Download Putting Pen to Papal: A Historiographical Analysis of the

Benjamin Lee (3823184)
Putting Pen to Papal: A Historiographical Analysis of the
Assertion of Power by the Medieval Papacy
Arguably, the Papacy in the 12th century reached a position of very great power by accident. By
inheriting the Western Roman Empire’s administrative network, the Catholic Church and by
extension the Papacy was de facto the best administrator in Western Europe. The large tracts of land
owned by the Church as well as canon law influencing almost everyone in Christendom ensured that
by AD 1100, the claims made by the Papacy of supreme spiritual, and on occasion temporal power
over Christendom were very much justified. However, as the Middle Ages progressed, the
emergence of strong national monarchies like Sicily and France 1 as well as the continued pressure of
non-orthodox theological views (i.e. heresy) challenged the Papacy’s claim to supreme power. In the
face of these challenges from monarchies and heresies, Popes have used a variety of methods
ranging from temporal force to spiritual showmanship to assert their power and counter these
challenges. When it came to spiritual matters, there is a general consensus amongst historians that
the methods wielded by Popes proved highly effective. However, when it comes to Papal assertion
of power in the temporal realm, historians still argue as to the efficacy of the Papacy’s attempts. This
essay analyses the historiography on Papal strategies to build their own powerbase, to oppose
heretical teachings and to contest secular assertion of power with particular focus on the case
studies of Innocent III (r. AD 1198-1216) and Boniface VIII (r. AD 1294-1303).
In order to better project the power of the Church, popes centralised the church as an institution
around the curia. Forged documents like the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretrals which established supreme
control of the Papacy over ecclesiastical affairs allowed Pope Nicholas I (r. AD 858-867) to depose
several archbishops.2 Similarly, Pope Gregory VII (r. AD 1073-1085) and his Gregorian Reforms drew
more power to the papal curia at the expense of the bishops – a move which succeeded,
Bokenkotter argues, because many influential people saw it as a “safeguard against tyranny of the
1
2
F. Donald Logan, A History of the Church in the Middle Ages, London 2002, pp. 254-255
Thomas Bokenkotter, A Concise History of the Catholic Church, New York 2004, pp. 121-124
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local bishop or lord”3. The centrepiece of papal projection of power in general, though was arguably
the Fourth Lateran Council, deemed to be the “most dramatic expression of the monarchical power
of the medieval papacy”4. The ecumenical council orchestrated and planned by Innocent III had
representatives from bishoprics, college churches, secular states as well as patriarchs of the Eastern
Churches in attendance. Innocent III ensured attendance by preventing attendees from having any
excuse to not come5 – notice of the council were sent out more than two years before the event,
and the council was timed to ensure representatives could travel in the summer. The three main
sessions of the council were also meant to show the Pope’s supreme power – Innocent III did not so
much discuss the 70 canons which came out of the council as presented it to the attendees who
approved all of them 6 while the heated debate over who should hold the office of Holy Roman
Emperor during the second plenary session meant Innocent was presiding over an important, secular
matter. Although the details of the third plenary session were lost, the final act of the council is
recounted by the Giessen Manuscript – on the 9th hour (the hour of Jesus’ crucifixion), Innocent III
closed the council and blessed it with a shard of the True Cross, and the council members all fell to
their knees in veneration7; or so the story goes.
While most historians agree that Lateran IV was an awesome spectacle and a manifest expression of
papal power, the efficacy of the council has been debated. Although the unknown German cleric
who wrote the Giessen Manuscript showered the council with praise,8 historians like John Moore
took a more cynical approach, stating that those with “ample experience may have recognised
immediately that most of the canons would soon be ignored, as much because of human inertia as
from active opposition.”9 Although one may instinctively agree with Moore’s assertion, one must
3
ibid. p. 125
Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250, Oxford 1989, p. 416
5
Brenda Bolton, ‘A Show with a Meaning: Innocent III’s Approach to the Fourth Lateran Council’, in Innocent III:
Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care, Aldershot 1995, p. 55
6
Logan, p. 195
7
Bolton, p. 63
8
ibid. pp. 53-57
9
John C. Moore, Pope Innocent III (1160/61-1216): To Root Up and to Plant, Leiden 2003, p. 250
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remain mindful of potentially putting the cynical modern mentality onto this event. Did clergy of the
13th century have the same cynical mindset that we do? It seemed the writer of the Giessen
Manuscript didn’t. In addition, because religion permeated so many aspects of society, Innocent III’s
waving of the piece of the True Cross must have had some impact; even if the canons were
eventually ignored, the spectacle of the Fourth Lateran Council would have very likely overwhelmed
and inspired those who were present.
Force was by far the preferred method of The Papacy in handing heretical teachings. The first three
canons Innocent III presented In Lateran IV were the reiteration of Catholic philosophy and were
intended to rebut heretical ideas,10 particularly that of the Cathar movement, which was thriving in
the Languedoc region of France. Innocent III was not shy of using force and the Inquisition against
heretics11 – his first encyclical to the bishops in Languedoc encouraged them to be “*no+ stricter in
judgement than in the eradication of heretics”12 and even granted the same indulgences as a
pilgrimage to Rome for any who acted against heretics. When combined with the Papal bull
Vergentis in senium – which essentially equated heresy with treason and granted the offender’s
property to those who rooted heresy out, the result was the Albigensian Crusade.13 There doesn’t
seem to be any disagreement on the success of Innocent III’s methods – the Cathari were effectively
wiped out as a religious force in the 20-year long campaign.
The main challengers to the Papacy however, were the monarchies which grew from relatively
powerless decentralised kingdoms to far stronger national entities through the Middle Ages. To keep
these upstart monarchies in check, medieval Popes were armed with various forms of ‘spiritual
artillery’ such as excommunication, interdict, or more commonly, the Papal bull – decrees backed of
the Pope’s spiritual authority. As mentioned above, Innocent III’s Vergentis in senium gave the
impetus for the Albigensian Crusade, and the destruction of Cathar heresy. When Boniface VIII
10
ibid. pp. 239-240
Bokenkotter, pp. 131-132
12
Morris, p. 441
13
ibid. pp. 441,444
11
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attempted to prevent the monarchies from appropriating clerical funds without his permission, he
issued the bull Clericis laicos which threatened anyone who participated in receiving or even paying
clerical taxes with excommunication.14 However, King Philip IV “the Fair” of France responded by
banning the export of specie from France and Boniface made an about-face with Etsi de statu,
another Papal bull which effectively granted the French King the right to tax the clergy without his
permission. 15 This was followed by a period of Boniface VIII alternating between publishing
confrontational bulls like Ausculta fili and Unam sanctam and conciliatory ones like Etsi de statu
before expiring due to a violent fever following a kidnap attempt by Philip IV’s chief minister
Guillaume de Nogaret. When Papal bulls were not sufficient, Popes resorted to excommunication
and interdict to pressure their targets into conforming to their wishes. Pope Innocent III responded
with excommunication and an interdict on England – forbidding priests from granting any
sacraments apart from baptism and last rites – when King John attempted to impose his selection
for Archbishop of Canterbury over the Pope’s preferred candidate Stephen Langton. The Pope
ultimately got his way – coupled with King John paying homage to the Pope – after a six-year
interdict (AD 1208-1214) and the threat of a French invasion. Innocent III had also used the same
methods seven years earlier to compel French King Phillip II “Augustus” to accept Ingeborg of
Denmark as his Queen and wife. Again, Innocent III was successful in getting Philip II to reconcile
with his estranged wife.16 In AD 1210, Papal darling and Holy Roman Emperor Otto IV laid claim on
Sicily – then part of the Kingdom of Naples which was in turn under the regency of Pope Innocent III
– for the Empire and earned an excommunication for his trouble. Innocent III then proceeded to
support the young King of Naples Frederick II for the seat of the Empire – which he did obtain in AD
1220. It would be important to point out that Pope Boniface VIII was in the process of writing the
14
Papal Degree Clericis Laicos, in B. Tierney. ed., The Middle Ages, Volume One: Sources of Medieval History,
nd
2 edition, New York 1973, pp. 297-298
15
Izbicki, Thomas M., ‘Clericis Laicos and the Canonists’, in J. Sweeney and S. Chodorow, eds., Popes, Teachers
and Canon Law in the Middle Ages, Ithaca 1989, pp. 179-180
16
Bokenkotter, p. 130
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excommunication of Philip IV over the clerical taxation affair when the kidnap attempt on him was
made by de Nogaret.17
It is clear that Innocent III enjoyed better results in his assertion of power than Boniface VIII did, but
was it due to the usage of ‘spiritual artillery’? There are some historians who argue that these means
contributed little if any towards achieving the goals of the Papacy. Morris argues the widelyobserved interdict on England did not serve the Church’s ends because the people would blame the
Church for not conducting Mass rather than the King.18 Innocent III’s new candidate for the Holy
Roman throne Frederick II would eventually betray the Papacy and attempt what Otto IV did, 19
obtaining two excommunications in the process and Boniface VIII’s Papal bulls were effectively
ignored and were even defied by Philip IV. In other words, the Papacy could “respond to outside
pressure, exert moral influence… but only rarely could it command.”20 Yet there are others who
argue that ‘spiritual artillery’ was just as potent as any other political method but its efficacy
depends on its usage. Guillaume de Nogaret, the minister who attempted to kidnap Boniface VIII
apparently said he was spurred into action when he heard the Pope was writing an
excommunication bull against Philip IV.21 The argument goes Boniface VIII failed where Innocent III
succeeded because Boniface VIII was not as consummate a politician as Innocent III. In his quarrel
with Philip IV, Boniface VIII continuously alternated between confrontation and conciliation, being
“too pliable for too long”22 in his dealings with the French. Izbicki firmly puts the blame of the failure
of Clericis laicos – and by extension the other bulls related to the affair – on the Pope who “yielded
to the pressures of practical politics.”23 There is a fork to this argument which puts forward the idea
that it was the increased power of the King which prevented the success of the ‘spiritual artillery’ at
Boniface VIII’s command. Logan argues Boniface VIII found in Philip IV a far better adversary than
17
Bokenkotter, p. 182
Morris, p. 428
19
ibid. pp. 425-426
20
ibid. p. 451
21
Joseph R. Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair, Princeton 1980, p. 277
22
Logan, p. 259
23
Izbicki, p. 189
18
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anything Innocent III ever faced.24 Aided by two highly competent lieutenants, Pierre Flotte and
Guillaume de Nogaret conducted a widespread propaganda campaign which focused on ad
hominem arguments against the Pope.25 Philip and his advisors also took advantage of the lack of
specific grievances in Papal bulls like Ausculta fili and spun them in a way to put the Papacy in a bad
light.26 The propaganda campaign was successful in obtaining support against the Pope due to its
targeted nature – spinning of bulls worked with the third estate while ad hominem attacks,
particularly accusing Boniface VIII of heresy gained the support of the nobles and to a limited but
sufficient extent, that of the clerics.27
The medieval Papacy was both proactive and reactive in asserting its power, projecting it in the form
of great councils as well as striking against heresy and other competing sources of authority with a
mixture of temporal force and spiritual might. Historians seem to have agreed on the efficacy of
temporal force in the eradication of Cathar heretics. However, there are many differing opinions on
the effect of the ‘spiritual artillery’ employed by the Papacy. In general, there are two main camps:
the cynical one which argues ‘spiritual artillery’ had little, if any effect and the other arguing that the
religious mentality of medieval Europe would have given these methods significant firepower.
Failures in the application of ‘spiritual artillery’ (e.g. Boniface VIII’s case) were attributed to
Boniface’s lack of political acumen or King Philip IV’s abundance of it. The ubiquity of religion in the
lives of medieval Christendom would lead me to side with the less cynical camp. Matters such as
relics and excommunication were taken seriously and thus, ‘spiritual weapons’ would definitely have
had an effect on everyone involved. Like any other political tool, how they would be affected would
then depend on how the tools were used.
24
Logan, p. 259
Sophia Menache, ‘A Propaganda Campaign in the Reign of Philip the Fair, 1302-1303’. French History, 4, 4,
1990 pp. 431-432
26
Strayer, p. 269
27
Menache, pp. 438-440, 446
25
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Benjamin Lee (3823184)
Bibliography
Bokenkotter, Thomas. A Concise History of the Catholic Church. New York, 2004.
Bolton, Brenda. "A Show of Meaning: Innocent III's Approach to the Fourth Lateran Council." In
Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care, by Brenda Bolton, 53-67. Aldershot, 1995.
Izbicki, Thomas M. "Clericis Laicos and the Canonists." In Popes, Teachers and Canon Law in the
Middle Ages, by J. Sweeny and S. Chodorow. Ithaca, 1989.
Logan, F. Donald. A History of the Church in the Middle Ages. London, 2002.
Menache, Sophia. "A Propganda Campaign in the Reign of Philip the Fair, 1302-1303." 4, no. 4 (1990):
427-454.
Moore, John C. Pope Innocent III (1160/61-1216): To Root Up and to Plant. Leiden, 2003.
Morris, Colin. The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250. Oxford, 1999.
"Papal Decree: Clericis Laicos." In The Middle Ages, Volume One: Sources of Medieval History, edited
by B. Tierney, 297-298. New York, 1973.
Strayer, Joseph R. The Reign of Philip the Fair. Princeton, 1980.
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