Download Sino-US Relations 1931-1939 - Warren Hills Regional School District

Road to Pearl Harbor
Sino-U.S.
Relations
1931-1939
Mr. O’Brien
Road to
Pearl
Harbor
US II
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/neutrality/ (enter Asia)
Date
European Event
JAPAN TIMELINE 1
Official US Reaction
Description of US Reaction
Event 1 Japan Invades
Manchuria
September
1931
Event 2 -
Japan Invades
Jehol Province
December
1932
1. Japan wanted to create an ―autonomous‖
region north of the Great Wall
2. December 9 – attacked and gained control
of Jehol (Manchuria’s southwest border)
3. Fighting cont. until spring of 1933 - truce
NFA
1. Denunciation
2. Hoover was leaving presidency
2
Event 3 -
Japan
Renounces
Naval Treaty
Restrictions
December
1934
Event 4 -
Promotes
―Autonomy
Movement‖ in
North China
November
1935
1. Chiang Kai Shek fighting
Communists in China – ignore
Japanese
2. June 1935 – China officially recognizes
Japan’s control in northern China- and
withdrew all Chinese forces
3. 5 months later – Tokyo created East Hopei
Autonomous Council to govern Japanese
land within China that was outside territory
of Manchukuo
NFA
1. Growing Concern to FDR
2. US had supported ―Open Door‖ in
China
3. No support for a response from US
people or government (Neutrality
Act just 3 months prior)
4. Simply warned Japan that US was
watching
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Event 5 -
1. Felt kinship w/ Germany and Italy  all attempting to overthrow the
status quo and
 all defied the LON
 all anti-communist (anti USSR)
2. 11/25/36 – signed agreement to
mutually cooperate against the
threat of communism
Japan Signs
Anti-Comintern
Act
November
1936
Event 6 -
War Breaks Out
Between Japan
and China
July 1937
3. Russia began courting friendship with UK,
France and US
NFA
1. Deeply troubling to Europe and US
2. 3 powers now acting together
3. Japan had the sovereign right to sign
the agreement
4
Event 7 Panay Incident
December
1937
Event 8 -
Japanese
Offensives in
China
May 1938
1. Japanese captured Tsingtao (north), Suchow
(west)
2. Japanese control now ran from Mongolian
river in North to Shanghai
3. Used air raids against civilians
4. Japanese army (as progress inland)
vulnerable to guerilla attacks from
Communists b/c so small – had to have
supplies sent from Japan
5. Could not get China to surrender
Embargo Strategic
Materials
1. Since Japan attacked civilians –
discourage the export of planes and
parts to Japan
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Event 9 Japanese
Offensive in
Southern China
October 1938
Event 10 -
Fighting
Between
Japanese and
Soviet Forces
July 1939
1. USSR was directly north of Manchukou and
Mongolia was an USSR puppet state
2. May 1939 – Japanese troops fired on
Mongolian cavalry along the China-Mongolia
border
3. 60,000 USSR vs. 30,000 Japan
4. Mid September truce – USSR won
5. Would remain at peace until after WWII
6. Encouraged Japan to move south
NFA
1. Little interest to USA
6
The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 was only the first step in what became a much larger campaign for Japan to create a pro-Japanese
"buffer state" in North China, a campaign that resulted in full-scale war between Japan and China in 1937. From the beginning the United States
considered Japan the aggressor, but refused to take any direct action beyond issuing diplomatic denunciations (disapprovals) , sending small amounts
of aid to the Chinese government (which they instead used to fight Mao Zedong and the Communists), and imposing very limited economic sanctions
against Japan.
While the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, came as a shock to Americans, there had long been talk of the possibility that a war might occur between the
United States and Japan. In other words, FDR knew that an attack was imminent. Here was a case of two emerging world powers, both of whom with competing economic
interests in China, increasingly coming into contact during a period when the European nations with spheres of influence in China were falling into decline. The United States was
engaged in a lucrative trade with China, trade which was protected from bases in the Philippines, which had been a U.S. possession since 1898.
U.S. policy in China was (on paper – but not in reality) based on the principle of the "open door"—that is, all countries were to have equal economic opportunities for trade and
investment opportunities in China – and no nation was to colonize China. However, this principle faced a severe challenge from Japan, who constantly pointed to the western
nation’s high levels of control over Chinese land and economy – often gaining an extreme profit at the expense of the Chinese. Japan also pointed out their exclusion from China.
Japan in the 1920s faced overpopulation and economic depression. Moreover, America's trade and immigration policies—which by the 1920s had raised tariffs to unprecedented
levels, and had cut off all possibility of Japanese immigration to the United States—were viewed as direct threats to Tokyo's interests. All of this strengthened the influence of
high-ranking Japanese Army and Navy officers, who claimed that Japan’s problems could only be solved by the conquest of Manchuria, both as a source of raw materials for
Japan's factories and as area to be settled by Japanese colonists. Japanese naval officers also objected to the Five-Power Pact (a treaty Japan and other leading nations signed
after WWI), claiming that national honor demanded a navy equal in size to that of the United States or Great Britain (i.e. the treaty only allowed a Japanese navy that was a
fraction of the size of the US and UK).
Through the rest of the 1920s Japan's economy steadily declined. Finally, concluding that the Chinese government would not act, officers of the Japanese Army (led by Hideki
Tojo) stationed in southern Manchuria decided to force the issue. In September 1931(and without the knowledge of Emperor Hirohito), outside the town of Mukden, a small group
of officers secretly blew up a length of track belonging to a Japanese-owned railway. Then, after blaming the sabotage on Chinese "bandits," the Japanese Army moved to occupy
all of Manchuria. Japan's civilian government had not authorized this operation, but after an unsuccessful attempt to restrain the army in Manchuria the leaders in Tokyo decided to
go along with it.
The international response, therefore, was one of alarm. Nevertheless, given that most of the industrialized world was in the grip of the Great Depression, no concrete steps were
taken to block this act of aggression. All of this, of course, meant that Japan believed that it could proceed with its plans for China without foreign interference. In March 1932
Tokyo announced the creation of an "independent" state of Manchukuo, to be ruled by the former Chinese Emperor (who had been deposed twenty years earlier, at the age of
five). The following year Japan withdrew its delegation from the League of Nations.
Although Tokyo's ambitions caused alarm among the Chinese, for the first few years the Chinese government showed little willingness to resist Japan's growing power in the
country's northern provinces. Indeed, China's leaders seemed far more interested in fighting Chinese Communists, who were engaged in a continual campaign of subversion.
However, this all changed in December 1936, when the Chinese government abruptly changed course and signed an agreement with the Chinese Communists who were fighting
them; from now on, both sides pledged, they would cooperate against the common threat of Japanese imperialism.
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Alarmed at this turn of events, the government in Tokyo began preparations for war, and after fighting broke out at the Marco Polo Bridge, just outside Peking, in July 1937 the
Japanese army launched a full-scale offensive. Within a few weeks the Japanese had captured the Chinese cities of Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, and were advancing rapidly
toward the capital of Nanking.
Given that the United States had considerable trading and missionary interests in China, the Sino-Japanese War could not help but attract attention from Washington. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt wasted no time in branding Japan as an aggressor, yet he did very little to hinder Japan's war effort. After all, in 1937 domestic affairs were still very much
the president's highest priority.
FDR's policies in East Asia were not without their critics, the most important of whom was Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo. In a letter to Cordell Hull, the Secretary
of State, he recommended that the United States either had to threaten to use force against Japan (which, in order to be credible, would require a serious increase in the size of
the American armed forces), or to stay out of the Sino-Japanese conflict altogether. The administration's policy of moral disapproval of Japan’s actions, limited assistance to
China and economic pressure on Japan, he warned, would not deter Tokyo-it would only anger the Japanese and drive them toward more extreme measures.
Indeed, the U.S. response did not bring an end to Japanese aggression in China, but it did encourage the Chinese government in holding out against Tokyo's demands. The
Japanese army continued its advance, seizing the Chinese capital at Nanking (followed by extreme looting and rape which shocked the world) in December 1937. The Nanking
Massacre, in which hundreds of thousands of Chinese were killed during the six weeks after the Japanese captured the city, outraged world opinion, and quickly became a symbol
of Japan's aggression against China. Tsingtao, Hankow, and the port cities of South China (the most important of which was Canton) fell over the course of 1938. Yet the Chinese
government refused to surrender, moving its capital west to Chungking, far in the interior of the country.
All of this posed a serious problem for Japan. While its army had won every battle against the Chinese, it was clear that there were not enough Japanese troops to overrun a country
as large and populous as China. Indeed, by late 1938 there were not even enough men to impose an effective occupation over those parts of the country that they had conquered, so
that a powerful Communist-led guerrilla movement was able to operate behind Japanese lines. By 1939, therefore, the offensive had run out of steam. Tokyo concluded that it
could only win the war by cutting China off from its foreign sources of support. This, however, would mean expanding the scope of the war, and potentially escalating U.S.Japanese tensions into a full-scale crisis.
Analysis Questions:
1.
Provide the date for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
2.
Why were U.S. and Japan often at odds during the first half of the 20 th century?
3.
What was the ―Open Door Policy‖ and what criticisms did Japan have of this policy?
4.
What 2 problems existed in 1920s Japan which would serve to encourage them to expand, or colonize?
8
5.
What criticisms did the Japanese (especially the military) have of US immigration policy towards China (and the rest of Asia)?
6.
What was the Japanese military’s criticism of the Five-Power Pact?
7.
After the Japanese military concluded that their government would not use their suggestions to improve Japan, what action did they take to force the issue?
8.
Why did the international community (including the US) react little to China’s attack of Manchuria?
9.
The lack of action on the part of the U.S. or the League of Nations gave Japan what impression?
10. Why did China’s leaders show ―little willingness to resist Japan’s growing power‖ in Manchuria?
11. What happened in December 1936 that caused the Chinese government (Nationalists) to become more willing to combat Japan?
12. As a result, fighting broke out at THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE (in Peking or Beijing), and what else did the Japanese army do?
13. Why did Sino-Japanese relations (China and Japan) attract attention from the U.S.?
14. Why did FDR do little to help China, even though we labeled Japan as the aggressor?
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
15. In bullet format, explain Joseph Grew’s critique of FDR’s foreign policy in East Asia.
16. Describe the Nanking Massacre.
17. Even though Japan won EVERY battle with the Chinese, what was preventing Japan from defeating them?
18. Since the Japanese could not defeat the Chinese in a traditional war, what was their strategy? With which nation would this cause problems for Japan?
10
Annotation
For the Japanese leadership, events in Europe during the first half of 1940 offered new opportunities for resolving the war in China, which had been going on
since 1937. A "southern advance" into the British, French, and Dutch (the Netherlands) colonies of Southeast Asia could serve both to cut off the Chinese
from Western aid, and to provide a source for raw materials that otherwise would have to be purchased from the United States. However, such a course ran
the definite risk of war with the United States—a risk that Tokyo was ultimately willing to accept.
Guiding Question
Was the "southern advance" by Japan a reasonable attempt to address to Japan's international dilemma, or was it a reckless step toward war?
Activity 1: Japan's "Golden Opportunity"
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Directions: We will thoroughly analyze the document below, which will allow us to label the map above.
General Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation, July 27, 1940: http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/146/146app02.html
The Japanese viewed the rapid German victories in Europe in the first half of 1940 as a great opportunity for solving the “China Incident,” which was by this
time in its fourth year. In late July Japan’s most prominent military and political leaders attended a conference in Tokyo to discuss their options. Their
conclusions were summarized in the following document.
Policy
The Japanese Empire will strive for the immediate settlement of the China Incident by improving internal and external conditions in keeping with changes in
the world situation …
Article 1.
In regard to the … immediate subjugation of the Chungking Regime (i.e. China) by every possible means, to include the prevention of third power aid to
Chiang Kai-shek, will be carried out…
Article 2.
In regard to external measures to hasten the settlement of the China Incident and, at the same time, solve the problem of the southern advance, the
following steps will be taken:
…2. A firm attitude toward the United States will be maintained and the inevitable and natural deterioration of relations with the United States, following the
execution of the measures mentioned above will be accepted…
3. The following steps will be taken toward French Indo-China and Hong Kong:
a. Request will be made to French Indo-China...for complete discontinuation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek (China’s Nationalist leader). At the same time,
French Indo-China will be requested to furnish supplies to our army, to permit the use of airfields and to allow passage of Japanese troops through the
country. Moreover, efforts will be exerted to obtain the resources necessary for the Japanese Empire. Armed strength will be employed, if necessary,
depending upon the situation.
b. Various maneuverings will be carried out so as to eliminate immediately the antagonistic attitude of Hong Kong [Hong Kong was a British colony]. Burma
will be completely blockaded to prevent aid reaching Chiang Kai-shek…
4. Efforts will be made to obtain important resources from the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies [this especially meant oil] for the present by diplomatic
measures…
Article 3.
…4. In employing armed strength, efforts will be made to limit the war adversary to Great Britain insofar as possible. However, thorough preparations for
the commencement of hostilities against the United States will be made as it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country.
12
Activity 2: Japan's Decision for War
Directions: Use the interactive timeline ―America on the Sidelines: The United States and World Affairs, 1931-1941
(http://teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/neutrality/) to go through the events in Asia from July 1940 through September 1941.
Event/Date
Closing of
the Burma
Road
July 1940
Japan
Occupies
Northern
Indochina
September
1940
Event
Official U.S.
Reaction
Description of U.S. Reaction
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Japan
Occupies
Southern
Indochina
July 1941
Japan
Proposes
East Asia
Settlement
September
1941
14
At an Imperial Conference in Tokyo in early September 1941 Japan's military and civilian leaders reached a critical decision. During the previous month President Roosevelt,
reacting to the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, issued an executive order freezing of all Japanese assets in the United States. The most dramatic effect of this order
was that Japan would be unable to purchase oil from any of its primary suppliers. Tokyo's oil reserves were dwindling, and without access to foreign oil the Japanese military
effort against China would have to be called off. Therefore Japanese officisla agreed that while a diplomatic settlement should still be pursued, the country had to begin
preparations for a possible war with the United States and Great Britain, to seize the raw materials that they were now unable to obtain, and to begin no later than December
1941. Tokyo set a deadline of November 29 for negotiations. If no agreement with the U.S.was reached by then, the Japanese would initiate a war in dramatic fashion—with a
surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor.
In this lesson you will put yourselves in the shoes of U.S. and Japanese diplomats in the final months of 1941, earnestly trying to reach a settlement that will avoid war.
Guiding Question  Was war between the United States and Japan inevitable after September 1941?
Activity 1 Last Chance for Peace?
Although the Japanese military was already planning an attack against the United States, Tokyo instructed its diplomats in Washington to continue negotiations in the hope that
some kind of accommodation could be reached.
There were four main issues of concern:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the ongoing Japanese war against China,
the Japanese occupation of French Indochina,
Japan's alliance with Nazi Germany, (The Tripartite Pact)
and the U.S. refusal to sell oil to Japan.
In this activity you will take on the role of U.S. and Japanese negotiators in Washington D.C. trying to find a diplomatic solution to these problems. In the process you will learn
just how difficult—perhaps impossible—this was.
Directions: You will read your assigned role (US or Japan), and will be responsible for being a diplomatic during next class. You will participate in small group mock negotations.
Remember:
1. Your goal is to see if you can come to an agreement regarding the 4 issues mentioned above.
2. Your nation’s goals were discussed in your HW reading – you should be aware of them.
3. IMPORTANT – as a diplomat you must remain true to your instructions as outlined in the HW reading.
4. At this point, everyone present in class today who was assigned the HW begins with a perfect score of 30 on the assignment. If you are not taking part in the debate, I
will give you the zero.
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
Event/Date
Event
Official U.S.
Reaction
Reject
Japan
Proposes
East Asia
Settlement
September
1941
Japan
Proposes
―Modus
Vivendi‖
November
19
Attack on
Pearl Harbor
December
1941

In response to their assets being frozen by
FDR (resulting in their inability to buy oil)

Proposed the ―East Asia Settlement‖ with US

One of the terms of the agreement was US
accepting China occupying China and
Indochina
Description of U.S. Reaction


Unwilling because settlement involved
acceptance of Japan in China and Indochina (and
the loss of US sphere of influence)
Joseph Grew  US ambassador to China –
argued that current US policy would result in
Japan attacking US
16
Later that afternoon the Japanese ambassador presented Secretary of State Hull with a statement (Memorandum, December 7, 1941) that placed the blame for the failure of
negotiations between the two countries squarely on the shoulders of the United States. After reading it Hull claimed he had "never seen a document that was more crowded
with infamous falsehoods and distortions." The following day Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, calling December 7 a "date which will live in infamy" and asking
for a declaration of war against Japan. Congress wasted no time in doing so. The differences between America and Japan would be settled on the battlefield, not at the
bargaining table.
Address Delivered by President Roosevelt to the Congress, December 8, 1941
Mr. Vice President, and Mr. Speaker, and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives:
Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of
Japan.
The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance
of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American Island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States
and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing
diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.
It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time
the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost.
In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.
Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.
Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.
Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.
Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.
Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United
States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.
As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.
But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.
[SINO-U.S. RELATIONS 1931-1939]
No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe that I
interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery
shall never again endanger us.
Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.
With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us God.
I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and
the Japanese Empire.