Download - Researchmap

American Intellectuals’ Cooperation with the U.S. Government during the
Manchurian Incident: Focus on Edward C. Carter and Chester Rowell of
the Institute of Pacific Relations
TAKAMITSU Yoshie
Abstract:　This paper discussed two important points concerning American IPR
members’ cooperation with the U.S. government. First, American intellectuals involved
in the IPR diligently cooperated with the U.S. government, despite the IPR’s well-known
principle of being “non-governmental” and Edward C. Carter was quite politically active
long before the start of the Second World War, even though he was unconsciously a
state-oriented nationalist rather than a communist sympathizer. Second, Carter’s
suggestion that the entire Japanese government (including the army) highly regarded
American opinions and possible actions far greater than those of the League of Nations
was the key to deterring Japanese aggression.
Introduction
The objectives of this thesis are twofold. First, I present a case concerning American
intellectuals’cooperation to the government during the Manchurian Incident with particular focus
on Edward C. Carter and Chester Rowell who involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations. Second,
I examine the relevance of their observations and Carter’
s insistence that Japan regarded the views
of American people and the possible action of the U. S. government far more than those of any
other power or of the League of Nations.
Established in 1925, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) was the first international nongovernmental organization to focus on the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of the IPR was to
ostensibly serve as an information center and forum of scientific research for the region that was
independent of any specific government.
In recent years, there has been a growing appreciation of the influence of non-governmental
organizations in the field of public diplomacy, even between the World Wars1）. In regard to IPR
studies, significant advances have been made by Tomoko Akami who suggested (through
philosophical approach) that the IPR was state-oriented2）. This suggestion that prominent members
of the IPR performed actions according to state-oriented thinking is significant.
Akami examined the relationship between the state and new liberals in Japan through referring
the detailed cooperation between the Japanese government and the Japanese Council of the IPR.
However, there is limited information regarding American IPR members’cooperation with the
government during the early 1930s3）.
Although the establishment of the IPR would lead to open discussions regarding U.S.–Japan
immigrant issues, the U.S. government believed that it would have a negative effect on American
32
American Intellectuals’Cooperation with the U.S. Government during the Manchurian Incident (TAKAMITSU)
national interests4）. Thus, according to the U.S. State Department documents, there is limited
evidence to indicate cooperation between the U.S. government and the American Council of the
IPR.
The importance of Americans in the IPR was extremely high because of the number of members,
leadership and financial contributions5）. The IPR was indeed an American dominated organization
even though its overall purpose was to function as international organization.
In this thesis, I will examine the cooperation by American intellectuals who involved in the IPR
with particular focus on Edward C. Carter and Chester Rowell by utilizing the Hornbeck Papers.
Stanley K. Hornbeck, the chief of the Far Eastern Division of the U.S. State Department, is
considered as the person who connected the American Council of the IPR and the U.S. government
in the 1930s.
1　Carter’s cooperation with the U.S. government
Edward C. Carter, a central figure of the IPR, was Secretary of American IPR from 1926 to 1933
and Secretary General of the International IPR from 1933 to 1946. Carter was an extremely
competent figure with a strong personality who had been involved with the YMCA student
movement at Harvard University since 1900. He was especially active in international YMCA
activities in Asia, Europe, and the United States6）.
The Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931 occurred just before the fourth IPR Conference
(21 October to 2 November 1931) in China. Because of this incident, the conference was almost
canceled, and the Japanese government was deeply concerned about how the conference would
unfold eventually. However, Jerome Greene, the chairperson of the Pacific Council, moved forward
with the plans, and on October 13, the Pacific Council decided to hold the conference in Shanghai7）.
At that time, Carter remained in China in order to attend the conference. Immediately after the
incident, he interviewed several officials of the South Manchuria Railway and other pertinent
Japanese individuals8）.
U.S. Ambassador to Japan, William Cameron Forbes, was on leave in the United States and did
not return to Tokyo until November 5. According to these dates, Ambassador Forbes was absent
from the Far East for approximately six weeks after the Manchurian Incident occurred9）.
Due to the lack of information in the U.S. government regarding the incident, Carter diligently
worked to obtain any related information. In communication with Nelson T. Johnson, the American
Minister to China, Carter sent his report of the Manchurian situation to the U.S. State
Department10）.
After returning to the United States, Stanley K. Hornbeck, the chief of the Far Eastern Division
of the U.S. State Department, invited Carter and George H. Blakeslee to attend a meeting on
December 8, 1931 in Washington D.C. concerning the Manchurian situation11）.
It is important to note that Hornbeck and Blakeslee were also the founding members of the IPR
established in 1925. Although Hornbeck’
s appointment as the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of
the U.S. State Department was in February 1928, he participated in the first and second IPR
conferences in Hawaii before that time. However, he resigned from the IPR board in March 1929
33
人文社会科学研究 第 28 号
just before the third IPR conference in Kyoto, because he expected that the Manchurian problem
would be the subject of a heated debate at the conference. He also feared that the IPR would be
criticized as a tool of American government because of his membership 12）. However, Carter
continued to consult various matters regarding the IPR through personal letters with Hornbeck.
Blakeslee, a professor of International Relations at the Clark University, was a key figure of
emerging academic field of International Relations of Far East in the United States. Blakeslee
recommended that Hornbeck (who earned a Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin) become the first
lecturer of the Contemporary Far Eastern Politics at Harvard University. Then, he asked Hornbeck
to participate in the IPR when he established the new venture. Blakeslee participated in the first,
second, and third IPR conferences and informed Hornbeck of the arguments of the third conference
at Kyoto related to the American policies13）.
In the meeting at the U.S. State Department, Carter insisted that Japanese military action in
Manchuria was planned by the Japanese military officials with additional support by the officials of
the South Manchuria Railway. According to his interview with officials of the South Manchuria
Railway, the officials told him that the Japanese military action was warranted (even if it was
conspiracy), and they were indignant with the Chinese because of their violation of Japanese treaty
rights guaranteed in 1915 and 191814）.
2　Rowell’s cooperation with the U.S. government
Chester Rowell was a journalist from California who believed in Republican reformism. As a
member of the IPR, he participated in the first, second, fourth, and sixth conferences. Thus, when
the Manchurian Incident occurred, he stayed in China to attend the fourth IPR conference and
diligently collect any related information concerning the incident through his IPR and other
networks, as Carter did.
On February 2, 1932, Secretary Stimson communicated with Rowell at a meeting in which
Hornbeck was also present. In this meeting, Rowell expressed his observations of the Manchurian
situation and presented a written memorandum at Stimson’
s request15）.
Rowell believed that the Manchurian Incident occurred because Japanese military officials and
South Manchuria Railway officials expected a resolution by armed force. According to Rowell,
Kiyoshi Kanai, who was a representative of the Japanese Government Railways in China and
participated in the third, fourth, and sixth IPR conferences, stated,“You may as well understand the
situation. China has, in boycott, a weapon against which we are powerless. We have, therefore, no
choice but to use against the Chinese our weapon against which they are powerless, armed force16）.”
Kanai was a close friend of Yusuke Tsurumi at Ichiko, a prestigious Japanese high school, and a
subordinate of Inazo Nitobe 17）. From the perspective of the Japanese military, Kanai was an
internationalist18）. However, Rowell had suspected that he was the head of the Japanese Secret
Service in China.
In November 1931, Rowell traveled to Japan and met Motosada Zumoto of The Herald of Asia,
who participated in the first and second IPR conferences. According to Rowell, Zumoto appeared to
be the unofficial eyes and ears of the Foreign Office19）. Zumoto, a graduate of the Sapporo
34
American Intellectuals’Cooperation with the U.S. Government during the Manchurian Incident (TAKAMITSU)
Agricultural School in the same years as Nitobe, was a publicist closely associated with the
Japanese government20）. He participated in the first and third IPR conferences and was well known
by American Far Eastern experts through the Williamstown Institute of Politics, which held annual
international relation conferences since 192121）.
Zumoto told Rowell that he noted a significant influx of Japanese political gangsters during his
trip to Manchuria. After returning to Tokyo, Zumoto told Shidehara that unless he took prompt and
vigorous steps, the army in Manchuria would soon take matters into their own hands. However,
Shidehara did not follow his advice. On September 18, Zumoto made a speech before the Rotary
Club in Tokyo in which he stated that the only escape from a military coup was reorganization of
the government led by a person who was more resolute (even if less intelligent) than Wakatsuki.
This person would also support the foreign minister in more vigorous policies while simultaneously
holding back the army22）.
Meanwhile, Rowell observed that there was lack of harmony between the Japanese Premier and
Foreign Minister on one side, and the Minister of War (Minami) on the other in the beginning of the
Manchurian Incident. According to Rowell, after the Japanese Kanto Army occupied Tsitsihar on
November 19, 1931, Matsuzo Nagai, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, admitted that the action
at Tsitsihar was against their will23）.
Although Rowell did not meet Baron Shidehara during that time, he discussed the necessary
evacuation plans with Vice Minister Nagai and Shiratori, the Director of Information Bureau of
Japanese Foreign Ministry. Both men agreed that they would not tolerate the troops of“any Chinese
war lord,”especially those of Chang Hsueh-ling. Nagai also stated that Chiang Kai-shek could not
spare any troops for the Manchurian Incident. Besides, Shiratori bluntly stated that they would have
nothing to do with“warlord”Chang Kai-shek24）.
Rowell concluded that the weakening of the Nanking Government was a major objective of the
entire Japanese strategy25）.
3　The importance of American opinion and action
Interviews by Carter and Rowell reflected the exact atmosphere of that time. The profits of the
South Manchuria Railway sharply dropped by the competition with the Chinese Railway newly
constructed on a parallel with the South Manchuria Railway. The officials of the South Manchuria
Railway recognized that the way of Chinese was unfair and illegitimate. In addition, they expected
the Japanese military to solve their problems rather than the Japanese government because they
knew that the Japanese government had nothing to do, and they predicted that something like the
Manchurian Incident would occur in the near future26）. According to a survey of Tokyo Imperial
University students two months before the Manchurian Incident, 88% agreed to use armed force to
resolve the Manchurian problem27）.
Carter emphasized the importance of American opinions and possible actions by the U.S.
government in the U.S. State Department meeting. According to Carter from his numerous
conversations, it was evident that Japan regarded such views of U.S. government in regard to
Manchuria as of greater importance than those of any other great power or of the League of
35
人文社会科学研究 第 28 号
Nations28）.
From his conversations with Japanese Army officers and other related sources, Carter was
convinced that all of the Japanese military officers did not have the same views regarding the
Manchurian policy. Rowell also pointed out the lack of harmony within the Japanese government.
Carter stated further that recent action had undoubtedly been carried out by a group of younger
officers who were clear as to their objective and had been able to push through the plans which they
had adopted. But many of the Army officers, especially the older men, did not favor such drastic
measures as have been carried out29）.
At that time, because of the lack of information, Secretary Stimson could not conclude whether
the Japanese Army conducted its activities according to the plans of the Japanese government or
s opinion
their own30）. However, accurate information by Carter and Rowell was significant. Carter’
differed from Forbes who insisted that the United States should avoid allowing Japanese public
opinion to fester by such a public statement. Conversely Forbes insisted that it would be effective
for the United States to use armed force31）.
According to Carter, Japanese, including the liberals, believed that all of the leading U.S.
newspapers, except the World-Telegram, were supporting Japan’
s actions in Manchuria. He also
expressed his conviction that it would be to the best interest of the United States to publically
clarify its opposition to the military measures in Manchuria hoping that this information might
gradually reach and influence Japanese liberal opinion32）.
On December 6, 1931, just before the meeting with Carter at the State Department, Hornbeck
proposed that Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, imposed economic sanction against Japan. His
plan was to simply force Japan give up its aggressive policy through economic pressure. However,
Stimson did not agree to such an action 33）. He believed that Japan should understand the
internationalism which seeks a diplomatic solution to international conflict instead of war.
Hornbeck retracted his proposal of economic sanctions against Japan after he realized that his
government did not intend to use armed force against Japan.
However, if the United States delivered the message that they could not tolerate the Japanese
policy immediately after the Manchurian Incident, then what would have happened? The Japanese
government (including the Japanese army) highly respected the American government, and they
realized that they did not have sufficient political, economic, and military power to pursue their
policy against the United States. Therefore, as Carter insisted, possible action of the United States
in regard to Manchuria was essential. In fact, such action was much more important than the
League of Nations since the Japanese government did not regard that the League of Nations had
sufficient power to prevent war.
Conclusion
This paper discussed two important points. First, Carter and Rowell were closely working with
the U.S. State Department by utilizing their IPR network during the Manchurian Incident. In
addition, Carter worked for the U.S. State Department by participating in the analysis of the
Manchurian situation until June 193234）.
36
American Intellectuals’Cooperation with the U.S. Government during the Manchurian Incident (TAKAMITSU)
American intellectuals involved in the IPR diligently cooperated with the U.S. government,
despite the IPR’
s well-known principle of being“non-governmental.”Carter was quite politically
active long before the start of the Second World War, even though he was unconsciously a stateoriented nationalist rather than a communist sympathizer. Although the U.S. government did not
prefer to openly discuss the immigration problem, it still viewed the IPR as a useful tool and
welcomed the cooperation of IPR members.
Second, Carter’
s insistence that Japan highly regarded American opinions and possible actions of
the U.S. government was correct. In addition, both Carter and Rowell observed the lack of harmony
within the Japanese government. However, it is important to note that Carter realized the difference
between the younger Japanese Army officers and their older counterparts. Furthermore, his
suggestion that the entire Japanese government (including the army) highly regarded American
opinions and possible actions far greater than those of the League of Nations was the key to
deterring Japanese aggression.
During their quest to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Order, the U.S. government, including American
IPR members such as Carter, Rowell, Blakeslee, and Hornbeck, could not tolerate Japanese policy
during the Manchurian Incident. As a result, Carter recommended that the U.S. State Department
impose effective measures to deter Japanese aggression.
注
1 ) Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 芝崎厚
士『近代日本と国際文化交流』有信堂、1999年。
2 ） Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, London and New York, Routledge, 2002.
3 ） Several studies were referred regarding such cooperation during the Second World War. Inderjeet Parmar,
Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmilan, 2004. 油井大三郎『未完の占領改革』東京
大学出版会、1989年。
4 ） Akami, p. 53.
5 ） Akami, pp. 47-52.
6 ） Akami, p. 169.
7 ） Akami, p. 160. 片桐庸夫『太平洋問題調査会の研究』慶應義塾大学出版会、2003年、195-200頁。
8 ） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, box.45, Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
9 ） 菅英輝「駐日アメリカ大使ウィリアム・C・フォーブス」『北九州大学外国語学部紀要』40、1979年、
45頁。
10） Hornbeck to Castle, 1931/9/30; Castle to Hornbeck, 1931/10/5, box 45, Hornbeck Papers. William Castle, the
Under Secretary of State, did not welcome Carter’
s approach to the U.S. State Department.
11） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, p.2, box.45, Hornbeck Papers.
12） Hornbeck to Carter, 1929/3/23, box 45, Hornbeck Papers.“I suspect that the session at Kyoto may develop
some rather warm discussions and get out upon some rather thin ice. It may be distinctly advantageous to be
able to say that the Institute has not had suggestions from and has in no way been influenced by governments
(at least the American Government). In fact, the more I think about it, the more I am inclined to believe that
for the good of all concerned it will be best for me to drop off.”
13） Blakeslee to Hornbeck, 1922/4/25; 1924/2/7; Hornbeck to Blakeslee, 1924/2/9, box 30, Hornbeck Papers.
14） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, p. 2, box. 45, Hornbeck Papers.
15） 793.94/4121, 1932/2/2, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between Japan and
China
, 1930-44, reel 12, National Archires.
（RDSPRJC）
16） 793.94/4121, p. 4, 1932/2/2, RDSPRJC.
17） 岩永裕吉君伝記編纂委員会編『岩永裕吉君』1941年、第一編54頁。
18） 財団法人通信社史刊行会編『通信社史』1958年、351-360頁。
19） 793.94/4121, p. 3, 1932/2/2, RDSPRJC.
37
人文社会科学研究 第 28 号
20） 白山映子「頭本元貞と太平洋問題調査会」『近代日本研究（慶応大学）』第25巻、2008年。
21） Blakeslee to Hornbeck, 1928/8/10, box 30, Hornbeck Papers. Blakeslee often referred the arguments by
Zumoto in the IPW in his personal letter to Hornbeck.
22） 793.94/4121, p. 4, 1932/2/2, RDSPRJC.
23） 793.94/4121, p. 9, RDSPRJC.
24） 793.94/4121, pp. 9-11, RDSPRJC.
25） 793.94/4121, p. 13, RDSPRJC.
26） 満鉄関係者からの聴取書、本館4B 023-00平11法務-06477-100、公文書館所蔵。
27） 竹内洋『丸山眞男の時代』中公新書、2005年、290頁。
28） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, p. 3, box.45, Hornbeck Papers.
29） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, p. 3, box.45, Hornbeck Papers.
30） Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931-Ⅲ, p. 85.
31）菅52頁。
32） Memorandum, 1931/12/8, p. 1, box. 45, Hornbeck Papers.
33） Shizhang Hu, Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy,1919-1937, Greenwood Press, 1995, p. 138.
34） Hornbeck to Carter, 1932/7/1; Carter to Hornbeck, 19327/23, box. 45, Hornbeck Papers.
38