Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Review: The Doom of the Russian Monarchy Reviewed Work(s): Russia 1917. The February Revolution by George Katkov Review by: Boris Elkin Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 47, No. 109 (Jul., 1969), pp. 514-524 Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4206110 Accessed: 07-02-2017 21:35 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Modern Humanities Research Association, University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Slavonic and East European Review This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Reviews The Doom of the Russian Monarchy Katkov, George. Russia igiy. The February Revolution. Longmans, London, 1967. 489 pages. Maps. Index. The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution called forth the publication of a number of books. They are naturally diverse. Of those published in England particular notice was taken of the work by Dr George Katkov. It cost its author much labour; but as to the problem of the origin of the revolution?and, regardless of the great authority of de Tocqueville, the problem of those who seem to him the culprits of the revolution is in the centre of Dr Katkov's attention?the reader cannot help feeling that the author had fixed ideas on the Russian revolution before he began to write his book. Dr Katkov is prone to disregard facts where they contradict his own manifest preconceptions and to make assertions that are not adequately supported by historical evidence. He sets out to challenge the prevailing view that great revolutions ori? ginate in a spontaneous way and suggests that the revolution of February 1917 was instigated by the Germans, the freemasons and the Russian liberals. So far as the Germans are concerned, available evidence suggests that their intervention in Russia's internal affairs did not become tangible until after the February revolution. Certainly, prior to February 1917 they tried to stimulate separatist movements and, what is more questionable, strikes. On 26 December 1915 the Socialist politician and speculator A. Helphand (Parvus) received from Count U. von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German minister in Copenhagen, the sum of one million roubles which, he re? ported, was passed on to his agents in Russia.x However, he was then ad? vised by his agents to defer the intended action. This is where the evidence ceases: no one knows whether Helphand really did anything to stir up revolution in 1917. Yet Dr Katkov makes the unsubstantiated allegation that Helphand's actions were very important. 'Despite the lack of any documentary evidence in the Auswartiges Amt archives,' he writes, 'the continuous character of the strike movement in Russia in 1916 and at the beginning of 1917 strongly suggests that it was controlled and supported by Helphand and his agents' (p. 96). This assertion is repeated later with greater emphasis. 'We have seen elsewhere [where??B.E.] that the Petrograd strikes of January 1916 were instigated and financially sup? ported by Helphand's organisations and that the simultaneous Nikolaev strikes were probably organised by the same agency. In view of these precedents [?!], it is hard to believe that the Germans had no hand what? ever in the events of 23-26 February 1917, which so closely resembled the 1 Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, igi^-igi8, London, 1958, pp. io, 14. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REVIEWS unrest of the 515 previous yea dence ; nor, one suspects, ha February 1917, vigorously su unlike the feeble unrest of 1 of the German leaders wa dismember it and annex so S. P. Mel'gunov, whose infl rejected many'.2 the view that th As for the freemasons, there is no justification for the view that they 'had infiltrated the Kadet party' (p. 16), since among the founders of that party only V. A. Maklakov was known as a mason. One should treat with scepticism the masons' own claims to have had far-flung connections or exerted great influence.3 Mme E. D. Kuskova, to whose posthu? mously published letters Dr Katkov refers, cannot be regarded as an exception to the rule. Knotty problems of this kind cannot be disentangled by making wild assumptions. 'We can safely assume', writes Dr Katkov, 'that Guchkov's efforts to penetrate the ranks of the army and Guards officers and to recruit supporters for his plot were based on masonic ties' (p. 175). In fact A. I. Guchkov's army connections were based on his life? long interest in military affairs. He met many senior officers in his capacity as chairman of the Duma Defence Commission; indeed, he first became acquainted with General V. I. Gurko when they were both serving in South Africa during the Boer War, as Dr Katkov himself mentions (p. 41). I knew Guchkov well and after the revolution discussed with him more than once the plot in which he had taken part. On the whole he kept t his deposition to the Extraordinary Investigating Commission, but o one occasion he did mention a prominent general who had gone back on his word and withdrawn from the revolutionary action that had bee agreed; having said this, Guchkov pledged me to keep his name secret The impression I gained from these conversations accords with Mel'gunov's conclusions: that a court revolution was planned but not carried out. A P. N. Milyukov wrote in his memoirs, Guchkov's conspiracies created striking situations but generally ended in failure. Under the collective term 'liberals' Dr Katkov includes everyone op? posed to the pre-revolutionary regime. However, most of these men were in fact monarchists. The only incontrovertible liberals were the Kadet led by Milyukov. Dr Katkov admits that they were patriots who strov for victory in the war and strongly opposed revolution: '[the] Kadet as a whole were not ready to link up with the revolutionary movemen (p. 189). Yet, characteristically, he later remarks that there were defeatists among them and casts unfounded aspersions upon their patriotism. 'Th fear of defeat and humiliation of Russia,' he writes, 'was, if we are no 2 S. P. Mel'gunov, Na putyakh k dvortsovomu perevorotu, Paris, 1931, p. 223. 3 According to the paper on freemasonry in Russia, read by Bro. P. Telepneff, i 1922 to the English lodge named below, Nicholas II was a member of the occult lodge o Martinist rite, 'The Cross and the Star', suspended in 1916 (Transactions of Quatuo Coronati Lodge, vol XXXV). This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 516 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW mistaken, only the ostensible and avowable expression of deep-seated fear that the war might end in victory befo aspirations of the opposition had been fulfilled, and that opportunities offered for their fulfilment by war condition (p. 231). Dr Katkov does not name a single liberal defeatis cite a single word uttered or published by any such pers need to refute what is but a figment of the imagination. The author's argument appears to be that, while Milyuk steadfastly opposed to any revolutionary or unconstitutional war-time, there was a left wing within the Kadet party w satisfied with the leader's tactics. He speaks of 'strong op N. V. Nekrasov and Prince L'vov, supported by the lawye and Margulies' (p. 15). He is right about Nekrasov and M although it is worth noting that on 27 February 1917, at the f meeting of Duma members after the prorogation of th Nekrasov who proposed that order should be re-establishe of the old regime.4 He is wrong about Prince G. E. L' Margulies. L'vov had discontinued his connection with th after 1906 and took no further part in politics until the government's prestige was on the point of vanishing.5 Fin cannot be described as a left-wing Kadet since he was another party. This does not mean that there were no Kadets who criticised their leader's tactics. Such opposition did exist, but at no time was it significa or influential. Milyukov had to hold a special meeting of the parliament party in 1916 to reconsider its tactics; however, he says in his mem that 'the debates were ardent, but as a result only two or three protesti members declared for left tactics.'6 At that time there were 59 Kadets i the Durna.7 Thus the number of dissidents was evidently very low, it is unlikely to have been higher previously. Dr Katkov is at pains to discredit the activities of the war indust committees and other voluntary organisations set up by patriotic-minde members of Russian society. Their purpose was to promote the war effo more vigorously once it had become apparent that, although the f army was ready for great sacrifices, the government in the rear was un to render effective support. The civil and military authorities were who unprepared for warfare on such a tremendous scale. As early as 18 Decem ber 1914 General M. A. Belyayev, the chief of the general staff, told th British and French ambassadors that the official figures for the rese of rifles were 'criminally false', and that the depots were nearly em the artillery needed 45,000 shells a day, but the factories then produ only 13,000 at the most. He concluded that during the next three month 4 R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (eds.), The Russian Provisional Government, i Documents, 3 vols., Stanford, 1961, vol I, p. 45. 5 Cf. T. I. Polner, ?hiznennyy put' knyazya G. E. L'vova, Paris, 1932, pp. 1 i2ff. 6 P. N. Milyukov, Vospominaniya, 2 vols, New York, 1955, vol II, p. 264. 7 Ibid., p. 396. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REVIEWS the condition ous.8 In of General the face Russian Denikin of this inefficient, and by the replacing the 517 it descr situation was state the appara recently put it: 'The Russian was not yet in people's min supply of munitions was c witness were the writes: great army 'That even the the received serv enemie from Russ and in 1916?7,238. The pro 1914 to 4,251 in 1915 and 1 At the same shock front in occurred caused by 1915 in the rifles w traini information drilling with sticks near my A group of onlookers gathere exchanging impressions. He word 'treason' (izmena), wh people in the street. Sick and told what they knew, and in an important effect upon p Dr Katkov states that the liberals 'undermined the Russian state and the war effort by rumour-mongering', but fails to mention the adminis? trative incompetence that was the real cause of public dissatisfactio General Denikin, a distinguished commander, addressing the army officer conference at Mogilyov in May 1917, said that the Russian troops had been treasonably deprived of shells.13 Whether such treason existed or no who would dare to say that the tsar's government was not responsibl for Russia's military unpreparedness ? It was the voluntary organisations (and also allied aid) which succeeded in repairing the serious defects th existed in the equipment and supply of the armed forces. From the summer of 1915 onwards Russia was plunged into a seriou internal political crisis which ended in revolution. Nicholas II, probab shaken by the military defeats, decided to part with his most reactionary ministers and to replace them by independent persons. A few months late however, he yielded to the pressure of his wife, the empress Aleksand Fyodorovna, who was acting on Rasputin's instructions, and dismiss 8 M. Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre, 3 vols, Paris, 1921vol I, pp. 231-2; Sir George Buchanan, My Mission in Russia, 2 vols, London, 1923, vol p. 219. 9 Gen. A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoy smuty, 5 vols, Paris, 1923-7, vol I, part I, pp. 28 ff. 10 M. Ferro, La revolution de igiy, Paris, 1967, p. 51. 11 Gen. N. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, New Haven, 1931, pp. 129, 155 et seq. 12 Ibid., pp. 140, 131. 13 Denikin, op. cit., vol I, pt. II, p. 113; cf. Gen. A. Lukomsky, {Iz vospominaniy', in Arkhiv russkoy revolyutsii, Berlin, 1922, vol II, p. 35. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 518 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW the men he had recently appointed. A. A. Polivanov, the who had immensely improved the condition of the army, re of the customary letter of thanks from the tsar a peremptor 'The work of the war industries committees does not in confidence and I find your supervision of them insuffic tative.'14 Nicholas H's decision to dismiss Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich as commander-in-chief, and to assume the supreme command himself, was taken with the active participation of Rasputin, if not on his initiative. This is confirmed by the most competent witness, the empress, in two of her letters to the tsar.15 This step contributed to the growing decay of the government in Petrograd, which came under her domination. General A. A. Mossolov, a courtier close to Nicholas II, states definitely that 'when [the emperor] left for the front he took the opportunity to delegate his powers to the empress.'16 M. V. Rodzyanko also mentions that he heard strong rumours that she had been appointed regent. Whether this was actually so or not, the empress came close to exercising such powers. On 25 August 1915 Nicholas wrote to her: 'Think, my wifey, will you not come to the assistance of your hubby now that he is absent?'17 As Sir Bernard Pares comments: 'In this casual way the management of the estate is handed over.'18 Sir George Buchanan's view was that 'the Empress, more especially after Stunner became President of the Council in February 1916, virtually governed Russia.'19 A few months earlier Aleksandra Fyodorovna, had told him: 'The Emperor, unfortunately, is weak; but I am not, and I intend to be firm.'20 The empress received reports on governmental affairs from the prime minister, I. L. Goremykin, and his successor B. V. Stunner (who did this, on Rasputin's orders, regularly once a week), as well as from several of their cabinet colleagues. She interfered repeatedly in order to dismiss or appoint ministers. Between the middle of 1915 and February 1917 Russia had no less than four prime ministers, five ministers of the interior, three ministers of war and three foreign ministers. The right-wing deputy V. M. Purishkevich appositely called this 'ministerial leapfrog'. Dr Katkov speaks of Nicholas II as a man of'saintly' character, whose ethics were allegedly inspired by the ideals of 19th-century Russian Christianity typified by Dostoyevsky's figures of Prince Myshkin or Alyosha Karamazov (pp. 354 ff.). These comparisons do not bear examina? tion. When Myshkin arrived in Russia, he immediately began to protest against capital punishment. Nicholas II not only ordered executions 14 P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), Padeniye tsarskogo rezhima . . ., 7 vols, Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-7, vol VII, p. 82. 15 Dated 7 January and 3 August 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, London, 1923, pp. 256, 378. 16 Gen. A. A. Mossolov, At the Court of the Last Tsar, London, 1935, p. 28. 17 Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, London, 1929, p. 71. 18 Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, London, 1939, p. 279. 19 Buchanan, op. cit., vol I, pp. 238-9. 20 Ibid., p. 238. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REVIEWS without 519 embarrassment, bu (as on 9 January 1905). Th principle of will realising traits of active love in the p Dr Katkov's imaginative p account for. It disregards Nicholas II and had to deal with him. To say nothing of the memoirs of Witte, the objectivity of whic questioned, Dr Katkov disregards that indispensable source of infor tion, the truthful recollections of Count V. N. Kokovtsov, a loyal collab rator of Nicholas II often years' standing. Nor does he take notice of book by General A. A. Mossolov, who for seventeen years was at the hea of the last tsar's chancellery and in quite frequent contact with him unpretentious account of his service, in the course of which he often w riding or walking in the tsar's company, helps us to gauge his personali Kokovtsov's appraisal of Nicholas' character is on the whole favoura but with reservations. 'He was usually simple and affable,' he writ the tsar 'was quick to grasp everything, had a very good memory, thou of a somewhat external character, possessed a very cheerful and a mind, and never did I observe in him the least digression from th traits . . . Under the influence of the empress the idea of absolutism gr stronger with Nicholas II each time that Russia's internal life beca calmer and more stable, and the political complications which he so times had to take into account and which impelled him to make con sions to the requirements of life, as in 1905, receded into the past . . . T personal views of the tsar were indisputably less definite than the view the empress. The tsar understood well the difference in his autocra before and after 1905. He never dwelt on the theoretical question wheth he was obliged to carry out the laws he had himself granted or whet his prerogatives remained as unlimited as they had been before. He simp took the accomplished fact into consideration.'21 General Mossolov in his book, written in a rather military style, repo that Nicholas II 'declared himself to be God's representative . . . H mission emanated from God and for his actions he was responsible only his conscience and to God . . . The tsar took his role as God's represe tive with the utmost seriousness . . . The tsar hated to take anyone into confidence . . . The tsar never talked of serious matters with members of his entourage, even if they belonged to the imperial family. He disliked expressing an opinion.'22 It is instructive to confront the above Russian evidence with the results of the research work done by competent non-Russian historians, whose judgments spring from different points of departure. To economise space I will refer to two historians only. 21 Count V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moyego proshlogo: vospominaniya rgo^-igig gg., 2 vols, Paris, 1933, vol I, p. 118; vol II, pp. 351 ff., 461; cf. Trotokol doprosa V. N. Kokovtsova v Chrezvychaynoy Sledstvennoy Komissii 11 sentyabrya 1917 g.' (Voprosy istorii, 1964, no. 2, pp. 94-111; no. 4, pp. 94-117.) 22 Mossolov, op. cit., pp. io, 11, 13, 14. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 520 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW Gerard Walter, the author of several book wrote on the last tsar: 'Politics inspired him w and an intense dislike of politicians. After h put an end to every hope of mitigating th Russia lived during the reign of Alexander III, about "senseless dreams" . . . became grievo 1905 was terrible: frightened to death, he w festo granting to Russia a kind of national however to ignore it and, when he could, to w extorted from him.'23 Marc Ferro, author of a recently published book on the Russian revo? lution, makes the following judgment: 'The tsar autocrat was above all a monarch disposed to inactivity, . . . fatigued by a conversation above the average . . . He liked only the company of mediocrities . . . The more talented his ministers, the sooner he took a dislike to them .... In the foreground he always had the defence of his prerogatives . . . Ashamed of having had to institute the Duma after 1905, Nicholas II did not experience any pangs of conscience when he ordered troops to fire on the people; he was angered with his people because they had risen in revolt against his majesty and asked himself whether he could pardon that people.'24 One opinion about Nicholas II was widespread, namely that he was wanting in will-power; the empress mentioned this in her conversation with the British ambassador and the tsar himself admitted this in a letter to his wife. If this is true, lack of will-power was combined in a strange wa with obstinacy. The fatal dissolution of the First Duma?a compromi with which would have been difficult, but possible25?was partly due t instigation by Stolypin, but the dissolution of the Second Duma wit the accompanying coup d'etat of 3 June 1907 was, as solidly established by V. A. Maklakov, the deed of Nicholas II.26 From this deed a direct line leads to further plans for a coup d'etat and, consequentially, to the fall of t Russian monarchy. It was with good grounds that Maklakov, a steadfas monarchist, was led by the event of 3 June to the view that the monarchy seemed to have wished to bear, without fail, the guilt for the downfall of Russia.27 Nicholas II never forsook this idea of a coup d'etat. In 1909 or 19 io (the precise date is uncertain) he proposed first to I. G. Shcheglovitov, minister of justice, and then to M. G. Akimov, chairman of the State Council, that they should assist him in carrying out a coup d'etat. Although both men were inveterate reactionaries, they refused. In 1913 the tsar made the same suggestion to Nicholas Maklakov, the aggressively reactionary minister of the interior. The latter accepted, but the tsar subsequently 23 Gerard Walter, Histoire de la revolution russe, Paris, 1953, vol I, p. 12. 24 Ferro, op. cit., p. 49. 25 See the opinion on this by V. O. Klyuchevsky in his letter to A. F. Koni of 21 July 1906 in the former's posthumously published personal archive: Pis'ma, dnevniki, aforizmy i mysli ob istorii, Moscow, 1968, p. 204. 26 V. A. Maklakov, Vtoraya Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Paris, n.d., pp. 224 ff. 27 Ibid., p. 202. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REVIEWS changed his mind, 521 as he de of little value in view of his on 18 June 1914, the tsar su and proposed a draft law w opinions of either the majo two legislative institutions, t them to the role of consulta government. A. N. Naumov, previously the indepe year clusion that Nicholas II was important affairs of State former served deputy many minister of that in informed circles the tsar was called 'the miniaturist'.29 At the t end of his reign Nicholas once again reverted to the subject of his a cratic prerogatives, partly to escape from harsh realities and partl satisfy the demands of his wife. Aleksandra Fyodorovna was a chronic invalid. Although she com plained in her letters of heart trouble, competent specialists diagn her ailment as hysteria.30 She was fanatically convinced that Rasputin w a saint, chosen by God to protect the Russian imperial family. She lived in Russia for nearly a quarter of a century, but seems to have veloped no attachment for her adopted country. True, she was intereste in the Orthodox Church, but mainly in so far as this interest could reconciled with her superstitions. She knew little of the real Russia, detested both the traditionalist aristocracy of Moscow and the cosm politan society of St Petersburg. General Mossolov, who in the cour seventeen years had many opportunities to observe the empress, st that she only brought herself to speak Russian when addressing Orthod clergymen or servants.31 The independent-minded Naumov records that in an official discussion on the programme for developing rural cra the empress angrily objected to his opinion that the instructors should Russians, and was not ashamed to call Russia 'a savage and igno country'. He explained this outburst by the fact that some months earli he had ejected Rasputin from his ministry.32 Aleksandra Fyodorovna communicated Rasputin's suggestions to husband, who sometimes hesitated to obey her will but usually did s the end. When he appointed A. F. Trepov, who was not a candidate Rasputin, head of the government, she reproached him for disregar the opinions of'our Friend'.33 The following ministers owed their appoin ment to Rasputin: Stunner (chairman of the Council of Ministers), A 28 A. N. Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominaniy, 2 vols, New York, 1955, vol II, p. 53 29 V. I. Gurko, Tsar' i tsaritsa, Paris, 1927, p. 11. 30 Gen. A. Spiridovich, Raspoutine, Paris, 1935, p. 89; deposition by Zanotti, the la maid of the empress, in N. SokolofF, Enquete judiciaire sur Vassassinat de la Familie Impe Russe, Paris, 1923, pp. 97 et seq. 31 Mossolov, op. cit., pp. 34-5. 32 Naumov, op. cit., vol II, pp. 534-5. 33 Letter of io November 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa . . ., p. 438. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 522 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW Khvostov (interior), A. D. Protopopov (in (justice), N. P. Rayev (procurator-general o viduals were offered superior posts by Rasputi offered the post of prime minister; V. N. Mam in-law, was offered the posts of minister o general of the Synod. Dr Katkov maintains that the prestige of the appreciably undermined by 'wild rumours' o and passim). He prefers not to discuss Rasp believe that Stolypin was acting on rumours w Rasputin's influence was threatening the st successor, who uttered a similar warning to 1911-12 'the question of Rasputin became t immediate future.'35 Similarly, V. I. Gurko Council, wrote that 'all Russia knew the semi-literate, debauched, drunken muzhik o throne.'36 Were these conservative membe 'rumour-mongers' ? In fairness it should be added that Dr Kat irritation at suggestions made in some oppositi ment was preparing to conclude a separate peac We now know that Nicholas II honourably re point the critics were making was that, if t continuing the rotten autocratic regime and in the country, revolution was likely to break ou a separate peace might prove unavoidable, course would be for Russia. This point of vi to the tsar by N. N. Pokrovsky, the last ministe imperial regime, as is evident from his depo Investigating Commission.37 After assuming the post of commander-in spent about one and a half years at army G and frequently twice a day, the empress sen husband. The tragic letters of the empress, sin English and in Russian translation, as well a in Russian translation,38 are a most important political history during the last months of the Katkov pays little attention to this mine of in Allusion has been made above to the influen Fyodorovna upon senior government appoin superfluous to add that she also interfered with 34 35 36 37 M. V. Rodzyanko, The Reign of Rasputin, London, Count V. N. Kokovtsov, op. cit., vol II, p. 21. V. I. Gurko, op. cit., p. 99. P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), op. cit., vol V, pp. 360 ff. 38 Cf. fns. 15, 17; Tsentrarkhiv, Perepiska Nikolay a i A Leningrad, 1923-7, 5 vols. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REVIEWS military strategy and 523 foreig release of the banker D. L. both friends of Rasputin, responsible for freeing the f linov, from confinement in awaiting trial on indictme passed to the tsar 'a messag saw in says it all the the night. He begs you is necessary, otherwise winter approved brought by about . . .'41 It Nicholas his was II, A continuous barrage of criticised Rasputin or the zyanko the of the tsar abuse. t dismissal.4 a r empress wished a as Kokovtsov and No State machine could be expected to sustain such mortal blows. To rely, in this distress, on the tsar was hopeless. He hardly realised what was going on. He thought that the only way he ought to serve Russia was by repression. He fanatically abhorred political evolution and progress. This was tantamount to inviting revolution. Autocracy, too, could by the natural course of things lead to revolution, from which Russia could be saved only by some miracle. Within the writer's lively recollection that was the prevailing mood in Russia. The tsar's autocracy degenerated into the reign of a gang of rogues. The response to that autocracy was despair. The autocracy of Nicholas II, who submitted to his mentally abnormal wife, was felt in Russia as an ill omen. The meaning of autocracy was correctly understood by educated people. I find an adequate formulation of that understanding in the papers of Klyuchevsky, the foremost and wise historian of Russia: 'Autocracy is a fortunate usurpation, the only justi? fication of which is continuous success or constant ability to correct mistakes or misfortunes. Unsuccessful autocracy ceases to be lawful.'44 The reign of Nicholas II was a chain of mistakes. What could be expected from an autocratic tsar, who handed over a considerable part of his powers to his hysterical wife and, through her, to Rasputin and his clique? The struggle against autocracy in Russia lasted nearly two centuries. It began in 1730, when Anna Ivanovna, the niece of Peter the Great, was elected under the condition that she would sign a paper limiting her 39 Letters of 31 October, 3 November and io December 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa . . ., pp. 430, 433, 449. 40 P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), op. cit., vol V, pp. 446 ff. 41 Letters of the Tsaritsa . . ., p. 221; cf. further letters of 24 and 25 September advising the abandonment of the Brusilov offensive, ibid., pp. 412-13. 42 Letter of 19 July 1916, ibid., p. 316. 43 Letters of 11 September 1915, 4 January 1916 and 17 September 1916; for a th of deportation to Siberia, cf. letter of 14 December 1916: ibid., pp. 157, 250, 401, 4 44 Klyuchevsky, op. cit., p. 396. This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 524 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW powers; she signed it and thereafter tore it in Fyodorovna, with the connivance and assistance though maybe unconsciously, broke down th That was the suicide of the Russian monarch London Boris Elkin Munich and after: New Documents from Prague Nittner, Ernst (ed.) Dokumente zur Sudetendeutschen Frage, 1916-1967. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Ackermann-Gemeinde, Munich, 1967. 581 pages. Krai, Vaclav (ed.) Das Abkommen von Munchen, 1938: Tschechoslowakische diplomatische Dokumente, 1937-1939- Academia, nakladatelstvi Cesko- slovenske akademie ved, Prague, 1968. 369 pages. Index of names. Kennan, George F. From Prague after Munich?Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940. Princeton University Press/O.U.P., London, 1968. 266 pages. Index. The three documentary volumes given above all contain documents about the Munich crisis and its sequel; all three make absorbing read? ing. The first of them is the most ambitious, attempting to show the development of the Sudeten German question over half a century, while the second is the most important, containing a wealth of unpublished material from the archives of the Czechoslovak foreign ministry; the third is perhaps of more ephemeral interest, which centres above all on the youthful author of these dispatches. The many facets and complexities of the Sudeten German question are illustrated convincingly in the volume edited by Nittner who has included not only pieces of Nazi origin but also numerous documents on the Sudeten German 'Activists' (the parties cooperating with the Czecho? slovak government) and Social Democrats, as well as on the Nazi punitive measures and the destruction of Lidice, on Hitler's plans for a surprise attack (Fall Gruri), and on the plans of the German opposition to Hitler. But the volume is bound to create confusion in the mind of the reader, partly because it includes many pieces only tenuously related to the Sude? ten German question, partly because there is no annotation whatever, partly because views and retrospective assessments are mingled indis? criminately with real contemporary information. The volume starts with two declarations of loyalty of Czech politicians towards the Habs? burg monarchy from the years 1916-17; they have no relation whatever to the Sudeten German problem and might have found a legitimate place in a volume on the history of Bohemia under the Habsburgs, but not here. Document 26 contains some short extracts from an electoral address of the Austrian Social Democratic Party of 1919, but without any indication that it has been very much abbreviated and that it comes from Austria; nor are we told where the full text might be found.1 It is true that in 1 The full text is in: Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschosterreichs. Abgehalten in Wien vom 31. Oktober bis This content downloaded from 90.208.136.33 on Tue, 07 Feb 2017 21:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms