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Liberalism, Marxism and the Class Character of Radical Democratic Change BRUCESMARDON ith the reexamination of socialism that has occurred as a result of the crisis of working class politics and the implosion of the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s, there has also been a reexamination on the Left of the role and importance of liberalism in the development of new democratic forms. This reassessment has occurred in a context of great concern with the politics of language and discourse as well as with the need to recognize the plurality of democratic struggles. One major current of thought that has grown out of these different concerns is that associated with the notion of "radical democracy." In this approach, liberal democracy and liberal democratic discourse are seen as the starting point for radical democratic institutions that greatly increase the rights and freedoms of various oppressed groups. Two of the most complete expositions of this approach are provided in the work of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis as well as that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.! Both sets of writers argue that liberal democracy and liberal democratic discourse provide the crucial context for the development of radical democracy. Laclau and Mouffe state that, "The task of the Left ...cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural W Studies in Political Economy 37, Spring 1992 129 Studies in Political Economy democracy. "2 In their opinion, radical democracy, which has as one of its goals "the abolition of capitalist relations of production,"3 continues a long process of "democratic revolution" that started with the French Revolution and has gained impetus with the development of "the so-called 'new social movements' of the last few decades."4 Bowles and Gintis echo this opinion: we are not suggesting that liberal democratic society step outside its historical trajectory to inaugurate a new order. We believe that liberal democratic capitalist society has itself produced the conditions that make our postliberal democratic vision historically relevant.J They claim that "no fundamental shift in social dynamics"6 is required to move into a society that involves the displacement of profit-driven capital markets by the democratically accountable planning of investment and resource allocation, the organization of workplaces and other communities by means of representative and participatory institutions. and the attenuation of economic inequality ...? Central to this approach is the claim by these writers that there is a cumulative movement toward greater and greater individual rights within liberal discourse and liberal democracy. Both Laclau and Mouffe as well as Bowles and Gintis claim that there has been a progressive expansion of democratic demands - "the deepening of the democratic revolution" in the case of Laclau and Mouffe, and "the expansionary tendency of personal rights" in the case of Bowles and Gintis - which has increasingly extended the scope of democracy to different areas of social life. 8 Radical democracy is viewed by these authors as a further phase in this cumulative development. For Laclau and Mouffe, as for Bowles and Gintis, the process of radical democratic change from within liberal democratic arrangements, while subject to the requirements of successful mobilization, is not necessarily restricted by any fundamental obstacles. In addition, they argue that there is no necessary "class belonging" to the process of democratic change. Instead, a multiplicity of different identities that have been discur130 SmardonlRadlcal Democracy sively articulated form the basis for democratic development. Indeed, it is Marxism's insistence on the necessity of class struggle that is opposed most clearly by these writers. Laclau and Mouffe state that From everything we have said, it is evident that the deepening of a mass democratic practice ...can be achieved only if it is recognized that these tasks do not have a necessary class character and if stagism is renounced in a thoroughgoing manner.s Similarly, Bowles and Gintis argue that the criteria of group membership, and hence its social composition, cannot be determined a priori. A multiplicity of "us and them" divisions is possible in any social order.10 As a result, both sets of writers also argue that analysis of democratic development must move beyond Marxism and its stress on class struggle as a necessary aspect of radical social change. I I In combination, these views provide a particular understanding of political struggle and democratic development. For Laclau and Mouffe, the crucial task for a "New Left" in the current period is the construction of a new "hegemonic articulation" in which the discourse of democratic rights provides the unifying theme for the diverse forms of opposition to oppression. This new hegemonic articulation is formed in opposition to the hegemonic project of "liberalconservative discourse" which "under the cover of the defense of 'individual liberty' would legitimize inequalities and restore the hierarchical relations which the struggles of previous decades had destroyed."12 Similarly, for Bowles and Gmtis, the focus of struggle is the promotion of personal rights (the rights of persons to control their own bodies, to economic security, to equal opportunity etc.), In their understanding of struggle, what is crucial is that the discourse of personal rights be mobilized by the various oppositional forces into ever greater areas of social life; thereby undermining remaining "citadels" of unaccountable power and increasing the participation of people in decisions affecting their work places and their communities. This extension of personal rights 131 Studies in Political Economy occurs in opposition to other notions of rights, such as those connected with property rights, which have developed as key sources of legitimacy for economic inequality and undemocratic forms of social power. They state that the discourse of rights is fraught with internal tensions due to its genesis in social conflict and the consequently contradictory forms it is obliged to assume in social life. This contradictory character explains both its emancipatory potential and its seemingly limitless capacity to legitimate social inequality and undemocratic economic arrangements.U Thus, for all of these writers, the crucial confrontation on the path to greater democracy is that between different discourses. And the crucial determinant of success is the ability of different groups to mobilize alternative "hegemonic articulations" or to promote expanded definitions of "personal rights" from within liberal democratic arrangements. Utopian Democracy It will be argued that this view does not give nearly enough weight to private capital and its opposition to radical democratic change. While both sets of writers acknowledge the existence of social forces capable of limiting democratic development, they do not sufficiently integrate an analysis of those forces into their treatment of the movement from liberal to radical democracy. In the case of Bowles and Gintis, they point to the difficulties experienced by the Mitterrand government in France after its election victory in 1981 as an example of the power of the "capital strike,"14 but do not integrate this form of class power into their analysis of radical democratic change. Instead, the constraints imposed on democratic change by the ability of capitalists to withdraw their investments and by the international mobility of capital, occur only in the context of an alternative anti-democratic model of development called "global liberalism,"lS For Bowles and Gintis, radical democracy is a means of removing the limitations on democratic development that are created by the power of the capital strike,16 but they fail to see that 132 SmardonlRadlcal Democracy the process of development of radical democracy is itself constrained by this power. Instead, they simply argue: 1) that this evolution is based on the essentially democratic character of the drive for expanded "personal rights"; 2) that their postliberal vision is "not synonymous with the extension of state power," because it "affirms the sentiment that neither the centralized state nor the capitalist corporation will be the vehicle of human liberation;" and 3) that the "new technical and organizational demands being made upon economic life today," such as the growing importance of knowledge to the process of economic growth, are incompatible with the hierarchical nature of capitalism and will raise the costs of maintaining that type of social order.l? None of these explanations deals with the process of conflict that underlies the movement from a liberal democratic capitalist society into one which features a radical extension of democratic rights. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe are aware of social forces working against democratic development, but do not feel that those forces create major incompatibilities between liberal and radical democracy. At one point, they state that In the case of the strategy of construction of a new order, the changes which it is possible to introduce in social positivity will depend not only on the more or less democratic character of the forces which pursue that strategy, but also upon a set of structural limits established by other logics - at the level of the state apparatuses, the economy and so on.18 But at another point, they observe, If the radical democratization of society emerges from a variety of autonomous struggles which are themselves overdetermined by forms of hegemonic articulation; if, in addition, everything depends on a proliferation of public spaces of argumentation and decision whereby social agents are increasingly capable of self-management; then it is clear that this process does not pass through a direct attack upon the State apparatuses but involves the consolidation and democratic reform of the liberal State. The ensemble of its constitutive principles - division of powers, universal suffrage, multi-party systems, civil rights etc. - must be defended and consolidated. It is within the framework of these basic principles of the political community that it is possible to advance the full range of present-day 133 Studies in Political Economy democratic demands (from the rights of national, racial and sexual minorities to the anti-capitalist struggle itself).19 In their discussion of the transition from liberal to radical democracy, Laclau and Mouffe make no mention of the "structural limits established by other logics" - particularly the structural limit represented by the investment powers and global mobility of private capital - but instead focus on the ability of liberal democracy to provide "public spaces of argumentation and decision." This view leaves out of consideration the role of capitalist economic prerogatives in constituting liberal democracy, a "constitutive principle" that is directly challenged by the goals of radical social change. Laclau and Mouffe also do not analyze the problems that may be associated with sustaining the commitment of "human beings" to greater equality rights in a context of economic crisis brought on by the opposition of capital to radical democratic goals. It appears that, in some "essentialist" way, the drive for equality rights is regarded as an inherent aspect of the human character, one which has been developing without interruption from the time of the French Revolution. Laclau and Mouffe claim that, " ...once human beings accept the principle of equality in one sphere they will attempt to extend it to every other sphere of life."2Q In their view, once the principle of political equality was established with the "Rights of Man" and the French Revolution, an inevitable process was started, leading to the demand for more and more rights in other spheres of social life. There is no discussion of the impact of different social situations on the very existence of this drive. While they do discuss the effect of various social conditions on the specific form and timing of demands for equality rights (eg, their analysis of anti-capitalist struggles in the nineteenth century),21 there is still an assumption that these events take place within an overall necessary progression toward the establishment of equality rights in all spheres of social life. Because Bowles and Gintis, as well as Laclau and Mouffe, do not contextualize their analysis of radical democratic 134 SmardonlRadical Democracy change in terms of the contradictions created by existing liberal democratic institutions and their articulation with capitalist economic prerogatives, they are able to posit a continuous and linear transformation of liberal democracy into radical democracy. The result is a form of utopian democracy in which new democratic forms develop without any necessary connection to the power relations of liberal capitalism. Two Positions Other writers have covered this theme in their critiques of the radical democratic theorists. Ellen Meiksins Wood, in particular, has stressed the extent to which Laclau and Mouffe and Bowles and Gintis do not consider the serious obstacles, at the level of both the state and economy, to the democratization of production relations because they view new democratic relations as a continuation of liberal democracy.22 These points, however, are made as part of a general defense of classical Marxist notions concerning the primacy of the working class in the transformation of social relations.23 Two very distinct positions have thus been established. On the one hand, the radical democrats point to the development of a multiplicity of social movements and a variety of political identities in the current period, and argue that democratic struggle must not "privilege" class by assuming that class antagonism will necessarily occur and will be at the heart of any democratic mobilization. On the other hand, the Marxists argue that major democratic change, given the capitalist context in which it will occur, cannot avoid class struggle. They also argue that the working class must be primary because it remains as the only social force capable of challenging capital on its own terrain at the work place. The debate thus moves between arguing for "no necessary classes" or arguing for "the necessity as well as the primacy of classes." The present analysis claims that there is no need to choose between such stark alternatives. The radical democratic theorists do make an important point: that the social movements have changed the political landscape in the latter part of the twentieth century by multiplying the number of 135 Studies in Political Economy political identities. besides those of class. that can be involved in democratic struggle. and by focusing attention on other forms of oppression. besides those of class. which must be dealt with in any truly democratic social transformation. They are also correct in pointing to the fact that these identities are not necessarily anti-capitalist. but only become so through a process of "bonding through discourse and organization. "24 They do assume. however. that. because workers are not necessarily anti-capitalist. and because class identity is just one of many identities with a potential interest in radical democratic change. class antagonisms can be regarded as a contingent aspect of democratic struggle. This view is unrealistic because it claims that a political project which has as one of its goals "the abolition of capitalist relations of production," and "the displacement of profit-driven capital markets by the democratically accountable planning of investment and resource allocation." can be pursued without the necessary involvement of class antagonisms. In the first place. class-defined struggle is necessary because a major radical democratic task must be to empower workers in their role as producers (i.e. as a group of people placed in a particular relationship of subordination to capital); and to create a degree of unity and understanding that will allow that goal to be achieved. Some specification of struggle in class terms is necessary in order for workers and others to understand what is to be accomplished through an important part of the radical democratic agenda. There is a correspondence between the goals of radical democratic change and the creation of class identities that it would be foolish to ignore. This correspondence is particularly significant given the location of workers at the heart of the capitalist production process and thus their importance in terms of successfully implementing radical democratic change at the work place. As well. the opposition of private capital to radical social change is an unavoidable class antagonism. which. it will be argued below. is more important than ever before. Class forms of understanding are thus also necessary in order for 136 SmardonlRadical Democracy workers and others to see what stands in the way of radical democratic change. The critical importance of private capital in opposing radical democratic demands, and the importance of class identities in contributing to the achievement of radical democratic goals does not mean that worker-led organizations and the demands emanating from those bodies must be given the highest priority in the organization of struggle. Indeed, it will be argued below that broadly based democratic struggle against capital in the current period is not likely to be one in which worker-led organizations are dominant or primary. This paper thus argues for radical democratic change in which classes are necessarily involved, but does not argue for a process of struggle in which the working class is primary. In this context; it should be pointed out that capitalist class obstacles do not represent the only barriers to radical democratic development. There are other potential obstacles to such a development in areas such as gay and lesbian rights, gender rights as well as the rights of black and ethnic minorities which cannot be simply reduced to, or derived from, class divisions. However, this paper focuses on the limitations imposed by class power, not because these are the only obstacles to radical democratic development, but because it is the constraints in this area which are most blatantly denied in the attempt by Bowles and Gintis and by Laclau and Mouffe to downplay the significance of class antagonisms in the construction of radical democracy. Strong Capital and Democratic Change The opposition of capital to fundamental democratic change has a particularly strong impact in the current international economic context. The globalization of production and of finance has greatly undermined the ability of governments based in particular nation states to pursue policies that challenge the economic prerogatives of capital. A clear illustration of this point is provided by the fate of the Meidner Plan proposal in Sweden. This plan was met with stiff and uncompromising resistance on the part of capital, and was implemented only in a greatly watered 137 Studies in Political Economy down form. As Gregg Olsen points out, "A series of amendments made between 1976 and 1983 gutted the plan,leaving it a mere shadow of the original Meidner program. "25 The original program had called for the development of wageearner funds which would have given worker-elected representatives a much greater say in the operations of many of the largest Swedish companies. When the plan was finally enacted in 1983, the impact of the program was greatly circumscribed by the limited sources of funds and the inadequate coverage of Swedish corporations. Attempts to increase work place democracy in Sweden experienced a similar fate. The 1977 Act of Co-determination fell far short of requiring democratic input on the part of workers.26 A critical reason for the success of Swedish capital in opposing these changes was its much greater independence from the Swedish state and economy. During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of economic changes occurred in which Swedish capital greatly increased the importance of foreign investment and the proportion of exports in its business operations.S? These changes decreased the ability of the Swedish state to exercise control over the investment patterns of Swedish capital, and the ability of Swedish labour to challenge the prerogatives of capital, because a much smaller proportion of overall business operations was based in Sweden or was dependent on the Swedish domestic market. As well, the Swedish state was much more constrained by international financial markets as a balance of payments deficit and a government budgetary deficit forced it to rely on external sources of funding.28 All of these changes undermined the ability of the Swedish state to pursue democratic reforms that were out of line with international trends. The original Meidner proposals, which called for a 20 percent levy on corporate profits to finance the wage-earner funds, would have represented a significant cost difference between Sweden and other countries had it been implemented - a cost difference that was particularly difficult to implement given the expanded role of exports in overall economic activity. This cost was in addition to the fact that the original Meidner proposals would have led to a significant erosion of 138 SmardonlRadlcal Democracy capitalist control over investment and over the disposition of profits - an erosion which the Swedish state was illprepared to enforce given its greater reliance on international money markets and the increased ability of Swedish multinationals to move production to other countries. In important ways, the same situation is apparent in other western capitalist nations. In all of these countries, there has been a common tendency toward internationalization of production and toward expanded trade based on greater intraindustry specialization and the rapid rise of multinational corporatiens.t? In this more globalized environment, individual states are increasingly concerned with maintaining conditions within their boundaries that are internationally competitive in order to avoid major shifts of production away from their areas, to ensure that exports are not priced out of world markets and to avoid major currency crises. Robert Cox points out that Throughout most of this century the role of states has been conceived as a buffer protecting the national economy from disruptive external forces in order to encourage internal levels of economic activity sufficient to sustain domestic employment and welfare ...In the past couple of decades the priority has shifted to one of adapting domestic economies to the perceived exigencies of the world economy.30 The radical democratic agenda runs up squarely against this new political reality. The increased interest on the part of states in promoting international competitiveness has provided a basis in many countries for slashing wages, benefits and other rights won by workers in the period of fordist compromise.U Even when governments attempt to promote international competitiveness through various kinds of interventionist policies, rather than through "hyper-liberalism,"32 the purpose is to expand an economy which continues to be run according to capitalist principles of ownership and control. This context makes it very difficult for any liberal democratic government to move against the grain and undermine capitalist power by increasing popular control over the eco- nomy. As in the Swedish case, that government would be 139 Studies in Political Economy risking serious erosion in the level of exports as well as in production and employment. It is completely unrealistic to expect that, in a context of global restructuring, capital would accept the investment and work place changes of radical democracy and not move in a massive fashion to other jurisdictions with more favourable conditions - particularly in those countries, such as the United States, Canada and Britain, which have strong 'free-market' traditions. The problems associated with the likely reaction of capitalists to radical democratic change are only enhanced by the steady increase in the mobility of capital, which has indeed accelerated in the 1980s. This change has produced far more integrated global financial markets employing sophisticated technologies which allow for the almost instantaneous transfer of large quantities of capital - a change that greatly increases the ability of capital to respond to radical democratic demands.33 The ability of capital to shift when unfavourable economic conditions are perceived was amply illustrated after Mitterrand's victory in the 1981 election in France. That government was forced to back down from its redistributive Keynesian policies in the face of a serious balance of payments deficit, declining investment, and rising unemployment.H However, the importance of globalization is not restricted only to demands for investment and work place democracy. The entire gamut of radical democratic concerns ranging "from the rights of national, racial and sexual minorities to the anti-capitalist struggle itself" are affected by this changed context. The current environment of limitations on human rights legislation, of funding cuts for AIDS research and development programs and for women's programs are all part of a political agenda that is heavily informed by the "need" to promote international competitiveness through lowering taxes, reducing business costs, and maintaining maximum "flexibility" in the utilization of labour.35 This context is diametrically opposed to radical democratic changes concerned with increasing the rights of oppressed groups under liberal democratic capitalism. As was shown by the opposition of capital to the development of pay equity in Ontario's private sector and the response of 140 SmardonlRadical Democracy the provincial state to capital's opposition, there is little willingness to implement changes which greatly increase costs of production and limit the ability of capital to determine employment conditions. In Ontario, small capital was opposed to any form of legislated pay equity, claiming that it could not afford it, and the provincial government responded to this opposition by exempting all employers with 10 or fewer workers from the legislation. Large capital was also opposed to pay equity and gained a series of amendments to the legislation which greatly limited the scope and coverage of the plan in the private sector.36 These limitations were passed despite the efforts of the Equal Pay Coalition, which had fought for much more inclusive legislation. Currently in Ontario, there is strong business opposition to the reform agenda of the New Democratic Party (NDP) government. How many of its planned changes in areas such as pay equity, worker protection, and increased minimum wages will be implemented, in the face of threats by capital that Ontario will suffer for its support of the NDP, remains to be seen.37 None of these issues, however, are considered by Bowles and Gintis or by Laclau and Mouffe because they do not see any form of fundamental contradiction between liberal democracy and radical democracy. Rather, because the development of new forms of social relations is seen as an unproblematic extension of existing liberal democratic trends within capitalism, there is no attempt to consider the potentially disruptive impact of strong capital in an era of global competition. Indeed, for Bowles and Gintis, radical democracy is a major means of stimulating economic growth through increasing work place productivity and eliminating the economic costs associated with the need to monitor and supervise labour in the alienated conditions of hierarchical work places.38 Marxism and Radical Democracy There is another important reason why Laclau and Mouffe and Bowles and Gintis do not place enough emphasis on the class obstacles to radical democratic change: their rejection of Marxism and its insistence on class struggle as a necessary aspect of fun141 Studies in Political Economy damental democratic transformation. The desire on the part of these theorists to distance themselves from Marxist explanations of social change leads to a very limited treatment of Marxism as a body of theory. From Marx through to more recent Marxist literature on the transition to socialism, one central concern of Marxists has been the tension between democratic expansion and class forms of social power.39 Neither Laclau and Mouffe nor Bowles and Gintis discuss this aspect of the Marxist debate in a serious way. Instead, they simply claim that Marxism is fatally flawed by a commitment to objectively defined class struggle, and by a tendency toward "totalitarian" forms of politics. On this basis they move beyond Marxism to "new" forms of politics in which there is a greater appreciation of the importance of democratic rights as well as a less predetermined view of social change.40 But this simply ignores central aspects of the main theoretical concerns of Marxists. The fact that Marxist debates have often led to a qualified belief in the possibility of democracy in particular situations is neither the result of a lack of concern with democratic rights, nor is it due to a commitment to objectively defined social change. Rather it is due to their belief that the possibility of democracy in advanced capitalism cannot be defined or analyzed without considering the class contradictions that would stand in the way of any major attempt at the democratic transformation of the economy. This aspect of Marxist analysis needs to be retained in any radical democratic project. Because both Laclau and Mouffe and Bowles and Gintis do not seriously consider this crucially important theme in Marxist thought, they also do not seriously consider the important insights which Marxism provides concerning the class structures of power and domination that must be overcome if the development of radical democratic institutions is to proceed. However, not all aspects of Marxist analysis retain their relevancy in the current period. The growth of the social movements and the dramatic failures in Eastern Europe have changed the context of struggle in a way that undermines the tenability of traditional Marxist arguments concerning 142 SmardonlRadlcal Democracy the leadership role of the working class. While, as was stated earlier, class-based forms of mobilization are necessary given the class obstacles to democratic change and the goals of radical democracy, this does not imply that radical democratic struggle must focus on workers as the primary agents of social transformation. Indeed, in the present context, an insistence on the primacy of worker-led struggle is divisive and has little possibility of success. The social movements have been very important in emphasizing the existence of other sites of oppression outside the work place, and in establishing autonomous organizations for the purpose of mobilizing resistance in a variety of areas - including resistance against capital.41 Activists in a number of social movements, such as peace activists struggling against the military/industrial complex, or environmentalists struggling against corporate pollution, or feminists struggling against the exploitation of women in various parts of the world, have been instrumental in developing opposition to capital. But these struggles are part of wider agendas that are not strictly concerned with traditional socialist goals. They are also concerned with social changes, such as more ecologically-sustainable patterns of development or the creation of more equal relationships between women and men, that do not necessarily flow from the establishment of more democratic production relations. These various organizations are thus not prepared to redefine themselves primarily along class lines or to subordinate themselves to the primacy of worker-led organizations. What is required at the present time is a hegemonic strategy against global capital that builds on the existing foundations developed by the social movements and by labour activists in various countries, rather than a strategy which systematically alienates large segments of potential support by insisting on the primacy of the working class in any process of social transformation. In the current context, especially in light of the democratic failures in Eastern Europe and in other so-called "worker states," any attempt to subordinate the diverse forms of opposition to capital under the primacy of worker-led resistance would fail and would 143 Studies in Political Economy only weaken existing movements for change. In this regard, Marxism has something to learn from the radical democratic theorists and their insistence on the plural character of struggle in the latter part of the twentieth century. None of this, however, justifies the tendency of the radical democratic theorists to stress continuity between liberal and radical democracy. The need to integrate a diversity of struggles into democratic change does not negate the fact that serious impediments remain between the two types of democracy. In an era of global capital, it is more important than ever before to recognize the major obstacles to radical democratic expansion and the utopian qualities of any vision which claims that the radical democratic agenda can be developed as a simple extension of existing liberal democratic trends. Notes This article benefitted greatly from the comments of the reviewers at Studies in Political Economy. particularly those of Manfred Bienefeld. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 144 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic Books. 1987). hereinafter referred to as DC; Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso. 1985). hereinafter referred to as HSS. An important summary and defense of Laclau and Mooffe's position in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy will also be used extensively in the paper: Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Post-Marxism Without Apologies," New Left Review No. 166 (Nov-Dec 1987), pp. 79-106, hereinafter referred to as "PMWA." HSS, p, 176. HSS, p, 192. HSS, pp. 159-160; "PMWA," pp. 104-105. DC, p. 179. DC, p. 179. DC, p. 209. DC, 27-64; HSS, 152-171; "PMWA," 104-106. HSS, p. 58. DC, p. 161. DC, pp. 18-20; "PMWA," pp. 103-104; HSS, pp. 85-88. HSS, p, 176. DC, 174-175. DC, p. 190. DC, pp. 188-193. DC, p. 209. SmardonlRadical Democracy 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. DC, pp. 179-180. HSS. p. 190. "PMWA," p. 105. "PMWA," pp, 104-105. HSS, pp. 156-157. Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Retreat From Class (London: Verso. 1986). See also Nonnan Geras, "Post-Marxism'}" New Left Review No. 163 (Mayflune 1987). pp. 78-80. 23. Wood, The Retreat from Class. pp. 14-15; Geras, "Post-Marxism'}" pp. SO-51 and pp. 80-81. 24. DC, p. 161. 25. Gregg Olsen, "Labour Mobilization and the Strength of Capital: The Rise and Stall of Economic Democracy in Sweden," Studies in Political Economy No. 34 (Spring 1991), p. 114. See also: Leo Paniteh, "The Tripartite Experience," in K. Banting (ed.), The State and Economic Interests (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). pp.55-63. 26. Olsen. "Labour Mobilization ...••• p. 113. 27. Ibid., pp, 115-136. 28. Ibid., p. 127. 29. For a discussion of these changes, see Nigel Grimwade, International Trade: New Patterns of Trade. Production and Investment (London: Routledge, 1989), Chapters 2 and 4. 30. Robert W. Cox, "The Global Political Economy and Social Choice," in D. Drache and L. Genler (eds.), The New Era of Global Competition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991). p. 337. 31. On the rise and fall of the fordist compromise, see A. Glyn, A. Hughes, A. Lipietz, and A. Singh, "The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age," in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet Schor (eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990). pp. 39-125. 32. This tenn is used by Cox. "The Global Political Economy and Social Choice," p. 342. 33. On the changes that have occurred in capital markets, see D.E. Ayling, The Internationalization of Stock Markets: The Trend Towards Greater Foreign Borrowing and Investment (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1986), and Paul Stonham, Global Stock Market Reforms (Aldershot: Gower, 1987). 34. For a discussion of the many policy reversals of the Mitterrand government, see Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 1986). pp. 192-226. 35. For an example of this political agenda in Canada, see Warren Magnusson et, al., The New Reality: The Politics of Restraint in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1984). 36. Concerning the opposition of capital to pay equity, see Carl Cuneo, Pay Equity (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1990). pp. 30-31. 35-36. 40-41, 55-65, 86-95, 100-102 and 116-119. See also Pat Annstrong and Hugh Annstrong, "Lessons From Pay Equity," Studies in Political Economy No. 32 (Summer 1990). pp. 35-37. 37. Toronto Star 26 June 1991, p. D1. 38. DC. pp. 211-213. 145 Studies in Political Economy 39. 40. 41. 146 For a discussion of this theme in Marxist analysis, see Martin Camoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). HSS, pp. 85-88; "PMWA," pp. 105-106; DC, pp. 14-20. There is a large and growing literature on the social movements. Only a few examples can be cited here. For a discussion of feminist activism in several areas of resistance, including resistance against capital, see Guida West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg, Women and Social Protest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). On the antinuclear movements, see Wolfgang Rudig, Anti-Nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy (Longman, 1990). Concerning the very active peace movement in Britain, see James Hinton, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 20th Century Britain (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989).