maintained basic stability in the region.
Generally speaking, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
China has achieved a stable neighboring environment.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, China’s relations with
Third World countries also developed. Besides using traditional bilateral mechanisms, China has paid increasing attention to multilateral mechanisms for increasing consultation and coordination with
Third World countries, strengthening the mutual protection of legitimate interests and rights of developing countries. China has
played an important role in such structures as the UN, Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Conference, informal China–Eastern Europe meetings, and the China-ASEAN leaders’
conference. The new problem China needs to resolve, as it domestically becomes a market economy, is how to develop economic relations with Third World countries and how to make effective use of
foreign aid.
As the new century began, China’s efforts to develop a new structure of foreign relations was not yet complete. There are still a number of unpredictable factors. But in the foreseeable future, China’s
domestic reform and the process of China’s integration into the
world economy will continue to be stable forces driving Chinese diplomacy. And China’s present foreign policies are likely to continue,
because those factors that contributed to foreign policy stability in
the 1990s are likely to remain.
Japanese Politics
and Security Policy, 1990–2001
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
(Preliminary Version)
Throughout the 1990s, domestic politics in Japan was much more
fluid than in the 1970s and 1980s.1 From 1990 to the spring of 2001,
nine men served as prime minister—Toshiki Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa,
Morihiro Hosokawa, Tsutomu Hata, Tomiichi Murayama, Ryutaro
Hashimoto, Keizo Obuchi, Toshiro Mori, and Jun’ichiro Koizumi.
The one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
that began in 1955 ended in the summer of 1993 when the LDP split.2
Since then, all governments have been coalitions. Many new parties
were formed, but most of them were short-lived. The LDP survived
as the largest party in both houses of the Diet. However, the Japan
—————
Shin’ichi Kitaoka is a Professor at the University of Tokyo; Matake Kamiya is a Professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
1. For a concise overview of Japanese politics during the 1970s and the 1980s by
one of the authors, see Matake Kamiya, “Japanese Politics and Asian Policy,” in The
Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972–1989, ed. Ezra F. Vogel et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002).
2. For a detailed analysis of the one-party dominant system in Japanese politics
since 1955 with the LDP as the predominant party, see Seizaburo Sato and Tetsuhisa
Matsuzaki, Jiminto seiken (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1986).
82
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
83
Socialist Party (JSP), which had been the number-one opposition
party for 38 years, gradually lost its political influence and became
marginal by the year 2000.
The Gulf Crisis, from 1990 to 1991, eventually led to the splits
within the LDP and to the formation of the non-LDP Hosokawa administration in August 1993. The Hosokawa administration lasted
only for eight months. In June 1994, after two months of the Hata
administration, in June 1994, the LDP, the JSP, and a new party, the
Sakigake, formed a coalition government with JSP chairperson Murayama as prime minister.
In January 1996, within the same three-party coalition, the LDP
regained the premiership, when LDP president Hashimoto replaced
Murayama. Hashimoto was able to form a single-party cabinet after
the LDP victory in the October 1996 general elections. Hashimoto,
however, had to resign after an unexpected LDP defeat in the July
1998 upper house election, and he was replaced by Obuchi. In January 1999, Obuchi formed a coalition cabinet with the Liberal Party;
the Komeito Party joined the coalition in October of that year. In
April 2000, after Obuchi’s sudden death, Yoshiro Mori of the LDP
formed a new coalition cabinet with the Komeito Party and the Conservative Party, a small new party that formed after a split in the
Liberal Party earlier in that month. The approval ratings for the Mori
administration were consistently low, and the LDP experienced a severe slump in the June 2000 general elections. In April 2001, Mori
was replaced by Koizumi, who was heralded by the Japanese public
as a bold reformer.
Despite these fluid political circumstances, Japan witnessed many
changes in security policy during the 1990s. During the Gulf War,
Japan faced bitter international criticism for not doing more than
paying some U.S.$13 billion to support the multilateral forces. Afterward the Japanese government somewhat timidly started to assume
wider roles in regional and global security affairs, including the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces overseas to work with other countries in noncombat operations. In June 1992, the Diet passed the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law, which authorized the dispatch
of the Self-Defense Forces’ personnel for U.N. peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief operations. In 1993, when Hosokawa became the
first non-LDP premier since 1955, his administration decided to
maintain the security alliance with the United States and started an
examination of possible new directions for Japan’s security policy
within that framework, which resulted in the issuance of the New
National Defense Program Outline in November 1995. Under the
84
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
Murayama administration, the Socialist Party abandoned its longcherished policy of unarmed neutrality and adopted the policy of
maintaining firmly the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Under the Hashimoto administration, the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—
Alliance for the 21st Century” was issued by the leaders of the two
countries in April 1996, and Tokyo and Washington revised the
guidelines for the bilateral security cooperation in September 1997.
Under the Obuchi administration, the Diet passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations
in Areas Surrounding Japan (the so-called guideline law) in May
1999. As a result of such changes, Japan’s security policy at the start
of the new century was much more realistic and “normal” than at
the beginning of the 1990s.
Such changes, however, were not brought about all at once by a
transfer of the premiership from one party to another. Nor were they
brought about by a stable administration with a strong political
power base. They took place gradually, during a period of successive
weak administrations and constant and complex changes in party
coalitions. How did such consistent changes toward a more realistic
security policy occur under the extremely fluid and unstable domestic political environment?
The central clue to answer this question can be found in the relationship between seiji kaikaku (political reform) and kokusai koken (international contributions), the two terms that represent the key to
understanding the development of Japanese politics during the
1990s. Throughout this period, there was a growing dissatisfaction
among Japanese citizens about the nature of domestic politics. While
an increasing number of politicians attempted—or at least claimed to
be attempting—to respond to such public demand in one way or another, most of them came to share the basic understanding that seiji
kaikaku had to have two fronts: domestic politics and external policy.
On the external front, virtually everyone agreed that Japan’s security
policy had to be changed so that Japan would be able to make a
greater kokusai koken to international peace and security, although
there were divergent opinions as to what type of contributions
suited Japan.
The central lesson that the Japanese learned from the Gulf War
was that Japan’s postwar pacifism had to be amended if Japan was
to become a respected member of international society. For the first
time since 1945, a vast majority of the Japanese people came to share
the understanding that their country must take on a greater security
responsibility in proportion to its economic power and contribute
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
85
more actively and visibly to the maintenance of international peace.
Thus, despite the extreme fluidity and instability of Japanese politics
throughout the period covered by this chapter, the issue of security
policy reform, as the way for Japan to make international contributions, received considerable attention from the Japanese public, as
well as from the politicians.
This chapter will attempt to illustrate the changes and continuities
in Japan’s security policy from the Gulf War to the resignation of the
Mori cabinet in April 2001 by examining the relationship between security policy reform and domestic political reform during that period.
Seiji Kaikaku and Kokusai Koken
In the context of Japanese politics since the early 1990s, the two
terms seiji kaikaku and kokusai koken have had very specific meanings.
The term seiji kaikaku was first used in the mid-1970s and has been
a key item on the political agenda in Japan ever since. In the 1990s,
however, seiji kaikaku acquired a new meaning. During the 1970s and
the 1980s, the main purpose of political reform was by and large seen
to be the elimination of political corruption (seiji fuhai) and money
politics (kinken seiji ). During the 1990s, as an increasing number of
Japanese started to question the validity and effectiveness of LDP
politics in solving the problems confronting Japan, including the
pressing issue of economic restructuring, the focus of discussion
about political reform shifted from the elimination of political corruption and money politics to the reform of the LDP and Japanese
politics as a whole.3
The debate over political reform eventually led in 1994 to the reform of the electoral system of the House of the Representatives (the
lower house). Under the traditional medium-sized constituency system, LDP candidates often had to compete not only against opposition party candidates but also against colleagues who belonged to
different LDP factions. Since they belonged to the same party, their
competition usually had little to do with policies. Foreign and security policies were among the least debated issues, because it was
generally believed that foreign policy would not win votes. The LDP
candidates competed with one another only to win a seat. In order to
survive the competition, most, if not all, of the LDP candidates were
forced to spend a vast amount of “meaningless” money. Meanwhile,
—————
3. Major works on political reform during the 1990s includes Takeshi Sasaki, Ima
seiji ni nani ga dekiru ka; and Shin’ichi Kitaoka, Kokusaika jidai no seiji shido.
86
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
under the medium-sized constituency system, opposition parties
were almost guaranteed survival. Because a number of seats (usually
3–5) were allocated each electoral district, the opposition parties
could expect that they would win some seats in the elections and
maintain some political influence. Content with such a state of affairs, the opposition parties were reluctant to change their unrealistic
policies. One of the most typical example of such reluctance was the
JSP’s maintenance of unarmed neutrality (hi-buso churitsu) as the central principle of its foreign and security policy until summer 1994,
when Murayama became the first Socialist premier since 1948. Criticism of the medium-sized constituency system grew rapidly.
The second term, kokusai koken, was relatively new in Japanese
politics. It was used on some occasions during the period between
Japan’s conclusion of the peace treaty with the Allies in 1951 and Japan’s gaining membership in the United Nations in 1956. The expression rarely appeared in Japanese politics after that. It was only
after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 that kokusai koken
became an important item on the political agenda in Japan. Reflecting on Japan’s behavior during that crisis, the Japanese started to
discuss seriously in what ways their country should contribute to the
international society.
There are, of course, a variety of possibilities for Japan’s international contribution. During the 1990s, however, discussion of kokusai
koken in Japan focused mainly on the issue of Japan’s possible role in
the maintenance of world peace. It resulted in the fundamental review of Japan’s security policy, including the role of the Self-Defense
Forces in it.
In the Aftermath of the Gulf War
JAPAN’S REACTION TO THE GULF CRISIS
Japan’s initial reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1990, was remarkably quick. Tokyo officially blamed Baghdad on
August 5 and even decided to apply sanctions against it, including
suspensions of economic assistance to Iraq and of imports of Iraqi
crude oil, before the United Nations took equivalent actions.
By mid-August, many countries, including the United States, had
decided to dispatch military forces to the Gulf. As early as August
10, Canada sent two destroyers and one supply ship with 934 military personnel.
Japan, however, did not announce any measures for contributing
to multinational peace efforts in the Gulf until August 29. Even then,
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
87
Japan promised only a package of measures for “cooperation to restore peace in the region” and “cooperation with affected countries
in the Middle East.” The former consisted of material, medical,
transport, and financial support; the latter of economic assistance to
help countries near the area of conflict, including assistance to refugees. Japan somehow failed to specify the total amount of its financial contribution until the next day. The announced amount, U.S.$1
billion, invited more criticism than praise from the international
community. Many believed that the sum was far too small for the
world’s second largest economic power. Responding to such criticism, the Kaifu administration announced an additional financial
contribution of U.S.$3 billion on September 14.
Tokyo’s slow and somewhat clumsy announcement of its contributions to the multilateral coalition against Iraq gave the world the
undesirable impression that a reluctant Japan had been forced to increase its financial contribution under U.S. pressure and would
probably make more contributions if pressure was increased. During
the process, Japanese political leaders gave little, if any, consideration to what role Japan should assume in solving the problem and
how Japan could give a favorable impression of its role to the world.
On September 6, the New York Times carried an editorial that described Japan’s initial financial contribution as “modest.” It also insisted that although it was understandable that Japan and Germany
would not be able to participate in any military operations because
of constitutional restraints, Japan should be able to dispatch minesweepers, doctors, and transport planes to the Gulf. The editorial
criticized Japan’s reluctance to take such measures for trivial domestic reasons while the United States risked the lives of its soldiers.4
The Japanese government in fact tried to send a medical team to
the Gulf but failed to do so, because it tried to form such a team
solely of civilians. In reality, only the Self-Defense Forces had the capability to conduct medical activities near a battlefield. The Japanese
government tried to provide “transport support” using civilian aircraft. However, it failed to obtain the necessary cooperation from the
civilian airline companies and was therefore forced to charter foreign
aircraft for that purpose.
From summer to autumn 1990, there was growing support among
the Japanese that their country should make something more than
material and financial contributions. No consensus was reached,
however, as to what that something was. There was strong opposi—————
4. New York Times, Sept. 6, 1990.
88
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
tion to the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces overseas, because of
the pacifist orientation of postwar Japanese. The majority of Japanese
seemed to believe that Japan’s contribution should be limited to
nonmilitary fields in which the country possessed comparative
strength. Under such circumstances, the government submitted to
the Diet the U.N. Peace Cooperation Bill in October 1990. The bill
was intended to establish a U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps, which
would be composed of civilian volunteers as well as personnel seconded from other government branches, including the Self-Defense
Forces. The bill would authorize the participation of the corps in
noncombat activities not only in U.N. peacekeeping operations but
also in U.N.–authorized enforcement operations. The bill, however,
was severely criticized by the public as well as the opposition parties
and did not pass even the House of Representatives, where the LDP
commanded a majority. Even within the LDP, there was considerable reluctance to pass the bill.
On October 22, the New York Times carried another editorial that
urged Japan and Germany to make constitutional amendments. Arguing that the ideal of collective security required Japan and Germany not only to make financial contributions but also to fight
against common enemies, the editorial admitted that it would be difficult for the two countries to actually fight because of the legacies of
the World War II and the lingering anxieties of Japan’s neighbors. It
insisted, however, that it should be politically realistic for Tokyo and
Bonn to consider partial amendments to their respective constitutions so that they would be constitutionally able to dispatch military
forces overseas to participate in collective security or international
peacekeeping operations.5 After the Gulf War, the German government changed its constitutional interpretation in that direction so it
could send military forces to areas outside NATO. The Japanese
government, however, has still not changed the constitution or its interpretation of it.
On November 29, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution
authorizing member-states to take forcible actions against Iraq. The
Gulf War started when the multilateral forces led by the United
States launched “Operation Desert Storm” on January 17, 1991 and
ended with the Iraqi surrender on February 28. When the war
started, the Japanese government felt extremely nervous about the
way the international community perceived the fact that Japan’s contribution to the multilateral efforts was virtually limited to the finan—————
5. Ibid., Nov. 29, 1990.
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
89
cial one of U.S.$4 billion. Japan, which relied most heavily on oil
from the Middle East, played no visible and meaningful role in solving the crisis other than paying money. Japanese leaders, aware of
the seriousness of foreign criticism, perceived it as really a dangerous situation for Japan. On January 24, the Japanese government
therefore decided to contribute an additional U.S.$9 billion to the
multilateral forces and to send Self-Defense Forces aircraft to Jordan
for refugee transfers, although the war ended before Japan dispatched any aircraft to the region.
If the Operation Desert Storm had not ended with such an easy
and one-sided victory by the multilateral forces—in other words, if
the multilateral forces had suffered many more casualties in the
war—the international criticism against Japan’s inaction would have
been even more severe. In fact, after the end of the war, when the
Kuwaiti government placed a big advertisement in the Washington
Post and other major U.S. newspapers to express its appreciation to
some thirty countries that had contributed to the Gulf War, Japan
was not even mentioned. Providing a total financial contribution of
U.S. $13 billion—far more than any other country—to support the
multilateral operation against Iraq, Japan received almost no thanks,
only strong criticism from other countries in the world. Iraq condemned Japan for funding the war against it, but other countries in
the world, including Japan’s Western allies, criticized Japan for being
a nation unwilling to shoulder political and security responsibilities
proportionate to its economic power for domestic reasons. One
Japanese commentator called this incident “Japan’s defeat in 1991.”6
The Japanese government did send four minesweepers and two
support ships to the gulf in April 1991 in a somewhat belated effort
to silence international criticism of Japan for its failure to contribute
more than cash to the allied military efforts. Although Japan took
this action almost two months after the battles ended, sweeping
mines was still a difficult task with considerable risk, and the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces ships to restore the safety of the high
seas in the Gulf, therefore, won more praise than Japan’s earlier financial contributions.
The issues connected with the Gulf War opened rifts among the
members of the ruling LDP and eventually contributed to defections
from the party in 1993. Toshiki Kaifu, Ichiro Ozawa, and two other
LDP leaders, who had served as prime minister and the three top
party executives (secretary-general, chairman of the Executive Coun—————
6. Ryuichi Tejima, 1991-nen Nihon no haiboku (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1993).
90
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
cil, chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council), respectively,
during the Gulf Crisis, all left the LDP later in 1994 and formed the
Shinshinto Party in 1994. These leaders urgently wanted political reform, but their departure was accelerated by their experiences during the Gulf War. As high-level LDP leaders, they were caught between the growing international demand that Japan fulfill security
responsibilities commensurate with the size of its economy and the
strong domestic resistance to meeting that request not only from the
opposition parties but also from within their party itself. After a long
period of struggle, they eventually failed to make Japan meet international expectations.
THE PKO LAW AND THE SDF’S PARTICIPATION IN UNTAC
Following the end of the Gulf War, with increasing public support
for Japan becoming more active in making contributions to international peace, a majority of LDP leaders, along with officials of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and internationalists in other ministries
and agencies of the government urged Japan to participate in U.N.
peacekeeping operations. They also urged Japan to take an active
role in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, where Japan had
played a major role in peace negotiations. The fact that Akashi, a
Japanese official at the United Nations, had played a key role in U.N.
activities in Cambodia helped Japanese officials mobilize public
support for sending Japanese there. The LDP took the lead in developing the necessary legal framework for Japan to participate actively
in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Shortly after the Gulf War, the
LDP established the Special Committee on Japan’s Role in the International Society, headed by Ozawa, to examine the relationship between the concept of collective security and Japan’s Constitution. Although the process was slowed for a while because of Ozawa’s heart
disease, the committee produced a report that argued that Japan
should expand its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and
assume a more assertive leadership role in regional security.7
In September 1991, the government submitted to the Diet the Bill
Concerning Cooperation for the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and
Other Operations (the PKO Bill), to authorize the participation of
Self-Defense Forces personnel in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Even with growing public support, the passage
of the bill was difficult and took a considerable length of time. In Ja—————
7. [Reference is required.]
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
91
pan, aversion to the idea of sending the Self-Defense Forces abroad
for any purpose was still widespread. There remained strong voices
of dissent even with respect to the involvement of the Self-Defense
Forces in disaster-relief efforts in foreign countries. After a long and
intense debate, the bill finally passed the Diet in June 1992 with the
support of the LDP, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Komeito
Party. In order to strike a compromise of the three parties, however,
the government had to permit exceptionally strict restrictions on the
activities of Japanese peacekeepers. For example, the so-called core
functions (hontai gyomu) of peacekeeping forces were to be “frozen”
until such time that a new separate law would “thaw” such functions. “Core functions” refers to the missions usually carried out by
armed troops, such as monitoring disarmament, patrolling buffer
zones, and inspecting for weapons. Consequently, possible contributions by the Self-Defense Forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations
were limited to logistical support until the Diet finally passed the
legislation to “thaw” these functions in December 2001. In addition,
the government set much stricter guidelines on the use of weapons
by Japanese peacekeepers than was the usual U.N. practice.
Even with such restrictions on the activities of Japanese peacekeepers, JSP members, who had clung to an extremely idealistic policy of unarmed neutrality throughout the Cold War period, were still
firmly against the bill. At the time when the PKO bill was deliberated in the Diet, the Socialists were actually ready to make some
compromise with the government position and interpret the use of
the minimum military force necessary to exercise the right of individual self-defense as constitutional. However, they could not accept
sending Japanese forces overseas. During the Diet session in spring
1992, JSP members, lacking the votes needed to block the bill, utilized a Japanese style filibuster, including hours of gyuho (ox-walk)
tactics, in which each JSP representative walked and voted as slowly
as an ox in order to delay the passage of the bill. That represented
the toughest resistance shown by the JSP in its history to oppose passage of a LDP-sponsored bill in the Diet.
Despite such fierce opposition from the Socialists (and the Communists), the bill finally passed the Diet in June 1992. In the upper
house election the following month, the JSP campaigned against the
new PKO Law but suffered a humiliating defeat. In October, under
the new law, an engineering battalion of Japan’s Ground SelfDefense Forces was sent to join the U.N. Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). This marked the first time that Japanese troops
participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Although two Japa-
92
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
nese lost their lives during the UNTAC operations—one civilian police officer and one U.N. volunteer—the Japanese mission fulfilled its
obligations successfully, contributing to the success of the first national election in Cambodia in May 1993.
The passage of the PKO Law and the dispatch of the Self-Defense
Forces to Cambodia represented a watershed in Japanese attitudes
toward overseas commitments. After summer 1992, domestic opposition to the participation of the Self-Defense Forces in noncombatant
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance activities rapidly weakened. The decision to send a small number of military personnel to be a part of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique
(UNUMOZ) in May 1993 was calmly accepted by the Japanese public. When another Self-Defense Forces mission was sent to Zaïre to
help Rwandan refugees from September to December 1994, it provoked barely a protest, though it represented the first time since the
end of the World War II that Japan had dispatched its military units
abroad under its own flag. Units of Self-Defense Forces have also
been part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) in the Golan Heights from February 1996 to the present
and participated in the evacuation of the East Timor refugee centers
from November 1999 to February 2000. The Japanese public gradually learned through these experiences that Japan’s active participation in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance activities could win high international esteem. Their initial
concern that the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces abroad might
invite unwelcome criticism from East Asian neighbors that Japanese
militarism was reviving was gradually replaced by confidence that
Japanese peacekeepers could contribute effectively to peace and security in the region and elsewhere.
THE END OF LDP DOMINANCE
It was remarkable that such a major policy shift took place at a time
when Japanese politics were in utter turmoil. Throughout the early
and mid-1990s, in particular, the most important item in the Japanese political agenda was seiji kaikaku. In the aftermath of the Cold
War, an increasing number of Japanese started to question whether
the 1955 system of LDP dominance could cope with problems created by rapidly changing domestic and international environments.
Under nearly four decades of one-party dominance, the influence of
zoku (tribe), groups of LDP politicians representing special interests
in areas such as construction, agriculture, commerce, transportation,
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
93
education, and defense had become increasingly strong in political
decision-making.8 Deliberation at Diet sessions had become increasingly nominal as behind-the-scenes negotiations among factions and
zoku within the LDP and between the LDP, the permanent ruling
party, and the permanent oppositions prevailed. Under such a system, the vested interests cherished by the zoku and opposition parties
tended to be preserved. The situation also became a hotbed for
money politics and a series of political scandals involving leading
LDP politicians. From summer 1991 to summer 1993, as the public
demand for change in such a political situation mounted, Prime Ministers Kaifu and Miyazawa tried to promote political reform. Their
failures eventually led to the end of LDP rule in August 1993.
In summer 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu, whose term as president of
the LDP was to expire in October, was eager to achieve political reform during his administration. He aimed to have the Diet pass the
“three bills related to political reforms” before the upcoming LDP
presidential election. However, deliberations on the bills in the Diet
resulted in deadlock in late September. Kaifu stated that he would
make a “grave resolution” to face the state of affairs, implying that
he would dissolve the House of the Representatives if it did not pass
the bills. Kaifu’s power within the LDP was, however, very weak.
Being a member of a small faction within the LDP and not even a top
leader of that faction, he had to depend totally on the support from
the largest faction, led by Takeshita. When the leaders of that faction
did not endorse Kaifu’s “grave resolution,” he had no option but to
withdraw from the LDP presidential election.
When Miyazawa became prime minister in November 1991, the
public welcomed him as a full-fledged prime minister after more
than two years of absence. Consequently, Miyazawa initially enjoyed
a high support rate. His political power base within the LDP was,
however, limited because he was a leader of the second largest faction and always required support from the Takeshita faction. His political power was severely damaged when that faction split into two
in late 1992 because of another major political scandal in which major LDP leaders, including the vice president of the LDP and managing director of the Takeshita faction Shin Kanemaru, received a bribe
from Tokyo Sagawa-Kyubin Transport Company. The majority and
the minority groups within the Takeshita faction formed separate
—————
8. For a concise explanation of zoku and their political influence in English, see Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1988), pp. 114–16.
94
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
factions and chose Keizo Obuchi and Tsutomu Hata, respectively, as
their leaders. In the case of Hata’s group, it was widely believed that
the real leader of the group was not Hata but Ozawa. Some of the
media called the group the “Hata-Ozawa faction.” The Takeshita faction had its origin in the Tanaka faction. Beginning in 1974, the Tanaka-Takeshita faction had always maintained its position as the
largest faction in the LDP until the split. The split in the Takeshita
faction, therefore, represents a watershed in Japanese politics.
The Sagawa scandal took place only three years after Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita’s resignation in June 1989 due to his involvement in the Recruit scandal. Viewing this as part of a series of political scandals since the Lockheed scandal and the arrest of former
prime minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1976, the Japanese public was totally disgusted with the corruption among LDP politicians. Demands
for political reform mounted. Even before the revelation of Kanemaru’s involvement in the Sagawa scandal in August 1992, there
was a growing sense among the public that Japanese politics was at a
total stalemate. The formation of the Japan New Party in May by
former governor of Kumamoto prefecture and former LDP upper
house member Morihiro Hosokawa, who insisted on the necessity of
“reshuffling of political parties” (seikai saihen) in order to achieve political reform, was widely welcomed by the public. Facing this situation, Miyazawa, whose old-style leadership style attached importance to the adjustment of the interests within the LDP, was unable
to meet growing public demands for political reform.9
In the Diet session that started in January 1993, a major agenda
item was political reform, particularly the reform of the electoral system of the House of the Representatives. In the medium-sized constituencies, competition among candidates from the same party (the
LDP) had little to do with policies. They competed only to win a seat.
Such competition easily turned into a competition to bring back a
larger share of the central government’s budget to the district and to
gain a variety of material and financial benefits for the constituents.
Furthermore, because candidates had to spend a huge amount of
money to maintain the koenkai (support group) in the district, money
politics was rampant.
The negotiations to get a new constituency system proved very
difficult. The LDP argued for a new system of smaller, single-seat
districts. The opposition parties, convinced that the single-seat elec—————
9. Takeshi Igarashi, “Miyazawa Kiichi,” in Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi, ed. Akio Watanabe (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1995) p. 429.
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
95
toral constituency system would be disadvantageous for smaller parties, insisted on a proportional representation system. Moreover,
within the LDP, a considerable number of Diet members opposed
any change in the medium-sized constituency, which dated back to
1925. The very first attempt at a fundamental reform of that system
almost seven decades after its creation surely represented an earthshaking event for every politician.
Prime Minister Miyazawa promised several times that he would
formulate a concrete reform plan and submit it to the Diet, but he
failed to do so. The opposition parties proposed a vote of noconfidence in the Miyazawa cabinet, and it passed in the lower
house in June 1993, with the support of the Hata-Ozawa faction of
the LDP. After Miyazawa dissolved the lower house, the HataOzawa group formed the Shinseito Party, and a separate group of
LDP Diet members headed by Masayoshi Takemura seceded from
the party and formed the Sakigake.
Hosokawa, Hata, Ozawa, and Takemura wanted political reform
to entail more than just the reform of the electoral system for the lower
house of the Diet. Ichiro Ozawa, the leading advocate of political reform and arguably the most influential figure in Japanese politics
from the early to the mid-1990s, advocated reform both of domestic
politics and foreign policy. In his best-selling Blueprint for a New Japan:
The Rethinking of a Nation (1993), Ozawa urged that Japanese citizens
must accept more responsibility in political decision-making so that
their country would be able to adapt to post–Cold War realities.10
Postwar Japanese politics has been, fundamentally, quite cozy and undemanding. While Japan concentrated on its own economic development and
the distribution of its newly generated wealth, it left the maintenance of international order to the United States. The government had two relatively
painless tasks: to hear the views of the opposition and to allocate budget
funds as fairly as possible. “Consultation on allotments” accurately sums up
the whole of our politics. There is no serious discussion or debate on Japan’s
future course. This snug postwar structure, in which everyone makes deals
with each other and no one bears responsibility for them, will have to be
eradicated.11
Ozawa believed that Japan should become a nation that functioned
independently and assumed responsibilities in accord with its eco—————
10. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994). The original Japanese version was published in the previous year under the title Nihon kaizo keikaku (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).
11. Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, p. 62.
96
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
nomic power. In order to do so, he argued, Japan must establish
strong political leadership by concentrating more power in the hands
of the prime minister. Ozawa also argued that Japan should become
a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni), willing to assume the same kind of
international political and security responsibilities as other nations.
The issues of political reform and international contribution were
thus closely connected in political debate in Japan in the early 1990s.
Although Ozawa lost personal popularity, the powerful impact of
foreign disapproval after the Gulf War helped his message gain
widespread approval. Virtually every reformist politician wanted
not only domestic political reform but also a foreign policy wherein
Japan would make an international contribution as the second largest economic power in the world. This growing consensus explains
why the passage of the PKO Law and the dispatch of the SelfDefense Forces to Cambodia, which had been unthinkable for decades under the stable LDP rule, became possible when Japanese politics was in utter turmoil.
From the Hosokawa Coalition
to the LDP-Socialist-Sakigake Coalition
THE BIRTH OF THE HOSOKAWA ADMINISTRATION
In the July 1993 general election following Miyazawa’s dissolution of
the lower house, the two biggest losers were the LDP and the Socialist Party.12 While the LDP failed to win a majority in the house, the
JSP lost nearly half of its seats. In contrast, two of the new parties,
the Shinseito and the Japan New Party, won a major victory. The
number of seats of other major political parties remained almost the
same as before the election. With the collapse of socialism in Eastern
Europe, socialism lost its appeal. The LDP lost votes primarily because of faction leaders who made their factions independent.
After the election, it was possible that the Sakigake and/or the Japan New Party could form a coalition with the LDP, but at that moment Ozawa exercised the utmost of his political power and managed to form an anti-LDP coalition of the JSP, Shinseito, Komeito,
Japan New Party, Democratic Socialist Party, and Sakigake. Conse—————
12. In this election, the major political parties won the following number of seats:
the LDP 223 (before the election 227 seats), the Socialist Party 70 (137), the Shinseito 55
(36), the Komeito 51 (46), the Japan New Party 35 (0), the Democratic Socialist Party 15
(13), the Communist Party 15 (16), and the Sakigake 13 (10).
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
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quently, the Hosokawa administration took office in August 1993,
ending 38 years of LDP rule.
The Hosokawa cabinet declared that it would stake its political
fate on the reform of the electoral system of the House of the Representatives. The cabinet submitted a reform bill to the Diet in late
1993. Deliberation on the bill turned out to be long and messy. The
agreed plan stated: (1) the lower house would consist of 500 seats;
and (2) 300 of them would be elected under the single-seat electoral
constituency system and 200 would be elected under a proportional
representation system (the entire nation would be divided into
eleven blocks). One of the major reason why Hosokawa could accomplish the reform of the electoral system of the lower house despite obstinate opposition from inside and outside the ruling coalition was the initial overwhelming public support for his cabinet,
which exceeded well over 70 percent at that time.
On the foreign policy front, the Hosokawa administration made
some notable moves in the direction of making Japan a country that
assumed responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. In
August 1993, Hosokawa made a definite statement about Japan’s
war responsibility, which invited criticism from domestic hawks but
was well received abroad. Hosokawa also expressed Japan’s desire
to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. At the
moment when the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was concluded in December 1992, the
Hosokawa Administration made a decision that Japan would partially open its rice market. Most important, in February 1994, Hosokawa formed the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, which consisted of scholars, business people, and former high-ranking civilian
and uniformed government officials and commissioned it to examine
possible new directions in Japan’s security policy. The final report of
the advisory group, which was submitted to the Murayama administration in August that year, advocated that “Japan should extricate
itself from the security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new [international] order” while maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Japan
alliance. This provided the basis for the New National Defense Program Outline issued in November 1995.13
—————
13. Advisory Group on Defense Issues, “The Modality of the Security and Defense
Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century,” Aug. 12, 1994. The quotation
is from p. 7.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
Within the Hosokawa administration, the loose coalition could
not maintain unity. There was a delicate relationship between the
Shinseito Secretary-General Ozawa and Sakigake leader Masayoshi
Takemura. In January 1994, Takemura published a book titled Small
but Brilliant Country, Japan. In his book he criticized Ozawa’s assertion that Japan should become a “normal nation and instead advocated that Japan be a distinctive smaller power.”14 He agreed with
Ozawa that Japan should make a more active international contribution but insisted that this contribution should be nonmilitary in accordance with his interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution.
Another major worrisome factor for the Hosokawa administration
was the JSP, which turned more leftist after the humiliating defeat of
right-wing Socialists in the July 1993 lower house election. After the
election, the chairpersonship was transferred from the right-wing
Sadao Yamahana to the left-wing Tomiichi Murayama. It was, however, Yamahana who became a cabinet member of the Hosokawa
administration, while Murayama stayed out of the cabinet. It was
obvious that he and many other JSP members were dissatisfied with
many of the policy decisions made by the Hosokawa administration,
including electoral reform and Japan’s external posture.
A decisive confrontation came when Prime Minister Hosokawa
announced a plan to establish a “national welfare tax” in February
1994, in which he proposed add a new tax that would be used exclusively for welfare purposes, raising the consumption tax rate from 3
to 6 percent. Takemura, who was serving as chief cabinet secretary of
the Hosokawa administration, openly criticized the prime minister,
saying the announcement on taxes was too abrupt. The Socialists
were also strongly against the plan. In the end, the “national welfare
tax” plan was withdrawn by Hosokawa but left a major crack in the
coalition.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE HOSOKAWA COALITION
Prime Minister Hosokawa’s sudden announcement of his resignation on April 8, 1994, astonished the entire Japanese public. When
Hosokawa assumed the premiership, he enjoyed extraordinarily
high popular support because of public expectation that he would be
able to achieve the goal of political reform and make politics
“cleaner.” But revelations by the LDP in spring 1994 of possible
—————
14. Masayoshi Takemura, Chiisaku-tomo kirari to hikaru kuni, Nippon (Tokyo:
Kobunsha, 1994).
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
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Hosokawa connections with the Sagawa Kyubin tainted him and seriously undermined the foundation of his political power.
With the resignation of Hosokawa, many different factional alliances became possible. Ozawa tried to support a senior LDP politician Michio Watanabe for the premiership. In spring 1994, the situation on the Korean Peninsula was growing increasingly tense
because of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Observing this,
Ozawa believed that Japan needed a government that could exercise
strong leadership and make timely security policy decisions in cooperation with the United States. He worried that an administration
involving Takemura and the Socialists, who were sympathetic toward Pyongyang, would not be able to deal with the situation appropriately. He, therefore, wanted to form a new party by uniting
those in the ruling coalition with some in the LDP, such as Watanabe
and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who shared a realistic stance toward security policy. Anticipating that a considerable
number of people would leave the coalition if the Watanabe administration were formed, Ozawa urged him to leave the LDP with about
a hundred followers. It soon became apparent, however, that Watanabe would not be able to gather as many followers as he and
Ozawa expected. On April 19, Watanabe finally gave up the intention to leave the party and join Ozawa.
On April 25, the Diet nominated Hata, who represented the same
coalition as Hosokawa, to be the new prime minister. On the same
day, however, Ozawa suddenly formed a new parliamentary bloc
named Kaishin that included the Shinseito, Japan New Party, Komeito, and Democratic Socialist Party but excluded the Socialists.
Angry at this move, the next day the JSP announced that it would
leave the coalition.
In the end, Hata formed a cabinet, but with the Socialists’ defection it was a minority cabinet. In June, after the fiscal year 1994
budget finally passed the Diet, a vote of no-confidence in the Hata
Cabinet was proposed in the lower house. Although Hata wanted
to dissolve the lower house in response, Ozawa, the strong man of
Hata’s coalition, was against the idea. Consequently, Hata had no
option but to resign. Ozawa thought that the coalition should avoid
the next lower house election until the new electoral system would
take effect in December of that year. He also believed that the coalition would be able to remain in power even after Hata’s resignation
if they supported former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, a LDP reformist, for the premiership by gaining a new splinter group from
the LDP.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
The process of nominating a new prime minister was very intricate. The ruling coalition, led by Ozawa, voted for Kaifu. Within the
LDP, while Michio Watanabe and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone supported Kaifu, the party executives, who had been
strengthening linkages to the Socialists, decided to support the JSP
Chair Murayama. This would ensure that Socialists would join their
alliance and, they reasoned, that Murayama, with a small base and
no governing experience, would leave them with considerable leverage. The result of the vote in the lower house gave Murayama a victory over Kaifu by 261 to 214. The unlikely marriage between the
LDP and its traditional opponent was the product of the shared animosity toward Ozawa. While the Socialists were bitter about
Ozawa’s harsh treatment of their party in April, many in the LDP resented him for splitting their party and depriving them of the status
of members of the ruling party. The Sakigake, whose party leader
Takemura had engaged in harsh confrontation with Ozawa while
they were in the Hosokawa coalition, joined the LDP and the Socialists to form a new coalition for the same reason.
THE PERIOD OF MURAYAMA’S PREMIERSHIP
The sudden emergence of a JSP prime minister in Japan, at a time
when the Socialist party had become much smaller, astonished almost everyone. Observers at home and abroad particularly worried
what changes would take place in Japan’s security policy. The Socialists had cherished an extremely pacifist policy of unarmed neutrality
for over forty years. They had argued that Japan should abolish the
unconstitutional Self-Defense Forces and abandon the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and they had bitterly opposed the dispatch of SelfDefense Forces abroad for any purpose. And Murayama was known
as a leftist within that party. It was he as the chair of the JSP Diet
Administration Committee who had directed the Socialist diet members to employ notorious ox-walk tactics in the Diet session in the
spring of 1992 to delay the passage of the PKO Bill.
During Murayama’s premiership, however, Japan took a series of
critical steps to redefine its security policy and its alliance with the
United States in a more realistic direction. First, a sea change in JSP
security policy took place soon after Murayama assumed office in
June 1994. In early July, at the annual G-7 summit meeting in Naples,
he assured U.S. President Bill Clinton that Japan’s diplomacy would
not change under his administration and the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty would be maintained. On July 18 and 20, in his address before
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
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the extraordinary Diet session, he repeated his intention of preserving the security treaty with the United States and accepted the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. On July 21, he declared that
the policy of unarmed neutrality had ended its historical role. These
surprising policy shifts were officially approved by the annual JSP
congress on September 6 without much struggles. Soon, the party
also accepted Japan’s participation in international peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the United Nations, including dispatch of
the Self-Defense Forces for noncombat purposes, as a proper way for
Japan to make an international contribution. From September to December that year, Murayama sent the Ground Self-Defense Force
troops to help Rwandan refugees in Zaïre. It was the very first time
that in the postwar period that Japan had dispatched its military
units abroad under its own flag. These ironic developments probably
indicated that the Self-Defense Forces’ successes in Cambodia and
Mozambique and the favorable international reactions to these operations had made Murayama and many other Socialists realize the
limitations of their traditional security posture. In short, the Socialistled administration brought a virtual end to the party’s traditional
support of unarmed neutrality.
It was during the nineteen months of the Murayama administration that the basic framework of Japan’s post–Cold War security policy, which continues to the present, was established.15 On August 12,
1994, Murayama received the final report of the Advisory Group on
Defense Issues, which had been established by Hosokawa in February. The report recommended that Japan should assume a more active security role to contribute to the international community. It advocated that the Self-Defense Forces be given a wider scope for that
purpose. It also stressed the necessity of maintaining the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty and of enhancing the detailed security arrangements
between the two countries.
In accord with this report, the government revised the 1976 National Defense Program Outline and issued the new National Defense Program Outline (NNDPO) in November 1995. It declared that
Japan would maintain its traditional “exclusively defense-oriented
policy” and emphasized that the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements
—————
15. For concise explanations of the nature of Japanese security policy in the post–
Cold War era, see Matake Kamiya, “Reisen-go no Nihon no anzen hosho seisaku:
jizoku to henyo,” Motohide Saito, ed., Higashi Ajia kokusai kankei no dainamizumu (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shinposha, 1997); and Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen hosho: sengo 50-nen no
mosaku (Tokyo: Yomiuri shinbunsha, 1997), chap. 10.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
would continue to be indispensable for Japan’s security and for
peace and stability in the region. The NNDPO insisted that:
while the principal mission of the Self-Defense Forces continues to be the defense of Japan, the Self-Defense Forces, taking into account changes in domestic and international circumstances and Japan’s position in the international community, will also have to be prepared for various situations such
as large-scale disasters which can have a significant impact on our highly
developed and diversified society and play an appropriate role in a timely
manner in the Government’s active efforts to establish a more stable security
environment.16
Simultaneous with the revision of the National Defense Program
Outline, the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance was started on
both sides of the Pacific in mid-1994 and was virtually completed
while Murayama was in office. Tokyo and Washington originally
planned to issue the final product of this process, the “Japan-U.S.
Joint Declaration on Security,” between Prime Minister Murayama
and President Clinton on the occasion of Clinton’s visit to Osaka to
attend the annual APEC summit in November 1995, although the
sudden cancellation of Clinton’s visit due to domestic matters
forced the issuance of the declaration to be postponed until next
April, after Murayama’s unexpected resignation in January.
Through this process, Japan and the United States not only reaffirmed the continuing importance of the alliance between them and
the maintenance of U.S. military presence in Japan but also transformed the nature of the alliance from a joint mechanism to counter
a specific common threat (the Soviet Union during the Cold War
period) to an international public good to serve as a regional stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific.
This represented a sea change in Japan’s security policy.17 The
deeply pacifist orientation among the postwar Japanese has its roots
in collective Japanese memories of the country’s militarist past and
still runs deep in Japanese elite and mass culture. The memory of
World War II has produced among the Japanese people an unwavering determination that they must transform their country into a
—————
16. “National Defense Program Outline in and After FY 1996,” adopted by the Security Council and by the CABINET on Nov. 28, 1995, section 3.
17. On Japan’s postwar culture of pacifism and antimilitarism, see Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993); Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s
National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17, no. 4
(Spring 1993); and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and
Military in Post-war Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
103
“nation of peace” (heiwa kokka) and should never again wage war.
This determination has been strongly buttressed by the extremely
negative image of the military in postwar Japanese society. Disgusted with the follies of their own military since the beginning of
the 1930s, the Japanese people developed a deep distrust of the
military and great skepticism about the legitimacy and usefulness
of military power as a tool of external policy. There has been a
strong aversion to military solutions to the problems of national security and world peace, because they are seen as contradictory to
the ideals of peace embodied in the Preamble and the Article 9 of
Japan’s Peace Constitution. Until as late as the early 1990s, strong
public abhorrence of anything military-related, even including policies for the defense of Japan, militated strongly against Japan’s assuming security roles beyond self-defense in its narrowest sense.
This represents the main reason for Japanese reluctance to participate in international peace operations and for substantial opposition to the right of collective self-defense. Although pacifist orientation remains strong in Japanese society today, Japanese views on
peace and security have become much more realistic in the past
several years. The widespread public support, or at least acceptance, of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the spring of 1996 reflected the
changes in attitudes.
The political power base of Prime Minister Murayama was weak.
The JSP’s popularity rating had been dropping steadily since the
1970s, particularly after the end of the Cold War. It was widely believed that many of the incumbent Socialist lower house members
would not be able to survive the next election under the new electoral system. The approval rating of the Murayama cabinet was
modest at best.
Outside of the LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition, the remnants of the
former Hosokawa coalition founded the Shinshinto Party (New
Frontier Party) in December 1994. Holding 180 seats at the lower
house, the Shinshinto soon proved to be a tough opposition for the
ruling coalition. Earlier in 1995, it earned victories over the LDP in
some by- and gubernatorial elections. In the upper house elections in
July, the party gained 40 seats (22 from local constituencies and 18
from the nationwide proportional representation system), and the
LDP gained 46 (31 from local constituencies and 15 from the proportional representation system).
A number of domestic factors help to explain why major developments in Japan’s security policy could take place under the Mura-
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
yama administration despite its weak power base. First, the LDPSocialist-Sakigake coalition as a whole commanded a comfortable
majority in both houses of the Diet. Despite the repeated secessions
of its Diet members from the party, the LDP remained the largest
party in both houses by a wide margin. Under such circumstances,
the most essential precondition for the government to make important political decisions was not obtaining the consent of the opposition but reaching a compromise and consensus among themselves,
particularly between the LDP and the JSP. Second, since the Socialists’ decided immediately after Murayama took office to abandon the
policy of unarmed neutrality and to accept the existence of the SelfDefense Forces and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the two parties
could reach compromises with regard to security policies.
Third, the Shinshinto was weak in policy planning because the
main motivation behind its creation was not policies and ideals but a
shared sense of anxiety among the opposition parties that smaller
parties would not be able to survive in the coming lower house election under the new system.18 Fourth, the Shinshinto’s ability to resist
the ruling coalition’s policy initiatives was further damaged by continuing intraparty quarrels. When the party was formed, former
Prime Minister Kaifu was chosen as party leader. It was, however,
Ozawa who was actually the most influential figure in the party and
the architect of the party itself as well as most of its policies. Despite
his capabilities as a politician, Ozawa’s high-handed political style
repeatedly offended his colleagues, and many of them came to hold
personal grudges against Ozawa. For example, former Prime Minister Hata, another influential leader in the party and once a close ally
of Ozawa, increasingly criticized Ozawa as too bossy and undemocratic. In the party election to choose the first party leader in December 1994, Hata was badly beaten by Kaifu, who was supported by
Ozawa. One year later, Hata and Ozawa engaged in a fierce struggle
over the position of Kaifu’s successor as the second party leader.
Ozawa won an overwhelming victory with support from the Komeito, but the bruising struggle left a strong sense of resentment
within the party.
Fifth, Ozawa and many other mainstream members of that party
actually had few policy differences from the ruling party. In contrast
to the 1955 system, there were no longer any ideological differences
between the ruling and opposition parties with regard to security
matters.
—————
18. Jun Iio, “Murayama Tomiichi,” in Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi, p. 458.
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
105
POLITICS OF HISTORICAL RECOGNITION
Prime Minster Murayama, while basically following traditional conservative security policies, naturally sought foreign policy areas in
which his government could take a socialist stance. The Teachers’
Union (Nikkyoso), a strong supporter of the JSP, had long criticized
the Japanese military in World War II and maintained good relations with Chinese officials. Murayama thus started to pursue “history issues” to promote reconciliation between Japan and its
neighbors on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the World War
II. In Japan, there was a growing recognition that the history issue,
if not properly handled, could undermine Japan’s desire to expand
its security role.
The so-called textbook problem in regard to World War II history
was first politicized in 1982. It began with newspaper reports in Japan in late June of that year alleging that Japan’s Ministry of Education, through the official school textbook-screening system, had ordered the publishers of school history textbooks to replace the term
“aggression” (shinryaku) with the term “advance” (shinshutsu) to describe Japan’s military actions in Asia before 1945. However, it was
soon discovered that these reports were false.19 The erroneous allegation, nevertheless, was widely taken at face value throughout East
Asia, and the Japanese government eventually apologized for the incident to China and Korea.20
The “history issues” became even more politicized in the 1990s
when the “comfort women” ( jugun ian-fu) issue came up21. Since the
prewar period, the existence of so-called comfort places (ian-jo) near
Japanese troop areas overseas was a well-known fact. Many of the
women there had sold themselves into prostitution because of poverty. There were many Japanese comfort women, but even more Koreans because poverty was more prevalent in Korea than in
mainland Japan in the prewar period. In the normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea that was concluded in 1965, however,
the two governments agreed that all the issues between the two
countries in the past were settled. Moreover, despite the Korean
—————
19. Watanabe Shoichi.
20. Akihiko Tanaka, Nitchu kankei, 1945–1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai,
1991), pp. 120–25.
21. In Korea, the term teishintai (volunteer corps) is often used to indicate comfort
women. This usage is, however, wrong. Teishintai was the term to indicate a scheme of
mobilization of students to work during the war.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
claim that those women were forcibly taken out of Korea and were
forced to engage in prostitution by the Japanese authorities, no case
has been found in which the Japanese governmental agencies were
directly involved in forcibly mobilizing comfort women.
In order to soothe international criticism against Japan over the
comfort women issue, in 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono
of the Miyazawa cabinet had issued a statement of apology. Murayama expressed essentially the same views in his statement in 1994
but wanted to do more. In 1995, his administration announced a plan
to establish the nongovernmental Asian Women’s Fund, whose mission was to raise funds for former foreign comfort women and give
them some compensation along with the prime minister’s apology.
Although the JSP had long insisted on official compensation to former comfort women, Murayama was not able to get his coalition
partners to agree and had to be satisfied with the establishment of
the nongovernmental fund.
Some criticized the fund, arguing that the Japanese government
should pay official compensation to those women. For example, the
U.N. Subcommittee on Women’s Right “took note” of a report on the
comfort women issue submitted by a special reporter. The report
advised Japan to offer official compensation to those women. The
publication of this report further complicated the issue, because the
research by some Japanese conservatives revealed that many of the
cases of forcible mobilization of women by the Japanese government
cited in the report were actually either false or groundless. In March
1998, however, the same reporter submitted another report to the
same U.N. subcommittee that described the measures taken by the
Japanese government with regard to the comfort women issue, such
as the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund, as welcome efforts.
The U.N. Committee on Human Rights adopted a resolution acknowledging that the Japanese government was taking “positive
steps” to deal with the issue.
In August 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the
World War II, Prime Minister Murayama issued a statement (“Murayama danwa”) acknowledging and apologizing for Japan’s aggression during the war. He also announced the formation of the Asian
Women’s Fund and the Peace and Friendship Program between Japan and its East Asian and Oceanic neighbors. The latter focused on
bilateral joint history studies and youth exchange programs. He and
the JSP also sought a Diet resolution to express Japan’s recognition of
and self-reflection on its role and behavior in the war. Strong voices
of objections against the idea were, however, raised by a consider-
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
107
able number of conservative members of the LDP, who argued that
history is not an issue suitable for political resolutions by the Diet. In
order to achieve a compromise within the ruling coalition, very ambiguous expressions and wordings were intentionally chosen for the
resolution. When the lower house eventually adopted the resolution,
however, only 251 members of the house out of the total of 502 attended the session. Members of the Shinshinto and other opposition
parties expressed disagreement with the wording of the resolution
and preferred to be absent from the session. This was really an unusual way to adopt a resolution in the Diet, because the established
custom of the Diet is to adopt any resolution unanimously.
Historically, it is common for all issues relating to a war to be settled by the surrender of one party, trials of war criminals, reparations, and the conclusion of the peace treaty. Japan has already gone
through this process with regard to World War II. Some observers
believe that Japan has never admitted its war responsibility, but they
are wrong. The Far Eastern Tribunal of War Crimes determined that
Japan conducted invasions, and the principal figures in charge of Japan’s conduct of the war were executed. The San Francisco Peace
Treaty prohibits Japan from denying the results of that tribunal. In
addition, many other lower-ranking military officers and soldiers
were also executed or imprisoned for war crimes. A considerable
number of Japan’s postwar prime ministers made apologies for their
country’s past behavior on occasions of foreign visits, although the
wordings were sometime vague. If the traditional criteria are applied, Japan has taken its responsibility for World War II quite properly. One of the major reasons why Japan’s “history issue” has been
brought up again in recent years may be that the world has entered
into an era of peace and prosperity with the end of the Cold War. In
the past, politics was preoccupied with the present and lacked the
time to discuss the responsibilities of one country for a war that
ended half a century before.
The LDP Regains the Premiership
LIMITED POWER BASE OF THE LDP
In January 1996, after his support base had weakened, Murayama
suddenly announced his resignation, and the LDP regained the premiership after two years and five months. Since then, the LDP has
retained the office of prime minister without interruption to the present. However Japanese politics has not returned to the old days of
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
LDP predominance. One can discern significant differences between
Japanese politics after January 1996 and before August 1993.
First, the LDP has not held a majority in the upper house since
1989. Cabinets have ruled by a coalition, and since 1996, politicians
as well as the public have always recognized the real possibility of
another change of power.
Second, the Socialists, who had dominated the opposition for
most of the postwar era were, after 1996, a small, marginal party in
both houses. In the lower house elections in October 1996, they won
only fifteen seats. The demise of the Socialists ensured that the days
of highly ideological confrontation between supporters of the U.S.Japan Security Treaty System and a free market economy on one side
and advocates of unarmed neutrality and socialism on the other
would never return.
Third, the “reshuffling of political parties” (seikai saihen) has continued, especially among the opposition. Yet debate on Japanese security policy from January 1996 to the resignation of the Mori cabinet
in April 2001 became much more frank, realistic, and pragmatic. The
public, while maintaining the basic spirit of Japan’s postwar pacifism, took a much more realistic attitude toward security matters.
The issuance of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April
1996 and the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines in September 1997
and the passage of the so-called Guideline Laws in May 1999, each of
which could have provoked a bitter division in Japanese society in
the old days, barely caused a protest. In this sense, Japan moved
closer to becoming a “normal nation.”
The fluid nature of Japanese politics and the limited power base of
the LDP administrations, however, did constrain Japan’s security
policy during this period. The LDP did not enjoy the luxury of making policy decisions unilaterally. The consent of other parties had to
be obtained, and compromises had to be made. Through the process
of interparty negotiations, the relatively cautious attitude toward an
expansion of Japan’s security role held by the Socialists, the Sakigake, the Komeito, and the former Socialists within the Democratic
Party, often acted as a brake to slow the pace of policy changes. The
LDP also had to pay close attention to the still prevalent pacifist orientation among the public. Generally speaking, the Japanese people
came to accept the idea of Japan’s active “international contribution”
in the field of peace and security but still remained hesitant about
utilizing military power for that purpose. Many Japanese were and
remain today attracted to the idea that Japan’s contribution to world
peace should be pursued mainly by nonmilitary means and that its
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
109
military contribution should be kept minimal.22 Consequently,
changes in Japanese security policy took place only incrementally.
REDEFINITION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
During the period of Hashimoto’s premiership, the most remarkable
development in Japan’s security policy was the issuance of the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security” in April 1996 and the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines that followed.
The end of the Cold War generated a pressing need for Tokyo and
Washington to re-evaluate and restructure the U.S.-Japan Alliance to
fit the new regional and global security environment now that the
Soviet threat no longer existed. The Bush administration’s announcement of a plan for a gradual reduction of the U.S. military
presence in East Asia caused anxiety in Japan. Moreover, the Clinton
administration initially gave highest priority in its relations with Japan to the issue of economic friction and showed little interest in security relations. The high-handed attitude of Clinton’s trade negotiators aroused bitter resentments in Japan. When the summit meeting
between Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Clinton in February 1994 failed to produce an agreement on the new “trade framework talks,” U.S.-Japan relations were nearly at a deadlock. The security policy communities both in Tokyo and in Washington worried
seriously that the economic friction between the two allies could undermine the foundations of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
The North Korean nuclear crisis in the spring and summer of that
year finally caused the two governments to recognize the importance
of the security relationship and start the process of re-evaluation and
restructuring the alliance. A series of in-depth discussions between
Tokyo and Washington started in the autumn of that year to define
new roles for the alliance in a changed international environment. In
February 1995, in the so-called Nye Report, the Clinton administration declared that the U.S. forward deployment in East Asia would
be maintained at roughly its present size of 100,000 for the foreseeable future, that is, for about twenty years. The report also called the
—————
22. A typical example of this type of argument is Yoichi Funabashi’s advocacy of
Japan as a “global civilian power.” See Yoichi Funabashi, Nihon no taigai koso: reisen-go
no bijon wo egaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), chap. 6; and Yoichi Funabashi, “Introduction: Japan’s International Agenda for the 1990s,” in Japan’s International Agenda,
ed. Yoichi Funabashi (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 11–13. The
original Japanese version was published three years before under the title Nihon senryaku sengen: shibirian taikoku wo mezashite (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991).
110
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
U.S.-Japan Alliance the “linchpin of United States security policy in
Asia” and acknowledged that the U.S. security policy in East Asia,
including its military presence in the region, “relies on access to
Japanese bases and Japanese support for United States operations.”23
In September 1995, however, the rape of a twelve-year-old
schoolgirl by three U.S. marines in Okinawa severely strained the
U.S.-Japan Alliance. The Japanese public was outraged over the
nasty crime committed by foreign soldiers. In Okinawa, a small island prefecture where 75 percent of the U.S. base area in Japan is
concentrated, the people’s rage was particularly fierce. Since the reversion of the islands from the United States to Japan in 1972, Okinawans had always felt that an excessive share of the burden to
maintain the U.S.-Japan Alliance had been imposed on them by the
central government in Tokyo. With this terrible incident, their frustration burst into anger and demands to reduce the U.S. bases on
their islands. In order to overcome this crisis, both Tokyo and Washington took sincere measures to sooth the anger of the Okinawans,
including the establishment of the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) in November. In April 1996, shortly before President Clinton’s visit to Japan, Tokyo and Washington reached an
agreement on the return of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station,
one of the two largest U.S. bases in Okinawa.
Then, on April 17, 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President
Clinton held a summit meeting in Tokyo and issued the “Japan-U.S.
Joint Declaration on Security,” which officially confirmed that both
countries shared a strong will to redefine and maintain their decades-old security alliance into the post–Cold War era as a stabilizing
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The two leaders not only reaffirmed the significance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the end of the
Cold War but also expanded the purpose of the alliance and pledged
that the two countries would undertake efforts to expand security
cooperation in a number of fields. In this sense, the alliance was “redefined.”
Following the issuance of the joint security declaration, the two
governments initiated a process of revising the more specific 1978
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, a task that was completed in September 1997. Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the
United States promises to defend Japan in the case of an enemy attack. Until the Defense Guidelines were adopted in 1978, however,
—————
23. [citation necessary]
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
111
the two countries had lacked any kind of agreement as to the specific
means of actual military cooperation in case of such contingencies
for nearly three decades, since the conclusion of the original treaty in
1951. One of the main reasons why such an unusual state of affairs
was tolerated for so many years was the overwhelming power of the
United States over Japan during that period.
In the mid-1990s, the attention of the two governments shifted
from cases of enemy attack on Japan to cases of contingencies in the
areas surrounding Japan (shuhen jitai). In the 1978 Defense Guidelines, however, the means of military cooperation between the two
countries in such contingencies were not specified at all. The crisis
on the Korean Peninsula in 1994 suddenly awoke a sense of urgency
in both capitals for improving this facet of their alliance. This has
proved to be a delicate issue. Any moves by Japan and the United
States to prepare for contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan
have caused concern not only in North Korea but also in China because of the Taiwan issue.
For Hashimoto, the issuance of the joint security declaration and
the adoption of the new guidelines could finally be decided by his
cabinet alone. In order to provide the content for the declaration
and the new guidelines, however, he had to gain the consent not
only of the LDP but also of the Socialists and the Sakigake. In reality, although the Socialist Party had agreed to maintain the U.S.Japan Alliance, it was reluctant to strengthen it and opposed to
many of the measures for that purpose, such as relocation of the
core functions of the Futenma Air Station to somewhere else in
Okinawa prefecture. It also opposed the passing of new laws concerning contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan (“guideline
laws”). Even within the LDP, some influential leaders such as former Party Secretary-General Koichi Kato argued that relations
among Japan, the United States, and China should take the shape of
an isosceles triangle. They took a relatively cautious attitude toward
the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Thus, the process of
taking concrete steps to give content to the joint declaration and the
new guidelines was very slow. For example, Hashimoto’s plan to
construct a heliport to relocate the core functions of the Futenma
Air Station off the coast of Nago City in Okinawa had to be tabled,
at least for the time being. Although the government submitted the
Bills Concerning Contingencies in the Areas Surrounding Japan (the
Guideline Bills) to the Diet session in 1998, the passage of the bill
was delayed until May 1999.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
THE COLLAPSE OF THE HASHIMOTO CABINET
In October 1996, the first lower house elections under the new electoral system were competed between Hashimoto’s LDP and Ozawa’s
Shinshinto. Although the old “1955 system” was sometimes called a
“two-party system,” the number of the JSP candidates who ran in
each lower house election was limited to around 130, that is, one
candidate in each of the 130 local constituencies. In fact, there had
been only one occasion in which the number of the Socialist candidates exceeded half the total number of seats in the lower house, and
that happened quite a long time before. These facts clearly meant
that the JSP never expected to form a single-party government. In
contrast, in the 1996 lower house elections, the LDP and the Shinshinto fielded about the same number of candidates.
In the elections, the LDP won 238 seats, and the Shinshinto 156
seats. The Democratic Party, which was founded shortly before the
election by those who had left the Social Democratic Party (the new
name of the Socialist Party after January 1996), and the Sakigake won
52 seats. Although the LDP was twelve seats short of a majority, it
could still form a single-party government for the first time since the
collapse of the Miyazawa administration in the summer of 1993,
with support from the Social Democratic Party and the Sakigake
from outside the cabinet.
Having gained a victory in the October 1996 general elections,
Hashimoto declared that he would make utmost efforts to accomplish what he called the “six major reforms” and started to wrestle
with the task. The six major reforms were (1) administrative reform,
such as reorganization of government ministries and agencies;
(2) structural reform of the economy by relaxation of restrictions;
(3) structural reform of the financial system; (4) banking reform,
which was known as Japan’s version of “big bang”; (5) social security reform; and (6) educational reform. In the Diet session of 1997,
Hashimoto successfully obtained the Diet approval for his financial
reform bill. Hashimoto also organized the Administrative and Financial Reforms Council in summer 1997, which he chaired himself.
He actively participated in the discussions of the council members
and created the basic framework for the reorganization of ministries
and agencies. Under such circumstances, he enjoyed a high approval
rating and was re-elected president of the LDP in September 1996.
Following the retirement of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1972,
the LDP had eleven presidents before Hashimoto. Except for former
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was elected to the presi-
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
113
dency for three terms, each served only one term. Despite the facts
that the Hashimoto faction (the Obuchi faction) was not very big,
that he was not even a top leader of that faction, and that he did not
enjoy strong support from other LDP factions, he could still be reelected because of his popularity among the public. Once the public
turned their backs on him, his political power base quickly eroded.
In this sense, it was a serious mistake for Hashimoto to appoint
Takayuki Sato, who had been found guilty in the Lockheed scandal
in the 1970s, as a cabinet minister when he reshuffled the cabinet
right after his re-election as the LDP president. Public reaction to this
appointment was very negative, and Hashimoto’s popularity began
to drop sharply. In November 1997, the news of the bankruptcy of
two of Japan’s major financial institutions, Yamaichi Security and the
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, came as enormous shocks. Although
Hashimoto initiated several financial policies to cope with the situation, most of those actions came too late to have satisfactory effects.
In the July 1998 upper house elections, the LDP suffered an unexpected loss, and Hashimoto was forced to resign. Keizo Obuchi of
the LDP took over the premiership.
RESHUFFLING OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES
In the meantime, internal conflicts within the Shinshinto Party over
party policy recurred continuously after the general elections in October 1996. The party was dissolved in December 1997. By April
1997, a considerable number of the Shinshinto Diet members, including former Prime Ministers Hata and Hosokawa, had already left the
party. What turned out to be critical for the fate of the party was
Ozawa’s attempt to cooperate with the LDP after April. It was the
base issue in Okinawa that made him take such a step. The Hashimoto administration’s attempt to legislate a new law, which would
enable the prime minister to force renewal of the leases without the
consent of the governor of Okinawa prefecture, was opposed by the
Socialists in the ruling coalition. Recognizing the importance of the
Okinawa base issue for the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,
Ozawa actively approached the LDP to realize the “conservativeconservative” cooperation (between the LDP and the Shinshinto) to
break the stalemate on the issue.
Since the early 1990s, Ozawa had been known as an ardent advocate of reshuffling of political parties based on differences in policies
and ideals. He repeatedly argued that the issues of security policy
and international contribution should be the most important touch-
114
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
stone by which political parties should be formed.24 He regarded cooperation between the LDP, the Socialists, and the Sakigake as an illegitimate marriage of convenience. He also regarded the composition of his own party as inappropriate, because the Shinshinto itself
was a product of a marriage of convenience among members of the
former Hosokawa coalition formed out of a shared sense of anxiety
that the smaller parties would not be able to survive the lower house
elections under the new system. It was therefore natural for Ozawa
to seek cooperation among those who shared the same view on security matters.
When Ozawa won the party leader election in December 1997, he
astonished the entire county by abruptly dissolving the Shinshinto
for “purification,” that is, to establish a new party of his own that
would solidly unite around him by excluding those unwilling to follow his neo-conservative policies and ideals. With 41 other lower
house members and twelve upper house members, he founded the
Liberal Party. Among the anti-Ozawa members of the former Shinshinto, Michihiko Kano’s group, together with Hata’s group, who
had left the party a year earlier, joined the Democratic Party in April
1998 to form a new Democratic Party. Forty-seven members of the
lower house who had belonged to the Komeito formed the New
Party Peace for a short period of time and then restored the Komeito
in October 1998.
Japanese politics from the collapse of the Miyazawa administration in August 1993 until the dissolution of the Shinshinto at the end
of 1997 could be depicted as a series of pro-Ozawa versus antiOzawa confrontations. Ozawa’s strong, aggressive personality, his
leadership style, and his arbitrary way of politics attracted some
while it offended others. Since his new party—the Liberal Party—
turned out to be merely a medium-sized one, the focus of Japanese
politics shifted to the LDP versus the Democratic Party confrontation
after April 1998. In April 1998, the Democratic Party was merely a
middle-sized party with only about 90 seats in the lower house. In
the upper house elections that took place three months later, it increased its seats remarkably and caused a stunning LDP defeat, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Hashimoto.
—————
24. See, e.g., “Kokusai koken to anpo mondai wo seikai saihen no jiku ni: Ozawa
Ichiro-shi kenkai,” Yomiuri shinbun, Sept. 18, 1993; “Seiji no shin-fukei: Nihon no
shinro seikai saihen nirami anpo, kokusai koken . . . sakuso,” Yomiuri shinbun, Nov.
30, 1993; “Seiji ni sekinin to ketsudan wo: Shinseito Ozawa Ichiro-shi intabyu,” an interview with Ozawa, Yomiuri shinbun, Feb. 14, 1994.
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
115
FROM OBUCHI TO MORI
Shortly after Obuchi succeeded to the premiership, his administration sought cooperation with the Liberal Party. The LDP, which did
not have a simple majority in the House of Councilors (upper house,
or Sangi-in), approached the party whose policies were the closest to
its own. The Liberal Party wanted to join the ruling coalition to make
the next election easier for them. It also hoped to utilize this opportunity to carry out the policies and ideals that it had been advocating. The coalition government between the LDP and the Liberal
Party started in January 1999.
Obuchi had been leader of a major LDP faction, but he had been
known as a mediocre politician with an extremely nice personality.
Shortly after he assumed office, one of the authors of this chapter
wrote: “One of the weaknesses of the Obuchi Cabinet is the prime
minister himself. He is awfully poor at making speeches.”25 Time
magazine described him as a “cold pizza.”26 Initially public expectations for his administration were low; his approval rating was modest at best. In his eighteen months in office until his stroke in April
2000, however, Obuchi successfully got through a number of significant bills, each of which could have evoked harsh opposition in the
past, including bills for the reorganization of ministries and agencies,
amendment of the Diet Law concerning abolition of the system of
seifu-iin (government committees), the law concerning the national
anthem and the national flag, and the wiretapping law. In the security field, the Guideline Bill finally became law in May 1999, more
than a year after its submission by the Hashimoto Cabinet. It represented another major step forward in the strengthening of the U.S.Japan Alliance to stabilize the Asia Pacific. The Diet even formed a
study group on the constitution and paved the way for a revision of
Article 9 to expand Japan’s contribution to international security.
Two domestic factors contributed to such remarkable achievements by Obuchi. On the one hand, Ozawa’s neo-conservative ideals
and policies had a considerable impact, even though he was personally unpopular. The LDP came to take a more realistic policy line
than before, particularly in the security field. On the other hand,
joined by many of the former Shinshinto members in early 1998, the
—————
25. Shin’ichi Kitaoka, “Hashimoto naikaku to Obuchi naikaku: Jiminto seiji ha
kawaru no ka,” in Shin’ichi Kitaoka, Futsu no kuni he (Tokyo: Chuo koron shinsha,
2000), p. 234. This article originally appeared in Chuo koron, Oct. 1998.
26. Citation necessary. Also need to check the actual wording.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
Democratic Party became centrist in the true sense of the word. Although there were a considerable number of former JSP leftists in the
party, their influence on party policies, particularly in the security
field, rapidly waned. In June 1999, the Democratic Party announced
a security policy outline that was even more realistic than the LDP’s.
The victory of Yukio Hatoyama, who during the campaign in the
party representative election in September of that year, advocated
amending the Constitution, possibly including Article 9, made the
increasingly centrist nature of the Democratic Party even clearer.
With the emergence of the centrist Democratic Party as a dominant opposition and a possible substitute for the LDP as a ruling
party, cooperation in foreign and security policies has become possible in Japan for the first time in the postwar period. Sharing with the
LDP the basic values and ideals of liberal democracy and the basic
principles of Japan’s prosperity as described above, most of the Democrats have been ready to cooperate, negotiate, and make necessary compromises with the ruling party in the area of security policies. They have shared a basic understanding with the LDP that
Japan’s international contribution must be increased in proportion to
its economic size and that Japan’s security role must be expanded.
Meanwhile, coalition politics continued. For Obuchi, forming a
coalition with the Liberal Party was only the first step in consolidating and stabilizing the political power of his administration. Shortly
after his re-election as party president in September 1999, he
achieved an expanded coalition between the LDP, the Liberal Party,
and the Komeito. The position of the Liberal Party and Ozawa in the
renewed coalition was, however, delicate. First, the Liberals were
afraid that the participation of the Komeito, which had more Diet
seats than their party, could lower the value of the Liberal Party for
the LDP and undermine their say in the coalition. Second, the Liberals were reluctant to form a coalition with the Komeito, which had
traditionally claimed to be a party of peace and welfare and shown
quite a strong pacifist tendency. For example, in the deliberations on
the PKO Bill in 1991–92, it was due mainly to the Komeito’s insistence that a number of additional restrictions on the activities of
Japanese peacekeepers, such as the “freezing” of the “core functions”
of peacekeeping forces and much stricter guidelines for the use of
weapons by Japanese peacekeepers than standard U.N. practice,
were introduced. The Liberals worried that Komeito policies, particularly on matters of Japan’s security and international contribution, quite often conflicted with those of the Liberal Party, a neoconservative party.
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
117
After trying to secede from the coalition several times, the Liberal
Party finally did so in April 2000. At that moment, however, more
than half of the party formed a new Conservative Party and remained in the coalition. By then, Ozawa had alienated so many people that his prominence in Japanese politics greatly declined.
Within the LDP, not everyone agreed with the formation of a coalition with the Komeito. The Komeito is based on a religious group
called the Soka gakkai, an organization of believers in a newly established sect of Buddhism. Although the members of the Soka gakkai
have given ardent support to the Komeito, public opinion polls have
shown that a majority of Japanese voters outside that religious organization have consistently felt considerable antipathy toward the
party. Many influential political leaders in the LDP, including Koichi
Kato, a leader of one of the four major factions within the party, were
negative about Obuchi’s decision to form a coalition government
with the Komeito.
Prime Minister Obuchi suffered a stroke the day after the secession of the Liberal Party from the coalition and was forced to resign
shortly afterward. Obuchi never regained consciousness before his
death the next month, and the LDP leaders chose his successor not
for the purpose of carrying out some specific policies but to protect
the framework of the coalition. A leader of one of the major factions
in the LDP, Yoshiro Mori had been known as a typically old-style
ordinary politician skilled at balancing interests but not outstanding
with regard to policies and ideals. Mori was, however, positive
about maintaining relations with the Komeito, and the LDP wanted
votes from the members of the Soka Gakkai more than anything.
Mori suffered from a low approval rating from the beginning.
He was one of the least popular and least respected prime ministers
in postwar Japan. In the general elections in June 2000, the ruling
coalition kept its majority in the lower house, but lost many seats.
Although Mori narrowly put down the rebellion by former Party
Secretary-General Koichi Kato in November 2000, his approval ratings continued to decrease until they reached single-digit levels near
the end of his term because of a series of political scandals and
Mori’s political blunders, such as his remark on May 15 that Japan
was a “country of gods” (kami no kuni),27 invited harsh criticism both
domestically and from neighboring nations.
—————
27. Although it is common to translate the Japanese word kami as “god” or “gods,”
it should be noted that there is a wide difference in the meanings of kami in Japanese
118
Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
Under Mori not much progress was made with regard to Japan’s
security policy. After the Diet passed the Guideline Law in May
1999, the foreign and security policies community in Japan expected
that the legislation of contingency laws would be the next. Japan had
no laws governing the conduct of the military under various contingencies, for example, a military crisis in the territory or territorial
waters of Japan. This represents one of the major negative byproducts of Japan’s postwar culture of pacifism under which frank discussion of military matters was long considered near taboo. Although there were some signs that Obuchi started to pay serious
attentions to this issue after the passage of the Guidelines Law, with
strong support from the Liberal Party, Mori remained largely passive on the issue, largely because of Komeito refusal to support the
contingency law. The expansion of Japan’s participation in international peacekeeping operations, including the clarification of the core
functions of peacekeeping forces, was not seriously pursued. When
the new U.S. administration under President George W. Bush signaled that it would attach much greater importance to Japan as the
most significant U.S. ally in Asia, the Mori administration failed to
follow.
Even without strong political leadership, however, Japan’s security policy was not paralyzed. Some progress was made in U.S.Japan security relations, including the agreement by the two governments in September 2000 to co-establish a “coordination mechanism.” This would provide a framework for consultation and policy
coordination between the two allies and joint operations and other
types of security cooperation, such as Japan’s logistical support to
the U.S. operations in case of enemy attack against Japan as well as
contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan.
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been considerable advances in Japanese security policy. Until the Gulf War, except for a
small number of security experts, most Japanese considered events
beyond the Japan’s territorial waters as beyond the scope of security
policy of their country. The dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces overseas was out of the question even in cases of traditional peacekeeping or disaster relief. Such was the negative byproduct of Japan’s
—————
and god in English. In the case of Mori’s remark on May 15, 2000, it is more proper to
translate kami as “spirits.”
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
119
postwar culture of pacifism. Although security relations with the
United Sates were central to the maintenance of Japan’s security under the Cold War environment, the Japanese people were quite reluctant to expand actual military cooperation with the United States.
The basic structure of Japanese politics under the 1955 system buttressed Japanese reluctance to assume security roles beyond selfdefense in its most narrowly defined sense. Because of the fundamentally antiestablishment nature of the Socialist Party, which permanently dominated the opposition, the security debate could not
avoid becoming a highly ideological dispute and easily turned into
political turmoil. Under the political culture of nare-ai (collusion) and
motare-ai (mutual dependence), the permanent ruling party, the LDP,
tended to prefer avoidance of serious confrontation with the Socialists and criticism from the public by doing nothing rather than attempting to change security policies.
In the 1990s, Japan passed the PKO Law and gradually expanded
its participation to international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief activities. The country adopted the New National Defense Program Outline in 1995, which expanded the mission of the SelfDefense Forces to include preparation for situations that could have
“a significant impact on Japanese society” and the assumption of
roles “in a timely manner in the Government’s active efforts to establish a more stable security environment.”28 As for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Japanese government, in close cooperation with Washington, redefined the alliance not only to reaffirm its importance but
also to expand its role as regional stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific. Following the joint security declaration in April 1996, the two allies
adopted the new guidelines in September 1997 and Japan passed the
Guideline Laws in May 1999 to take necessary measures to implement the contents of the new guidelines.
The following domestic changes contributed to such progress in
Japan’s security policy. First, the divergence on security policy
among the political parties in Japan narrowed to a considerable extent. Under the 1955 system, enormous and unnegotiable differences
of opinion existed between the LDP and the JSP with regard to security matters. With the demise of the JSP and the rise of more realistic,
centrist oppositions, particularly of the Democratic Party after the
spring of 1998, security debates in Japan were freed from ideological
confrontation for the first time in the postwar period. Consequently,
Japanese politicians finally started frank discussion on security is—————
28. “National Defense Program Outline in and After FY 1996,” section 3.
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Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya
sues from the standpoint of national interest that was largely absent
under the 1955 system.
Second, the nature of Japan’s pacifism changed to a considerable
extent. Throughout the postwar period, the Japanese people have
maintained an unwavering determination that they would make Japan a “nation of peace.” Until the Gulf War, they believed that Japan
could achieve that goal by not doing anything in the security field
except for self-defense. Being strongly determined that they would
never let their country become an aggressor again, the postwar Japanese believed that Japan should not be involved militarily in security
matters beyond its own territory and territorial waters and should
avoid using its military capability for any purpose but individual
self-defense, not even for U.N. peacekeeping operations or any other
types of international peace efforts.29 What is equally important, they
assumed that the international community wanted Japan to maintain
such an attitude in the security field. The experience of the Gulf War
taught the Japanese that such an assumption no longer applied. They
learned that the international community wanted Japan to shoulder
the security responsibility that went with its economic power beyond its border. Since then, the Japanese have sought to find a way
to transform their postwar pacifism from “passive pacifism” to “proactive pacifism.” An increasing number of the Japanese came to
share the view that Japan should become a “nation of peace” not
only in a sense that it would never again use its military forces for
aggressive purposes but also in a sense that it would make every effort to maintain and promote international peace and security in cooperation with other countries in the world.
Some may still argue that not much changed in Japan’s security
policy throughout the period covered by this chapter. They are partially right. When Prime Minister Mori resigned and Jun’ichiro Koizumi came to power in April 2001, many desirable changes were yet
to be made: the discussion about the legislation of contingency laws
had barely started; the ban on exercising of the right of collective selfdefense was maintained; core functions of peacekeeping forces remained frozen; and Article 9 of the Constitution remained unchanged.
—————
29. For the Japanese attitude toward the United Nations and other international
peace operations, see Matake Kamiya, “Pacifism and the Japanese Attitude Toward
the United Nations,” in Japan and Multilateral Diplomacy, ed. Philippe Régnier and
Daniel Warner (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2001).
Japanese Politics and Security Policy, 1990–2001
121
Despite these unchanged aspects, substantial change in Japan’s security policy took place during the 1990s. Prime Minister Koizumi has
brought about a series of astonishing changes in Japan’s security policy since the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11,
2001, including the dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Forces ships to
the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to U.S. Navy ships engaging in the war against the terrorists in Afghanistan. This represents the first occasion in which the Japanese government sent the
Self-Defense Forces overseas during wartime. Koizumi has also expressed his desire to complete the legislation of contingency laws.
Many politicians, including Koizumi, in the Democratic Party as well
as in the LDP, have started to argue that Japan needs to “review” the
traditional policy of not exercising the right of the collective selfdefense.
In short, throughout the 1990s, Japanese politics was in constant
flux around the issue of political restructuring. Many leading politicians shared the understanding that domestic politics as well as external policies of Japan required fundamental reform. They believed
that without making a greater “international contribution” in the security field, Japan would never be a respected member of international society. Ichiro Ozawa, who led the movement toward political
reform from the early to the mid-1990s, strongly believed that Japan
had to “normalize” its security policy in order not to be isolated in
international society. Thus, even in the tumultuous atmosphere of
political reform, a new consensus emerged for an expansion of Japan’s contribution to international unity in a multilateral context.
Part II
U.S.-China Relations
From Denial to Leadership:
The Clinton Administration and China
Robert S. Ross
The Clinton administration was the first administration elected following the end of the Cold War. It thus was the first U.S. administration to
develop security policy in a strategic setting in which the United States
faced no great powers rivals and no immediate or even short-term
threats to its vital security interests. These international changes affected not only U.S. foreign policy but also the domestic politics of U.S.
foreign policy. In this unprecedented international and domestic context, U.S. foreign policy of the prior 55 years could not serve as a basic
framework for the new administration. In many areas the Clinton administration had to develop U.S. security policy de novo.
The Clinton’s administration faced its greatest foreign policy difficulties in developing policy toward China. During its two terms, it struggled to come to terms with the ongoing post–Cold War reality of Chinese power, the limits of American power, and the corresponding
necessity of incorporating Chinese interests into U.S. foreign policy. In
the best of circumstances, this would have been difficult. But the administration’s protracted inability to acknowledge Chinese importance
—————
Robert S. Ross is a Professor of Political Science at Boston College.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
125
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Robert S. Ross
to U.S. interests and its prioritization of domestic policy over foreign
policy exacerbated the difficulty. This led to policy inconsistency.
During the two terms of the Clinton presidency, American policy
toward China went through three phases. In each phase the administration adopted policies that failed to acknowledge U.S. interest in taking
into account Chinese power. In each phase, this overconfidence in
American power resulted first in policy failure and then in policy correction. Not until the end of its second term did the Clinton administration fully understand not only that Chinese power required the president to take international policy initiatives that acknowledge Chinese
interests but also that the president must exercise domestic leadership
to realize U.S. interests in U.S.-China relations.
In the first phase of Clinton’s evolving China policy, from January
1993 to May 1994, the administration believed that the United States
could use its market power to coerce China into accommodating U.S.
demands regarding human rights in China. This period ended with delinkage of trade and human rights. In the second phase, from May 1994
to July 1997, the administration acted as if U.S. pre-eminence allowed it
to ignore China. This led to policy drift, resulting in congressional activism and destabilizing changes in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. This period ended with the President’s Clinton’s visit to China in 1997, to
greater U.S. accommodation of Chinese interests on the Taiwan issue,
and greater engagement of China regarding weapons proliferation.
These changes reflected the administration’s new recognition that managing global weapons proliferation required Chinese participation in
international arms control institutions. In the third phase, from late
1997 to November 2000, the administration remained reluctant to take
the initiative and exercise domestic leadership to achieve an agreement
with China on Chinese membership in the WTO. It ended when the
United States and China concluded a WTO agreement and the Clinton
administration then successfully fought for domestic legislation that
ended the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974
Trade Act to U.S.-China trade relations.
President Clinton’s difficulty in developing a successful China policy
was not unique to his administration. Each time since U.S.-China rapprochement in 1972 that control of the White House switched political
parties, the new administration believed that it could adopt a stronger
China policy that downgraded China’s strategic importance and, thus,
placed less emphasis on U.S. accommodation of Chinese interests. This
was also the experience of the Carter and Reagan administrations. But
in each case, the new party in the White House was compelled to carry
out a significant policy reversal as it came to terms with the reality of
From Denial to Leadership
127
Chinese power and the corresponding necessity for negotiation and
mutual compromise. As we shall see, what distinguished the Clinton
administration from its predecessors was that its policy adjustment was
so protracted and costly.
The Failure of Sanctions
When the Clinton administration took office in January 1993, it struggled not only with developing a post-Cold War China policy but also
with the legacy of the Chinese government’s violent June 4, 1989, crackdown on the Beijing student movement and with the Clinton presidential campaign’s statements on U.S. policy toward human rights in
China. During the campaign, Clinton had argued that the Bush administration remained a captive of outdated Cold War security concerns
that placed excessive importance on strategic cooperation with China.
He assured the voters that unlike President Bush he would not “coddle” the dictators of Beijing and that he would not hesitate to use Chinese exports to the United States as leverage against China’s human
rights abuses.1 It was this combination of confidence in post–Cold War
U.S. power and a commitment to human rights that drove Clinton’s
first efforts in China policy.
One of President Clinton’s first decisions concerned trade with
China. In the first months of his presidency, China had hoped that he
would abandon his campaign rhetoric and recognize China continued
importance in the post-Cold War order. It also sent a high-level trade
delegation to the United States, which placed large orders for U.S. aircraft and automobiles.2 Nonetheless, rather than unconditionally extend
China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, in late May 1993 Clinton issued an executive order linking continuation of China’s MFN
trade status with its human rights practices. Whereas President Bush
had resisted congressional efforts to link trade and human rights, Clinton embraced linkage as a presidential commitment. Clinton administration officials believed that the executive order had removed linkage
—————
1. New York Times, Apr. 2, 1992. The Democratic Party’s use of China policy as a campaign issue is well discussed in James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999), 260–64.
2. Chinese optimism is reflected in Guo Zhenyuan, “Clinton’s New Policy Toward
China,” Shijie zhishi, Jan. 16, 1993, in FBIS, Jan. 28, 1993; and Zhang Xinhua, “An Analysis
of U.S. Economic and Trade Strategy Toward China,” Jiefang ribao, May 10, 1993, in FBIS,
May 24, 1993, pp. 8–10. On the trade mission and purchases, see China Daily, Apr. 5, 1993,
in FBIS-China, Apr. 6, 1993, pp. 7–8; Xinhua, Apr. 9, 1993, in FBIS, Apr. 12, 1993, p. 6; and
Xinhua, Apr. 14, 1993, in FBIS, Apr. 14, 1993, p. 6.
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Robert S. Ross
from congressional politics, thus enhancing White House flexibility,
and that China would make some limited human rights changes that
would make possible continued U.S. cooperation with China and the
continuation of MFN. But the executive order further politicized China
policy, for the president had made a personal commitment to impose
punitive trade sanctions on China should Beijing not conform to U.S.
demands. Yet even a presidential commitment and the obvious political
costs for the president of retreat from linkage could not make credible
to China the U.S. threat to disrupt U.S.-China trade.
The administration made a strong effort to persuade China of its resolve and elicit Chinese compromise. President Clinton, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher, and other officials personally pressured
China to make reforms. In October 1993 Christopher warned Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen that without quick progress on human rights,
China would lose its MFN status. At the APEC meeting in Seattle, the
president held a “frank” and “candid” discussion with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. After Beijing released a small handful of dissidents,
Christopher insisted that it had not done enough. In February 1994, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, during a visit
to Beijing, held an unannounced meeting with Wei Jingsheng. The next
month, Christopher visited China with the announced intention to
withdraw MFN status unless China compromised. In May President
Clinton told Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jihua that China had to make
more concessions by June 3, the deadline for renewing China’s MFN
status, if it expected to maintain normal trade relations.3
President Clinton had done all he could to persuade Chinese leaders
that the United States would revoke China’s MFN status if they did not
satisfy U.S. demands. The president had linked his personal credibility
to this policy, suggesting that domestic political costs made compromise impossible. But Chinese leaders remained intransigent, adopting
policies more hostile than those of 1992 and 1993. In meetings with administration officials, they expressed no willingness to meet U.S. conditions. Prior to Secretary Christopher’s visit to Beijing, Chinese leaders
rearrested or detained at least thirteen dissidents, including Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan. In their meetings with Christopher, they refused
to discuss human rights. Premier Li Peng insisted that China would endure U.S. sanctions rather that succumb to pressure. In May, as the June
—————
3. New York Times (hereafter NYT), Oct. 1, 1993; NYT, Oct. 21, 1993; NYT, Nov. 20,
1993; Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), Dec. 2, 1993; NYT, Jan. 24, 1994; NYT,
Feb. 28, 1994; NYT, Mar. 12, 1994; FEER, Mar. 24, 1994, pp. 18–20; NYT, May 3, 1994.
From Denial to Leadership
129
3 deadline approached, Chinese police arrested four Shanghai democracy activists.4
Washington’s strenuous effort had failed to elicit Chinese concessions. Chinese leaders assessed American credibility by focusing on the
costs and benefits for U.S. interests of imposing sanctions, and they
concluded that American interest in Chinese treatment of political dissidents was far less than its interest in access to the Chinese market and
stable U.S.-China political relations. They were correct. President Clinton, despite his commitment to retaliate against Chinese intransigence,
flinched from the domestic political costs and from the national economic and security costs of disrupting U.S.-China trade. Chinese leaders successfully called the administration’s bluff.
Denying MFN to China would have elicited PRC retaliation against
American exports. Although American reliance on China’s market is
insignificant compared to Chinese reliance on the U.S. market, key sectors of U.S. industry and the labor force would have been affected. The
economies of Washington and Kansas, for example would have been
significantly affected were Beijing to cancel orders from Boeing and
purchase European Airbuses instead. In 1994, China purchased 13 percent of Boeing aircraft sales.5 Many states would have been affected
were Beijing decide to buy wheat from other countries. American telecommunication, energy, and automobile corporations are in competition with their foreign counterparts for a share of China’s infrastructure
and transportation sectors. Simply put, despite the administration’s
confidence in U.S. post–Cold War power, China possessed considerable
economic power that it was prepared to use to achieve political goals.
Chinese leaders understood the importance of the Chinese market to
the U.S. economy, and rather than compromise, they threatened to retaliate against U.S. sanctions.6
Just as politics had persuaded the president to link economic sanctions with China’s human rights policies, politics had pushed him to reevaluate his policy. China’s warnings of economic and political retaliation affected the U.S. policy debate. During Christopher’s March 1994
visit to Beijing, executives from AT&T, General Electric, and Dow Jones
sharply criticized the administration’s human rights policy. Executives
of 450 California companies signed a petition urging the White House
—————
4. FEER, Mar. 17, 1994, p. 16; NYT, Mar. 5, 1994; NYT, Mar. 12, 1994; Washington Post
(hereafter WP), Mar. 13, 1994; Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1994.
5. Dow Jones Newswires, June 25, 1996.
6. See, e.g., Zhongguo tongxunshe, Mar. 20, 1994, in FBIS, Apr. 1, 1994, pp. 4–5; and
Xinhua, May 4, 1994, in FBIS, May 5, 1994, pp. 8–9; Also see the coverage of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s statement in the NYT, Mar. 21, 1994.
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Robert S. Ross
to delink trade relations. Nearly 800 companies wrote to the president
to urge him to separate trade from human rights. Secretary of the
Treasury Lloyd Bentsen and Director of the National Economic Council
Robert Rubin distanced themselves from the State Department’s position by advocating delinkage. Under Secretary of Commerce Jeffrey
Garten argued that the “economic stakes with China are enormous”
and that the United States needed “to inject commercial considerations
more into the policy.” In Congress, Democratic Representative Lee
Hamilton, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called for
a “broader understanding of the national interest.” Leading Democratic
and Republican senators, including Max Baucus, John Danforth, and
Bill Bradley, advised Secretary Christopher to eschew sanctions, no
matter how intransigent China might be. One hundred and six members of the House of Representatives, including Speaker Tom Foley,
Minority Leader Robert Michel, and Minority Whip Newt Gingrich,
advised President Clinton to approve unconditional renewal of China’s
MFN status.7
Security considerations were also influential. Representative Hamilton warned that “single-minded emphasis” on human rights had interfered with U.S. pursuit of security interests. Former Secretaries of State
Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and Lawrence Eagleburger criticized the
threat of sanctions as a failure and advised the administration to place
greater emphasis on such issues as arms control and regional security.
Even Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, who had played a major role in developing the Clinton administration’s sanctions policy, acknowledged that U.S. preoccupation with human rights had undermined other American interests in U.S.-China relations and in regional
affairs.8
In the weeks prior to the president’s decision, administration officials
met many times to consider their options. The president spoke with
former presidents and senior foreign policy advisors, and he met with
members of Congress. On May 18, eight days prior to his announcement of delinkage, he met with his senior political and foreign policy
advisors to elicit their advice. It was widely acknowledged that China
had made only minimal concessions. Nonetheless, the president de-
—————
7. NYT, Mar. 14, 1994; FEER, May 12, 1994, p. 16; NYT, Mar. 19, 1994; NYT, Mar. 20,
1994; NYT, Mar. 27, 1994; NYT, Jan. 30, 1994; NYT, May 11, 1994; NYT, May 20, 1994; NYT,
May 25, 1994.
8. NYT, Mar. 18, 1994; NYT, May 11, 1994; WP, Mar. 28, 1994; WP, May 5, 1994; Asian
Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1994; FEER, May 19, 1994.
From Denial to Leadership
131
cided to retreat from the brink. In May 26 he announced delinkage of
China’s MFN status with its human rights policies.9
The U.S. threats failed to change Chinese behavior because in the
U.S.-China relationship U.S. interest in Chinese dissidents was less important than U.S. economic and security interests. The White House
had overestimated U.S. ability to compel China to conciliate U.S. pressure and underestimated Chinese retaliatory power, which encouraged
it to allow domestic concerns to inform China policy. But it learned that
despite U.S. pre-eminence, Chinese retaliation could inflict high costs
on U.S. security and the U.S. economy. Indeed, China observed the
pressures on the White House from both business sectors and political
leaders and recognized the administration’s error. It called the Clinton
administration’s bluff because it correctly assessed the relative importance of human rights in U.S. policy and the repercussions of disrupted
U.S.-China trade for the president’s political situation. As one Chinese
report characterized the administration’s dilemma, the president was
“working furiously” to get himself out of the “self-inflicted trap” of
linking MFN to human rights.10
The administration’s overconfidence in U.S. power vis-à-vis China
and the president’s corresponding tendency to ignore Chinese interests
and to allow domestic politics to determine foreign policy was also reflected in the Yinhe affair and the conflict over Chinese hosting of the
2000 Olympic Games. From late July until early September 1993, the
administration accused the Yinhe, a Chinese ship, of carrying internationally proscribed chemical weapon precursor agents to Iran and demanded that China cease the shipment and that the Yinhe return to
China before reaching Iran. Despite continued Chinese denials that the
Yinhe carried any such chemicals, including a reported personal denial
by President Jiang Zemin,11 the administration demanded that China allow U.S. inspectors to board the Yinhe and to search for the chemicals.
—————
9. For a close analysis of the decision-making leading to delinkage, see David M.
Lampton, “America’s China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage,” China Quarterly, no. 139 (Summer 1994).
10. Chen Dawei, “Clinton Faced With Decision on Problem of China’s Most-FavoredNation Status, Zhongguo xinwenshe, May 16, 1994, in FBIS, May 17, 1994, p. 9. For other
Chinese commentaries on the domestic politics of MFN, see, e.g., Xinhua, Mar. 26, 1994,
FBIS, Mar. 28, 1994, pp. 3–4; Xinhua, May 4, 1994, in FBIS, May 5, 1994, pp. 8–9; Xinhua,
May 5, 1994, in FBIS, May 5, 1994, p. 8; Xinhua, May 6, 1994, in FBIS, May 9, 1994, pp. 4–5;
Xinhua, May 11, 1994, in FBIS, May 11, 1994, p. 7; Xinhua, May 18, 1994, in FBIS, May 19,
1994, p. 6. For a fuller analysis of why the sanctions failed, see Robert S. Ross, “China,” in
Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1998).
11. See Kyodo, Aug. 18, 1993, in FBIS, Aug. 18, 1993, p. 2.
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Robert S. Ross
Chinese leaders eventually consented. They directed the Yinhe to proceed to Saudi Arabia before unloading in Iran so that U.S. officials
could board the ship. Yet the U.S. inspectors failed to find the proscribed chemicals. Chinese were angry that administration did not
apologize and that it did not offer compensation to China for the expenses the ship incurred from the extensive delay in reaching Iran.12
Negotiations over Chinese missile proliferation reflected a similar
U.S. tendency toward unilateralism. Following the Bush administration’s September 1992 decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 aircraft, in violation of the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China arms sales communiqué, Beijing
retaliated by shipping M-11 missiles to Pakistan, thus violating its February 1992 bilateral pledge not to export missiles covered by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China was not a member of the
MTCR, and the United States refused to offer it membership. Washington preferred to exclude China from the technical MTCR discussions
and to retain the option of using the MTCR against Chinese exports.
Nonetheless, in August 1993 the Clinton administration, apparently
frustrated with China’s denials that it had exported proscribed missiles
to Pakistan, imposed sanctions prohibiting export to China of selected
advanced military-related technologies. It imposed these sanctions just
as the United States and China were entangled in the Yinhe affair and
Congress voted against China’s hosting of the 2000 Olympics.13
The administration ultimately failed to persuade China to acknowledge that it had transferred missiles to Pakistan in violation of its February 1992 agreement. The White House nonetheless lifted the August
1993 sanctions in October 1994 in return for a Chinese commitment not
to export in the future missiles “featuring the primary parameters of the
Missile Technology Control Regime—that is, inherently capable of
reaching a range of at least 300km with a payload of at least 500kg.”14
Similar U.S. assumptions about Chinese accommodation to U.S.
power were reflected in July and August 1993 when the House of Rep—————
12. NYT, Sept. 6, 1993. Chinese sources estimate the costs of the delay to be nearly $13
million. See Xinhua, Sept. 10, 1993, in FBIS, Sept. 10, 1993. According to interviews with
former U.S. officials, the chemicals were never on the Yinhe because the Yinhe had left
Shanghai for Iraq before the ship carrying the chemicals from Dalian arrived in Shanghai.
For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Ross, “China”; and Robert S. Ross. “The Diplomacy of Tiananmen: Two-Level Bargaining ad Great Power Cooperation,” Security Studies
10, no. 2 (forthcoming).
13. Xinhua, Aug. 25, 1993, in FBIS-China, Aug. 26, 1993, pp. 3–4; Xinhua, Aug. 26, 1993,
and Aug. 27, 1993, in FBIS-China, Aug. 27, 1993, pp. 1–2.
14. See “Joint United States–People’s Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation,” Oct. 4, 1994.
From Denial to Leadership
133
resentatives and then the Senate passed resolutions calling on the International Olympic Committee not to award Beijing the 2000 Olympic
Games. Rather than weigh in on the issue, the White House distanced
itself from the congressional process, allowing Congress to speak for
the United States. When the International Olympic Committee awarded
the 2000 Olympics to Sidney, the resulting widespread anti-American
backlash in China undermined U.S. efforts to encourage popular Chinese support for U.S. policies, including its human rights policies.
Policy by Default: Taiwan
Policy and the Role of Congress
The experience of linkage and delinkage, the Yinhe affair, and Chinese
missile proliferation seemed to sour the administration on dealing with
China. Thus, rather than accommodate itself to the reality of Chinese
power and develop a more realistic policy, it turned its attention away
from China, for the most part ignoring China policy. Although it had
ceased purposefully challenging Chinese interests, the Clinton administration now acted as if it could simply ignore China’s importance to
U.S. interests. The sole initiatives during the next year focused on
China’s human rights violations. In addition to publicly condemning
Chinese violations, for the first time the United States submitted a resolution condemning China to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
White House inattention to U.S.-China relations created a domestic
leadership vacuum. Congress filled the vacuum. And Taiwan, which
had been unsuccessful in taking its case to the administration, took its
case to Congress. Congress used White House passivity to change
American policy toward Taiwan. As in the first phase of Clinton’s
China policy, China policy failed in the second phase, once again requiring policy reversal. But this time the reversal inflicted even greater
costs on U.S. interests.
Many members of Congress could not understand why U.S. diplomats at whatever rank could not meet with their Taiwan counterparts.
This pattern, which has been introduced after normalization of relations
between China and the United States in 1979, seemed to members of
Congress overly solicitous to Chinese concerns and insulting to Taiwan.
When the restrictions placed on Lee Teng-hui in 1994 during his transit
stopover in Honolulu were publicized and Taiwan’s lobbying efforts
underscored the U.S. constraints on Taiwan’s diplomatic activities,
Congress demanded change. The administration, concerned over the
domestic politics of China policy, modified U.S. relations with Taiwan.
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Robert S. Ross
The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review raised the level of U.S. diplomats permitted to travel to Taiwan and meet with their Taiwan counterparts in
their offices.15
Congress’ next initiative concerned Lee’s request for a visa to visit
Cornell University. In February 1995 Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before Congress that allowing such a visit would be contrary to U.S. policy. In April 1995 he told Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen that a visa for Lee Teng-hui would be “inconsistent with an unofficial relationship” with Taiwan. Within the administration, National
Security Council officials argued against issuing the visa. But after the
Senate voted 97–1 and the House of Representatives voted 360–0 in
support of a visa in May, the president decided to allow Lee to visit the
United States.16
The visa decision followed a succession of similarly important
changes in U.S. Taiwan policy since the end of the Cold War. In 1992
George Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 military planes to Taiwan.
The sale violated the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China communiqué on U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan and suggested increased political U.S. support for
Taiwan.17 Then, in September 1994 the Clinton administration revised
its policy on U.S. government contacts with Taiwan. As a leading Chinese authority observed, Washington’s visa decision was the latest step
in a dangerous post–Cold War trend that could lead to a Taiwan declaration of independence.18 People’s Daily observed that if the trend con—————
15. On the Taiwan Policy Review, see NYT, Sept. 7, 1994.
16. Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 286–87; interview with Robert Suettinger,
director of Asian affairs, National Security Council. On the role of Congress and domestic
politics in U.S. policy toward Taiwan, see Robert G. Sutter, “Domestic Politics and U.S.China-Taiwan Triangle: The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Conflict and Its Aftermath,” in After
the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations, ed. Robert S. Ross (Armonk, N.Y.:
M. E. Sharpe, 1998). The best account of this episode is David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2001), pp. 49–50.
17. For a discussion of the arms sales communiqué, see John. H. Holdridge, Crossing
the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), chaps. 13 and 14; and Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation:
U.S.-China Relations, 1969–1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), chap. 6. See
also James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from
Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999).
18. See the remarks by Wang Jisi in Wen wei po, Aug. 29, 1995, in FBIS-China, Sept. 13,
1995, pp. 6–7. See also the discussion of U.S. policy in 1994 in Wang Li, Bolan qifu: ZhongMei guanxi yanbian de quzhe licheng (Roaring waves: the tortuous process of the evolution
of U.S.-China relations) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998), p. 297–98. On the new
U.S. policy toward Taiwan officials, see also Steven Greenhouse, “U.S., Despite Critics, Is
From Denial to Leadership
135
tinued, “Lee Teng-hui will have less to fear in colluding with ‘Taiwan
independence forces.’”19 Indeed, prior to his departure for Cornell University, Taiwan announced that it was prepared spend U.S.$1 billion to
secure admission to the United Nations.20
The administration was in conflict with China over Taiwan because
it had ceded policy initiative to Congress. It now sought to rectify the
situation by expecting China to accommodate itself to U.S. policy,
rather than try to maintain cooperation by taking active measures to restore Chinese confidence in the U.S. commitment to the one-China policy. It dismissed Beijing’s demands for a formal restatement of U.S. policy and ignored Chinese military actions aimed at encouraging U.S.
responsiveness. Apparent U.S. dismissal of Chinese interests in part led
Beijing to escalate its military diplomacy, culminating in the March 1996
Taiwan Strait confrontation. Only after the confrontation did the administration acknowledge that China had the ability to undermine important U.S. interests in East Asia and that it would have to negotiate
with Beijing on the Taiwan issue.21
In response to initial Chinese protests over the visa decision, the
White House insisted that U.S. policy had not changed, despite its prior
statements that such a visit was contrary to U.S. policy. President Clinton explained to Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu that there had been no
major change in U.S. policy. The State Department held that the decision was “completely consistent with the . . . three communiques that
form the basis” of U.S.-China relations. Assistant Secretary of State
Winston Lord dismissed the significance of the decision when he char—————
to Expand Taiwan Ties,” NYT, Sept. 7, 1994, p. A5.
19. Author interviews with Chinese analysts. Ren Fan, “The U.S. Government Should
Change Its Course Immediately,” People’s Daily, June 13, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 16,
1995, p. 7; Zhongguo tongxunshe, May 29, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 2, 1995, p. 5.
20. Commentary, “Where Does the United States Really Want to Lead Sino-U.S. Relations?” Xinhua, June 17, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 19, 1995, pp. 10–12; Commentary, “A
Self-Vindication of Advocacy for Splitting the Motherland,” Xinhua and People’s Daily,
July 23, 1995, in FBIS-China, July 24, 1995, pp. 91–93. See also, e.g., Ren Fan, “The U.S.
Government Should Change Its Course Immediately,” p. 7. Taiwan’s military exercises
are reported in Lien-Ho Pao (Taipei), May 26, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 5, 1995, p. 89–90;
Agence France-Presse, May 30, 1995, in FBIS-China, May 30, 1995, p. 85. For China’s reaction to the exercises, see Xinhua, June 27, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 27, 1995, p. 90. Taiwan’s effort to enter the United Nations is discussed in Di Xiangqian, “Money Diplomacy
Goes Against the Popular Will in Taiwan,” People’s Daily, July 12, 1995, in FBIS-China, July
18, 1995, pp. 77–78; and in Central News Agency (Taipei), June 28, 1995.
21. For a detailed analysis of 1995–96 U.S.-China diplomacy, see Robert S. Ross, “The
1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Spring 2000).
136
Robert S. Ross
acterized it as a mere “tactical change.” Christopher said that the visit
was “quite compatible” with unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations.22
Beijing retaliated by canceling visits to Washington by Defense Minister Chi Haotian and State Counselor Li Guixian and by cutting short a
visit to the United States by the Chinese air force chief of staff. It also
suspended bilateral discussions over arms proliferation and human
rights.23 More important, from July 21 to July 28 it conducted missile
tests and naval and air exercises in the waters near Taiwan. Three days
before Qian Qichen and Warren Christopher met in Brunei, it launched
six surface-to-surface missiles approximately 100 miles from Taiwan.24
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that “what we are
going to do is make the U.S. realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right track.”25
In Brunei Christopher presented Qian Qichen a confidential letter
from President Clinton to President Jiang Zemin, in which Clinton
stated that U.S. policy opposed Taiwan independence, did not support
Taiwan membership in the United Nations, and did not support a twoChina policy or a policy of one China and one Taiwan. These were basically the same confidential commitments American presidents had been
making to Chinese leaders since Richard Nixon visited China in 1972.26
Christopher did not rule out future visits by Taiwan leaders to the
United States but said that Lee Teng-hui’s visit was a “special” situation
and that future visits would be personal, unofficial, rare, and decided
on a case-by-case basis.27 As for Chinese military activities, he reiterated
—————
22. Author interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger; Department of
State daily press briefing, May 24, 1995; and on-the-record briefing by Assistant Secretary
of State Winston Lord, May 30, 1995. Christopher’s remarks were made on the July 11,
1995, Public Broadcasting System’s News Hour. See the Chinese analysis of U.S. “ambiguity” in He Chong, “Will the Talks Between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the U.S.Secretary of State Improve Sino-U.S. Ties?” Zhongguo tongxunshe, Aug. 1, 1995, in FBISChina, Aug. 1, 1995, p. 6. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
23. On the cancellations, see Department of State daily press briefings, May 24 and
May 26, 1995, and the May 30 press briefing by Assistant Secretary of State Lord; and Xinhua, May 26, 1995, in FBIS-China, May 26, 1995, p. 3. For subsequent Chinese moves, see
Xinhua, June 16, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 19, 1995, p. 1; and Agence France-Presse, June
22, 1995, in FBIS-China, June 22, 1995, p. 1.
24. Xinhua, July 18, 1995, in FBIS-China, July 19, 1995, p. 13; and Agence France-Press,
Aug. 11, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 11, 1995, p. 13.
25. Quoted in South China Morning Post, Aug. 1, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 1, 1995, p. 5.
26. Mann, About Face, p. 330. On the commitments of previous administrations, also
see Ross, Negotiating Cooperation. See also the Chinese account of the meeting in Xinhua,
Aug. 1, 1995, FBIS-China, Aug. 2, 1995, p. 4.
27. Christopher, In the Stream of History, p. 289. See also Christopher’s July 28, 1995,
speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.; Michael Dobbs, “U.S., China Agree
From Denial to Leadership
137
the State Department position that such activities do not contribute to
“peace and stability in the area.”28
Qian said that Christopher’s statements were helpful but that the
“true value of a promise is shown in real action.” Prime Minister Li
Peng explained that although Christopher and Qian held a positive
meeting in Brunei, “it is not enough to make oral statements and what
is important is to translate the statements into actions.”29 Moreover, in
late July, just a few days after China began its July military maneuvers,
Taiwan launched its own missile and naval exercises. In August it announced that it would conduct live artillery tests. Lee was “still stubbornly challenging the ‘one-China’ principle.” Liu Huaqing, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, observed that
because Taiwan’s leaders had purchased foreign weaponry, they could
be “cocky” and resist reunification.30
On August 15 Beijing began a second round of missile tests and naval exercises. These activities were scheduled to last until August 25,
when Under Secretary of State Tarnoff arrived in China. The Chinese–
influenced Hong Kong press reported that the naval exercises simulated a blockade of Taiwan and a response to U.S. military intervention.31 Chinese leaders explained to Tarnoff they would welcome a U.S.China summit, but they also wanted public affirmation of the commitments that Clinton had made in his letter to Jiang Zemin. They suggested that a summit issue a U.S.-China communiqué that would address future visits to the United States by Taiwan’s leaders and embody
the “three nos” in Clinton’s letter—no to Taiwan independence, no to a
two-China policy, and no to Taiwan membership in the United Nations.
Washington parried PRC demands. The State Department downplayed the importance of Chinese exercises. and Tarnoff privately reiterated U.S. assurances regarding Taiwan’s independence and U.N.
membership and reaffirmed that future visits to the United States by
—————
to Talks On Relations,” WP, Aug. 2, 1995, p. A27.
28. Department of State daily press briefings, July 14 and Aug. 11, 1995; author interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger.
29. Xinhua, Aug. 1, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 2, 1995, p. 4; Xinhua, Aug. 17, 1995, in
FBIS-China, Aug. 17, 1995, p. 5.
30. Commentator, “Lee Teng-hui Stubbornly Challenges the ‘One-China’ Principle,”
Xinhua, Aug. 23, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 23, 1995, p. 50. On Taiwan’s maneuvers, see
Agence France-Presse, July 25, 1995, in FBIS-China, July 25, 1995, p. 41; and Voice of Free
China, Aug. 1, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 2, 1995, p. 78. Liu’s comments are in Ta Kung Pao,
Sept. 4, 1995, in FBIS-China, Sept. 7, 1995, p. 32.
31. Agence France-Press, Aug. 26, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 28, 1995, pp. 81–82;
Zhongguo tongxunshe, Aug. 15, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 17, 1995, p. 57; and Ming Pao,
Aug. 16, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 18, 1995, pp. 27–28;
138
Robert S. Ross
Taiwan’s leaders would be rare. The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded that the talks were useful but maintained that “whether SinoU.S. relations can be restored to normal depends on whether the U.S.
side will take actions to honor its commitments.”32 Jiang Zemin told
former President George Bush that “we demand . . . practical and effective measures” to remove the consequences of Lee’s visit and to “avert
the recurrence of big ups and downs” in U.S.-China relations. Li Peng
said that China wanted “concrete actions.”33
The dispute over Taiwan became enmeshed in negotiations over a
possible summit. President Jiang was to be in New York in October
1995 to attend the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of U.N. General
Assembly and could travel to Washington for a summit. China wanted
a summit to focus on the Taiwan issue, but the administration insisted
that the summit address arms proliferation, trade issues, and human
rights.34 The State Department declared that the U.S. position on Taiwan was “abundantly clear” and it “is not going to change.” and that
“the stage is over in the relationship” in which the United States would
try to mollify Beijing’s concerns over the Taiwan issue.35
China faced a de facto U.S. ultimatum: either drop the Taiwan issue
or forgo a summit. On October 2 China accepted the U.S. terms. Qian
told Christopher that China would suspend its assistance to Iran’s
nuclear energy program and that it was ready to work for greater cooperation. After three more rounds of Tarnoff-Li meetings, the two sides
announced that Presidents Jiang and Clinton would meet on October 24
at Lincoln Center in New York. Beijing then announced that its ambassador would return to Washington, D.C. China also agreed to resume
the U.S.-China military dialogue and to hold discussions on trade and
other issues.36
—————
32. Gong Li, Zhong-Mei guanxi redian toushi (Perspective on hotspots in China-U.S. relations), (Harbin: Heilongjiang chubanshe, 1996, p. 159; Department of State daily press
briefings, Aug. 11 and Aug. 28, 1995. Xinhua, Aug. 27, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 28, 1995,
p. 3; and Xinhua, Aug. 29, 1995, in FBIS-China, Aug. 30, 1995, p. 1.
33. Xinhua, Sept. 8, 1995, and Xinhua, Sept. 11, 1995, both in FBIS-China, Sept. 11, 1995,
pp. 13–15.
34. NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and other administration officials.
35. Department of State daily press briefing, Sept. 18 and Sept. 21, 1995.
36. On the Chinese suspension of the nuclear energy agreement and the decision to
move ahead with summit discussions between Tarnoff and Li, see Department of State
daily press briefing, Sept. 29, 1995. Qian’s remarks are in Xinhua, Sept. 27, 1995, in FBISChina, Sept. 28, 1995, pp. 11–12; and Xinhua, Oct. 1, 1995, in FBIS-China, Oct. 2, 1995, p. 11;
The return of the ambassador is reported in Kyodo, Oct. 17, 1995, in FBIS-China, Oct. 17,
1995, p. 1. On military exchanges, see Zhongguo tongxunshe, Oct. 31, 1995, in FBIS-China,
Nov. 1, 1995, p. 1.
From Denial to Leadership
139
The Clinton administration had apparently resisted Chinese pressure
regarding Taiwan and secured an important concession regarding nuclear energy cooperation with Iran. Clinton had merely reaffirmed to
Jiang that visits by Taiwan leaders to the United States would be “unofficial, private, and rare” and would be decided on a case-by-case basis.
He repeated confidential assurances that Washington opposed Taiwan’s independence and U.N. membership.37 Although Beijing had
wanted a “state visit,” replete with a formal banquet and military honors; it agreed to the New York meeting rather than accept a working
visit in Washington. Thus, Washington could use Beijing’s continued
interest in a state visit to extract additional concessions.38 Assistant
Secretary of State Lord reported that China accepted the U.S. position
that “we have to get on with the broad agenda.” China understood that
the administration had “reaffirmed as much as we’re capable of doing”
concerning U.S. Taiwan policy. Director of Asian Affairs for the National Security Council Robert Suettinger believed that the summit enabled the two sides to make “significant progress.”39
But China had decided simply to shelve the Taiwan issue until its
leverage improved. Following the summit, Qian said that Clinton and
Jiang had held a “positive and useful meeting,” but “this does not mean
that the Taiwan issue will not again be the main issue affecting U.S.China relations.” He insisted said that the “differences and contradictions” between Washington and Beijing “need to be addressed and
tackled.”40
In October, following the announcement of the New York summit,
Jiang Zemin observed PLA Air Force and Navy exercises and boarded a
command ship to observe a “high-tech war game” of submarines, destroyers, and missile launchings. The Foreign Ministry stressed that the
maneuvers demonstrated China’s resolve to safeguard sovereignty and
territorial integrity.41 On November 15, at the beginning of the two—————
37. See the Oct. 24, 1995, post-summit briefing in New York at the Warwick Hotel by
State Department and NSC officials; Zhu Chenghu, ed., Zhong-Mei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi (Developing change in China-U.S. relations and its trend) (Nanjing: Jiangsu
renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp. 190–91; and Xinhua, Oct. 25, 1995, in FBIS-China, Oct. 25,
1995, p. 18; interview with and administration official.
38. Author interview with Policy Planning Staff Deputy Director.
39. Oct. 24, 1995, post-summit briefing in New York at the Warwick Hotel by State
Department and NSC officials; briefing by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord at
the Royal Hotel Osaka, Japan, Nov. 16, 1995.
40. Xinhua, Oct. 1, 1995, FBIS-China, Oct. 2, 1995, p. 11; Xinhua, Oct. 26, 1995, in FBISChina, Oct. 27, 1995, pp. 2–3; and Nov. 16, 1995, press availability of Christopher and Qian
at the New Otani Hotel, Tokyo.
41. Xinhua, Oct. 18, 1995, in FBIS-China, Oct. 18, 1995, pp. 25–26; and Zhongguo xin-
140
Robert S. Ross
week campaign period before the Taiwan’s December 2 elections for
members of the legislative assembly, China began another round of
military activities aimed at maintaining the “unity” of China and resisting the “splittist” activities of the Taiwan independence forces. The exercise included a simulation of an amphibious PLA landing on a Taiwan-held island and attacks on a mockup of Taiwan’s largest airport.42
The United States responded with conspicuous silence from the
White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department. In
his November visit to Beijing, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph
Nye merely privately reiterated that China’s exercises were counterproductive. He focused his discussions on developments in the U.S.Japan alliance, which he stressed were not aimed at China, and on renewal of the U.S.-China military dialogue.43 American officials understood that the White House had contributed to U.S.-China conflict by
failing to keep its pledges regarding Taiwan, and they did not want to
overreact to China’s exercises. They also believed that Beijing needed to
vent its anger. And they wanted Taiwan to understand that “actions
have consequences,” that provoking China is not cost-free.44
But China’s exercises aimed to coerce Washington to curtail its activities that encouraged Taiwan independence. Beijing thus concluded
that the next round of PLA activities should be even more provocative.45 Moreover, these exercises would precede the March 23, 1996, direct Taiwan election for president. As the first democratic election of a
Taiwan leader, it would add domestic and international legitimacy for
sovereignty for Taiwan. Furthermore, campaign politics might encourage Lee to use the independence issue to raise support for his candidacy. Simultaneously, Taiwan stressed U.S. support for Taiwan. In late
January it revealed that the Nimitz aircraft carrier had transited the Tai—————
wenshe, Oct. 19, 1995, in FBIS-China, Oct. 20, 1995, p. 2.
42. For a discussion of the exercises, see Tang Zhengshui, Zhong-Mei qiju zhong de Taiwan wenti, 1969.1–1999.12 (The Taiwan issue in the U.S.-China chess game, January 1969–
December 1999) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000), p. 414; Xinhua, Nov. 25,
1995, in FBIS-China, 95–227; Ping Kuo Jih Pao, Nov. 27, 1995, in FBIS-China, Nov. 27, 1995,
pp. 24–25; author interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger. On the Nye
visit, see Zhongguo xinwenshe, Nov. 15, 1995, in FBIS-China, Nov. 16, 1995, p. 4–5.
43. Author interview with former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye; Patrick E. Tyler, “China-U.S. Ties Warm a Bit as China-Taiwan
Relations Chill,” NYT, Nov. 18, 1995, p. A3; and “Perry Voices Concern for Taiwan,” NYT,
Feb. 7, 1996, A3. Cf. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 85–86.
44. Author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye.
45. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
From Denial to Leadership
141
Taiwan Strait in December, expressed appreciation to the U.S. Congress
for seeking expedited delivery of Patriot missiles to Taiwan, and announced antisubmarine exercises. It then announced delivery from the
United States of a missile frigate, which would contribute to Taiwan’s
antisubmarine and air defense, and a substantial increase in its defense
budget to deal with the threat from the mainland.46
Washington did appear to support Taiwan’s independence drive. On
January 6, the Clinton administration approved a visa for Taiwan Vice
President Li Yuan-zu to transit Los Angeles on his way to Guatemala.47
Then on January 31, the White House approved two additional transit
visas for Li to travel round-trip between Taiwan and Haiti. Although
the administration needed more than a week to make the decision, it insisted that the visa was a “routine matter” that should not affect U.S.China relations.48
From late January through February, the PLA massed over 100,000
troops in Fujian province.49 China’s deployments caught Washington’s
attention. Assistant Secretary of State Lord told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration had stressed to Beijing its
“deep concern” over PLA activities. He warned that the administration
was closely watching developments and that if hostilities occurred, the
“impact . . . would be extremely serious.” The State Department announced that senior national security advisors had held a series of
meetings to assess Beijing’s activities and that these meetings would
continue.50 Nonetheless, on March 4, Beijing announced that the PLA
would conduct surface-to-surface missile tests just off the coast of Taiwan’s two largest port cities. Chinese leaders had concluded that if the
target zones were not close to Taiwan, the tests would be ineffective in
opposing Taiwan “splittism” and U.S. policy toward Taiwan.51 On
—————
46. See the extensive discussion of this period in Taiwan’s U.S. policy, in particular
Taiwan’s manipulation of the passage of the Nimitz, in Tang Zhengshui, Zhong-Mei qiju
zhong de Taiwan wenti, pp. 417–21.
47. ”U.S. Visa to Taiwan Aide,” NYT, Jan. 7, 1996, p. A9; and Department of State daily
press briefing, Jan. 5, 1996; and Xinhua, Jan. 9, 1996, in FBIS-China, Jan. 11, 1996, p. 2.
48. Department of State daily press briefing, Jan. 23, 1996, and Jan. 31; and China Radio International, Feb. 2, 1996, in FBIS-China, Feb. 2, 1996, p. 1.
49. Associated Press, Feb. 6, 1996; Department of State daily press briefing, Feb. 14,
1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, “China Plans Maneuvers off Taiwan,” WP, Feb. 5, 1996, p. A1; and
Steven Mufson, “China Masses Troops on Coast near Taiwan,” WP, Feb. 14, 1996, p. A16.
50. Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord before the Subcommittee
on East Asia and the Pacific, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 7, 1996; and Department of State daily press briefings, Feb. 13 and Feb. 14, 1996.
51. Xinhua, Mar. 4, 1995, in FBIS-China, Mar. 5, 1996, p. 68; Central News Agency,
Mar. 7, 1995, FBIS-China, Mar. 7, 1996, p. 81. Author interviews with Chinese policy ana-
142
Robert S. Ross
March 7, despite vigorous and repeated discussions between U.S. and
Chinese diplomats, the PLA fired three M-9 missiles into the target
zones.52
Although the Clinton administration understood that the PLA was
not preparing to attack Taiwan, it feared that if the United States did
not forcefully respond, China would doubt Washington’s commitment
to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan conflict. The Defense Department
explained that Washington needed to communicate its determination
that China resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully. It could not
allow Chinese leaders to conclude that “the U.S. had lost interest in that
area of the world.” As Perry later recalled, the United States had to
demonstrate its “military resolve” regarding its Taiwan policy.53 Moreover, the United States’ reputation as a dependable ally of East Asian
countries was at stake. Christopher explained that “because Asian and
Pacific nations looked to the United States to preserve stability in the
region, we had to take action to calm the situation.”54
On March 7, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu visited Washington
to hold prearranged discussions with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Earlier that day, China had tested its M-9 missiles. Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry joined Lake for
his evening meal with Liu. Perry charged that Chinese missile tests
“bracketing Taiwan,” were “reckless” and “aggressive” and could be
seen as a threat to American interests. He warned that the United States
“had more than enough military capability to protect its vital national
security interests in the region and is prepared to demonstrate that.”
Lake insisted that the exercises threatened vital U.S. security interests in
—————
lysts.
52. Agence France-Press, Mar. 8, 1996, FBIS-China, Mar. 8, 1996, p. 37; Department of
State daily press briefing, Mar. 7 and Mar. 8, 1996; and White House press briefing, Mar.
7, 1996. Note that throughout the period, Chinese missile tests did not interfere with shipping in or out of Taiwan. See Central News Agency, Mar. 8, 1996, in FBIS-China, 96–47;
and Central News Agency, Mar. 13, 1996, in FBIS-China, 96–50.
53. Department of Defense news briefing, Mar. 14, 1996; Ashton B. Carter and William
J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 92–93. On the administration’s low assessment of the risk of war, see Secretary of Defense William Perry’s comments at the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., Feb. 28, 1996; Department of State daily press briefing, Mar. 5, 1996; and Department of Defense news briefing, Mar. 14, 1996. See also Christopher, In the Stream of History,
p. 427; Patrick E. Tyler, “China Signaling U.S. That It Will Not Invade Taiwan,” NYT,
Mar. 13, 1996, p. A3; and author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
54. Christopher, In the Stream of History, p. 427. See also Department of Defense news
briefing, Mar. 14, 1996.
From Denial to Leadership
143
the western Pacific.55 But on March 9 China announced that it would
conduct air and naval exercises with live ammunition in the waters
near Taiwan.56
Secretary of Defense Perry proposed that a carrier battle group transit the Taiwan Strait. But after consultations with NSC advisers, who
advocated a less provocative display of force, and with General John
Shalikashvili, who preferred to keep the carrier further from China’s
coastal weaponry, Perry agreed to a more cautious plan.57 The United
States deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan to observe China’s behavior. The Independence moved to the waters
east of Taiwan and the Nimitz moved to the Philippine Sea, which
would allow it to join the Independence on short notice.58 China then
launched its second set of March exercises and launched its fourth M-9
missile test. Then it announced that from March 18 to March 25 the PLA
would conduct joint air, ground, and naval exercises near Pingtan island, within ten nautical miles from Taiwan-controlled islands.59
—————
55. See Perry’s comments at the Department of Defense news briefing, Dec. 8, 1996;
and Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, p. 96.
56. Xinhua, Mar. 9, 1996, in FBIS-China, Mar. 9, 1996, p. 54.
57. Author interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger. See also Mann,
About Face, pp. 336–37. Cf. Carter and Perry, Preventative Defense, pp. 96–99; and Patrick
Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), p. 33.
58. American Forces Press Service, Mar. 11, 1996. Also see Department of Defense
news briefings, Mar. 12, Mar. 14, and Mar. 16, 1996; Department of State daily press briefing, Mar. 11, 1996; author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and
other administration officials. Note that although the Nimitz was ordered to proceed to
waters near Taiwan, it was also ordered to sail at a deliberate pace, and it never reached
the vicinity Taiwan but was close to the Philippines. Author interview with U.S. official.
Note also that Chinese leaders were aware of the deliberate pace of the Nimitz. Author interview with Chinese policy analysts.
59. White House press briefing, Mar. 12, 1996; and interview with NSC Director of
Asian Affairs Suettinger. Note that despite lack of tension, the NSC worked with the Defense Department to prepare a number of scenarios in which U.S. forces would engage
the PLA. Regarding the bravado, Secretary of Perry used China’s ongoing exercises to
remind Beijing that the United States had the “best damn navy in the world.” See Rupert
Cornwell, “Taiwan Fans Flames in the War of Words,” Independent (London), Mar. 20,
1996, p. 9; Department of State press briefing, Mar. 19, 1996. See also Mann, About Face,
pp. 337–38. China demonstrated its own bravado after the dispatch of the carriers. See the
interviews with PLA generals in Ta Kung Pao, Mar. 13, 1996, in FBIS-China, 96–50. Also
note that on Mar. 22 the Defense Department and China reported that each had taken the
initiative to delay a visit to the United States by Minister of Defense Chi Haotian. Department of Defense news release, ref. no. 149–96; and Xinhua, Mar. 22, 1996, in FBISChina, Mar. 25, 1996, p. 3. See also Carter and Perry, Preventative Defense, p. 99.
144
Robert S. Ross
American military diplomacy had rescued its credibility to resist
PRC use of force against Taiwan and its reputation in East Asia.60 But
there was widespread recognition within the administration that the
U.S.-China confrontation had risked conflict and that the relationship
was “broke” and that it had to be “fixed.” Inattention to China policy
had led to serious conflict, and the relationship had to be placed on
more cooperative footing. In May 1996 Secretary of State Christopher
presented the administration’s first major speech placing the U.S.-China
relationship and the Taiwan issue within a larger, comprehensive strategic perspective. Then Washington reversed its position on a U.S.China summit. In July in Beijing, NSC advisor Lake suggested that the
two countries exchange summits. In November Clinton met Jiang in
Manila and agreed to exchange state visits in 1997 and 1998.61
In contrast to the 1995 summit negotiations, in 1997 not only did the
administration agree to discuss Taiwan, but it also made a concession.
During the October summit, Clinton assured Jiang that the United
States did not support a two-China policy, Taiwan independence, and
Taiwan membership in the United Nations or in other international organizations requiring sovereignty for membership. For the first time,
administration officials publicly reported the president’s assurances.62
—————
60. On China’s reaction, see Shi Yinhong, “Kunnan yu xuance: dui Taiwan wenti de
sikao” (Difficulty and choice: thoughts on the Taiwan issue), Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy
and management), no. 5, 1999, p. 4; Shi Yinhong, “Meiguo dui Hua zhengce he Taiwan
wenti de weilai” (U.S. policy toward China and the future of the Taiwan issue), Zhanlüe
yu guanli, no. 6, 2000; author interviews with Chinese policy analysts. Countries throughout the region adopted a cautious attitude toward the U.S. response, lest they alienate
China on a sensitive issue in Chinese foreign policy. Their reaction reflected the common
concern of allies of entrapment versus abandonment, and they chose to split the difference. They were concerned that although an enhanced U.S. commitment to the defense of
Taiwan might enhance their security vis-à-vis China, it might also drag them into a conflict over Taiwan. See the discussion of entrapment and abandonment in Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics 36, no. 4 ( July 1984): 461–
95. Beneath the caution, there was evidence of general support for the U.S. response. See,
e.g., the transcript of the Mar. 12, 1996, Japanese Foreign Ministry press conference in
FBIS-East Asia, Mar. 13, 1996, pp. 7–12; Nigel Holloway, “Strait Talking,” FEER, Mar. 21,
1996, p. 16; “Asians Laud Us Privately,” FEER, Apr. 4, 1996, p. 17; and Strategic Survey,
1995/96 (London: Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 178–79.
61. Author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and other administration officials. See Christopher’s speech, “American Interests and the U.S.-China
Relationship” presented to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, May 17, 1996. Zhongguo tongxunshe, July
8, 1996, in FBIS-China, 96–133; and Central People’s Radio, June 8, 1996, in FBIS-China,
July 9, 1996, pp. 6. On the Clinton-Jiang meeting in Manila, see Xinhua, Nov. 24, 1996, in
FBIS-China, 96–228.
62. Background press briefing by senior administration officials, the White House,
From Denial to Leadership
145
Taiwan remained on the agenda of Clinton’s June 1998 visit to Beijing.
China wanted Clinton to make public U.S. policy toward Taiwan independence. In return for Chinese concessions, including providing the
president with an opportunity to deliver on Chinese television an unedited speech and agreeing to a nuclear nontargeting pact, the president
met China’s request. For the first time a U.S. president publicly stated
that the U.S. did not support Taiwan independence.63 Prior to March
1996 Washington had refused to even consider restraining its Taiwan
policy, regardless of Chinese quid pro quos.
The new U.S. posture toward China was evident when Lee Teng-hui
announced in July 1999 his “special state-to-state” approach to negotiations with the mainland, bringing Taiwan perilously close to the declaration of independence that Beijing had long maintained was a cause of
war. The State Department held Lee responsible for the resulting suspension of the mainland-Taiwan dialogue and expected Taiwan to
make the necessary clarifications to allow the dialogue to resume. Clinton called Jiang Zemin to reassure him that the United States held to its
one-China policy. The president also announced postponement of an
arms sales mission to Taiwan. When Clinton met Jiang in New Zealand
in September, he reasserted U.S. support for a one-China policy and
explained that Lee Teng-hui’s statement “had made things more difficult for both China and the United States.”64 The United States had effectively aligned itself with China against Lee’s statement and warned
Taiwan that if it made moves toward independence it could not count
on U.S. support.
Recognition of China’s strategic importance was also reflected in the
administration’s changing policy toward Chinese proliferation activities. In the past Washington had excluded China from international in—————
Oct. 29, 1997; Department of State daily press briefing, Oct. 31, 1997; and interview
with an administration official. Note that the president’s Aug. 1995 letter to Jiang Zemin stated that Washington “opposed” independence for Taiwan. By the 1997 summit
the administration had shifted to “does not support” independence for Taiwan. See
Mann, About Face, pp. 330, 355–58. The president’s commitment had now become established policy. See Albright’s press conference at the Beijing International Club Hotel,
Apr. 30, 1998.
63. See the president’s June 30, 1998, remarks at the Shanghai Library, the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary (Shanghai, People’s Republic of China); and interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger.
64. Department of State daily press briefing, July 13 and July 14, 1999; testimony of
Deputy Secretary of State Susan Shirk before the House International Relations Committee, Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, Sept. 15, 1999; Philip Shenon, “U.S. Cancels Military
Aides’ Visit to Taiwan,” NYT, July 22, 1999, p. A8; and David E. Sanger, “Clinton and
Jiang Heal Rift and Set New Trade Course,” NYT, Sept. 12, 1999, p. A1.
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Robert S. Ross
stitutions governing weapons proliferation, yet it demanded that China
abide by these institutions’ export restrictions. But beginning in 1998
the administration shifted course. It now sought Chinese membership
in these institutions, in recognition that both U.S. interests and global
stability required acceptance of Chinese participation in the institutions
that establish the global rules.
The administration first adjusted policy regarding nuclear proliferation. Prior to the October 1997 U.S.-China summit in Washington, the
Clinton administration encouraged Beijing to join the Zangger Committee, which is the implementation arm of the export control provisions of
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Beijing soon agreed. Following this summit, Washington proposed that Beijing join the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), which entails more restrictive “full scope safeguards” on
exports of fissionable materials and related technologies associated with
the nuclear nonproliferation.65
The administration then reversed policy regarding missile proliferation. In 1993 the Clinton administration had imposed sanctions on
China for transferring M-11 missiles to Pakistan, despite Chinese exclusion from the MTCR. But at the 1998 U.S.-China summit in Beijing,
Clinton suggested to Chinese leaders that China join the MTCR, in recognition that Chinese cooperation with U.S. interests require more than
simply unilateral demands.66 When the issue of Chinese missiles transfers to Pakistan re-emerged in1999, the administration once again considered imposing sanctions in accordance with U.S. legislation. Nonetheless, although, as in 1993, China denied that it had transferred any
proscribed weapons, the president waived the sanctions requirement,
content to reached agreement with Beijing covering future Chinese activities. The administration did, however, impose targeted sanctions on
Pakistan entities for their cooperation with China.67
The Clinton administration had come a long way since its May 1995
decision to allow Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University. But the
—————
65. On the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on U.S. decisions with China on PRC membership in these institutions, see the transcript of the Oct.
29, 1997, White House background briefing on nuclear cooperation with China. Also see
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s fact sheet on multilateral nuclear export control regimes.
66. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Beijing, “Press Availability by
President Clinton and President Jiang, June 27, 1998. For a discussion of Chinese membership in MTCR, see Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, pp. 173–76.
67. See the July 8, 1999, press conference by Senior Advisor for Arms Control and Security John D. Holum, U.S. Embassy, Beijing; U.S. Department of State press briefing,
Aug. 9, 2000; U.S. Department of State press briefing, Nov. 21, 2000. Also see Nayan
Chanda, “Final Deadline,” FEER, May 18, 2000.
From Denial to Leadership
147
United States paid a price for the president’s inattention to Chinese
power, policy drift, yielding of policy initiative to Congress, and ultimately failed policy and policy reversal. Not only had the United States
been compelled to engage in a politically costly display of force with
China, which continues to affect U.S.-China relations, but it made concessions on Taiwan that may well have been unnecessary had it better
managed policymaking vis-à-vis Congress, better defended the status
quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations, or better managed its diplomacy with Beijing following Lee’s visit to Cornell University. Moreover, the president
had not even avoided domestic political costs. His statement in Shanghai of the “three-nos” created domestic controversy and undermined
support for his meetings in China.
Learning to Take the
Initiative: China and the WTO
In this third phase of administration policy, the Clinton administration
continued to cooperate with China on Taiwan and on proliferation, but
it remained reluctant to use its authority to promote greater economic
cooperation with China. Only after a third major policy setback did the
White House finally step forward to adopt a leadership role in domestic
politics and take the initiative to promote U.S.-China relations by securing legislation to end the application of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik
Amendment to trade with China, thus ending the annual congressional
review of China’s human rights violations as a precondition to continued MFN status for China and facilitating a U.S.-Chinese agreement regarding Chinese membership in the WTO.
The United States since 1988 had been negotiating with China over
Chinese membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and then in the WTO. A tentative agreement had been reached
in spring 1989, but in the aftermath of Beijing’s June 1989 repression of
the Chinese student movement the Bush administration deferred finalizing the agreement. Negotiating Chinese admission to the GATT/
WTO thus became the responsibility of the Clinton administration.
As China’s international importance grew with continued economic
development, negotiating China’s entry into the international trade order became more difficult. Whereas in the late 1980s China’s level of
development enabled the United States to encourage Chinese admission on fairly generous terms, by the mid-1990s, as a large economy,
China had to be treated as a major trading power, regardless of its level
of economic development. Without adequate reciprocity, China would
be able to significantly penetrate the economies of the advanced indus-
148
Robert S. Ross
trial economies, affecting their level of unemployment, without offering
access to its own market. Not only would this be unfair, but nonreciprocity would undermine support for free trade with China in the domestic politics of the advanced industrial economies, creating pressure
for protectionism. Thus, Chinese entry to the international economic
order required significant Chinese concessions, regardless of China’s
level of development or the risk to China’s inefficient and/or nascent
domestic industries. The United States insisted that China would not
receive the same treatment received by other developing nations seeking admission to the GATT/WTO. American interests, rather than principle, would guide the negotiations.
But Chinese interests in the negotiations were as important or even
more important than U.S. interests. Rapid Chinese compliance with
GATT/WTO rules on trade and foreign investment might not only displace Chinese industries and financial institutions, thus undermining
China’s development prospects, but might also lead to widespread unemployment and political instability. China’s economy was at the stage
of development in which other economies, including South Korea and
Taiwan, had used protectionist policies to shield their nascent industries and weak political systems. Ultimately, Chinese admission to the
GATT/WTO required greater Chinese risk than American risk, for
China had to make the adjustment to enter the existing international
trade order.
When the Clinton administration reopened negotiations with China
regarding PRC entry into the GATT in 1993, China insisted that it receive developing-country status and thus be exempt from the GATT’s
strict free-trade requirements.68 In 1994 the GATT membership completed negotiations on the formation of the WTO. Those countries that
were members of the GATT at the end of 1994 would be considered
founding members of the WTO. As the end of the year approached,
China sought immediate admission into the GATT with developing
status and high-level protectionism, refusing to make any concessions
to U.S. interests in gaining access to the Chinese market. Nor was the
United States ready to negotiate seriously. In 1993 and 1994, the Clinton
administration remained focused on China’s violations of human
rights; on its violation of rules governing textiles imports to the United
States, exports of goods made by prison labor, and intellectual property
—————
68. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative W. Douglas Newkirk opened negotiations in
Beijing in Mar. 1993. Xinhua, Mar. 1, 1993, in FBIS-China, Mar. 1, 1993, p. 8. U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor met with Chinese negotiators in Beijing in late July. See
Xinhua, July 29, 1993, FBIS-China, July 30, 1993, p. 1.
From Denial to Leadership
149
rights; and on the negotiations for greater U.S. access to the Chinese
market.69 When China did not enter the GATT by the end of 1994, the
negotiations broke off, and there was little enthusiasm on either side for
an early resumption.
Negotiations for a U.S.-China WTO accession agreement lurched
along with little progress until early 1999. By that time progress in U.S.China relations following the 1998 Beijing summit and sustained Chinese economic growth had persuaded Chinese leaders to consider making significant concessions to enter the WTO. And President Clinton
seemed intent on taking the lead on the issue. In November 1998 he
wrote to Jiang Zemin suggesting that the WTO negotiations could be
concluded by early 1999. He then wrote Jiang in February 1999 to suggest that an agreement be concluded during Prime Minister’s Zhu
Rongji’s April visit to Washington. China seemed ready to deal. In advance of Zhu’s visit to Washington, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo met and authorized Zhu to reach agreement with Clinton on the
basis of a generous Chinese negotiating position.70
By the time Zhu Rongji arrived in Washington, China’s extensive
concessions had drawn praise from U.S. officials. After the negotiations
in Washington, the president’s senior trade, security, and China advisors agreed that China had offered the United States a very favorable
agreement and that Washington should accept. And the president
seemed to agree. In a major speech setting the stage for Zhu’s visit and
the announcement of an agreement, Clinton said that it would be an
“inexplicable mistake for the United States to say no” if China were
willing to abide by global trade rules. American business leaders and
lobbyists were told to prepare for the announcement of the agreement.71 But at the last minute, Clinton backed away from the
agreement, deterred by his fear of the political costs associated with a
trade agreement with China and the political battle necessary to win
congressional agreement on permanent MFN status for China. In his
meeting with Zhu on April 7, Clinton explained that he feared that
—————
69. On the various trade issues, see Xinhua, Sept. 4, 1993, in FBIS-China, Sept. 7, 1993,
p. 15; China Daily, Oct. 31, 1993, FBIS-China, Nov. 1, 1993, pp. 7–8; Xinhua, Dec. 2, 1993, in
FBIS-China, Dec. 2, 1993, p. 1.
70. See Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agreement, NBR
Report (Nov. 1999). For a discussion of U.S. and Chinese economic and political circumstances on the eve of Zhu’s visit, see Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s WTO Membership, Policy
Brief, no. 47 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Apr. 1999).
71. William Clinton, “U.S. Will ‘Seek Truth from Facts’ on China,” Mayflower Hotel,
Washington, D.C., office of the press secretary, The White House, Apr. 7, 1999. See also
WP, Mar. 5 and Nov. 10, 1999; Wall Street Journal, Mar. 25 and Apr. 9, 1999. The list of
Chinese concessions was published by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. See the
Apr. 8, 1999, “Backgrounder.”
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Robert S. Ross
with Zhu on April 7, Clinton explained that he feared that domestic
opposition to the agreement would be insurmountable and that he preferred to defer announcement of an agreement. Zhu was dismayed with
Clinton’s last-minute reversal, but he had little choice but to agree.72
As had been the case since 1993, the president did not adequately
appreciate China’s global economic and political importance and the
corresponding necessity to use presidential leadership in support of
China policy. But this time, the president encountered significant domestic costs for allegedly lacking the political courage to lead on China
policy. He encountered widespread bipartisan political criticism as well
as criticism from business leaders for being unable to accept yes for an
answer. Republican Senator Frank Murkowski suggested that “a good
economic deal may indeed have been sacrificed on the altar of political—either ineptitude, incompetence or expediency.” Democratic Senator Max Baucus argued that the United States “cannot let perfection be
the enemy of the good.”73
The administration had misjudged the domestic dynamics of the
summit and U.S.-China trade, and now for political reasons Clinton
quickly moved to suggest that negotiations were on track and that he
was committed to reaching a U.S.-China WTO agreement as soon as
possible. On April 13, he telephoned Premier Zhu, who had left Washington for New York, to try to salvage both the agreement and his political standing. The two leaders then issued their third joint statement,
agreeing that for the two sides should “move intensively on negotiations toward resolution of the remaining issues in their talks” and that
the “negotiations continue by the end of the month in Beijing.”74
But before the negotiations could fully resume, U.S.-China relations
became embroiled in a series of disputes, including the April U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia without U.N. agreement, the May 7 U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the U.S. domestic controversy
over alleged Chinese spying and illegal contributions to President Clinton’s presidential campaign, and Lee Teng-hui’s announcement of Taiwan’s “special state-to-state” policy toward the mainland (discussed
above). Clinton was not prepared to resume negotiations as long as the
administration faced charges that it had taken Chinese campaign con—————
72. WP, Nov. 10, 1999; Wall Street Journal, Apr. 9, 1999; Fewsmith, China and the WTO.
See also the joint press conference the next day. Joint Press Conference of the President
and Premier Zhu Rongji of the People’s Republic of China, The White House, Apr. 8,
1999.
73. WP, Apr. 14, 1999; NYT, Apr. 15, 1999.
74. Joint U.S.-China Statement, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Apr.
13, 1999. NYT, Apr. 15, 1999.
From Denial to Leadership
151
tributions and had failed to adequately investigate charges of Chinese
spying. President Jiang was unwilling to negotiate with the United
States until he could subdue China’s domestic reaction to the embassy
bombing with an adequate U.S. explanation for the bombing and with a
U.S. commitment to provide compensation to the families of the Chinese who died in the bombing.
After the debacle of Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington, the onus was
on the president to persuade Jiang and Zhu that he was prepared to defend a trade agreement. He started this process on August 27 when he
wrote to Jiang to seek a resumption of the negotiations. He reinforced
his message in early September in New Zealand when he met with
Jiang and urged him to resume the negotiations and expressed confidence that the two sides could resolve the remaining issues. After a
number of rounds of exploratory negotiations in Beijing in August and
September, on October 16 Clinton telephoned Jiang to reinforce his interest in reaching an agreement.75
But not until November did serious negotiations to resolve the impasse begin. On November 6, Clinton again telephoned Jiang, underscoring his interest in serious negotiations and his willingness to close a
deal. The administration also indicated that it hoped to be able to announce an agreement before Clinton and Jiang met at the November 30
WTO meeting in Seattle.76 On November 15, after prolonged and extended negotiations in Beijing and repeated interventions by Zhu
Rongji, the two sides reached a final agreement on China’s accession to
the WTO. China agreed to significant liberalization of its foreign economic policies, including additional concessions since Zhu’s April visit
to Washington. In particular, Beijing had made additional compromises
regarding liberalization of its financial and agricultural sectors and allowing U.S. safeguards against import surges.77
The only quid-pro-quo the United States could offer in exchange for
Chinese concessions was permanent MFN status. For the first time in
his presidency, Clinton decided to draw on the support of U.S. business
community to challenged directly the domestic opposition to U.S.—————
75. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling, and Press Secretary Joe Lockhart, Auckland, New Zealand, Sept. 11,
1999; NYT, Nov. 2, 1999.
76. NYT, Oct. 26, 1999; NYT, Nov. 2, 1999; WP, Nov. 3, 1999; WP, Nov. 13, 1999; WP,
Nov. 16, 1999.
77. On the conclusion of the agreement and a discussion of its main points, see “USTR
Barshefsky’s Press Remarks Following Negotiations with China on the WTO,” American
Embassy, Beijing, China, Nov. 15, 1999. See also the discussion of the agreement in China
Business Review, Jan.–Feb. 2000.
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Robert S. Ross
China cooperation, including organized labor, to win support for his
China policy.78 The first round of politics occurred in the spring in
preparation for the vote on permanent MFN status for China in the
House of Representatives. The president personally called members of
Congress to seek their votes and met with them in the Oval Office. He
met with state governors in the Oval Office, arguing that the WTO
agreement would be good for their local economies. He gave press conferences, wrote articles, and gave television interviews. He and his senior trade and security advisors traveled the country giving speeches explaining the importance of Chinese membership in the WTO and of
granting China permanent MFN status. He sought the public support of
former presidents and secretaries of state from both parties. And the
administration cooperated with business groups to coordinate lobbying
of potential congressional supporters, thus overcoming the influence of
single-issue pressure groups and labor unions. In the end, the president
won easily. On May 24, the House of Representatives voted 237 to 197
in support of permanent MFN status for China.79 The costs to the president were minimal. Indeed, he benefited from having achieved a significant political victory over his opponents. President Jiang telephoned
president Clinton to thank him for his “leadership” on the House
vote.80
The president repeated his political efforts in June in preparation for
the Senate vote. The administration closely worked with a bipartisan
group of senators, including Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott, to ensure that the Senate passed legislation identical to the legislation passed by the House of Representatives, thus avoiding a HouseSenate conference, revised legislation, and a second vote in both the
House and the Senate. On September 19, the House version of the legislation granting China permanent MFN status passed in the Senate by
an overwhelming 83–15 vote, confirming President Clinton’s leadership
capabilities in defending his China policy.81
In his last eighteen months in office, President Clinton had moved
from advocating an agreement calling for Chinese membership in the
WTO, to resisting such an agreement, and then back to advocating it
and fighting for it. This evolution reflected China’s ability to impose
costs on U.S. economic interests and on the president’s domestic stand—————
78. See the discussion of labor opposition in NYT, May 14, 2000.
79. NYT, Mar. 10, 2000; WP, Apr. 4, 2000; NYT, Apr. 4, 2000; WP, May 3, 2000; NYT,
May 10, 2000;, WP, May 24, 2000; WP, May 25, 2000.
80. WP, May 29, 2000.
81. NYT, June 21, 2000; NYT, July 12, 2000; WP, Sept. 20, 2000.
From Denial to Leadership
153
ing, which compelled the president to ultimately ultimate recognize the
importance of accommodating legitimate Chinese interests in order to
achieve U.S. interests. When President Clinton ultimately decided to
lead on this issue, he achieved not only a domestic political victory but
also a victory for U.S. interests in U.S.-China relations and in a stable international economic order.
Conclusion
The Clinton administration’s experience in dealing with China was not
unique. Each time since U.S.-China rapprochement in 1972 that the control of the White House switched political parties, the new administration believed that it could adopt a stronger China policy that downgraded China’s strategic importance and, thus, placed less emphasis on
U.S. accommodation of Chinese interests. This was the experience of
the Carter and Reagan administrations.
Within the first few months of his administration, President Jimmy
Carter told National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that his administration should be careful not to “ass-kiss” Chinese leaders “the
way Nixon and Kissinger did” and that domestic political considerations should play a large role in his policy toward China. The result was
an initial U.S. retreat from the concessions that the Nixon and Ford administrations had offered Beijing regarding U.S.-Taiwan relations in order to reach agreement on normalization of relations. But within eighteen months, after Deng Xiaoping categorically rejected the new
administration’s less accommodating terms and the normalization negotiations stalemated, the Carter administration returned to the normalization policy of its predecessors.82
During his 1980 presidential campaign, Republican candidate
Ronald Reagan insisted that he “would not pretend, as Carter does,”
that the relationship “we now have with Taiwan is unofficial.” After entering the White House, Reagan also insisted that his administration
would sell Taiwan whatever arms it needed for its defense, in accordance with the terms of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, including advanced military aircraft. But before long the Reagan administration had
adopted the Carter administration’s policy regarding the diplomatic
status of Taiwan, denying Taiwan government representatives in the
United States many of the privileges enjoyed by official foreign diplomats. Moreover, after nearly eighteen months of sometimes very diffi—————
82. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), p. 200.
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Robert S. Ross
cult negotiations, the Reagan administration also negotiated with China
restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.83
As with President Clinton, who had promised in the 1992 campaign
that unlike Bush he would use trade as leverage to change China’s human rights policies, Presidents Carter and Reagan were compelled to
carry out a significant policy reversal as they came to terms with the reality of Chinese power and the necessity for negotiation and mutual
compromise. But what distinguished the Clinton administration from
its predecessors is not that its initial China policy failed and that it was
compelled to reverse course and adopt a more cooperative posture, but
that it took so long and that it entailed a costly confrontation in the
Taiwan Strait. Whereas it took the Carter and Reagan administrations
approximately eighteen months to return to the center, not until March
1996, after more than three years into his presidency, did President
Clinton reconcile himself to negotiating cooperation with China over
the Taiwan issue. And not until after April 1999 did he grasp the importance of exercising presidential leadership to ensure the success of his
China policy. And whereas prior administrations managed to negotiate
their differences with China over Taiwan and return to the center without excessive instability, the Clinton administration encountered a confrontation with the Chinese military in the Taiwan Strait before it finally
adopted its predecessor’s Taiwan policy.
The Clinton administration’s especially difficult and protracted policy adjustment reflects America’s unique post–Cold War strategic environment. America’s overwhelming strategic superiority enables Washington to act on impulse, to make mistakes, and to allow domestic
political concerns to dominate policymaking. Because the United States
is so dominant, the imperative to collaborate is reduced, and the temptation to act unilaterally, including allowing domestic politics to determine foreign policy, can prove irresistible. Yet the experience of the
Clinton administration reveals that overwhelming U.S. global superiority can produce overconfidence that the United States can simply expect
cooperation from other countries. The history of the Clinton administration’s China policy reveals that China possesses the ability to impose costs on the United States, requiring the United States to take into
account Chinese interests.
In 2001 a new political party took control of the White House. Expressing dissatisfaction with the repeated policy changes of the Clinton
administration, the Bush administration seemed intent on establishing a
consistent China policy based on Chinese respect for U.S. power. Some
—————
83. NYT, Aug. 26, 1980.
From Denial to Leadership
155
officials in the new administration seemed to prefer engaging in a test
of wills rather than managing conflicts of interests. Yet, thirty years after U.S.-China rapprochement and frequent aborted attempts by new
administrations to correct the “mistakes” of their predecessors, it
should be clear that the ultimate policy of the Clinton administration
reflected U.S. national interest in negotiating cooperation with Chinese
power. Thus, President George W. Bush had to relearn the lessons of
his predecessors. Once again, a new administration endured a protracted period of U.S.-China conflict before its China policy returned to
the center.
Narrowing Differences but
Diverging Priorities: Sino-American
Relations, 1992–2000
Jia Qingguo
In examining the development of the Sino-American relationship
since the early 1990s, one is confronted with a jarring irony: after
twenty years of opening and reform, China has become more American than at any time in history; yet Americans’ view of China has become more critical.
Americans who visited China twenty years ago find China a very
different place today. City streets are now dotted with McDonalds,
Pizza Huts, and Kentucky Fried Chickens. Shops sell Colgate toothpaste, Estée Lauder perfumes, Nike shoes, and Microsoft Window
software. Cinemas are showing Titanic, Hannibal, Pearl Harbor, and
other Hollywood hits. Chinese youth are fascinated with American
stars like Michael Jackson, Madonna, and Michael Jordan. Colorful
advertisements are omnipresent, courting the best and the worst desires of Chinese consumers. Cab drivers are unrestrained in venting
their frustrations with various social evils and with the police. Mil—————
Jia Qingguo is Professor Dean of International Relations at Peking University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
157
lions of Chinese peasants regularly participate in competitive elections to choose their village heads. On top of all this, the Chinese
government openly advocates human rights as universally applicable values and has engaged in dialogue with foreign governments
and NGOs on the topic, although it insists on equality and mutual
respect as a basis for the dialogue.
As if none of these changes matters, many Americans have found
more reasons to criticize China.1 Some say China is “against” free
trade because it maintains “high” trade barriers and “low” business
access for foreign companies. China “sells” dangerous weapons and
technologies to the “rogue” states. China “conducts espionage”
against the United States. China tries to influence American politics
by “making illicit campaign contributions.” The Chinese human
rights situation is “deteriorating.” China takes an “irresponsible”
approach to international problems such as the Kosovo crisis. To
some, China is more dangerous than the former Soviet Union because, unlike the former Soviet Union, China has a viable economy
to sustain its military capabilities. In the eyes of some extreme antiChina American rightists, China and the United States are heading
toward a conflict and Americans should prepare for it.2 Accommodation, they warn, is tantamount to despicable appeasement. Therefore,
it is necessary to oppose China’s ambitions. Many of the contested
China’s bid to hold the Olympics. If the world allows China to host
the Olympics, these people warned, it would legitimize all the
wrongs associated with the Chinese government, and, sooner or
later, Americans would find that freedom and democracy had been
seriously damaged.3
How can one explain this phenomenon? What has gone wrong in
this relationship? A close analysis of the development of SinoAmerican relations since the end of the Cold War suggests an answer: China and the United States may have fewer and fewer differences as a result of the drastic changes in China, but their priorities
are diverging more and more. In its search for modernization, China
must undergo three fundamental transitions: modernization, a systemic transition from a central planned economy to a market one,
—————
1. Program on International Policy Attitudes, “General Attitudes Toward China,”
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/china/china1.cfm.
2. Lichade Boensitan and Luosi Mangluo, Jijiang daolai de Zhong-Mei chongtu, trans.
of Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (Beijing: Xinhua
Publishing House, 1997).
3. The U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution opposing China’s bid to
hold the Olympics in 2008.
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Jia Qingguo
and a leadership transition from a generation of charismatic leaders
to one of techno-bureaucrats. Despite much progress in China, these
transitions have generated increasing social tension and placed increasing pressures on the country’s relatively weak political institutions. Confronted with these challenges, the Chinese government has
concluded that political stability is the precondition for China’s continued development. Accordingly, it has made political stability its
top priority and will silence political dissent if it threatens political
stability.
Meanwhile, in its efforts to maintain security and continued U.S.
access to Asia since the end of the Cold War, Washington has declared that preventing the rise of a hegemonic state hostile to the
United States in Asia is a critical national interest. As China’s economy continues to grow rapidly and its international influence expands, many in Washington feel increasing uncomfortable. To them,
a powerful but ideologically different China presents threatens U.S.
national interests in Asia. Although they may doubt China’s ability
to overcome monumental developmental difficulties and remain
communist, they fear that China may succeed. Accordingly, they believe it is of utmost importance for the United States to prevent this
from happening. They may be able to tolerate China’s development;
but they feel that the United States must ensure that China changes
in such a way that it does not pose a threat. This means that the
United States must persuade China to abandon its ideology and its
political system. Because of such views, the U.S. Government attaches increasing importance to changing China through both carrots and sticks.
Since the mid-1990s, this conflict in priorities has become an increasingly important factor in shaping Sino-American relations. As
the United States steps up its efforts to pressure China to observe
human rights and introduce democracy, China increasingly feels
threatened and considers it necessary to fight back. As China resists
U.S. pressures, the United States finds more reason to worry that its
worst nightmares might become true and it therefore increases pressures on China. This situation has made the relationship increasingly
difficult for the two countries to manage and led to the irony discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
The Drift Toward Confrontation
In retrospect, the development of Sino-American relations since 1992
can be divided roughly into three periods: (1) a drift toward confron-
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
159
tation; (2) an attempt to build a constructive strategic partnership;
and (3) a search for the ground rules of a new game.
The election of Bill Clinton as U.S. president in 1992 generated
fresh uncertainties in Sino-American relations. During the presidential campaign, Clinton went out of his way to condemn President
George Bush’s China policy. Among other things, he claimed that
Bush had coddled the “dictators” in Beijing. He promised that, if
elected, he would get tough with China.4 After his election, many
people were interested in seeing what forms getting tough with
China would take.
The Clinton administration found plenty of issues on which it
could confront China. As Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state
for East Asia, told American lawmakers, these issues included Beijing’s human rights behavior, arms sales to regions where the United
States believed they would heighten instability, and a growing trade
imbalance in China’s favor.5 Times had changed, the Clinton administration argued. The old days when the United States needed China
for strategic cooperation against Soviet expansionism were over. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had become the only superpower in the world and, more than ever before,
believed that it should push for democratization abroad. Consequently, the United States could take advantage of this situation to
change China in a way consistent with American values and way of
life (and indeed should do so).6
Soon after Clinton took office, he advocated steps to make China
change its human rights practices. On February 28, 1993, a White
House spokesman said that the president believed that the United
States could attach conditions to the renewal of China’s mostfavored nation status (MFN—later renamed “normal trade relations,” or NTR), such as an improvement in human rights and the
practice of democracy.7 On May 3, in a conversation with Chris Pat—————
4. Jia Qingguo, “Shilun Kelindun zhizheng yilai de Zhong-Mei guanxi” (On SinoAmerican relations since Clinton took office), in Liang Shoude et al. eds., Mianxiang 21
shiji de Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe (China’s international strategy for facing the 21st century) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue Publishing House, 1998), p. 42.
5. Liu Liandi, ed., Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian (Selected important documents on Sino-American relations) (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House,
1996), p. 349.
6. Jia Qingguo, Jishou de hezuo: Zhong-Mei guanxi de xianzhuang yu qianzhan (Difficult cooperation: current status and future prospects of Sino-American relations) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Publishing House, 1998), p. 94.
7. Ibid., p. 95.
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Jia Qingguo
tern, the British governor of Hong Kong at the time, Clinton said that
China’s achievements in reforming its economy had to be accompanied by responsible behavior, such as respect for human rights and
progress in democratization.8 On May 28, the White House issued an
executive order on the extension of China’s MFN status. Although
agreeing to renew China’s MFN status for the coming year, it set
seven conditions for the renewal of the MFN status the following
year.9
In explaining its position on the MFN issue, the administration
made no secret of its intentions. On June 8, Winston Lord told a
group of American congressmen that Clinton wanted to use access to
American market as a stimulus to improve human rights in China.
He also said that China had no alternative but to comply with the
conditions listed in the executive order. If it failed to do so, the
United States would not hesitate to suspend China’s MFN status.10
That action would severely damage the Chinese economy and the
political control of the Chinese government.
In response to pressures from the Clinton administration, the
Chinese government argued that it was committed to the improvement of human rights and that it had made much progress. However, for historical and other reasons, China confronted a different
set of problems in the area of human rights from those faced by other
countries. Dealing with these problems required an approach
adapted to Chinese circumstances. China was willing to exchange
views with foreign governments and NGOs on how to improve human rights. Such exchanges, however, should be conducted on the
basis of equality and mutual respect. No government had the right to
impose its own values and priorities on China. In a talk with the editor in chief of the US News & Daily Report on February 23, 1993,
President Jiang Zemin said that the Chinese government was more
concerned about its domestic human rights situation than any other
government in the world. China had 1.1 billion people, and improving the quality of their life was an extremely difficult task. The Chinese government had been trying hard to do so ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The Chinese
constitution provides fundamental protections of various rights. The
Chinese government had also signed a series of international treaties
to protect human rights. Beijing believed that a mutual understand—————
8. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, p. 351.
9. Jia Qingguo, Jishou de hezuo: Zhong-Mei guanxi de xianzhuang yu qianzhan, p. 95.
10. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, p. 353.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
161
ing on human rights could arise from a dialogue of equals. This
would be helpful for mutual understanding. Even if countries could
not solve all the problems between them, they should seek common
grounds and learn to live with their differences. Concerning the difference between China and the United States on the question of human rights, Jiang pointed out that China had advocated international
dialogue but opposed foreign coercion. China opposed international
interference in a country’s internal affairs whatever the pretext, including human rights. External pressures on China were not only
objectionable but would be ineffective.11
In a May 29, 1993, statement on Clinton’s decision to attach conditions to the renewal of China’s MFN status for the following year,
the Chinese government protested the decision on the grounds that
it violated the three communiqués and trade agreements between
the two countries and that it constituted serious interference in
China’s internal affairs. The Chinese government pointed out that
politicization of the trade issue, especially the attachment of conditions to the renewal of China’s MFN status, was not acceptable. Such
a practice, it claimed, could only damage economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. Ultimately it would also hurt important U.S. interests. It urged the Clinton administration to revoke
its decision in the best interests of the two countries.12
Not only did both countries stick to their respective positions on
human rights, but the Clinton administration endeavored to make
China conform to arms sale practices consistent with its perception
of U.S. national interests. For some time, the U.S. government had
been worried that China would sell Silkworm missiles to Iran and
medium-ranged missiles to Saudi Arabia. It also suspected that
China had been helping Pakistan and Iran develop nuclear weapons
or at least had sold them technology and equipment that would enable them to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Accordingly, the first Bush administration had told the Chinese government to stop selling weapons to regions that it deemed unstable.
Meanwhile, it pressured China to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
In its efforts to do so, the Bush administration used a carrot-and-stick
approach. On the carrot side, it offered to lift some of the military
sanctions imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.
On the stick side, it suspended the review and approval of high-tech
—————
11. Ibid., p. 119.
12. Ibid., p. 121.
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Jia Qingguo
exports to China. In part because China had no interest in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies and in part because China did not wish to let the arms sale issue jeopardize SinoAmerican relations (despite its belief that its arms sale had not
breached any international treaties or agreements, China had agreed
to some of the U.S. requests), the two countries had more or less
worked out a compromise before Clinton assumed office.13
However, the Clinton administration took a heavy-handed approach to this issue. On July 23, 1993, U.S. officials told their Chinese
counterparts that they had reliable information that a Chinese cargo
ship, the Yinhe, was carrying substances that could be used to make
chemical weapons. It demanded that the Chinese government stop
the ship and unload the cargo. Following this démarche, the Clinton
Administration sent warships and reconnaissance planes to follow
the Yinhe and take pictures. The Chinese government quickly investigated the matter and found that the ship carried no such chemical
substances. However, when it told the Clinton administration this
and demanded an end to U.S. harassment of the Chinese ship, Washington insisted on its version and used its influence to prevent the
ship from docking in nearby countries until it had been inspected.
As a result, the Chinese ship had to drift at sea for more than twenty
days, causing substantial financial loss to the shipping company. After consultation, the Chinese side agreed to let a third party conduct
an onboard investigation. The investigation found none of the substances alleged to be on the ship. However, the Clinton administration remained unconvinced. At its insistence, the scope of the inspection was expanded several times, and in the end it insisted that every
container on the ship be inspected.14 Despite the fact that the ship
was found to be carrying no materials that could be used in weapons
manufacture, the Clinton administration refused to apologize to
China or to compensate the company for the costs of the delay. These
actions caused significant resentment on the Chinese side.
Soon after the Yinhe debacle, the Clinton administration alleged
that China had transferred missile technologies to Pakistan in violation of the MTCR regulations, and on August 25 it announced that it
would prohibit the export of certain high-tech products to China for
—————
13. Gong Li, Zhong-Mei guanxi redian toushi (Analysis of the hot issues in SinoAmerican relations) (Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Publishing House, 1996), pp.
214–15.
14. Ibid., pp. 217–19.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
163
two years.15 In response to the U.S. announcement, Liu Huaqiu,
China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, issued a strong protest to the
U.S. government. He pointed out that the United States was selling
dangerous weapons to certain sensitive areas of China (meaning
Taiwan), endangering China’s national security, while imposing
sanctions against China on the basis of false allegations about
China’s arms sale practices. Such actions were unreasonable and
hegemonic. He said that the Chinese government had agreed to observe the MTCR rules because the United States had previously
lifted sanctions on high-tech exports to China. If the Clinton administration was to restore such sanctions, China would have to reconsider its commitments to the MTCR rules and the U.S. side would
bear the consequences.16
In addition to the human rights and the arms sale issues, the Clinton administration also thought that it could make China accept new
arrangements for relations between Washington and Taipei. On September 7, 1994, the Washington announced that it would adjust relations with Taipei. Among other actions, (1) U.S. officials would develop higher-level contacts with Taiwan authorities; (2) the U.S.
government would approve a request to change the name of the office representing the Taiwan authorities in Washington from the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to the Economic and
Cultural Representative Office of Taipei; and (3) although the United
States would continue not to support Taiwan’s admission to the
United Nations, it would support its membership in other international organizations if participation did not require nation-state
status.17
Washington’s efforts to upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations immediately brought an angry response from Beijing. On September 10,
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu summoned U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy and strongly protested the U.S. move. He said
that the action had seriously violated the three communiqués between China and the United States and constituted blatant interference in China’s internal affairs. After reiterating the Chinese government’s policy on the Taiwan question, he pointed out that Beijing
would not compromise its principles. If the Taiwan authorities took
major steps toward independence with foreign assistance, the Chinese government would not sit idly by. Should that happen, the
—————
15. Ibid., p. 220.
16. Renmin ribao, Aug. 28, 1993.
17. Gong Li, Zhong-Mei guanxi redian toushi, p.156.
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Jia Qingguo
whole region, including the United States, would be negatively affected. The Taiwan question, Hua pointed out, was an “explosive issue.” He urged the Clinton administration to refrain from roiling
Sino-American relations and instead to facilitate cooperation between the two countries.18
On human rights, arms sales, Taiwan, and other issues, the Clinton administration sought to change China. When Clinton first came
to office, he thought that such efforts were quite promising despite
Chinese resistance. After all, the United States was strong and China
weak. And with the Soviet Union gone, the United States could devote more efforts and resources to making China comply with U.S.
demands. After all, as China-U.S. economic relations expanded,
China was becoming more dependent on the United States, especially in trade and investment. What alternative did China have
other than compliance? However, it did not take long before the
Clinton people realized that it could not so easily change China.
Contrary to its expectations, the administration’s heavy-handed approach had put the Chinese on the defensive and generated one crisis after another in the relationship until the administration found it
necessary to back down, with considerable political embarrassment.
As time passed, the Clinton administration found that China was
not going to meet the human rights conditions the United States had
attached to the renewal of its MFN status. The administration found
itself caught in a difficult dilemma. Having publicly stated that it
would suspend China’s MFN status if China failed to meet its conditions, it was under political pressure to carry out the threat. However, suspension of China’s MFN was not what it really wanted, and
it soon realized the high domestic political costs. Suspension of
China’s MNF status would seriously affect American exports to
China, damage the interests of the American consumers who wanted
Chinese products, and threaten American investment in China. On
top of all this, it promised to do little to improve human rights in
China. Powerful American business interests began to pressure the
administration not to sacrifice their interests in an unrealistic human
rights crusade. Increasing numbers of Americans argued that
China’s human rights situation was more likely to improve if the
United States kept China engaged with the outside world rather than
isolated from it.19
—————
18. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, pp. 152–54.
19. Gong Li, Zhong-Mei guanxi redian toushi, pp. 269–70.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
165
The Clinton administration increasingly sought to find a way out
of the dilemma. At first, it opted to step up pressures to make China
comply with its conditions. It sent John Shattuck, assistant secretary
of state for human rights, to China to pursue this policy. During his
visit to Beijing, without prior consultation with the Chinese government, Shattuck met with Wei Jingsheng, an outspoken but often irresponsible critic of the Chinese government. The Chinese government
was infuriated by what it perceived as a deliberate provocation. As it
became convinced that the Clinton administration had no intention
of respecting China’s legitimate interests, Beijing became even less
willing to compromise with Shattuck.20 Shattuck’s visit made U.S.
objectives harder to achieve.
In mid-March, Secretary of State Warren Christopher decided to
go to Beijing himself. On the eve of his visit, the U.S. Senate passed a
resolution in support of the Clinton approach by a two-thirds margin. With congressional support behind him, Christopher demanded
that the Chinese government meet the human rights conditions
listed in Clinton’s executive order. He threatened that a failure to
meet these conditions would lead to suspension of China’s MFN
status. The Chinese government, however, did not buy the threat.
Qian Qichen, Chinese vice premier and foreign minister, told Christopher that the jurisdiction of U.S. executive orders and U.S. laws
did not extend to China, and China was under no obligation to implement them. The Chinese government did not believe that coercion
was the way to resolve differences between the two countries. The
only way to do so, Qian argued, was through consultation on an
equal basis.21 Although top Chinese leaders did agree to meet him,
Christopher returned to the United States empty-handed.
Some media reported that the Chinese leaders had deliberately
slighted Christopher. To be fair, the Chinese leaders had no intention
of slighting him or of allowing Sino-American relations to drift toward confrontation. In fact, they did not object to efforts to improve
the Chinese human rights situation. They made it known that that
was exactly what they had long been trying to do. However, they
also knew that this was easier said than done. China was undergoing
drastic changes. Although such changes had facilitated resolution of
some long-standing problems, they had also exacerbated others and
generated new challenges. These problems and challenges were seriously straining China’s political institutions and threatening to un—————
20. Ibid., p. 267.
21. Renmin ribao, Mar. 15, 1994.
166
Jia Qingguo
dermine its political stability. Under the circumstances, the Chinese
government felt that it had to silence certain individuals whose behavior it believed posed serious threats to China’s political stability.
It feared that if people were given complete freedom to challenge the
political authority, China would descend into political instability, if
not chaos. That would end China’s economic development and political progress. What the Clinton Administration was demanding of
China was precisely to let these individuals have a free hand to challenge the Chinese government. In the eyes of the Chinese government, the U.S. demands went against China’s vital national interests
and therefore it felt it could not afford to give Christopher what he
wanted, even if led to U.S. suspension of China’s MFN status.
When the time to decide whether to renew China’s MFN status
came in the spring of 1994, anti-China groups in the United States
gathered under the banner of human rights and demanded that Clinton deliver on his threat to China. At the same time, large American
businesses and others who wanted to see more cooperation between
the two countries stepped up their efforts to achieve a renewal of
China’s MFN status. After long and careful weighing of the pros and
cons, Clinton finally decided to opt for renewing China’s MFN
status. He publicly acknowledged that his policy of linking trade and
human rights issues had not achieved its purpose. And he now believed that suspending China’s MFN status would not facilitate
American objectives and interests. Accordingly, his administration
would discontinue linking MFN renewal to Chinese progress on
human rights. In a statement explaining his decision, Clinton wrote
that the linkage policy had reached its logical end. The annual debate on renewal of China’s MFN status might hinder progress on
important security and economic issues. Furthermore, linkage was
unlikely to lead to significant progress even on human rights. The
administration concluded that the best way to promote human rights
in China was to increase contacts, promote trade, enhance international cooperation, and seek extensive and frequent dialogues on the
question of human rights.22
Pragmatic considerations not only prompted this policy switch
but also led to a compromise on the arms sale issue. China repeatedly told the United States that its exports to Pakistan did not violate
the technical requirements of the existing control regimes. The
United States may have reasons to suspect Chinese violations of
these regimes. However, as in the case of Yinhe, it is also conceivable
—————
22. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, pp. 375–78.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
167
that its suspicions were not well founded. It imposed sanctions on
China without solid evidence. The Chinese government also warned
that if the U.S. sanctions against China continued, China might refuse to honor its previous commitments to the United States on the
arms sale issue and might also refuse to cooperate on other security
issues such as security dialogue and the Korean Peninsula. This
clearly went against U.S. interests. Since the stakes were high, after
extracting additional commitments from China to adhere to the
MTCR requirements in its arms exports, the U.S. administration finally agreed to begin lifting sanctions that had been imposed on
China since August 1993.23
The Taiwan question proved more difficult for the administration.
Clinton’s decision to upgrade U.S. relations with Taiwan appeared to
have emboldened Lee Teng-hui, the separatist leader of Taiwan, in
his efforts for Taiwan independence. As a person educated and influenced more by Japanese culture than Chinese, Lee had been carefully manipulating Taiwan toward independence since he consolidated his power in the early 1990s. Among other things, he had been
pushing for the so-called pragmatic diplomacy, which called for
promotion of Taiwan’s ties with foreign countries through an active
and flexible approach so as to gain broader international recognition
of Taiwan’s separate “sovereign statehood.” In doing so, Taiwan authorities had used aid and even bribes to lure potential target countries. In this respect, no other country represented a greater prize
than the United States. Lee Teng-hui figured that the independence
cause would be greatly advanced if he could get the United States to
alter its one-China policy. However, to his dismay, the Clinton administration, just as its predecessors, did not wish to jeopardize
American national interests just to accommodate Lee’s aspirations,
however sympathetic they might have been to his efforts. Under the
circumstances, Lee decided to work around the administration to
achieve his goals.
Lee and his associates helped arrange for Lee Teng-hui to visit his
alma mater, Cornell University, where he had received his Ph.D.
They arranged a handsome donation of a few million U.S. dollars to
Cornell and suggested that more could come if Lee’s visit could be
arranged. As a private educational institution, Cornell had every interest in attracting alumni donations, particularly at a time when its
president was undertaking an ambitious fundraising program in
Asia. Consequently, it extended an invitation to Lee. Lee used the
—————
23. Gong Li, Zhong-Mei guanxi redian toushi, pp. 221–22.
168
Jia Qingguo
occasion to take his case to the U.S. Congress. Taiwan hired a highpowered public relations firm in Washington and bombarded U.S.
lawmakers with appeals as well as favors. With the scenes of
Tiananmen suppression still fresh in their minds and frustrated with
China’s defiance of U.S. demands over the years, most American
congressmen felt that the Clinton administration should let Lee
travel to Cornell. They saw no reason for the U.S. government to be
sensitive to Chinese feelings. After all, from an American perspective, what was wrong with a student visiting his alma mater, especially in a private capacity? Accordingly, resolutions urging the administration to allow Lee to visit Cornell were introduced in the
Congress and passed with overwhelming margins in both the Senate
and the House.24
Initially, the Clinton Administration chose not to allow Lee to
visit. It was aware of the strong Chinese feelings on this question
and anticipated substantial disruptions in Sino-American relations
should it approve Lee’s visit. In the light of these considerations, it
stated publicly and privately that it would not consider Lee’s case.25
However, as domestic pressures built, the politically vulnerable
Clinton felt that he could not afford to offend Congress. He abruptly
reversed the administration’s position and gave Lee Teng-hui the
visa he had been craving. In its official announcement on the decision, the Clinton administration claimed that it considered such a
visit an individual’s right, one that the rights-conscious American
government should not deny. In an attempt to moderate Chinese reactions to this about-face, the Clinton administration claimed that
Lee’s visit was strictly private and the decision should not be construed as a change of the U.S. policy with regard its commitment to
the one-China principle.26
After gaining U.S. permission to visit Cornell, Lee Teng-hui became dizzy with success. He ignored the administration’s request
that he keep his visit low-key and nonpolitical. Instead, he traveled
to Cornell with all the pretensions of a head of state and delivered a
highly political speech there. Among other things, he tried to emphasize Taiwan’s status as a separate sovereign state by inserting the
“ROC” or the “ROC at Taiwan” eighteen times in his 4,500-word
speech. He claimed that some people had said that the Taiwan au—————
24. Su Ge, Meiguo duihua zhengce yu Taiwan wenti (U.S. China policy and the Taiwan question) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Publishing House, 1998), p. 736.
25. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, pp. 391, 419.
26. Ibid., pp. 421–22.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
169
thorities could not break its international isolation and that he for
one did not believe it. He further stated that he wanted to dare the
impossible, that is, Taiwan’s separation from China. He appealed to
Americans to support his efforts in this regard.27
All this was too much for the Chinese government to tolerate. The
administration’s about-face on Lee Teng-hui’s visit took the Chinese
government by surprise. Until the last moment, the Clinton administration had assured the Chinese government that it would not approve Lee’s visit. Prior to Clinton’s decision, some Americans had
told the Chinese government that it should not rule out the possibility that the Clinton administration might cave in to domestic political pressures and approve Lee’s visit. Some Chinese also made a
similar case at internal meetings. However, high-ranking officials of
the Clinton administration continued to assure the Chinese government that it was government policy not to approve Lee’s visit, almost until the last minute. The Chinese government naturally felt betrayed. As Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen later told a U.S.
visitor, “I was assured a visa would not be issued. Imagine what I
thought and what was thought of me when the visa was granted.”28
Confronted with this situation, the Chinese government decided
that it had to react, and react strongly, if it ever wished to maintain
domestic political unity as well as to defend China’s vital national interests. On May 26, following the announcement of Clinton’s decision, the Chinese government announced that it would postpone the
Chinese defense minister’s scheduled visit to the United States as
well as discontinue planning for the visit of State Councilor Li
Guixian and Commander in Chief of the Chinese Air Force Yu
Zhenwu to the United States. On May 28, the Chinese government
decided to suspend consultations between Chinese and American
specialists on MTCR cooperation and nuclear energy development
issues. It also canceled the upcoming visits by American officials
from the U.S. State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Lee’s provocative behavior and speech at Cornell infuriated the
Chinese government further. Out of nationalistic sentiments as well
as domestic political considerations, it felt that it must do something
more. It recalled its ambassador to Washington on June 17. The following day, U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy left Beijing since his
—————
27. Su Ge, Meiguo duihua zhengce yu Taiwan wenti, pp. 741–42.
28. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 69–70.
170
Jia Qingguo
term had ended. With the outbreak of the Taiwan crisis, Beijing delayed its agreement to the appointment of a new American ambassador. As a result, for the first time since the normalization or relations in 1979, neither country had an ambassador in the other’s
capital. Relations between the two countries dropped to their lowest
point since normalization.29
To demonstrate its determination to defend its territorial integrity,
Beijing announced plans to conduct military exercises in the Taiwan
Strait. Between July 1995 and March 1996, the People’s Liberation
Army would conduct “missile tests” and hold military exercises in
the Taiwan Strait. Following the first wave of military exercises and
missile “tests” in July and August 1995, the United States tried to
minimize public demonstrations of the U.S. commitment to defend
Taiwan and at the same time resist Beijing’s demand that Washington give a firm commitment that it would not again allow Lee Tenghui and other top Taiwan leaders to visit the United States. In meetings with Qian Qichen on August 1 in Brunei, Warren Christopher
tried to be conciliatory. He told Qian that he would deliver a letter
from President Clinton to President Jiang expressing the U.S. intention to develop a cooperative relationship with China. He also proposed a summit meeting during Jiang’s upcoming visit to New York
on the occasion of United Nation’s fiftieth anniversary. With regard
to the U.S. position on future visits by the Taiwan authorities, although Christopher refused to give in to China’s demands, he assured his Chinese counterpart that the United States would handle
such visits with extreme caution and care.30
By this time, Beijing probably concluded that it had achieved its
objectives despite the fact that the United States had not completely
met its demands. After all, the United States was strong, and China
was weak. There was not much more that Beijing could do to address its perceived injustice. Accordingly, it announced that its ambassador would return to Washington and that General Li Xilin
would represent Defense Minister Chi Haotian at the ceremonies at
Pearl Harbor in September commemorating the end of World War II.
In September, Beijing also approved the posting of James Sasser as
U.S. ambassador to China. On October 24, Presidents Jiang and Clinton met in New York, and both expressed a desire to promote a
healthy and stable relationship between the two countries. SinoAmerican relations appeared to be moving back on track.
—————
29. Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, op. cit., p. 32.
30 Garver, Face Off, pp. 74–79.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
171
However, that was not the end of the story. Beijing still wanted to
teach Lee Teng-hui a lesson. In March 1996, Beijing conducted another round of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This time, the
People’s Liberation Army fired missiles at areas close to Kaohsiung
and Keelung, Taiwan’s two major harbors. Lee Teng-hui had continued the provocative and defiant behavior that followed his return to
Taiwan from the United States. Beijing wanted to use the exercises to
restrain his behavior and to reduce his chance of re-election as the
leader of the Taiwan authorities in the forthcoming “presidential”
election in Taiwan.
The tension in the Taiwan Strait caused great concern in Washington. In an attempt to avoid appearing weak at home, Clinton dispatched two U.S. aircraft carrier task forces to the vicinity of Taiwan.
He also hoped to deter a sudden Chinese military takeover of Taiwan.31 China went ahead with its missile “tests” despite the U.S. deployment. Chinese missiles hit the targets accurately, and Beijing declared victory. Despite the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, during the
exercises both the Chinese and the American governments acted
with great caution. Nevertheless, it was a sobering experience for
both sides because both realized how close to a devastating military
confrontation they were as a result of Lee Teng-hui’s manipulations
for his own political agenda.
Much was said about the effect of Beijing’s military maneuvers in
the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 1996. Some argued that it was a
total failure. According to this view, Beijing failed to achieve its objectives. It did not bring the Taiwan authorities to their knees. It further alienated the residents of Taiwan.32 It increased rather than decreased Lee Teng-hui’s vote count in Taiwan’s “presidential”
election became the DPP supporters supported Lee for fear of war
with the mainland. It also alarmed Japan and provided it with a
good reason to cooperate with the United States more closely, especially on the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) question.33
—————
31. Dennis Van Vranken Hicky, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Implications for
US Security Policy,” in Zhao Suisheng, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China,
Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 279.
32. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Mainland China Factor in Taiwan’s 1995 and 1996
Elections: A Secondary Role,” in Greg Austin, ed., Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra: Australian National University, 1997), pp. 49–51.
33. Greg Austin, “Taiwan and PRC Military Power in Japan’s Domestic Politics,”
in Austin, Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future, pp. 105–8.
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Jia Qingguo
Some, however, believed that Beijing was successful in achieving
its objectives. In this perspective, through these exercises, Beijing
managed to draw a clear line in the Taiwan Straits for Washington
and Taipei as to how far they could go on the Taiwan issue. This was
important because misunderstandings arising from ambiguity could
lead to real military confrontation. In addition, the military exercises
also helped restrain separatists in Taiwan. Although Lee Teng-hui
may have received more votes in the election, he got them from the
Taiwan separatists such as DPP supporters. As a result, the Taiwan
separatist party DPP experienced a substantial loss in the election.34
In the meantime, the New Party, which endorses the goal of eventual
reunification, gained a significant percentage of votes. Finally, although the exercises did provide Japan with an excuse to enhance its
security relations with the United States, including developing TMD,
the real reason Japan did so was its perceived vulnerability as a result of its continuing economic stagnation and China’s concurrent
rapid development. In other words, Japan would have probably
done the same thing even if the military exercises had not occurred.
Although both arguments have some validity, on balance, it appears that the military exercises were at least useful in clarifying the
limits to which all parties concerned could go on the Taiwan question. Short of such clarity, opportunistic behavior on the part of some
parties might have led to a larger and more dangerous crisis in the
Taiwan Strait. In part because of this, following the Taiwan crisis,
Washington reiterated its adherence to the one-China policy. Although Washington resisted Beijing’s pressures to rule out future
visits by Lee Teng-hui, Secretary of State Warren Christopher found
it necessary to assure his Chinese counterpart that such visits would
be handled with extreme caution in the future.35 Nonofficial relations
between Taiwan and the United States might expand in the years to
come, but the United States was unlikely to upgrade the relationship
soon.
The Taiwan authorities also got the message from the exercises.
Confronted with Beijing’s pressures and Washington’s ire at Taipei’s
manipulations, Taipei decided that it was necessary to repeat the
one-China principle and promised to make additional efforts to improve its rapidly deteriorating relations with Beijing after the presidential election in Taiwan. On March 9, 1996, Lee Teng-hui said that
—————
34. This can be seen in the setback suffered by the DPP in the recent “presidential”
election in Taiwan (Taiwan yanjiu 1996, no. 2: 8-9).
35. Ibid., 1996, no. 1: 89.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
173
Taipei would gradually expand economic and trade relations with
the mainland to the areas of culture exchanges and would make that
one of Taiwan’s five developmental goals in the next four years. He
repeatedly claimed that the priority of his new presidential term
would be to “resolve the hostile situation between the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait.”36 For a while, it appeared that Lee Teng-hui finally realized what a dangerous situation he had created for the very
people he claimed to defend.
Beijing also learned from this experience. To many in Beijing,
peaceful reunification was preferable, but there were certain limits to
it. Recent developments on Taiwan suggested that the peaceful reunification policy itself was insufficient to induce Taipei to toe the
line. Additional pressures were necessary to change Taipei’s structure of interests so that it would not go too far toward political independence. These include selective use of military deterrence. There
were risks in applying military pressures and the stake involved was
high, but territorial integrity was not something that could be compromised. Although Beijing was unlikely to attempt a military takeover of Taiwan in the near term, it felt it had to be prepared for a
military showdown if Taiwan separatists pushed the island to be independent.37
The Clinton administration’s efforts to force changes on China
lasted from 1993 to 1996. In some areas, it accomplished its goals. For
example, its pressures played a role in the Chinese government’s decision to release some prisoners that the Clinton administration classified as political dissidents. It also managed to extract more commitments on the part of the Chinese government to adherence to
arms control regimes. However, its policy was largely a failure. Most
notably it failed to prepare Americans for the development of a constructive relationship between the two countries as they approached
the twenty-first century. Ironically, the administration eventually realized that it was easier to change its policy than to change China.
Building a Constructive Strategic Partnership
The catchword of the new policy orientation of the Clinton administration was “engagement.” By the time the Taiwan Strait crisis
ended in 1996, the engagement policy had already been in place for
—————
36. Ibid., 1996, no. 2: 96.
37. You Ji, “Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics,” in Austin, Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future, pp. 53–54.
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Jia Qingguo
more than two years. As early as summer 1993, concerned about the
negative implications of the rapid deterioration in Sino-American relations, some in the administration began to advocate more official,
especially military, contacts and dialogue between the two countries.
This eventually led to the drafting of an action memorandum under
the leadership of Anthony Lake, Clinton’s national security advisor.
Among other things, the memorandum called for “broad engagement” with China. After approving the policy proposal in September
1993, the Clinton administration formally communicated this new
policy orientation to the Chinese side later in the month. This led to a
series of visits by senior administration officials to China in the subsequent months culminating in the summit between Jiang and Clinton in November 1993 at the APEC meeting in Seattle.38
When President Clinton first put forth the engagement policy, it
was meant to be a moderate approach to dealing with China. However, given the harsh words Clinton had used on the China question
during the presidential election campaign and what he had done on
this issue since he assumed office, it is not surprising that many
Americans had a difficult time keeping up with him. To various degrees, Clinton’s about-face had disappointed American Chinabashers while puzzling those Americans who favored better relations with China. Whereas the former complained bitterly and
loudly that Clinton had betrayed them, the latter wondered whether
Clinton really meant what he said.
From the very beginning, the engagement policy failed to obtain a
true domestic consensus in the United States. Although most Americans interested in Sino-American relations paid lip service to the
concept, the word “engagement” meant different things to different
people. Some Americans interpreted the engagement policy as one
of promoting mutually beneficial relations with China.39 Some believed that it was another means of changing China peacefully according to American values.40
Some viewed it as a euphemism for keeping China in an inferior
position, if not backwardness, and, if that could not be achieved, for
—————
38. Su Ge, Meiguo duihua zhengce yu Taiwan wenti, pp. 680-85.
39. Xiao Fulideman, “Zhong-Mei guanxi: huidao jichu” (U.S.-China relations: back
to the basics), trans. Wang Xuehong, Dashiye (Big vision), July 1997, pp. 9–13.
40. Andelu Nasen and Luobote Luosi, Changcheng yu kongchengji: Zhongguo dui anquan de xunqiu, trans. of Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the
Empty Fortress (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1997), pp. 225–31.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
175
confronting China.41 As a result, as soon as the policy was announced, it became a victim of partisan and interest group politics.
Different parties vied to impose their interpretation of engagement
on U.S. China policy, while the Clinton administration spent so
much time and efforts defining and defending it that it barely had
energy to practice it.
If Americans found it difficult to adjust to the Clinton administration’s drastic turn toward engagement, so did the Chinese. For quite
some time after the policy was announced, many Chinese remained
puzzled and suspicious of the Clinton administration real intentions.
Like their American counterparts, they found it difficult to believe
that the same U.S. president who had been so critical of China and
who had adopted a series of measures bordering on confrontation
with China could really be serious in promoting an engagement policy that aimed at building a mutually beneficial relationship with
China.
The problem was further compounded by the feeble defense of
the policy initially mounted by the Clinton administration. When the
policy was first announced, the administration justified it negatively.
The United States, according to the Clinton administration’s explanation, did not find sufficient progress in China’s protection of human
rights. In fact, in its view, China fell far short of expectations. However, the administration believed that confrontation with China
could not bring the desired changes. Only through engagement
could the United States produce such changes in China. Accordingly, the United States would abandon the policy of linking extension of China’s MFN status to improvement of its human rights
situation, but it now looked to engagement, meaning dialogues and
consultations, to bring about the desired changes.42
Once the engagement policy was defended this way, the Clinton
administration found itself trapped in a position of justifying its
China policy by how much it was changing China. However, China
is a large country, and the way things happen there has its own logic
and often defies external intervention. Moreover, the United States
had few resources to change China within a short period of time.
This was especially true during the period immediately following
the Cold War when most Americans were more interested in enjoying the peace dividend than supporting their government’s engage—————
41. Lichade Boensitan and Luosi Mangluo, Jijiang daolai de Zhong-Mei chongtu, pp.
169–83.
42. Liu Liandi, Zhong-Mei guanxi zhongyao wenxian ziliao xuanbian, p. 377.
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Jia Qingguo
ment in large-scale international programs or adventures. On top of
this, even if U.S. efforts sometimes had an impact on some particular
issues, the Chinese government did not want to acknowledge the
role of American pressure because of domestic political considerations.43 Under the circumstances, it was difficult for the Clinton administration to find and use Chinese concessions to justify its engagement policy. Consequently, those skeptical of the engagement
policy had more reasons to be skeptical, and the China-bashers had a
field day ridiculing and condemning it.
To make things worse, having consolidated his power in Taiwan,
Lee Teng-hui found it increasingly difficult to put up with the fact
that his presidency had little formal international recognition. With
help from his friends in the U.S. Congress, he had managed to get
the Clinton administration to issue him a visa to visit his alma mater,
Cornell University. Lee’s highly publicized tour of the United States
provoked an angry response from Beijing and led to a crisis in the
Taiwan Strait. In an attempt to stabilize the situation, the Clinton
administration found it necessary to dispatch two aircraft carrier
task forces to the Taiwan Strait. After the crisis, Lee found himself
worse off than before because both Beijing and Washington were
frustrated by his highly irresponsible political maneuvers and decided to block such attempts in the future. One unintended consequence of this episode, however, was that the Clinton administration
found it even more difficult to defend its policy of engagement. By
sending the aircraft carriers, Clinton confirmed the China-bashers’
argument that the United States had to resort to confrontation, military confrontation if necessary, to attain American objectives in dealing with China.
On top of all this, the engagement policy was implemented at a
time when China was undergoing drastic fundamental transitions,
namely, modernization, broad-scale social changes, and a leadership
transition. The rapidity of modernization and the transformation of
China’s centrally planned economy into a market economy has created a great deal of social and political tension in Chinese society, the
leadership transition left China with weak institutions as well as a
leadership weak in authority in comparison with the previous generations of leaders headed by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Consequently, the Chinese political order was (and is) under tremendous
stress. Fully aware of this situation, the Chinese government believes
—————
43. For example, China’s release of some prisoners whom the United States believed were being held for political dissent.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
177
that China’s future depends on maintaining political stability at
home.44 Accordingly, it finds it necessary to suppress open challenges to its authority. However, when it did this, the Clinton administration’s critics found more excuses to condemn the engagement policy.
As time went by, Chinese views of the engagement policy began
to take shape. A brief analysis reveals three different Chinese readings of the engagement policy. The first reading regarded the policy
as a sham, a euphemism for de facto containment. People holding
this view argued that both the track record and some official statements of the U.S. government have shown that the true intention of
the engagement policy was to contain China and transform it into a
U.S. political and economic appendage. As a group of young authors
claimed in their highly inflammatory book China Can Say No, “ ‘Containing China’ has already become a long-term strategy of the US.”
Accordingly, they argue that Chinese should have no illusions in
dealing with the United States. 45
The second reading acknowledged that the engagement policy
was different from the containment policy. According to this view,
although the United States did not hide its desire to change China
according to its own criteria and objectives, the engagement policy,
unlike the containment policy, did not advocate confrontation with
China and recognized the need for mutual accommodation. Therefore, it could not be regarded as a hostile policy. As far as China was
concerned, this policy could provide a basis for development of an
acceptable, mutually beneficial relationship.46
The third reading was that neither of the other two readings was
accurate. The engagement policy was by no means a pure policy either of engagement or of containment. Rather it was a mixture of the
—————
44. As Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the
president of the People’s Republic of China, put it: “China cannot accomplish any
thing without political stability”; see Jiang Zemin, “Gaoju Deng Xiaoping lilun weida
qizhi, ba jianshe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi shiye quanmian tuixiang qianjin”
(Uphold the great banner of the Deng Xiaoping theory and carry forward the course
of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st century), in Shiwuda
baogao duben (Reader of the reports at the Fifteenth Party Congress) (Beijing: Renmin
Publishing House, 1998), p. 18.
45. Song Qiang et al., Zhongguo keyi shuobu (China can say no) (Beijing: Zhonghua
gongshan lianhe Publishing House, 1996), p. 61.
46. Zhan Shiliang, “Cong shiji zhijiao Meiguo quanqiu zhanlüe kan Meiguo duiHua zhengce” (U.S. China policy as viewed from U.S. global strategy at the turn of the
century), in Liang Shoude et al. eds., Mianxiang 21 shiji de Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe, pp.
25–33.
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two. It was a policy of engagement in the sense that it sought contacts and dialogue with China as opposed to confrontation. It was a
policy of containment because its aim was to limit the growth of
China’s national capabilities and international influence. The new
U.S. policy therefore presented Sino-American relations with both
challenges and opportunities. Since China was ready to coexist
peacefully with the United States, whether the two countries could
find a way to advance their national interests through developing a
cooperative relationship between them depended entirely on the
United States.47
The relative influence of the three readings waxed and waned
over time with fluctuations in U.S. domestic politics over its China
policy. The first reading was more popular during the period immediately following the announcement of the engagement policy. According to a survey conducted by Zhongguo qingnian bao (China
youth daily) in 1995, most of the respondents regarded the United
States as the least friendly country.48 As the Clinton administration
persisted in advocating the engagement policy despite fierce domestic political opposition, the third reading gained increasing acceptance. After President Jiang visited the United States in 1997 and
concluded an agreement with President Clinton pledging to build a
constructive strategic partnership, the second reading became more
popular. After President Clinton’s visit to China, this reading became even more popular. However, beginning in early 1999, as
American criticisms of China mounted, the first reading resurfaced.
The NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and particularly its surprise attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade appeared to make it the most influential among the three. Following
the collision between an U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter plane
near the Chinese coast as well as some tough talk on U.S. China policy on the part of the second Bush administration, most Chinese concerned with Sino-American relations find it hard to abandon the first
two readings.
It was only during its last years that the Clinton administration
decided to take a more positive approach to justifying its policy of
engagement by openly acknowledging the progress China had
made. Defending his decision to invite President Jiang Zemin to
—————
47. Wang Jisi, “ ‘Ezhi’ haishi ‘jiaowang’?: ping lengzhan hou Meiguo dui-Hua
zhengce” (“Containment” or “engagement”?: on U.S. China policy during the postCold War period), Guoji wenti yanjiu (International studies), Jan. 1996, pp. 1-6.
48. Zhongguo qingnian bao (China youth daily), Sept. 27, 1995, p. 4.
Sino-American Relations, 1992–2000
179
make an official visit to the United States in 1997, President Clinton
said in a joint press conference with President Jiang on October 29,
1997: “The American people greatly admire China’s extraordinary
economic transformation, and we understand the importance that
your own experiences and your present challenges lead you to place
upon maintaining stability. We also appreciate the fact that human
rights have been advanced in China by greater freedom from want,
freedom of movement in career choice, and widely held local elections.”49 The Clinton administration’s open acknowledgment of the
progress China had achieved was favorably received by the Chinese.
Jiang’s visit to the United States and Clinton’s subsequent visit to
China the following year saw relations between the two countries
improve, and the two countries agreed to work toward a strategic
partnership. For a while, the engagement policy appeared to acquire
considerable significance.
Although the administration’s new justification made its engagement policy more defensible, it may have come too late. The old justification of the policy had already taken root, and it must have been
difficult for the American public to appreciate the argument that
China had made progress, especially in the political field, after being
told so many times that China’s human rights situation was deteriorating. Meanwhile, beginning in 1997, the Clinton administration’s
critics launched wave after wave of attacks against China and the
administration’s China policy on a whole range of issues. American
public media were full of allegations against China, from nuclear
proliferation to human rights violation, from illegal campaign contributions to espionage. Even though many allegations had no factual basis, their high visibility and the frequency with which they
appeared in American media, along with the absence of adequate efforts to examine their validity, ensured that many Americans accepted the allegations at face value. and this turned them against
China. Anti-China feelings in the United States reached a boiling
point.
To some extent, Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to the United States in
1999 helped to reduce the intensity of such feelings. The premier
claimed that the purpose of his trip was to provide Americans an
opportunity to vent their frustrations against China. His candor,
humor, and friendly gestures struck a responsive chord and pro—————
49. “Transcript: Clinton/Jiang 10/29 Joint Press Conference” (U.S. welcomes
China’s emergence as constructive partner) (5470), http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/
posts/HK1//wwhpw0d.html.
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Jia Qingguo
duced much goodwill for China among Americans. For a while, it
appeared that the difficult time in Sino-American relations was over,
and the relationship was back on track. However, on May 7, a crisis
erupted because of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The bombing killed three Chinese journalists and diplomats
and led to widespread angry protests against the United States in
China. For a few days after the bombing, domestic political considerations on the part of the Chinese government made it impossible
for the two governments even to communicate with each other.
Ironically the angry response of Chinese youth gave Clinton’s critics
an opportunity to revive anti-China feelings among Americans.
Both the Chinese and the U.S. governments were fully aware of
the danger of letting the relationship drift toward confrontation. Accordingly, both took a series of measures to control the escalation of
the crisis. For example, repeated U.S. efforts were made to apologize
for and explain the bombing and to initiate negotiations between the
two sides on the question of compensation for Chinese casualties
and property damage. However, although the downward spiral of
the relationship may have been arrested, for months the relationship
could only be stabilized at a fairly low level.
As time passed, some new progress was made in the year 2000.
Through long and hard work, the two countries finally concluded
the agreement on China’s membership in the WTO. Despite fierce
opposition from some quarters in the United States, the Clinton administration also managed to get congressional approval of China’s
permanent normal trading status. However, during November, with
the American presidential election campaigns looming, and the
China policy of the Clinton administration under constant attack, it
was difficult to advance Sino-American relations.
Strategic Competitors?
As in the previous American presidential election campaigns, China
policy became an issue of contention in the presidential race in 2000.
During the campaign, the Republican candidate, George W. Bush, attacked President Clinton’s handling of U.S. relations with China. He
criticized Clinton for focusing too much attention on China at the
expense of Japan, an American ally in Asia. He also expressed his
difference with Clinton on the question of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program. He vowed that he would push for such programs if he were
elected. China has opposed both programs. It believes that the two
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181
programs threaten to undermine the existing balance of power in
Asia as well as in the world and have serious implications for
China’s national security. Finally, Bush also said that he wanted to
change the United States’ Taiwan policy from one of strategic ambiguity to one of strategic clarity. He stated that the United States
should make it clear to China that it would intervene militarily if the
PLA attacked Taiwan. He also said that he supported more arms sale
to Taiwan and endorsed the Taiwan Enhancement Act advocated by
some pro-Taiwan congressmen and strongly opposed by the Chinese
government. In summary, Bush argued that the relationship between
China and the United States is not one of strategic partnership. Instead, it is one of strategic competition.
Bush’s campaign remarks caused considerable uneasiness among
the Chinese. They differed, however, as to the implications of the
remarks. Some believed that Bush was going to get tough with
China, and Sino-American relations would deteriorate sharply if he
came to power. Others argued that Bush’s tough talk was merely
campaign rhetoric. It was politically useful for him to differ from
Clinton during the presidential campaign in order to win election.
Otherwise, how could he persuade American voters that he would
make a difference if he were elected? Ultimately, he would adopt a
China policy similar to that of Clinton since it served American national interests best. Still others believed that Bush’s China policy
would be different from that of Clinton. In their eyes, like other Republicans, Bush was likely to attach more importance to high-profile
political issues such as national security than to low-profile issues
such as trade and human rights in foreign policy. Consequently, one
was likely to see more conflicts between China and the United States
on security and Taiwan but fewer conflicts on trade and human
rights. However, the net impact of this kind of China policy on SinoAmerican relations would be moderate.
The Bush people traveling to China before and immediately after
his election appeared to be positive on the future development of relations between the two countries. Of course, the Bush administration did explain it was going to take a tougher line on a range of issues that concern China. However, the new administration’s policy
was also going to be more realistic, consistent, and therefore predictable. That meant that it was unlikely to subject the relationship to the
same wild ride as Clinton’s China policy had done. That appeared to
be good news for Sino-American relations. However, recent developments such as China’s alleged technical assistance to Iraq in improving the latter’s communication system, the U.S. introduction of a
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resolution condemning China’s human rights practice at the annual
meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the Pentagon’s new restrictions on military contacts between the two countries, and the large U.S. arms sale to Taiwan appeared to suggest
otherwise. On top of all this was the Bush administration’s tough
rhetoric concerning the collision of a U.S. spy plane with a Chinese
fighter plane near China’s coast. What will happen in Sino-American
relations in the days to come is therefore highly uncertain.
However, if the history of Sino-American relations offers any
guidance, the relationship is likely to continue to fluctuate within
limits. As pointed out in my essay reviewing Sino-American relations between 1972 and 1992 in the predecessor to this volume, despite the emotional intensity evoked at different phases of development, the two countries have neither forged a formal military
alliance nor engaged in formal warfare since they first established
contact. They have been unable, however, to realize a higher level of
cooperation because they have too many differences. Yet they cannot
engage in full-scale confrontation because they have too many important overlapping interests that they must preserve. Despite the
many changes both between and within the two countries over time,
the nature of the relationship has remained largely unchanged.
Thirty years ago, in an historic move, China and the United States
reached out to each other, effectively ending twenty year s of comprehensive confrontation. Since then, much has happened within
and between the two countries. Among other things, relations have
evolved from a narrow focus on strategic cooperation against the
Soviet Union to a comprehensive engagement covering political,
economic, cultural, as well as strategic interactions. As a result of the
unexpected performance of the U.S. economy and the sustained rise
of China during the 1990s, the relationship between the two countries has assumed an unprecedented importance both for the two
countries and for the rest of the world.
At this junction, foresight and courage are the virtues that the two
countries most need in their leadership. Leadership with foresight
and courage would enable the two countries to overcome their differences and develop a genuine constructive partnership in the best
interests of the two countries and of the world at large. Shortsighted
and cowardly leadership would compound the problems and generate additional sufferings and mistrust between the two countries and
damage the interests of the two countries and those of the world.
Given the many uncertainties, we should hope for the best, but we
must be prepared for the worst.
Part III
U.S.-Japanese Relations
U.S. Policy
Toward Japan in the 1990s
Gerald Curtis
President Bill Clinton, who was in office for almost the entire decade
under consideration in this volume, came into the presidency with a
seemingly new and tough, even belligerent, approach to Japan. Yet
the fundamental thrust of his policy was in many key respects a continuation of patterns that had developed over the previous several
decades.
Clinton was criticized for bypassing Japan in his dealings with
China, but the absence of close consultations with Japan over China
policy had been a characteristic of U.S. diplomacy since the days of
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. As upset as Japanese leaders
may have been that Clinton would spend ten days in China without
even passing through Japan, it did not compare to their shock at
learning that President Nixon had sent Henry Kissinger to talk to
Chinese leaders in Beijing.
Clinton adopted an ill-fated “results-oriented” trade policy, but
this was hardly the first time an American administration had
sought Japanese acquiescence to managed trade agreements. Indeed,
the idea for results-oriented trade first surfaced not in the early years
—————
Gerald Curtis is Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
185
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Gerald Curtis
of the Clinton administration but in the last years of the preceding
Bush administration.
The Clinton administration strengthened security ties with Japan
even as it bitterly criticized Japanese economic policy. It kept a high
firewall between the two, just as every preceding administration,
again back to the Nixon era, had done. It combined indifference interrupted by sporadic bouts of attention to Japan by the president,
secretary of state, and key foreign policy advisors with successful
bureaucratic management of the relationship. This also was very
much in line with the practices of previous administrations.
The Clinton administration did not accomplish much in its Japan
policy, but evidence that the relationship suffered more under Clinton than it did under previous administrations is elusive at best. As
Clinton approached the end of his first term, and especially after reelection to a second one, with the U.S. economy booming and the
Japanese one tanking, Clinton dropped the results-oriented trade
policy that he had championed so forcefully when he first came into
office. The security relationship was reinvigorated with a reaffirmation of the security treaty and an agreement to draw up new guidelines for cooperation in the event of military contingencies occurring
in the areas surrounding Japan. Japan all but dropped off the U.S.
foreign policy radar screen.
The problem with the Clinton administration’s policies toward
Japan was not that it broke the thread of continuity with the policies
that had evolved over previous years. The problem was that the
president was far more interested in domestic and personal issues
than foreign policy and never himself articulated a coherent strategy
for dealing with Japan or foreign policy more generally. The Clinton
administration came to power at a time of dramatic changes in the
geopolitical situation in East Asia and in the East Asian regional and
global economy. Yet it failed to articulate a strategy to contend with
these new political and economic forces. It also seemed nearly
oblivious to the impact of its rhetoric and policy pronouncements on
the Japanese public and Japanese policymakers. Its seeming readiness to bypass Japan on the way to China and to push for managed
trade agreements with Japan produced a degree of distrust among
Japanese leaders that was far greater than had been true during previous administrations. The penchant among the administration’s top
officials for lecturing the Japanese about how they should run their
economy (i.e., that they should run it the way the Americans ran
theirs) created a great deal of irritation in Japan without having the
intended effect of changing Japanese policies.
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
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In the end perhaps no great damage was done. Despite the failings of President Clinton and his key foreign policy people, the professionalism of the bureaucracy that was tasked with managing relations with Japan and the efforts of key individuals in developing
sensible policies and handling sensitive bilateral issues kept the relationship on a relatively even keel. As ambassador to Japan, Walter
Mondale handled with skill and sensitivity a terrible incident in
Okinawa in which several marines sexually attacked a young girl.
His successor, Ambassador Thomas Foley, performed with equally
admirable skill in responding to the tragedy caused by the accidental
sinking of a marine vocational Japanese high school study ship by a
U.S. submarine in the waters off Hawaii.
Clinton himself did a lot of on-the-job training. As was true of his
foreign policy in general, his interest in Japan or East Asia was
spasmodic. When events demanded it, however, he could focus on
Japan with prodigious concentration. Multilateral and bilateral
summits and his decision to fly to Tokyo to attend the funeral of
Prime Minister Obuchi brought him to Japan more times than any
previous American president. Preparations for these trips forced the
government machinery to produce position papers that defined U.S.
policy and raised the level of knowledge and understanding of the
president and cabinet officials. Clinton also brought his formidable
political skills into play in Japan. His televised town meetings in Tokyo charmed the Japanese audience about as much as they did
American ones.
If one were to assign a grade to the Clinton administration for its
Japan policy, even allowing for a degree of grade inflation, a C for
the first term and a B for the second would seem about right. Anything lower would suggest that he did irreparable harm to the relationship. That is impossible to document, and in any case it seems
unlikely. A higher grade would imply that he made some positive
contribution to strengthening relations with Japan, and there is no
evidence for that. Japanese leaders seemed relieved that the Clinton
years had come to an end and that his vice president had not been
elected president. Their enthusiasm for George W. Bush, replete with
what were surely unrealistic expectations about a new “pro-Japan”
policy in the White House, was a reflection of their unhappiness
with Bill Clinton. And the two major sources of that unhappiness
were U.S. policies toward China and toward trade relations with Japan.
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The U.S.-China-Japan Triangle
As with previous administrations going back to Nixon, China
loomed as a major issue in U.S.-Japan relations for the Clinton administration. It came into office with one set of policies toward China
and went out with another entirely different one. Clinton criticized
the Bush administration in the 1992 presidential campaign for coddling the “butchers of Beijing” and committed himself to make mostfavored-nation (MFN) treatment of China conditional on improvement in its human-rights policy. Within a year, he had discarded that
policy and pushed for unconditional MFN treatment of China and a
policy of “engagement.” By Clinton’s second term, engagement had
been expanded to a substantively vague but rhetorically robust emphasis on the need to build a “strategic partnership” with China.
This phrase sounded rather odd to those who had thought that Japan
was the United States’ strategic partner in Asia. Clinton never explained how China was a “partner” and in what sense that evolving
partnership should be viewed as “strategic.” The ambiguity in U.S.
thinking about China and East Asia combined with the extravagant
language used to express it was very unsettling to Japanese leaders.
Like most of its predecessors, the Clinton administration paid little attention to consultations with Japan in developing its policies
toward China. Moreover, it appears that it never carefully assessed
how its China policy might affect relations with Japan or Japanese
policy toward China. The absence of extensive consultations with
Japan about China in itself was nothing new. That had been U.S.
practice since the first Nixon shock. Indifference to Japanese views, a
concern about possible leaks, and a Japanese unwillingness to express views if consulted that might complicate its own relations with
China all contributed to this pattern of behavior.
East Asia, however, was a very different region when Bill Clinton
came to power than it had been when Richard Nixon initiated the
American opening to China. There was no longer a Cold War and a
Soviet threat to draw the U.S. and Japan together. China had
emerged as an increasingly powerful economy and important player
in international relations in the region. The Japanese economy was
suffering the aftereffects of the collapse of the economic bubble. Its
economy was in recession, while China continued its remarkable
economic expansion. Its financial system was in a state of crisis. The
entire region, with the notable exception of China, suffered a huge
financial collapse in 1997 and the United States and Japan disagreed
on what to do about it. When the Japanese floated the idea of creat-
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
189
ing an Asian Monetary Fund, the United States quickly and publicly
squashed it.
The Clinton administration did not seem to carefully consider
how its China policy might affect relations with Japan in this
changed environment. The result was the emergence for the first
time of rather sharp divergence in U.S. and Japanese policies and
strategies for dealing with China. In the 1970s when Nixon opened
relations with China and Carter normalized them, Japan made sure
to stay in step with U.S. policy. It was not happy that the U.S. did not
consult with or inform Japan about its China policy, but it was confident that a strengthening of Sino-American relations in the context
of a Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union would not come at the
expense of U.S.-Japan ties. There had been no U.S.-China-Japan “triangle” during these years because Japan was solidly in the U.S. corner in a bipolar struggle with the Soviet Union. In the 1980s under
Reagan and Bush, the United States and Japan pursued parallel policies toward China. Even Japan’s quick ending of Tiananmen massacre sanctions against Beijing had the tacit support of President Bush,
who would have done just the same as the Japanese if it had not
been for Congressional opposition.
U.S.-Japan relations with respect to China during the Clinton
years were another matter. By the time the Clinton administration
came to power, the Cold War had ended, Sino-Japanese economic
ties had grown strong, and the Japanese were no longer worried
about missing the bus to China, as they had been in the 1970s. Now
they seemed more concerned to avoid having Japanese policy whiplashed by Washington’s erratic steering of the United States’ China
policy.
When Clinton came to power, then Prime Minister Miyazawa
urged him to avoid a confrontational stance with regard to human
rights issues in China and to accord China unconditional MFN
treatment. Later the Japanese reacted with caution to the Clinton
administration’s embrace of a new policy of strategic partnership
with China, concerned that Clinton seemed to be playing down the
importance of the one truly meaningful strategic partnership that the
United States had in East Asia, the one with Japan, in favor of developing a new one with China. As the 1990s unfolded, for the first time
U.S.-Japan-China relations began to evince a triangular quality. Since
the need to balance the Soviet Union was no longer a factor, relations
among the three countries took on a new dynamic.
The Chinese, for example, who had given tacit support to the
U.S.-Japan security treaty for years, reacted strongly to the Clinton-
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Hashimoto April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security and the decision
to revise the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. They
demanded unsuccessfully that the United States and Japan publicly
state that Taiwan lay outside the area to which the guidelines applied and expressed concern that the security declaration was intended to encourage Japan to play a regional military role.
A little more than a year later, in October 1997, Chinese president
Jiang Zemin made a very public stopover in Hawaii on his way to a
meeting with Clinton in Washington. The visit to the battleship Arizona was full of intended symbolism about the old friendship between the United States and China and old enmity between the
United States and Japan.
A year later, in November 1998, Jiang visited Tokyo, apparently
expecting, and in any case demanding, a written apology for Japanese aggression against China and cruelties toward the Chinese
people during the World War II. South Korean president Kim Dae
Jung had received a comparable apology during a visit to Tokyo a
month earlier. The Japanese were unwilling to do the same for Jiang,
making it clear to him that a written apology would come only after
China made changes in its approach to dealing with Japan. Kim had
publicly declared that the two nations should face the future rather
the past. The Chinese, however, were not ready to do the same. This
left the Japanese taking a hard line toward China precisely at a time
when the Clinton administration, emphasizing engagement and strategic partnership, was taking a soft one. This neatly reversed the
situation that prevailed when Clinton first came into office. At that
time the Japanese took a soft line toward China, and the Clinton administration took a hard one on human rights. The United States’
and Japan’s China policies were seriously out of sync.
In June 1998 Clinton made a ten-day trip to China. Much has been
made of the fact that he did not stop in Japan either on his way to or
from China. Not doing so probably was a mistake, but the decision
not to visit Tokyo was not as important as what Clinton said about
Japan while he was in China. After the Asian financial crisis broke
out in the summer of 1997, the Clinton administration became increasingly agitated at Japan’s failure to take the drastic actions the
administration believed were necessary to restore soundness to Japan’s banking system and to get its economy back on the road to
growth. In a joint press conference with Jiang in Beijing on June 27,
1998, Clinton applauded China for its “great statesmanship and
strength in making a strong contribution to the stability . . . of the
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191
entire region by maintaining the value of its currency.” He then went
on to point an accusing finger at Japan and seemed to say that in the
U.S.-China-Japan triangle Japan had now become a common problem for the United States and China.
“The United States, as you know,” Clinton remarked, “has
worked hard to try to support the stability of the Japanese yen and to
help growth resume in Japan. The key here, I believe, is for the plans
to reform the financial institutions in Japan and take other steps that
will get growth going and get investments going in Japan to be
made.” He then added, just to show the Chinese audience perhaps
just how chummy he and Jiang had become, “I think that ultimately
while President Jiang and I would give anything to be able to just
wave a wand and have all of this go away, we are not the only actors
in this drama. And a lot of this must be done by the Japanese government and the Japanese people. And we can be supportive but
they have to make the right decisions.” The imagery of Clinton and
Jiang hand in hand with a magic wand that they wished they could
use to deal with Japan caused considerable consternation in Tokyo,
where it was interpreted as further evidence of the United States
“passing” Japan and drawing closer to China.
Previous administrations had undertaken initiatives toward
China without consulting with Japan. In the context of the Cold War,
however, this left Japan with injured pride but not with serious concerns that rapprochement with Beijing might lead to a kind of abandonment of Japan. Clinton was the first president to raise serious
doubts about the implications of U.S. China policy for U.S. relations
with Japan. Japan did not scurry to get its policies in line with the
United States. Instead it put greater emphasis on developing its political ties with other nations on China’s periphery that also were
unhappy with what they saw as the Clinton administration’s naïve
enthusiasm for China.
Eventually Clinton was able to assuage Japanese concerns that the
United States was “passing” Japan in favor of forging a closer relationship with China. His China policy, after all, was just that, a policy toward China, rather than an element in a well thought out and
comprehensive regional or global strategy. The Japanese remained
wary to the end of the Clinton administration’s approach to China,
but fears that the Clinton administration was moving away from
emphasizing relations with Japan as the centerpiece of U.S. policy in
East Asia, something stressed repeatedly by the Japanese mass media, subsided.
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The Framework Agreement
In February 1989, the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations, the most senior private-sector advisory committee of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, issued a report calling on the Bush administration to adopt a “results-oriented trade
strategy.” The committee recommended that the United States identify those sectors where “an increase in US exports could be expected
if Japan were to act like other industrial countries with similar economic attributes” and “insist on appropriate sectoral import levels
that properly reflect the international competitiveness of US” and
other foreign suppliers.1 The Bush administration did not have time
to act on this recommendation, but Clinton did, leading to the most
contentious and least productive period in postwar U.S.-Japan trade
relations. In a sense the Clinton administration paid the price of
years of bitter battles between the United States and Japan over trade
issues. With the United States moving toward a results-oriented
trade policy, which, it should be noted again, was initiated in the last
years of the Bush administration, Japanese resentment and anger
boiled over.
The Clinton administration came into office just at the time that
so-called revisionist thinking about Japan was at the peak of its influence. Clinton and the senior people on his economic team swallowed this theory hook, line, and sinker. According to the thenpopular theory, Japan was not a normal country, and there was no
way to level the playing field, given the peculiar nature of Japan’s
institutions and the mindset of its people. Special measures were
needed to gain access for foreign goods in Japan and to prevent Japan from surpassing the United States to become the world’s most
powerful economy. Negotiations that focused on process and the
elimination of barriers, as had been the case earlier with the Market
Oriented Specific Sector or Structural Impediments Initiative talks,
were bound to fail. Japan would simply drag out the negotiations,
and even when it agreed to make a change requested by the Americans, it would find a way to make sure it did not have the consequences the United States expected. It was foolish to think that
Americans could change the way the Japanese ran their economy.
The only thing to do was to decide what market share or what kind
of access the outside world should have in key industries in Japan
—————
1. Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations, Analysis of the U.S.-Japan
Trade Problem (Washington, D.C., 1989).
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
193
and then negotiate a results-oriented agreement, leaving it to the
Japanese to figure out how to do it. So went the revisionist argument, and so went the Clinton Administration.
This strategy flew in the face of U.S. support for a rules-based
multilateral trade regime, and it was propelled by a self-defeating arrogance: Clinton’s trade negotiators seem never to have considered
what to do should the Japanese refuse to play the game that Clinton
was now insisting on playing. They could not imagine that the Japanese would say no to U.S. demands. But that is exactly what the
Japanese did, and it left the Clinton administration scrambling for a
response.
In Tokyo on July 10,1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa and President
Clinton announced the successful conclusion of a new agreement, officially called the United States-Japan Framework for New Economic
Partnership. According to Miyazawa, the agreement would “improve the bilateral relationship and benefit the world economy.”
What it actually provided was a framework for the most bitter and
ultimately the most unsuccessful period in the entire postwar history
of U.S.-Japan trade negotiations.
Clinton had gone to Tokyo determined to come home with nothing less than an agreement that would provide a scaffolding for results-oriented trade negotiations. Miyazawa, in rather typical Japanese style, wanted to avoid sending the president home emptyhanded and so aimed at getting an agreement that seemed to give
the Americans what they wanted without actually committing Japan
to the “qualitative and quantitative measurements” that Clinton insisted upon.
Clinton and his team left Tokyo believing that the Japanese had
agreed to do what the U.S. administration wanted them to do with
respect to trade negotiations. The Japanese seemed relieved that they
had succeeded in avoiding a confrontation and managed to send
Clinton home with a face-saving and not very meaningful agreement. Clinton had no sooner claimed success in getting Japan to
agree to use measurable indicators than the chairman of Keidanren
praised the accord precisely for not including numerical targets. The
Clinton administration believed that the framework agreement
meant concrete Japanese concessions on matters relating to autos
and auto parts, high technology, and medical equipment. The Japanese government claimed success for having avoided making any
commitments that went much beyond the “series of seminars to encourage automakers to purchase U.S. auto parts” that MITI officials
had offered to set up.
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For years the United States and Japan had been engaged in trade
wars that actually amounted to elaborate and well-scripted games in
which the goal was to contain Congressional pressures for protectionist measures and avoid a serious rupture in the relationship. In
the course of developing the games’ rules, and as the world economy
changed and globalization became more intense, the goal of the
game became less one of restricting Japanese access to the American
market and more one of expanding U.S. access to markets in Japan.
Instead of securing changes in Japanese procedures and laws to improve access for foreigners to Japanese markets, Clinton wanted to
negotiate trade agreements that would guarantee concrete results for
foreign manufacturers. Miyazawa and the trade bureaucrats in Japan
understood that Clinton wanted to change the rules of the game, and
they were determined to derail his efforts to do so.
Under the trade game as it had been played, the U.S. administration worked with Japan to contain Congress. This is what frustrated
trade negotiators like Clyde Prestowitz, who complained that “instead of a negotiator, the U.S. trade team became an adviser to the
government of Japan on how to handle the U.S. Congress.”2 In the
new game that Clinton decided to play, the U.S. administration
would enlist Congress to contain the much talked about and feared
Japanese economic threat.
The negotiations were led on the American side by Mickey Kantor, the trade representative, and on the Japanese side by Hashimoto
Ryutaro, the minister of international trade and industry. Having
decided to follow the revisionists’ script, Kantor insisted that Japan
agree to quantitative targets, as it had done in the Semiconductor
Agreement that had been negotiated during the Reagan administration. The Americans saw the semiconductor agreement as the model
to be followed in their negotiations with Japan and seem to have
convinced themselves that Japan would succumb to U.S. pressure.
The Japanese, however, regretted ever signing the semiconductor
agreement and were determined not to make an agreement that
would guarantee market share to foreign companies again.
The Clinton administration ended up with little to show for the
rancor generated by Kantor’s trade negotiations with Hashimoto.
Hashimoto’s domestic popularity soared. He appeared to be tough
in standing up for Japan against the Americans. In a picture published in all the major Japanese newspapers, Kantor is shown hold—————
2. Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead
(New York: Basic Books, 1988), p.281.
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
195
ing a kendo staff to Hashimoto’s throat. Hashimoto, an accomplished kendo player, had given him the staff as a present and himself set up the pose with it pointing to his own throat. The symbolism of the American negotiator threatening without knowing what
he was doing and fated to be defeated by his more sophisticated
Japanese opponent was not lost on the Japanese public.
The negotiations turned out to be a public relations bonanza for
Japan. Despite a history of Japanese protectionism and American
openness, suddenly Japan was claiming to defend the principles of
free trade against a U.S. government intent on imposing managed
trade agreements. The Clinton administration’s trade policy toward
Japan provoked a strongly negative reaction throughout Asia, where
leaders worried that if the U.S. effort to establish a results-oriented
trade regime with Japan succeeded, the United States would use the
same approach to strike bilateral deals with other countries in the
region that were much less powerful than Japan.
Clinton, to his credit, was unlike any earlier president in the importance he attached to international economic issues. He seemed to
understand instinctively that economic relations were an integral
component of national security. Convinced that the United States’
future well-being depended on its being the leader of the global
economy, he seemed far more interested in economic issues than in
the geopolitical ones that were the staple of the foreign policy establishment. He was not well informed about Japan, however, and he
surrounded himself with advisors who believed that Japan would do
what they demanded and who had prepared no fallback position if
their demands were not met.
Clinton personally and aggressively advanced the administration’s revisionist agenda with Japan. During the G-7 summit in Tokyo in the summer of 1993, after the Diet’s vote of no-confidence in
Miyazawa and in the middle of the election campaign for the Lower
House, Clinton used a reception at the American Embassy to meet
leaders of the opposition parties. He left the impression among Japanese that he preferred the opposition to the LDP and expected that if
the opposition parties came to power, they would curtail the bureaucracy’s powers and push economic reform. The LDP never forgave him, and it was one reason the party’s leaders were so pleased
to see Clinton’s chosen successor, Al Gore, defeated in the November
2000 presidential election.
Parties opposed to the LDP did take control of the government in
the autumn of 1993, but when Prime Minister Hosokawa visited
Washington in February 1994, Clinton greeted him with demands
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that Japan accept quantitative indicators and market sharing guarantees. While criticizing Japan for putting too much power in the hands
of the bureaucrats, Clinton was asking for the kind of guarantees
that could be made only if the bureaucracy enforced them. Hosokawa refused to bend to Clinton’s demands and the summit ended
in a standoff. For the first time in postwar U.S.-Japan relations a
meeting between the leaders of the two countries did not produce
some kind of an agreement. Hosokawa, who had been weakened
domestically by a fiasco involving a proposal to increase the consumption tax and by conflict among the ruling coalition parties, desperately wanted an agreement with Clinton to demonstrate his leadership abilities. His refusal to cave under American pressure brought
him some short-lived applause for being the first prime minister to
say no to the United States, but his failure to manage the American
relationship contributed to his fall from power a couple of months
later. Whatever their anger about Clinton’s trade policy, Japanese
business and political leaders understood that they needed a good
relationship with the United States.
After Hosokawa’s fall, Japan continued to dig in its heels about
being opposed to “managed trade,” with senior bureaucrats in MITI
saying not only that they would resist the Clinton administration’s
specific demands, but also that they would insist from that future
trade negotiations focus on multilateral agreements rather than bilateral deals.
The Clinton administration approached the end of its first term
with the effort to pursue a results-oriented trade policy toward Japan
having produced little more than frustration, disappointment, and
bitter feelings all around. By the time of his re-election, however, Japan was no longer the perceived threat that it had been when Clinton first came into office. The stock market and real estate bubble of
the late 1980s had burst, leaving Japan with economic problems that
grew only more serious as the new decade unfolded. The revisionist
assumption that Japanese global economic dominance could not be
stopped unless the United States departed from the normal rules of
international trade and imposed a managed trade regime on Japan
looked rather silly in the face of America’s economic renaissance and
Japan’s financial and economic mess.
The focus of attention in Clinton’s second term shifted from trade
to finance, and to the dangers that Japan’s banking crisis posed to the
international economy. The key administration player in Japan relations now was not the trade representative but Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Rubin. Enormous pressure was put on Japan, in-
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197
cluding repeated public scolding of Japan’s leaders for not dealing
more forthrightly with the crisis in the financial system. How effective this was is hard to say, but it is probably the case that U.S. pressure at least contributed to speeding the decision taken by Prime
Minister Obuchi in the fall of 1997 to nationalize the long-term credit
bank, which was eventually sold to an American consortium, and inject public funds into the banking system.
Japanese indecisiveness with respect to finance system reform
was a source of intense frustration in Washington, for which Rubin
became the primary spokesman. Clinton came into office thinking
that one of his major foreign policy challenges was how to deal with
Japan’s global international power, but in his last years as president
what he had to worry about was the danger to the international system posed by Japan’s economic weakness and the fragility of its financial system.
One other economic issue in U.S.-Japan relations during the Clinton years deserves mention. That is the sharply negative American
reaction to the Japanese proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund
(AMF). No sooner had Japan floated this proposal than U.S. Treasury officials rejected it. There appear to have been two reasons for
the American reaction. One was the concern that an AMF would
open a soft window for loans to countries that suffered from the
Asian financial crisis and thus undermine the tough policies of the
IMF. The other was that the AMF would be used by Japan to expand
its regional political influence at the expense of the United States.
A good case can be made that the United States overreacted to
this Japanese initiative, or at least reacted too quickly. It would have
made more sense to ask Japan to put its money on the table, to spell
out exactly what it was proposing, and to negotiate the details afterwards. There would be time to reject the proposal later, if that
seemed the best course of action. To the extent that there was concern that this was an effort on Japan’s part to gain political influence
in East Asia at U.S. expense, that reflected an overestimation of Japan’s ability to exercise political leadership in East Asia and a kind
of knee-jerk reaction to anything that suggested a break with the
status quo.
Enhanced Bilateralism
One of the successes of the Clinton administration in its dealing with
Japan relates to its handling of North Korea. This issue was managed
with considerable skill by Clinton’s special representative to review
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policy vis-à-vis North Korea, former secretary of defense William
Perry. Perry consulted closely with South Korea and with Japan on
the North Korean issue, and the pattern of trilateral consultations
that he employed provides something of a model for the future.
Traditional multilateral institutions are weak in East Asia, and
they are likely to pretty much stay that way. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) are useful organizations in terms of creating multilateral
channels of communication about economic and security issues.
They are not likely to develop into much more than that. The necessary ingredients for effective multilateral institution building are
much more scarce in East Asia than they are in Western Europe or
even in South America. Levels of economic development vary
widely, and political systems range from democratic to authoritarian. A sense that East (including North and Southeast) Asia is a discrete region with common interests is growing stronger, but it is still
weak. It will be many years at best before strong regional multilateral institutions develop.
U.S.–Japan–South Korean consultations about North Korea, however, reflect what might be characterized as “enhanced bilateralism.”
Perry consulted with Japan and with South Korea, and Japan and
South Korea consulted with each other and with the United States.
No trilateral institution was created, but effective tripartite dialogue
and policy coordination were achieved. This kind of noninstitutionalized multi-nation cooperation is occurring with respect
to other issues as well. It offers a more appropriate model for East
Asia for the foreseeable future than the Western European type of
regional organization does.
A related point, and related to the American response to the proposal for an AMF, is U.S. policy toward East Asian regional dialogues and organizations. The United States reacted strongly against
Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for an East
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), in part at least because Mahathir
himself was so overtly anti-western. But now the EAEC exists in all
but name in the form of ASEAN+three, and no great damage has
been done to American interests as a result. It makes sense for the
United States to lighten up in its criticism of East Asian regional initiatives from which it is excluded. Japan can play a greater political
as well as economic role in East Asia without threatening American
interests; indeed, in some ways a higher-profile Japanese role in the
region can help further U.S. interests. If it results in Japan’s becoming a bigger market for the exports of other East Asian countries, for
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example, that would be good news for the world economy and for
Japan. Fears that Japan might somehow surpass the United States as
the dominant political force in the region lack any grounding in reality. Other countries in East Asia, especially Japan’s nearest neighbors
Korea and China, would resist strenuously if Japan embarked on a
drive for regional power, replete with the military means to project
Japanese power.
Managing the Alliance
The picture I have drawn of the Clinton administration’s Japan policy is not a flattering one. Clinton did not bring people into his inner
circle of advisors who knew much (as distinct from thinking they
knew much) about Japan or about the people who hold important
positions in politics, government, and business in Japan. He did not
give relations with Japan the attention it deserved, and he himself
did not articulate a strategy that placed relations with Japan in the
larger context of U.S. policy in East Asia.
This is not as damning an indictment of the Clinton administration as it may appear, however. Previous administrations dealt with
Japan in a rather similar manner, as I argued in my chapter in the
previous volume in this series. This overall picture does not comport
well with the idea that the relationship with Japan is the United
States’ most important bilateral relationship bar none, as the late
ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield was fond of saying and many
others are fond of repeating. For a relationship that is supposed to be
so crucially important, the pattern of inattention on the part of top
American leaders is quite remarkable.
Yet what is more remarkable and more important is that the U.S.Japan relationship is strong and stable and that the two countries are
becoming ever more interdependent. Three factors help explain this
reality.
The most important is that government leaders in the United
States, and in Japan as well, whatever the bilateral frictions of the
moment, never lost sight of the reality that good relations between
the United States and Japan were in their country’s vital national interests. Thus economic frictions were not permitted to affect security
ties adversely, and trade conflicts were contained by the perceived
need to avoid a real trade war. Japan was not consulted to any great
extent by the United States as it developed its China policies, but no
administration permitted China policy to undermine relations with
Japan. The failures of U.S. policy toward Japan are primarily a mat-
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ter of lost opportunities to engage Japan more fully in the resolution
of a variety of international issues.
A second factor accounting for the strength of U.S.-Japan relations
is that governments are only a part and in many ways a small part of
the relationship. The economic interdependence that exists and that
is intensifying between Japan and the United States is the result of
decisions taken for reasons of self-interest on the part of private sector actors in both countries. This chapter has focused on government
and diplomacy, but a full treatment of U.S.-Japan relations in any period needs to analyze these private sector interactions.
Finally, the relationship has remained strong because at the governmental level it is managed by professionals who are committed to
maintaining good relations. The roles of individuals with responsibilities for Japan in the Defense Department and the Department of
State, and of the ambassador to Japan, though weaker than they
were in the early postwar period when a relatively coordinated Japan policy could be managed from the Japan Desk at the State Department, remain critical to the effective management of the alliance.
Professionals in the bureaucracy (who in the American case need not
be professional bureaucrats) have played a key role through successive administrations in managing this alliance and keeping it on an
even keel.
Some Thoughts About
the New Bush Administration
Whenever a newly elected president is not from the same party as
the outgoing incumbent, his election is invariably accompanied by
promises of important changes in foreign policy. So it was with
George W. Bush. When he succeeded Bill Clinton in the White
House, he promised, among other things, to take a harder line with
China and to pay more attention to working closer with Japan. He
came into office saying all the right things about consulting closely
with Japan and encouraging it to define its own role rather than
badgering it to play the roles the United States wanted it to play. He
also appointed people who had considerable experience dealing
with Japan to key positions in his administration.
The history of postwar U.S. foreign policy is a story of how these
promises for change go largely unrealized as the pressures for continuity gradually succeed in dominating the foreign policy decisionmaking process. Bill Clinton came into office promising to be
tougher with China than outgoing President Bush and left office ad-
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
201
vocating a strategic partnership and downplaying Chinese human
rights issues.
George W. Bush’s claim that China was a strategic competitor instead of partner led to speculation that the new administration was
going to emphasize the dangers of an emerging China threat and
seek to rally Japan and others to contain it. Within a few months after Bush came into office, the forces at work to pull China policy
back toward the center were in full swing. Whatever the long-term
security concerns, there was nothing to be gained politically, especially once the election was over, from tenser relations with China,
and there were powerful economic reasons for trying to maintain
good relations with China. China is, after all, a huge and growing
market and the target of an increasing amount of U.S. foreign direct
investment. The Bush administration is far more of a businessman’s
government than was the Clinton administration, and several of its
most important members have had experience in international business. Once in office, President Bush began the search for a China policy that would balance economic interests and security concerns,
which is precisely what his predecessor found himself doing.
With respect to Japan, the promise of closer consultations especially on regional security issues was premised on the assumption
that the Japanese were eager to engage in frank discussions and
make new meaningful commitments as a result of those discussions.
If previous experience were to be an accurate guide, it would not
take long before the administration concluded that these expectations were unrealistic. In the absence of a problem emerging that
made a focus on relations with Japan imperative, it seemed to be
only a matter of time before the Bush administration turned its attention away from Japan and focused on problems that needed to be
solved and on countries that could help solve them. It was unlikely
that Japan would consume much of the time that the president or his
chief advisors gave to foreign policy.
This was the situation before September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the
Pentagon in Washington changed the American understanding of
what national security means, and it also changed American understanding of what it means to be an ally. The implications for U.S.Japan relations are profound.
During the long years of the Cold War, U.S. security policy had
two overriding objectives. One was to maintain a credible deterrence
against a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, and the other was to
be able to project its force far from American shores to assist allies
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Gerald Curtis
and other friendly nations against aggression by third countries. The
need for homeland defense against anything other than a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union was all but inconceivable.
September 11 changed that thinking. Americans were made painfully and horrifically aware that they are vulnerable to attacks by
transnational networks of terrorist organizations. Reducing this
threat requires not only military action but also a worldwide cooperative effort to interrupt the flow of money to these organizations,
to gather and share intelligence about them, and to use political and
economic tools of diplomacy to reduce the ability of these terrorist
groups to attract new recruits.
The alliance the United States forged with Japan, obligating the
United States to defend Japan but imposing no reciprocal burden on
Japan in case of an attack on the United States, served the interests of
both countries during the Cold War years. The U.S. could take care
of itself; the problem was to assist the weaker state. The explicit
asymmetry in responsibilities was necessary to make the treaty compatible with the war-renouncing clause in Article 9 of Japan’s constitution and to reassure other countries worried about a potential revival of Japanese militarism and of Japan’s return to the status of a
major regional military power.
Whatever the limits of the legal obligations Japan assumed under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and however restrictive the limits
on the roles of the Self-Defense Forces imposed by the current government interpretation of Article 9, the view of Japan as an “ally” of
the United States would not have survived a Japanese failure to become involved in the U.S.-led effort in the aftermath of September 11
to reduce the terrorist threat posed by Osama bin Ladin and his alQaeda organization. Prime Minister Koizumi recognized this reality.
He got the Diet to pass legislation that made it possible for Japan to
provide rear-area support in the Indian Ocean for U.S. military actions, to provide security for refugee camps in Afghanistan, and to
assume the task of protecting the security of U.S. military bases in
Japan. Various public opinion polls indicated that his decision to
stand firmly with the United States in fighting terrorism was supported by a majority of the Japanese public.
It is far too early to say how September 11 will affect U.S.-Japan
relations, and Japanese foreign and military policy more broadly.
Three points deserve to be emphasized. One is that U.S.-Japan relations would be in crisis had Koizumi not acted as decisively as he
did. The second is that U.S. and Japanese leaders need to repeatedly
emphasize the point that what is at issue is not what Japan should
U.S. Policy Toward Japan in the 1990s
203
do in response to U.S. demands, but what Japan should do in its own
self-interest in cooperation with the United States and other countries to combat terrorism. If the issue is phrased in terms of responding to U.S. pressure, the only outcome can be U.S. displeasure that
the Japanese response is not bigger and Japanese resentment that
they are being dictated to by the Americans. Koizumi has been careful to put the issue in terms of Japanese self-interest. The mass media’s penchant for looking for U.S. “pressure” and for presenting
Japanese government policy as a response to that presumed pressure, however, remain as strong after the traumatic events of September 11 as it was before.
U.S. relations with Japan grew stronger in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack on the United States. As time goes on,
however, the geopolitics of East Asia will re-emerge in the form of
new challenges to American and Japanese policymakers. The terrorist threat has suppressed rivalry and stimulated new patterns of cooperation among states, including U.S. relations with China and
with Russia. Agreement that there needs to be a global coalition to
counter terrorism also muted Chinese and Korean concerns about
the participation of Japanese military forces in support of U.S. actions in Afghanistan. Over time, however, the security issues that
were of concern to the United States and Japan before September 11,
including North Korea and Taiwan and how to maintain a balance of
power in East Asia, will reassert themselves. Economic issues may
surface even more quickly, given the depth of Japan’s economic
problems and the adverse bimpact of the terrorist attack on the U.S.
and world economy. The challenge of managing relations with Japan
in a manner that contributes positively to U.S. national interests will
be even greater in the future than it has been in the past.
Japan’s Policy Toward the
United States During the 1990s
Koji Murata
The 1990s are often called Japan’s “lost decade.” In this decade, Japan faced a series of international crises and domestic political and
economic disruptions. Nonetheless, the U.S.-Japan alliance grew
stronger during the decade, and the prime minister played a critical
role in this effort. This chapter examines Japan’s policy toward the
United States, in the international and domestic contexts of the time.
The first half focuses on how Japan responded to the security crises during the early and mid-1990s, and the second half on the process of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Security Crises
The 1990s were the first decade after the end of the Cold War. In January 1989, the Showa Emperor passed away at the peak of prosperity in
postwar Japanese society. At the end of the 1980s, Japan’s Gross National Product (GNP) accounted for about 15 percent of the total
world GNP. It was often said, in those days, that the real threat for the
—————
Koji Murata is Professor of Diplomatic History at Doshisha University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
204
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
205
United States was not Soviet military power but Japanese economic
power and that the real victor of the Cold War was not the United
States but Japan and West Germany. Nonetheless, Japan soon demonstrated that it was not the real victor of the Cold War.1 As Kitaoka
Shin’ichi points out, in the early and mid-1990s, Japan faced serious
security challenges, internationally, regionally, and domestically.2
THE GULF CRISIS AND THE PKO BILL
First, Japan failed to respond promptly and properly to the Gulf
CRISIS in 1990. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and announced the annexation of Kuwait on August 8. During the Cold
War era, Iraq would have been prevented from taking such an action
by the Soviet Union for fear of a clash with the United States. The
Gulf crisis was the first serious security crisis in the post–Cold War
era. The United Nations passed a resolution asking Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait. In mid-August, the United States and other countries
decided to dispatch armed forces to the Middle East.
Washington expected Japan to play a substantial role in the crisis.
Money was not enough. During a visit to Washington, Tanba Minoru, deputy director-general of North American Affairs Bureau of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), sent a message to Tokyo
that the gap between the two countries was very serious and that
Tokyo should take strong measures, for Japan’s response would decide the future of U.S.-Japan relations for the next ten to twenty
years.3 Although the Japanese economy depends heavily on Middle
Eastern oil, Japan nonetheless decided to contribute only economic
assistance to the multinational forces let by the United States. On
August 30, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki announced economic assistance of U.S.$1 billion for recovering
peace in nonmilitary areas such as medical aid and refugee assistance. On September 14, the Kaifu administration decided to add $3
billion more. Japan’s contribution was criticized by the United States
and other countries as “too little and too late.”
—————
1. Iokibe Makoto, ed. Sengo Nihon gaikoshi (Postwar Japanese diplomatic history)
(Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1999), pp. 226–27.
2. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Nihon no anzen hosho: reisengo 10 nen no chiten kara” (Japan’s security ten years after the end of the Cold War), Gaiko Forum, special issue of
1999.
3. Kunimasa Takeshige, Wangan senso to iu tenkanten (The Gulf War as the turning
point) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1999), pp. 30–31.
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Koji Murata
Japan, which tended to understand international military conflicts
as either defensive or offensive wars, lacked a sense of responsibility
for international security affairs. During the crisis, Japan failed to
pass the United Nations Peace Cooperation bill in the National Diet.
According to a public opinion survey in November 1990, 78 percent
opposed dispatching the Self Defense-Forces (SDF) abroad, and only
15 percent supported it. After Prime Minister Kaifu submitted the
bill to the National Diet, his approval ratings decreased from over 50
percent to 33 percent.4
It was unfortunate that at this critical moment the Japanese government was under the weak leadership of Prime Minister Kaifu.
Since the Japanese public saw him as a clean politician at a time of
political scandals, Kaifu enjoyed relatively high public support.
However, he belonged to the smallest faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Prior to assuming the prime ministership, Kaifu
was known as a dove who lacked experience in foreign and security
affairs. Prime Minister Kaifu hated even to meet with senior officials
of Japan Defense Agency (JDA) during the crisis.
On January 17, 1991, the multinational forces led by the United
States began air raids against Iraq. Japan immediately decided to
contribute $9 billion more to the multinational forces. Ozawa Ichiro,
powerful secretary-general of the LDP, was an advocate of dispatching the SDF to the Middle East. He recalls: “The dreams of peace in
Japan were broken by the Gulf War. In this sense, it was like the
Black Ships at the end of the Edo era.”5 Ozawa also introduced an interesting story. A SDF officer met an American officer and told him
that each Japanese was contributing about $100 to solving the crisis.
The American responded: “I will pay you $100. So, would you go to
the war on my behalf.”6 Michael Armacost, then U.S. ambassador to
Tokyo, who was often called “Mr. Gaiatsu” (Mr. External Pressure),
recalls:
The hesitancy of Japan’s initial response, the multitude of conditions imposed on its financial contribution, its reluctance to share the risks as well as
the costs of a major multilateral venture, and its tendency to reach tough decisions only under the most intense international pressure prompted questions among many Americans about its reliability as an ally and global diplomatic partner. At the same time, many Japanese were irritated by the
intensity of US criticism and resented the fact that their financial support for
—————
4. Asahi shinbun, Nov. 6, 1990.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
207
Desert Storm was all too often ignored in Western celebrations of the coalition’s victory.7
Under Ozawa’s leadership, on April 26, after the end of the war, Japan
dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. This decision caused
wide controversy in Japan and created a split in the LDP. The minesweepers served in the Gulf and returned to Japan on October 30.
As the end of his term as the president of the LDP drew near,
Kaifu repeatedly expressed his “indomitable resolve” for political reform. The Takeshita faction, the majority faction in the LDP, however, decided not to support him. On October 4, 1991, Kaifu withdrew from the race for president of the LDP. On November 23,
supported by the Takeshita faction, Miyazawa Kiichi was elected as
the next prime minister. Miyazawa, a longtime prime ministerial
candidate, was one of the most brilliant and experienced politicians
in the LDP.
Based on the lesson of the Gulf crisis, on June 6, 1991, Ozawa created in the LDP a special committee on the role of Japan in the international community. Then, the LDP tried to pass in the National Diet the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) bill. Given Japan’s important role in
the Cambodian peace process, Ozawa and others wanted to have the
SDF participate in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The bill was, however, not passed in the National
Diet during the extraordinary session of 1991. Many LDP members
criticized Prime Minister Miyazawa, a well-known dove, for not
pushing the bill enough to pass it. Miyazawa, realizing the bill was
crucial to his political survival, then supported it more vigorously.
Finally, on June 15, 1992, supported by the LDP as well as the Clean
Party or Komeito and the Social Democratic Party, the so-called PKO
bill was passed in the National Diet. Under the new law, the SDF was
able to participate in PKO activities under the United Nations. This
was Japan’s first step for international security beyond its own territorial defense since the end of World War II. Nonetheless, Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is still limited to logistical
support assignments such as medical care, transportation, communications, and construction services. The assignment of peacekeeping
forces for monitoring disarmament, as well as for garrisoning and patrolling buffer zones, is “frozen” pending new legislation. Prescribing
limits for military activity has been a common pattern of postwar
—————
7. Michel H. Armacost, Friends or Rivals: The Insider’s Account of U.S.-Japan Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 51–52.
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Koji Murata
Japanese defense policy.8 The Japan Socialist Party ( JSP) and the
Communist Party, however, made repeated efforts in the National
Diet to resist the passing of even this moderate bill. Under this new
law, more than 1,200 SDF members participated in UNTAC.
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
In February 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
demanded the right to inspect nuclear facilities in North Korea. In
March, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In spring 1994, the United States dispatched five aircraft carriers to the sea around North Korea. In those
days, a slim majority of the American public thought that it was
“worth risking war” to prevent North Korea from manufacturing
nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense under Secretary William Perry drew up a detailed contingency plan for bombing North
Korean nuclear facilities. Based on experiences in Vietnam and Persian Gulf, General Gary Luck, the U.S. commander in Korea, estimated that as many as a million people would be killed in a fullscale war on the Korean Peninsula, including 80,000 to 100,000
Americans.9 It was the most serious security challenge in Northeast
Asia since the end of the Cold War.
The United States prepared an Operation Plan “50-27.” According to this plan, Japan was expected to exercise its right of selfdefense in case of a Korean contingency. Washington wanted to
discuss the plan with Tokyo because, according to General Robert
Riscassi, former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Japan was an
“integral part” of the operation. Tokyo, however, reportedly refused even to discuss it.10
In those days, Japan suffered from a terrible political vacuum. In
the July 1993 general elections for the House of Representatives, the
LDP lost its majority and Prime Minister Miyazawa resigned. In the
new coalition government under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, many cabinet members, including the prime minister himself,
lacked experience in foreign and security affairs. Furthermore,
—————
8. Koji Murata, “Japan,” in Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000, ed. Richard W. Baker
and Charles E. Morrison (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange [JCIE],
2000), p. 102.
9. Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1997), pp. 323–24.
10. Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (Alliance adrift) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1997), p. 314.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
209
Hosokawa abruptly resigned eight months later, and the Hata Tsutomu cabinet that followed lasted only for 64 days.
The United States unofficially asked Japan about the possibility of
dispatching minesweepers to protect U.S. aircraft carriers. The JDA
refused, saying it was unconstitutional. In the Gulf crisis, Japan had
dispatched them only after the end of military actions. But the JDA
realized that logistical support and intelligence exchanges with the
United States were necessary in the event of an emergency on the
Korean Peninsula. In this political vacuum, the bureaucracies took
the initiative. The Cabinet National Security Affairs Office organized
a working group to examine Japan’s possible contributions in the
case of a conflict in Korea. Officials from the JDA, the MOFA, the
National Police Agency, and the Cabinet National Security Affairs
Office participated in this four-agency meeting. When, in spring
1994, the United States demanded that Japan contribute 1,059 items,
the working group was expanded.
Reportedly, soon after the Hosokawa cabinet was established, the
government completed a policy paper for responding to issues such
as Japanese civilian evacuation from South Korea and ship inspections on the high seas. Also, when the Hata Cabinet was established
in April 1994, the government was almost ready to submit several
bills to support the U.S. forces and to enhance the activities of the
SDF in case of contingencies in Korea.11 Nonetheless, basic questions
still remained unanswered. First, it was not clear if Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defense. Second, it was also unclear
how the Japanese government would ask for cooperation from local
governments, which controlled civilian ports and airports, to support U.S. forces under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the United States. Third, under the prior consultation system, it was not certain if the Japanese government would
respond affirmatively to the direct dispatch of the U.S. fighters to
combat areas in the Korean Peninsula.
Fortunately, the crisis was averted after former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang. Nonetheless, this experience reminded the U.S.-Japan security policy community of the lack of
readiness of the alliance. Ishihara Nobuo, then deputy chief cabinet
secretary, recalls:
The United States believed that because the embargo aimed at preventing
North Korea from developing nuclear weapons was for the security of Japan, Japan should cooperate with the United States as much as possible. I
—————
11. Asahi shinbun, Sept. 16 and 17, 1996.
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Koji Murata
thought at that time if the situation became worse, it would be a big problem. I was concerned that the relations with the United States might fall into
trouble and that the operations of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty might malfunction. So, I pointed out the necessity of making a crisis manual immediately to the ministries and agencies concerned.12
The discrepancy between American and Japanese attitudes toward
the security of Korea was clear. Japan tried to respond to the crisis in
the context of U.S.-Japan relations.
THE OKINAWA PROBLEM
When the tragic rape incident occurred in Okinawa on September 4,
1995, the foundations of the U.S.-Japan alliance were again seriously
shaken. Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, recalls, “It was a shock like a typhoon.”13
American responses were quick. On September 12, Aloysius O’Neill,
counsel general in Okinawa, visited Governor of Okinawa Ota Masahide to apologize. On September 21, President Bill Clinton stated in a
radio address that the United States deeply regretted the incident.
On the other hand, neither Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, the
JSP leader, nor Foreign Minister Kono Yohei apologized to Okinawa
about this incident. Governor Ota resentfully recalls, “While the
Japanese government always emphasizes the importance of the U.S.Japan security relationship, without any apology, it took an indifferent attitude toward the rape incident in Okinawa, the core place of
the alliance.”14 In fact, although Okinawa comprises only about 0.6
percent of Japan’s total land mass, about 75 percent of all U.S. military installations in Japan are on Okinawa. The Murayama cabinet
also failed to respond properly to other crises such as the HanshinAwaji earthquake in January 1995 and terrorism by a religious cult
group in Tokyo in May 1995, which consequently expanded the
Japanese sense of insecurity and accentuated the balance of crisis
management.
Nishimura Kumao, former director-general of the Treaty Bureau,
MOFA, expressed the essence of the asymmetrical character of U.S.Japan alliance as “cooperation between the material factor and the
—————
12. Ishihara Nobuo, Shusho kantei no ketsudan (Decisions in the prime minister’s office) (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1997), p. 142.
13. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu.
14. Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan (Decisions on Okinawa) (Tokyo: Asahi
shinbunsha, 2000), pp. 174–75.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
211
human factor.”15 The former refers to the U.S. bases in Japan, and
the latter to the U.S. armed forces. Now, there was a possibility that
the core of U.S.-Japan security relations, America’s stable use of its
military facilities in Japan, might be seriously endangered. One reason this incident generated such a large public outcry was that the
U.S. soldiers suspected of the crime remained under the control of
the U.S. military under the SOFA. Japanese police were not allowed
to take suspects into custody until there was an indictment.16 The
United States agreed to revise the way in which SOFA was implemented. Through the initiative of Ambassador Walter Mondale during a visit by Secretary of Defense Perry to Japan at the end of October, the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in
Okinawa (SACO) was established to talk about reduction and realignment of U.S. bases on Okinawa. In retrospect, however, it was
a mistake for the Japanese and the U.S. authorities not to specify
the conditions under which Japanese police would be allowed to
take American suspects into custody before indictment. For, when
another rape incident happened in June 2001, it still took five days
before an American soldier suspected of the crime was taken into
custody by Japanese police, which again sparked a large outcry in
Okinawa.
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, who succeeded Murayama in
January 1996, was eager to resolve U.S.-Japan tensions and to consolidate U.S. bases on Okinawa. In 1996 alone, he met Governor Ota
five times. Hashimoto also established a private consultative body
on Okinawa for the chief cabinet secretary headed by Shimada Haruo, a professor of economics at Keio University, and appointed
Okamoto Yukio, a former MOFA official, as special assistant to the
prime minister on Okinawa. They frequently visited Okinawa.
In April 1996, under the interim report of SACO, the U.S. government agreed to relocate the Marine Corps air station at Futenma,
one of the most controversial bases in Okinawa, within five to seven
years—providing another suitable location was found for those
forces. The final report in December 1996 called for the return of
eleven U.S. military facilities, accounting for approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. bases on Okinawa. The return of
—————
15. Nishimura Kumao, San Francisco heiwa joyaku, Nichi-Bei anpo joyaku (The San
Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) (Tokyo: Chuko bunko,
1999), p. 48.
16. Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), ed., Asian Security, 1996–1997
(Tokyo: RIPS, 1997), p. 21.
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Koji Murata
seven of these are contingent on successful relocation within Okinawa prefecture.17
The final SACO report, however, did not resolve the Okinawa
base issue. Under the Special Law Governing Land for Armed Forces
Stationed in Japan, it was possible for the government to forcibly
lease land from individuals who would refuse to voluntarily enter
into land-lease contracts. But the law required that in such a case the
mayor or the governor must sign the lease contract in place of the
landowner. In the event that the governor should refuse, the central
government must initiate proceedings against him to force him to
carry his duties. Then, the issue would go to the Land Expropriation
Committee. In the case of the U.S. military’s Sobe Communications
facility, scheduled to expire in May 1997, more than 3,000 landowners refused to renew their leases. Governor Ota also refused to sign
the documents required to continue the forced lease of the land. In
August 1997, the Supreme Court allowed the central government to
take action to force the governor to carry out his duties. Then, Governor Ota accepted this judgment and signed the documents. Ota
feared that if he continued to refuse, the central government would
revise the Special Law Governing Land for Armed Forces in Japan.
During this process, however, the Hashimoto administration
reached the conclusion that the law should be revised. Although
Hashimoto failed to obtain the support from the JSP, then a member
of the governing coalition, he succeeded in receiving support from
the New Progressive Party (Shinshinto) led by Ozawa Ichiro. On
April 17, the law was passed in the National Diet with an overwhelming majority. Under the revised law, even after an expiration
of contract, with proper compensations for landowners, the central
government can temporarily use the land until legal proceedings are
completed. Governor Ota, who had once compromised, felt betrayed
by the government.18
In the gubernatorial election in Okinawa on November 15, 1998,
Inamine Keiichi, a local business leader supported by the LDP, defeated Ota. He appealed to voters to overcome the recession in Okinawa by restoring healthy relations with the central government,
which had provided limited economic aid to Okinawa while Governor Ota had been uncooperative. He received 374,833 votes to Ota’s
337,369. Inamine proposed the construction of new airport in Nago
—————
17. Eiichi Katahara, “Japan,” in Asia Pacific Security Outlook, 1998, ed. Richard W.
Baker and Charles E. Morrison (Tokyo: JCIE, 1998), p. 73.
18. Ota, Okinawa no ketsudan, p. 256.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
213
city for shared use by civil aviation and the U.S. military over a period of fifteen years. The prospects for base reductions in Okinawa,
however, remain uncertain. Michael Green observes, “The modus
operandi of base issues will have to change to converge with an increasingly fluid Japanese political scene and growing Japanese aspirations for control of the modalities of the alliance.”19
What do these crises reflect about Japan’s security policy during
the early and mid-1990s? First, the Gulf War made clear the lack of a
Japanese sense of responsibility for international security beyond its
own territorial defense in the post–Cold War era. One effort to address this resulted in the PKO Law, although the law restricted Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations to logistical
support activities. Second, the North Korean nuclear crisis revealed
Japan’s lack of preparation for cooperating with the United States in
regional security emergencies. Experts both in Tokyo and in Washington realized the necessity of establishing a new framework for the
U.S.-Japan alliance in the highly volatile East Asian security environment. Third, tensions over the Okinawa base issue created a
problem for a stable long-term U.S.-Japan alliance. In order to reduce
the U.S. bases in Okinawa, Japan needed to take action, but the tensions between the national government and Okinawa officials has
made it difficult to resolve base issues in a timely fashion.
The crux for resolving these issues, however, lay in Japan’ s domestic political uncertainties and the U.S. approach to Japan under
Presidents George Bush and William Clinton, which concentrated on
pressuring Japan for economic openings. President Bush, for example, brought senior auto executives with him to Tokyo in January
1992 in order to highlight trade issues with Japan. When President
Clinton came to power in January 1993, he brought into government
officials who were even more eager to push Japan on economic issues. The alliance seemed to drift.
The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
In February, 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa established a committee headed by Higuchi Kotaro, the president of Asahi Beer, to consult with him on defense issues. Other core members included Watanabe Akio, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, and
—————
19. Michael J. Green, “The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations
After the Cold War,” in New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis
(Tokyo: JCIE, 2000), pp. 250–51.
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Koji Murata
Nishihiro Seiki, former administrative vice minister of defense. According to Prime Minister Hosokawa, he chose Nishihiro because he
was the most liberal of the former senior JDA officials. Hosokawa believed that Japan needed a new defense policy after the end of the
Cold War. He expected a drastic reform and asked the Higuchi
Commission to discuss ideas that could for the basis of a new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The original NDPO had
been adopted in October 1976, and this was to be the first major revision since then.
In August 1994, after meeting twenty times, the commission submitted its report to Prime Minister Murayama. The report, widely
known as the “Higuchi Report,” was entitled “Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: Outlook for the Twenty-First
Century.” It was a very bold report that reaffirmed the importance of
the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post–Cold War era. For public acceptance it was important that the report was conducted under the leadership of a prime minister, not just by the JDA bureaucracy. Former
Prime Minister Hosokawa, who had initiated this process, however,
reportedly felt betrayed because the strong pro-alliance content of
the report seemed to him a reflection of JDA views.20 Also, the Higuchi report advised the expansion of multilateral efforts as the new direction for Japanese security policy. This caused fears among some
security specialists in Washington. Soon, two young security specialists, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, responded to the Higuchi
report by publishing their own report, “Redefining the U.S.-Japan
Alliance.” In general, American security experts tend to call the reexamination of security relations a “redefinition,” whereas the Japanese government uses the less drastic term “reaffirmation.” In this
report, the two authors suggested the possibility of revising the
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978 for strengthening the alliance.21
Watanabe Akio, however, notes: “There was nothing to undermine the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. . . . We just tried to
trace the logic from the multilateral theme to the bilateral theme and
to Japan’s own defense policy.”22 In fact, as Michael Mochizuki
points out, the original Japanese word for multilateral was takakuteki.
—————
20. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp. 261–64.
21. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994).
22. Interview with Professor Watanabe Akio, Hiroshima, Dec. 5, 1998.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
215
This Japanese word could also be translated as “multidimensional.”
If it had been translated in this way, the concept would probably
have been less provocative.23
Perhaps American uneasiness stemmed from two sources. The
first is the fact that the report was submitted to Murayama, a Socialist prime minister who had long denied the importance of the U.S.Japan alliance. Ironically enough, however, it was lucky that the
process of restrengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance was initiated under the Murayama cabinet, since it was difficult for leftist forces to
attack a Socialist prime minister. It is interesting that it was the left
wing instead of the right wing of the JSP that had promoted the formation of a coalition government with the LDP.24
The second is that President Clinton had paid little attention to
the U.S.-Japan alliance. In fall 1994, Joseph Nye, a prominent Harvard professor of international politics, assumed the position of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Since
the U.S.-Japan alliance was adrift, Nye wanted to strengthen the alliance. In November, he visited Tokyo and exchanged opinions
with Japanese policy elites. Helped by Ezra Vogel, his Harvard colleague and a famous Japan expert, in February 1995 Nye and his
bureau of the Department of Defense (DOD) completed the report,
entitled “The United States’ Security Strategy in East Asia and the
Pacific,” or the so-called Nye Report. The DOD report of 1990, “East
Asian Strategic Review” (EASI), had outlined a process for restructuring and reducing the U.S. forces in the region “without jeopardizing [U.S.] ability to meet its security commitments” in three
phases.25 The intended readers of the 1990 report had been the U.S.
public and the Congress, who had wanted the “peace dividend” after the Cold War. For the Nye Report, they were the American allies in Asia who were concerned about possible further force reductions in the region.
The Nye Report includes several important points for the U.S.Japan alliance, which will have an important influence on Japan’s national peace and security. First, it demonstrated the U.S. defense
commitments in the region by maintaining a forward presence of
—————
23. Mike M. Mochizuki, ed., Toward A True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), p. 37.
24. Hara Yoshihisa, Sengoshi no naka no Nihon shakaito (The Japan Socialist Party in
postwar history) (Tokyo: Chuko shinsho, 2000), pp. 312–14.
25. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1990).
216
Koji Murata
about 100,000 U.S. troops for the foreseeable future. Second, it emphasized the extreme importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the region. Third, it also expressed the U.S. determination to promote multilateral cooperation and dialogue.26
By 1995, the JDA had already been preparing for the revision of
the NDPO for five years. The Nye Report helped this process very
much. In fact, Murata Naoaki, then administrative vice minister of
defense, reportedly said that it was “an ideal time” to revise the
NDPO.27 In the new NDPO, adopted in November 1995, the term
“U.S.-Japan security arrangements” is mentioned eleven times (in
the old NDPO of 1976, the term appears only twice). The new
document also refers to the possibility of taking appropriate responses in the areas surrounding Japan by ensuring the effective
implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements. Reportedly, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau was concerned about the constitutionality of going beyond a strictly self-defense oriented doctrine as in the 1976 NDPO.28
The Okinawa rape incident, however, made these bureaucratic
efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo insufficient. Now, higher
political leadership was required. In November 1995, President
Clinton was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Murayama in the
Osaka meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum. Due to the urgency of the U.S. budget debate in the United
States, Clinton’s visit to Japan was postponed until April 1996. During this delay, several important things happened to the U.S.-Japan
alliance. First, responding to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s
visit to the United States in July 1995 and the Taiwanese presidential election in May 1996, China conducted provocative missile exercises near Taiwan. These incidents convinced Tokyo and Washington of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the volatile
East Asian security environment. Second, in January 1996, Prime
Minister Murayama resigned, and Hashimoto Ryutaro, a LDP conservative leader who was keen on defense issues, replaced him. In
the LDP, Kawara Tsutomu, former JDA director-general, was appointed chairman of Security Policy Research Commission. As for
further strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, Kawara played a key
—————
26. Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East
Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995).
27. Murata Naoaki, “Tomen suru boei mondai” (Urgent defense issues), Nihon no
anzen hosho ni kansuru koenshu (Collection of speeches on Japan’s security) (Tokyo: Nihon sekai senryaku forum, 1997), p. 219.
28. Mainichi Shinbun, Aug. 9, 1996.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
217
role in building consensus among LDP and JDA officials.29 Third, in
February 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto met President Clinton in
California, and the two agreed on the consolidation and reduction
of U.S. bases in Okinawa.
In April 1996, when President Clinton visited Tokyo, he and
Prime Minister Hashimoto made public the Joint Security Declaration. The declaration affirmed that the U.S.-Japan security relationship “remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for
the Asia-Pacific region as well as we enter the twenty-first century”
and that “a continued US military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” Clinton also
reaffirmed that the United States would meet its commitments in the
prevailing security environment and that it would be necessary to
maintain “its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region.” The two leaders further
agreed to initiate a review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation of 1978.30
Based on the U.S.-Japan Declaration on Security, the guidelines
were revised in September 1997. Because the new guidelines define
the role of U.S.-Japan alliance in a post–Cold War era, their scope is
much wider than that of the 1978 guidelines. The new guidelines, for
example, mention the U.N. Charter and include humanitarian activities such as emergency relief operations. They also set forth more
concrete terms. While the new guidelines “will not obligate either
Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures,” “the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their judgments, in their
specific policies and measures.”
At the heart of the new guidelines are the sections related to a
“situation in areas surrounding Japan.” They read:
When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.
The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing
further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas sur-
—————
29. Nakajima Kuniko, “Nihon no gaiko seisaku kettei katei ni okeru Jiyuminshuto
Seimu chosakai no yakuwari” (Role of Policy Research Commission of the Liberal
Democratic Party in the foreign-policy decision-making process), in Nihon no gaiko seisaku kettei yoin (Domestic determinants of Japanese foreign policy), ed. Gaiko seisaku
kettei yoin kenkyukai (Tokyo: PHP kenkyusho, 1999), p, 84.
30. RIPS, Asian Security, 1996–1997 (Tokyo: RIPS, 1997), pp. 18-19.
218
Koji Murata
rounding Japan. . . . They will support each other as necessary in accordance
with appropriate arrangements.
As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on
Japan’s peace and security, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect
lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. Forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.31
The new guidelines also make an attempt at bilateral defense
planning and mutual cooperation planning. The latter aims at “to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding
Japan in peacetime.” The promotion of mutual cooperation planning
is a sort of overdue homework that should have taken place under
the 1978 guidelines. The new guidelines also establish “a bilateral
coordination mechanism involving the relevant agencies of the two
countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.”
When the guidelines were issued, Prime Minister Hashimoto told
reporters that “we have a massive amount of work before us, such as
working out specific legislation and government ordinances.”32 In
order to do so, in fact, policy coordination among almost all central
agencies (probably, except for the Imperial Household Agency and
the Ministry of Education), local governing bodies, and the private
sector under strong political leadership was required. It was, therefore, very unfortunate that the Hashimoto cabinet had to devote itself to cope with the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. Hashimoto’s
economic policy, especially the increase in a sales tax, also caused a
serious recession in Japan. In 1997, Japan’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) decreased 0.7 percent over the previous year. It was the first
time Japan had suffered from negative economic growth in 23 years.
In April 1998, the Japanese government finally submitted to the
Diet bills to implement the new guidelines: (1) a new bill providing
for rear-area support to U.S. forces during an emergency in a surrounding area; (2) the revision of the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA); (3) the revision of the SDF Law to allow the dispatch of Maritime SDF ships to evacuate Japanese nationals; and (4) a new basic bill to allow Japan to search suspicious vessels during an emergency. In July, however, the LDP lost the upper
house elections, and Hashimoto had to resign. Obuchi Keizo, Hashi—————
31. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” Sept. 23, 1997.
32. RIPS, Asian Security, 1998-99 (Tokyo: RIPS, 1998), p. 63.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
219
moto’s successor, could not pass the bills in the National Diet because of the serious confrontation with the Democratic Party, the
biggest opposition party, over the finance recovery bill.
In August 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile (as Japan
believes) or a satellite (as North Korea claims) over Japanese territory. Although Japan had already been within the range of North
Korean missiles, this incident shocked the public. The Japanese government quickly decided to suspend its financial aid to the Korean
Energy Development Organization (KEDO). It later agreed to resume it in October. Washington and Seoul were concerned about the
deterioration of the KEDO regime. The Japanese government also responded quickly, determining that it should develop its own reconnaissance satellites, a proposal endorsed by U.S. Defense Secretary
William Cohen. And in March 1999, two North Korean ships were
found in Japanese waters near the Noto Peninsula. The Japanese
government authorized the Maritime SDF to engage these ships,
which had ignored an order to stop in the Japanese territorial waters.
This was the first such order since the SDF was established in 1954.
These incidents increased the sensitivity on security affairs of the
Japanese public. Furthermore, between these incidents, Prime Minister Obuchi formed a coalition government that included the Ozawa
Ichiro–led Liberal Party in January 1999. Then, supported by the
governing parties and the Clean Government Party, the guidelinesrelated bills were finally passed by the National Diet in May 1999.
The major issues, and the government response, were as follows:
1. Should the bill make it clear that it comes within the framework
of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty? The final bill states that it is within
the framework of the treaty.
2. What is the definition of “situations in areas surrounding Japan”? The concept is not geographical but situational; included in
the final bill is the qualification: “for example, cases that may develop into a direct military attack on Japan if let alone.”
3. Do plans for action by the SDF require advance approval by the
National Diet? Diet approval is required in principle, but in emergencies approval can be retroactive.
4. Is a U.N. Security Council resolution required for the SDF to inspect suspicious ships on the high seas? The Liberal Party was
strongly opposed to this condition. The bill on this issue was separately passed in December 2000. Under the law, either a U.N. resolution or an agreement from a flag country is required.
5. Is it possible to distinguish clearly between a combat area and a
rear area (in which case the SDF would provide logistical support to
220
Koji Murata
U.S. forces in an action)? The newly established Constitutional Research Commission of the National Diet will discuss the question together with the concept of collective self-defense.
6. How specific must the government be in requests to local governing bodies and the private sector for their cooperation with U.S.
forces? On this question the government sought to demonstrate the
degree of specificity by providing ten examples.33
Two things should be examined about the above-mentioned process:
the Sino-U.S.-Japan relationship and changes in policymaking process in Japan. First, China has repeatedly expressed its concerns about
the new guidelines, and these Chinese attitudes have influenced
Japanese domestic politics. Soon after the interim report of the new
guidelines was made public in June 1997, for example, Kato Koichi,
then secretary-general of the LDP, said in Washington that the Taiwan Strait should be excluded from the areas surrounding Japan.
Responding to these remarks, however, Kajiyama Seiroku, then chief
cabinet secretary, noted that the strait should naturally be considered
one of these areas. During a visit to Beijing in September 1997, Prime
Minister Hashimoto, therefore, felt compelled to reassure China that
“no specific areas are being discussed” with regard to “situations in
areas surrounding Japan.”34 Whether Taiwan is included in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” or not, however, cannot be determined in advance for it depends on Beijing’s and Taipei’s behavior.
The Clinton administration’s attitudes toward Japan shifted from
“Japan bashing” to “Japan passing.” Serious trouble began to affect
the U.S.-Japan relations soon after Clinton was inaugurated and continued until the summer of 1995. To resolve economic disputes,
Washington applied pressure on Japan to achieve a number of numerical targets. For the first time, anti-U.S. groups emerged among
elite bureaucrats and business leaders who had previously been proAmerican. That was why Nye and others were seriously concerned
about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Then, after strengthening security ties with Japan, in June 1998
Clinton visited China to improve relations with it, but failed to stop
in Tokyo at either end of the China visit. During his talks with President Jiang Zemin of China, Washington’s new “strategic partner,”
Clinton made disparaging remarks about Japan’s economic difficul—————
33. Murata, “Japan,” pp. 98–99.
34. Murata Koji, “Do the New Guidelines Make the Japan-U.S. Alliance More Effective?,” in, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century, ed. Nishihara
Masashi (Tokyo: JCIE, 2000), p. 31.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
221
ties. But this “Japan passing” was only a slightly annoying episode
in the U.S.-Japan relations.35 The real problem lies neither in Clinton’s failure to stop in Tokyo nor in what he said in Beijing to Jiang.
It lies in what he did not say there. In Beijing, President Clinton
should have talked about the importance of the U.S.-Japan security
relationship, for it is important for Beijing to understand that the
U.S.-Japan alliance will remain firm.36
Second, the process of revising the guidelines had an impact on
Japan’s defense policy in several ways. First, it reflected a greater
promotion and institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan security dialogues. Second, it influenced relations between the MOFA and the
JDA, which became more horizontal as more JDA officials became
familiar with strategic issues. Third, the influence of uniformed officers of the SDF in defense policymaking also increased. And finally,
the integration of SDF’s three service functions is progressing
through dialogues with their U.S. counterparts.
After the passage of the guidelines-related bills, however, the bureaucracies tended to lose clear policy goals on security issues. Furthermore, a series of scandals weakened the influence of bureaucracies on the policymaking process in general. The MOFA and the JDA
are, of course, not exceptions. In October 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi made a strong coalition government with the Liberal Party and
the Clean Government Party. This made it more difficult, however,
to coordinate security policy among the governing parties. Obuchi
also decided to hold the 2000 summit meeting in Okinawa in order
to demonstrate Okinawa’s contribution to regional security and to
stimulate the local economy. But, in April 2000, he suddenly passed
away. Now there was a vacuum since the power of the bureaucrats
had declined but politicians were not yet strong enough to manage
highly debatable policies.
The frequent changes of prime minister and the difficulty in gaining political consensus greatly complicated Japan’s decision-making
and implementation on security issues. Kaifu, a dovish prime minister, failed to respond properly to the Gulf crisis, the first serious security challenge in the post–Cold War world. Although Miyazawa
passed the PKO act, his attitudes to the security affairs were reactive
and passive. Believing in the necessity of a new liberal security
framework for the post–Cold war environment, Hosokawa initiated
the review of Japan’s new defense policy, which ironically led to the
—————
35. Iokibe Makoto, “Good Signs for the Alliance,” Japan Times, Mar. 19, 2001.
36. Comment of a former senior Japanese government official.
222
Koji Murata
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, since this was not his intention. Hata, due to his extremely short prime ministership, did not do
anything substantial. Murayama failed to respond to crises such as
the Okinawa rape incident, the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and the
terrorism by the religious cult. Ironically again, however, this Socialist prime minister played a role in promoting the redefinition or reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Hashimoto himself was convinced of the importance of solving the Okinawa problem and
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Faced with the Asian economic crisis and the defeat in the upper house elections, however, he
could not achieve his goals. Obuchi tried to achieve these goals politically more carefully than Hashimoto, but his sudden death unfortunately brought an abrupt end to his efforts.
Lessons
It seems to be safe to say that, faced with serious security challenges,
Japan succeeded in strengthening its alliance with the United States
during the 1990s. Despite domestic political and economic problems,
Japan demonstrated its adaptability in the area of security affairs.
Without this, the 1990s would have really have been a “lost decade.”
In this sense, as Tanaka Akihiko points out, the Japanese government’s experiences in the 1970s when it adopted the original NDPO
and the original guidelines under the new security environment may
have worked as rehearsals for those in the 1990s.37
Nonetheless, Tokyo’s approaches to the security issues were very
incremental and reactive to a series of crises. This was true of postwar Japanese security policy before the 1990s and remained true beyond the 1990s. In critical moments, bureaucrats tended to play a
key role. Occasionally, politicians took an initiative, but not for long.
Although new frameworks such as the new guidelines were established, basic questions such as the possibility of exercising the right
of collective defense are still open. The new security frameworks
such as the new guidelines and the guidelines-related acts were too
complicated for the general public to understand. Public education
about the security affairs is inadequate. The continuing fear among
Japanese of being entrapped in U.S. military actions remains a serious obstacle. Soon after the guidelines were adopted, for example, in
November 1997 a public opinion survey conducted in both Japan
—————
37. Tanaka Akihiko, “1970 nendai no anzen hosho seisaku no tenkan” (Changes in
Japanese security policy in the 1970s), Gaiko Forum, special issue, 1996.
Japan’s Policy Toward the United States During the 1990s
223
and the United State found that 39 percent of American respondents
expected that Japan would take military actions in response to a military emergency in Korea, but only 2 percent of Japanese did.38 The
Japanese public must be prudent in its readiness to take military action in response to military contingencies in Taiwan because of the
danger of conflict with mainland China.
In order to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, there are a number of lessons we should learn from the experiences of the 1990s.
First, Japan should examine its security policy not only from the perspective of what Washington wants but also from the perspective of
what it needs. Second, Japan and the United States should further
promote security dialogues at political, bureaucratic, and academic
levels. Third, whatever the short-term costs, Japanese politicians and
bureaucrats should undertake a broader effort to educate the public
on security issues. We should avoid overemphasizing a single factor
such as the North Korean military threat to justify the importance of
the U.S.-Japan alliance. Fourth, Japan and the United States should
promote multilateral security cooperation as well as bilateral cooperation. The revival of multilateral diplomacy was one of the significant characteristics in East Asian international politics in the 1990s.
There is no doubt that the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to cultivate
healthy multilateral frameworks that can include other countries. 39
—————
38. Yomiuri shinbun, Nov. 24, 1997.
39. Akihiko Tanaka, “International Context of U.S.-Japan Relations in the 1990s,”
in New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, p. 290.
Part IV
Sino-Japanese Relations
Sino-Japanese Relations at the
Turn of the Century (1992 to 2001)
Zhang Tuosheng
In 1992, both China and Japan solemnly commemorated the twentieth anniversary of relations, dispelling the shadow over the bilateral
relationship since 1989. Relations between the two countries were
fully restored and were moving forward. Sino-Japanese relations
during these twenty years experienced friction and setbacks, yet the
dominant trend was toward friendly cooperation. However, in
the early 1990s, new waves of problems arose between China and
Japan. By the mid-1990s, the overall atmosphere had become very
tense as bilateral relations reached their lowest point since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. Where Sino-Japanese
relations would head became a serious concern of the governments
and peoples of both countries. As history enters the twenty-first century, with efforts from both sides, the bilateral relations have basically recaptured a momentum of smooth development and have
formed a new framework for the future. Although the path ahead is
—————
Zhang Tuosheng is a Researcher at the China Foundation for
International and Strategic Studies.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
227
228
Zhang Tuosheng
still tortuous and bumpy, there is reason to expect Sino-Japanese relations are off to a good start for the new century.
This review of Sino-Japanese relations from 1992 to 2001 is divided into three sections: the basic situation of the Sino-Japanese relations, how to view the major differences between the two countries, and the conclusion.
The Three Periods of
Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1990s
Sino-Japanese relations underwent twists and turns in the decade after 1992. The decade witnessed a relative smooth start and conclusion, but, in between, relations deteriorated for some time. Developments in the decade can be divided into three periods.
1992–94
In the first period, bilateral relations were stable and smooth with
progress in many years. Generally speaking, bilateral relations did
not change significantly from the end of the Cold War until 1994. In
1992 China and Japan achieved a high tide of friendly cooperation as
they solemnly commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two countries. Beginning in 1994,
old frictions returned and new frictions cropped up, cooling the relationship.
The high tide in 1992 was symbolized politically in the exchange
of visits between General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Emperor Akihito. Japan pointed out to China its desire for developing stronger
Sino-Japanese relations while maintaining strong Japan-U.S. relations, the so-called two-wheel diplomacy. Through frequent highlevel contacts, both sides reiterated their determination to continue
to develop Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of the Joint Communiqué and Friendship Treaty.
Economically, the two countries in 1993 achieved three “firsts”:
Sino-Japanese trade set a historical record as Japan became China’s
number-one trading partner and China became Japan’s secondlargest trading partner. In Chinese technology imports, Japan ranked
first. The investment of Japanese enterprises in China leaped also to
first place.1
—————
1. Liu Jiangyong, ed., Japan at the Turn of the Century: New Political, Economic and
Diplomatic Trends (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 1995), p. 403.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
229
In the security area, the two countries in 1993 held the first round
of security dialogues and in 1994 restored military contact that had
terminated in 1989. Furthermore, international cooperation between
the two sides was strengthened as cultural and personnel exchanges
expanded rapidly.
Even during this period of good relations, some frustrations occurred. For example, in 1992, the adoption of the PKO Bill in Japan,
permitting Japanese armed forces to go overseas, aroused concern in
China. In 1994, after the formation of a coalition government (composed of three parties—the LDP, Socialist Party, and Sakigake Party),
Japanese political and social trends grew more conservative. Japan
became concerned with China’s “increase in defense spending,” and
public support grew for linking economic aid to China with China
ending its nuclear tests. Despite Chinese protests, Japan invited Xu
Lide (vice chair of the Executive Yuan of Taiwan) to visit Japan. Nagano Shigeru and some other cabinet ministers distorted Japan’s aggressive history against China. All these cast dark shadows over the
smooth development of Sino-Japanese relations.
1995–96
With the redefinition of U.S.-Japan relations, it became clear that the
positive strategic cooperation between China and Japan against the
Soviet Union in the Cold War had come to an end. Some Japanese
politicians made comments on Taiwan and on history that heated
friction between the two countries. By 1996 the severe escalation of
frictions and differences between the two countries had made bilateral relations fall to their lowest point since the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations. The growth in bilateral economic relations
slowed but still grew at a fast pace, and this bond prevented relations from further deterioration. To forestall further deterioration,
the Japanese government adopted some measures to improve bilateral relations.2 The Chinese government, on the one hand, made
some stern representations to Japan while, on the other, it exercised
—————
2. In November 1996, after the second Hashimoto cabinet was formed, the new
cabinet soon announced a policy of improving Sino-Japanese relations. Hashimoto
emphasized this policy repeatedly on important occasions, such as the summit meeting of the two countries in Manila, where he said, “Sino-Japanese relations are as
important as U.S.-Japan relations.” He announced that Japan would adhere to the
“Murayama acknowledgment” on the history issue. The summit meeting in Manila
became the basis for resuming and advancing Sino-Japanese relations.
230
Zhang Tuosheng
considerable restraint. By the end of 1996, bilateral relations began
turning for the better, and tensions eased.
Many frictions and disputes between the two countries appeared
during these two years. By politicizing economic aid, Japan exerted
pressures on China to stop its nuclear tests by a 95 percent cut in
untied grants and threatened to freeze government loans. China
strongly protested this pressure on its nuclear testing. Japanese
rightist forces used the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory in the worldwide anti-fascist war to engage in large-scale organized activities to reverse the judgment of history.3 This made the “no
war” clause adopted by the Japanese Diet an empty measure. This
decision represented a refusal to conduct a sincere re-examination of
the past.4 In 1996, Hashimoto, in his capacity as prime minister,
openly paid homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, where the tablets of the
first-grade war criminals are kept.5 His visit to the Yasukuni Shrine
underlined the mutual differences between the two countries over
the history issue. Concerning the Taiwan issue, Japan attempted to
invite Lee Teng-hui to Osaka for the 1995 APEC meeting, then issued
a “protest” to China on its missile exercises against Taiwan’s “independence forces” in 1996, becoming the only Asian country that
showed this support for Taiwan. In 1996, Japan and the United
States issued their Joint Declaration, which redefined the Japan-U.S.
alliance and brought profound changes in Japanese-U.S. security cooperation. This new move triggered strong concern in China. In the
same year, some Japanese right-wing organizations landed on the
Diaoyu Islands a number of times, but the Japanese government
—————
3. For example, over 200 LDP members formed the “Parliamentarians’ League for
the 50th Anniversary of the End of the War” to hinder the Diet from adopting a resolution reflecting on Japan’s role in World War II. The “People’s Committee for the
50th Anniversary of the End of the War,” with more than 5 million members,
launched a campaign to collect signatures demanding the Diet not use the words “aggression,” “colonial rule,” and “territorial expansion” in the resolution reflecting on
Japan’s role in World War II.
4. In the summer of 1995, the Japanese Diet adopted the “Bill on Drawing Lessons
from History and Reiterating Our Determination to Preserve Peace.” It delivered condolences, without distinguishing the invader from the invaded, completely avoided
acknowledgment of the aggressive nature of the war; and stated that there were many
instances of colonial rule and invasion in history so as to cover up Japan’s role as the
main state that embarked on aggression and colonial rule in World War II. Japan
promised only a “re-examination” to victimized people and countries but refused to
apologize. For this reason, this resolution was severely criticized by progressive
groups in Japan and by other Asian countries.
5. Hashimoto’s action broke precedent—no prime minister had paid homage at the
Yasukuni Shrine since 1985.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
231
adopted a quietly permissive attitude, which revived the territorial
disputes between the two countries that had been quiescent.
Yet, even during this period, some aspects of bilateral relations
made some progress. Economically, Japanese investment continued
to increase. The total contracted investment set a new record of
U.S.$7.59 billion in 1995, which then made Japan the second-largest
investor following the United States in China. Bilateral trade continued to grow, exceeding U.S.$60 billion in 1996. Politically, the
changes in Japan’s attitudes toward the “no war clause” received a
very poor response from Asian countries, Prime Minister Murayama, in August 1995, made a speech on Japan’s aggressive history
on behalf of the Japanese government.6 This speech was well received by the Chinese government and was significant in suggesting
how the two countries might successfully manage the history issue
in the future. Furthermore, China and Japan maintained high-level
contacts and cooperated in international affairs in many areas. Prime
Minister Murayama visited China in May 1995,7 and he met President Jiang Zemin at the end of the year in New York. The meeting
between President Jiang and Prime Minister Hashimoto, as well as
the meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries at
APEC at the end of 1996 in Manila, laid a strong foundation for improving bilateral relations in the years to come.
1997–2001
In this third period, frictions and disputes between the two countries
still existed, but they were brought under better control with joint effort by both countries. Bilateral relations gradually improved, and by
2000 there was a new momentum of overall improvement. The new
trend of bilateral relations heralds the hope that in the early twentyfirst century relations may gradually emerge from protracted difficulties in adapting to the end of the Cold War and enter a new period of relatively stable and normal development.
—————
6. In this speech Murayama stated, “In a period not long ago, an erroneous state
policy took Japan to war. . . . The colonial rule and invasion caused untold destruction
and suffering in many countries, especially Asian countries. . . . Without reservation, I
face up to this historical fact and again express my deep re-examination and sincere
apology.”
7. Murayama was the first Japanese prime minister to visit the Lugou Bridge, the
site where Japan launched its comprehensive invasion of China. He inscribed his
name in the visitor’s book with the comment, “acknowledge history, pray for friendship and lasting peace between Japan and China.”
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The major progress made between the two countries during 1997–
2001 is as follows: Politically, through strengthening high-level dialogues, the two sides reached an agreement to make joint efforts to
achieve a friendly and cooperative partnership.8 This move establishes a new framework for developing Sino-Japanese relations in
the twenty-first century. In 1997, Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Li
Peng exchanged visits. In 1998, President Jiang Zemin paid a state
visit to Japan.9 In 1999 and 2000, Prime Minister Obuchi and Premier
Zhu Rongji exchanged visits.10 In 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi paid
a working visit to China.11 These high-level exchanges played an important role in shaping the new framework of bilateral relations.
Economically, due to the impact of the East Asian financial crisis,
bilateral trade volume and Japanese direct investment in China had
begun to slow down and even to decline. But in 1999, the trade volume began to rise, and since 2000 trade growth accelerated,
reaching new peaks of U.S.$83.17 billion in that year and $87.75 billion the following year. Direct investment topped $4.35 billion in
2001, 49 percent higher than that of 2000. In 1999 Japan took the
lead among developed countries in reaching an agreement with
—————
8. The definition of the partnership goes beyond the traditional bilateral relationship. The two countries expressed their determination to enhance their international
cooperation, while continuously promoting friendly bilateral cooperation. This has
significance for the future development of their bilateral relations.
9. During this visit the leaders of both countries decided to establish a partnership,
set up a hot line, and exchange visits of national leaders every two years. They signed
33 agreements. Furthermore, the two sides addressed the handling of the issues on
history and Taiwan, on which they still had differences, and important results were
achieved. For example, Japan acknowledged its aggression of China in history explicitly in the Joint Declaration and made an oral apology; Japan declared its will to continue to observe the position on the question of Taiwan expressed in the 1972 Joint
Statement and reiterated that there is but one China and that Japan will only maintain
people-to-people and regional contacts with Taiwan.
10. Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Japan, aiming to “increase trust and reduce suspicion,” was a complete success. He carried on spontaneous dialogue with Japanese on
live TV, making a favorable impression on the Japanese audience.
11. To resolve the difficulty in bilateral relations caused by Japanese history textbook and homage to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers, Prime Minister
Koizumi paid a one-day working visit to China on August 8, 2001. Upon arrival in
Beijing, he immediately went to Lugou Bridge, where the Japanese aggression broke
out, paid homage to the Chinese People’s Memorial of the War Against Japanese Aggression, and delivered on the spot a speech of apology to the Chinese people, remorse of history and the desire against waging war again. President Jiang Zemin and
Premier Zhu Rongji held meetings with the Japanese prime minister. Then in late October Chinese and Japanese leaders met again when the prime minister attended the
APEC Informal Leadership Meeting in Shanghai.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
233
China on China’s entry into the WTO. In recent years, the two
countries have seriously explored cooperation on China’s “western
development program.” With the progress of the so-called “10+3”
dialogue between ASEAN on the one hand and China, Japan, and
South Korea on the other, both countries have adopted a more positive attitude on multilateral economic cooperation and regional
economic integration in East Asia.
The two countries gradually enhanced their military and security
consultative mechanisms through successful exchange of visits of
high-level military leaders.12 In 1999 both sides signed a memorandum, beginning the process of disposing of the chemical weapons
left behind in China by the Japanese army in World War II. The two
countries also consulted on setting up a mutual notification mechanism for marine investigation and reached an agreement on reciprocal visits by naval fleets as well. Cultural exchanges and personnel
visits were also fruitful. In 2000, Japan organized a delegation of
5,000 people to visit China and opened its tourist market to China,
marking a new phase in people-to-people exchange between the two
countries.
In 1997–2001 a number of issues served as sources of friction between the two countries. A series of measures for intensifying the
Japan-U.S. military alliance and the rising voices for amending the
Japanese Constitution deepened China’s concern over Japan’s future
direction. Japan also expressed grave concern over China’s increase
in military spending. The activities of pro-Taiwan groups in Japan,
such as publicly asserting that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers
Taiwan and inviting Lee Teng-hui, the representative of Taiwan independence forces, to Japan,13 triggered strong opposition from
China. On the history issue, there were many instances when Japanese distorted and negated their aggressive history.14 In 2001, differ—————
12. In 1998 and 1999, the two sides successfully conducted the exchange of visits
between the defense minister of China and the director general of the Japan Defense
Agency and also between the general chief of staff of the PLA of China and the director general of Japan's Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two sides elevated the irregular diplomatic and defense consultations of the personnel concerned, begun in 1997, to regular
security dialogues at the bureau chief level and later the ministerial level.
13. See the statement of Seiroku Kajiyama, the chief Cabinet secretary, on emergencies in the surrounding areas in August 1997, in Yomiuri, Aug. 18, 1997.
14. Summary of the War in East Asia, published in 1997 in Japan, completely and
systematically propagates a positive view of the war. This book aroused a shock
among top leaders in China. The book was edited by the “History Research Commission,” a group of 105 Diet members with Hashimoto as an advisor. According to some
Japanese scholars, the book is not influential in Japan, and many Japanese have never
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ences on history issues resurfaced as the Japanese government released two history textbooks that overtly beautified and denied the
history of Japanese aggression,15 and newly elected Prime Minister
Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine amid strong opposition from
China, ROK, and other countries. The appearance of Chinese research vessels in areas disputed by the two countries and of naval
vessels in the area adjacent to Japan aroused strong responses from
the Japanese media. At the same time, the issue of reducing ODA to
China again came to the fore. The year 2001 also saw the first serious
trade war between the two countries.16 In addition, the rise in crimes
committed by Chinese nationals in Japan, and the default on debts
from the bankruptcy of Chinese companies, such as GITIC, added to
the frictions between the two countries.
The Major Differences Between the Two Countries
Clearly, Sino-Japanese relations at the turn of the century had made
progress, but frictions and differences were growing, bringing about
negative impacts on bilateral relations. Some differences have disappeared, some are hopefully being resolved step by step, but many of
them may continue for a long time to come. It is important to analyze
the differences in order to reduce disturbances and uncertainties and
to realize a healthy development of bilateral relations in the future.
During this period, the major issues creating frictions between the
two countries are China’s nuclear tests, Japan’s efforts to reduce
ODA to China, historical issues, the Taiwan issue, Diaoyu Island,
and the renewal of the Japan-U.S. military alliance. Underlying all
these problems is a more significant issue, the strategic suspicion between China and Japan.
FRICTION OVER CHINA’S NUCLEAR TESTS
Nuclear testing was the first serious issue to emerge between the two
countries after 1992. Russia, Britain, the United States, and other nu—————
heard of it. This just reflects the complexity and sensitivity of the history issue between the two countries.
15. The issue of Japanese history textbooks caused serious problems in SinoJapanese relations in 1982 and 1986.
16. In April 2001, Japan decided to exercise “temporary urgent restrictions” over
the import of three Chinese agricultural produces. China considered the Japanese
move against WTO rules and, when the effort to urge a negotiated solution failed, was
forced to take countermeasures by increasing tariffs over automobiles, handheld or
vehicle-mounted mobile phones, and air conditioners.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
235
clear powers declared moratoria on nuclear testing in early 1990s.
The international community began to negotiate for the conclusion
of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) in 1995. Against
this background, while supporting the conclusion of CTBT, China, as
the latest power to develop nuclear weapons, conducted its last four
nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996. Japan reacted strongly to the tests, not
only lodging protests but also exerting economic pressure by threatening to stop ODA to China. Japan’s action set off a serious dispute
between the two countries.
The dispute did not reflect fundamental differences over the two
countries’ views of arms control and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Rather, it reflected certain policy differences caused by
their different experiences and situations. Japan is the only country
to have been the victim of nuclear explosion and is the only major
power to have foresworn the development of nuclear weapons.
Therefore it is understandable that the Japanese people are especially
sensitive to nuclear testing and advocated an early signing of the
comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Japanese public opinion exerted
strong pressure on the Japanese government. However, on the Chinese side, as a country that has long lived under a nuclear threat,
China developed its nuclear weapons only for its own survival.
From the time it first developed nuclear weapons, China has solemnly declared it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and
has undertaken far fewer nuclear tests than other nuclear states. It
was therefore understandable for China to conduct the last few nuclear tests to guarantee its nuclear weapons’ safety before signing the
CTBT, and the Chinese people supported this policy.
Under these circumstances, the temporary difference should have
been tackled through consultations and mutual understanding, but
the Japanese government adopted the method of exerting economic
and political pressure on China. Japan’s demands were naturally rejected by China. The Chinese believe that Japan overresponded. In
the Chinese view, (1) Japan is a country under the protection of a nuclear umbrella, and its status is thus very different from that of other
states that do not possess nuclear weapons. (2) Japan had uttered not
a word in the past when the United States conducted nuclear test explosions but now strongly criticized China, whereas the numbers of
tests conducted by China and the United States were not even comparable.17 (3) The fact that Japan linked ODA with China’s nuclear
—————
17. Before declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing in October 1992, the United
States had conducted 1,030 tests. Before a similar declaration in July 1996, China had
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tests was in fact politicizing economic aid and interfering in China’s
internal affairs. At that time, the sanctions against China by some
Western countries, led by the United States since 1989, had not been
totally lifted, and Japan’s linkage of the political issue with the economic issue could only heighten China’s resentment at such pressure. During the ODA dispute, the Japanese Foreign Ministry supported the reduction of aid grants to China but, in consideration of
Japan’s national interests and the overall Sino-Japanese relations,
was not in favor of stopping all loans. Its efforts played a role in preserving loans to China and prevented a further escalation of the bilateral dispute. Since China and Japan have no fundamental differences over the basic direction of international arms control and
nonproliferation efforts, this dispute ended when China declared a
moratorium on nuclear tests in July 1996 and signed the CTBT in the
October 1996.
It is worth pointing out that the dispute over the nuclear issue did
not last long, but it had far-reaching unfavorable effects on the bilateral relationship. At the time, Japanese media made use of this issue
to propagate the “China threat,” which had a very negative impact
on Japanese public opinion toward China.
FRICTION OVER JAPAN’S ODA TO CHINA
This is a problem for the bilateral relationship that first emerged in
1992. This problem is not very serious in comparison with other issues. However, if it is not handled properly, it could have a damaging impact on bilateral relations in the future. Until now, bilateral
friction over ODA has been in the following three areas: (1) Japan’s
tendency to politicize economic aid; (2) Japan’s criticism that China
gives little publicity to Japan’s ODA; and, (3) the growth of public
opinion in Japan to cancel ODA.
Japan first began politicizing economic aid in the mid-1980s, but
this did not affect the giving of aid to China before the early 1990s.
Japan further politicized the issue when the Four Principles on
ODA18 were officially put forward by the Japanese government in
—————
conducted a total number of 45 tests. The figures are still the total numbers of tests by
the two countries up to now.
18. While conducting economic aid, Japan will take into account the following factors: (1) the military spending of the recipient countries, (2) weapons development
and production of the recipient countries; (3) weapons import and export of the recipient countries; and, (4) the extent of democratization, a free market economy, basic
human rights, and the guarantee of freedom in the recipient countries.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
237
1992. Japan linked ODA with China’s nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996,
taking the first step toward adjusting economic aid on the basis of
political criteria. In 1999 and 2000, the issue of “Chinese research
vessels” led Japan again to use ODA to pressure China. Why does
Japan politicize its aid policy? Perhaps Japan’s chief consideration is
to use its economic strength as a lever to increase its political power
and promote its political influence. However, practices in international relations suggest that it is not strange at all to provide economic aid with political strings, but any such move as a tool for
pressure openly usually fails to achieve its political objective and
harms bilateral trade relations, especially when the object of pressure
is a major power like China. In the Chinese view, this is pouring oil
on the fire. It achieves no constructive results. Therefore, the Japanese might well seriously consider whether to do it again or not in
the future.
With respect to China’s attitude toward Japan’s ODA, the Japanese government expressed dissatisfaction time and again, and the
Japanese media’s reactions have been even stronger.19 The Japanese
argument is that Japan provides China with huge amounts of annual
economic aid, but the Chinese government seldom gives it publicity,
fails to express appropriate appreciation, and the Chinese people
have little knowledge of it. This is puzzling for the Japanese people.20
This Japanese perspective is at best incomplete. In fact, since starting
the cooperation of governmental funds between the two countries in
1979, for a fairly long period of time, China had always spoken
highly of it, explaining that the aid from Japan supported Chinese reform and opening and played an important role in speeding Chinese
modernization. During a short period in the 1990s, there was less
publicity and less praise for Japanese aid. There are perhaps two reasons. First, Japan’s politicizing of economic aid caused dissatisfaction
and concern among Chinese. Second, some Chinese had begun to
take Japanese economic aid for granted.21 Actually, the fundamental
—————
19. When Japan provided ODA to China at the very beginning, the Japanese politicians felt, on the one hand, like the rich helping his poor neighbor and, on the other, as
providing for some compensation for China’s giving up the war indemnity demand.
As a result, they were quite low key about ODA. Huge changes took place in this regard in the 1990s.
20. Kono Yohei, “Establishing Genuine Friendly and Cooperative Partnership,” Japan Bulletin, no. 124, Cultural Section, Embassy of Japan to China, Oct. 31, 2000, p. 20.
21. According to this view, since the Japanese invasion caused China an astronomical and incalculable loss and China gave up its claim for war indemnity, Japan
should naturally give economic aid to China. It is understandable why some wished
to link Japanese economic aid to China with China’s abandonment of war reparations,
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reason was that the friendly sentiment of the Chinese toward the
Japanese people had begun to fade away as a result of increased friction over the issue of history. In the autumn of 2000, as bilateral relations began to improve, the Chinese government held a solemn
ceremony to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Japan’s
governmental aid to China. Furthermore, during a visit to Japan,
Premier Zhu Rongji praised Japanese economic aid highly and
promised more publicity for it in the future. These efforts demonstrated China’s formal position on ODA and played a positive role in
rooting out misunderstanding and reducing friction.
Japanese demands for reducing or even canceling ODA has several roots. One is the above-mentioned frictions and the influence of
the “China threat” theory. Another is the Japanese government’s
budget constraints caused by the economic stagnation in the 1990s.
These problems have had an unfavorable impact on the cooperative
atmosphere between the two countries, although it has not directly
damaged bilateral governmental funding. The Japanese government
has taken a prudent attitude toward this problem. While reassessing
ODA to China, it continues carrying out the agreements for cooperation and continues to consult with China over this matter. It is wise
for Japan to take this stance. Japan’s ODA to China is beneficial not
only to Chinese economic development but also to Japanese economic development. This cooperation has become an important
symbol22 for the friendly and cooperative relationship. A change in
this policy would have a serious unfavorable impact on their bilateral relations. It is likely that after the completion of the fourth preferential Japanese government loan, Japan will still continue ODA to
China if there are no serious setbacks in Sino-Japanese relations and
if the Japanese economy improves, although there may be some
changes in content, form and volume.
—————
but it is inappropriate to do so because it runs counter to the decision by Chairman
Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. At the time, China’s decision to give up war
reparations was based on two considerations: (1) showing friendship to the Japanese
people and freeing them from the hardship of the payment, and (2) drawing lessons
from learning from the history after World War I (the Treaty of Versailles, which
specified that Germany should pay a tremendous amount of war reparations, plunged
the Germans into serious difficulties, thus triggering German desire for revenge).
China in no way considers it appropriate to substitute aid for reparations. Japanese
economic aid to China is mutually beneficial cooperation based on bilateral willingness.
22. At present, China receives the largest amount of Japanese ODA, and Japan
ranks first among the countries providing ODA to China.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
239
DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HISTORY
Different views of history have been an old, core problem in SinoJapanese relations. It caused trouble for the bilateral relationship
several times in the 1980s and became more serious in the 1990s. The
continuing problems arising from “slips of the tongue” by Japanese
cabinet ministers in 1993 and 1994, to the large-scale and wellorganized activities of the right wing for reversing history in 1995,
1996, and to the incident of Japanese textbook and the problem of
Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, indicate that the settlement of the history
issue between the two countries has a long way to go.
As in the 1980s, frictions in bilateral relations in the 1990s were
again caused mainly by the Japanese side, and the biggest source of
trouble was the Japanese rightist forces. Their repeated denial of Japan’s history of aggression and glorification of wartime activities
evoked very strong reactions from Chinese people and the government. However, the situation in the 1990s differed from that of the
1980s. This decade saw obvious development of the Japanese society
in a more conservative direction. The weakening of progressive forces
made them less capable of exerting adequate political pressure on the
wrong actions of the Japanese government. In this situation, the Japanese rightist forces run rampant in distorting history. Meanwhile,
China and Japan began to diverge further away from each other in
history education. As time passed by, the young generation in Japan
knew little about history as a result of intentional neglect of education
in modern history. Whereas in China, patriotic education stressed in
the 1990s focused very much on that history of humiliation that must
not be forgotten. As a result, the two people increasingly saw history
differently. At the same time, with the rapid expansion of public media, any news event, once it occurred, has a far more rapid and extensive influence than in the past. The coverage by the media sometimes
“reflected” and “magnified” the reactions of both sides. Therefore, it
is actually not difficult to understand why the frictions between the
two countries on the historical issue escalated.
In the Chinese view, Japan has consistently failed to look seriously at its own provocations while accusing China of overreacting.
In recent years, as Japan’s sense of guilt faded and nationalism rose,
Japan has developed “apology fatigue.” Japanese say they are tired
of China’s demand for an “apology” and do not want to talk about
the problem any more. They say China will never be satisfied, and
China wishes to manipulate the history card. These views have
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gained support among the new generation of Japanese leaders,23 but
Chinese believe these views are unfounded.
Long before the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties,
Chinese leaders often mentioned three things when meeting Japanese friends: (1) The Japanese are a great people. (2) The responsibility for World War II rests with a small number of militarists, not
with the Japanese people, who were also the victims. (3) Since Japan
had apologized for what it had done in the past, China was willing
to let bygones be bygones, and that the two countries should look to
the future. This attitude was reiterated by China when the two countries re-established diplomatic relations in 1972 and when they
signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. It is clear that had it
not been for serious incidents in which Japan continuously glorified
and denied its history of aggression, China would not have tangled
with Japan on the history issue.
Of course, since the 1970s, Japanese leaders have, indeed, made
some apologies to China and progressed in acknowledging the aggressive war.24 However, as Premier Zhu Rongji said during his visit
to Japan in 2000, so far Japan has not made a formal, written apology
to China. Meanwhile, the frequent denials of its aggressive history
and the “slips of the tongue” by many high-level officials detract
from the apologies.
It is unfortunate that twice in the 1990s Japan missed opportunities to rid itself completely of historical burdens. Once was in 1995,
the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. At that time, Asian countries universally expected the Japanese Diet to adopt a sincere resolution of self-reexamination, apology, and renunciation of war in order to address the historical issue. However, the resolution passed
by the Diet deeply disappointed them, leading to severe criticism
from the media in Asian countries, including progressives in Japan
itself. The second chance was President Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit to
Japan, when China expected Japan to make a formal apology on the
—————
23. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 94.
24. During his visit to China in 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka’s attitude on the historical issue was: “During the past few decades, my country created a lot of troubles
for the Chinese people. . . . I expressed my deep self-reexamination.” After serious
criticism from Premier Zhou Enlai, the Japanese side in the “China-Japan Joint Communiqué” added the following paragraph, “The Japanese side deeply felt the responsibility of inflicting major destruction on the Chinese people because of the war and
expressed deep self-reexamination.” In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone for the
first time recognized that to China the war was a war of aggression. In the 1990s, the
attitudes of Hosokawa and Murayama on the history issue were universally praised
by China and other Asian countries.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
241
history issue in the Joint Declaration. This would have completely
settled the problem and created prospects for improved bilateral relations. But, in the end, China’s goodwill was rejected by Japan.
South Korea and Japan announced in 1998 that they had solved the
problem of history, but friction has returned because of the Japanese
textbook and the Yasukuni Shrine problems. Such events make other
Asians think that although an official resolution or apology is important because it is legally binding, considering the current situation in
Japan, the history issue is unlikely to be resolved once and for all.25
Despite these difficulties, the history issue does not necessarily
have to plague Sino-Japanese relations long into the future. The unfortunate history occurred more than fifty years ago, and Japanese
society has undergone profound changes. Although remnants of
militarism still exist, since the overwhelming majority of Japanese
people despise them, the militarists cannot rise again. For China,
what really merits attention is Japan’s current policy and future direction. Regarding the erroneous views of history that exist in Japan,
we should rely on Japan’s farsighted politicians, objective scholars,
and fair-minded media to educate the Japanese public and increase
their awareness in order to finally resolve the issues. In this longterm process, whether the friendly relations and cooperation between China and Japan can continue developing is vital.
Keen foreign observers will have already noticed that, when talking about the history issue and Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese
leaders often used the saying, “If the past is not forgotten, it can be a
guide for the future.” But in recent years, they often quote another
saying, “Take history as a mirror and face the future.” To me, this
change is very significant.26 The latter saying reflects a more pragmatic attitude of the Chinese government toward the history issue,
as well as its sincere wish to look to the future. This new attitude influences China’s policy to Japan, and if it receives a positive response
—————
25. There are very complex reasons for this situation in Japan. It has something to
do with unique Japanese religious and cultural background and the sense of tragedy
stemming from its history as a victim of the atomic bomb attack. But the most fundamental reason is the uncompleted post–World War II democratic reform. In this regard, the United States must shoulder responsibility. It kept the monarchy and adjusted its Japan policy purely out of its own strategic interests with the appearance of
the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War. As a result, Japan actually failed to
clean up militarism, and the general public on the whole has not had a clear view of
history.
26. According to the literal meaning of the two sayings in Chinese, “Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future” is similar to “take history as a mirror.”
“Face up to the future” is a new idea not implied in the former.
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from Japan, both countries may transcend history and embark on a
path like the reconciliation between Germany and France.27
FRICTION ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE
The Taiwan issue, the major political precondition for normalizing
relations between China and Japan, was addressed and resolved by
the Three Principles for re-establishing diplomatic relations.28 After
normalization of relations between the two countries in the 1970s
and 1980s, there were no serious bilateral frictions on this issue. But,
since 1993, the Japanese government, responding to Taiwan’s “pragmatic diplomacy” has continuously elevated Taiwan-Japan relations
and promoted official exchanges. In addition, Japan had been critical
of China in its struggle against Taiwan independence. This problem
extended beyond political to security issues, creating serious frictions involving both areas.
After World War II, the Japanese retained strong pro-Taiwan sentiments and maintained many kinds of ties with Taiwan, including
with Taiwan “independent forces.” Their anti-China and pro-Taiwan
position resulted from their anti-Communist ideology and nostalgia
for the era of colonial rule over Taiwan. The links with Taiwan were
the major obstacle to re-establishing diplomatic relations between
China and Japan, but their influence weakened as Japanese ties with
China expanded. Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s “democratization” and
Lee Teng-hui’s pro-Japan policy have enhanced Taiwan’s influence
on the newer generation of Japanese politicians and most of the major political parties in Japan, increasing their affinity for Taiwan.
These new pro-Taiwan forces are taking root in Japanese political
circles. This development has not yet thoroughly changed Japan’s
basic policy on Taiwan, but it has become a strong motive for elevating relations with Taiwan.29
Japanese policy readjustment on Taiwan also has a deeper layer of
geopolitical causes. Some Japanese politicians believe that as China
continues to rise rapidly, it will seek a hegemonic position in Asia.
—————
27. Germany and France were enemies that had hated each other for generations.
They have accomplished genuine and thorough reconciliation since World War II.
This is the historical lesson that we can draw for Sino-Japanese relations.
28. The Three Principles established for the restoration of diplomatic relations are:
(1) The PRC is the only legitimate government of China; (2) Taiwan is an unalienable
part of the PRC; and (3) the Japan-Taiwan Treaty is illegal and invalid and should be
abolished.
29. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 83.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
243
Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland means not only the rise of
China but also control of Japan’s lifeline—the sea lanes—which
would be detrimental to Japan. Therefore a no-war and no-peace
stalemate across the Taiwan Strait is in Japan’s national interests.
Some even hold that Japan should consider the possibility of helping
the United States carry out a joint military intervention in the Taiwan
Strait, although other Japanese believe it would be a nightmare for
Japan to become involved in such a conflict. Presently such strategic
considerations are not yet presented in official publications but have
become an open “secret” in the Japanese media, in papers written by
Japanese research institutes, and particularly in the propaganda by
Japanese right-wing forces. This causes China great worry and it to
be high alert.
In face of the fierce friction on the Taiwan issue and the overall
difficulties in bilateral relations in 1996, the Japanese government
has stated on many occasions that Japan’s position on Taiwan, which
was defined in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué in 1972, will not
change. Japan has also delivered the clear-cut commitment not to
support Taiwan’s independence. Thus, tensions over the Taiwan issue have gradually relaxed. In 1999, Lee Teng-hui openly put forward his “state-to-state” theory. In 2000, the DPP, a party that advocates Taiwan’s independence, came to power. Because the Japanese
government took a fairly cautious attitude toward these dramatic
changes, no major setbacks occurred between the two countries on
the Taiwan issue. However, in April 2001, in disregard of strong opposition from China, the Japanese government allowed Lee Teng-hui
to visit Japan on medical grounds, forcing China to cancel a planned
visit by Chairman Li Peng of the National People’s Congress to Japan within the year. The new friction highlighted the serious differences between the two countries on the question of Taiwan. In the
future, difference on the Taiwan problem may remain for a long
time. If not handle properly, this could become the biggest challenge
confronted by the two countries in the early part of this century.
THE DISPUTE OVER THE DIAOYU ISLANDS
AND THE SURROUNDING WATERS
The dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands and
the surrounding waters has a long history. In the 1970s, in order to
normalize Sino-Japanese relations and conclude the Sino-Japanese
Peace and Friendship Treaty, the leaders of the two countries wisely
decided to shelve the dispute. In the 1980s, although there was some
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friction on this issue between the two sides, the overall situation was
stable. In the 1990s, however, friction escalated. In the summer of
1996, some members of Japanese right-wing organizations landed on
one of the Diaoyu Islands and built a lighthouse and some memorial
monuments. The Japanese government adopted an indulgent attitude, which heightened tensions. Around the same time, disagreements over marine rights also increased. The dispute over the issue
of “Chinese research vessel” that broke out in 2000 was a reflection
of the rising tensions.
There are many reasons for the increasing aggravations: (1) Even
though the Chinese government has assumed a very pragmatic attitude toward the Diaoyu Islands issue,30 the Japanese government
has refused to acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute.
Therefore it is impossible for the two sides to work together to solve
the problem, and the lack of forward motion is bound to lead to
more frictions. (2) Since the end of the Cold War, all nations have focused their attention on economic development. Japan, as an island
country, is heavily dependent on the seas. Since sea products and
maritime activities play a significant role in the two countries’ development strategy, when interests do collide, the problems are more
serious. (3) It also has something to do with the sentiments of the
peoples. As mutual misgivings increase and friendly feelings decrease, coupled with exaggerated media coverage, any dispute on
specific issues may escalate into serious ones.
One aspect of this dispute deserves special mention. In 1996,
when serious friction occurred between the two countries on Diaoyu,
Japan announced that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covered that
area. Initially the U.S. government was neutral, but later, under
Japanese diplomatic pressure, senior U.S. Defense Department officials announced that the United States was obliged to defend the
“Senkakus” against attack according to the Security Treaty.31 This
produced a very strong response from China, which took this as a
dangerous signal that Japan would use the U.S.-Japan military alliance to deal with China.
However, after 1997, there has been some progress in dealing
with this issue. For example, Japanese rightists reduced their activities on the islands; the agreement on fisheries, slow in coming, fi—————
30. China has proposed two policies for solving this dispute: (1) shelving the dispute for common development, and, (2) if the above is difficult to achieve, the two
countries should take the overall situation into account to avoid any conflict and leave
it to the next generation.
31. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 87.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
245
nally went into effect in 2000, delineating jointly administered areas.
In the same year, to solve the problem of research vessels in disputed
areas, through consultation both sides agreed on a prior notification
mechanism, which was soon put into practice. As a matter of fact, on
matters related to territorial disputes, the rejection of dialogue and
the resort to provocative actions can only intensify conflicts and are
detrimental to the interests of both sides. With sincere and serious
consultations and dialogues, the issue can be managed successfully,
even if it is not thoroughly resolved. Statesmen with vision in the
two countries should make common efforts to resolve these territorial disputes. From a long-term perspective, “shelving the dispute
and promoting joint development,” as advocated by the late Chinese
leader Deng Xiaoping, is still the best means to handle this problem.
FRICTION OVER THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY
ALLIANCE AND THE TMD ISSUE
The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was issued in 1996, and
the New Defense Guidelines to the military alliance were adopted in
1997. In 1998, Japan decided to participate in the U.S. development
of TMD and in 1999 passed related legislation. During these years,
plans for strengthening their alliance were basically realized. In the
process of redefinition, the content and nature of the alliance has undergone major changes: expanding the Japanese operations, shifting
to new defense targets, increasing Japan’s role in the alliance, turning the nature of the alliance from defense to offense. After September 11, 2001, Japan quickly adopted an anti-terrorism law32 and set
three warships in November to the Indian Ocean to take part in the
U.S.-led war against terror. Although Japan claimed that the Japanese forces would provide only logistical support to U.S. forces, this
was only a step toward actually participating in war. The changes in
the Japan-U.S. alliance and the prospect of Japan’s seeking to acting
beyond its peace constitution has triggered deep worries in China
and created deep frictions on security issues between China and Japan. In response to China’s strong reactions, Japan indicated to
China many times that the U.S.-Japan Alliance is not directed against
—————
32. The main feature of the act is to expand the scope of the self-defense forces acting overseas from the Asia-Pacific region to all international open seas, skies, and territories of third country with agreement of the parties concerned. Furthermore, it provides that there is no need to ask for prior approval by the Diet for sending the selfdefense forces overseas and that the only necessary procedure is to report to the Diet
within twenty days after the fact.
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any third country, that “emergencies in the surrounding areas” is not
a geographical concept, that the Security Treaty is within the scope
of the Japanese Constitution, and that the basic content of the JapanUS alliance remains unchanged.
Both Japan and the United States have strong reasons to redefine
and strengthen the alliance. After the end of the Cold War, following
the disappearance of the military threat posed by the USSR, the cohesiveness of the alliance waned while trade frictions between the
two countries increased. For a period of time, Americans raised a
clamor over the “Japan threat.” The Clinton administration, which
gave priority to economic issues, continuously pressured Japan, intensifying the conflicts between Japan and the United States. Therefore, easing tensions and consolidating the alliance was a major consideration in the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Since 1992, by speeding up reform and opening, China’s economic
takeoff became even more remarkable. Therefore the international
community’s concern about “China’s collapse “33 was replaced by
concern of the “China threat.” Some international relations theorists
insist that a rising power is bound to challenge the existing international order. Needless to say, China is a rising power with a social
system and values different from those in the Western world. Fending off China thus helps strengthen their alliance.
After the end of the Cold War, to maintain its dominant role in the
Asia Pacific, the United States felt it needed help from Japan. At the
same time, Japan’s national strategy has begun to change. Its longtime high priority for the economy and low priority for the military
while relying on the United States has begun to shift to a strategy of
building powerful and independent armed forces, seeking parity
with the United States, and becoming a “normal country.” Because
of national and international constraints, it is difficult—for the moment—for Japan to become a political and military power by gaining
independence from the United States. It therefore seeks to realize its
objective by strengthening the alliance. Thus the expansion of Japan’s military role in the Asia Pacific region meets the needs of both
countries.34 The tension on the Korean Peninsula, repeatedly empha—————
33. After the June 4 “Tiananmen Incident” in 1989, especially after the profound
changes in the USSR and Eastern European countries, some anti-China forces in the
international community predicted that the disintegration of the Chinese socialist system was expected soon.
34. While supporting a larger military role for Japan, many Americans still believe
that the U.S.-Japan alliance should play the role of “cork in the bottle” with Japan.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
247
sized by the United States and Japan, is naturally another important
factor leading the two countries to intensify their alliance.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was strategic cooperation between
China, Japan, and the United States against the Soviet Union. At that
time, China did not oppose the Japan-U.S. alliance, but it also did not
endorse it.35 For a fairly long period of time, China, the United
States, and Japan formed a relatively balanced triangle, which was of
course beneficial to regional security and stability. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War, when the international situation relaxed
on the whole, the United States and Japan not only strengthened
their military alliance but also took China as a potential target. This
increased China’s sense of insecurity and affected the subtle balance
of the triangular relationship. Deep worry and firm opposition have
been expressed in China. Since the Japanese government still refuses
to exclude Taiwan from the area covered by the alliance, and some
Japanese government officials have even publicly advocated including it, there is a danger of strategic confrontation between China and
Japan. It is in the basic interest of both countries to make every effort
to avoid this scenario. To this end, Japan must keep its promise that
the alliance is not directed at China, and Japan should exclude Taiwan from its coverage. This is the only wise choice for Japan.
In recent years, as an important alliance-strengthening measure,
Japan and the United States have conducted joint research on TMD.
This, in turn, further intensifies the divergences on security issues
between China and Japan. In the view of Japanese and the U.S. officials, TMD will be an important tool for maintaining the security
status quo in East Asia. But in fact it will be a major step to damage
the status quo and may generate a new arms race in the region. The
possibility that a TMD system might be used in the future to “protect
Taiwan” has aroused strong concerns in China. There is an argument
that China’s opposition to TMD is inconsistent with its no first-use
policy, otherwise, why should China fear that TMD might threaten
its nuclear forces?36 This logic is not convincing. China commits itself
to no first-use of nuclear weapons, but it has the right to possess the
necessary capability for retaliation—namely, a second-strike capability to ensure deterrence. China is naturally opposed to the joint development of BMD by the US and Japan, which might neutralize
—————
35. Ezra Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, eds., The Golden Age of the U.S.China-Japan Triangle 1972–1989 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center,
2002), p. 243.
36. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 92.
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Zhang Tuosheng
China’s minimum nuclear deterrent. How to solve this problem
should be an important agenda item in China-Japan strategic dialogue.
“STRATEGIC SUSPICION” BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES
Beginning in 1992, China has had worries over Japan’s “embarking
on the road to become a big military power” and seeking a “joint
domination of the Asia Pacific” with the United States. Since 1992,
Japan has had seriously growing concerns about the “China threat”
and China’s “search for hegemony.” This is a profound problem between the two sides. Other problems between China and Japan are
all related to this underlying concern, and this “strategic suspicion”
has made it more difficult for the two sides to resolve specific issues
between them.
In the 1970s and 1980s, China had some concern over Japan’s “revival of militarism.” By the mid-1980s, China began to worry that
Japan was embarking on a path to becoming a military power. In the
past, China suffered deeply from Japanese militarism. And in reality,
there have always been people in Japan who have denied the history
of aggression and even advocated militarism. In this situation, it was
natural for China to feel worried and concerned. But at that time, the
worry usually appeared in the company of bilateral frictions on the
issues of history and the Taiwan question and gradually faded away
when frictions were settled. And compared with the mainstream
Chinese view toward Japan, the worries were insignificant.
Since early 1990s, great changes took place. Japanese nationalism
has grown, while calls to amend the constitution are rising rapidly.
Japan’s military strength is also growing, and there is an increasing
likelihood that Japan will follow the United States in using the military alliance to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. All
these have deepened Chinese worries over Japan’s future direction.
Could the readjustment of Japan’s national strategy derail Japan
from peaceful development? Could the enhancement of the JapanU.S. military alliance lead to “joint domination of the Asia Pacific”
by the two countries? These have become hot topics in diplomatic
and academic circles in China.37 In such a situation, even though
China’s general policy on Japan remains unchanged, and although
—————
37. In recent years, the “revival of Japanese militarism” has been rarely mentioned
in Chinese academic circles. The focus has been on “preventing Japan from embarking
on the road of becoming a big military power.” I believe the latter conforms more to
the facts.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
249
China’s basic wish is to develop long-term friendly cooperation with
Japan, Chinese must remain vigilant over Japan’s changes. These issues will create more instabilities and uncertainties for its policy toward Japan.
Japan’s concern with the “China threat” and “Chinese hegemony”
has increased for the following reasons:
1. In the course of defense modernization, China’s increase in
military expenditures for missiles and its nuclear arsenal have diminished transparency.
2. To achieve reunification, China continuously threatens Taiwan
with force and refuses to abandon the right to use force. Because of
Japan’s dependence on open shipping lanes, this may constitute a serious security threat to Japan.
3. China pressures Japan on many issues and tries its best to prevent Japan from playing a larger role in regional and international
affairs. Among these, the issue that angers Japan the most is China’s
“ambiguous attitude” toward Japan’s wish to become a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council.38
4. With its rapid rise, China is bound to challenge the existing
international order and compete with the United States and Japan
for the dominant role in the Asia Pacific region.
Japan’s “strategic suspicion” of China has gradually increased
since the end of the Cold War. Although we cannot say its worries
are entirely irrational, in general they are groundless. First, defense
modernization is a natural part of China’s modernization drive,
with an objective to defend its territory and sovereignty more effectively and to promote national reunification. However, in line with
the policy mapped out by Deng Xiaoping, China’s defense modernization must be subordinate to and serve the central task of economic development. This policy cannot easily be changed. All objective observers acknowledge that China’s military strength is no
match for that of the United States and, in many aspects, that of Japan. This situation will remain unchanged for a long time. Regarding the defense budget, these two countries are not in a position to
find fault with China. It is true that China’s military transparency
—————
38. Aside from the issue of Japan’s membership in the Security Council, Japan has
raised some other issues such as Chinese and U.S. opposition in 1997 to Japan’s idea of
setting up an Asian Monetary Fund and, in 1998, after Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests, China’s opposition to Japan’s proposal for emergency consultation by the five
nuclear powers plus Japan and Germany.
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Zhang Tuosheng
needs to be enhanced,39 but this is not enough to justify the “China
threat” theory.
Second, it is China’s long-cherished wish that Taiwan be returned
soon to the motherland. This is China’s internal affair. To this end,
China’s policy is “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems.” Since the 1990s, with support from certain foreign forces, the
momentum for independence in Taiwan has grown rapidly, and the
situation across the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated. Therefore, China
has struggled against Taiwan’s “independence forces” (including its
missile exercises, which were in accord with international law) and
reiterated that it will not renounce the right to use force. China’s aim
is to deter the forces for independence in Taiwan and to try its utmost to avoid a situation in which it is compelled to resort to force.
In fact, if the international community, especially the United States
and Japan, adhere to the one-China policy thoroughly and give no
support to Taiwanese independence forces, the situation across the
Taiwan Strait will be much calmer and the process for peaceful reunification with Taiwan will go much more smoothly. Under this
circumstance, Japan’s worry over the possibility of conflict resulting
in obstruction of its sea lanes would be totally unnecessary.
Third, in principle, since China supports multipolarity, it should
support Japan’s efforts to become a major “pole” in the world and its
assumption of a larger role in the international community. In fact,
many Chinese scholars have continuously advocated this. Then why
does China still have reservations about Japan playing a larger role
in the international community and maintain an “ambiguous attitude” about its permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council? Although there is indeed an issue as to whether it is reasonable
for China to respond to Japan’s appropriate wish for a larger international role,40 the fundamental issue appears to be a problem in Japan
itself. Japan has not been able to unload completely its historical
burden to win the trust of Asian countries. This is the real source of
the “pressure” Japan feels. Therefore, if Japan genuinely intends to
gain support from Asian countries, including China, for its effort to
become a normal state and a great political power, it is of utmost
importance to resolve the history issue and maintain its course of
peaceful development.
—————
39. Since 1995, China has published three white papers on defense policies, arms
control, and the disarmament of China. The practice will be further developed and become regular in the near future.
40. Shi Yanghong, “Reflections on the Severe Situation in China-U.S.-Japan Relations,” in International Economic Review, no. 4 (2000): 58.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
251
Fourth, the history of the last twenty years shows that China’s
growth is achieved through following policies of reform, opening,
and growing compatibility with the ways of the international
community. China has stood for establishing a new international
political and economic order. To this end, China should first join
the existing international mechanisms and play an active role as a
responsible and influential member so as to improve and perfect it
step-by-step. Sine the 1990s, China has quickened its pace in joining
existing international mechanisms and becoming a member of all
major international organizations, including the major arms controls
treaties. In 2001, China became a member of WTO. In light of these
unquestionable realities, how can one put China on a par with
those rising powers in history that fought the old colonial powers
for the spheres of influence and used military force to upset the existing order?
Unfortunately, in the past ten years, the idea of a “China threat”
has been widely propagated in Japan. This results from a lack of understanding of China, propaganda by right-wing forces, and a failure of self-confidence in its own economic development. The sharp
contrast between rapid economic growth in China and the economic
recession in Japan since the early 1990s casts a heavy psychological
shadow over the Japanese people.
At present, the mutual lack of trust and strategic suspicion between China and Japan has received great attention from both governments. The slogan “increasing trust and reducing suspicion” is
designed to respond to this problem. But this is easier said than
done. To put it into practice will depend on many subjective and
objective factors in both China and Japan, such as domestic politics,
the courage and vision of the leaders, the prospects for bilateral
economic cooperation, the settlement of the thorniest issues about
history, the management of the Taiwan issue under the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, as well as the evolution of the trilateral relationship
between China, Japan, and the United States. But the key element is
the future road of the two countries. If Japan can continue to keep
on the road of peaceful development and does not seek status as a
military power while China adheres to economic development as its
focus and follows the independent foreign policy of peace, and, if
both countries are resolutely opposed to hegemonism and neither
seeks hegemony themselves (a major principle embodied in the
China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty), then mutual strategic
suspicion can be gradually dissolved through joint efforts by the
two sides.
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Zhang Tuosheng
Conclusions
Through this brief review of the twists and turns in Sino-Japanese relations at the turn of the century and through the analysis and summary of the bilateral issues, three conclusions may be drawn.
First, in comparison with the twenty years after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, the Sino-Japanese relationship
at the turn of the century has undergone dramatic changes—both in
the outward manifestations and in the underlying fundamentals.
There are three changes in underlying fundamentals: (1) With the
disappearance of the shared security interests in dealing with the
threat of the Soviet Union, security frictions between China and Japan are on rise although there is still cooperation. (2) The rapid
growth in bilateral economic and trade relations has become the
strongest bond for maintaining good bilateral relationships. (3) Cooperation in international affairs in many areas has expanded and
strengthened beyond the constraint of bilateral relations.
As for outward manifestations, two trends are obvious. (1) The
economic gap between the two countries has narrowed as China’s
overall national strength grows, and the relationship is now one between two strong countries. (2) While the two countries have basically
maintained a friendly and cooperative framework of relations, the
atmosphere of bilateral friendship has clearly declined, and differences, suspicion, and competition are clearly on the rise. Friendship
and cooperation coexists with friction and competition.41
Second, major changes in bilateral relations during this period
have their profound domestic and international contexts. The main
factors underlying these changes are the following: the end of the
Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union, changes in American policy on China, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and
its international influence, changes in Japanese domestic politics and
foreign policy42 as well as its protracted economic stagnation, the escalation of the Taiwan issue, and the end of an old generation of
leaders in both countries. Among these elements, the end of the Cold
War is the most far-reaching and decisive. Because both China and
—————
41. Liu Jiangyong, Hesitant Japan (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Publishing House, 2000),
p. 302.
42. The changes in Japanese domestic and foreign policy are manifested in its effort to seek the status of a normal country and shake off the shadow of a defeated
country. This is actually a natural development with changed domestic and international situations. China has gradually realized this.
Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century
253
Japan were unprepared for the sudden change and its consequences,
their thinking lagged behind the new situation, and the bilateral relationship entered a period in which they did not adapt to the new circumstances. From 1997 to 2000, bilateral relations gradually improved and developed relatively smoothly, as a result of the
continuous efforts of both countries to adapt to the new environment
in line with their national interests and the readjustment of their foreign policies. The joint decision to establish a friendly and cooperative partnership dedicated to peace and development is a major result of this readjustment. This readjustment is still going on and
seems likely to continue for some time.
Third, one can be cautiously optimistic about the Sino-Japanese
relationship in the twenty-first century because in the past ten years
bilateral relations still achieved striking advances on many fronts,
even though differences and frictions increased. Although bilateral
relations deteriorated for a while, the situation lasted only for a limited period of time, and differences were brought under control most
of the time. If one drew a curve of the relationship from 1992 to 2001,
there would be relatively smooth development at the two ends and
deterioration in between. The current trend is upward. After so
many twists and turns, the two countries have made up their minds
to establish a partnership in order to maintain and develop their
common interests, which has laid a solid foundation for bilateral relations in the new century. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
have had a profound influence on the international situation and the
international strategic pattern. In face of a common threat, the possibilities for coordination and cooperation among powers are increasing. In this connection, China-U.S. relations have markedly improved and developed. This may be very positive for the furtherance
of Sino-Japanese relations. It can be predicted that the Sino-Japanese
relationship will continue to encounter twists and turns in the future,
especially on issues of history and Taiwan. With Chinese membership in WTO, economic frictions will also grow between the two
countries. But the shared interests of the two neighbors will overwhelm these risks in the end. Recent bilateral cooperation on regional economic affairs shows that there exists a greater potential for
further improvement and development in the relationship. If both
China and Japan can adhere to the new framework defined by the
1998 joint declaration and uphold the important principle of “increasing trust and reducing suspicion” agreed upon by their leaders
in 2000, Sino-Japanese relations can gradually overcome difficulties
that occurred in the post-Cold War decade and begin a relatively
smooth and stable development for the new millennium.
Japan’s Policy
Toward China in the 1990s
Akio Takahara
As Japan conceived its policy toward China in the 1990s, it was indeed embarking on a voyage without a chart. The Cold War was
over, and throughout the world nations were seeking a new order.
In the initial part of this process, Japan’s alliance with the United
States seemed, in some people’s eyes, to be “drifting.”1 Domestically,
the “one-party rule” of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was finally over. When the LDP returned to power in 1995, it formed a
previously unthinkable alliance with the Socialist Party, its archenemy for the past 40 years. The Japanese economy, which in the 1980s
had seemed to be catching up with and even overtaking that of the
United States, floundered in the wake of the bursting of the “bubble
economy” in the early 1990s.
The Japanese were losing self-confidence, while China, rising from
the shock of the June Fourth Incident in 1989 and the collapse of the
socialist camp in Europe, achieved stunning economic growth in the
—————
Akio Takahara is a Professor at Rikkyo University.
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004. This essay may not be reproduced without permission from the Harvard University Asia Center.
1. Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (An alliance adrift) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1997).
254
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
255
mid-1990s, thanks to the mighty leadership of an octogenarian revolutionary. This occasioned far-reaching changes in China that became
important factors in the making of Japan’s China policy. First, the
Chinese enhanced their national pride, and the public started to express a wish to see their leaders “say no” to the United States and Japan.2 Second, China’s involvement in the global market economy
deepened, which increased not only interdependence and opportunities for Japanese firms but also China’s involvement and presence
in the regional economy. According to the Japanese statistics, the
amount of Japan-China trade reached U.S.$85.8 billion in 2000. China
was then Japan’s third-largest trading partner after the United States
and the European Union, while, according to Chinese statistics, Japan
was China’s largest trading partner.3 Third, economic growth enabled
the Chinese to quicken the pace of expanding and upgrading their
military arsenal. All through the 1990s, the annual growth rate of
China’s defense budget was in double digits, increasing fourfold from
25.1 billion RMB in 1989 to 107.6 billion in 1999.4
In this context, we cannot forget another significant development
in the 1990s, namely, the further democratization of Taiwan and its
increasing openness in expressing its unwillingness to be a part of
the People’s Republic of China. Lee Teng-hui, who was brought up
in Taiwan when it was a colony of Japan, revised the constitution of
the Republic of China in 1991 and made it clear that the constitution
applied only to the area that was then effectively under the rule of
the KMT government. In other words, the Nationalists have since
then acknowledged that the Communists are the legitimate rulers of
the mainland. This led to the 1999 statement by Li that the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland amounted to a special, stateto-state relationship.5
In Chinese eyes, the United States loomed large behind Taiwan.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Gulf War made it clear to the
world that the United States was far ahead of others in revolution—————
2. China Can Say No, a book filled with animosity against Japan and particularly
against the United States, became a bestseller in 1996.
3. Yasuo Onishi, “China Growing into an Economic Power Stronger than Japan,”
in Kayahara, Ikuo (ed.), Whither China?, ed. Kayahara Ikuo (Tokyo: Sososha, 2001),
p. 142.
4. National Bureau of Statistics, ed., China Statistical Yearbook, 2000 (China Statistics
Press, 2000), p. 262.
5. Akio Takahara, “War and Peace Between the Communists and the Nationalists:
China-Taiwan Relations in the Latter Half of the 20th Century,” Heiwa kenkyu, no. 25
(Nov. 2000): 44–46.
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Akio Takahara
izing military affairs. At the end of the 1990s, U.S. participation in
the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces, particularly the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, made it clear that China had fallen further behind, despite its strenuous efforts to catch up. The United
States’ strength and supremacy in information technology also led
it to a dramatic economic recovery. Thus the United States emerged
as a pre-eminent overall superpower. The gap between the United
States and other countries was likely to continue for the foreseeable
future, which created issues for both China and Japan. The Chinese
benefited by increasing their exports to the U.S. market, but at the
same time they tended to see the reconfirmation of the Japan-U.S.
alliance and the expansion of NATO in Europe as part and parcel
of a new strategy by the sole remaining superpower to dominate
the globe.
This chapter reviews some major episodes in Japan’s policy toward China in the 1990s and attempts to explore the Japanese interests and thinking that were involved. For the convenience of understanding the evolution of policies, I divide the decade into three
periods: the good times, 1990–autumn 1994; the hard times, autumn
1994–autumn 1996; and the new period of an unsettled partnership,
autumn 1996–present. In addition to the factors mentioned above
that appeared for the first time in the 1990s, we cannot ignore others
that continued from earlier days, such as the history issue. Special attention will be paid to those cases in which there were gaps in perception between Japan and China. In the conclusion, I try to identify
the basic concerns and patterns of approaches or thinking in Japan’s
policy toward China in the 1990s and discuss what should be done
to improve the Sino-Japanese relations in the future.
The Good Times: 1990–Autumn 1994
In the wake of June 4, 1989, Japan’s policy was not to isolate China
from the world. This was the case despite the dramatic deterioration
in people’s perception of China as a result of the incident. According
to the survey conducted by the Japanese government each year, the
percentage of those who felt close to China fell from 68.5 percent in
1988 to 51.6 percent in 1989, while those who did not feel so rose
from 26.4 percent in 1988 to 43.1 percent in 1989.6 Nevertheless, the
Japanese government held to its policy of engaging China, and Japan
—————
6. Past results can be seen at http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/gaikou_01/images/
zu28.gif and zu29.gif.
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
257
was the first among the industrialized countries to end the sanctions
and resume economic assistance. In August 1991 Prime Minister
Kaifu became the first among the G-7 leaders to visit Beijing after
June 1989. He made the following remarks:
Since China adopted the reform and opening-up policies in 1978, cooperation between Japan and China has had a more positive meaning to the AsiaPacific region. This is because the Chinese economy has been linked with the
economy of the Asia-Pacific, which is the most dynamic in the world.
Through supporting the Chinese economy, Japan can contribute not only to
the stability and development of China but also to the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.7
Note that Kaifu referred to the Asia-Pacific, a concept that was used
to include the United States. And by emphasizing the important role
that this region played in supporting the growth of the world economy, Kaifu wanted to convince the United States and Europe that
Japan’s cooperation with China suited their interests as well.8
Japan was also concerned about the domestic politics of China.
In the wake of June 4, it was unclear whether China would proceed
with reform and opening or to revert to a more orthodox planned
economy. In fact, a specific plan for recollectivizing agriculture was
drafted and discussed at the Politburo and the executive meeting of
the State Council, although it was rejected in the end.9 Finding an
obvious interest in supporting the reformist camp, Japan believed
that it should contribute to the Chinese economy by providing the
know-how as well as the resources needed in promoting marketization. Despite the newly introduced ODA policy to take into account
such factors as the development of weapons of mass destruction
and arms exports by the recipient country, these principles were not
strictly applied to China. This was because China’s stable development was regarded as vital to the interests of Japan and the re—————
7. A policy speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu at the Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange Centre, Aug. 11 1991, in Nitchu kankei kihon shiryoshu 1949 nen–1997 nen (Basic
materials on Japan-China Relations, 1949–97) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), p. 770.
8. Tanaka Akihiko, “Relations with Japan,” in Chugoku soran, 1992 nenban (China
almanac 1992) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1992), p. 127. This almanac is published every other
year, and Tanaka reviews Japan-China relations in detail in each volume.
9. Hearing the rumor that recollectivization was just around the corner, farmers
started to cut fruit trees and kill cattle. This and other retrogressive policies are discussed in Akio Takahara, Head-on Collision: The Political Currents in China, Spring 1992,
Discussion Paper for the Japan-U.S. Consultative Group on Policies Toward the People’s Republic of China, Second Meeting: Political Issues, in Tokyo, cosponsored by
the Asia Society and the Japan Institute of International Affairs, April 1992.
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Akio Takahara
gion.10 It was in the same spirit that Japan has consistently been
strongly supportive of China’s joining the GATT and later the
WTO.
In its bilateral relations, Japan responded positively to China’s
strong request for a visit by the emperor to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of relations in 1992. This took
place despite opposition from some LDP members who argued that
the emperor’s visit should not be used politically.11 In his banquet
speech in Beijing, the emperor acknowledged that there was a period
when Japan had brought great hardship to the Chinese people and
remarked that this caused him to feel deep sorrow. He continued
that, based on deep remorse, the Japanese had firmly resolved that
they should never repeat such a war and should remake Japan as a
peaceful nation.12 In the following year, Premier Hosokawa, who led
the first coalition government in almost 40 years, expressed deep
remorse and apologized to those who suffered from Japanese invasion and colonial rule in a speech to the Diet.13 These remarks were
made not as a tactical move in consideration of the Japan-U.S.-China
triangle, that is to strengthen Japan’s position vis-à-vis the United
States (Japan-U.S. relations were under a lot of stress at the time), but
they were meant to consolidate further the basis for a long-term, cooperative relationship between Japan and China.
During this period, there was a significant move in terms of regional security. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) met for the first
time in 1994. It took the shape of an ASEAN forum, but a good part
of the original initiative stemmed from Japan.14 From the viewpoint
of the Japanese, they would rather remain in the background, playing the role of a “shadow actor” (kuroko), since they thought Japan’s
initiative in the area of security was not yet welcomed by the nations
that suffered from Japanese aggression in World War II. One of the
important aims of ARF was to obtain the participation of China. Co—————
10. See the Report on Aid to China, compiled and published by the Japan International Cooperation Agency in December 1991.
11. Tanaka Akihiko, “Relations with Japan,” in Chugoku soran, 1994 nenban (China
almanac, 1994) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1994), p. 145.
12. Nitchu kankei kihon shiryoshu, 1949 nen–1997 nen, pp. 794–95.
13. Ibid., p. 802.
14. Seiichiro Takagi points out that Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama’s
proposal for a regional security dialogue in July 1991 led to the establishment of ARF
(Seiichiro Takagi, “In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan-China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era,” Japan Review of International Affairs 13, no. 1 [Spring
1999]: 25–26).
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
259
opting a big neighbor in this manner was called the “Gulliver approach,” which had been adopted earlier by the Southeast Asian
countries when they established ASEAN to engage Indonesia.15
In this period, China was facing a hostile Europe and North
America and was eager to make a breakthrough by improving relations with Japan. Since the Clinton administration was especially
critical of China in its initial phase, the Chinese seemed not at all uncomfortable when Hosokawa said “no” to the Americans but spoke
softly to the Chinese. Initially, China was rather cautious about the
Japanese expanding their role in the post–Cold War international political scene, especially with regard to their sending the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) overseas. However, China was beginning to get used to
the idea that Japan was to become a “political power,” and in the end
the participation of both the PLA and the SDF in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia was seen positively by Beijing as
well as by Tokyo.16
The Hard Times: Autumn 1994–Autumn 1996
This rosy picture did not last long, however. First, Taiwan became a
hot issue. China protested vehemently against the reported idea of
the Olympic Commission of Asia to invite President Lee Teng-hui to
the Asian Olympic Games held in Hiroshima in October 1994. In the
end it was Vice Premier Xu Lide who came from Taiwan in his capacity as chairman of the Committee for Inviting the 2002 Asian
Olympic Games, but still a strong protest was made by Beijing.
Obviously Japan had no intention of changing its basic policy regarding Taiwan, which was manifested in the 1972 Japan-China Joint
Communiqué: Japan fully understands and respects China’s position
stipulated in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. This article
obliged Japan to implement the clauses of the Cairo Declaration,
which stated that one of the aims of the war against Japan was to
force Japan to return Taiwan, as well as Manchuria, to the Republic
of China, which was the government of China at the time.17
—————
15. Tatsumi Okabe, “Learning to Survive with ‘Gulliver,’ ” The World Today 52,
no. 6 ( June 1996): 155–56.
16. Akihiko Tanaka, “Relations with Japan,” in Chugoku soran, 1994 nenban,
pp. 148–50.
17. Japan’s position on Taiwan’s status is detailed in Akio Takahara, “The Present
and Future of Japan-China Relations,” Gaiko Forum English Edition, Summer 2000,
p. 45.
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Akio Takahara
However, Taiwan was now a democracy with an impressive record of economic development. The desire of the Taiwanese to acquire more global recognition, preserve the status quo, and avoid
forceful reintegration with the mainland was growing. A democratic
leader in Taiwan had no choice but to endeavor to achieve these desires of his people. These factors, together with the historical and cultural affinity that was personified in Lee Teng-hui, did contribute to
the rise in sympathy among the Japanese public for the fate of the
Taiwanese.18
China, for its part, had been disturbed by Lee Teng-hui’s “vacation diplomacy” to the Southeast Asian countries and by his attempt
to gain a seat in the United Nations for Taiwan. It was also the time
that the complete transfer of power from the so-called second generation of leaders to the third generation was officially announced at
the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee in
September 1994, and Jiang Zemin, the “core of the third generation
of leaders,” had chosen Taiwan as the first major policy area to assert
his own style of leadership.
His conciliatory eight-point proposal was made in February 1995,
but it bore little fruit.19 Later that year Lee Teng-hui visited the
United States, which was understood to be the result of pressure on
the Clinton administration from the overwhelming vote in Congress
supporting his visit. Although this had no direct relation with Japan,
Japan was soon deeply involved in an argument with China over the
relationship between the Taiwan issue and the reconfirmation of the
Japan-U.S. alliance.
The reconfirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance proved to be the
largest issue in the Japan-China relations in the 1990s. For the Japanese policymakers, what mattered most was perhaps the political
significance of the alliance with the United States. They had to explain to the public what the alliance meant after the Cold War. They
feared that economic friction with the United States and the problems that arose from the U.S. bases in Japan and especially those in
Okinawa could lead to stronger anti-U.S. feelings and questioning of
the alliance. Since they regarded that canceling the alliance would
fundamentally change the status quo in Japan and in the region,
—————
18. The interview of Lee Teng-hui by the prominent Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba,
published in Shukan Asahi (Weekly Asahi), expressed so much sympathy that it became notorious among the mainland Chinese.
19. Yamamoto Isao, Chu-Tai kankeishi (The history of China-Taiwan relations) (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 1999), pp. 223–31.
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
261
with which they and most other countries had been comfortable,
they willingly cooperated with U.S. government officials to adjust
the alliance to the new era.20
There is little doubt that when the Japanese and the U.S. governments talked about possible “circumstances surrounding Japan” in
the new guideline for defense cooperation, they were alluding
mainly to a war in the Korean Peninsula, where a crisis had just been
overcome in 1994. As regards China, the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint
Declaration on Security referred to it in the following way: “They
[Hashimoto and Clinton] emphasized that it is extremely important
for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of
both countries in furthering cooperation with China.”21 Certainly it
was with great sensitivity that the two sides composed this sentence,
since it had turned out that the declaration was signed only a month
after China launched missiles off the coast of Taiwan and the United
States sent two aircraft carriers into the area. Neither Japan nor the
United States wished to promote the “China threat theory” in their
joint declaration.
However, the Japanese as well as the Americans became increasingly concerned about China’s future in the mid-1990s. What caused
this concern included the frictions arising from China’s nuclear testing, over which Japan held back aid to China, and the intensive antiJapanese, patriotic propaganda to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. No matter what the intention of the
patriotic education in China was, it effectively imprinted a very
negative image of Japan and the Japanese on the minds of the Chinese, including children.22
The backdrop to Japan’s uneasiness about China at the time was
the impressive economic growth of China, which was generally welcomed by the Japanese but then stood in stark contrast to the quagmire into which the Japanese economy had fallen. The Chinese missile tests, aimed to intimidate Taiwan, took place just next to
Yonakuni Island, the western tip of Japanese territory. This, together
with the nuclear tests, enhanced the militaristic image of China in
the minds of the Japanese. The percentage of those who felt close to
—————
20. See Funabashi, Domei hyoryu.
21. See http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/sengen_.htm.
22. I often encounter Chinese youths who reveal that the Japanese they have met
are actually much “nicer” than they expected from the images that they had learned
about and had seen in the Chinese media. They may be mistaken, of course, but the
point on education still holds.
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Akio Takahara
China in the government survey declined to 45.0 percent in 1996, its
lowest in history so far, and the percentage of those who did not feel
so rose to its highest point, at 51.3 percent.23
The Chinese, on the other hand, had reasons to be gravely concerned about the reconfirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Many
suspected that it was an integral part of the new U.S. strategy to
dominate the globe in combination with the expansion of NATO in
Europe, and that Japan would be playing a larger security role in the
region as an agent of the United States. In addition to this, the Chinese official media seemed to identify a linkage between Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the construction of a lighthouse on the Senkaku Islands by right-wing activists, seeing these as
part of a plot to revitalize militarism in Japan.24 The Chinese were
becoming more apprehensive about the growing capability of the
Japanese military and felt that the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance betrayed their expectation of a stronger Japan serving as a
counterbalance against the United States.25 There was an increasing
nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese public, which seemed to
be supported by the economic success and the patriotic education
campaign. In 1996 an anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese book, China Can
Say No, became a bestseller.26
The immediate question that worried the Chinese was whether
the “circumstances surrounding Japan” would include the Taiwan
Strait or not. Koichi Kato, the then secretary-general of the LDP, told
Chinese leaders during a 1997 visit to Beijing that the new Japan-U.S.
defense guidelines were not aimed against China. According to the
Japanese press reports, Kato suggested that Taiwan should be excluded from the perimeter of the defense guidelines. His political rivals pounced on the remark. Seiroku Kajiyama, then the director of
the Cabinet Secretariat, argued that the perimeter should not be
specified and strongly hinted that Taiwan was also included.27 Officially the Japanese government made a rather ambiguous explanation, saying that “circumstances surrounding Japan” was not a geo—————
23. See note 6 to this chapter.
24. See, e.g., the commentary by the Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 17, 1996, quoted in
Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, p. 455.
25. Takagi, “In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership,” p.32.
26. The book was promptly translated into Japanese and published in Japan; see
Song Qiang, et al., No to ieru Chugoku (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1996).
27. Akihiko Tanaka, “Relations with Japan,” in Chugoku soran, 1998 nenban (China
almanac, 1998) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), pp. 146–49; Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp.
437–38.
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
263
graphical concept but a concept that focused on the nature of the circumstances. In any case, the intention of Japan was neither to encourage Taiwan’s independence nor to promote unification, but to
prevent the use of force in solving the problem. Hostilities across the
Taiwan Strait would be the worst nightmare for the Japanese, not
only because of the geographical proximity but because of its potential to undermine the basis for stability and prosperity in the region.
The New Period of an
Unsettled Partnership: Autumn 1996–Present
Once the reconfirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance was all but a fait
accompli, Japan and China moved toward reconciliation and entered
a new period in their relationship. The Japanese prime minister at
the time was Ryutaro Hashimoto. When Hashimoto met Jiang Zemin
in Manila in November 1996, Hashimoto told Jiang that he attached
as much importance to Japan-China relations as he did to Japan-U.S.
relations. He also stated that his cabinet shared the understanding of
history with the Murayama cabinet, which had expressed deepest
remorse and sincere apologies for Japan’s colonial rule and invasion
in the past.28
A uniqueness of Hashimoto’s foreign policies existed in his advocacy of “Eurasian diplomacy,” placing China as the linchpin of the
Asia-Pacific and the Eurasian continent. He understood well the importance of engaging Russia in handling the triangle with China and
the United States. Hashimoto’s China policies were articulated in his
speeches that were made just before and during his visit to China in
September 1997. One of the points in the speeches was to compare
Asia with the situation in post–Cold War Europe, pointing out that
Asian countries, among them Japan and China, should be doing four
things: to understand the variety of polities, economies, histories, religions, and cultures that exist in Asia; to increase opportunities for
dialogues; to promote cooperation and mutual learning; and to create a common order. Based on this framework, he proposed a regular annual summit meeting and the strengthening of the security dialogue between Japan and China. In addition to the dialogue and
cooperation on bilateral issues, he argued that the two countries
should discuss regional and global issues and tackle them jointly and
constructively.
—————
28. For Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s statement, see Nitchu kankei kihon
shiryoshu, 1949 nen–1997 nen, pp. 819–20.
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Akio Takahara
The idea was to place Japan-China relations in a wider context so
as to relativize the relationship. The metaphor used among the Japanese officials was for Japan and China to get out of the stuffy, small
room where they sat face to face and discuss matters in a large hall.
The backdrop to this idea was the ongoing globalization and the
consequent growing drive for regional integration. Perhaps the Chinese were still cautious when they responded negatively to the Japanese proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund not long after the
eruption of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. But the Chinese
soon came to accept the spirit of regional cooperation, changed their
minds about the Asian Monetary Fund, and eventually agreed on
the extensive list of mutual cooperation announced at the time of
Jiang’s visit to Japan in November 1998.
As is well known, however, Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan turned out
to be a bumpy ride. He was angry that the Japanese did not agree to
include the word “apology” in the Joint Declaration on Building a
Friendship and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Development,
and that Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi apologized only verbally during the official summit meeting. While in Tokyo, the president repeatedly reminded the Japanese about their wartime deeds and the need
to contain militarism, which was regarded by many Japanese as unnecessary, impolite, and irritating.29 Jiang was angry especially because Obuchi had apologized in writing when President Kim Dae
Jung of South Korea visited Japan a month earlier.
From the viewpoint of the Japanese, Japan had expressed its
apologies to China on many occasions, including the emperor’s visit
to Beijing, while it had not been done so to the Koreans. Even when
the word “apology” was not uttered, the spirit had been clear and
was accepted by the Chinese leadership of the times. Otherwise, it
would not have been possible to normalize the relations and sign the
Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. The 1972 Japan-China Joint
Communiqué reads, “The Japanese side realizes keenly its responsibility as to the serious damage it inflicted on the Chinese people
through the war and feels deep remorse.”30 Then, Zhou Enlai stated:
The invasion of China by the Japanese militarists brought about an extreme
disaster to the Chinese people and great damage to the Japanese people.
“Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future.” We must firmly
remember such experiences and lessons. The Chinese people have followed
—————
29. Ryosei Kokubun, “Japan-China Relations After the Cold War: The Transformation of the ‘1972 Regime,’ ” Kokusai mondai, no. 490 ( Jan. 2001): 43.
30. Nitchu kankei kihon shiryoshu, 1949 nen–1997 nen, p. 428.
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
265
the teaching of Chairman Mao and have strictly distinguished the very small
number of militarists and the majority of Japanese people. . . . The Chinese
and the Japanese are both great nations and are both diligent and brave
peoples. The peoples of the two countries must be friendly toward each
other for generations and generations.31
It is well known that Mao and Zhou then decided to give up their
claim for reparations, which was a great relief to the Japanese side.
When Deng Xiaoping came to Japan and met the Showa Emperor in
1978, he said, let bygones be bygones and from now on we should
look forward and construct a peaceful relationship between the two
countries.32 Many Japanese were greatly moved by the magnanimity
of these great leaders, but, in contrast, they were much disappointed
with Jiang Zemin’s tenacity.33 In addition, Kim Dae Jung had made it
clear that the Koreans would not take up the history issue in the future, while Jiang was apparently unwilling to make this promise.
Obuchi was also under pressure from within the LDP not to give
in to China this time. With China’s accelerated growth in the 1990s,
the Japanese, like people elsewhere, could imagine the emergence of
China as a major global power. Many Japanese felt the historical issues were sometimes used in China to strengthen Chinese nationalism and to pressure Japanese for economic concessions.34 As China
grew stronger, Japanese could imagine further political pressure and
economic competition from China, creating doubts about the wisdom of a continued low posture toward China. The new perspective
was strengthened as the proportion of Japanese who were adults in
World War II declined and the proportion of those born after the war
who felt they were not responsible for the war grew.
The irritation among some Japanese had also stemmed from what
seemed to be China’s tactic to belittle Japan to the United States. This
took place as if it were a means to strengthen the image and author—————
31. For his speech at the welcoming banquet for Prime Minister Tanaka, see ibid.,
p. 420.
32. Ibid., pp. 518–19.
33. At the press conference held just before Jiang left Tokyo for Sendai city, a Japanese reporter asked in goodwill, “Mr. President, you have repeatedly raised the history issue in your meetings during this visit. Would you like to use this opportunity to
send other messages you have brought to the Japanese public?” Jiang paused for a
while and then burst out on the history point once again. The Xinhua News Agency
had to change the question when it reported on this press conference.
34. One precedent was set in 1987, when Deng Xiaoping brought up China’s abandonment of reparations in demanding greater assistance from the Japanese during a
conversation with Jun’ichiro Yano, the then leader of the Komei Party (see Nitchu kankei kihon shiryoshu, 1949 nen–1997 nen, p. 707).
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Akio Takahara
ity of Jiang Zemin after his re-election as party general-secretary in
September 1997, seven months after the death of Deng Xiaoping. In
the following month, Jiang made a stopover in Hawaii on his way to
meet Clinton and visited Pearl Harbor, the implication of which was
rather obvious. After the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese media
repeatedly reprimanded Japan for its irresponsibility in letting the
exchange rate of the yen fall. When Clinton reciprocated the Jiang
visit the following year, he made the same argument, praising the
Chinese for maintaining the value of the RMB and accusing the
Japanese of letting the yen fall.35
The irritation on the part of the Japanese influenced the discussion
over the review of ODA grants to China. Some members of the LDP
complained vociferously that it was no use providing ODA to the
Chinese, who took it for granted and were never grateful. Some ignored the earlier discussions on the application of ODA principles to
China and insisted that ODA should not be provided in the light of
China’s military buildup and arms exports. Negative reports in the
right-wing Sankei shinbun about the Chinese using the ODA for military purposes fueled the indignation. In fact, considering the rapid
growth, huge savings, and the foreign exchange reserves of China,
and Japan’s economic stagnation and huge budget deficits, the economic rationale for aiding China looked rather thin. Nevertheless,
the wise men’s group, convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
review ODA to China, concluded in early 2001 that ODA should be
continued for the stability and prosperity of China and of the region.
However, the group recommended that the foci of the ODA should
be shifted to environmental conservation and social development
and that the amount should be adjusted in accordance with the fiscal
conditions of Japan.
During this period, however, Japan’s inclination toward regional
cooperation continued, and the good news for Japan was that China
became an active participant in regional forums. To the eyes of outside observers, it seemed that this switch became salient in 1999 in
the wake of NATO’s decision on its new strategic concept and the
bombing of Yugoslavia and the Chinese Embassy there. At the occasion of the ASEAN+3 meeting in Manila in November 1999, China
agreed for the first time to attend the Japan-Korea-China triangle
summit meeting. At the same meeting the following year in Singapore, it was agreed by the three parties that this meeting should be
—————
35. Akio Takahara, “The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis: The Case
of China,” Ajia kenkyu 45, no. 2 (Aug. 1999): 58–59.
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
267
made a regular, annual event, and that the year 2002 be made a year
of exchange among the three countries. The significance of this year
was threefold: Japan and Korea jointly would host the World Cup
Football Games; Japan and China would celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the normalization of relations; and Korea and China
would celebrate the tenth anniversary of normalization. China, in its
meeting with ASEAN, proposed that they should aim for a free trade
treaty, while ASEAN responded with a proposal to include Japan
and Korea as well in forming an East Asian free trade area. After all,
both Japan and China understood that regional cooperation was the
trend of the times.
Since 1999, despite the hiccups that occurred now and then, such
as the chauvinist remarks on history by some Japanese politicians
and the great publicity given to them in China, which helped to inflame the issue, or China’s strong protest against the Japanese-U.S.
joint research on theater missile defense, or Japan’s strong protest
against Chinese naval and research vessels intruding into Japanese
waters, both governments have basically maintained a conciliatory
approach toward each other. There is a growing concern, however,
about the vicious circle of friction and distrust between the general
public in the two nations. This perhaps reflects the rise in nationalism in the two countries, which in turn could be attributed to the
shared sense of uncertainty in the face of drastic systemic restructuring required by globalization. Not only Japan’s but also China’s policymakers could no longer ignore public opinion, and they had to
think quickly of ways to foster mutual understanding and trust if
they wanted to expand their room for maneuvering.
Concluding Remarks
From the above analysis, it seems to me that Japan’s policies toward
China in the 1990s were conceived in three contexts. First, there was
the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In fact, one aspect of the reconfirmation of the alliance was directed toward China, not in an aggressive way but in a defensive way, although that was not the major aspect of it as far as Japan was concerned. It cannot be denied that
many Japanese were increasingly worried about a stronger China
and that some believed that reconfirming the alliance with the
United States was essential in maintaining the power balance in the
region. At the same time, Japan was undecided about its policy in
the case of hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. It could only waffle on
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Akio Takahara
the issue, but it hoped that ambiguity would contribute to deterring
the use of force.
Second, there was the context of the growing regional integration.
Japan was willing to provide further assistance to China in order to
support its stable development, which would be beneficial to all the
countries in the region. Japan consistently promoted the idea of regional cooperation, and the multilateral, Gulliver approach of the
surrounding countries to engage China started to take effect, as
China began to realize that regionalism was a historical trend and
also a useful tool in extending its influence and interests without offending neighboring countries. China had actually faced a dilemma
in pursuing policies of peace and development. China said it needed
a peaceful environment for development, but once China developed,
it posed a threat to the neighboring countries because of its size and
its determination to build an even stronger military. In this context,
all parties in the region began to see the merit of regional frameworks as a mechanism for “win-win” or “all-win” relationships.
Third, there was the bilateral context. The official, conciliatory
policy toward China was generally upheld throughout the period,
although relations were strained in the mid-1990s by a combination
of various factors including Taiwan, nuclear testing, historical issues,
and territorial disputes. Needless to say, there was no advantage to
Japan in allowing the relationship to deteriorate.
Having said all these things, we easily can point out a basic dilemma that Japan, as well as the United States, faced in pursuing its
China policy in the post–Cold War era. In terms of security concerns, Japan and the United States do not want to see China develop its military might to challenge the status quo in the region.
On the other hand, Japan and the United States are willing to
strengthen their economic ties with China. This will contribute to
China’s economic development, which inevitably will lead to the
expansion and modernization of the Chinese military. The United
States may be able to bear this dilemma longer because of its wide
lead in military capabilities and its geographical distance from
China. Japan, however, lacks these advantages and will not be able
to put up with the pressure for long. There is only one way to solve
this dilemma of strategic confrontation and economic engagement:
that is, to establish a multilateral security framework in the AsiaPacific on top of the existing bilateral alliances. In this way, Japan
will neither confront China strategically by depending exclusively
on the United States, nor confront the United States by strengthening ties with China and the other countries of East Asia. Japan, to-
Japan’s Policy Toward China in the 1990s
269
gether with China and the United States, should take the initiative
in implementing such an arrangement.
In order to realize this idea, however, it is imperative that the vicious circle of friction and distrust be reversed between the Japanese
and the Chinese. It seems to me that there is a basic psychological
problem to be solved: the Japanese feel superior to the Chinese in
terms of their economic and social development, while they feel inferior about culture, civilization, and the status and role in international politics; the situation is the opposite with the Chinese, who
feel superior to the Japanese in terms of tradition and civilization
and their influence in international politics but inferior about the
level of economic and social development. Both sides become worried when they perceive that their superiority is being undermined.
It will take time to alter these mindsets, but the only solution here
is to engage at all levels, actively promote dialogue, and boldly question any seed of misunderstanding. An example is the mistaken
statement that the Japanese do not admit there was a massacre in
Nanjing in 1937. How many Japanese actually deny the massacre?
Extremely few. No doubt, the Japanese should not forget the history
of the war with China and deepen their understanding about the
cause of the folly. The Chinese, on their part, should not forget the
recent fifty-odd years of Japanese peace and contribution to the region and should see history as a trend and take the postwar years as
an important reference in judging Japan. It would also help if the
two nations could embark on exciting joint projects, such as the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund and training facilities for
the U.N. peacekeeping operations.