Download The Doom of the Russian Monarchy

Review: The Doom of the Russian Monarchy
Reviewed Work(s): Russia 1917. The February Revolution by George Katkov
Review by: Boris Elkin
Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 47, No. 109 (Jul., 1969), pp. 514-524
Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London,
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4206110
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Reviews
The Doom of the Russian Monarchy
Katkov, George. Russia igiy. The February Revolution. Longmans, London,
1967. 489 pages. Maps. Index.
The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution called forth the
publication of a number of books. They are naturally diverse. Of those
published in England particular notice was taken of the work by Dr
George Katkov. It cost its author much labour; but as to the problem of
the origin of the revolution?and, regardless of the great authority of de
Tocqueville, the problem of those who seem to him the culprits of the
revolution is in the centre of Dr Katkov's attention?the reader cannot help
feeling that the author had fixed ideas on the Russian revolution before he
began to write his book. Dr Katkov is prone to disregard facts where they
contradict his own manifest preconceptions and to make assertions that
are not adequately supported by historical evidence.
He sets out to challenge the prevailing view that great revolutions ori?
ginate in a spontaneous way and suggests that the revolution of February
1917 was instigated by the Germans, the freemasons and the Russian
liberals.
So far as the Germans are concerned, available evidence suggests that
their intervention in Russia's internal affairs did not become tangible until
after the February revolution. Certainly, prior to February 1917 they tried
to stimulate separatist movements and, what is more questionable, strikes.
On 26 December 1915 the Socialist politician and speculator A. Helphand
(Parvus) received from Count U. von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German
minister in Copenhagen, the sum of one million roubles which, he re?
ported, was passed on to his agents in Russia.x However, he was then ad?
vised by his agents to defer the intended action. This is where the evidence
ceases: no one knows whether Helphand really did anything to stir up
revolution in 1917. Yet Dr Katkov makes the unsubstantiated allegation
that Helphand's actions were very important. 'Despite the lack of any
documentary evidence in the Auswartiges Amt archives,' he writes, 'the
continuous character of the strike movement in Russia in 1916 and at the
beginning of 1917 strongly suggests that it was controlled and supported
by Helphand and his agents' (p. 96). This assertion is repeated later with
greater emphasis. 'We have seen elsewhere [where??B.E.] that the
Petrograd strikes of January 1916 were instigated and financially sup?
ported by Helphand's organisations and that the simultaneous Nikolaev
strikes were probably organised by the same agency. In view of these
precedents [?!], it is hard to believe that the Germans had no hand what?
ever in the events of 23-26 February 1917, which so closely resembled the
1 Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, igi^-igi8, London, 1958,
pp. io, 14.
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REVIEWS
unrest
of
the
515
previous
yea
dence ; nor, one suspects, ha
February 1917, vigorously su
unlike the feeble unrest of 1
of the German leaders wa
dismember it and annex so
S. P. Mel'gunov, whose infl
rejected
many'.2
the
view
that
th
As for the freemasons, there is no justification for the view that they
'had infiltrated the Kadet party' (p. 16), since among the founders of that
party only V. A. Maklakov was known as a mason. One should treat
with scepticism the masons' own claims to have had far-flung connections
or exerted great influence.3 Mme E. D. Kuskova, to whose posthu?
mously published letters Dr Katkov refers, cannot be regarded as an
exception to the rule. Knotty problems of this kind cannot be disentangled
by making wild assumptions. 'We can safely assume', writes Dr Katkov,
'that Guchkov's efforts to penetrate the ranks of the army and Guards
officers and to recruit supporters for his plot were based on masonic ties'
(p. 175). In fact A. I. Guchkov's army connections were based on his life?
long interest in military affairs. He met many senior officers in his capacity
as chairman of the Duma Defence Commission; indeed, he first became
acquainted with General V. I. Gurko when they were both serving in
South Africa during the Boer War, as Dr Katkov himself mentions (p. 41).
I knew Guchkov well and after the revolution discussed with him more
than once the plot in which he had taken part. On the whole he kept t
his deposition to the Extraordinary Investigating Commission, but o
one occasion he did mention a prominent general who had gone back on
his word and withdrawn from the revolutionary action that had bee
agreed; having said this, Guchkov pledged me to keep his name secret
The impression I gained from these conversations accords with Mel'gunov's
conclusions: that a court revolution was planned but not carried out. A
P. N. Milyukov wrote in his memoirs, Guchkov's conspiracies created
striking situations but generally ended in failure.
Under the collective term 'liberals' Dr Katkov includes everyone op?
posed to the pre-revolutionary regime. However, most of these men were
in fact monarchists. The only incontrovertible liberals were the Kadet
led by Milyukov. Dr Katkov admits that they were patriots who strov
for victory in the war and strongly opposed revolution: '[the] Kadet
as a whole were not ready to link up with the revolutionary movemen
(p. 189). Yet, characteristically, he later remarks that there were defeatists
among them and casts unfounded aspersions upon their patriotism. 'Th
fear of defeat and humiliation of Russia,' he writes, 'was, if we are no
2 S. P. Mel'gunov, Na putyakh k dvortsovomu perevorotu, Paris, 1931, p. 223.
3 According to the paper on freemasonry in Russia, read by Bro. P. Telepneff, i
1922 to the English lodge named below, Nicholas II was a member of the occult lodge o
Martinist rite, 'The Cross and the Star', suspended in 1916 (Transactions of Quatuo
Coronati Lodge, vol XXXV).
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516 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
mistaken, only the ostensible and avowable expression of
deep-seated fear that the war might end in victory befo
aspirations of the opposition had been fulfilled, and that
opportunities offered for their fulfilment by war condition
(p. 231). Dr Katkov does not name a single liberal defeatis
cite a single word uttered or published by any such pers
need to refute what is but a figment of the imagination.
The author's argument appears to be that, while Milyuk
steadfastly opposed to any revolutionary or unconstitutional
war-time, there was a left wing within the Kadet party w
satisfied with the leader's tactics. He speaks of 'strong op
N. V. Nekrasov and Prince L'vov, supported by the lawye
and Margulies' (p. 15). He is right about Nekrasov and M
although it is worth noting that on 27 February 1917, at the f
meeting of Duma members after the prorogation of th
Nekrasov who proposed that order should be re-establishe
of the old regime.4 He is wrong about Prince G. E. L'
Margulies. L'vov had discontinued his connection with th
after 1906 and took no further part in politics until the
government's prestige was on the point of vanishing.5 Fin
cannot be described as a left-wing Kadet since he was
another party.
This does not mean that there were no Kadets who criticised their
leader's tactics. Such opposition did exist, but at no time was it significa
or influential. Milyukov had to hold a special meeting of the parliament
party in 1916 to reconsider its tactics; however, he says in his mem
that 'the debates were ardent, but as a result only two or three protesti
members declared for left tactics.'6 At that time there were 59 Kadets i
the Durna.7 Thus the number of dissidents was evidently very low,
it is unlikely to have been higher previously.
Dr Katkov is at pains to discredit the activities of the war indust
committees and other voluntary organisations set up by patriotic-minde
members of Russian society. Their purpose was to promote the war effo
more vigorously once it had become apparent that, although the f
army was ready for great sacrifices, the government in the rear was un
to render effective support. The civil and military authorities were who
unprepared for warfare on such a tremendous scale. As early as 18 Decem
ber 1914 General M. A. Belyayev, the chief of the general staff, told th
British and French ambassadors that the official figures for the rese
of rifles were 'criminally false', and that the depots were nearly em
the artillery needed 45,000 shells a day, but the factories then produ
only 13,000 at the most. He concluded that during the next three month
4 R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (eds.), The Russian Provisional Government, i
Documents, 3 vols., Stanford, 1961, vol I, p. 45.
5 Cf. T. I. Polner, ?hiznennyy put' knyazya G. E. L'vova, Paris, 1932, pp. 1 i2ff.
6 P. N. Milyukov, Vospominaniya, 2 vols, New York, 1955, vol II, p. 264.
7 Ibid., p. 396.
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REVIEWS
the
condition
ous.8
In
of
General
the
face
Russian
Denikin
of
this
inefficient,
and
by
the
replacing
the
517
it
descr
situation
was
state
the
appara
recently put it: 'The Russian
was not yet in people's min
supply of munitions was c
witness
were
the
writes:
great
army
'That
even
the
the
received
serv
enemie
from
Russ
and in 1916?7,238. The pro
1914 to 4,251 in 1915 and 1
At
the
same
shock
front
in
occurred
caused
by
1915
in
the
rifles
w
traini
information
drilling with sticks near my
A group of onlookers gathere
exchanging impressions. He
word 'treason' (izmena), wh
people in the street. Sick and
told what they knew, and in
an important effect upon p
Dr Katkov states that the liberals 'undermined the Russian state and
the war effort by rumour-mongering', but fails to mention the adminis?
trative incompetence that was the real cause of public dissatisfactio
General Denikin, a distinguished commander, addressing the army officer
conference at Mogilyov in May 1917, said that the Russian troops had been
treasonably deprived of shells.13 Whether such treason existed or no
who would dare to say that the tsar's government was not responsibl
for Russia's military unpreparedness ? It was the voluntary organisations
(and also allied aid) which succeeded in repairing the serious defects th
existed in the equipment and supply of the armed forces.
From the summer of 1915 onwards Russia was plunged into a seriou
internal political crisis which ended in revolution. Nicholas II, probab
shaken by the military defeats, decided to part with his most reactionary
ministers and to replace them by independent persons. A few months late
however, he yielded to the pressure of his wife, the empress Aleksand
Fyodorovna, who was acting on Rasputin's instructions, and dismiss
8 M. Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre, 3 vols, Paris, 1921vol I, pp. 231-2; Sir George Buchanan, My Mission in Russia, 2 vols, London, 1923, vol
p. 219.
9 Gen. A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoy smuty, 5 vols, Paris, 1923-7, vol I, part I, pp. 28 ff.
10 M. Ferro, La revolution de igiy, Paris, 1967, p. 51.
11 Gen. N. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, New Haven, 1931, pp. 129,
155 et seq.
12 Ibid., pp. 140, 131.
13 Denikin, op. cit., vol I, pt. II, p. 113; cf. Gen. A. Lukomsky, {Iz vospominaniy', in
Arkhiv russkoy revolyutsii, Berlin, 1922, vol II, p. 35.
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518 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
the men he had recently appointed. A. A. Polivanov, the
who had immensely improved the condition of the army, re
of the customary letter of thanks from the tsar a peremptor
'The work of the war industries committees does not in
confidence and I find your supervision of them insuffic
tative.'14
Nicholas H's decision to dismiss Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich
as commander-in-chief, and to assume the supreme command himself,
was taken with the active participation of Rasputin, if not on his initiative.
This is confirmed by the most competent witness, the empress, in two of
her letters to the tsar.15 This step contributed to the growing decay of the
government in Petrograd, which came under her domination. General
A. A. Mossolov, a courtier close to Nicholas II, states definitely that 'when
[the emperor] left for the front he took the opportunity to delegate his
powers to the empress.'16 M. V. Rodzyanko also mentions that he heard
strong rumours that she had been appointed regent. Whether this was
actually so or not, the empress came close to exercising such powers.
On 25 August 1915 Nicholas wrote to her: 'Think, my wifey, will you not
come to the assistance of your hubby now that he is absent?'17 As Sir
Bernard Pares comments: 'In this casual way the management of the
estate is handed over.'18 Sir George Buchanan's view was that 'the
Empress, more especially after Stunner became President of the Council
in February 1916, virtually governed Russia.'19 A few months earlier
Aleksandra Fyodorovna, had told him: 'The Emperor, unfortunately, is
weak; but I am not, and I intend to be firm.'20
The empress received reports on governmental affairs from the prime
minister, I. L. Goremykin, and his successor B. V. Stunner (who did this,
on Rasputin's orders, regularly once a week), as well as from several of
their cabinet colleagues. She interfered repeatedly in order to dismiss
or appoint ministers. Between the middle of 1915 and February 1917
Russia had no less than four prime ministers, five ministers of the interior,
three ministers of war and three foreign ministers. The right-wing deputy
V. M. Purishkevich appositely called this 'ministerial leapfrog'.
Dr Katkov speaks of Nicholas II as a man of'saintly' character, whose
ethics were allegedly inspired by the ideals of 19th-century Russian
Christianity typified by Dostoyevsky's figures of Prince Myshkin or
Alyosha Karamazov (pp. 354 ff.). These comparisons do not bear examina?
tion. When Myshkin arrived in Russia, he immediately began to protest
against capital punishment. Nicholas II not only ordered executions
14 P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), Padeniye tsarskogo rezhima . . ., 7 vols, Moscow-Leningrad,
1924-7, vol VII, p. 82.
15 Dated 7 January and 3 August 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, London, 1923,
pp. 256, 378.
16 Gen. A. A. Mossolov, At the Court of the Last Tsar, London, 1935, p. 28.
17 Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, London, 1929, p. 71.
18 Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, London, 1939, p. 279.
19 Buchanan, op. cit., vol I, pp. 238-9.
20 Ibid., p. 238.
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REVIEWS
without
519
embarrassment,
bu
(as on 9 January 1905). Th
principle of will realising
traits
of
active
love
in
the
p
Dr Katkov's imaginative p
account for. It disregards
Nicholas II and had to deal with him.
To say nothing of the memoirs of Witte, the objectivity of whic
questioned, Dr Katkov disregards that indispensable source of infor
tion, the truthful recollections of Count V. N. Kokovtsov, a loyal collab
rator of Nicholas II often years' standing. Nor does he take notice of
book by General A. A. Mossolov, who for seventeen years was at the hea
of the last tsar's chancellery and in quite frequent contact with him
unpretentious account of his service, in the course of which he often w
riding or walking in the tsar's company, helps us to gauge his personali
Kokovtsov's appraisal of Nicholas' character is on the whole favoura
but with reservations. 'He was usually simple and affable,' he writ
the tsar 'was quick to grasp everything, had a very good memory, thou
of a somewhat external character, possessed a very cheerful and a
mind, and never did I observe in him the least digression from th
traits . . . Under the influence of the empress the idea of absolutism gr
stronger with Nicholas II each time that Russia's internal life beca
calmer and more stable, and the political complications which he so
times had to take into account and which impelled him to make con
sions to the requirements of life, as in 1905, receded into the past . . . T
personal views of the tsar were indisputably less definite than the view
the empress. The tsar understood well the difference in his autocra
before and after 1905. He never dwelt on the theoretical question wheth
he was obliged to carry out the laws he had himself granted or whet
his prerogatives remained as unlimited as they had been before. He simp
took the accomplished fact into consideration.'21
General Mossolov in his book, written in a rather military style, repo
that Nicholas II 'declared himself to be God's representative . . . H
mission emanated from God and for his actions he was responsible only
his conscience and to God . . . The tsar took his role as God's represe
tive with the utmost seriousness . . . The tsar hated to take anyone into
confidence . . . The tsar never talked of serious matters with members of
his entourage, even if they belonged to the imperial family. He disliked
expressing an opinion.'22
It is instructive to confront the above Russian evidence with the results
of the research work done by competent non-Russian historians, whose
judgments spring from different points of departure. To economise space
I will refer to two historians only.
21 Count V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moyego proshlogo: vospominaniya rgo^-igig gg., 2 vols,
Paris, 1933, vol I, p. 118; vol II, pp. 351 ff., 461; cf. Trotokol doprosa V. N. Kokovtsova
v Chrezvychaynoy Sledstvennoy Komissii 11 sentyabrya 1917 g.' (Voprosy istorii, 1964,
no. 2, pp. 94-111; no. 4, pp. 94-117.)
22 Mossolov, op. cit., pp. io, 11, 13, 14.
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520 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
Gerard Walter, the author of several book
wrote on the last tsar: 'Politics inspired him w
and an intense dislike of politicians. After h
put an end to every hope of mitigating th
Russia lived during the reign of Alexander III,
about "senseless dreams" . . . became grievo
1905 was terrible: frightened to death, he w
festo granting to Russia a kind of national
however to ignore it and, when he could, to w
extorted from him.'23
Marc Ferro, author of a recently published book on the Russian revo?
lution, makes the following judgment: 'The tsar autocrat was above all
a monarch disposed to inactivity, . . . fatigued by a conversation above the
average . . . He liked only the company of mediocrities . . . The more
talented his ministers, the sooner he took a dislike to them .... In the
foreground he always had the defence of his prerogatives . . . Ashamed of
having had to institute the Duma after 1905, Nicholas II did not experience
any pangs of conscience when he ordered troops to fire on the people; he
was angered with his people because they had risen in revolt against his
majesty and asked himself whether he could pardon that people.'24
One opinion about Nicholas II was widespread, namely that he was
wanting in will-power; the empress mentioned this in her conversation
with the British ambassador and the tsar himself admitted this in a letter
to his wife. If this is true, lack of will-power was combined in a strange wa
with obstinacy. The fatal dissolution of the First Duma?a compromi
with which would have been difficult, but possible25?was partly due t
instigation by Stolypin, but the dissolution of the Second Duma wit
the accompanying coup d'etat of 3 June 1907 was, as solidly established by
V. A. Maklakov, the deed of Nicholas II.26 From this deed a direct line
leads to further plans for a coup d'etat and, consequentially, to the fall of t
Russian monarchy. It was with good grounds that Maklakov, a steadfas
monarchist, was led by the event of 3 June to the view that the monarchy
seemed to have wished to bear, without fail, the guilt for the downfall of
Russia.27
Nicholas II never forsook this idea of a coup d'etat. In 1909 or 19 io (the
precise date is uncertain) he proposed first to I. G. Shcheglovitov, minister
of justice, and then to M. G. Akimov, chairman of the State Council,
that they should assist him in carrying out a coup d'etat. Although both
men were inveterate reactionaries, they refused. In 1913 the tsar made
the same suggestion to Nicholas Maklakov, the aggressively reactionary
minister of the interior. The latter accepted, but the tsar subsequently
23 Gerard Walter, Histoire de la revolution russe, Paris, 1953, vol I, p. 12.
24 Ferro, op. cit., p. 49.
25 See the opinion on this by V. O. Klyuchevsky in his letter to A. F. Koni of 21 July
1906 in the former's posthumously published personal archive: Pis'ma, dnevniki, aforizmy i
mysli ob istorii, Moscow, 1968, p. 204.
26 V. A. Maklakov, Vtoraya Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Paris, n.d., pp. 224 ff.
27 Ibid., p. 202.
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REVIEWS
changed
his
mind,
521
as
he
de
of little value in view of his
on 18 June 1914, the tsar su
and proposed a draft law w
opinions of either the majo
two legislative institutions, t
them to the role of consulta
government.
A.
N.
Naumov,
previously
the
indepe
year
clusion that Nicholas II was
important affairs of State
former
served
deputy
many
minister
of
that in informed circles the tsar was called 'the miniaturist'.29 At the
t
end of his reign Nicholas once again reverted to the subject of his a
cratic prerogatives, partly to escape from harsh realities and partl
satisfy the demands of his wife.
Aleksandra Fyodorovna was a chronic invalid. Although she com
plained in her letters of heart trouble, competent specialists diagn
her ailment as hysteria.30 She was fanatically convinced that Rasputin w
a saint, chosen by God to protect the Russian imperial family. She
lived in Russia for nearly a quarter of a century, but seems to have
veloped no attachment for her adopted country. True, she was intereste
in the Orthodox Church, but mainly in so far as this interest could
reconciled with her superstitions. She knew little of the real Russia,
detested both the traditionalist aristocracy of Moscow and the cosm
politan society of St Petersburg. General Mossolov, who in the cour
seventeen years had many opportunities to observe the empress, st
that she only brought herself to speak Russian when addressing Orthod
clergymen or servants.31 The independent-minded Naumov records that
in an official discussion on the programme for developing rural cra
the empress angrily objected to his opinion that the instructors should
Russians, and was not ashamed to call Russia 'a savage and igno
country'. He explained this outburst by the fact that some months earli
he had ejected Rasputin from his ministry.32
Aleksandra Fyodorovna communicated Rasputin's suggestions to
husband, who sometimes hesitated to obey her will but usually did s
the end. When he appointed A. F. Trepov, who was not a candidate
Rasputin, head of the government, she reproached him for disregar
the opinions of'our Friend'.33 The following ministers owed their appoin
ment to Rasputin: Stunner (chairman of the Council of Ministers), A
28 A. N. Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominaniy, 2 vols, New York, 1955, vol II, p. 53
29 V. I. Gurko, Tsar' i tsaritsa, Paris, 1927, p. 11.
30 Gen. A. Spiridovich, Raspoutine, Paris, 1935, p. 89; deposition by Zanotti, the la
maid of the empress, in N. SokolofF, Enquete judiciaire sur Vassassinat de la Familie Impe
Russe, Paris, 1923, pp. 97 et seq.
31 Mossolov, op. cit., pp. 34-5.
32 Naumov, op. cit., vol II, pp. 534-5.
33 Letter of io November 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa . . ., p. 438.
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522 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
Khvostov (interior), A. D. Protopopov (in
(justice), N. P. Rayev (procurator-general o
viduals were offered superior posts by Rasputi
offered the post of prime minister; V. N. Mam
in-law, was offered the posts of minister o
general of the Synod.
Dr Katkov maintains that the prestige of the
appreciably undermined by 'wild rumours' o
and passim). He prefers not to discuss Rasp
believe that Stolypin was acting on rumours w
Rasputin's influence was threatening the st
successor, who uttered a similar warning to
1911-12 'the question of Rasputin became t
immediate future.'35 Similarly, V. I. Gurko
Council, wrote that 'all Russia knew the
semi-literate, debauched, drunken muzhik o
throne.'36 Were these conservative membe
'rumour-mongers' ?
In fairness it should be added that Dr Kat
irritation at suggestions made in some oppositi
ment was preparing to conclude a separate peac
We now know that Nicholas II honourably re
point the critics were making was that, if t
continuing the rotten autocratic regime and in
the country, revolution was likely to break ou
a separate peace might prove unavoidable,
course would be for Russia. This point of vi
to the tsar by N. N. Pokrovsky, the last ministe
imperial regime, as is evident from his depo
Investigating Commission.37
After assuming the post of commander-in
spent about one and a half years at army G
and frequently twice a day, the empress sen
husband. The tragic letters of the empress, sin
English and in Russian translation, as well a
in Russian translation,38 are a most important
political history during the last months of the
Katkov pays little attention to this mine of in
Allusion has been made above to the influen
Fyodorovna upon senior government appoin
superfluous to add that she also interfered with
34
35
36
37
M. V. Rodzyanko, The Reign of Rasputin, London,
Count V. N. Kokovtsov, op. cit., vol II, p. 21.
V. I. Gurko, op. cit., p. 99.
P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), op. cit., vol V, pp. 360 ff.
38 Cf. fns. 15, 17; Tsentrarkhiv, Perepiska Nikolay a i A
Leningrad, 1923-7, 5 vols.
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REVIEWS
military
strategy
and
523
foreig
release of the banker D. L.
both friends of Rasputin,
responsible
for
freeing
the
f
linov, from confinement in
awaiting trial on indictme
passed to the tsar 'a messag
saw in
says it
all
the
the night. He begs you
is necessary, otherwise
winter
approved
brought
by
about
.
.
.'41
It
Nicholas
his
was
II,
A continuous barrage of
criticised Rasputin or the
zyanko the
of the tsar
abuse.
t
dismissal.4
a
r
empress wished a
as Kokovtsov and
No State machine could be expected to sustain such mortal blows. To
rely, in this distress, on the tsar was hopeless. He hardly realised what was
going on. He thought that the only way he ought to serve Russia was by
repression. He fanatically abhorred political evolution and progress.
This was tantamount to inviting revolution.
Autocracy, too, could by the natural course of things lead to revolution,
from which Russia could be saved only by some miracle. Within the writer's
lively recollection that was the prevailing mood in Russia. The tsar's
autocracy degenerated into the reign of a gang of rogues. The response
to that autocracy was despair.
The autocracy of Nicholas II, who submitted to his mentally abnormal
wife, was felt in Russia as an ill omen. The meaning of autocracy was
correctly understood by educated people. I find an adequate formulation
of that understanding in the papers of Klyuchevsky, the foremost and wise
historian of Russia: 'Autocracy is a fortunate usurpation, the only justi?
fication of which is continuous success or constant ability to correct
mistakes or misfortunes. Unsuccessful autocracy ceases to be lawful.'44
The reign of Nicholas II was a chain of mistakes. What could be expected
from an autocratic tsar, who handed over a considerable part of his powers
to his hysterical wife and, through her, to Rasputin and his clique?
The struggle against autocracy in Russia lasted nearly two centuries.
It began in 1730, when Anna Ivanovna, the niece of Peter the Great, was
elected under the condition that she would sign a paper limiting her
39 Letters of 31 October, 3 November and io December 1916: Letters of the Tsaritsa . . .,
pp. 430, 433, 449.
40 P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), op. cit., vol V, pp. 446 ff.
41 Letters of the Tsaritsa . . ., p. 221; cf. further letters of 24 and 25 September
advising the abandonment of the Brusilov offensive, ibid., pp. 412-13.
42 Letter of 19 July 1916, ibid., p. 316.
43 Letters of 11 September 1915, 4 January 1916 and 17 September 1916; for a th
of deportation to Siberia, cf. letter of 14 December 1916: ibid., pp. 157, 250, 401, 4
44 Klyuchevsky, op. cit., p. 396.
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524 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
powers; she signed it and thereafter tore it in
Fyodorovna, with the connivance and assistance
though maybe unconsciously, broke down th
That was the suicide of the Russian monarch
London
Boris
Elkin
Munich and after:
New Documents from Prague
Nittner, Ernst (ed.) Dokumente zur Sudetendeutschen Frage, 1916-1967.
Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Ackermann-Gemeinde, Munich,
1967. 581 pages.
Krai, Vaclav (ed.) Das Abkommen von Munchen, 1938: Tschechoslowakische
diplomatische Dokumente, 1937-1939- Academia, nakladatelstvi Cesko-
slovenske akademie ved, Prague, 1968. 369 pages. Index of names.
Kennan, George F. From Prague after Munich?Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940.
Princeton University Press/O.U.P., London, 1968. 266 pages. Index.
The three documentary volumes given above all contain documents
about the Munich crisis and its sequel; all three make absorbing read?
ing. The first of them is the most ambitious, attempting to show the
development of the Sudeten German question over half a century, while
the second is the most important, containing a wealth of unpublished
material from the archives of the Czechoslovak foreign ministry; the
third is perhaps of more ephemeral interest, which centres above all on
the youthful author of these dispatches.
The many facets and complexities of the Sudeten German question
are illustrated convincingly in the volume edited by Nittner who has
included not only pieces of Nazi origin but also numerous documents on
the Sudeten German 'Activists' (the parties cooperating with the Czecho?
slovak government) and Social Democrats, as well as on the Nazi punitive
measures and the destruction of Lidice, on Hitler's plans for a surprise
attack (Fall Gruri), and on the plans of the German opposition to Hitler.
But the volume is bound to create confusion in the mind of the reader,
partly because it includes many pieces only tenuously related to the Sude?
ten German question, partly because there is no annotation whatever,
partly because views and retrospective assessments are mingled indis?
criminately with real contemporary information. The volume starts
with two declarations of loyalty of Czech politicians towards the Habs?
burg monarchy from the years 1916-17; they have no relation whatever
to the Sudeten German problem and might have found a legitimate place
in a volume on the history of Bohemia under the Habsburgs, but not here.
Document 26 contains some short extracts from an electoral address of
the Austrian Social Democratic Party of 1919, but without any indication
that it has been very much abbreviated and that it comes from Austria;
nor are we told where the full text might be found.1 It is true that in
1 The full text is in: Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschosterreichs. Abgehalten in Wien vom 31. Oktober bis
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