Download In Defense of Theocracy

In Defense of Theocracy
ALLEN VERHEY
The presumptuous intention of this otherwise modest little piece is to provide a
defense of the notion of theocracy and a constructive theological account of its significance for the late twentieth century. l wi ll look first - and all too briefly- at some relevant
bib lical materials. It will then be necessary to distinguish the idea of theocracy from a
number of political positions sometimes mistakenly judged to be implicit in theocracy.
Fina lly, I will undertake to describe the normative significa nce of the idea of theocracy for
the pluralistic world in which we live.
Etymologically, "theocracy" is derived from two Greek words, theos and kratein; the
fundamental sense is, therefore, "the rule of God" o r "the reign of God." That political
image is, of course, a central one in the Bible's description of the relation of God to the
world , including the political world , and of his activity within it. Wherever we turn we are
confronted by it and claimed by it.
The historica l narratives of the Old Testament tell the story of God's reign. He
chooses a people, covenants with them (on the model of a suzerain), provides them with
his law, and gives them the land. There God reig ns through the administration of judges,
a motley collection of charismatic figures , until the monarchy is instituted in response to
the Philistine th reat. The kings reign "under God" until their refusals to heed the prophetic call to turn make inevitable the judgment of God. But still God reigns, and will
reign. Now Cyrus is his "anointed," now Ezra, the scribe of his law.
In the prophets "the reign of God" is both assumption and promise. Their "thus said
the Lo rd" is a form taken from the language of diplomacy, as a courier delivers the
message of the king. From Elijah's dramatic conflict with the prophets of Baal who sat at
Jezebel's table to Amos' conflict with Amaziah to the lame nts a nd promises of the later
prophets the issue is the reign of God. The prophets reminded the people of the convenant;
they defended Yahweh's claim as their legitimate suzerain; and they anno unced his judgments upon and promises to the nation. The prophets know, moreover, that the rule of
God extends far beyond the borders of Israel a nd Judah; all the nations stand und er his
sovereignty a nd under his judgment; it is his righteousness, not their power, which is
finally decisive.
In so ngs of worship the people celebrated God's reign. In Psalm 47, for example,
which may have been connected with an annua l ceremony celebrating God's ent hronement, a ll peoples are invited to join in praising God. And the reason is simply the confident and joyful assurance that God is "a great king over all the earth" (Ps. 47:2, cf vs . 7).
T he psalm closes with a splendid vision of God's reign, of the princes of the peoples
gathered as the people of the God of Abraham. On the basis of this faith and vision the
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psalmists exhort Israel not only to praise but to "say among the nations, 'The Lord
reigns' " (Ps. 96: 10). The theocratic vis ion always has the whole world and the future
on its horizon. It is oriented toward a future in which the Lord comes to judge (e.g.,
Ps 96: 13), to establish his universal reign beyond ambiguity a nd challenge and corruption.
Finally, Jesus of Na zareth comes announcing that that future is imminent, that the
kingdom of God is at hand and a lready making its power felt in his ministry. It is true
that Jesus does not announce the kingdom as an ideal political order whose coming is
contingent upon human striving. Its coming is contingent not on human act ivit y but on
the de·cisive act of God , the apoca lyptic, world-shattering, and world-renewing act of God
which establishes his reign. But it is a lso true that Jesus does not announce the kingdom
as limited to God's sovereig nty in the mysterious region of the soul. The scope of God's
reign is nothing less than cosmic . Jesus nowhere narrows the scope of apocalyptic expectation to the mystical or pious or "existential" su.rrender of the heart to God. Jesus comes
with no political program to estab lish the kingdom, but the kingdom he announces is no
less political than personal. His announcement of the coming reign of God calls into
question the present order, including its conventional rules of prestige and protocal, pomp
and privilege. His expectation of God's rule is condensed into axioms like "many that are
first shall be last, and the last first" (Mark 10:3 1, Luke 13:30, Matt. 19:30, 20:8) and
"whoever exa lts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted"
(Matt. 23: 12, Luke 14: 1 1, 18: 14). In the light of such a great reversal, the self-assertiveness
of nations, too, falls under judgment, and the national desire for conventional prominence
and security is called into question. Jesus rejected the vengeful nationalism of much contemporary apoca lyptic expectation and of the zealots. But the implication is not evidently
a pacifist prohibition of political power and coercion, but rather a judgment on the pride
of power and a transformation of the way power is construed, now as a vocation to
humble service (Mark 10:42-44 and par.). Politically, too, then, the coming kingdom is
good news for the poor and oppressed. So, Jesus was no Sadducean collaborator either,
and the temple cleansing (Mark 11:15-18 and par, John 2:13- 17) was surely- even if not
merely- a political challenge to the priestly aristocracy. The famous, but notoriously difficult, saying of Jesus about the tribute money, "Render to Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and to God the things that are God's" (Mark 12: 17 and par.), is no zealot ca ll to
arms, but neither is it the sort of compartmentalization of "two realms" which would
leave the Herodians, the Sadducees, and other collaborators with an easy conscience. In
the context of Jesus' announcement of the coming cosmic sovereignty of God, there can
be no question about what things do and do not belong to God. All things will belong to
him, the claims of Caesar notwithstanding, and even now Jesus' hearers are called to
welcome that coming sovereignty.
It is not implausible that this Jesus should be considered dangerous, dangerous
enough to kill, by those who refused to repent, who refused to welcome the coming reign
of God. So Jesus was put to death as a pretender to the throne. But God raised him up.
God ent hroned him at his right hand , "far above all rule and authority and power and
dominion" (Eph. 1:21). And the New Testament proclaims that he is no pretender, that
God has vindicated him as Messiah, as "his anointed ." The New Testament with one voice
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joins "the loud voices in heaven, saying, 'The kingdom of the world has become the
kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever' " (Rev. 11: 15).
God reigns and will reign. That theocratic vision is non-negotiable for the church, as
it is for her Scriptures. That theocratic vision may not be reduced to its political implications, but neither may it be emptied of them. God's reign is not merely political, but it is
nevertheless surely political.
II
To defend theocracy is not, of course, to defend any or all of the political positions
which have sometimes been associated with it. Indeed, quite to the contrary, since the
notion of theocracy has sometimes been easily and sensationally discredited by confusing
it with other notions, a defense of theocracy must undertake at least briefly to distinguish
it from some of the political positions sometimes thought to be entailed by it.
Theocracy has sometimes been confused with hierocracy, with the political rule of a
priestly or clerical hierarchy. But theocracy does not entail hierocracy, as the power of
judges and kings in Israel makes quite plain. The theocratic vision makes political rulers
responsible to God, not to his priests. Religious leaders are neither identified with political
leaders nor given authority over them by theocracy.
Theocracy has more often been confused with bibliocracy, with the legislation and
enforcement of the positive law found in Scripture. But theocracy does not entail any
particular legal code. One contribution the Old Testament scholars have made is their
demonstration that the laws and codes of the Old Testament were not something static,
settled once for all in eternity, but rather something constantly changing to bring new
situations under the reign of God . Theocracy is not to be identified with the enforcement
of any of these particular codes nor the sum of them.
Theocracy has often been confused with historical instances of self-conscious attempts
to reflect and institutionalize God's reign. But if neither Israel's amphictyony nor her
monarchy are necessarily entailments of theocracy, it need hardly be said that neither
Calvin's Geneva, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Penn's "holy experiment" in Pennsylvania, Van Raalte's "Colony," Leo XIIl's Rerum Novarum, nor any other historical
instance of a theocracy is to be identified and confused with theocracy itself. To defend
theocracy is not necessarily to defend, say, Calvin's Geneva or to propose that a contemporary state ape Penn's "holy experiment." Indeed we might add to that list non-Jewish
and non-Christian theocracies in ancient Babylon and Egypt or in old Mecca or contemporary Teh'ran. For it is also a confusion to suppose that the notion of theocracy entails
the rule of God who is the father of our Lord Jesus Christ.
To distinguish "theocracy" from some of the positions often confused with it may be
enough to defend "theocracy" from certain easy and sensational accusations. But the exercise seems to have left "theocracy" open to the easiest and most sensational accusation of
all, the accusation that "theocracy" is an empty cipher without any meaning at all. To
defend theocracy against that accusation, however, requires a positive account of the
meaning of theocracy. It is to such an account that I now turn. In the analytica l part of
what follows, I hope to show that every state has a "theocratic" dimension. In the conJOO
structive part, I hope to state certa in theocratic views which at least cohere with the
Christian faith and suggest their political relevance for the pluralistic world in which we
live.
III
Every state has a "theocratic" dimension. It is as H. R. Niebuhr said, "Fa ith as
human confidence in a center and conserver of value and as human loyalty to a cause
seems to manifest itself almost as directly in politics, science, and other cultural activities
as it does in religion" (Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, p. 64). Indeed, in that
sense a ll people and a ll human communities "live by faith."
The importance of confidence and loyalty to communities, including political communities, can hardly be denied. States re ly on and seek to elicit confidence in and loyalty
to not only the executive, legislative, and judi.cial functions of government but also to "the
cause" they seek. Nation-states do not typically rely on brute force; they seek to legitimate
their power by some "mission." Czarist Russia presented itself to it.s subjects and to the
world as Holy Russia, a servant of Orthodoxy. Communist Russia, for a ll its atheism, is
no less devoted to a cause which transcends it. France and the United States present
themselves as devoted servants of democracy and human rights. Every nation-state seeks
to secure its citizens' loyalty to itself because it is loyal to the cause. That there is hypocrisy in this is patent, for nations often act in simple self-interest rather than in the interest
of any cause which transcends them. But hypocrisy always pays its subtle tribute to the
good, and here no less than elsewhere hypocrisy involves the admission that the cause is
good and binding, even if we are not sufficiently devoted to it. Any government's fa ilure
to act in ways coherent with the cause to which its citizens are loyal can resu lt in a crisis
of confidence. Confidence in government is not unrelated to confidence in the cause. But
confidence involves more than mere devotion to the cause . It also involves (often implicit)
assumptions about the nature of persons and their communities, about the fault in persons and / or their communities, and about their prospects a nd destiny. These beliefs may
support and sustain loyalty to a cause, but they a lso affect policy designed to further the
cause. If citizens have confidence that truth is a n ally of justice or a worthy order or a
decent common life and not an enemy, then and only then will they have confidence in a
government which protects freedom of speech and inquiry. If citizens believe that technologica l innovation provides the remedy for personal and social ills, then they will confidently seek technologica l solutions for what may not be technological problems. Truth or
technology may or may not in these cases become "the cause," but they are sure to
influence whatever policy is formu lated to pursue the cause and to affect the confidence of
citizens in their government to serve it.
I have, up to this point for the sake of emphasis, used the singu lar, "the causc"- to
speak of that to which nation-states are loyal and in which they. have confidence. It is not
so simple, of course, at least not often. There are various causes which lay claim on a
nation's loyalty and confidence. And they cannot all be .se rved at once, at least not often.
The cause of peace and the cause of justice both claim loyalty and confidence, but they
sometimes seem (at least) to entail different political policies and actions. The cause of
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freedom and the cause of order often seem to make conflicting legitimate claims. We ca n
talk about the cause of a "just peace" or an "ordered freedom" but such locutions do not
hid e the necessity of re la ting distinct ca uses and establishing priorities . The theocratic
dimension of statecraft points in the direction of ma ny causes, many "goods," to which a
state is loyal and in which its subjects have confidence. But the point remains that every
state has a theocratic dimension, not that they all acknowledge one god or the one true
God .
To that observation may be added another: in many places, notably and ironically in
"consensual" stat.es, and surely in this country, there is precious little public consens us.
There is little consensus either about a cause transcending the nation , to which the citizens
are loyal and because of which they are loyal (or not) to the government, or a bout the
assumptions concerning the nature, fau lt , and prospects of the human and socia l condition. The cause becomes "pluralisnt itself. And, no doubt that cause has won important
victories over real and vicious injustices. But besides providing very little ~ uid a .nce for
public decisions, it is always in dang.e r of reducing the public good to an additive result
(or balance) of mu.ltiple private goods and specia l interests, and of reducing public mora lity to tolerance.
It is in the context of the theocratic dimension of statec;;raft on the one hand and in
the context of American pluralism on the pther than the attempt to provide a constructive
account of theocracy must be undertaken.
IV
The fundamental premise of theocracy in the Christian tradition is that the cause we
must serve politically and the cause the nations must serve is God's cause. This premise, of
course, is still a long way from the formation of policy. To move from this premise to a
more concrete political stance demands that we specify what God's cause is, and that is
not altogether easy. Shall we identify his cause with his glo ry? But then we shall have to
specify his glory. Sha ll . we identify his cause with the good of human persons or the
well-being of the whole c.reation? In either .case "good" and "well-being" are complex
ideas, and God and ·his cause transcend our attempts to talk about them .
That, perhaps, is the first conclusion .worth noting. Precisely because a theocratic
position recognizes God's cause as alone worthy of our and our nation's .ultimate loyalty
and confidence, we must avoid presuming that our cause or our nation's is identical with
God's, even if we are trying to be faithful to him. We and the nation must rema i·n open to
the possibility that we have overlooked some part of the compl~xity of God's cause, a~d
we must resist the .temptation to make a part, any part, of God's cause an idol. To remind
ourselves and the nations of that is part of wliat it means to "say among the nations 'God
is King,' "and it is no sma ll contribution· to the public good. .
·
But if we never know enough of'God and his cause to b~· ab le to identify it selfass.u r~d ly, it does not follow that we know nothing of God or his cause. God has not left
hirnself or his cause without witness; he and his cause are not totally unknown. We know
God int~nds peac~;· we know he i~tends justice; we know he intends the flourishing of the
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whole creation; we know he intends to feed th e hungry, to protect the powerless, to bless
the poor; we know ... many goods that are a part of God's cause. The Christian theocrat
is in much the sa me position as anyone else attentive to the theocratic dimension of
statecraft; there are many and diverse legitimate "causes" which do not fall automatically
into place and priority. But that is not to say that the only contribution of the Christian
theocrat is the warning against confusing one of these causes or a set of them with God's
cause, for not every political cause has a place within loyalty to the God who raised Jesus
from the dead , and not every cause that has a place can be given prominence of place or
priority. The international superiority of the Aryan race can hardly claim any place in
God's cause. In Viet Nam "national honor" could not finally claim priority over "peace"
and ')ustice." So, the Christian theocrat can and must select and exclude, relate and order
the diversity of political "goods," even though a simple unitive understanding of God's
cause is beyond his ken. That is the second conclusion worth noting, and the second
contribution of a Christian theocrat to the public good .
The fundamental premise coheres with certain beliefs and assumptions about the
nature, fault, and destiny of persons and their communities . Such beliefs, it was observed,
are a feature of the theocratic dimension of statecraft. They nourish and sustain loyalty to
the cause and they are relevant to the formation of policy . To deal adequately with the
Christian assumptions about creation, fall, and redemption as these are relevant to the
nature, fault, and prospects of man and his communities would demand a full-scale political theology. (A good start is made in Rich Mouw's Politics and the Biblical Drama.) In
lieu of that let me briefly sketch some of the assumptions of the Christian theocrat and his
most important contemporary rival, the technocrat, as they face questions of policy concerning, say, genetic research.
The technocrat assumes that man is by nature a "tool-maker," that he transcends
nature by controlling it, and seeks by curiosity and inventiveness to do so more and more.
For the fault is in nature, not in man. Man is beset by nature, it is nature which keeps him
from getting what he wants and needs . Values are finally wants and needs, they are
preferences, tastes, without objective reference. The prospects for man and his communities are bright as long as human curiosity and inventiveness are unencumbered by the fears
of those without a taste for it. Technology provides the path to what we want. "Better
living through Chemistry." Laissez innover! Such assumptions make it very difficult to say
"no" to any kind of genetic research or technology.
The Christian believes that man is by nature a creature of God, a part of his creation
and along with it dependent on him . Humanity as it comes from God is always fellowhumanity, and the dominion over nature given with his creation is always responsible
dominion. He is responsible to God for his use and abuse of nature, for the effect of his
dominion on both nature and his fellow-humans. The fault is neither in nature nor in his
dominion but in himself in his pride and sloth, his folly and his greed. The prospects for
persons and their communities- and their technologies- always tilt toward darkness
when human pride, sloth, folly, and greed are not reined by law and tempered by a sense
of finitude and, yes, sin . But God is always active not only as creator and judge but also
as redeemer of his world and his creatures. He is always creating new possibilities of
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restraining evil and promoting well being. And the prospects for persons a nd their communities so metimes tilt toward splendour when they tend the creation and care for their
fellow -humans. Such ass umptions would plainly not cohere with a cavalierly and naively
antitechno logical spirit, but they wou ld not look to technology as the "fa ith fu l savior"
either. It might be possible with such assumptions to say "no" to some kinds of genetic
research and technology which most threaten the creation and man's rootedness in it or
are most liable to become instruments of human pride or folly or greed.
The third conclusion worth noting, then, is that loyalty to God's cause on the one
hand and public policy on the other should be informed by Christian beliefs about the
creation, fall, and destiny of persons and their communities. This is the third contribution
of a Christian theocrat to the public good.
It begins to appear that our second and third conclusions point toward "the
enforcement of morals" (to use the title of Lord Devlin's book on morality and law). And
there is a sense in which no theocrat could or would disown that task . But a Christian
theocrat will have very good grounds for qualifying and restricting that task. For in the
Christian view one of the causes wh ich is part of the complex cause of God is freedom,
and that freedom is nourished and sustained by Christian assumptions concerning persons
and their communities. Tru ly to serve God's cause is to serve it freely. Never mind now
the arguments based sole ly on reason and the dignity of persons (and such arguments can
be made for freedom, and they may not be finally ignored by theocrats). The point now is
that God himself is the source, preserver, and destiny of human freedom. Freedom does
not become a negligible value, then, even when it is used paradoxically to deny its own
source and destiny. Freedom remains a public good, and its preservation and protection a
theocratic obligation. It is as Calvin himself said, " Indeed, the magistrates ought to apply
themselves with the highest diligence to prevent the freedom (whose guardians they have
been appointed) from being in any respect diminished, far Jess vio lated" (Inst., IV.xx.8).
Freedom, of course, may not be unlimited; the result would be anarchy. But freedom
must be protected and preserved. That is the first qua lification on the theocratic
"enforcement of morals."
The Christian theocrat a lso knows that morality outreaches the grasp of legal sanctions. Morality is concerned with dispositions and character as we ll as actions. Law and
its sanctions focus on ex ternal actions. It is true, of course- and no theocrat would wish
to deny- that certain habits of mind and action may be influenced by public law. But it is
also true tha t the "habit" of respect for the law is diminished when laws and sanctions are
imposed where there is no possibility of adequate or equitable enforcement. That is the
second qualificat ion on the theocratic "enforcement of morals."
Morality out reaches law, moreover, not only in that it is concerned with character as
well as conduct, but also in the kinds of actions it prescribes and prohibits. When our
Lord commends the behavior of the good Samaritan, he ma kes a moral point, not a
pol itica l one. The selfless generosity of the Samaritan deserves high praise, and Jesus
prescribes similar behavior, "Go and do likewise" (Luke 10:37) . He does not urge political
sanctions against those who fai l so to act. The priest and the Levite deserve bla me but not
fine or imprisonment. The brigands who robbed and assaulted the man and left him half
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d ead are those who deserve still higher blame and, indeed , lega l punishment. The Lord
did not tell the story to make a politica l point, but one is there just the sa me. Ce rta in acts
are beyond the co mpetence of law. An e nforced generosity is a t best para do xical, for
ge nerosity means that one gives beyond what a nyone else has the right to expect. If I give
a stranger fifty dollars, I am being ge nero us. If I return fifty dolla rs to so meo ne I had
borrowed it from , I a m only giving him his due. The first kind of act is beyo nd the
co mpetence of law. The second kind is within it. The appropriate political response, therefore, to a state of affairs where people regularl y get robbed and bea ten and left "halfd ead" would be, 1. to increase police protection on that path to enforce the law against
theft a nd assault, and 2. to create the conditions in which people could freely act morall y
(for exa mple, by protecting them from subsequent litigation if they try to help within their
competence). Law must deal with what will inevitably seem to morality to be "minimal
sta ndards," prohibiting actions which deserve high blame, not those dese rving low bla me,
a nd enforcing actions which deserve low praise, not those dese rving high praise. This is
the third qualification on the theocratic "enforcement of morals."
With these qualifications, then, the Christian theocrat will own the vocation of the
"enforcement of morals." Law and its sanctions may be used to enforce certain "minimal
standards" when their enforcement is both possible and equitable and is consistent with
th e protection and preservation of freedom . That is the fourth conclusion worth noting,
and the fourth contribution of the Christian theocrat to the public good.
The conclusion, it may as well be acknowledged, is as abstract as the problems it is
intended to deal with are concrete. "The enforcement of morals" is never just that exactly,
but always the prohibition or prescription or regulation of certain acts, for th e sake of
avoiding particular public evils or achieving particular public goods, by means of sanctions which are real and finite , and involving the sacrifice of specific liberties . .Let us take
one example, but let it be a thorny one, abortion. The first problem here in "the enforcement of morality" is the difficulty of the moral question itself. How shall we "enforce
morality" if what morality prescribes and prohibits is not a ltogether clear? To some, to
those who perceive the unborn as a person from the moment of conception, morality
would presc rib e that we love it, be willing to sacrifice our interests for it , and at least not
intentiona lly kill it or take the conditions for life from it. The "minima l standard" on this
view would be to prohibit abortion save to prese rve the life of the mother. But so me do
not share this view either of the status of the fetus or (consequentially) of the demands of
morality or the "minimal sta ndard s." Some would insist, for example, that certain women
who carry a pregnancy to term deserve high praise and would , if they were to abort incur
low blame, as in the case of the woma n pregnant by rape or inces t or bedridd e n due to
the preg nancy or pregnant with a "defective" fetus . The "minimal standard" on such a
view wou ld not prescribe such praiseworthy decisions to complete the pregnancy nor
prohibit abortions in such cases; it would, rather, prohibit only those a bortions where to
complete the pregnancy would deserve low praise and to terminate it, high blame- as in
cases of a bortion for convenience. It may be observed that a Christian theocra t will recognize that one cause in the co mplex cause of God is life itself. That rules out, I judge, the
m orality of a bortion for the sake of convenience, but it does not automatically settle the
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issue between those who perce ive the fetus a veritable hum a n perso n and those who do
not. They will sti ll differ both about the morality of a bortion in genera l and about the
"m inimal standards" to be legislated in particular.
But let us put that difficulty behind us. Let us suppose now that there is no difficulty
to the moral question of abort ion or to determining the "minima l standards." The conclusion would a llow the e nforcement of these sta nd ards when their enforcement is both
possible and eq uitab le and is consistent with the protection and preservation of freedom.
And here new difficulties arise. The former inequities in enforcement of legislation prohibiting abo rti on were one rea so n for the widespread call for abortion reform in the sixties
and sh ould not now be forgotten . The rich managed to get "legal" and competent abortion s by travel or deception (with the cooperation of physicians in both). The poor were
driven to quacks and illegality. T he difficulty of equitable enforceme nt counts aga inst
legislation (or a constit uti ona l amendment) prohibiting abortion. T hat difficulty needs to
be ba lanced, however, by the inequities which result from the absence of suc h legislation
(and those inequities are enormous if the fetus is a veritable huma n person). The question
is one of proportion or balance a nd is often difficult to judge, but it is unavoidable for
those who wou ld be serious abo ut the theocratic task of the enforcement of morals. The
other qualification insists on the protectio n and preservation of freedom. This, too , creates
questions of balance and proportion. The concrete restriction of freedom must be weighed
agai nst the good accomplished or preserved by the legislation . If the good involves the
protection of another's freedom - and it does if the fetus is a person- then the balance
necessary to restrict freedom is clearly present. But if the good is some other value, some
other part of the complex of God's cause, then the question of sufficient weight to balance
the importa nce of freedom is sometimes as intractable as it is inevitab le. Sometimes,
surely, it is not difficult: Who would not restrict the freedom to yell "fire" in a crowded
theatre in order to avoid the evil of mayhem? But how sha ll we weigh the freedom t·')
determine what happens with one's own body over against the life of what is not but may
become (on a certain view of the unborn) a human person?
The C hristian theocrat will own th e vocation of "the enforcement of morality" and
will acknow led ge the importance and the difficulty of determining the "minimal standards," the possibilities of eq uitab le enforcement, and the proportionality of the good
accomplis hed or the evil avo id ed to the freedom sacrificed. That was , it will be recalled,
th e fourth conclusion worth noting, and the fourth co ntribution to the public good.
It is important, finally, to return to the first conclusion, to a llow it th e last word. God
and his ca use transcend our attempts to talk about them and surely to "enforce" them .
The "minimal standards" will always fa ll short of the "love, joy, peace, patie nce, kindness ,
goodness, gent leness, se lf-control" which God gives a nd demands. That higher righteousness will never a llow us to identify the nation's order as the ca use of God. But neither wi ll
it a ll ow us to despise the "m inima l standa rd s" as unrelated to God's cause. The Christian
th eocra t will be prepared to te nd to so res in the body politic with remedies considerably
less winso me than th e C hristian chari smata. Loyalty to God and his ca use should augment both the responsibi lit y and th e capacity to attend without self-righteo usness to the
preservation of small but genuine goods and the avoida nce of considerable and genu ine
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ha rms in the co mm o n li fe of na ti o ns. T ha t is th e voca ti o n of th e theocra t , a nd th e defe nse
of theoc racy. G od reig ns a nd will reig n. T ha t may nei th e r be red uced to its po litica l
imp lica ti o ns no r e mpt ied o f the m .
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