Download Repertoires and Violence in Contentious Politics

Repertoires and Violence in
Contentious Politics
Spath – 385 Arab Politics & Society
Spring 2010
Defining a Repertoire of Contention
 Contentious repertoires:
arrays of contentious performances that are currently known
and available within some set of political actors. (Tilly &
Tarrow, 2006)
 Set of tools available for use by political activists that
the general public would recognize as a form of political
protest.
 BRAINSTORMING repertoires in various settings
Technology in the Repertoire
 Avoiding Technological Determinism
 Innovations in communications technology must be analyzed
dynamically – operates in two opposing ways:
 lowers the costs of coordination among activists who are
already connected with each other; facilitates mobilization
 BUT –
 excludes those who lack access to the new means of
communication, increasing communications inequality and
prevents potential activists from joining
 Facilitate larger state coordination and the ability for states
to use repression.
Violence in the Repertoire
 Differentating between „Conflict‟ and „Violence‟
 Difference in degree and in kind (strategy)
 Popular View – Islamic activists are radical fanatics engaged in
irrational, deviant, unpredictable violence
 Does not explain why violence is used in certain places at certain
times
 More social-scientific view – we can at least try to explain why
we observe the use of violence when and where we do by
examining human behavior and political context
Protests in Bahrain (1994-1998)
 Fred Lawson reading
 2 Key Questions:
 Why did discontent lead to mass protest WHEN it did?
 Why did it take on the different forms (modes) of contention it did at
different times?
 Q1 – 4 key developments in „93 and ‟94
 Merchants & Shopkeepers (Shi‟i) replaced by state-run business
 Entrepreneurs w/ skilled domestic labor replaced by foreign labor
 Shrinking economy prevented development of industrial sector
 Social regulation of women affected prospects for jobs and higher ed.
 TRIGGER EVENTS – imprisoning 3 prominent Shi‟i Activists
Protests in Bahrain – Dynamic Repertoires
 Early 90s contention – petitions to the ruler
 Example: “Elite Petition” vs. “Popular Petition” to restore parliament and release
activists – same goals, different approach
 Changes in repertoires as RESPONSE to state behavior
 Regime response was mildly coercive; not accommodating
 People took to the streets using localized mobilization (Shi‟i neighborhoods)
 Still petitions, but demonstrations & sit-ins became the dominant mode of
contention
 Followed by increased selective repression
 Pacting for a Pacified Public
 Deal between detained influential societal leaders and the regime
 Short period of passivity
 Failure of Pact, targeted harsh repression  violence as strategy
 Collective punishment and back to demonstrations
 Leadership change and moderation in repressive tactics
Hafez & Wiktorowicz
Violence in Egyptian Islamic Movement
 2 Questions
 Specific –Why did Islamists turn to violence in EIM?
 General -Why do social movements utilize violence as contention
given the presence of other tactics? What explains variation across
countries and over time?
 2 Forms of the „Popular View‟
 Ideational Factors - Political or Religious ideologies can
completely explain the use of violence.
 Psychological Factors - Socioeconomic background tells us
something about grievances and therefore participation violent
groups (deprivation theories)
Hafez & Wiktorowicz
Violence in Egyptian Islamic Movement
 It is more effective to view violent activists as rational actors
operating within a context of opportunities and constraints that
inform decisions about appropriate tactics to use.
 Political Opportunity Structure – Focus on TWO
 Accessibility to institutionalized politics
o Access versus Exclusion
 State Repression
o Timing and Targeting
 What does this mean for political strategy?
Timing and Targeting
TIMING
TARGETING
Selective
Indiscrim.
Pre-Emptive
Reactionary
FACILITATE
VIOLENCE
DETER
VIOLENCE
Hafez & Wiktorowicz
 3 Important Changes in Pol. Opportunity Structure
contributed to emergence of violence as a tactic

First, Egypt witnessed the deliberalization of institutional
politics in the 1990s (esp. Ikhwan)
 Second, the authorities in Egypt began to dismantle the
network of the Gama‟a in Upper Egypt
 Finally, repression against the Gama‟a was indiscriminate;
Empirical Work - Event Analysis
 The fundamental unit of analysis in this study is the
contentious event.
 Event analysis is widely recognized as a tool for studying
waves of mobilization.
 It is essentially a way of tracking over time the rise and
fall of particular types of events and the features
associated with them (Beissinger 2002: 42).
Subject – Verb - Object
Transcription
subject
verb
object
the same night the mob (gathered)
mob
#gather
none
the mob committed great violences in
Surry-Street, in the Strand, particularly
at the Coach Office, not a window was left
with a whole pane of glass
mob
#break
owner of Coach Office
My research team found multiple accounts of these attacks in 1829’s Times of London.
Example
from Charles
Tilly’s
Study
onwithin
Great
Britain
Here
is how we transcribed
and classified
the major
actions
a cutting
incident on
May 4th:
Transcription
Verb
Broad Verb Category
certain evil-disposed persons riotously assembled
assemble
move
entered the dwellings of the journeymen silk weavers
enter
move
and maliciously cut and destroyed the silk in the looms
destroy
attack
#end
#end
end
a reward of 200L is hereby offered
offer
negotiate
The left hand verb presents our simplified transcription of the phrase’s central action.
The right hand column shows our placement in one of eight extremely broad categories
of verbs: attack, control, end, meet, move, negotiate, support, and other. (More on
verb categories in a moment.)
Source: Tilly. Contentious Performances Chapter 2. Unpublished draft 2007.
Empirical Work – Event Data Analysis
Figure 5.4: Demonstrations and Violent Events in the Soviet Union and Successor States,
1987-1992
300
250
Violent Events
Cumulative Number of Events
Demonstrations
200
150
100
50
Year
Source: Data Supplied by Mark Beissinger
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
0
From Hector Forero’s Student Memorandum