Download Now I come to a brief outline of the task of a theory of tradition

The Conspiracy Theory of Society 1
Karl R. Popper
In order to explain what is, I think, the central task of social science, I should like to begin by
describing a theory which is held by very many rationalists—a theory which I think implies exactly
the opposite of the true aim of the social sciences. I shall call this theory the ‘conspiracy theory of
society’. This theory, which is more primitive than most forms of theism, is akin to Homer’s theory
of society. Homer conceived the power of the gods in such a way that whatever happened on the
plain before Troy was only a reflection of the various conspiracies on Olympus. The conspiracy
theory of society is just a version of this theism, of a belief in gods whose whims and wills rule
everything. It comes from abandoning God and then asking: ‘Who is in his place?’ His place is
then filled by various powerful men and groups—sinister pressure groups, who are to be blamed for
having planned the great depression and all the evils from which we suffer.
The conspiracy theory of society is very widespread, and has very little truth in it. Only
when conspiracy theoreticians come into power does it become something like a theory that
accounts for things which actually happen (a case of what I have called the ‘Oedipus Effect’). For
example, when Hitler came into power, believing in the conspiracy myth of the Learned Elders of
Zion, he tried to outdo their conspiracy with his own counter-conspiracy. But the interesting thing
is that such a conspiracy never—or ‘hardly ever’—turns out in the way that is intended.
This remark can be taken as a clue to what is the true task of a social theory. Hitler, I said,
made a conspiracy that failed. Why did it fail? Not just because other people conspired against
Hitler. It failed, simply, because it is one of the striking things about social life that nothing ever
comes off as intended. Things always turn out a little bit differently. We hardly ever produce in
social life precisely the effect that we wish to produce, and we usually get things that we do not
want into the bargain. Of course, we act with certain aims in mind; but apart from these aims
(which we may or may not really achieve) there are always certain unwanted consequences of our
actions; and usually these unwanted consequences cannot be eliminated. To explain why they
cannot be eliminated is the major task of social theory.
I will give you a very simple example. Let us say that a man in a small village must sell his
house. Not long before there was a man who bought a house in that village because he needed one
urgently. Now there is a seller. He will find that, under normal conditions, he will not get nearly as
much for his house as the buyer had to pay when he wanted to buy a similar one. That is to say, the
very fact that somebody wants to sell his house lowers the market price. And this is generally so.
Whoever wants to sell something always depresses the market value of what he wants to sell;
whoever wants to buy something raises the market value of what he wants to buy. This is true, of
course, only for small free markets. I do not say that the economic system of free markets cannot be
replaced by another one. But in a market economy this is what happens. You will agree with me
that there is no need to prove that the man who wants to sell something usually has no intention of
lowering the market price, and that the man who wants to buy something has no intention of raising
it. We have here a typical instance of unwanted consequences.
The situation described is typical of all social situations. In all social situations we have
individuals who do things; who want things; who have certain aims. In so far as they act in the way
1
From Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Chapter 4 (“Towards a
Rational Theory of Tradition”). 2 nd ed. New York: Routledge. 2002. Pp. 165-168.
in which they want to act, and realize the aims which they intend to realize, no problem arises for
the social sciences (except the problem whether their wants and aims can perhaps be socially
explained, for example by certain traditions). The characteristic problems of the social sciences
arise only out of our wish to know the unintended consequences, and more especially the unwanted
consequences which may arise if we do certain things. We wish to foresee not only the direct
consequences but also these unwanted indirect consequences. Why should we wish to foresee
them? Either because of our scientific curiosity, or because we want to be prepared for them; we
may wish, if possible, to meet them and prevent them from becoming too important. (This means,
again, action, and with it the creation of further unintended consequences.)
I think that the people who approach the social sciences with a ready-made conspiracy
theory thereby deny themselves the possibility of ever understanding what the task of the social
sciences is, for they assume that we can explain practically everything in society by asking who
wanted it, whereas the real task of the social sciences 2 is to explain those things which nobody
wants—such as, for example, a war, or a depression. (Lenin’s revolution, and especially Hitler’s
revolution and Hitler’s war are, I think, exceptions. These were indeed conspiracies. But they were
consequences of the fact that conspiracy theoreticians came into power—who, most significantly,
failed to consummate their conspiracies.)
It is the task of social theory to explain how the unintended consequences of our intentions
and actions arise, and what kind of consequences arise if people do this that or the other in a certain
social situation. And it is, especially, the task of the social sciences to analyse in this way the
existence and the functioning of institutions (such as police forces or insurance companies or
schools or governments) and of social collectives (such as states or nations or classes or other social
groups). The conspiracy theorist will believe that institutions can be understood completely as the
result of conscious design; and as to collectives, he usually ascribes to them a kind of grouppersonality, treating them as conspiring agents, just as if they were individual men. As opposed to
this view, the social theorist should recognize that the persistence of institutions and collectives
creates a problem to be solved in terms of analysis of individual social actions and their unintended
(and often unwanted) social consequences, as well as their intended ones.
2
In the discussion which followed the lecture, I was criticized for rejecting the conspiracy theory, and it was asserted
that Karl Marx had revealed the tremendous importance of the capitalist conspiracy for the understanding of society. In
my reply I said that I should have mentioned my indebtedness to Marx, who was one of the first critics of the conspiracy
theory, and one of the first to analyse the unintended consequences of the voluntary actions of people acting in certain
social situations. Marx said quite definitely and clearly that the capitalist is as much caught in the network of the social
situation (or the ‘social system’) as is the worker’; that the capitalist cannot help acting in the way he does: he is as
unfree as the worker, and the results of his actions are largely unintended. But the truly scientific (though in my opinion
too deterministic) approach of Marx has been forgotten by his latter-day followers, the Vulgar Marxists, who have put
forward a popular conspiracy theory of society which is no better than the myth of the Learned Elders of Zion.