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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF EARLY BUDDHISM
BY
KALUKOTTEGE KUMAR PIYASIRI
THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
OCTOBER 1977
without the loving kindness of these two friends, who always
took the time to care, to listen and to be concerned.
They
have looked after me very carefully and their affection has
been a constant moral encouragement to me.
I wish to express
my sincere thanks to D.T. Rajapatirana ,, Dr. H. H. E. Loafs,
Dr. J.T.F. Jordens, Professor Q.B. Gibson and to my friends,
Mr. John Pflugradt and Mrs. B. Johnstone for many acts of
kindness and for valuable and constructive suggestions at
every stage of the writing of this thesis.
They have always
enthusiasti9ally encouraged and willingly helped me in many
ways.
I wish to thank the Australian National University
for allowing me to carry out this research project and I am
especially grateful to Mr. C.W. Plowman and Mr. G. Dicker,
of the Australian National University administration for
their assistance and support, not least in the final stage
of preparing this thesis.
I must also take this opportunity
to express my sincere thanks to Professor M.B. Ariyapala for
his help and co-operation on a number of difficult issues I
had with the University of Sri Lanka.
Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to my wife
Chandra, to whom I owe an enormous debt and from whom I never
cease to learn.
''Knowledge" as ~rya§~ra says in the J;takam;l; "is the special
cause for receiving presents from persons of high rank".
I
have been a most fortunate recipient of favours while engaging
in the pursuit of it.
If the results of the search set out in
this thesis give any satisfaction to the learned world, then
the purpose of my quest will have been fulfilled.
CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · ·
1- 16
Subsections (Numbers here denote paragraphs)
1.1.1 - 1.1.3: Introductory observations.
1.2.1 - 1.2.2: Early Buddhism was a product
of social change in ancient India. 1.3.1 1.3.6: Criticism of the view that early.
Buddhism does not concern itself with social,
political and legal ideas. 1.4.1 -1.4.4:
Some views suggesting that the Buddha based
his system on the teaching of the Vedas.
1.5.1 -1.5.2: Impression created in connection with early Buddhist social and political
ideas and the neglect of such ideas in the
context of Indian social and political
thGught.
1.6.1 -1.6.5: Previous works on
the subject. 1.7.1- 1.7.6: The purpose of
the present work, impression created by some
modern scholars concerning Buddhist social
and political thought and its modern interpretations. 1.8.1-1.8.6: Source materials
used and the treatment of the subject. 1.9.1
- 1.9.2: Main topics discussed and the
usefulness of the present work.
CHAPTER II:
POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION
Subsections.
2.1.1: Introductory
observations. 2.2.1 -2.2.5: Classification
of ideas of political obligation and
authority in Indian tradition.
2.3.1.
-2.3.7: Examination of the theological
theory of the Vedic tradition. The first
version -monistic view.
2.4.1-2.4.2: A
second version -divine invention.
2.5.1-2
.5.6: The third version-magico-religious
view.
2.6.1- 2.6.6: Final version of the
theological theory - idea of an agreement.
2.7.1 -2.7.2: Summary of the theological
theory.
2.8.1-2.8.6: Comments on the
Vedic and post-Vedic ideas of the origin of
kingship.
2.9.1: The early Buddhist
approach to the subject.
2.10.1 -2.10.18:
The arguments against a personal creator God.
2.11.1 -2.11.12: The notion of social
contract. 2.12.1 -2.12.3: The other
versions-different schools of Buddhism and
the summary.
2.13.1 -2.13.6: Examination
of the meaning of Mahasammata - its narrow
explanation. 2.14.1-2.14.5: Its wider
explanation, its meaning and its sociopolitical implications.
2.15.1-2.15.3:
Important features of the notion of social
contract. 2.16.1: Conclusion.
17- 69
Page
CHAPTER III:
THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA
70-133
Subsections. 3.1.1: Introductory
observations. 3.2.1-3.2.5: Dhamma as a
word of importance in Indian religious
traditions.
Its derivations - developments from the days of the Vedas. The
words rta, dharman and dharma.
3.3.1-3
.3.8: ·some observation about the
assumption that the both concepts, the
Vedic dharma and Buddhist dharma, are of
the same nature. The Brahma~ic and
Upanisadic conception of dharma.
Its
interpretations - the sources - the
various uses in different contexts.
3.4.1-3.
4.9: What is dhamma of early Buddhism in
contrast to the Vedic and post-Vedic systems?
Some of the fundamental differences
between Vedic dharma and Buddhist dhamma.
3.5.1- 3.5.7: Relation of dhamma to the
social contract theory of early Buddhism.
3.6.1 - 3.6.4: The authority of dhamma
in the sphere of social and political life,
and its explanations.
3.7.1- 3.7.13:
Principles enunciated to rule in accordance
with dhamma.
3.8.1 -3.8.12: The concept of
world-ruler. The spiritual and material
welfare of the subjects.
3.9.1-3.9.4:
Duties of the subjects.
3.10.1-3.10.7:
Connection of the early Buddhist account
of the world-ruler with the reign of Asoka.
Difference of opinion as to whether the
idea of the world-ruler in the early Buddhist
account is in some way linked with Asoka.
3.11.1 - 3.11.8: Asoka's policy of dhamma
and its relationship with the dhamma of
early Buddhism.
3.12.1 -3.12.5: Asoka's
internal and foreign policy.
3.13.1-3.13.10:
The early Buddhist attitude to war.
3.14.1:
Conclusion.
CHAPTER IV:
ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Subsections. 4.1.1: Introductory
observations.
4.2.1- 4.2.3: Ancient Indian
social order and its origins. The conflict
between the Aryans and the Dasas and Dasyus.
4.3.1 -4.3.9: The origin of the four-fold
division gf society (varna).
The authority
of the Brahmanas and the"reasons for their
claim to supe~iority.
4.4.1 - 4.4.5:
Preliminary observations on the idea of
equality in early Buddhism. 4.5.1 -4.5.4:
Man's duty in his human existence. 4.6.1
-4.6.6: The classification of the
arguments used by the early Buddhists in
134-185
Page
support of their attitude to equality. The
first argument-Biological.
4.7.1 -4.7.8:
The second argument - Anthropological.
4.8.1 -4.8.10: The third argument-Sociological. 4.9.1-4.9.3: The fourth argumentLegal.
4.10.1- 4.10.17: The fifth
argument -Moral. 4.11.1-4.11.8: The sixth
argument-Religious. 4.12.1 -4.12.3:
Examination of some misconception
regarding the spirit of egalitarianism of
early Buddhism. 4.13.1: Conclusion.
CHAPTER V:
ATTITUDE TO LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
186-221
Subsections. 5.1.1 -5.1.2: Introductory
observations. 5.2.1 -5.2.4: Preliminary
observations to disprove the view that
there is no Buddhist law.
5.3.1-5.3.8:
The Buddhists views on the nature of
justice, of law, and. of punishment with
a comparison of post~ Vedic notions .1 1:
General observations on tne Vinaya laws
and their place in a context of "law"
5.5.1-5.5.10: The formation of the
Saflgha and its prime motive. The purpose
of enacting rules and regulations and
of legislation. 5.6.1-5.6.5: The
codified laws of the Sangha. §orne
interpretations of the word patimokkha.
An outline of the seven categories of
patimokkha.
5.7.1-5.7.7: The
jurisdiction of the Sangha. 5.8.1-5.8.11:
The juridicial procedure of the Sangha.
Discussion about some methods of
conducting trials and settling legal
disputes.
5.9.1-5.9.6: The democratic
foundation of the Sangha. The conception
of a welfare state. 5.10.1-5.10.2.
Final observations.
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
222-224
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
225-227
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
228-258
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
259-271
1
CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1.1.
It has been observed that most social and
political ideas properly began with the Greeks, more
importantly, from the days of Plato and Aristotle, and that
all succeeding social and political thought is a footnote
and a commentary on Greek thought 1
But there is also
definite and significant thought on social and political
ideas in the Indian context 2 .
1.1.2.
.5'
*<•
The foundation of social and political ideas of
the Indian tradition were first laid in the oldest
literature of the Vedic period (the Vedic Samhitas and the
Brahmanas) .
These ideas were later developed through
varied channels such as the literature of Brahmanical law-
.
books (Smrtis), Epics and Puranas, Kautilya's Arthasastra,
------
.
unorthodox canonical works of the Buddhists and Jainas, the
classical Sanskrit and Tamil literature and the literature
of historical records of the later periods
1.1.3.
3
The present work forms a study of the social and
political ideas contained in the large body of early
Buddhist literature, especially that composed in the Pali
language.
1.2.1.
In a very real sense, early Buddhism is in part
a product of social change in ancient Indian society, and
this change is indirectly reflected in its early literature.
It reflects the rise to importance in the social order of
/
2
classes connected with the production and exchange of goods,
whose members seem to have been some of the most enthusiastic
supporters of the new religion
1.2.2.
4
If we agree that early Buddhism was in part a
product of social change in ancient India, it is also clear
that it responded to the needs of the people at a time when
material culture was expanding rapidly.
Its appeal to the
laity was founded partly on the notion of social concern,
which encouraged frugality and what in modern economic terms
would be called reinvestment, arid partly on the notion of
the perfectibility of the individual 5 .
1.3.1.
Though such was the case, according to all our
evidence, dissentient opinions, to the effect that early
Buddhism is incompatible with social, political and legal
ideas are often to be found in the writings of earlier
scholars of Buddhism.
The reasons for this are many.
For
one thing, it has been commonly assumed hitherto that early
Buddhism was almost entirely concerned with individual
ethics.
Thus, various scholars have maintained that the
spiritual uplift of the individual was the chief aim of
early Buddhism.
Furthermore, they maintained that there is
in early Buddhism no place for a genuine social and political
theory, because of i·ts doctrine concerning the ultimate end
of human striving, for which is prescribed a course of action
designed to lead to the Summum bonum of dukhanirodha or
Nibbana (Sabbadhammanam uttamatthena varam) .
3
1.3.2.
Many views have been expressed to the effect
that with such a doctrine early Buddhism was not concerned
with social and political problems.
In some earlier studies
by the Western scholars one may find the view expressed that
Buddhism is so lofty and sublime a system that it cannot be
practised by ordinary men, because its teaching is directed
towards detachment from the worldly affairs, that is, that
it is super-mundane (lokottara)
1.3.3.
6
.
Along with this, there is an impression created
in the Western mind that Buddhism is a mere system of selfdiscipline for monks with no significant message for the
ordinary man except that he also should renounce the world,
take a yellow robe, and try to attain nibbana.
This
impression may be summed up in the following statements:
"It is in fact surprising that such"a
body of doctrine as the Buddhist, with
its profoundly other-worldly and even
anti-social emphasis ... can have become
even as 'popular' as it is in the modern
7
environment" ,
"one of the features
of the study of Buddhism most frustrating
to the Western mind is the effort
necessary to discover a social philosophy
within it.
The question suggests itself:
Is there any?"
8
The same author
proceeds to suggest the answer:
"To
tell the truth the Buddha had little,
either of concern for society
4
as such or of firm conviction of its
possible improvability" 9 ,
"Buddhism
generally stands aloof from the affairs
of the world"
1.3.4.
10
•
There are others who believe that Buddhist
teaching is non-political in nature and is a "non-political
and anti-political" religion.
Among them, Max Weber writes:
"Buddhism is a specifically unpolitical
and anti-political status religion,
more precisely, a religious 'technology'
of wandering and of intellectually
schooled mendicant monks ... and it is
a 'salvation' religion" 11
1.3.5.
Sangarakshita, a Mahayana Buddhist monk,
following the same line, writes:
"As a teaching aiming at the experience of
Enlightenment, Buddhism has no direct
concern with the collective life of man
on the social and political level.
It
does not tell its followers how many
wives they may have or what form of
government they should support.
At the
same time, as the existence of the
monastic order indicates, external
conditions are not altogether irrelevant
to the development of the wholesome
mental attitudes on which the experience
5
of enlightenment depends.
A minimum of
social and political teaching is, therefore, scattered here and there through
the Tripitaka.
That, notwithstanding
the example of Asoka, they were never
taken up and systematically developed
in India is perhaps due to the
predominantly philosophical and otherworldly tendency of the Indian Buddhist
. d"l2 .
m~n
1.3.6.
With regard to Buddhist legal ideas, another
scholar writes:
"In the strict sense of the word, there
is no Buddhist law;
there is an
influence exercised by Buddhist ethics
or changes that have taken place in
custom.
No Buddhist authority, whether
local or central, whether lay or clerical,
has ever created or promulgated any law.
Such law as has been administered in
countries ruled over by monarchs nominally
Buddhist has been custom rather than law,
and the custom has been in the main preBuddhistic, fixed and established before
the people became Buddhist"
1.4.1.
13
.
Among other scholars, including some contemporary
ones, there is an attempt to review the teaching of the
6
Buddha or early Buddhism in the light of the Vedic
(Brahmanic and Upanisadic) system.
They maintain that the
Buddha restated what was already current among the brahmi.ns
and based his system on the teaching of the Upanisads.
Thus
Radhakrishnan writes:
"The Buddha did not feel that he was
announcing a new religion.
He was born,
grew up, and died a Hindu.
He was
restating with a new emphasis the ancient
ideals of Indo-Aryan civilization"
1.4.2.
14
.
Similarly, Coomaraswamy writes:
"The more superficially one studies
Buddhism, the more it seems to differ
from the Brahmanism in which it
originated, the more profound our study,
the more difficult it becomes to
distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism;
or to say in what respects, if any,
Buddhism is really unorthodox"
1.4.3.
15
.
Rhys Davids is of the same opinion:
"Gautama was born and brought up and lived
.,16
and died a Hindu
"Such originality
as Gautama possessed lay in the way in
which he adopted, enlarged, ennobled, and
systematized that which had already been
well said by others"
17
.
"Buddhism grew
and flourished within the field of
orthodox belief"
18
.
7
1.4.4.
According to this common view, some scholars
think that, though early Buddhist literature may contain
some social and political ideas, these are not original,
but borrowed from Vedic thought or the general political
ideas of times
19
.
For example, Ghoshal writes:
"The Buddhist canonists deal incidentally
with a few chosen topics of the state,
but they share with the authors of the
Dharmasutras and the Arthasas·tra the
credit of being the makers of Hindu
political theory
1.5 .1.
20
Much has been written about ancient Indian
social and political ideas and their development may be
traced fairly clearly, but most authors, both Hindu and
Western, tend to ignore to a great extent early Buddhist
teachings in the context of Indian social and political
thought.
However, a few writers have been impressed by
early Buddhist political thought, for instance, Ghoshal,
who writes:
"The most important contribution of the
early Buddhist canonists to the store of
our ancient political thought consists in
their 'total' application of the principle
of righteousness to the branches of the
king' s internal and foreign administration"
1.5.2.
21
However, even by such writers as Ghoshal, early
Buddhist social and political ideas are treated very
8
cursorily in lengthy books which are replete with reference
to Kautilya's Arthasastra and the twelfth book of the
Mahabharata;
they tend to think of Kautilya's Arthasastra
as a treatise on political science free from religious
ideology, though this is a matter for debate.
We cannot
discuss this problem in detail since it does not directly
concern us.
1.6.1.
The early Buddhists' teachings on ethico-
•
religious matters and metaphysical problems are fairly well-
known, but their teachings on social and political matters
are little known to the West, largely because of the
negative views mentioned above.
More positive views,
however, of the social and political ideas of early Buddhism
are not lacking, though they are rare.
1.6.2.
Jayatilleke has examined the early Buddhist
principles of law, including international law, and has
presented arguments against the view that there are no
Buddhist social, political and legal ideas, and presented a
brief account of them based on material in early Buddhist
texts and in earlier studies on the subject
22
.
Unfortunately,
he died before he was able to make a detailed study of these
topics.
1.6.3.
He has shown that the early Buddhists had views
about the duties of the state, the rights of the people and
of individuals, the principles on which civil and criminal
law should be founded, the just social order, inter-state
relations and world government.
9
1.6.4.
One of his concluding remarks was that early
Buddhism for the most part respected utilitarian and
pragmatic principles.
In his own words:
"There emerged with Buddhism the concept
of a common good, embracing the whole
world and conceived as both material and
spiritual welfare.
Going along with this
idea there was the concept of common
humanity transcending national and racial
barriers
The social contract theory
of the origin of society, the state and
law made it obligatory for the state to
serve the best interests of the people
and of mankind.
Sovereignty was vested
in the people and was limited by the
requirement of righteousness or dhamma.
The conception of the welfare state was
conceived for the first time"
1.6.5.
23
.
Apart from Jayatilleke's very valuable study, we
can find only a few monographs on such topics as the
jurisprudence and internal polity of the Buddhist Order
as well as one or two chapters in lengthy textbooks
few articles and pamphlets
26
25
24
,
, and a
Two recent studies in the
form of doctoral theses of Lancaster University should also
be mentioned
27
.
These works do not advance our knowledge
and understanding greatly beyond what is already known.
There are still various gaps in our knowledge in this field.
Therefore, in this thesis, an attempt is made to complete
10
the task which Jayatilleke could not finish in detail.
1.7.1.
In considering the purpose of this thesis, it
must not be forgotten that the main features of early
Buddhism are ethico-religious in character and this limits
the range of early Buddhist teachings on other aspects of
life.
In fact, varying ethico-religious systems produce
varying patterns of social and political thought and, despite
the "ultimate end" which is prescribed by early Buddhism,
there is no logical reason why it should not have had a
genuine social and political system.
1.7.2.
Basham, following the same line as those scholars
who maintain that early Buddhism has no social and political
doctrines, says:
"It is at first sight surprising that this
other-worldly movement, with its rather
pessimistic attitude towards life, and its
emphasis on detachment and the renunciation
of most of the material pleasures of life,
should have made an appeal to the mercantile
class at a time when trade was expanding
rapidly"
28
However, he points out that there are other cases of
merchants adhering in large numbers to new religious
movements of a rather pessimistic kind, which tend to
promote frugality, and gives examples such as early
. t.lanlty,
.
. .
c h rls
Is 1 am an d Ca 1 vlnlsm
same opinion:
29
.
Reynolds is of the
11
"Religions at various levels of human history
have expressed a concern both for the
attainment of personal salvation and for
the establishment and maintenance of proper
order in the world" 30 .
1.7.3.
In the light of these interpretations, we wish
to emphasise the fact that, apart from the main determinants
of early Buddhism, a number of questions relating to social,
political and legal ideas are dealt with in early Buddhist
literature and have affected social and political life in
lands influenced by Buddhism.
These ideas may be gleaned
from various texts of the Pali canon, and from other early
Buddhist literature, and show parallels with those of the
West and of other Asian systems 31
1.7.4.
Interest has been more closely focussed on the
study of Buddhist social and political ideas since the
Buddhist nations of Asia regained their political independence after the Second World War.
In the long history of
those nations, Buddhism has had an increasing effect upon
their entire social and political life, and since they
achieved political independence it has resumed its previous
role in shaping their social and political ideas, now also
influenced very strongly by the thought of the West.
1.7.5.
It is necessary to mention Gard's observation
in this point.
He says:
"Since its inception in the sixth century
B.C., Buddhism has exerted profound and
12
varied influences upon Asian political
thought and institutions.
For example:
in India, for centuries until its decline,
Buddhism preserved principles of
republican government and legislative
procedure, public welfare and national
security, conventional law, and elective
kingship of headship.
In Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia,
Buddhism has generally avoided direct
interference in politics but at the same
time has been a pacifying and civilizing
factor in the administration of political
authority.
In Tibet, Buddhism became the
state in both theory and administration
(sic).
In China, Buddhist monasticism
alternately accepted and rejected political
jurisprudence.
In Japan, Buddhism
characteristically sanctioned and
administered state authoritarianism or
opposed it by becoming a rival political
and economic power" 32
1.7.6.
Much has already been written on the role played
by Buddhism in the contemporary social and political
development of the Buddhist nations of Asia.
But, while
there is an abundance of literature dealing with modern
Buddhist social and political ideas, there are only a few
studies on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism
13
(~.supra.l.6.2-
1.8.1.
1.6.6).
The aim of this thesis, however, is not to
produce an exhaustive treatment of the whole theme, but to
examine some of the socio-political foundations of the Indian
Buddhist tradition.
Our inquiry is basically conceptual and
therefore should be considered as falling within the scope
of the history of ideas rather than of events and systems.
A sense of history is a useful possession for a philosopher,
but a study of what people in previous generations, more
particularly about two thousand five hundred years ago in a
different social and political climate from the contemporary
world, actually intended by certain expressions does not
itself constitute a philosophical examination.
we do not
intend to establish a form of "Buddhist Modernism", since
there are a number of studies on modern Buddhist social and
political ideas.
Our interest is only in the history of
views and therefore the present work is intended to throw
light on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism.
1.8.2.
Our findings about early Buddhist social and
political ideas are primarily based on the source material
afforded by the Pali canon.
This is studied historically
and philosophically in the light of earlier and later
literary source material and the findings of other scholars.
1.8.3.
It has been observed by many scholars that the
Pali canon provides many descriptions and a variety of ideas
on the subject.
words:
Gard, for example, writes in the following
14
"The Mahavagga and Cullavagga are first
class documents of institutional literature
in the field of public life and social
polity.
Political science can derive much
data from these Vinaya texts both from the
viewpoint of institutions as well as from
that of theories.
The theories of the
Sakyan monks in regard to the problem of
authority, justice, liberty, individual,
democracy and so forth may be gleaned by
a careful student of political philosophy
out of many passages in this literature" 33 .
1.8.4.
We also consider many passages of importance to
be found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, though these in
most cases represent a later stage of Buddhist thought, not
so close to the idea of the Founder as the doctrines of the
Pali canon.
There are many Buddhist Mahayanist scholars who
argue against the above proposition because so much of the
Pali canon was obviously composed several generations after
the Buddha.
This is not the place to trace the arguments
by which such scholars have become convinced that Mahayana
more closely reflects the doctrine of the Founder of
Buddhism than Theravada, but it should be noted that the
different treatment of the career of the Buddha by the two
schools illustrates in a preliminary way the close relations
and the differences between them.
We may refer here to the
opinions of Basham and Thouless, who say:
"The Theravada school more closely reflects
15
the doctrine of the Founder of Buddhism
than does any other sect, and ... the
Theravada canon contains more authentic
reminiscences of the historical Buddha and
his times than do the Buddhist Sanskrit
sources" 34 ,
"It seems more likely that
Hinay~na was Buddhism as originally taught
and the Mahayana was a product of
.
.
,35
development and conventionallsatlon
l. 8. 5
However this may be, according to our prime
interest it is not essential that the movement as a whole be
brought into focus.
And yet, since many modern scholars
believe that little or nothing can be confidently ascribed
to the Buddha himself, ou·r interest does not lie so much in
terms of what the Buddha himself taught, but of what early
Buddhists taught.
l. 8. 6
Vedic and Sanskrit literature is used to throw
light on the historical background and for comparative
purposes.
l. 9.1
The question of political authority and
obligation has always been a fundamental problem of political
philosophy.
The second chapter of the present work will
discuss the nature, grounds and justification of political
authority and obligation as criticized and accepted by the
Buddhism of the Pali canon.
The social and political ideas
16
of early Buddhism are closely tied up with dhamma or the law
of righteousness.
observe
(~.supra.
We have seen, as Ghoshal and Jayatilleke
1.5.1 and 1.6.4), the importance of dhamma
in its socio-political context.
A detailed study of the
concept of dhamma will be made in chapter three, covering
its social, political and legal senses.
In the fourth
chapter, "Attitude to Equality", an attempt is made to give
the early Buddhists' views on such topical issues as racism,
human rights and freedom.
The fifth chapter, "Attitude to
Law " makes, on the one hand, a study of the Buddhist
monastic laws, and on the other, gives a picture of the
organization of the Sangha and its internal polity.
l . 9. 2
Those who still maintain that early Buddhism is
incompatible with social, political and legal ideas may find
this work a challenge to their opinions.
The social and
political ideas of early Buddhism are becoming an increasingly fruitful field for research, and this is reflected in
the material used in this work.
We hope that our work may
also be of interest to scholars of ancient and mediaeval
Western thought, because they may find in this study some
developments parallel to those in their own fields, as well
as differing ones.
We also hope that our work may rectify
some misconceptions about Buddhism, particularly in the area
of its social and political ideas.
17
CHAP'l'ER TWO
POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION
2.1.1.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate
the views of early Buddhism on the nature, grounds and
justification of political obligation and authority
(~.supra.l.9.1), as they appear in the Pali canon and the
non-canonical literature of early Buddhism.
We shall also
be concerned with what thinkers of the pre-Buddhistic era,
particularly those of the Vedic and later Vedic (Brahmanic
and
Upani~adic)
period, and post-Vedic thinkers, assumed or
accepted in regard to political obligation and authority, in
order to obtain a clearer perspective on early Buddhist
ideas.
This will be followed by a consideration of passages
in which political obligation and authority are discussed in
the Vedic and Buddhist texts.
2.2.1.
Ideas of political obligation and authority,
since men attained a certain maturity in the formulation of
a variety of expressions of them, can of course be classified
in many ways and looked at from a number of points of view.
If we confine ourselves to the Indian tradition, we can find
a number of ideas of political obligation and authority which
were accepted as valid by Indian thinkers.
2.2.2.
These ideas have been classified in many ways
and looked at under different names by modern scholars
writing on Indian social and political ideas.
For example,
some scholars, like Basham and Ghoshal, have mentioned three
18
different views.
According to Basham, they are:
Buddhist theory of social contract,
tii) theory of quasi-
divinity and (iii) theory of divine right 1 .
division is different.
right theory,
(i) the
He distinguishes:
Ghoshal's
(i) the divine
(ii) the ethico-religious theory and (iii) the
2
quasi-contractual theory .
According to him the Buddhist
social contract comes under the last head.
An account and
discussion of Ghoshal's interpretation will follow in
sections 2,.8.3 - 2.8.4.
There are also other classifications
of the Vedic and Buddhist ideas by many scholars 3 .
2.2.3.
From a careful study of different ideas on the
problem, however, it is possible to classify them into two
groups which may be called the theological theory and the
theory of social contract.
2.2.4.
The theological theory was accepted by Vedic and
post-Vedic thinkers of the orthodox schools.
In contrast,
the theory of social contract was accepted by early Buddhist
thinkers.
2.2.5.
It is necessary to point out two things.
First,
the word "theory" is used here in a rather loose sense:
the
ideas referred to are mostly put forward in a dogmatic manner
and are usually not supported by rational argument.
Secondly,
the application of the phrase "theological", rather than
"divine" in the present context is appropriate, because the
Indian doctrine is somewhat different from the Western idea
of "divine
right"~A
19
2.3.1.
Before embarking upon the theory of social
contract of early Buddhism, let us examine the theological
theory, which was widely accepted by orthodox thinkers.
we
can distinguish four different versions of this.
2.3.2.
The first version of the theological theory is
the monistic view.
It holds that the authority of the ruler
is derived from the sacrifice of the cosmic person, and the
subjects are obliged to obey the ruler because he promotes
their salvation in accordance with the omnipotent cosmic or
divine will of the cosmic person.
3B
More particularly, this
view is implied by the divine creation of the social order
in four classes with distinctive functions.
2.3.3.
According to the earliest account of this view,
the Primeval Person (PurusaJ , the highest God, who existed
before the foundation of the universe, was sacrificed by the
gods, who apparently were his sons.
From the body of the
divine victim the universe was produced.
The "Hymn of the
Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda, in which this first cosmic
•
sacrifice is described, tells how the four classes were
created by the divine victim when he was sacrificed by the
gods.
It says:
"When the gods divided Purusa, into how many
portions did they div1de him?
What was his
mouth, what were his arms, what were his
thighs and his feet called?
The Brahmana
was his mouth, of both his arms was the
Rajanya made, his thighs became the Vaisya,
,_
of his feet the Sudra was produced"
4
20
2.3.4.
This Vedic dogma of divine creation of society
in four classes were accepted as valid by later thinkers of
the orthodox schools and it was developed with slight changes
in many texts of the later period
5
In all, the ideas that
were accepted can be summarised as follows.
Society is a
divine institution, owing its origin not to human, but to
divine agency.
Each class had its own set of duties and
obligations (sva-dharma) exactly prescribed by the Creator.
The seconcr class (rajanya) was the ruling one.
The ruling
or warrior class was inferior to the Brahmana, but was
superior to the Vaisya and the Sudra.
commanded it to protect the people 6 .
The Cosmic Person
The protection of the
people is the divine purpose of the creation of the ruler,
7
because his authority is based on divine ordination .
2.3.5.
More importantly, from the tradition of the
cosmic sacrifice, a new attitude to the sacrifice developed,
leading to new and complex rituals such as the king's
inauguration sacrifice (rajasuya) , the horse sacrifice
(asvamedha)
the drink of strength sacrifice (vajapeya) , and
a number of other elaborate sacrifices and rituals.
These
rites had become a supernatural mystery and had many
8
bearings upon the authority of the ruler .
With the
development of the sacrificial cult the position of the
priestly class (Brahmanas) was consolidated and their social
status rose far above those of the other classes.
They were
considered to be gods in human form, and even rulers were
expected to place themselves at their service.
They were
looked on as supreme social servants because they imagined
21
that they derived their power from the cosmic sacrifice.
We
shall discuss the significance of these ceremonies and the
supreme role played by the priestly class elsewhere in this
chapter
2. 3. 6
(~.infra.
2.5.4 - 2.5.5) and in chapter four.
The implication of the monistic view and its
later elaborations is that the derivation of the authority
of the ruler is ascribed to a personal divine being, but
there seems to be contradictory views in many passages as
to who is that personal divine being.
During the Rg-Vedic
period, Varuna or Indra were generally credited with the
9
.
.
task o f creatLng the unLverse
By the period of the
Brahmanas and Upanisads, however, Prajapati "the Lord of
Beings", is thought of as a Primeval Person from whom the
universe was produced
10
.
This god was often identified with
Brahma, the masculine form of the neuter Brahman (Prajapatyo
- 11
- - 12
Brahma
, Prajapatyo
vai Brahma
).
In the Brahmanas
and
in the Upanisads, Brahma is represented as the creator as
well as the first teacher of the Vedas, who in the beginning
of the world was identified by himself "I am Brahma"
13
(v.infra. 2.10.4).
2.3.7.
In whatever way the monistic views were
developed, they involved a strong belief that the authority of
the ruler was derived from an omnipotent, omniscient Personal
Being.
The implication is that the subjects ought to obey the
laws of the state because they represent the creator's law.
2.4.1.
A second version of the theological theory,
that of divine invention, also appears in many forms and
22
aspects
14
, one of which is found in the Mahabharata.
It
tells that in the original state of nature everything was
perfect, and men lived together in peace and happiness,
having all things in common.
Then, at a certa1n stage of
the decline of the golden age, men began to commit violence
against each other.
When this happened everything which was
good and righteous was lost;
the Vedas were forgotten, the
religious rituals were no longer performed, unrighteousness
prevailed ..
Everything became sinful.
The gods, rather than
men, were overcome with fear, and the gods, not the men,
approached Brahma, the highest God, and asked for help to
put things right.
on polity.
Brahma composed the archetypal treatise
After this was composed, the gods went to Visnu,
the ruler of heaven, and asked him to ordain a king.
Visnu
created the first king out of his own mind, a miraculous
and supernatural being, to rule over men, and to ensure that
they fulfil their religious duties
2.4.2.
15
.
Passages such as this, wh1ch can be paralleled
by many other extracts, adapt the idea of divine creation of
the ruler so as to invest him with divine attributes or even
with divinity itself.
in other passages
What is emphasized in this legend and
fou~d in the Vedic Samhitas and Brahmanas
is that the authority of the ruler was not a matter of human
will, nor was obligation to obey him of human choosing.
The
ruler is entirely a divine creation and is endowed by the
Highest God, and thus his will is finally binding upon men.
The authority of the ruler,according to the story,is essentially
an emanation of,and a delegation by,divine authority,and there is
no obligation on the part of the ruler towards his subjects,
except to coerce them into maintaining religious norms.
23
.~
"--
,,
,
. . e.-.-
,!;~
'c-,1;-
'-'!"':'~A
<.:~~-"" ~-
All his rights are divine, his obligation
must ultimately be to the Highest God, and the ruler is the
servant of God, rather than the servant of men.
Furthermore,
this story seemec to embody the most extreme form of royal
divinity and shows a certain priestly sophistication not
found in the other stories of the origin of rulership.
2.5.1.
The third version of the theological theory is
the magico-religious view, which has in one form or another
played an important role in the history of Hindu political
ideas.
It expresses the idea that the authority and
obligation of the ruler is derived from the Most High and it
is based on the mutual relationship between the spiritual
authority and the temporal power.
Two of the best-known
expressions of this view are to be found in the early Vedic
literature.
They are:
(i) the authority and obligation of
the ruler is primarily based on the cosmic sacrifice and
secondarily on his connection with the royal and imperial
sacrifice
(~.supra.
2.3.5), and (ii) the authority and
obligation of the ruler is based on his personal unity and
identification with the gods
(~.infra.
2.7.2).
The same
tendency is found in the Brahmanas, which are text-books
intended to guide the priests, and it is in the Brahmanas
that we find developed ideas of what became for orthodoxy
the supreme source of power - the spiritual authority
(v.infra. 2.5.4).
As we shall see more precisely later, the
Brahmanas developed the idea of the two powers in order to
gain supremacy over the ruling class.
24
2.5.2.
The supremacy of the Brahmanas over the ruling
class is expressed in many passages of the Brahmana texts
16
.
At the same time, we can find some other passages which
in fact the Brahma~as were often
point to the conclusion that
17
treated as inferiors by the ruling class.
Ghoshal's statement on
this issue is quite correct, where he says that the mutual
relations of the two powers and the superiority of the
Brahmanas over the ruling class are expressed in diverse and
even
contr~dictory terms 18 .
Even with such references, the
magico-religious view has occupied the greatest attention of
the Brahmanic thinkers through the ages, and they maintained
that the priest had a claim to be the dominant class over the
ruling class for a number of reasons
2.5.3.
(~.supra.
2.3.5).
The most illuminating expression of the magico-
religious view with regard to polltical obligation and
authority is to be found in the words of the marriage ritual:
"I am That, thou art This, I am Sky, thou art Earth"
19
This
expression was taken out of its context in Brahmanic sources
and used to justify the claims of the Brahmanas to supremacy.
It is interesting to note coomaraswamy's interpretation of
this expression.
He says that ''the whole of Indian political
theory is implied and subsumed in the words of the marriage
formula:
I am that .....
20
.
In his statement, the words
"the whole of Indian political theory" lmply that this was
the case also with early Buddhism.
not believe or teach any such idea.
But early Buddhism did
The Buddha was always
critical of the supremacy of the Brahrnanas (see Ch. 4).
Therefore, in relation to early Buddhism or other heterodox
25
schools Coomaraswamy's observation is hardly justified.
2.5.4.
However, the important fact of the above
expression, which we should note is this.
It is said that
the ruler has to play the "feminine" role in the "marriage"
of the spiritual authority (brahma) and the temporal power
.
(ksatra).
In short, what it . tries to justify is the
dominating influence of the Brahmana priesthood over the
ruling class.
For even in the earlier Vedic texts
references are to be found indicating the predominance of
the priestly class over the ruling class
(~.supra.
2.3.5).
Throughout the Vedic literature it is evident that the
authority of the ruler is theoretically dependent upon the
spiritual authority which has been given to the Brahmana
priest, the Purohita.
Simultaneously with these ideas the
priests, while gaining supremacy in social and religious
matters, formulated more elaborate rituals and sacrificial
ceremonies.
These rituals and sacrifices rose to
preeminence and came to be regarded as the only means of
20A
attaining desired objects and ends. Martin Haug sums up the
theory of sacrifice promulgated in the Brahmanas thus:
"The sacrifice is regarded as the means for
obtaining power over this and the other
world, over visible as well as invisible,
.
.
.
anlmate
as we 11 as lnanlmate
creatures ,21 .
2.5.5.
As the sacrifice rose in importance, the power
of sacrifice became one of the cardinal doctrines of
Brahmanism.
All were said to be subject to the influence of
26
the .sacrifice.
Even the ruler is subject to it, and the
Brahmanas, who claimed to be able to understand and correctly
perform the sacrifices, emphasize the fact that the authority
of the ruler was based upon these sacrifices.
Ghoshal sums
up the bearing of these ceremonies upon tne authority of the
ruler as follows:
"The king derives his authority, including
his immunity from punishment, from the
sacrifice.
Further, he acquires his
divinity (to the point of identity with
the highest deity of the pantheon) by
virtue of his participation in the same
ceremony"
2.5.6.
22
As already pointed out, temporal authority is
guaranteed through the personal relationship in which it
gives preeminence over itself to spiritual authority
incarnated in the )?urohita.
This relationship between
temporal power and spiritual authority, even at the time of
the Rg-Veda, is explicit in the words of Agni (representing
the Purohita) addressed to Indra (representing the ruler);
"I go in person before you, 0 Indra ... and if you give me
23
.
my share, then through me you shall perform heroic deeds"
The implications of the etymology of the word purohita
(derived from purah "in front" and dha "to place" -
---.
"one put
in front", "one who takes precedence") are clear in the above
expression.
It is said that without the guidance of a
spiritual adviser the ruler cannot rule
guidance he rules by divine right.
24
.
With such
The Purohita represents
27
the divine authority originated from the highest sources,
namely the eternal Vedas, which were regarded as divine
revelation.
The Vedas contain a body of rules which is
binding upon the ruler in all his actions, and the
Pur~hita,
who is the custodian of the eternal Vedas, finds religious
reasons for obedience to the divine will, rather than to the
human will, and these reasons are valid for both the ruler
25
and his subjects . As we shall see later in this chapter
(v.infra. ·2.10.10 - 2.10.18), early Buddhism criticised and
rejected the authority of the Vedas and the power of
sacrifice.
2.6.1.
The final version of the theological theory is
the idea of an agreement between the ruler and his subjects,
with divine approval.
The stories of this agreement are
repeated in many texts, but they differ in detail
26
and can
be interpreted as indicative of ideas of both divine
selection and contractual agreement.
The most significant
passages illustrating the idea of an agreement are to be
found in the Aitareya Brahmana and in the Mah~harata.
2.6.2.
The former tells how the gods and the demons
(asuras)
were in battle, and the gods were suffering badly
at the hands of their enemies.
said:
The gods met together and
"through our lack of a king our enemies conquer us.
Let us make a king".
They consented and appointed Soma as
their king, with whom the gods reconquered all that they had
1 os t
27
.
7
-hmana, whlch
.
. t.1r1ya
Th e Talt
Bra
repeats th.lS s t ory
in a significantly altered form, says that the ruler was
28
appointed by the Highest God.
It says that Prajapati
created gods and demons, and when the gods were suffering
badly at the hands of their enemies, they did not select a
ruler, but sacrificed to the high God Prajapati, who sent
his son Indra to become their king, under whose leadership
the gods overcame the demons 28 .
2.6.3
In many versions of this legend, Indra was
identified as the ruler of the gods
29
.
Historically
considered, Indra was the most prominent divinity in the
Rg-Veda and in the Brahmanas and it seems that Soma,in the
.
.
Aitareya Brahmana's version of the legend, was an early
29A
priestly emendation of Indra.
It should also be noted that
.
.
in the Brahmanas, Varuna is also identified as the ruler of
the gods.
He was appointed by the Highest God
30
.
It seems
that at different periods and in different circles Varuna,
Indra and Soma were looked on as the supreme ruler of
heaven.
2.6.4.
The stories of the divine selection of a ruler
suggest that rulership originated through the external
insecurity of the gods and military necessity.
The ruler
appointed by the will and consent of the gods was a war
leader, and his first duty was to lead his subjects in
battle.
The Aitareya Brahmana further says in connection
with the great coronation ceremony of Indra that the ruler
was appointed by the gods on the grounds of his superior
merits.
He was the most powerful and the strongest among
the gods, who could lead in battle and establish external
29
security
31
All these references show that the above factors
furnished the occasion for the popular selection of the
ruler.
Moreover, the stories of this repeatedly emphasize
the vital role played by the Highest God, Prajapati.
2.6.5.
Another story reflecting the idea of a contract
between the ruler and his subjects is found in the
Mahabharata.
It tells how at one stage chaos was rife in
society and there was a great fear of anarchy because of the
passionate and covetous nature of men.
the idea of matsyanyaya
32
eating up the little fish.
This conforms with
- the analogy of the big fish
As in this analogy, society at
that stage was lacking in values and rules, and it was like
a "devil's workshop".
Without laws and a king to rule
(arajaka) , matsyanyaya operated, and the strong dominated
and ruthlessly exploited the weak.
When people were over-
powered by anarchy, they met together and made an agreement
to keep the peace and to expel evildoers.
Through the evil
passions of men, however, the agreement was not kept and
conditions became worse than before.
Then mankind in a body
went to Brahma, the Highest God, and asked for help.
ordained Manu, son of the sun, as the first king.
Brahma
Manu first
refused to become king because he assumed that men are by
nature deceitful and cruel and he would himself incur sin by
administering punishment.
The people, however, persuaded
him to be king by promising to give him shares of their crops,
a fiftieth part of their animals and precious metals, and
the most beautiful of their maidens, to fulfil religious
rituals and the like.
Manu then accepted their fixed
30
promises and confirmed that he would maintain the security
and the welfare of the people
2.6.6.
33
From the above, it is clear that these
contractual ideas, while agreeing on the fundamental
principle of the divine origin of kingship, differ only in
appointed
one aspect.
The ruler here is a divinely apointed figure,
but is appointed by the will of the people and at their
request in order to put an end to a state of anarchy and
•
degeneration, and the people are obliged to obey the ruler
because they have promised to do so.
2.7.1.
These are the four different forms of the
theological theory widely believed by the orthodox schools.
The four versions, while agreeing fundamentally upon the
divine creation and endowment of kingship, differ greatly in
details.
All versions of the theological theory sought to
explain the authority of the ruler and the limits of that
authority, the obedience of his subjects towards him and
his obligation towards his subjects by reference to the
highest authority, which is attained by virtue of the ruler's
connection with the Highest Deity.
2.7.2.
Since the derivation of the ruler's authority is
from the Most High, all Brahmanical legal literature takes
this kind of attitude with varying intensity.
For example,
at one place it is said:
''The ruler (rajanya)
is the visible
representative of Prajapati, hence while
being one he rules over many•
34
31
Elsewhere we read:
"The ruler is a great deity (mahati-devata)
in human form;
imposed from the Most High
without any intervention on the part of
mankind themselves" 35 .
The masses on the whole, therefore, were led to believe in
the divinity of the ruler 36 .
2.8.1.
It is clear that there is here no consistent or
single principle of the nature and grounds of political
obligation and authority, because the four versions of the
theological theory, which we have discussed above)are
mutually contradictory, and if one is true the other three
m~st
be false.
They are not products of rational or
empirical reasoning, but they are mere beliefs, and were
never backed by logical arguments.
Moreover, none of the
four versions provides a genuine notion of a social contract,
although occasionally some reference is made to agreements
between subjects and rulers.
The election of Soma or Indra
in the Brahmana legend involves no explicit mutual
relationship which could be called a contract, but merely
the popular choice of the ruler.
In the secomMahabharata
story <:::.supra. 2.6.5) the first king isappointed:by the
High God, and not by men, as the divine means of meeting
human need.
The subjects agree to pay taxes to the king in
return for his services, but this does not amount to a social
contract, because the king's position does not depend on the
contract, but OJl divine appointment.
32
2.8.2.
Before we leave this topic, it is necessary to
note a few comments of earlier writers on Hindu ideas of the
origin of kingship.
This would enable us to see how early
Buddhist ideas differ from those of early Hinduism.
'}
(1
•
,:_ 11! '-'
"''
"V~.J
,_, s -c
.,
;.~'
c
st:
~
s
(•\
0
r; ::::.::1
,s L:_~_:_L}C'
_.\_ ¢
0\T~l \JOJ~(S~
"At this point the paths of the Brahmanas
and the Buddhist thinkers diverge completely.
For the former, instead of tracing like the
latter the subsequent creation of kingship
to a governmental compact between the people
and a select individual in their midst,
derive it from the will of the creator"
~h~hd
~
~
37
-
.
-
further points out that, according to the first Mahabharata
story, the original ruler, who was not yet a king, derived
his title to rule from the gods.
His creation was due to
the initiative of the gods themselves, undertaken rather in
their own interests than in the interests of the afflicted
people.
He was created by the will of God the Preserver,
supplementing the creation of the science of polity by God
the Creator.
Preserver
38
.
He was moreover a mind-begotten son of the
Elsewhere, Ghoshal suggests that the ideas of
the king's origin in the Mahabharata and Manusaffihita exhibit
a complex blending of ideas formulated deliberately with the
object of counteracting the individualistic and antimonarchical tendencies of the Buddhist theory of contract
39
.
33
Moreover, he does not agree with some scholars, like Altekar
and Sengupta, who hold that the idea of the king's divinity
or divine personality was unknown in the Vedic period
40
Apart from a few exceptional passages, the idea of king's
divinity is a well-established fact in the Vedic texts.
2.8.4.
While we agree with Ghoshal's criticism of the
Vedic ideas of kingship, we do not agree with some of his
remarks on the early Buddhist idea of its ori0in.
For
example he says:
"The early Buddhist theory ,
contract
tended to strengthen a not on of social
contract which was familiar to Hindu
political theory, namely, that the king
was an official paid by his subjects for
the service of protection"
41
It is true that, according to the Buddhist tradition, the
first king Mahasammata was an official paid by his subjects,
but his position was not created in the same manner as that
of the first king according to Hindu tradition
2.11.11).
(~.infra
In his examination of kingship in ancient India,
Dumont points out that the Buddhist idea of the origin of
kingship has an entirely different character and based on a
contract binding on all future subjects and future kings,
but in the corresponding Hindu versions the divine or quasidivine quality of the king was not excluded
2.8.5.
42
.
Some Hindu scholars firmly believe that the
contractual ideas of the orthodox schools
(~.supra.
2.6.1 -
2.6.6) can be classified under a social contract theory.
As
34
we observed earlier, the legend of Manu differs considerably
from a tacit or implied contract because it involves divine
intervention, and also implies that the kings were treated
as gods so long as they obeyed the Creator's law.
Spellman
is much more specific at this point, when he deals with the
contractual ideas of the Hindus.
In his own words:
"What elements of the contractual theory do
we find in this story (the legend of Manu
in the Mahabharata)?
There appears to be
a type of anarchy in which men are living
and they are not satisfied with this.
Apparently they possess the power to
contract.
There is an offer to Manu by
the people and although we are not told
expressly that he accepts it, his actions
pursuant to the offer imply that he does.
But would Manu have had the power to act
independently of this offer?
Did he
derive his power from the people?
did they surrender to him?
What
In the usual
sense of the social contract, the leader
derives not only his right, but his
power as well, from the people.
It is
not clear that this was the case with
Manu" 43 .
Further he says that divine appointment is the prevailing
Hindu idea of the origin of kingship and, despite some
elements of social contract in the notion of an exchange of
35
taxation and protection, royal power was not derived from an
44 •
. h t h e peop 1 e accordlng
.
. d u tra d'ltlons
.
agreement Wlt
to Hln
Moreover, he points out that the most complete Indian version
of a social contract theory appears in Buddhist literature 45 .
2.8.6.
It is not the author's main intention to examine
the theological theory in detail, but only to show, in short,
what orthodox thinkers generally accepted on the issue of
political obligation and authority in order to gain a clearer
'
understanding of the early Buddhist ideas.
2.9.1.
Let us now turn our attention to the early
Buddhist ideas in regard to political obligation and
authority.
While rejecting most of the
religious and
metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers, the Buddha or
early Buddhism advocated a critical rationalism in the realm
of politics.
There were two main bases from which the
question of the grounds and justification of political
obligation and authority were approached by the early
Buddhists.
The first was the argument against a Personal
Creator God (Issara).
Secondly, while rejecting such a God,
early Buddhism recognized the authority of dhamma (see Ch.3)
and in one of its senses it put forward a social contract of
the origin of kingship in contradistinction to the
theological theory.
2 .10 .1.
Before we proceed to examine the notion of social
contract in early Buddhism, let us first consider the
Buddhist argument against the creator God.
As we
sa~
(2.3.6),
from the period of the early Upanisads, Brahma was considered
36
to be the creator, eternal, primordial, omniscient, powerful
"if
not almighty, and supreme.
~'
i\
The appellations of Brahma in
the Pali texts are the same as those of rsvara in the. early theis·
schools.
The concept Issara (Vedic Isvara, from Is, to have
power) means lord, ruler, master chief
.
Creat~ve
'
De~ty,
- 47.
Brah ma
46
;
and it also means
The concept of a Persona 1 creator
God and the attributes which are given to him are criticized
directly in the early Buddhist texts.
2.10.2.
On this issue the main Buddhist criticism was
that the thinkers of the Vedic tradition had no special
insight or direct understanding about the nature of Brahma.
They believe that God (Brahma) in heaven is the mighty God
(Maha-brahma), the omnipotent (abhibhu anabhibhuto)' the
>
omniscient (annadatthu-daso), the controller (vasavatti),
the lord (issaro), maker (!:catta) ,the creator(nimmata) , the
perfect or the most high (set tho) , the chief of all (sa'l'ij ita) ,
the almighty father of beings that are and are to be
• 48
.
( vasi pita bhuta-bhavyanam)
The early Buddhist reaction to the conception of
2.10.3.
a personal creator God was a determined attempt to deny every
one of those attributes.
In the Buddhist view, those
attributes are erroneous, for Brahma is not an eternal being
as the ignorant believe him to be.
For example, when the
monk Kevaddha asks him where the four elements of earth,
water, fire and air finally cease without leaving a trace,
he has to admit, after a long hesitation, that he does not
know
49
.
This clearly indicates that Brahma is not
omniscient.
This fact has been recently analysed very
~
~
'9-;
lucidly by Dharmasiri.
37
He says that a concept of a personal
creator God is delineated in terms of its attributes, and he
gives five main reasons how the concept of God is meaningless
.
.
ln
terms o f lts
attrl"b utes 50 .
2.10.4.
Early Budchist texts expressly assert that the
belief in Brahma is an opinion not based on empirical
.
.
.
.
. 51
o b serva t lon,
lt
lS
lnaccurate,
an d a d angerous l"11 uslon
In the Patika sutta, the Buddha exposes the falsity of the
--.-;-
traditional doctrine that the origin of things comes about
through the work of Brahma.
The text reads as follows:
"There are some recluses and brahmins who
declare as a doctrine received from their
teachers that the beginning of all things
was the work of the god Brahma.
I
(i.e.
the Buddha) have gone and asked them
whether it was true that they maintained
such a doctrine, and they replied that it
was;
but when I asked them to explain,
they have not been able to answer, and
have returned the question to me.
have explained it to them thus:
Then I
There
comes a time, sooner or later, ... when
the world is dissolved and beings are
mostly reborn in the world of Radiance
52
.
There they dwell, made of the stuff of
mind, feeding on joy, shining in their own
light, flying through middle space, firm
in their bliss for a long, long time.
38
Now there comes a time when this world begins
to evolve, and then the world of Brahma
appears, but it is empty.
And some being,
whether because his alloted span is past or
because his merit is exhausted, quits his
body in the world of Radiance and is born in
the empty world of Brahma, where he dwells
for a long, long time.
Now because he has
been so long alone he begins to feel loneliness, dissatisfaction and longing, and
wishes that other beings might come and
live with him.
And indeed soon other beings
... appear in the world of Brahma as companions to him; and in all respects, they lead
a life like his.
Then the being who was
first born thinks:
'I am Brahma, the mighty
Brahma, the conqueror, the unconquered, the
all-seeing, the lord, the maker, the creator ,
the supreme chief, the disposer, the father
of all that is or is to be.
I have created
all these beings, for I merely wished that
they might be and they have come here'.
And
the other beings ... think the same, because
he was born first and they later.
That is
how your traditional doctrine comes about
that the beginning of things was the work
- 53
of the god Brahma"
2.10.5.
Finally, the Buddha tells us that one of the
39
beings in the world of Brahma, by reason of his poor stock of
merit, was born on earth.
He recalls his former dwelling-
place, but does not remember what went before and says:
"Brahma, the great Brahma ... he by whom we
were created, lives in the Brahma world.
He is permanent, constant, eternal,
unchanging, and he will remain so for ever
and ever.
But we who were created by that
Brahma are all impermanent, transient
unstable, short lived, destined to pass
away" 54
In reply to Kevaddha's question Brahma says:
"
"I am Brahma
But Kevaddha replies "I did not want to know all about
who you are, I asked you where the four elements cease without
leaving a trace".
Brahma, unable to answer, and in order to
save his face, and not to display his ignorance before all his
retinue, says to Kevaddha:
front of them.
know the answer.
like that.
2.10.6.
"I did not wish to say this in
They think I know everything, but I do not
You should not come to me with a question
You should ask the Buddha"
55
.
It is clear, therefore, from the above accounts
that the Buddha strongly disagreed with the view that the
beginning of things was the work of Brahma.
According to
the early Buddhist point of view the world is impermanent.
Its central thesis emphasizes that everything is subject to
an unceasing flow of change (viparinama-dhamma) .
One of his
disciples once questioned the Buddha:
" 'The wo:r·ld! The world! ' is the saying, lord.
40
How far, lord, does this saying go?"
56
The Buddha answered:
"It crumbles away, monk.
called 'the world'.
Therefore, it is
What crumbles away?
The eye ... objects ... eye-consciousness
tongue .•. body ... mind ... It crumbles
away, monk.
Therefore, it is called 'the
world' ,S?.
To the Buddha the world is not a "thing" but only a vast
series of evanescent changes.
The law of causation as
affecting the physical and mental realms is regarded as
fully sufficient-to explain this cosmic series of changes
2.10.7.
58
Contradicting thus the conception of Brahma as
eternal and as creator, the early Buddhist texts represent it
as an illusion on a par with many other illusions which it is
S·-l
~-
t
0
\!C'
'·
cor.:ce
c
o:~_ct1
cs
C :~"' Cf:~
s e:·:_)_s c of ,
1-1~ strongly maintainS.
CJ.l.
C. S
,
·~
~
!_':lC£~]."
that "one should not overstep the limits
1\
of conventional usage" and sayS that by confusing the usages
y
of "is, was and will be" one can be led into intricate
philosophical muddles
59
Moreover, the Buddha says that the
people who talk about God (Brahma) and talk about ways of
attaining union with him are making meaningless statementl,
because no one can make the concept of a creator God meaningful
in any way, no one can give any criteria for discriminating
God from other entities.
To understand a concept one must
have delineating criteria for making that concept meaningful.
41
These criteria can be derived either from knowledge by
acquaintance or from knowledge by description 60
2.10.8.
The Buddha says that those who believe in Brahma
and talk about ways of attaining "union with" or "becoming one
with" him do not furnish any of the above criteria. For example
"Then you say, Vasettha, that none of the
brahmanas, or of their teachers, or of their
pupils, even up to the seventh generation,
has ever seen Brahma face to face.
And that
even the sages of old, the authors and
utterers of the verses, of the ancient form
of words which the brahmanas of to-day so
carefully intone and recite precisely as
they have been handed down - even they did
not pretend to know or to have seen where or
whence or whither God is.
So that the
brahmanas versed in the three Vedas have
forsooth said thus:
'What we know not, what
we have not seen, to a state of union with
that we can show the way, and can say: this
is the straight path, this is the direct way
which makes for salvation, and leads him,
who acts according to it, into a state of
union with God'.
Does it not follow, this
being so, that the talk of the brahmanas
turns out to be foolish talk? ... Verily,
Vasettha, that brahmanas versed in the three
Vedas should be able to show the way to a
42
state of union with that which they do not
know, neither have seen - such a condition
of things can in no wise be!
Just as when
a string of blind men are clinging one to the
other, neither can the foremost see, nor can
the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see
just even so, the talk of the brahmanas
versed in the three Vedas is but blind talk;
the first sees not ... The talk then of these
brahmanas turns out to be ridiculous, mere
words, a vain and empty thing"
2.10.9.
61
Further, the Buddha points out how the path to
God becomes meaningless because meaning cannot be attached
to the concept of God.
"Just as, if a man should make a staircase in
the place where four roads cross, to mount up
into a mansion.
And people should say to him:
'Well, good friend, this mansion, to mount up
into which you are making this staircase, do
you know whether it is in the east, or in
the south, or
west, or ... north? Whether
it is high or low or of medium size?'.
when so asked, he would answer:
people would say to him:
'No' .
And
And
'But then, you are
making a staircase to mount up into something - taking it for a mansion - which, all
the while, you know not, neither have seen'.
And when so asked, he would answer:
'Yes'.
Even so, the talk of that man was foolish
43
talk, and in the same way the brahmanas
are not able to point out the way to union
with that which they have seen ...
2.10.10.
As already pointed out
(~.supra.
n
62
.
2.3.5), one of
the cardinal doctrines of Brahmanism was the power of
sacrifice.
One's whole life is regarded as a sacrifice.
There were a number of elaborate and complicated sacrifices
such as the Asvamedha, Rajasuya and Vajapeya, which were
performed by kings and nobles, and besides these there were
numerous lesser sacrifices.
The Buddha condemned these
elaborate sacrifices, since they involved waste of effort
and valuable resources as well as injury to life.
In the
Kutadanta Sutt~ the Buddha points out what the ideal
sacrifice should be.
He describes the sacrifices held in
the days of yore, wherein no living things was injured;
all
labour was voluntary and the sacrifice was offered, not only
on behalf of the king, but on behalf of all.
He explains
other forms of sacrifice more potent than the gift of
. 1 t h"1.ngs 63
rna t er1.a
2.10.11.
Moreover, in the early Buddhist texts, the
argument against a personal creator God is based on the
transitoriness (aniccata) of each being.
Kamma operates
even on Brahma, and he is fallible and imperfect.
The
Brahmanas believe that pleasure and pain, weal or woe or
neutral feelings may be due to creation by God
64
.
"There are certain recluses and brahmanas
who teach thus, who hold this view:
'What
44
so ever weal or woe or neutral feeling is
experienced, all that is due to the
creation of a supreme god'.
I
(i.e. the
Buddha) approached them and asked:
'Is it
true, that the venerable sirs hold the view
and teach that whatsoever weal ... is
experienced, all this is due to the
creation of a supreme god?'.
Thus questioned
by me, they replied 'Yes, we do'.
said to them:
Then I
'So then, owing to the
creation of a supreme god, men will become
murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars,
slanderers, covetous, malicious and
heretical.
Those who rely on the creation
of a supreme god, those lack the desire,
and the energy, to do what is to be done
and to refrain from doing what is not to
be done.
So then, the necessity for action
or inaction not being found to exist in
them, the term 'recluse' cannot reasonably
be applied to yourselves since you live in
a state of bewilderment without heed or
restraint'"
2.10.12.
65
.
The fact of the world's suffering is another
argument against the belief that everything is the creation
of a supreme god.
standpoint.
Two arguments are adduced from this
The first is the puppet argument.
The Buddha
argues that if God creates and designs the world with his
45
foreknowledge, he has to bear the ultimate responsibility
for every action done by his creatures.
The puppet argument
is stated as follows:
"If God designs the life of the entire
world- the glory and the misery, the good
and the evil acts, man is but an instrument
of his will (niddesa-k~ri) and God (alone)
is responsible"
66
The secona argument is the argument from evil.
Given the
existence of evil in the world, how can there be a God who
is benevolent, omnipotent and omniscient?
The Buddha
criticized the existence God precisely on this ground.
His
main argument is that if God is all-knowing, all-powerful
and perfectly loving he should have made the world otherwise
than it is.
The argument from evil has several variants,
but it can be summed up as follows:
"If God (Brahma) is Lord of the whole world
and creator of the multitude of beings,
then why (i) has he ordained misfortune in
the world without making the whole world
happy or (ii) for what purpose has he made
the world full of injustice, deceit,
falsehood and conceit, or (iii) the Lord
of beings is evil in that he ordained
injustice when there could have been
justice"
2.10.13.
67
It is said, "the world is without refuge and
without a God"
(attano
loko anabhissaro) 68 .
Buddhaghosa
46
uses the argument against a personal creator God in his
analysis of the paticca-samuppada.
He takes the denial of
God's existence as the logical implication of "doerlessness",
the world is without a "doer", a "soul", a "person".
The
wheel of becoming is without known beginning, lacking both
Maker (karako) such as Brahma and percipient (vedako) ;
for
each consequent proceeds by reason of its anticedent, and
not through the intervention of an almighty deity
2.10.14.
69
All these arguments and more against a personal
creator God are also found in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts.
Asvaghosa, using the puppet argument, says:
''So others say that creation proceeds from
Isvara.
What is the need in that case for
action by men"
70
In the Mahabodhi Jataka of the Jatakamala several variants
of the above two arguments are given, and there is also
another argument, which concerns the question of the creation
of dharma.
"Further, the sovereignty of the Lord must
rest either on the lawful order of things
(dharma) or on something else.
If on the
former, then the Lord cannot have existed
before the dharma.
If effected by some
external cause, it should rather be called
'bondage', for if a state of depending
should not bear that name, what state may
not be called 'sovereignty'?"
71
47
2.10.15.
It is necessary to add, however, that although
early Buddhism rejects a personal creator God, it does not
reject the existence of supernatural beings, or even of
Brahma himself.
From the point of view of Patika Sutta, a
very powerful supernatural beings known as Brahma really
exists, but he did not create the universe, though he
imagines that he did
(~.supr~.
2.10.4).
According to the
early Buddhist point of view, the word "Brahma" is used to
denote a member of a species of deities inhabiting one of
the sixteen high heavens of the Rupa world of the Buddhist
cosmography.
He is in heaven, a morally perfect being, wise
and powerful, chief of all, but he is also subject to the
ignorance, delusion and misunderstanding which affect all
beings who have not attained supreme wisdom.
Therefore, he
. no t omn1sc1en
.
. t or omn1po
. t en t 72
1s
2.10.16.
In the early Buddhist texts more than one Brahma
is described, such as Maha-Brahma, Sahampati-Brahma, BakaBrahma and Brahma-sanankumara.
According to the early
Buddhist ideas, however, although Brahma is nominally the
highest being within the cosmos, he is lower in spiritual
status than a Buddha or an Arahant in that he has not
attained the transcendent wisdom.
The Buddha shows that man
can attain fellowship with such a being not by prayer or by
calling on his name, or by sacrificing animals but by being
"free from anger and malice, being pure in heart and gaining
self mastery" 73
2.10.17.
In the light of what is said above, it is fully
48
justifiable to claim that early Buddhism rejected the
creator-role of Brahma, but the existence of Brahma appears
to have been explicitly accepted, though early Buddhists
modified the word of Brahma on the lines of their own
thought.
Rhys Davids, for example, points out that the
neuter Brahman of the Upanisads is entirely unknown in the
Pali literature, and that the Buddha's idea of Brahma in the
masculine differs widely from that of the Brahma of the
. d s 74
UpanJ.sa
..
2.10.18.
There is also evidence in the early Buddhist
texts that, in addition to the divine authority in ethical,
social and political life, orthodox thinkers claimed
authority in the sphere of knowledge as having been inspired
by Brahma.
Vedas.
He was believed to be the first teacher of the
human or divine
The Buddha rejects all recourse to authority as
worthless
75
.
"
According to the Buddha, any statement
claiming to be authoritative should be accepted or rejected
only after one has discovered its truth or falisty after
personally verifying it.
This is so even with regard to
the statements of the Buddha himself
2.11.1.
76
.
Rejecting the uncritical religious and
metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers and recognizing
the authority of dhamma, early Buddhism put forward a social
contract theory of the origin of kingship.
This notion had
much influence on the political life of those days and after,
perhaps more than any Vedic or post-Vedic doctrine of the
origin of kingship.
Ghoshal is quite justified when he says:
49
"The most original contribution of the early
Buddhist canonists to the store of our
ancient social and political ideas consists
in their formulation of a remarkable theory
of the origin of man and of his social and
political institutions" 77
Moreover, this is one of the world's earliest versions of the
widespread contractual theory of the state.
The seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries were the heyday of the social
contract in Western thought, which is especially connected
with the names of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 78 .
2.11.2.
The early Buddhist theory of social contract
begins with an account of man in the state of nature - that
is of man outside of or apart from civil society.
The
original state of nature is variously described by Vedic,
early Buddhist and Jaina thinkers.
(~.supra.
We have seen earlier
2.6.5) the traditionalists' account of the
original state of nature, its decline because of man's sin,
and the formation of political institutions and of social
order by divine ordination.
Jainism, while rejecting the
doctrine that the universe is created or guided by a divine
will or divine mind, postulated a mythical age of perfectly
virtuous beings living in complete happiness, free from the
whole paraphernalia necessitated by man's dependence upon a
nature which was growing progressively less bountiful.
With
life becoming increasingly difficult owing to the cosmic
decline, some form of social organization became necessary,
and the people were persuaded to accept the family and social
50
order by their Patriarchs.
Man's increasingly sinful actions
were only a symptom of cosmic decline.
The necessity to
labour for food and clothes was another factor that brought
about the social order according to Jainism.
The formation
of a state of society was created by a succession of
Patriarchs blessed with superhuman attributes, in order to
adjust the people to their changing environment. According
to the Jaina account, the state was not instituted by any
definite cbntract, but it was virtually protective and
paternal.
It was instituted by the last patriarch, Rsabha,
who, realizing the need of a coercive system to maintain
society, persuaded the people to accept his son Bharata as
. f.J.rst k.J.ng 79
th eJ.r
2.11.3.
Early Buddhism also taught the existence of the
golden age, and the process of the gradual decline of
humanity on account of their sinful actions.
But the
description of the state of nature and the way in which men
formed their social order and their state differs widely
from the Vedic and Jaina ideas on the subject
2 .11. 4.
80
According to the early Buddhist tradition, in
the early days of the cosmic cycle mankind lived on an
immaterial plane, dancing on air in a sort of fairy-land,
where there was no need of food or clothing, no laws, no
king and no private property, family etc.
Then gradually
the process of cosmic decay began its work, and mankind
became earth-bound, and felt the need of food and shelter.
As men continued in this way, feeding on the earth, they
51
became more solid;
different characteristics appeared in
them, and in consequence insecurity and conflict appeared
among them
2 .11. 5.
81
.
In such conditions .men were placed in the more
difficult and uncertain position of the state of nature,
because some of them, attracted by the beauty, smell and
taste of the earth, gradually acquired gross bodies, due to
the gradual increase of their greed, conceit and lust
coupled with the growing scarcity of the edible earth.
"Then a certain being, greedy from a former
birth, said:
'What can this be?' and tasted
the sweet earth with his finger.
He was
delighted with the flavor and craving
overcame him.
Then others followed his
example ..• and as they did so their
radiance faded;
and as it faded the moon
and sun appeared, with the constellations
and the forms of stars, nights and days,
phases of the moon and months, seasons and
years ••.
,82
"Beings continued thus, feeding on the sweet
earth, •.. and the more they ate the more
solid their bodies became, some beautiful
and some ugly.
And the beautiful scorned
the ugly, boasting of their greater beauty.
And as they became vain and conceited
because of their beauty the sweet earth
disappeared.
Then growths appeared on the
52
soil, coming up like mushrooms, with
colour, scent and flavour like those of
the sweet earth ... Then creeping plants
arose, growing like rattans;
and beings
lived on them until the creepers too
disappeared ... Then rice appeared, already
ripe in the uncultivated soil, without dust
or husk, fragrant and clean-grained.
And
those beings continued to live on the
rice •.. ,and their bodies became more
and more solid, and their differences in
beauty even more pronounced, and the
characteristic of the female appeared in
women, and of the male in man.
The women
looked at the men too intently, and the
men at the women, and so passion arose,
and a raging fire entered their bodies.
In consequence they took to intercourse
together.
When people saw them doing so
some threw dust at them;
others ashes,
others cowdung, and shouted,
you foul one!
'Perish,
Perish you foul one!!
How could one person treat another like
that?'"
2.11.6.
83
.
The text continues that what was considered immoral
in those days is now considered moral.
In those days those
who had sexual intercourse were not allowed to enter a
village or a town for months, and they incurred so much blame
53
for their immorality that they started building huts in
or d er to concea 1
. 84
~t
.
Thus the gradual decline of humanity
began, on account of man's physiological differences and
psychological impulses.
With the progressive decline of the
cosmos, there developed human families and households, on
account of passion, desire (kama) and greed (gedha).
Agriculture was necessitated by the steady diminution of
the fertility of the wild rice which formerly grew in
abundance .•
In such a state the distinction between dhamma
and adhamma was blurred.
2.11.7.
In the whole account, there is no involvement
of gods or demons, Vedas or sacrifice, or doctrines like
matsyanyaya, but we are simply told that man's nature
brought about the growth of bad customs.
2.11.8.
With the growth of immoral customs, man's
psychological impulses dominated him, and there was a change
in attitudes and beliefs, desires and purposes.
It was at
this stage that men entered into a social contract.
"Then someone of a lazy disposition thought
to himself 'Why do I go to the trouble of
fetching rice night and morning?
I will
fetch enough for supper and breakfast in
one journey'.
Then another man saw him
and said 'Come on, my friend, let us go
and fetch our rice'.
the first man replied.
'I have got enough',
So the second man
followed the first man's example and thus
54
gradually others too.
And from the time
that people took to feeding on stored
rice the grain became covered with dust,
and husks enveloped it, and reaped stems
did not grow again, and there were pauses
in its growth, when the stubble stood in
clumps.
Then the people gathered together
and lamented, saying:
appeared among us.
'Evil customs have
Once we were made of
the stuff of mind ... and were firm in our
bliss for a long, long time ... But since
evil and immoral customs became rife among
us, we have degenerated until our grain has
become covered with dust ... and the stubble
stands in clumps.
Come now, let us divide
the rice fields, and set up the boundary
marks•• 85 .
2.11.9.
It is implicit in this account that the
transition of man from a state of nature to a state of
society is a gradual decline, on account of man's selfish
disposition.
After the households came into existence food
began to be stored, land came to be divided among
individual owners and boundaries had to be set up, thus
giving rise to rights of property.
In the above extract,
the thought and action of the man who first stored grain and
introduced private property in land were considered evil.
One might argue that such actions were in no way evil.
They
were considered evil because they were inspired by greed and
55
selfishness, and because of those actions ''the grain has
become covered with dust
and the stubble stands in
clumps", that is to say, the fertility of the soil
diminished.
The chief basis of the economy of the people
was in disorder, and lack of co-operation led to difficult
circumstances.
Early Buddhism in this passage condemns
hoarding up food and wealth 86 , since it leads to avarice
and wickedness
87
.
An individual may righteously (dhammena)
earn wealtn and use it righteously, sharing it with others
88
The first man's action arose from a selfish disposition, and
since then injustice has entered into human life.
To put an
end to disorder, man realized the importance of mutual
co-operation and assistance in order to preserve individual
rights.
So the fundamental laws of social relations were
established by substituting justice for psychological
impulses as the rule of man's conduct, and moral values
were associated with man's actions.
People then entered
into an agreement among themselves and set up the first
social institutions.
2.11.10.
When men formed themselves into a state of
society, there was a remarkable variety of natural
dispositions among them.
These different dispositions
resulted in lack of co-operation and breaches of their first
agreement.
The strength, the power, and the different
passions of the many individuals forming the first society
could not be fully harmonized, and in consequence weakness,
fear and selfish desires again struck at the very root of
their being.
According to the early Buddhist point of view,
.
56
greedy dispositions among men are never ending and have
increasingly grave consequences.
By repeated and
progressively worse and more sinful actions man will
ultimately reduce his life span from hundreds of thousands
of years in the earlier age to ten years or less in times
to come, when the world-cycle is nearing (samvatta) its
close
89
.
2.11.11.
With the gradual decline of humanity, on account
of its own greed, the people again entered into an agreement
to maintain justice and the like.
This was the stage at
which men formed their second contract with the
responsibility of law and order, which may be called a
contract of government.
"Then someone of_ a greedy disposition, while
watching his own plot, appropriated another
plot that had not been given to him, and
made use of it.
said:
The people seized him and
'You have done an evil deed in
taking and using a plot which was not
given to you.
Do not let it happen again'.
'Very well', he replied.
But he did the
same thing again and yet a third time.
Once more the people seized him and
admonished him in the same words, but this
time some of them struck him with their
hands, some with clods, and some with
sticks.
From such beginnings arose theft,
blame, false speech, and punishment.
Then
57
the people gathered together and lamented,
saying:
'Evil ways are rife among the
people - theft, blame, false speech, and
punishment have appeared among us.
Let
us choose one man from among us, to
dispense wrath, blame, and banishment when
they are right and proper, and give him a
share of our rice in return'.
So they
chose the most handsome ... and capable
among them and invited him to dispense
anger, blame, and banishment.
He consented
and did so, and they gave him a share of
their rice"
2.11.12.
90
.
Describing the etymology of words connected with
kingship, the text continues:
"Mahasammata means approved (sammata) by the
people (mahajana) , and hence Mahasammata
was the first name to be given to a ruler.
He was lord of the fields
(khettanam) and
.
hence khattiya
(Sanskrit ksatriya) was his
.
second name.
He pleases (ranjeti) others
by his righteousness (dhamma)
third name, raja
91
(king) .
- hence his
This was the
origin of the class of ksatriyas, according
to the tale of long ago.
They originated
from those same folk and no others, people
like themselves, in no way different;
their origin was quite natural and not
and
58
otherwise"
92
.
The text continues to explain the origin of the other three
classes, Brahmana, Vaisya, and Sudra (see Ch. 4).
2 .12 .1.
The account of the origin of man and his gradual
decline from the state of nature to the origin of kingship
is found in all schools of Buddhism with minor and sometimes
local variations, and is widely known.
In the Visuddhimagga,
the comme-ntator Buddhaghosa gives an account parallel to the
Agganna Sutta, and differs only in identifying Mahasammata
as the future Buddha (bodhisatta)
93
•
The Buddhist Sanskrit
accounts are to be found in the Mahavastu, in the Vinaya
section (the Qulva) of the Tibetan canon, in the
Lokaprajnapti, and in Vasubhandhu's Abhidharma-kosa
2.12.2.
94
•
If we take, for example, two accounts found in
the Mahavastu and in the Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the
Tibetan canon, we find slight changes, but they are only in
the words and phrases and not in the substance of the account
in the Agganna Sutta.
For instance, the Agganna Sutta at
one place says:
"The characteristic of the female appeared
in women, and of the male in man ... In
consequence they took to intercourse
together, when others saw them doing so
some threw dust at them ... What was
considered immoral (adhamma-sammatam) in
those days is now considered moral ... "
ly.supra. 2.11.5 - 2.11.6).
59
The Mahavastu says:
"The distinguishing characteristics of
female and male appeared among them
Becoming inflamed with passion they
violated one another.
And those who
witnessed them violating one another,
threw sticks at them, and clods of earth
and mud ... Then, indeed, this was
considered immoral, irreligious and
irregular, but now it is considered moral,
religious and regular"
The Vinaya section (the
~ulva)
95
of the Tibetan canon says:
"From eating rice their different organs
were developed;
some had those of males
and others those of females.
Then they
saw each other, and conceived love for
each other, and, burning with lust, they
came to commit fornication.
Others saw
what they were doing, so they threw at
them stones, gravel, pebbles, and
potsherds, and exclaimed:
thus insult us
'Why do you
... And thus it was that
what was formerly considered unlawful has
become lawful ... ,what was not tolerated
in former days has become tolerated ... ,
what was looked down on ... has become
praiseworthy nowadays"
96
60
2.12.3.
Such are the accounts to be found in the
literature of Buddhism about the origin of the world, of man,
and of his social and political institutions.
The Agganna
Sutta gives a quasi-historical account of the origin of
government, describing the development of man from the
original state of nature to a fully evolved society, when the
first king was approved by the people and was hence called
Mahasammata.
He was also called khattiya because he was the
overlord (adhipati) of the fields (khetta) ' and raja because
he pleased the people with dhamma.
Dhamma, thus, is finally
introduced as a basic constituent of the state (see Ch. 3).
Thirdly, it also tells us explicitly that man's social and
political institutions have no divine sanction but that they
are only measures of human expediency.
There was a necessity
among human beings to restrict their immoral ways, and their
freedom to do immoral acts.
For this reason mutual consent
was required to set up a king, that is to place one man among
them in highest authority.
The relationship between the king
and his subjects is a contractual obligation in which one
commands and the other obeys.
The contract is symbolized by
the institution of taxation, which is a payment for specific
work on the part of the king.
In this sense the story
explains the grounds and limits of political obligation and
authority of the ruler, which are based upon the consent of
the people.
2.13.1.
Let us now examine what is meant by "Mahasammata".
This is the central concept in the social and political ideas
of early Buddhism.
However, there is no direct inquiry about
61
the implications of the title Mahasammata, in the social and
political sense, in the early Buddhist texts or in later
writings of the different schools of Buddhism.
But the value
placed on Mahasammata is so great that some observations
about him are inevitable.
2.13.2.
Let us first consider the narrower explanations
of the word.
Most of the later Buddhist commentators
attempted to explain Mahasammata in terms of a mythical idea
of the origin of kingship.
According to the Pali chronicles
of Sri Lanka, Mahasammata is the proper name of a king who
lived in the beginning of this present age, and who was the
original ancestor of the Sakyan family, to which the Buddha
belonged.
The text gives a list of the dynasties from his
day up to the time of the Buddha, to prove that the line was
"unbroken• 97 .
2.13.3.
Moreover, Mahasamrnata is said to have belonged to
the Solar Dynasty and was identified as the Bodhisatta (the
future Buddha) , who was born among men after a sojourn in the
Brahma worlds.
The commentator Buddhaghosa says:
"In this cycle, among the beings who had made
this resolution (to select a king), the
Blessed one, the future Buddha, was then
more beautiful ...
They approached him,
asked his permission, and chose him
That wondrous event in the world, the
future Buddha, was first man"
98
.
An examination of the original Pali version will show that
62
Buddhaghosa's identification is wrong.
There are references
to Mahasammata in the canonical Jataka, but he does not
occur as the future Buddha.
For example, the Mandhatu
Jataka gives a list of the dynasties from Mahasammata to
Mandhata, and there identifies Mandhata as the future
99
Buddha . The fact to be noted, however, is that both the
Pali texts and their Commentaries agree that Mahasammata was
chosen by the people to put an end to disorder.
2.13.4.
On the other hand, the Vimanavatthu Commentary
explains that Mahasammata is the name given in the Buddhist
sacred books (sasane) to Manu 100 •
The interesting point
about this late commentarial reference is that it tries to
assimilate the early Buddhist legend of Mahasammata to one
of the Hindu myths.
The form of the legend given in the
Vimanavatthu Commentary does have some similarity with the
legend of Manu.
This would suggest that they are connected
in some way and did not arise wholly independently.
would then appropriate to pose,
by the Buddhist from Manu?,
It
(i) was Mahasammata adapted
(ii) Was Manu adapted by the
Hindus from the Buddhist Mahasammata?,
adapted from a common original?
(iii) Were both
Whatever the answer, i t can
be pointed out explicitly that the Pali version of the
Mahasammata story is the first reference in ancient Indian
political thought to a social contract in the proper sense.
2.13.5.
Moreover, in the Mahayana texts, there are
references to the doctrine of divine right (and duty) of
kings.
The suvarnaprabhasottama Sutra, for example, speaks
63
. . 10 l
. .
.
o f d 1v1ne
appo1ntment
of k.1ngs an d even roya l d.1v1n1ty
This shows clearly that non-Buddhist political ideologies,
including the well-known Hindu doctrine of the divine
creation of Manu and his Dharmasastra (i.e. Hindu law),
exercised deep influence upon later thinkers of different
schools of Buddhism
2.13.6.
102
.
The above explanations of Mahasammata do not
develop the social and political implications of the story,
but are rather concerned with harmonizing it with the
prevalent Hindu doctrine of royal divinity.
Jayatilleke
comments that it would be a mistake to associate the idea of
Mahasammata with divinity, for anyone can become a bodhisatta
and such a being has to•act with selfless devotion for the
good of others
103
.
Rhys Davids comments, in spite of its
good-humoured irony and its fanciful etymologies, the
Agganna Sutta reveals a sound and healthy insight and is
104
much nearer to the actual facts than the Brahmana legends
Varma comments that the account of Mahasammata is of
considerable sociological significance, but it did not
initiate any larger amount of further sociological and
political investigation in the writing of later Buddhist
. k ers 105 .
th 1n
2.14.1.
What is meant by Mahasammata is not explicitly
stated in the Buddhist texts.
But we can gather a number of
implications in the social and political sense from them.
The Pali version states that Mahasammata means approved by
the people as a whole (sannipatitva samaggajatehi mahajanehi
64
. 106
sammanltha kato mahasammata)
.
.
However, thls word has
been translated variously as "The Great Elect", "The Great
One Chosen by the Multitudes", "The Great Selected One",
"The Great Chosen One"
107
.
The point to consider is that,
in contrasting "chosen one" with "elect", some. writers make
108
.
.
.
a d lStlnctlon
Wl'th out d'ff
l
erence
.
The two are synonymous.
However, there is no clear indication that the ruler was
elected by a formal process, and it seems more accurate to
use the words "The Great Approved One".
2.14.2.
We have a similar account of Mahasammata in the
109
Jataka
.
.
.
In one of the Jataka storles the followlng
account is given:
"The people who lived in the first cycle of
the world gathered together, and selected
the most handsome, attractive and capable
among them as their king.
The quadrupeds
also gathered together and selected a lion
as their king;
and the fish in the ocean
selected a fish as their king called
Ananda ...
Then all the birds in the
Himalayan region assembled together,
crying:
'Among men, among beasts, and
among the fish too there is a king, but
amongst us no king.
We should not live
in anarchy (appatissavaso) ;
also select a king'.
and we must
They selected an owl.
And a bird made a proclamation that it was
necessary to show consent on this matter by
65
saying three times 'We are all agreed'
(ath'eko sakuno sabbesa~ ajjhasayagahanattha~
tikkhatum savisi).
A crow made a protest.
In the end the birds selected a golden goose
k'1.ng ,110
.
as t h e1.r
2.14.3.
Let us now try to find out what is exactly meant
by "mahasammata" in the light of the accounts given above.
Maha means great.
Sammata means approved, authorized,
selected or agreed upon
111
Thus Mahasammata means "the
great approved one", and it is evident that the king is
said to be. the "great approved one" because his kingship was
approved "by the people" or "approved by the great body of
the people" or "by general consent of the great body of
people".
On the whole we are of the opinion that the
explanation as "chosen by the whole people" is a forced one;
and was probably not in the minds of those who first used
the word.
2.14.4.
According to the tradition, as time went on,
the "contract of society" proved inadequate for ensuring
property rights (v.supra. 2.11.8).
To put an end to
disorder and to have greater security than before, the
people who had gathered together voluntarily agreed to
subject themselves to an authority as the opposing force
(pratibala)
112
.
By their mutual consent they decided to
give the authority to a person among themselves who could
administer the law justly and punish the guilty, and in
return they promised to give him a share of their harvests
66
in order to enable him to perform his duties.
And thus all
men, by consenting with others, bound themselves to an
authority which had been established by mutual agreement
among those who had gathered together.
2.14.5.
Consent imposes an obligation.
Therefore, it is
not necessary to explain how both parties, the king and his
subjects, have bound themselves by restricting their freedom
to perform duties imposed with their own consent.
This is
why the Buddhist texts demonstrate that the king is merely
primus inter E_ares, a being "like unto themselves and not
unlike", because of the equality of man, despite the fact
that the king selected has a handsome and commanding
personality.
Therefore, the king is of the people, is to
act in the interest of and for the people, and for this task
has been approved by mutual consent.
It is said in one
Chatu~~ataka of Aryadeva. that the king should not feel any
pride because after he has consented to rule he is "the
servant of the people" (gana-dasa), and for his services the
t axes one-slxt
.
h o f t h elr
.
. d uce 113
.
.
peop 1 e glve
ln
pro
2. 15 . 1.
The important facts that may be noted in the
early Buddhist theory of the origin of kingship are the
following.
First, the theory implies a democratic
conception of the state and the law.
Secondly, early
Buddhism conceived of the king as a human being and did not
believe in his divinity.
Thirdly, it implies that the king
has no authority, legislative, judicial or executive, except
by virtue of the fact that he has the people's consent as
67
long as he fulfils his contract, which means that
sovereignty in the sense of the supreme legislative power is
vested in the people and was limited by the requirement to
conform to the law of righteousness or dhamma (see Ch.3).
In the Pali Scriptures it is said that the king becomes the
114
.
--) o f soverelgnty
.
.
Slgn
or sy rob o 1 ( pannanam
, wh.lC h lS
vested in the people and is ultimately derived from dhamma
(v.infra. 2.16.1.
Also see Ch.3).
He should not be moved
by hatred or desire from material gain.
While it is the
king's first duty to maintain law and order, he has other
responsibilities as well, including that of positively
encouraging and contribution to the economic and spiritual
welfare of the people.
His service to the people must be
based on the law of righteousness (dhamma).
In this sense,
the Sutta gives a clear idea of the nature and limits of the
duty of allegiance owed by the subjects of the king, and of
the rights and duty of the king to maintain law and order
(see Ch. 3) .
2.15.2.
In this connection, another point that may be
noted is that if the king fails to fulfil the promise or
contract, which is presumed to exist, and instead of
providing good government betrays the trust that the people
have placed on him, the people have a moral right to depose
the king.
In one of the Jatakas the Bodhisatta addresses
crowd of citizens who are suffering the tyranny of a wicked
king and his Purohita in the following terms:
"Let town and country people assembled all
give ear.
The water is on fire.
From
68
safety comes fear.
The plundered realm may
well complain of king and priest.
forth protect yourselves.
proves your bane"
Hence-
Your refuge
115
This passage is evidently intended to show that every
individual has the moral right and even duty to engage in
rebellion against the king who betrays the contract.
The
statement "it is up to you to protect yourselves (attagutta
viharatha)'is made to the general public (mahajana), who are
told that the king is defrauding the people when he ought to
protect them and work for their welfare.
When the people
heard this advice, they thought, "Now we are without
protection", so they arose up with sticks and clubs in their
hands, and then beat the wicked king and the priest till
they died
2.15.3.
116
.
Thus the story of Mahasammata gives clear
answers to the problem of political authority and obligation.
In every respect it implies a novel idea which was not
current in any political context before the time of the
Buddha.
The king's authority is that of human will, and the
king holds office by virtue of the general consent of his
subjects, to perform his duties and bring happiness to the
people by means of dhamma.
We shall discuss the king's
duties and his other responsibilities in chapter three.
2.16 .1.
As we have seen, there was a necessity to
appoint a person from among the people and to put him under
an obligation.
How then was the person appointed put under
69
such an obligation?
The people have accepted a lawgiving
authority on the understanding that the lawgiving authority
should act in a certain way.
The appointed ruler has
consented to act in just such a way by assuming the power
granted to him by the people;
obviously then the obligatory
force of the general consent comes into effect.
But how the
law can come into effect, if there is no rule which stands
above the ruler?
The obligatory force of the general consent
cannot stem from the will of the parties alone.
Therefore,
there must be a rule making the agreement binding on the two
parties.
According to early Buddhism that rule is dhamma,
which we shall discuss in the next chapter (Ch. 3).
70
CHAPTER THREE
THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA
3.1.1.
The social contract theory of early Buddhism,
which we discussed in chapter two, is closely related to the
idea of dhamma.
In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine
this concept as the law of righteousness, since it reveals
the basis of allegiance in relationships between the ruler
and his subjects.
We shall then consider its relevance to
law and administration of the state, as it appears in the
early BJlddhist texts.
we shall a.lso distinguish, where it
is appropriate, the different uses of the early Buddhist
conception of dhamma from the Vedic (Brahmanic and
Upanisadic ) e>nd the Hindu conception of dharma, so that
we can see the significance of the early Buddhist ideas in
clearer focus.
3.2.1.
The word "dhamma" in Pali, and the corresponding
word "dharma" in Sanskrit, is perhaps the most distinctive
and indispensable word in the entire history of Indian
thought.
Indeed, it may be the best established word in
the Indian religious vocabulary.
It has several meanings or
shades of meaning which have to be understood according to
their context, since variations in the interpretation of
dhamma are many.
Therefore it has been noted that dhamma
is a most difficult word to define and is untranstable into
any other language.
Rhys Davids, for example, writes:
"The word 'dhamma' has given, and will
always give, great trouble to the trans-
7l
lators. It connotes, or involves, so
much" 1 .
3.2.2.
The word ''dhamma" or "dharma" is derived from
the root dhr, which means "to support", "to sustain", "to
--.
hold together";
thus, according to its derivation, it could
mean "that which supports", "that which sustains", "that
which holds together".
2
In the Rg-Veda, there is a conception of rta ,
3.2.3.
-.-
which can safely be translated as the regular course of
things.
Explanations of this concept are given by assuming
the existence of wills behind natural phenomena.
rta
-.-
The term
comes closest to the idea of a natural physical order,
that is, the cosmic order by which the universe, the gods
3
and men are governed ,
and it was considered to be the law
of Varuna, who is the administrator of the cosmic order or
4
law .
3.2.4.
At a later stage of the Rg-Vedic period, rta
~
acquired a moral and religious connotation, and was
identified with truth
(~atya).
.-
which is essentially a lack of harmony with natural and moral
5
law .
Rta was also associated with sacrifice or rite (yajna)
---
~-
The chief duty of man is to engage in yajna
because the
very manifestation of the world as well as its maintenance
is the effect of yajna.
As Macdonell points out, rta is
~
"order in the moral world as truth and right, and in the
6
religious world as sacrifice or rite" .
72
3.2.5.
However, during the Brahmanic and Upanisadic
period, :ta gradually became less important, and subsequently
the cosmic and moral law was denoted by dharman 7 (an early
form of dharma declined as a consonantal noun) , which has
connotations similar to rta.
-.--
the word
It occurs in conjunction with
~rata 8 , which denotes in this context the command
9
or law of a deity .
Later the word dharma was developed in
its masculine form, and became a key word in the Indian
religious vocabulary.
3.3.1.
The word "dhamma" is used in early Buddhism
with an emphasis rather different from its uses in other
Indian religious traditions.
But it has been frequently
assumed that the two conceptions, early Buddhist dhamma and
Vedic dharma, are of the same nature, or that early Buddhism
as a protestant movement merely cleared up certain confusions
and corruptions that had crept into the Vedicc notion of
. 10
d harma at t h e t1me .
For example, B.G. Gokhale, in an
examination of dhamma as a political concept, writes that
the early Buddhist concept of dhamma is related to the Vedic
concept of rta {v.supra. 3.2.3 - 3.2.4).
-.-- -
He defines rta as
-.--
"the regular order", and in other terms he thinks ;ta is
"the physical order of the universe, the due order of the
sacrifice, and the moral law in the world", which appears in
the Vedas as an independent authority as well as the
possession of some gods, especially Varuna.
Gokhale further
points out that the early Buddhists were doubtless acquainted
with these notions and borrowed parts of the Vedic concept
of rta which they interpreted in their own way;
-.--
and more
73
especially they applied it to their own political ideas
3.3.2.
ations.
11
.
We entirely disagree with Gokhale's observFor one thing, we never meet in Buddhist literature
the Pali word corresponding to :ta.
The word rta must have
lost much of its currency in India before the time of the
rise of early Buddhism, and it has never been traced in
either early Buddhist or Jaina literature.
Moreover, dhamma
is never associated with sacrifice or rite, or linked with
divine prototypes.
In many cases, the early Buddhist dhamma
has different connotations, or altogether different meanings
in different contexts from the Vedic and Hindu conception of
dharma.
However, this does not mean, as Jayatilleke points
out, that early Buddhism did not accept any notions at all
from the Vedic system.
Early Buddhism appears to have
followed the general principles of the moral tradition of
the past by taking what was considered to be sound and good
and developing it, while leaving out what seemed unsound or
evJ.'112 .
3.3.3.
Let us examine some of these contexts.
The
Brahmanic and Upanisadic conception of dharma is closely
associated with the omnipotent cosmic or divine will of the
cosmic person (purusa) .
---.-
This interpretation of dharma is
dealt with in the account of the divine creation of social
order in four varnas (v.supra. 2.3.3).
.
-
After the creation of:
the four varnas, the Highest God created dharma in order to
preserve his entire creation and give it stability.
said:
It is
74
"He was not strong enough.
He created still
further the most excellent dharma.
This
is the power (ksatra) of the ruling class
(ksatra), viz., dharma.
------
.
Therefore, there
is nothing higher than dharma.
So a weak
man controls a strong man by dharma, just
as if by a king.
Verily that which is
dharma is truth.
Therefore, they say of
a man who is speaking the truth 'He speaks
the dharma', or of a man who is speaking
dharma,
'He speaks the truth'.
both these are the same"
13
Verily
.
From the above it is evident that the law (dharma) is a
divine law, because it is ascribed to the will of God.
God
alone has the power of creating it for the sa.ke of individual
and collective security;
and it is binding upon the members
of society by virtue of its divine origin.
3.3.4.
'
The eternal Vedas (Sruti) are said to be the
primary source of dharma, Sacred tradition (Smriti) and
good custom or usage or convention (sadacara, sistacara,
- -acara,
sila,
samaya) 14 .
thus secondary.
They are all divinely created, and
They consist of a body of rules and
regulations for each member of society.
3.3.5.
Let us consider briefly the significance of
dharma in a socio-political context.
Together with the idea
of the divine creation of the four varnas and dharma, the
Brahmanical law-books stressed inequalities, laying heavier
75
burdens on Sudras and granting special privileges to the
Brahmanas (see Ch.4).
For the Sudras there was a divine
barrier to social relationships with the higher orders.
This was considered final, permanent and pre-ordained.
Dharma was believed by the Brahmanas to be a creation of God;
but from t.he early Buddhist point of view the Brahmanical
class system did not serve the best interests of society as
a whole, because it did not prescribe that all human beings
should be treated alike (see Ch.4).
3.3.6.
Along with the above ideas, dharma, the
supreme law of the social order, sets forth concretely the
distinctive status and functions of the four varnas in
accordance with the divine will.
Accordingly, there are
various types of dharma, both general and special.
Among
them, there is a special dharma of varna duties and
----.-
positions in an unalterable religious and social scheme
(varna-dharma) •
There is a dharma for the rules of life
for a particular period in one's life (asrama-dharma).
At
the same time, each individual member of society had his
own set of duties and obligations exactly prescribed by
the divine will (sva-dharma).
Moreover, there is a general
dharma applicable to all men and women, despite differences
in age or social status (sadharana-dharma or samanya-dharma)'
and there is a dharma for the regulation of communities
(samaja-dharma).
3.3.7.
In a political sense, there is a particular
dharma for the king (raja-dharma) , which applies to the
76
regulation of his kingdom.
The ruler was conceived to be
powerful only so far as he wielded dharma.
He should
protect dharma, both general and special and its protection
is the divine purpose of the Ksatriya varna.
----.-
The king's
ruling power (ksatra) was believed to be derived from the
Most High , but the brahman priesthood claimed to represent
the divine authority, and to exert a dominating influence
upon the king in all his actions.
The Purohita instructs
the king on dharma and guides him in the protection of
dharma, since he is the custodian of dharma
(~.supra.
2.5.6).
On such instruction and guidance, the king's duty, among
many other things, is to preserve and promote dharma in all
its aspects, while punishing those who reject their dharma,
thus fulfilling his own.
3.3.8.
we do not propose to scrutinize the various
types of dharma, as i t would divert us from our present
discussion.
But, on the whole, it is clear from an exam-
ination of Vedic and Hindu dharma, in all its aspects, both
general and special, that it is generally believed to be
based on divine will.
Dharma is used both in Brahmanism and
Hinduism to denote sacred law and duty, justice and
religious merit, based upon the sacred canon, the eternal
Vedas, and usage,. custom or convention.
They were all
considered to be divine in character because they were
derived from God himself, according to the Vedic and Hindu
literature.
Moreover, dharma refers to the rules of conduct
of the divinely ordained social order, and is often
designated as the eternal dharma (sanatana-dharma).
77
3.4.1.
In many aspects the early Buddhist dhamma
differed completely from the Vedic conception of dharma.
By
refuting and criticizing several uses of the term dharma,
early Buddhism enunciated a new philosophy of dhamma.
differences between the early Buddhist
The
dhamma and that of
Vedic and Hindu dharma, mainly in a socio-political context,
will be explained in this study.
3.4.2.
Here we may briefly indicate some of the
'
differences between these two concepts.
The first and
obvious observation is that early Buddhism does not subscribe
to a theistic origin of dhamma.
(~.supra.
As we have seen above
2.10.1 - 2.10.18), the notion of a personal
creator God had no place in early Buddhism.
According to
early Buddhism, dhamma is not God-given as was earlier
believed.
Since there is no act of creation, dhamma cannot
be ascribed to the will of God.
always existed.
It is supposed to have
It is timeless and universal, hence it is
the law of nature.
Even Brahma, who was considered to be an
almighty creator God by the Brahmanas, is subject not only
to the judgement of dhamma, but also to the universal laws
of impermanence, suffering and absence of any permanent
entity, according to early Buddhism.
Therefore a personal
God cannot have created dhamma, since it is superior and
anterior to any God.
3.4.3.
Moreover, early Buddhism paid no special
allegiance to the Vedas.
In fact, early Buddhism criticized,
both directly and indirectly, the Brahmanas' claim that the
78
eternal Vedas, which were considered to be the highest source
of dharma, were divine revelation and the final authority.
In addition to the Vedas, there were a number of other
sources of dharma
(~.supra.
3.3.4).
On the whole, early
Buddhism rejected and criticized all doctrines that dharma
has any particular source not only as worthless, but even as
wholly irrelevant
15
.
The early Buddhist dhanuna, therefore,
is not based on any theistic assumptions.
'
3.4.4.
There is, however, a further point, which is
very important.
For the early Buddhists dhamma is the law
of nature, which regulates and governs the totality of
existence.
It is also the law of nature of man's inward
being or, in other words, it is a governing principle of
human activity.
The Buddha is represented as a discoverer
of dhamma in both these aspects.
It was his realization
and proclamation of dhanuna which enabled him to attract and
maintain the loyality of a large number of very influential
members of the mercantile class.
Buddhist
dh~
Therefore the early
to a great extent determined by the Buddha's
discovery at the point of his enlightenment - the discovery
which became for him a unique feature of his teaching.
3.4.5.
According to the tradition, when the Buddha
gained enlightenment after six years of experimentation, he
was reluctant to teach to the world the dhamma, which he had
found with such difficulty.
He thought to himself:
"This dhamma is not readily comprehensible
to those who are given to craving and hate.
79
It goes against the current.
It is subtle,
profound and difficult to comprehend for
those who are enveloped in darkness would
not find it easy to see its truth" 16 .
Brahma then descended from his heaven and invited the Buddha
to teach dhamma to the world, which would otherwise be
destroyed saying:
"There was a dhamma in the past among the
Magadhan peoples, which was not perfect
and which was conceived by imperfect seers.
Open now the doors to immortality.
So
that people may listen to dhamma, which
has been fully comprehended by the Buddha
Teach dhamma.
Those who learn your
dhamma will become perfect"
17
This statement of Brahma recognizes the fact that the Vedic
teaching of dharma was not worthwhile, as it was not
conducive to the happiness of mankind as a whole
(~.supra.
3.3.5).
3.4.6.
The Buddha's teaching of dharma, as he found
it, is usually described as "the setting in motion of the
supreme wheel of the law" (dhamma-cakka) 18 .
The term
dhamma-cakka, here translated as "the Wheel of the Law" can
be more accurately rendered as "the law of righteousness"
since the cakka or the "wheel" is the emblem of authority
of the sovereign.
It also has the connotation of the
kingdom of righteousness since the term Brahma-cakka has
been used synonymously with it 19 .
But the term Brahma here
80
means the "highest" or "most sublime", and has no theistic
connotations.
3.4.7.
The Buddha gave his teaching to the world as a
way of life, telling men and women how they should employ
this existence in order to achieve supreme happiness.
The
Buddha's dhamma, therefore, appears as a message proclaimed
"for the welfare and happiness of the many"
20
, since he
himself is said to have been "born in the world of men for
welfare and happiness"
(manussa-loke hita sukhataya jatol
21
,
where the "welfare" is primarily the spiritual and secondarily the material welfare of humanity.
3.4.8.
There is in early Buddhism a concept of a world-
ruler or world-state,sman(cakkavattiraja), who is likewise
said to "be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind"
22
.
It is said:
"There are those two persons, who in being
born in the world are so born for the good
and happiness of mankind, for the wealth,
good and happiness of gods and men.
two?
Which
The worthy and perfect Enlightened
One and the World-ruler"
23
.
It is stated that the world-ruler sets up a just social order
embracing the whole earth, working primarily for the material
and secondarily for the spiritual welfare of humanity on the
basis of righteousness (dhamma).
We.shall examine the
concept of the cakkavattiraja in a later part of this
chapter.
Bl
3.4.9.
We have so far seen a few fundamental differ-
ences between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist dhamma.
It is
clear that early Buddhist dhamma is based partly on the
notion of the perfectibility of the individual and partly on
that of social consciousness.
As well as this, there are
many other differences between these two concepts, as is
apparent in the early Buddhist attitudes towards social
ethics, politics and law.
We shall consider them, while
discussing,the es.sential features of dhamma as a political
concept.
3.5.1.
we have now reached a point where we can
discuss in detail the nature of dhamma as a socio-political
concept.
The word dhamma has varied connotations, most of
them are of an ethical nature.
Several efforts have been
made to find suitable English translations of it, for
instance, "Normn, "Lawn, "Virtue",
11
Piety",
11
Justice",
"The Doctrine", and "Righteousness"; in our discussion it is
translated "the law of righteousness" in most
3.5.2.
cm;~texts.
Let us first consider the importance of dhamma
in relation to the social contract theory of early Buddhism,
to which reference has been made in chapter two.
According
to this, it was necessary to appoint a person from among the
people to preserve the social order;
he was called
Mahasammata, and was put under an obligation to do so.
the end of chapter two
(~.supra.
At
2.16.1), the principal
questions that we have posed in relation to the obligatory
82
force of the general consent are the following.
Is there a
law that regulates the relationships between the ruler and
his subjects?
What is the rule making the agreement binding
on the two parties?
grounded?
On what is the authority of the ruler
The answer to all these questions, according to
the early Buddhist point of view, is dhamma or the law of
righteousness~
~rhis
3.5.3.
conception of "law of righteousness" has
a number of implications for the early Buddhist conception
of law.
It means that the ultimate source of law in the state
should reside not in any ruler, human or divine, nor in any
body governing the state, nor in the state itself, but in
dhanuna or the law of righteousness.
This is not to be inter-
preted to mean that ;:Ihamma is some sort of mysterious entity,
but that it is only to the extent to which the state conforms
with dharruna
- - - in its .internal and foreign policy that man can
achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and
happiness.
Since man is free to choose and the right to
govern is vested in the people, according to the early Buddhist
social contract theory, it would be the responsibility of man
to set up such a state.
3.5.4
According to early Buddhism, the state of
nature in the blissful golden age was governed by dhamma.
When the gradual decline of humanity occurred, on account
of its own greed and passion, some men infringed dhamma
--with unhappy results.
Finally, when there ;vas strife and
injustice in society, the people needed an impartial
83
authority to lay down and enforce minimum good standards,
and bind them to dhamma.
This is well-illustrated in the
Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the Tibetan canon which states
that, before the first appointment of Mahasammata, a person
who stole another's rice was arrested and charged with theft.
But the thief made a counter-charge, saying:
"I have been
badly treated in that I have been laid hold of by these
people on account of some rice and brought into this
assembly".• Then the people in turn warned those who had
arrested him, saying:
"In bringing him here into our midst
you people have done him wrong", since they had no authority
to do so.
24
again"
.
The people let him off, warning him "do not it
It was then that, in the interests of fairer and
more efficient justice, among other reasons, the people
selected a king and delegated their functions to him.
3 •5 •5 •
The appointed person or individual is said to
have been under an obligation because he had consented to be
the authority and to guide the people in accordance with
dhamma.
It is said:
he pleases others by dhamma, hence he
"
is the king ...
(dhammena pare ranjeti kho
-.- . . • )"25 .
raJa
'
The force of dhammena is augmented and emphasized by the
explanatory clause "righteously indeed, not unrighteously"
(dhammen'eva no adhammena)
26
.
The Sanskrit version found in
the Mahavastu says:
"So originated the idea of Mahasammata
He is the king, which means one who is
84
a perfect guardian and protector ... he
who achieves security for his people by
means of dharma"
The Vinaya section (the
~ulva)
27
.
of the Tibetan canon says:
"Mahasammata ... was a righteous man and
wise, and one who brought happiness to
mankind with the law (dhamma), he was
.
- 28
called 'k1ng' or 'raja'''
•
3.5.6.
The above extracts indicate in the first place
the relationship of dhamma to kingship.
It is also said that
dhamma is the essence of kingship as well as the king's best
policy, since power is vested in him by virtue of his being
the protector of dhamma
29
.
The duty of the king is to
maintain law and order for the welfare and happiness of the
people as a whole, and this should be in harmony with dhamma
30
The king obtained the right from the people to interpret
dhamma in many ways, according to their needs.
The ideal
king of earlier times was said to obtain the consent of all
sections of people in carrying out the affairs of state
3.5.7.
31
.
The right of owning property justly acquired,
for example, is in accordance with dhamma.
case with just punishment.
This is also the
Part of what is meant here by
dhamma is the administration of justice, which involved the
punishment of those deserving punishment and the compensation
of those deserving compensation.
Dhamma, therefore, gives
wide scope to the duty of the king.
In the first place, it
gives the king the authority to rule and calls upon the
85
subjects to obey him so long as he rules in accordance with
dhamma.
The king should positively encourage and contribute
to the economic and spiritual welfare of his subjects.
When
he ceases to do so, the basis of allegiance is destroyed and
.
anarc h y Wl"11 relgn
supreme 32
Therefore, it may appear,
according to early Buddhism, that obedience is a moral
principle assumed through a promise, and the authority of
the ruler is derived from the will and consent of the people
in whose interests he should govern, but his power is subject
to the law of righteousness (dhamma) since the "wheel of
power turns in dependence on the wheel of righteousness"
' (bala-cakram hi nisraya
dharma-cakram pravartate) 33 .
3.6.1.
Thus early Buddhism recognises the authority
of dhamma in the sphere of social and political life.
The
social and political dhamma, therefore, needs to be explained
here.
In the Anguttara Nikaya, the question is asked as to
who is the king of a righteous king (dhammikassa dhammaranno
raja), the Buddha's reply is that it is dhamma.
"It is dhamma, monk.
Herein, monk, the
king, the wheel roller, a dhamma man, a
dhamma raja, relies just on dhamma,
honours dhamma, reveres dhamma esteems
dhamma;
with dhamma as his mandate, he
sets a dhamma watch and bar and ward for
folk within his realm
...
He set a dhamma
watch ... for warrior and camp follower,
for brahmans and for householder, for
town and country folk, for recluse and
86
godly man, for beast and bird alike.
Thus indeed, monk, that raja ... setting
a dhamma watch ... within his realm, rolls
on the wheel by dhamma;
and that wheel
may not be rolled back by the hands of
any h ostJ.'1 e creature" 34 .
3.6.2.
This passage, which can be paralleled with
many other passages in the early Buddhist texts, especially
in the Jataka stories, indicates in the first place that
dhamma is the "ruler of rulers" or the "highest in the world".
In the second place it recognises that the ultimate criterion
of the rightness, justice, legality, propriety etc. of any
government policy is dhamma.
It should be emphasized,
however, that this dhamma differs from the pre-Buddhistic
conception of
dh~.
righteousness,
Although the latter emphasized
it was placed within an explicitly
religious context and expressed in characteristically
theological terms
(~.supra.
3.3.3 - 3.3.8).
Therefore, there
is a great different between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist
dhamma.
3.6.3.
According to early Buddhism, it is dhamma in
conformity with which a reigning king should shape his
conduct and guide the course of administration in internal
and foreign policy.
This is explained in many discourses,
especially in the Jataka stories.
with an example.
We may illustrate this
In one of the Jataka stories, a king was
advised to practise dhamma towards friends and courtiers,
87
brahmans and ascetics, beast and birds, and in war and travel,
in town and village, in every land and realm
35
.
On this
basis, Ghoshal writes:
"The most important contribution of the
early Buddhist canonists to the store of
our ancient political thought consists of
their 'total' application of the principle
of righteousness to the branches of the
king's internal and foreign administration"
It was indeed this principle of dhamma, as we shall see, that
Asoka sought to embody in so many of his policies.
Moreover,
the ancient history of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) recorded in the
Mahavamsa and Culavamsa shows how this dhamma affected the
king's policies.
3.6.4.
Therefore, it appears that dhamma is not a
mysterious entity, as is often stated 37 , but something
comparable to Western natural law doctrine.
It is only to
the extent to which the king conforms with dhamma in his
policies that he can achieve his legitimate aspirations for
peace, prosperity and happiness.
If the king does not fulfil
his primary task of maintaining law and order in society by
means of dhamma, and is given to vice (adhamma), the people
have a moral right to depose the king
3.7.1.
(~.supra.
2.15.2).
Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that
the king, as the acknowledged head and leader, the refuge
and security of the people 38 , should rule in accordance with
dhamma in order to gain their goodwi11
39
The actions of
36
•
88
the king should be conducive to the happiness and welfare of
the people as well as his own
40
.
The king, therefore, should
avoid the four wrong courses of life (agatigamana), namely,
desire (chanda), malice (dosa), delusion (moha) and fear
(bhaya)
41
.
Moreover, he should refrain· from all evil and
cultivate good behaviour, observing the early Buddhist
ethical principles of the ten virtues (dasa-kusala-kammapathadhamma)42.
These ten virtues are applicable, not only to the
king but to all humanity.
3.7.2.
In the Majjhima Nikaya, we find these ten
virtues classified according to their expression through the
body, through speech and in the mind.
They are:
"1. He refrains from killing (panatipata)
and abides full mercy to all beings.
2. He refrains from stealing (adinnadana)
and is honest and pure of heart.
3. He refrains from sexual misconduct
(kamesu-micchacara) and does not
transgress the social mores (caritta)
with regard to sex.
4. He refrains from lying (musavada) and
is devoted to truth.
On being summoned
as a witness before an assembly or a
court of law, he claims to know what
he knows, he does not claim to know
what he does not know, he claims to
have seen what he saw and does not
claim to have seen what he did not
89
see;
he does not utter a conscious
lie for the sake of himself or for
the sake of others for some trifling
gain.
5.
He refrains from slander (pisuna-vacaya)
and holds himself aloof from calumny.
What he hears here, he repeats not
there in order to cause factions among
people.
He is a peace maker, who brings
together those who are divided, delights
in social harmony and makes statements
which promotes harmony.
6.
He refrains from harsh speech (pharusavacaya) and uses language that is civil
and pleasant to hear.
7.
He refrains from idle gossip
(samphappalapa) and speaks at the
right time in accordance with facts,
what is meaningful, righteous and in
accordance with law (vinaya-vadi)
8.
He refrains from covetousness
(abhij jhaya) , does not covet another's
property, and is generous in heart.
9.
He refrains from ill-will (byapada)
and is benovelent.
10. He refrains from holding false view
(micchaditthiya) and holds the right
philosophy of life, believing in the
90
reality of this world and the next, in
moral recompense, moral obligations
and values and in religious teachers
who have led good lives and have
proclaimed by their superior insight,
the nature of this world and the
next•• 41 .
3.7.3.
These ten virtues formed the basis of
legislation in some Buddhist countries.
For example, the
first great king of Tibet, Sron-b-tsan'-sgam-po
is said to
have "promulgated laws to harmonize with the ten virtues
prescribed by early Buddhism" 44 in the seventh Century A.D.
It should be emphasized, however, that these ten virtues,
unlike the commands of the Decalogue, are not to be
interpreted as commandments or laws.
They are recommended
on the grounds of higher self-interest and expediency.
A
person can voluntarily decide whether he should take upon
himself these ten virtues.
If he sincerely and consistently
does so, he can root out greed, hatred and ignorance and act
out of selfless service, love and understanding towards his
fellow beings, according to early Buddhism.
3.7.4.
From the standpoint of politics, the pursuit
of ten virtues is considered a necessary prerequisite of
social stability, international understanding and peace.
In
addition to the above ten virtues, early Buddhism recommends
that the king and his officials should act out of selflessness,
rectitude, mercy and the power of wisdom.
These characterist-
ics are mentioned in the list of ten qualities of the king
91
(dasa-raja-dhamma).
l.
They are~
Liberality, generosity and charity
(dana) .
2.
High moral character (sila).
3.
Selflessness (Eariccaga).
4.
Honesty and integrity (ajjava)
5.
Kindness and gentleness (maddava)
6.
Austerity in habits (tapa).
7.
Freedom from hatred, ill-will and
enmity (akkodha).
8.
Non-violence (avihimsa).
9.
Forbearance and tolerance (khanti).
10. Non-opposition and non-obstruction
(avirodha)
45
.
Another list of the same name <:::.supra. 3.6.3) mentions the
several duti.es of kings towards different classes of persons
and beings, including citizens in the town and country,
religious teachers and even birds and beasts
3.7.5.
46
.
The king with such virtues and qualities will
ward off pain and suffering from other beings, whether human
or non-human and promote their well-being and happiness.
Moreover, when the king follows righteous ways his people
will be righteous and peace will reign in his realm
47
.
In
the Anguttara Nikaya, we find the Buddha explains thus:
"Monks, when rajas are righteous, their
ministers are aJso righteous.
When they
are righteous, brahmins and householders,
the town folk and villagers are righteous.
92
This being so, moon and sun go right in
their courses ... constellations and stars
do likewise;
days and nights, months and
fortnights, seasons and years go on their
courses regularly;
winds blow regularly
and in due seasons.
Thus the devas are
not annoyed and the sky-deva bestows
sufficient rain.
Rains falling seasonably,
the crops ripen in due season, men who
live on those crops are long-lived, wellfavoured, strong and free from sickness"
48
Further the Buddha explains that if the king, who is reckoned
best among men, lives righteously, the whole realm dwells in
happiness and the people follow him as a herd of cattle follow
the. bull
49
3.7.6.
.
Early Buddhism openly condemns the king who
selfishly sits on the throne, indulges in the pleasures of
the sense, and is drunk with the intoxication of authority
50
Such a king brings about his own woe as well as that of his
subjects.
When the king is unrighteous evil consequences,
the reverse of those mentioned above
follow
51
.
(~.supra.
3.7.5.) will
One of the Jataka stories explain thus:
"At the time of unjust kings, oil, honey,
molasses and the like, as well as wild
roots and fruits, lose their sweetness
and strength, and not only these but the
whole realm loses its vigour"
52
93
3.7.7.
Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that
the king should refrain from evil and cultivate good towards
his subjects with loving kindness as a father loves his
children
53
.
The Buddhist virtue of metta is also said t.o be
analogous to a mother's love for her only child:
"Just as
a mother, as long as she lives, cares for her only child, so
should a man feel all-embracing love to all living beings
(mata yatha niyam puttam ayusa ekaputtam anurakkhe, evam pi
-
sabbabhute~u
-
-
-
manasam bhavaye aparimanam)
54
.
In early
Buddhism, the importance of love (metta) is greatly stressed.
This may be gathered from the following remark of the Buddha:
"None of the good works employed to acquire
religious merit is worth a fraction of the
value of loving-kindness"
55
The Pali word metta is an abstract noun meaning "love, amity,
sympathy, friendliness, active interest in others" derived
from the Sanskrit word "mitra" meaning "friend" 56 .
The
practice of the "highest life" or the "divine life" in this
very world is said to consist in the cultivation of the four
cardinal virtues, love (metta), sympathy (karuna), sympathetic
joy (mudita) and impartiality (upekka), towards all beings
57
The person who has successfully developed these qualities·
is said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing"
after bathing "in the waters of love and compassion for
one's fellow beings"
58
Inspired by the Buddhist ideals,
Asoka frequently stressed the importance of love in the
form of father-child relationship.
"All men are my children, and just as I
94
desire for my children that they should
obtain welfare and happiness in this
world and the next, so do I desire (the
same)
3.7.8.
for all men"
59
.
The nature of a kingdom is said to founded on
the "strength of friendliness"
(maitri-bala) 60 .
Therefore,
the king and his officials should perform their duties on
the four bases of kindliness (sangahavatthuni) in order to
win the hearts of the people.
mindness (dana),
They are:
(i) charitable-
(ii) affability (priyavacana),
(iii) work
for the welfare of society (atthacariya)and (iv) sense of
- 61 .
equal respect for all (samanattha)
One of the Jataka
stories states that the king should distribute every morning
and evening by public proclamation food and drink, garlands
and ointments 1 clothes, umbrellas and shoes to the needy.
Moreover, he should not make aged men and outworn domestic
animals labour.
He should pay due honour to them, because
they gave him service when they were strong
3.7.9.
62
Such a king is said to be a successful one, in
keeping his people positively happy through his encouragement
of and his contribution to their welfare.
In the Dlgha Nikaya,
Seniya Bimbisara, king of Magadha, is referred as "righteous
and ruling righteously, benign to priest and laymen, to town
and country folk (dhammiko dhammaraja hito brahamana~
63 and likewise
gahapatikanam
negamanan
c'eva janapadananca)
the text gives a list of eight characteristics of a good
king, among which we find the following:
95
"He is a believer (in dhamma), generous
benefactor (dayako danapati), keeps open
house to all, a welling spring (opana) for
the satisfaction of all religious people,
the poor and wayfarers, beggars and
petitioners.
He is a doer of good deeds
(pu~~ani) , is intelligent, learned, wise
and capable of thinking out matters
relating to the past, present and future"
3.7.10.
64
In addition to the above matters·, the king
should also base his daily life upon the principle of
vigilance (appamada) .
The essence of this principle is
summed up in the Dhammapada:
"Vigilance is the source of
immortality and negligence is that of death"
(appamado
65
amatapadam, pamado maccuno padam)
. It has been suggested
•
that this principle of vigilance had much effect on Asoka 66 .
The Buddha said by way of admonition to the king of Kosala:
"If you lead a vigilant life, your court
ladies will say:
vigilance.
'the king lives in
Let us live likewise'.
And
your court nobles, and your subjects in
town and country will say the same.
And
you living thus in vigilance, yourself
will be guarded and preserved, the house
of your women, your treasury and storehouses will be guarded and preserved too"
3.7.11.
The Jataka stories frequently refer to this
67
.
96
principle of vigilance.
The most important statement on not
being negligent, but being earnest and ruling in righteousness
.
occurs in the Tesakuna Jataka.
In this story, three wise
birds give instructions to a king, who adopts them as his
children, in ruling his kingdom in righteousness.
The king,
in the midst of the crowd of people, questioned the first
bird on the duty of a king.
Without answering the question
directly, the bird reproved the king for his negligence,
and then sa.id:
"To rule a kingdom righteously, the king
should avoid falsehood, anger and levity;
he should learn not to do again whatever
he has done in the past under the
influence of passion and sin; a king who
become negligent in his rule loses all
his wealth;
good luck and fortune delight
in a man who is energetic and free from
jealousy;
ill-luck delights in men of
ill-deeds who are afflicted with jealousy
and hard-hearted;
the king should be a
friend and protector to all:
he should
perform his duties without making mistakes
and without coming under the influence of
self-will and other passions;
he should
be earnest in efforts for good;
sluggard can attain happiness"
no
68
The second bird, replying to the same question, first declares
that the duty of a king consists of the acquisition of wealth
not acquired and the conservation of what is acquired, and adds:
97
"The king should select ministers who are
wise and learned, and free from vices
such as gambling and drinking;
he
should select other officials who would
guard him and his treasure;
he should
steer the kingdom's common weal as a
charioteer guides his chariot;
he should
keep his subjects well in hand; he should
himself examine the income and expenditure
and should not trust another for a loan or
deposit;
he should punish those deserving
punishment and favour those deserving
favour;
he should see that nothing is
done by himself or by others with overmuch
speed;
he should never mislead his
subjects and he himself should decide his
subjects' affairs;
way to wrath;
he should never give
he should not allow
unrighteous officials to ruin his
substance and his kingdom;
he should
practise virtuous conduct, for vices
lead to a state full of suffering and
69
woe"
.
The third bird in reply to the king's specific question of
"What is the highest of all powers?" said that there are five
powers which are in ascending order of importance.
(i) the power of limbs,
power of officials,
(ii) the power of wealth,
They are:
(iii) the
(iv) the power of high birth and (v) the
98
. d om 70
power o f w1s
Illustrating the power of wisdom in two
examples, he says that if a fool attain a rich and prosperous
kingdom, another will by violence seize it in his despite.
Even so, if a high born but unwise prince were to attain a
kingdom, he would not be able to rule with his whole
resources
3.7.12.
71
The Mahayana texts also repeat and develop the
same ideas of dhamma as the basic source of kingship.
For
example, in the Mahavastu, we find the parallel version of
the story of the three wise birds and their instructions on
the duties of king
72
.
Moreover, in the works of Asvaghosa
•
and Aryasura, we find the same ideas repeated and developed,
.
.
.
73
somet1mes Wlth sl1ght changes
.
-.
.
- Aryasura, 1n hls Jatakamala,
enumerates the good characteristics of a king:
"He was behaving like the embodied
righteousness and discipline, and was
intent on promoting the welfare of his
subjects like a father ... For his
administration of justice followed the
path of righteousness, and made no
difference between kinsmen and the rest
of his subjects.
It obstructed for his
people the road of wickedness
Perceiving the welfare of the creatures
to be the effect of righteousness, he
knew no other purpose than this"
3.7.13.
Mahayana
74
.
It should be emphasized, however, that in
Buddhism ideas of a different kind developed, more
99
especially the mythical attitude towards dhamma
75
.
Accord-
ingly, there is an interpretation of dhamma in terms of the
Vedic ideas of the divine right (and duty) of the king
(~.supra.
2.13.5), which lays down the principle that the
king is the divinely ordained instrument for the fulfilment
of dhamma
3.8.1.
76
.
One of the most important contributions of
early Buddhism to the history of Indian political thought, if
not to the political thought of the whole world, is that of
the concept of the world-ruler or world-statesman (cakkavattiraja).
He is depicted as a person like the Buddha, who comes
at a time when conditions are ripe, and, just as the Buddha
works primarily for the spiritual welfare of mankind, the
world-ruler works primarily for their material welfare
(~.supra.
3.8.2.
3.4.8).
The spiritual and material welfare of mankind
is conceived symbolically as the rolling onwards of a wheel
(cakka) •
The world-ruler sets rolling this wheel of material
welfare of mankind, under the superior power of dhamma, just
as the Buddha sets rolling the supreme wheel of "the law of
righteousness" (dhamma-cakka) for spiritual endeavour.
In
this sense, the "wheel" appears in two forms, one of which
belonged to the Buddha (dhamma-cakka), and the other to the
77 .
world-ruler (ana-cakka)
3.8.3.
The world-ruler, according to early Buddhism,
sets up an international social and political order on the
basis of dhamma, with a "political philosophy and constitution
100
based on the law of righteousness"
78
, just as the Buddha
sets up an international order (sangha) based on dhamma and
the constitution and codes of law (vinaya) .
Therefore the
most important force for the material and spiritual welfare
of mankind is that of dhamma, or in other words dhamma is
the common and ultimate basis of all social relationships
presided over by the Buddha and the world-ruler.
3.8.4.
The world-ruler, who works according to the
"law of righteousness", is able to extend his authority
"over the whole earth girded by the oceans, not by the rod
or sword but by the victory of dhamma" (imam pathavim
sagarapariyantam adandena asatthena dhammena abhivijjiya)
.
.
79
.
And again, as the Buddha says, the world-ruler sets up "a
kingless authority" (so pi nama arajakan cakkan vatteti)
80
.
To the question as to who is the world-ruler above the king
(ko pana ... ranno cakkavattissa raja), the Buddha replied
that it is dhamma:
"'Monks, a king who is a world-ruler, a
just and righteous ruler, even he is not
without a king' .
'At these words a
certain monk said to the Buddha:
who
then is the ruler over a world-ruler?'.
'Dhamma, monk', replied the Buddha"
81
"Monk, a king who is a world-ruler, a just
and righteous ruler, in dependence on
dhamma, honouring dhamma, respectful and
deferential to dhamma, with dhamma as
his banner ... as his standard ... as
101
his overlord, keeps constant watch and
ward for the folk.
Then again, a world-
ruler ... keeps constant watch. and ward
for the warriors, for brahmins, for town
and country folk, for beasts and birds
alike.
He ... who keeps constant watch
.•. rolls the wheel of sovereignty
according to dhamma.
That wheel of
sovereignty is not to be upset by any
human being whatsoever, or by any foe
that lives.
Just so, the Buddha is
dependent on dhamma, honouring dhamma,
respectful and deferential to dhamma,
with dhamma as his banner ... standard
as his overlord, keeps constant watch
and ward over actions of his body
actions of speech and thought ... and
keeps rolling the supreme wheel of dhamma
·and that supreme wheel of dhamma is not to
be turned back by any recluses or brahmins,
- 82
by any god or Mara or Brahma"
.
3.8.5.
Like Mahasammata, the world-ruler's function
is to maintain law and order in accordance with dhamma.
The
-Cakkavatt:is:ihanada
Sutta 83 , which complements the Agganna
Sutta, sets out in detail the origin of crime on account of
poverty and other economic factors.
According to the
Aggan;:;a Sutta, it was economic factors such as growing
demand, which made it necessary to institute private property;
102
and eventually, in order to safeguard the rights to such
property, the people select a king from among themselves.
We must assume that the kings who followed Mahasarnrnata were
believed to be so efficient and righteous that they kept
crime at a minimum.
It only reappeared after the ancient
principles of government were forgotten.
The Cakkavattislhanada Sutta claims to give
3.8.6.
the ancient principles of government and to foretell the
'
future of society.
It tells, in the form of a myth, how a
world-ruler of the past provided protection to his subjects
but later failed to provide economic security to the needy
for their subsistence and maintenance.
Hence crime appeared,
morality declined, and in consequence the standard of life
weakened, owing to the short-comings of a king in his
administration of the law by means of dharnrna and his failure
to give righteous instructions to the people.
The story
further tells that this decline will reach its nadir in a
catastrophic war in which the greater part of humanity will
be destroyed.
The remnant who manage to survive, learn the
ancient principles of government and proceed to rebuild the
just society on firm moral and economic foundations.
" ... Thus from goods not accruing to those
devoid of goods, poverty becomes rampant.
From poverty being rampant, stealing
becomes rampant ... the violence ...
killing ... lying ... slander ... sexual
midconduct ... abusive and idle talk ...
covetousness and ill-will ... false views
103
of life ... wanton greed and perverted
lust ... till finally filial and religious
piety and lack of regard for authority ...
Among such humans it is to them who lack
filial and religious piety and show no
respect for authority that homage and
praise will be given.
The world will fall
into promiscuity ... keen enmity will
become the rule, keen ill-will, keen
animosity, passionate thoughts even of
killing ..• in a father towards his child
and a child towards his father
Among
such humans there will arise a war of
seven days, during which they will look
on each other as wild beasts.
Dangerous
weapons will come into their hands and
they, regarding each other as beasts,
will deprive each other of life ... But
to those to whom it would have occured,
'let us not slay each other' - they
would betake themselves to dens of grass
of dens in the jungle, or holes in trees,
or river fastnesses, or mountain clefts,
and subsist on roots and fruits of the
jungle.
And they will do so for those
seven days.
And at the end of those
seven days, coming forth from dens and
fastness and mountain clefts, they will
]04
embrace each other, and be of one accord
comforting one another and saying:
How
good it is, my friend, to see you still
alive!
Then it. will occur to these
beings that it was only because they had
gotten into evil ways that they had this
heavy loss of kin.
They will then decide,
'Let us, therefore, now do good' ... So
they will practise virtues ... and they
will increase in length of life, in
comeliness and prosperity ... Among such
humans, this India
~iz.
the world) will
be mighty and prosperous, populous and
with plenty of food and having numerous
villages, towns and cities .....
3.8.7.
84
.
The above passage clearly indicates the impact
of man's economic environment on his life and on society.
According to the above passage, economic insecurity was the
immediate cause of tension and instability in human society
and loss of values and beliefs.
Man, whose inner nature is
essentially good, eventually comes to regard his fellow
85
1"1t1es.
.
.
. 1nequa
.
b e1ngs
as b eas t s b ecause o f econom1c
Therefore, the economic factor is considered as of primary
importance for a just social order.
~utta,
it is said:
let wealth be given"
"Whoever is poor in your kingdom, to them
(ye ca tata vijite adhana assu tesanca
dhanam anuppadajjeyyasi)
social stability.
In the Cakkavattisihanada
86
, for subsistence is essential for
10 5
3.8.8.
The king's duty is, therefore, to maximize
the national economy.
This should be guided by righteousness
a.nd imp<>.rtiality (samena) .
In doing so, the king ensures a
strong 2nd prosperous kingdom.
Concerning economic welfare,
for example, we find the following passage in one of the
texts:
"The world rests on two foundations - the
acquisition of wealth not acquired and
the conservation of what is acquired.
Therefore Require wealth and conserve
what you have gained, make firm efforts
within the bounds of righteousness.
The
realm of that king who rules unrighteously
becomes weakened and rent on all sides,
but. the realm of the king who rules
righteously is strong, prosperous,
flourishing and populous"
3.8.9.
87
Moreover, according to early Buddhism,
prosperity and the elimination of crime are possible only by
ensuring full employment and thereby developing the economy.
In contrast, the brahmins often advised the king to perform
sacrifices to secure such welfare
(~.supra.
2.5.5).
The
Buddha's advice was tt.at such measures were a waste of time
and resources.
This, for example, is the advice of the
Buddha on such issues as levying taxes, assistance to
business and agrict•lture and wages.
"The king's country, Sirs, is harassed
and harried.
There are dacoits abroad
10 6
who pillage the villages and townships,
and who make the roads unsafe.
were the
king, so long as that is so, to levy a
fresh tax, verily his majesty will be
acting wrongly.
But, perchance, his
majesty might think:
'I will soon put a
stop to thE·se scoundrels' game by
degradation and banishment, and fines and
•
bonds on death! '
But their license
cannot be satisfactorily put a stop to
so.
The remnant left unpunished would
still go on t.a:rassing the realm.
Now
there is one method to adopt to put a
thorough end to this disorder.
Whosoever
there be in the king's realm who devote
themselves to keeping cattle and the farm,
to them let his majesty tte king give
food and seed-corn.
Whosoever there be
... who devote themselves to trade, to
them ... give capital.
Whosoever ...
devote themselves to government service,
to them ... give wages and food.
Then
those men, foJlowing each his own business,
will no longer harass the realm;
the
country will be quiet and at peace;
and
the populace, pleased with one another
and happy, dancing their children in
t.heir arms, will dwell with open cloors"
88
107
The above passage clearly states that the
3.8.10.
planning of economic we].fare is the most important function
of the king.
A~cording to the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, a
king provided the care and protection of the land, but
neglected the economy, that is to say, he did not provide
wealth to those devoid of wealth (dhammikam rakkhavara naguttim samvidhahi, no ca kho ac1hananam dhanam anuppadasi)
.
.
and so poverty became widespread.
to his
89
,.
Then the king gave wealth
indigent
subjects without punishing thosE: who were
guilty of theft.
The result was that the people began more
and mere to commit theft in order to gain wealth from the
king.
Finally, the king was forced to establish capital
punishment for theft.
The only result of punishment was the
appe:arance of more serious crimes such as banditry and
looting.
The passage suggests that the suppression of crime
through punishment is futile, but the planning of economic
~telfare
leads to a happy and peaceful society.
3. 8 .11.
Thus giving vrealth to the needy is considered
<m important function of the righteous king
90
.
ThereforE,
the kinq sho«ld base hJ..s policy on the four bases of kindness
(v.supra. 3.7.8), work for social utility, and help those in
. t ress
d 1R
91
.
'
'
A k'1ng Ser17 1s
d as
ment1one
. h teous
B r1g
who redressed the poverty of the poorest in his
k'1ng,
kin~dor.•
and
had fresh taxes levied and wealth distributed among the needy
3.8.12.
While encouraginq material progress, earJy
Buddhism always lays great etress on the development of the
n:oral and spiritual welfare of the people.
The Buddha, who
92
108
is the spiritual counterpart of the world-ruler, works
primarily for moral and spiritual welfare, while his
temporal counterpart works for material welfare.
But at
t:he same time the world-ruler should work for spiritual
welfare, following the ethical principles such as the ten
virtues and other qualities, which we mentioned earlier
(~.supra.
3.7.1. - 3.7.12).
The king with such virtues and
qualities will provide righteous care and protection to all
his subjeohs,
inolu.ding birds and beasts, ensure that there
is no crime and no unemployment or poverty among the
citizens, and work for the good of the people with selflessness, love and understanding, dispensing impartial justice
<md promoting both material and spiritt'al welfare on the
principles of right.eousness and equality.
3.9.1.
While the king has duties to his subjects,
the duties of his subjects to each other are summed up in
the Sigalovada sutta 9 3
This Sutta is chiefly concerned
with the cultivation of virtue in the layman's life, his
family and his social relationships.
The reciprocal duties
of parents cmd children, husbands and wives, teachers and
pupils, employers and employees are enumerated.
It is said
that servants are to be assigned work according to their
capacity and ability, supplying them with food <md wages,
tending them in sickness, sharing with them unusual
delicacies, and gr<mting regular leave.
Employees, in their
turn, should be diligent and not lazy, honest and obedient
•
. wor k 9 4 .
an c1. earnest 1n
t h e1r
109
3.9.2.
Moreover, early Buddhism speaks of the
happiness of the average man as depending en economic security
or sufficient wealth acquired by just and righteous means
(atthi-sukha), the enjoyment of one's wealth by himself, his
family, his friends and relatives, while rerforming
meritorious deeds (bhoga-sukha), freedom from debt (ananasukha), and blameless moral and spiritual life (anavajjasukha)
95
.
It should be noted that three of these sources of
happiness are economic.
Therefore, welfare is conceived in
terms both spiritual and material, which is an idea of
importance in connection with dhamma.
3.9.3.
Furthermore, a layman should be skilled,
efficient, earnest and energetjc in whatever profession he
is engaged.
He should know :it well (utthana-sampada), and
should protect his income, which vas earned by just means
and by the sweat of his brow,
(arakkha-sampada) and from
which he derives feelings of economic security.
He should
have good friends (kalyana-mitta) who are faithfnl, learned,
virtuous, liberal and intelligent, who will help him along
t.he right: path away from evil.
He should spend reasonably,
in proportion to his income, neither too much nor too little,
without hoarding "lo!ealth avariciously or being extravagant,
and should live wj_thin his means (samajlvikata).
At the
same time, a layman should cultivate his spiritual welfare
by faith and confidence in moral, intellectual and
spiritual values
(saddha), abstaining from destroying life,
lying, stealing, sexual misconduct, falsehood and intoxicatinq
drinks (panca-sila) , practising charity, generosity, withm:.t
110
attachment and craving for his wealth (caga), and developing
wisdom which leads to the elimination of suffering, and to
~~
-
the realization of ultimatE: happiness (panna-sampada)
96
.
The eight-fold path to happiness and
3.9.4.
realization requires that one adopts a "right mode of
livelihood"
(samma-ajiva) .
The "wrong mode of livelihood"
(miccha-ajiva) is described <ts that of acquiring wealth with
the idea of adding gain to gain by resorting to trickery,
'
fraud and hypocritical talk
97
•
It is suggested that a good
Buddhist should not undertake trade in armaments, slaves,
.
.
.
mea t , 1ntox1cants and po1sons
98
Therefore, earning
righteously one should accumulate wealth and spend "one
portion for enjoyment, two portions for business and the
fourth portion should be deposited for the use in times of
.
need n
99
..
3 .10. 1.
Let us now consider some aspects of Asoka's
policy of government.
His importance for us lies in the fact
that he popularized the idea of ruling by righteousness
(dhamma).
Therefore, his policy of government is frequently
called a policy of dhamma.
Asoka is described as a world-ruler, who was
3.10.2.
a dhammika dhamma raja, a ruler who ruled in accordance with
dhamma
100
•
Therefore, it is with l:.im t-.hat v;·e find the
special significance of the early B"ddhist account of the
world-ruler (cakkavatti-raja) , to which reference has been
made above.(v.supra.3.8.1-3.8.12)
111
3.10 3.
There is, however, difference of opinion among
0
historians as to whether the cakkavatti idea] was adopted by
Asoka from the early Buddhists or the early Buddhists who
finally edited the Pali canon a few generations after Asoka
adopted it from him.
According to Buddhist sources, which
give the main body of Asoka's legends, such as the Mahavamsa,
Dipavamsa and Divyavadana, Asoka>as a pious Buddhist,ruled
his empire in accordance with the Buddha's dhamma, and tried
to strengthen and propagate Buddhism in and out of his
empire.
In the Dipavamsa, there is an attempt to connect
the idea of cakkavatti with Asoka.
It says" ... the wheel
of his power rolled through the great empire of Jambudvipa
"101
However, there are a number of discrepancies
between the legends and the edicts of Asoka.
The legends
give a different picture of Asoka in contrast to his own
. t s 102
e d 1c
.
..
3.10.4.
Since there are discrepancies in these two
sources, historians have expressed doubts whether the idea
of the cakkavatti in the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta (:::_.supra.
3.8.5) is in some way linked with Asoka.
Basham, when
speaking of this word, says that the interpretation of the
data is open to question, but the oldest occurrence of this
word appears in the Digha Nikaya.
Asoka or was inspired by him.
This text either inspired
However, the very late
character of the cakkavattisihanada sutta of the Digha
Nikaya suggests th
latterl03
His observation about the
very late character of the above sutta is correct, because
it records the prophecy of the future Buddha called Metteyya,
112
a late myth particularly popular in Mahayana Buddhism.
3.10.5.
Romila Thapar is also of the opinion that
it is unlikely that the cakravartin idea was a fully
developed political concept in the pre-Mauryan period, or
that most of Asoka's ideas were inspired by his ambition to
be a cakravartin.
Had this been the case he would surely
have mentioned it somewhere in his edicts, particularly as
he does give expression to many of his ambitions in these
104 •
sources
.
3.10.6.
On the other hand, S. Dutt suggests that it
was after his accession to the throne as a cakkavatti that
Asoka became a convert to Buddhism, and, after his
conversion, he aspired to fill the role of a dhamma-raja ·as
described in the Anguttara Nikaya (~.supra. 3.8.4).
He
gives evidence, following Kosambi and Lanman, that the text
named Aliya-vasani, recommended for the study to the monks
in the Calcutta-Bairat Edict, corresponds to the fourth
nipata of the Anguttara Nikaya and in the same Eoict occurs
a phrase borrowed from the text.
If Asoka was acquainted
with this part of the texts, we may presume his knowledge of
a sutta that occurs in it, describing the relationship of a
cakkavatti dhammika dhamma raja to dhamma.
Therefore Dutt
is of the opinion that it was from the text that Asoka
picked up the cue for the use of the term dhamma in this
way, and its frequent use in various contexts in his edicts
suggests that he meant it as a sort of emblem, to betoken the
overall character of his rule, that is the rule of a
113
- -105
cakkavattin who was a dhamma raja
3.10.7.
However, with all these differences of
opinion, we submit that the question forms a historical
problem, which is still open to debate.
possible.
No final answer is
But there are two sides to every question, and
some common features between the early Buddhist account of
the idea of cakkavatti and the character of Asoka's rule,
as Dutt suggests, are clear enough .
•
3.11.1.
What in fact is important for us is to
examine Asoka's dhamma and its relationship with the dhamma
of early Buddhism.
Asoka, in his edicts, repeatedly
emphasizes the importance of dhamma and makes use of it as a
moral and social force upon society, since he himself
professes to follow dhamma and wishes to employ it in all
his actions and measures, and has the intention of promoting
it.
3.11.2.
There is a difference of opinion among
scholars as to the exact nature of his policy of dhamma.
Some are of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma
conforms to the early Buddhist principles and policies of
government and betokens the overall character of the rule of
cakkavattin, who was a dhammika dhamma-raja
others who take the opposite view.
106
There are
Among them, Romila
Thapar is of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma was
.
.
. 107
h ~s own ~nvent~on
.
Therefore, it did not necessarily
conform to any of the religions.
114
"Had the dharruna conformed to any of the
religions, more particularly Buddhism,
the institution of the dhamma-mahamattas
would have been superfluous.
Each
religion had either its group of devoted
believers or its order of monks who could
have ben organized into active
propagandists with greater efficiency as
they would already have been ardent
believers"
3 .11. 3.
10 8
.
It is in fact true that Asoka himself
introduced new ideas, and some of them were not distinctively
Buddhist.
But Asoka's inscriptions and edicts, taken
collectively and broadly interpreted, show that there is
much Buddhist influence in his policy of dhamma.
We shall
illustrate this with examples.
3 .11. 4.
In the fourth Bhabru (or Bairat) rock
inscription the following texts are recommended by Asoka.
Scholars have identified these texts with parts of the Pali
canon
109
. d'1.cate d b e 1 ow:
, as 1.n
1. Vinaya samukase (samukkamsika dhammadesana: 8.5.420 ff.)
the Buddha's
principal sermon concerning the Four
Noble Truths.
2. Aliyavasani (dasa ariyavamsa: A.5.29)
the ten rules of the noble life.
3. Anagatabhayani (A.3.100 ff.): the five
]15
future dangers to be feared.
4. Munigatha (Muni sutta: sn. 207-221).
5. Moneyasute (Moneyyani: A.l.273):
On
moral perfection in body, speech and
mind.
6. Upatisapasine (Sariputta Sutta or
Therapanha Sutta: sn.955-975):
Question of Sariputta answered by the
Buddha.
7. Laghulovade (Maha-Rahulovada sutta:
M.l.421 ff.).
to lying
3.11.5.
selective.
Exhortation in regard
110
In his assimilation, Asoka was frankly
After greeting the Sangha, he says:
"You know, sirs, how deep is my respect
for and faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma
and Sangha ... Whatever the Buddha has
said is of course well said.
Allow me
to tell you what I believe contributes
to the long survival of the Buddha's
teaching"lll
This in fact shows how deeply he was influenced by Buddhism.
Moreover, Asoka mentions in several other places his faith
in Buddhism and his high regard for the Buddha and his
teaching.
Elsewhere he says:
"For two and a half years I have been an
open follower of the Buddha, though at
first I did not make much progress.
But
116
for more than a year now I have drawn
closer to the (Buddhist) Order, and have
made much progress.
rn India the gods
who formerly did not mix with men now do
so.
This is the result of effort, and
may be obtained not only by the great,
but even by the small, through effort thus they may even easily win heaven,
Father and mother should be obeyed,
teachers should be obeyed;
pity ...
should be felt for all creatures.
These
virtues of dhamma should be practised
This is an ancient rule, conducive to
long life"
3.11.6.
112
.
Asoka himself made public pronouncements about
his faith in Buddhism, and evidence of Buddhist influences
is not wanting in his Major Edicts.
many.
The reasons for this are
For one thing, he was ruling a country where there
existed a great diversity of faiths and sects.
For another,
as it is evident from his Rock Edict 13, he had a constant
source of danger from the wild uncivilized tribesmen of the
hills and jungles.
S. Dutt is much more specific, when
speaking of this problem he says:
" ... ruling over a country of people of
diverse faiths as an impartial sovereign,
even handed in his dealings and policies,
he could not exalt one faith over another
by his sovereign authority, though the
117
fact that the emperor himself was
Buddhist must have given a certain
. ht age
we~g
. h peop 1 e" 113
w~t
Ruling over a country where a great diversity
3.11.7.
of faiths and sects existed would have been impossible if he
did not apply an equal and impartial attitude.
He regarded
himself as the protector of the people rather than their
ruler.
The doctrine of loving kindness had a great effect
on Asoka (~.supra. 3.7.7).
From this it seems that he did
not lay great store by his sovereign authority, and saw the
practical advantage of applying dhamma to his policies.
He
interpreted dhamma in the designation of dhammika dhamma raja
in a sublimated sense, not as a concrete form of faith, but
an abstract ethical ideal that should set and regulate men's
pattern of life and conduct
3.11.8.
114
.
Asoka in applying the spirit of tolerance and
understanding towards other religions was following the early
Buddhist principle.
The Buddha very often showed great
respect to the leaders and followers of other religions and
strongly recommended his followers to respect other faiths
This precept in fact is what Asoka was following.
115
.
He
declared:
"The Beloved of the gods ... honours
members of all sects, whether ascetics or
householders, by gifts and various honours.
But he does not consider gifts and honours
as important as the furtherance of the
118
essential message of all sects.
This
essential message varies from sect to
sect, but it has one common basis, that
one should so control one's tongue as
not to honour one's own set or disparage
another's on the wrong occasions;
for
on certain occasions one should do so
only mildly, and indeed on other
occasions one should honour other men's
sects.
By doing this one strengthens
one's own sect and helps the others,
while by doing otherwise one harms one's
own sect and does a disservice to the
others.
Whoever honours his own sect and
disparages another man's, whether from
blind loyalty or with the intention of
showing his own sect in a favourable
light, does his own sect the greatest
possible harm.
Concord is best, with
each hearing and respecting the other's
teachings.
It is the wish of the Beloved
of the gods that members of all sects
should be learned and should teach virtue
•.. Many officials are busied in this
matter ... and the result is the progress
of my own sect and the illumination of
dh amma
.,116
.
119
3.12.1.
Let us examine some of the viewpoints that
Asoka adopted from early Buddhism.
First, the effect that
early Buddhism had on the internal and foreign policy and the
abandonment of aggressive war is clearly seen from his
statement in one of his Rock Edicts.
In Asoka's own words:
"When the king, Beloved of the gods and
Gracious Mien, had been consecrated eight
years.
Kalinga was conquered, 150,000
people were deported, 100,000 were killed,
and many times that number died.
But after
the conquest of Kalinga, the B.eloved of
the gods began to follow dhamma, to love
dhamma, and to give instruction in dhamma.
Now the Beloved •.. regrets the conquest
of Kalinga, for when an independent
country is conquered people are killed,
they die, or are deported, and that the
Beloved ... finds very painful and
grievous.
And this he finds even more
grievous -
that all the inhabitants -
brahmans, ascetics, and other sectarians,
and householders who are obedient to
superiors, parents, and elders, who treat
friends, acquaintances, companions,
relatives, slaves, and servants with
respect, and are firm in their faith all suffer violence, murder, and
separation from their loved ones.
Even
120
those who are fortunate enough not to
have lost those near and dear to th.em are
afflicted at the misfortunes of friends
The participation of all men in
common suffering is grievous to the
Beloved ...
There is no land, except
that of the Greeks, where groups of
brahmans and ascetics are not found, or
where men are not members of one sect or
another.
So now, even if the members of
those killed and captured in the conquest
of Kalinga had been a hundred or a
thousand times less, it would be grievous
to the Beloved ... He will forgive as far
as he can, and he even conciliates the
forest tribes of his dominions;
but he
warns them that there is power even in the
remorse of the Beloved ... , and he tells
them to reform, lest they be killed.
For
all beings the Beloved ... desires
security, self control, calm of mind, and
gentleness. He considers that the
greatest victory is the victory of dhamma;
and this he has won here (in India) and
even five hundred leagues beyond his
frontiers in the realm of the Greek king
Antiochus, and beyond Antiochus among the
four kings, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and
121
A1exander.
Even where the envoys of the
Beloved ... have not been sent men hear
of the way in which he follows and teaches
dhamma, and they too follow i t and will
follow it.
Thus he achieves a universal
conquest, and conquest always gives a
feeling of pleasure;
yet it is but a
slight pleasure, for the Beloved ... only
looks on that which concerns the next
life as of great importance.
The Beloved
... had this inscription of dhamma
engraved that all his sons and grandsons
may not seek to gain new victories, that
in whatever victories they may gain they
may prefer forgiveness and light punishment,
that they may consider the only (valid)
victory the victory of dhamma, which of
value both in this world and the next, and
that all their pleasure may be in dhamma
.117
3.12.2.
This alone shows the impact of the early
Buddhist attitude to war (v.infra. 3.13.1 - 3.13.9) on the
- ----language as well as on the policy of Asoka.
It appears from
the above passage that Asoka was trying to emulate the
example of the righteous world-ruler as described in the early
Buddhist texts.
It seems that he won many victories by the
method of "conquest by righteousness"
by the sword.
(dhamma-vijaya), not
It has been held that the concept of dharma-
122
vijaya is found in the Arthasastra 118 , but as we shall see
more precisely later
{~.infra.
3.13.4), the Brahmanical
dharma-vijaya was a conquest by the sword.
Barua has shown
that Asoka rightly characterized dharma-vijaya as a milder
mebhod of conquest, where forebearance and light punishment
were to be practised and preferred.
The Buddhistic dhamma-
vijaya was to be achieved "without the employemtn of the
sword or armed force ... " 119 .
It also seems that Asoka
sent envoys to the five Hellenic kings, whose names are
.
. d b y Ind1an1zat1on
.
.
. 120 , urg1ng
.
1 oose 1 y d 1sgu1se
them to accept
his policy and his moral leadership.
This means that he did
not give up his imperial ambitions, but attempted to further
. a b enevo 1 ent sp1r1t
. . an d w1t
. h out recourse to arms 121 .
t h em 1n
3.12.3.
It was in early Buddhism that there emerged
for the first time in Indian history the idea of a universal
good embracing. the whole world.
edicts of Asoka.
This idea is explicit in t.he
Their contents reveal the fact that his
main consideration was to set up a just social order and
work for the welfare of the whole world.
The following
reforms mentioned in his edicts throw light on social
welfare.
1. Forbidding slaughter of animals.
Sacredness of all life. {1st Major
Rock Edict, 5th Pillar Edict).
2. Establishments for the dispensing of
medicine for men and animals, and
works of social utility and help
extended to those in distress {2nd
123
Major Rock Edict, 7th Pillar Edict) .
3. Appointment of rural administrators
and heads of the districts in order to
instruct people in dhamma as well as
for other purposes (3rd Major Rock
Edict) .
4. Appointments of Ministers of dhamma to
work for the welfare and happiness of
the people without any discrimination
whatsoever throughout the empire (5th
Major Rock Edict) .
5. Prompt dispatch of business of the
kingdom (6th Major Rock Edict).
6. Change in the nature of the king's
pleasure trips and the practice of
tours connected with dhamma (8th Major
Rock Edict) .
7. Recommendation that various ceremonies
of dhamma which include regard for
slaves and servants, respect for
teachers, restrained behaviour towards
living beings, and donations to
religious people are recommended as of
great value (9th Major Rock Edict) .
8. Instruction to the officers and city
magistrates to practise impartiality
(1st Separate Edict - Dhauli and
Jangada) .
124
9. Instruction to the officers to win the
confidence of the frontier people, and
to work for their welfare and happiness
(2nd Separate Edict).
3.12.4.
All in all, we can see the application of
Buddhist principles to the policy of Asoka's government.
They can be compared with many passages of the early Buddhist
texts to which reference has been made above.
3.12.5.
~s
With all deference to some historians, such
Basham and Thapor, who say that the dhamma officially
propagated by Asoka was not Buddhism
122
, we wish to submit
that Asoka's, as a temporal counterpart of the Buddha
(cakkavatti-raja), attempted to rule his kingdom in both his
internal and foreign policy in accordance with the
humanitarian principles of early Buddhism as he understood
them.
It now remains for us to deal with the early
3.13.1.
Buddhist attitude to war, since this had a striking impact
on Asoka.
According to early B.uddhism, wars and disputes
have their origins in the minds of men.
The preoccupation
with thoughts of destruction and ill-will, and the subtle
defilements consisting of racial feelinqs, national feelings
and egotism or personal or national pride are the main causes
of wars and disputes.
The Buddha said that "it is possible
to rule a country in accordance with dhamma without smiting
or letting others slay, without conquering or making others
sorrow"
123
.
One should practise selfless service and
125
and friendliness for the sake of social harmony.
This is
well illustrated in the Mahavastu:
"0 king, do not foster hostility towards
neighbouring kings.
Whosoever hates will
be repaid with hatred by his foe.
cultivate ties of friendship with
neighbouring kings, ... for other peoples
honour kings who stedfast in friendship"
3.13.2.
124
Thus, non-aggression and co-operation are
recommended as the best policy for achieving peace, love and
understanding.
further wars.
According to early Buddhism, wars result in
The following are sentiments about war and
enmity expressed in the Dhammapada:
"'He abused me, beat me, overcame me,
robbed me' - in those who harbour such
thoughts hatred does not cease.
'He abused me ... ' -in those who do not
harbour such thoughts hatred ceases.
Hatred never ceases by hatred in this
world.
Hatred ceases by love - this is
the ancient law.
Other do not know that 'we come to an end
here'.
But those who know this, have
their quarrels calmed thereby.
The noblest conqueror is he who would
conquer himself ratrer than defeat a
hundred thousand men in battle.
Self-conquest is, indeed, better than the
126
conquest of all others.
Happily do we live without anger among
those who are angry.
Let us live without
anger amongst angry folk.
Victory breeds hatred;
the vanquished
live in sorrow.
The peaceful ones live in harmony giving
up both victory and defeat.
Conquer enmity with amity, evil with
good;
conquer miserliness with charity
and falsehood with truth.
Whoso desires his own happiness by
inflicting suffering on others is not
released from hatred, being himself
entangled in the bonds of hatred"
3.13.3.
125
.
The early Buddhist attitude to war differs
from that of Hinduism.
Even in Vedic times there existed a
political materialism among some recluses and brahmins, who
according to early Buddhist texts taught khatta-vijja or the
"scienC'e of power" 126 .
Buddhaghosa explains this term in a
sense similar to that of khatta-dhamma "the law of ruling or
.
" 1n
. t h e Jata
k as 12 7 as n1t1sat
"" .
th a 128 , wh.1ch
po 1 1. t.1ca 1 sc1ence
means both "political science and law".
This term is
mentioned in the Chandogya Upanisad as ksatra-vidya and
Sa~kara has interpreted this to mean "military science"
(dhanur-veda)
129
.
This "science of power" included both
military and political science as well as the study of law,
considered as an instrument for the retention and advancement
127
of power.
Here the principle of expediency based on one's
material interests was to be the guiding principles behind
military s.trategy, political power and law.
inculcates Machiavellian tricks.
This philosophy
A Jataka story refers to
this philosophy as follows:
"Fools thinking themselves learned say that
there is the "rule of might" (khatta-vijja)
in the world;
one may kill his parents,
elder brother, children and wife if one's
material interests demand it (attho ca
tadiso siya)
~I'\
3.13.4.
130
.
Following this philosophy, the later classical
texts of Hinduism such as the Dharmasastras, the Arthasastra,
the Santiparvan of the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita
illustrate the ideal of imperial domination by conquest.
For example, the entire Tenth and TWelfth Books of the
Arthasastra deal with the ideals of conquest.
In it there is
a formula of Sadgunya which sums up the military strength of
any "circle of states" (mandala) as consisting of the six
policies.
They are: making a treaty containing conditions
or terms, that is, the policy cf peace (samdhi), the policy
of hostility (vigraha), the policy of remaining quiet (and
not planning to march on an expedition) -
(asana), marching
on an expedition (yana) , seeking shelter with another king
or in a fort (_~amsrayal ' the double policy of samdhi with
one king and vigraha with another at the same time
( dval'dh'1bh-ava )131 .
The general principle is that when one
is weaker than the enemy, the policy of peace should be
128
followed, if stronger than he, the policy of hostility should
be followed.
If both are equal in power, neutrality is the
right policy, but if one is very strong, one should march
on an expedition.
When one is very weak, seeking shelter
with another king or in a fort is necessary, while the last
is the policy recommended when with help from another source
one can fight one's enemf 32
3.13.5.
It is clear from this sixfold policy that
peace is only a temporary expedient for a kingdom that feels
that it is not strong enough to defeat another kingdom.
Moreover, it is not a policy of maintaining a balance of
power to keep peace
133
All in all, the Hindu texts preach
the doctrine that conquering in battle is one of the duties
134 , an d engaglng
.
.
.
.
.
o f a k lng
ln
a war of aggresslon
lS
a
meritorious deed,
It is said:
"The kings who perform great sacrifices,
who are possessed of a knowledge of the
Vedas, and who gain victories in battle,
become foremost of those that acquire
many blessed regions hereafter by their
merit.
Therefore, a king who desires to
acquire religious merit should engage in
battle"
135
.
"For without battle, he cannot extend his
kingdom and acquire wealth to give away
and meet the expenses of sacrl' f 'lees .,136
"A king whose power has been consolidated
and who is confident of his own strength
129
should assail a neighbour who is weaker
than himself but never one who is
stronger"
137
"Consider your own class duty, then too
you have no cause to quail;
for nothing
is better for a man of the princely class
than a fight prescribed by law"
138
.
"Cast all your works on Me, your thoughts
(withdrawn) in what appertains to self;
have neither hope nor thought that 'This
is mine':
cast off this fever! Fight!"
139
"Hold pleasure and pain, profit and loss,
victory and defeat to be the same:
brace yourself for the fight.
bring no evil on yourself"
then
So you will
140
"Play not the eunuch, for this ill beseems
you:
give up this vile faint-heartedness.
Stand up, chastiser of your foes!"
3.13.6.
141
.
Those are some of the sayings about war in the
Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita.
It seems quite clear that
they are the antithesis of the sentiments expressed in the
early Buddhist texts
(~.supra.
3.13.2).
This may be further
illustrated from the advice of the Buddha.
He was placed in
a similar situation to that of Krsna on the eve of a war
...
between his own people, the Sakyas and their blood brothers,
the Koliyas.
A dispute arose between these two tribes about
the right to the use of the waters of the river Rohini, which
flowed between their territories.
When the dispute ran high,
130
with words of abuse, the soldiers on each side were
assembled (as the Kurus and Pandavas had assembled)
fight.
for the
The Buddha intervened and asked them what the war
was about.
The answer was that it was over the water.
He
settled the dispute by peaceful means and said:
"Why, on account of some water of little
worth, would you destroy the invaluable
lives of these soldiers•• 142 .
Commenting•on a war between two kings on another occasion the
Buddha says:
"Victory arouses enmity and the defeated
live in sorrow;
the victor obtains himself
. h er ,.143
a vanqu1s
On the other hand, the Hindus believe that
3.13.7.
"one who fights with selfless motive incurs no sin, whereas
if one fights with selfish motive he would still st2.nd to
profit either by gain and honour on earth or by glory in
heaven"l44.
'
"the warrior who falls in the battleground while
. h t1ng
.
.
h eaven ,.145
f 1g
atta1ns
the opposite ,·iew.
The early Buddhists maintain
For example, the Buddha answers the
question of a warrior-chief in connection with the above
beliefs thus:
"In the case of a warrior who in battle
exerts himself, puts forth effort, he
must previously have had this low, mean
perverse idea:
'Let those beings be
tortured, be destroyed, be exterminated,
so that they may be thought never to
131
have existed'.
Then, so exerting himself,
so putting forth effort, other men torture
him and make an end of him.
When his body
breaks up, after death he is reborn in a
hapless condition•• 146
~
A It is in this sense that early Buddhism condemned the
manufacture and sale of weapons of war as a wrong mode of
. l"h
1 1ve
1 oo dl47 .
•
3.13.8.
However, the question as to how a king should
meet aggression is also dealt with.
There is a mention of
two policies, each of which has been pursued by two kings,
who "rule their kingdom in accordance with righteousness"
..
) 148 .
( dhammena raJ]am
karento
in a Jataka story.
These principles are enunciated
It tells that two kings met in a place
where the carriage-road was deeply sunk between two' banks,
and there was no room for one carriage to pass another.
The
question of precedence was raised, since it was necessary for
one to give way.
Since i t was discovered that the extent of
their kingdom, their military strength, economic resources,
prestige and the nobility of birth and age of the kings were
the same, there was a discussion about their policies.
At
this stage the policy one is summed up as follows:
"He meets force with force, mildness with
mildness;
he wins over the good with
good and conquers the evil with evil"
149
The poli.cy of the other is summed up as follows:
"He conquers with kindness, evil with
good, greed with charity and falsehood
.
132
with truth"lSO
3.13.9.
This latter policy was acknowledged as the
best and the former voluntarily gave way.
The former is the
policy of meeting aggression with military force in a war of
self-defence without indulging in aggression oneself.
It
should be noted that early Buddhism did not talk about a
Utopian state and did not recommend a policy of disbanding
the army
151
.
Asoka also continued to govern his kingdom
without disbanding the army, since many of his subjects
faced a constant source of danger from the wild tribesmen in
his kingdom.
Despite the peace, security and prosperity of
the kingdom, the king must keep his army satisfied and in a
state of military preparedness and good humour, according to
Buddhism.
It is said in the Jatakamala:
"A prince who, having no reason to complain
of his army, fails to honour it and
disregards his military men who have shown
their valour on the battle field and are
renowned for their skill in the science of
arms, surely such a king will be deserted
.
. b attle" 152 .
·b y v1ctory
1n
The army is necessary to meet aggression, but it is said that
a king who rules his kingdom on the basis of friendliness is
unlikely to be attacked:
"On friendliness does his strength rest,
not on his motley-bannered army, which he
keeps only to comply with custom.
He
knows no anger, nor does he speak harsh
133
words, protects his land in the proper
manner.
Righteousness is the rule of
his actions, not political wisdom, that
b ase
3.13.10.
.
'153 .
sc~ence'
Despite the fact that a wise king may counter
aggression with military force, passive resistance is held
up as the better
.
~deal
154
.
- The Mahasilava Jataka illustrates
the fact that passive resistance would be eventually triumph•
ant if tried. It tells how the king of Kosala appeared
outside the city of Benares and sent a message to the king
of Benares bidding him either yield up the kingdom or give
battle.
However, the king of Benares had a thousand gallant
warriors, who would face the charge even of a rut elephant,
but his reply was:
"I fight not, let him seize my kingdom".
Finally after a series of events when the king was in a
position to overpower his foe but did not do so, i t is said
that "the usurper's heart was moved within him" and the king
.
rega~ne
3.14.1.
d h'~s k'~ng d om155
Thus it is clear that the political authority
is subject to dhamma or the law of righteousness.
The king
rules in accordance with dhamma and has an obligation of two
kinds.
First, he should promote the material and spiritual
welfare of his subjects in internal policy.
Secondly, in
foreign policy the king should not commit aggression and
co-operate with other kingdoms for the common good of mankind.
The keynote of early Buddhism is to reform humanity.
134
CHAPTER FOUR
ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY
We have seen in chapter three that there
4.1.1.
emerged with early Buddhism the conception of a common good,
embracing the whole world and conceived as material and
spiritual welfare.
Of similar importance is the conception
of a common humanity or unity of mankind.
This view is most
closely connected with the idea of equality.
In this
chapter, therefore, we shall examine the idea of equality,
as it appears in the early Buddhist texts.
In order to understand the early Buddhist
4.2.1.
attitude to equality, it is necessary to have a description,
however brief, of the ancient Indian social order and its
origins.
The earliest evidence we have of the Indian social
order is to be found in the Vedic literature, the work of the
1
Aryans , who entered India in the Second millennium B.C.
Our knowledge of their earliest phase is based primarily on
the Rg-Veda.
It gives a fairly clear picture of the first
-
settlement of the early Aryans in ancient India.
When the
Aryans first entered India, they fought with native peoples,
2
called Dasa and Dasyus , probably originally two prominent
indigenous tribes.
The main motive of the Aryans was to
subjugate and suppress these peoples.
Moreover, the Aryans
developed a consciousness of belonging to a superior race
from the beginning of their conflicts in India.
4.2.2.
A number of ways were devised by the Aryans
135
to develop a consciousness of belonging to a superior race,
because there was an acute disjunction between the Aryans
and the indigenous peoples in several respects.
In physical
appearance, the Aryans had certain inheritable physical
characteristics in common.
They were tall men, proud of their
fairer skin and disdainful of others whose skin was darker.
On the other hand, the Dasas and Dasyus were "dark skinned,
noseless and bull lipped" 3
religion.
There was also a difference in
•The Aryans had a common religion.
people did not worship their gods.
The darker
They were considered to
be phallus-worshippers, lawless and lacking devotion
4
Moreover, the language and manners of the two racial groups
5
were different .
4.2.3.
The Rg-Veda gives many accounts of the
emotions the Aryans felt towards one another and towards the
darker people.
For example, at one place, it is said:
"We are surrounded on all sides by Dasa
tribes.
They do not believe in anything.
They are not men.
Kill them.
0 destroyer of foes!
6
Destroy the Dasa race" •
The implication of this hymn is that there was intense racial
prejudice among the Aryans.
The Aryans treated the darker
people as an "out group" and looked on them as scarcely
7
human .
This extreme prejudice can also be illustrated by
another example, the recurring theme of the Aryans praying
8
to Indra for the elimination of the darker people .
~g-Veda
The
describes how Indra killed the darker people and
9
protected the white colour , and how he trampled down in the
136
caves the darker colour 10 .
4.3.1.
There was at first continuous fighting between
the Aryans and the darker people.
From these fights, the
Aryans gained complete victory and settled down in Panjab as
the dominant people.
When they were fairly well settled,
they developed a tendency towards a gradation of society.
Among the Aryans themselves birth (jati) in the families
(~ulas)
of priests, warriors and farmers was beginning to
.
intensify gradations in their society which may have existed
ll
.
ear l J.er .
In the early stage, the Aryans were divided into
three groups among themselves - priestly, warrior and
commoner, a division in which the three groups were expected
to promote spiritual progress, military pre-eminence and
cattle prosperity respectively 12
4.3.2.
In later times, there was a process of mixing
with the darker people in several aspects.
Therefore, the
notion of social differentiation was recognized, and
differences were sanctioned which placed individuals higher
or lower in the social scale.
In course of time, the system
of the four-fold division of society into Brahmanas, Ksatriyas,
Vaisyas and Sudras was fully recognized.
This division was
accepted as fundamental, primeval, and divinely ordained.
The four-fold division of society finally developed within
the Aryan race, the suppressed Dasas and Dasyus, or persons
partially descended from them, receiving a humble place in
.
-.
the socJ.al
order as Sudras,
who formed a kJ.nd
of helot class l3 .
4.3.3.
Each of these groups is referred to as Varna.
137
The word varna (Sanskrit, vanna in Pali) is often confused
.
----.-
with caste (jati, jat - literally meaning "birth"), since
many writers have translated it thus.
The word signifies in
its basic and general sense "appearance" or "colour", but as
shown by Trautmann, in its technical sense it comes closest
to the medieval western conception of "order" or "estates"
14
Trautmann writes that the most acceptable translation for
varna so far put forward is "class", but this term often has
an
economi~
connotation.
In Indian thought varnas are not
essentially economic but sacred.
Therefore, to translate
varna as "class" is to choose a term much too objective,
---.-15 .
.
t'f'
sc1en
1 lC an d mo d ern
4.3.4.
The origin of the caste system cannot be
clearly traced historically.
There are various hypotheses
about the origin of caste, but as shown by Basham, they have
no scientific validity.
He writes that varnas should never
be referred to as castes, since they are not and never have
been castes, and traditional view that castes are a result
of the fragmentation and miscegenation of the varnas is
----.--
. 16 .
qu1' te Wl'th out foun d at1on
4.3.5.
Whatever the origin of caste, it is clearly
evident from the Pali texts and the Brahmanical literature
that caste and the system of the four orders of society did
exist, the latter at least in theory.
Basham adds that the
most outstanding feature of traditional Indian society was
caste rather than varna.
Usually a brahmana is conscious of
being a brahmana, and so is a ksatriya, but the average
.
138
member of the two lower orders, which constitute the great
bulk of the population, is much more aware of his caste (jati)
than of his order (varna).
It is his caste, not the orders
of society to which he belongs, which gives him a sense of
community, of being a member of something greater than
.
1 f 17 .
h 1-mse
4.3.6.
The system of varnas was probably an
innovation of the Br~manas themselves.
Later this was given
a divine sanction by being considered as a creation of the
Cosmic Person.
As we have seen earlier
(~.supra.2.3.3.),
the "Hymn of the Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda describes
how the four varnas were created by the divine victim.
We
were also told that horses, cows, goats, sheep and other
animals were created from the same victim 18 .
4.3.7.
Later, it was believed that, in order to
maintain the prosperity of the world, the Cosmic Person
declared in due order the sacred laws to each of the four
varnas, laying down their specific aptitudes and functions
19
However, it is not made explicit in this religious context,
.
why all four varnas
were not treated equally, as they had a
.
common origin from the body of the Cosmic Person
20
;
but it
is assumed that the various parts of the body of the Cosmic
Person were considered nobler according to their height
above the ground.
As we have seen, later Buddhist authors
attacked this myth, claiming that if it is true then the
Cosmic Person is full of injustice and prejudice.
If he is
the Lord of the world why did he not give the sacred laws
.
139
without making any discrimination, opening the doors for
everybody?
and unjust
This implies that the Lord's creation is evil
(~.supra.
4.3.8.
2.10.2;
infra. 4.6.9).
In the social context the four-fold division
involved a fragmentation of the race
21
The four varnas
were looked on as essentially different species
22
.
The
Sudras were mainly distinguished from the others by race.
The practical outcome was that, in the social order,
subordinate and superior status, prestige and power, tended
to perpetuate themselves from one generation to another.
Duties, obligations and roles were recognized and respected.
The Sudras originally had no right to social status and they
were completely an "out group".
The only function that "the
Lord" prescribed to them was to serve others
23
.
The above
four-fold division of society received greater priestly
.
authority in the time of the Brahmanas and Upanisads.
.
The
concept of dharma was interpreted as being ultimately
connected with the divine creation of the social order in
four varnas (v.supra. 3.3.3).
.
-
Within this social order, the
Brahmanas claimed very high social privileges and supremacy
(~.supra.
4.3.9.
2.3.5., 2.5.4. - 2.5.5., 3.3.5 - 3.3. 7).
The Brahmanas had a number of reasons for
claiming their hierarchy of prestige and power over the
others. We have seen some of the claims of Brahmanas
regarding their supreme social status
- 2.5.6).
(~.supra.
The main reasons for this are many.
foremost was psychological and social.
2.3.5., 2.5.2.
The first and
The Brahmanas had a
140
great fear of losing their social status and they largely
regulated social behaviour through their influence over
kings and people.
Their most important psychological need
was to remain in the superior social position.
Moreover,
they had a fear of pollution from social contact, and this
led to rigid regulations in many fields of human activity.
Social intercourse was restricted on the grounds that the
four-fold division of society was genetically determined and
fixed;
ana inter-marriage was condemned as both biologically
and socially undesirable
. .
f
re 1 ~g~ous
reedom 25 ,
freedom
27
24
.
.
.
The lowest varna was denied
pol~t~cal
an d
, and equality before law
.
soc~al
28
.
freedom 26 ,
.
econom~c
All these beliefs,
attitudes and practices were associated with the Brahmanas
social and psychological need to preserve their own
innovation of social order and to maintain important functions
such as their trusteeship for the gods, and to remove their
fear of losing their distinguished positions.
From the
economic point of view the Sudras formed a supply of cheap
labour, and thus the institution was important even beyond
the ritual and social sphere.
4.4.1.
It has been widely recognized that early
Buddhism denounced all claims of the Brahmanas to superiority
and opened the doors for the welfare of a11
29
.
The reasons
adduced for this emergence of egalitarian thought are many.
For one thing, in ancient India at the time of the rise of
Buddhism, there was a rapid change in the structure of life
and society.
It was evidently a period of expanding material
culture with far wider commercial activities and economic
141
.
30
progress
However, the commercial classes rapidly gaining
8conomic importance, were socially inferior and they were in
practice generally treated contemptuously by the Brahmanas,
who claimed every social privileges and supremacy.
The Buddha
or early Buddhism strongly objected to such social
discrimination.
Romila Thapar, for example, writes that the
social equality preached by Buddhism made a strong appeal to
those who were considered socially inferior 31 .
4.4.2.
Throughout the Pali literature, no other
social problem is referred to so often as the supremacy of
the Brahmanas.
This was another reason, among many more, why
the Pali texts discuss the idea of equality.
In this sense
most scholars have treated Buddhism as unique among Indian
religions because of the central place it gives to the idea
.
31A
of equality.
However, there seems to be some misconception
in this proposition.
4.4.3.
According to one view the Buddha restated
what was already current among the Vedic thinkers.
Radhakrishnan and Rhys Davids, for example, have stated that
the Buddha was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu
or a typical Indian
(~.supra.
1.4.1, 1.4.3).
Rhys Davids
writes:
"Such originality as Gautama possessed lay
in the way in which he adopted, enlarged,
ennobled, and systematized that which had
already been well said by others;
in the
way in which he carried to their logical
142
conclusion, principles of equity and
justice already acknowledged by some of
the most prominent earlier thinkers"
32
.
Elsewhere, Rhys Davids writes:
"Some writers on Buddhism do not hesitate
to ascribe to the Buddha the role of a
successful political reformer, by
representing him as having fought for the
poor and despised against the rich and
privileged classes, and as having gone
far to abolish caste.
Other writers gird
at the Buddha because most of the leaders
of his Order were drawn from the ranks of
the respectable and well-to-do with an
education in keeping with their social
position, and disparage him for neglecting
the humble and wretched, for not using his
influence to abolish, or to mitigate, the
harshness of caste rules''
33
.
Giving these two alternatives, Rhys Davids adds that both are
equally unhistorica1
4.4.4.
34
.
While there are two sides to every question,
we shall try to follow the trend of argument.
The Brahmanas
view of social organization, as we have seen above, was based
on the system of four varnas, a system which was divinely
ordered.
In the thought of early Buddhism, as we have seen
in chapter three, the notions of justice, concord, friendship,
loving kindness and equal respect for all were seen as
143
essential for the preservation of just social and political
order.
These notions offered something approaching a true
conception of equality.
At a time when material culture was
developing so rapidly, equal religious, social, political
and judicial rights were considered as most desirable to
curb the power and prestige of any one class and to allot
social responsibilities, not according to any class system
but solely on merit.
The new emphasis on equality as an
ideal is perhaps best seen in the words of the Buddha:
"The facts being what they are, the people
of all four varnas are absolutely equal
and I do not see any difference at all
among them
.,35
The criteria of equality are:
"Not by birth does one become a brahman a,
by his action alone one becomes a brahmana,
a farmer, an artisan, a trader, a servant,
a thief, a soldier and a king"
4.4.5.
36
The assumption here is that men can be judged
only by the good and bad actions they do and not by the
stations of life in which they were placed by virtue of their
birth.
It is according to kammic 37 factors that men can be
divided into high or low orders.
Sutta
38
In the Culakammavibhanga
, the Buddha is asked the question:
"What is the reason and the cause for the
inequality among human beings, despite
their being human?".
The Buddha's reply is:
144
"Beings inherit their karnma and kamma
divides beings in respect of their
(various) high and low states"
39
.
Although early Buddhism recognizes this variation, it does
not assert that everything is due to kamma.
The recognition
of known inequalities among human beings does not mean that
early Buddhism accepted the status quo of a static conception
of society or denied the doctrine of equality of mankind.
The
ethical teachings of early Buddhism revolves round the
conception of the destruction or elimination of the evil
effects of
ka~
by effecting a change in the basis of human
motivation from that of greed, hate and ignorance to
selflessness, compassion and understanding.
In the sphere of
moral life, early Buddhism recognises the authority of dharnma.
This is clearly stated in the Ambalatthika-Rahulovada Sutta
40
,
where it is said that the behaviour of man should be such
that i t does not lead to the harm of oneself, of others, or
of both.
It should be morally good (kusala), yielding
happiness (sukhudraya) and resulting in happiness (sukhavipaka)
This is the path leading to the destruction of karnmic effects.
Hence, here too, dhamma is recognized as the authority,
depending on which society is graded
4.5.1.
42
It is necessary to point out, before taking
it up for actual discussion, the early Buddhist view of man's
duty in his human existence, since it has some relevance to
the idea of equality.
Early Buddhism holds that the world
goes through periods of evolution and dissolution (samvatta
.
) 43
and Vlvatta
· .
The early Buddhist texts state that the
41
.
145
world is gradually declining, on account of man's greed and
evil ways, and this decline will reach its nadir in a
catastrophic war
(~.supra.
3.8.6).
It seems from this
account, that the function of the Buddha and a world-ruler
is to restore the standards of human life, if temporarily.
It is with this possibility in mind that the Buddha is said
to have "been born for the good and happiness of mankind"
(~.supra.
3.4.7), and likewise a world-ruler is said to
"be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind"
3.4.8).
(~.supra.
On a basis such as this, i t is clear that both a
Buddha and a world-ruler are believed to stand for the
oneness of humanity, the idea of human equality and the
spiritual unity of mankind.
4.5.2.
Moreover, there are accounts of the origin
and extent of the universe and man's place in it.
According
to the early Buddhist conception of the universe, there are
innumerable world systems
44
.
In the vastness of the cosmos,
the human worlds form a very small part.
All beings within
the human worlds, however low their state of evolution may
be45
'
are said to have the capacity to evolve up to the very
highest state; and however high their states may be they are
said to be subject to death so long as they remain within
the human worlds
46
.
The human worlds are always represented
as standing midway in the hierarchy of the worlds. Life in
these human worlds is a mixture of the pleasant and unpleasant,
good and evil, while the pleasant and good traits are
intensified in the higher worlds and the unpleasant and evil
.
ln
t h e 1 ower 47 .
146
4.5.3.
The span of life of human beings is
insignificantly small in comparison with cosmic time and
may be compared in its duration to a line drawn on the
ear th 48 .
However
.
.
. .
~ns~gn~f~cant
man may b e f rom a
.
cosm~c
perspective, it is pointed out in the early Buddhist texts
that human birth is very valuable in the cosmic scheme. It
49
is said that "birth as a human being is a rare event"
.
In the course of our samsaric evolution human beings have
been born, •it is believed, hundreds of times as animals,
and it is rarely that we emerge into a human existence
50
.
It is said that it is a difficult thing for a man who has
gone down the scale of existence to a subhuman condition to
emerge as a man again.
The reason given for this is that
among the lower animals there prevails no practice of
righteousness or equitable living but just cannibalism, the
stronger preying on the weaker creature" 51 .
4.5.4.
At this rare human level, all human beings
have something in common by virtue of the fact that they
belong to a common humanity.
This being the case, the
people of the four varnas and people of "diverse races"
- (nanajacca)
are said to be equal 52 .
species.
Man belonged to one
Owing to this oneness, of which he is ignorant,
egotism or personal and national pride, racial feelings and
.
1
nat~ona
f ee 1"~ngs are
.d
cons~
ere d. as
.
k
m~sta
en
.
not~ons
53
.
Also, at this human level, whatever individual differences
there may be, man has within himself the capacity of gaining
the highest knowledge for his salvation.
Thus, everyone has
a duty to help his fellow beings in their development and no
147
one has any right or valid grounds to despise another.
Man
has within himself the ability of gaining moral, intellectual
and spriritual worthiness by developing and extending mutual
help to others
54
.
This is the point of departure in early
Buddhism for the idea of human equality, looking at the value
of human life, which is a rare thing in the cosmos.
4.6.1.
The new emphasis on equality as an ideal is
best seen in the arguments of the early Buddhists.
There are
a number of arguments scattered through the Pali texts, but
if we take them together and analyse them, we can find six
main arguments.
However, some writers like Rhys Davids and
B.C. Law classified them under three heads.
Rhys Davids, they are:
According to
biological, historical and ethica1
Law also mentions three arguments.
occupational and cultura1
56
They are:
55
.
biological,
On the other hand, Malalasekera
and Jayatilleke classified them under three heads biological, sociological and ethico-religious
Jayatilleke in his later work adds four more.
him there are seven arguments:
57
, but
According to
biological, anthropological,
sociological, legal, moral, ethical and religious or
. .
158
spJ.rJ.tua
Following Jayatilleke's classification
approximately, we submit six main arguments used by the early
Buddhists in support of their attitude to equality.
4.6.2.
biological.
Among these six arguments, the first is
It is said that in the case of animals and
plants, specific and generic differences are perceptible;
but mankind is one species.
The distinction is drawn clearly
148
in the Vasettha
Sutta 59 .
.
.
Two young
brahmanas,
Vasettha
and
.
Bharadraja, were discussing what makes a true brahmana.
The
latter maintained that it was pure descent from seven
generations of ancestors, with neither break nor blemish in
the lineage.
The former maintained that virtue and moral
behaviour made a true brahmana.
As neither could convince
the other, they referred the matter to the Buddha, who is
said to have replied in verse as follows:
"I will explain to you step by step and
accurately the division of living things
into species, for species are separated
one from another.
You should know that
grass and trees have no reasoning power,
yet they possess the characteristics of
their species, for species are separated
one from another.
Moreover, beetles,
moths and ants also have the
characteristics of their species, for
species are separated one from another.
And so it is with four-footed creatures,
great and small ... reptiles, snakes,
long-backed animals, fish and creatures
living in water, birds and winged
creatures, they ail have the characteristics of their species, for species are
separated one from another.
In all these
species the specific characteristics are
evident, but this is not the case with
149
men .•.
Not in the hair, head, ears,
mouth, nose, lips, brows, throat, hips,
belly, back, behind, sex .organs· or
breast ... , is there any specific
characteristics (to divide one class of
man from another) as there is in other
species.
There is no distinction in the
bodies of men (of different classes) .
The difference in men is conventional".
Continuing, the Buddha says:
"I do not
call one a brahmana on account of his
birth or his origin from a particular
mother"
4.6.3.
60
.
The dialogue goes on to show that the apparent
divisions between men are not due to basic biological factors
but are "conventional classificaton" (samanna), on
·-·-~-~=-==
occupational or economical grounds
(~.infra.
4.8.2.).
The
distinctions made in respect of the differences in skin
colour, hair, the shape of the head and so forth, are not
absolute categories.
Therefore men cannot be taken to
.
represent more t h an one spec1es
61
Malalasekera and
Jayatilleke writes:
"It would appear that early Buddhism is in
accord with the findings of the modern
biologists who exploded the doctrines of
racism and would urge the biological unity
of mankind in support of the concept of a
common humanity.
So when early Buddhism
150
asks us to treat all men, irrespective of
race or caste, as our fathers, mothers,
brothers and sisters or as one family,
there seems to be a deeper truth in this
statement than that of a mere ethical
. .62 •
recommendat1on
4.6.4.
There is also reference to the biological
argument in the Divyavadana.
Here i t is said that on the
application of the biological test, there is seen to be one
species among men and all of them possess common characteristics.
The Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas and the
.
.
Sudras are all names arbitrarily fixed 63 .
One example is
given as follows:
"If four sons are born in a family and
their father chooses to call them by
names Nandaka (gladdner), Jivaka (the
living), A~oka (sorrowless), and Sataya
(the long-lived), the names fixed have
no special connotation of their own and
have no proof that their bearers will
enjoy the blessings mentioned.
There are
certain qualities, moral, intellectual or
occupational, which children should acquire
as they grow up;
but these qualities
cannot be predicated of persons because
of their birth to certain parents•
4.6.5.
64
The most impressive and sustained Buddhist
151
attack on class distinction and the pretensions of the
Brahmanas in particular is given by Asvaghosa in his
Vajrasuci.
There is a similar text of the same name among
the minor Upanisads, which deals with the system of four
varnas.
Both texts begin with the following questions:
"Who is Brahmana?
Is a man Brahmana by
his birth or is he Brahmana by his
knowledge?
Is he Brahmana by following
the traditional usages, or by his
profession or by his mastery over the
65
Vedas?"
.
ancient Indian
The strength of"- , racial prejudice
is clear enough in the
Upanisad, where it says:
"Brahmana is of the white complexion
(sveta-varna),
Ksatriya is of the red
.
.
.
complexion (rakta-varna), Vaisya •..
tawny complexion (pita-varna) and Sudra
.
... dark complexion (krsna-varna)"
..
66
.
It is apparent from the Vajrasuci that Asvaghosa's criticisms
were chiefly directed against this racial attitude of the
Brahmanas
•
J
which the Hindu text(exceptional in this respect)
also criticizes.
4.6.6.
A number of arguments against class distinction
found in the early Buddhist texts are expanded by Asvaghosa.
There is reference to the biological argument.
Asvaghosa
says that the fatherhood of God in which Brahmanas believe
should imply the brotherhood of mankind.
If all men proceeded
....
from God, how then can there be four-fold'. insuperable diversity
among men?
"
Here is a man called Devadatta who gives birth to
152
four sons from one wife, the four sons, having one father
and mother, must be all essentially alike.
Distinctions of
species among beings are broadly marked by differences of
conformations and organizations.
In this world, we find
distinction in the footprints of cattle, elephant, horse,
and so of the rest;
but we have never heard or seen that
the footprint of a Sudra is different from that of a
Brahmana.
In this world, we find distinction in the male
and female 6rgans, in colour, complexion, and form, in
stools and in urine, in smell and in voice, of cattle,
buffalo, horse, and so of the rest.
Those furnish further
diagnostics whereby to separate these various animals, but
.
in all those respects the Brahmanas resemble the Ksatriyas,
.
Vaisyas and Sudras.
Again we find distinction in form, in
colour, in furs and in breaks, of the goose, pigeon, parrot,
cuckoo, peacock, but there is no such distinction found
among the four classes.
We find distinction in different
kinds of trees, in their stem, leaves, flowers, fruits,
barks, wood, seeds, juice and smell;
we do not find this to
be so in the case of the four classes, neither in limbs, nor
in skin, blood, flesh, bones, semen, stools, nor in form and
complexion, nor in their issues.
Again, as there is
similarity in joy and sorrow, in life, in intellect, in
functions, in conduct or in behaviour, in birth and death,
in sexual enjoyments and in fear, there is indeed no
distinction in Brahmana and others.
Moreover that there is
no distinction of classes among the fruits produced from the
same tree.
For example, take the fruits of the fig and
153
jack trees.
Among the fruits of these two trees, some grow
from the stem, or trunk, others from the branches, and some
others just above the root.
They have no such distinction
.
.
as, this is the Brahmana fruit, that is the Ksatriya fruit,
this is the Vaisya fruit and that is the Sudra fruit;
they are produced from the same tree.
as
There is no such
distinction among human beings too as they are also born
from the same person according to the brahmanical
tradition. ' There is another defect.
If the Brahmana is
born from the mouth, whence is the Brahmana woman born.
Certainly also from the mouth.
sister.
so the brahmanas disregard the convention of licit
and illicit intercourse.
But this is extremely repugnant
to the people of this world.
brahmanas are uncertain ..
are clearly of one species
4.7.1.
Then she is the brahmana's
so the social dogmas of the
All men are formed alike and
67
The second argument against class distinction
is the anthropological one.
The Agganna Sutta, to which
reference has been made above
(~.supra.
2.11.4 - 2.11.12)
shows that the claim of the brahmanas to be the legitimate
heirs of God is meaningless by giving an account of the
evolution of the world, of men and of society.
The brahmanas
claimed that "only a brahmana is of the best social grade,
other grades are low.
Only a brahmana is of clear complexion,
other complexions are swarthy.
Only they are of pure breed,
not they that are not of the brahmanas.
- 68
children of Brahma, heirs of Brahma"
.
They are genuine
154
4.7.2.
The early Buddhist answer to such claims is
that the brahmanas make them in ignorance of the past and
they have no basis in fact.
Originally all human beings
were alike and what later became class distinctions were due
to a division of specific occupations but they were not
necessarily absolute and were not created by God from the
very beginning of time.
The early Buddhist condemnation of
the brahmanical ideas is further seen where it is said that
the class of ascetics was formed by people from all the four
occupational classes "despising (the concept of) their own
duty"
69
(sakam dhammam garahamano)
.
Two themes run through the whole account of
4.7.3.
the Agganna Sutta.
we have seen earlier one theme which
describes the origin of the world, of society, and of
government.
The second theme describes the origin of class
from divisions of labour and occupational distinctions which
arose with settled society "among beings who were like unto
themselves and not unlike"
70
neva no asadisanam)
.
.
(neva sattanam anannesam sadisanam
.
~
Since we have seen the origin of the ksatriya
4.7.4.
class
(~.supra.
2.11.12), let us see the explanation of the
origin of the other three classes, brahmana, vaisya and sudra.
4.7.5.
The class of brahmanas originated likewise:
"Then it happened that some men thought,
'Evil ways are rife among men.
Let us
give up such evil and unwholesome ways'.
And they put away from them such evil ways.
155
The word brahmana implies that they put
away such evil ways, and so brahmana
became their earliest name ('Eapaka
akusale dhamme bahentiti'
... brahmana,
brahmana tv eva pathamam akkharam
71 .
upanibbattam)
.
.
They went to the forest and lived in
huts of leaves, and there they sat and
meditated.
They had no more use for
charcoal or the smoke of cooking, or for
the pestle and mortar, but they went to
vilJages, towns, or cities, seeking their
food, in the evening their supper, in
the morning their breakfast.
When they
had enough to eat they came back and
meditated in their huts, and so they were
given the second name of mystics because
they meditated ( 'jhayantiti' kho
...
jhayaka, jhayaka tv eva dutiyam akkharam
upanibbattam) .
Now some of them grew
tired of meditating in the forest, and
they went away, settled down in villages
and towns, and started compiling texts,
which they repeated to others.
saw this, they said:
When men
'These good folk
cannot meditate', and so they were called
teachers, and this became their third
name ('na dan'ime jhayantiti' kho ...
156
~jhayaka, ajjhayaka te eva tatiya~
.
akkharam upanibbattam)
.
72
•
At that time
these teachers were looked on as the
lowest or inferior brahmanas, but now
they are considered the best.
This was
the origin of the class of brahmanas ..•
'I'hey originated quite naturally and not
otherwise" 73 .
4.7.6.
The class of Vaisya originated likewise:
"There were some other people who married
and took to all kinds of crafts and trades
(visutta-kammante) ;
and because they took
to various kinds of business they were
called Vessa (Skt. Vaisya)
('visutta-
kammante payojentiti' kho ... vessa,
vessa tv eva akkharam upanibbattam) .
This
was the origin of this class Vaishyas
They originated quite naturally and not
otherwise"
4.7.7.
74
.
The class of Sudra originated likewise:
"Those who remained were hunters.
Those
who live by hunting have a mean trade,
and thus they were called Suddha (Skt. sudral . < 'luddha-cara khuddacara
·ti
O
kh0 •
0
o
SUdda I SUdda tV eve akkharam
upanibbttam) .
This was the origin of
this class of Shudras ...
They originated
157
quite naturally and not otherwise"
4.7.8.
75
.
It is in this text especially, describing the
origin of the world, of society, of government and of the
class system, that early Buddhism proclaimed the equality of
men on anthropological grounds.
This tells us explicitly
that neither the state nor the class system has any divine
sanction but that they are only measures of human expediency.
The text further explains that since such social and
functional differences arose among human beings in the
collective interest of society, socio-moral ideas were
developed, giving rise to a social ethics, which comes to
be known as dhamma , in opposition to what is detrimental to
the well-being of the community, that is to say, adhamma
76
.
Rhys Davids comments:
"We may not accept the historical accuracy
of this legend.
Indeed a continual note
of good-humoured irony runs through the
whole story, with its fanciful etymologies
of the names of the four vanna ...
But
it reveals a sound and healthy insight,
and is much nearer to the actual facts
than the Brahmin legend it was intended
to replace"
4.8.1.
:I,
77
The third argument against class distinction
is sociological.
This appears in many aspects.
First, early
Buddhism points out that there are certain peoples among whom
there are no rigid divisions of society.
Therefore, the
four-fold class system has no universal acceptibility.
In
158
78
79
.
the Assalayana Sutta
, Yona and Kamboja
are mentioned
as places in which there were only two classes of people,
namely lords and serfs, and this division too was not rigid
since lords sometimes became serfs and serfs lords:
"'What do you think about this, Assalayana?
Have you ever heard that in the lands of
Yona and Kamboja and other adjacent
districts there are only two classes,
lords and serfs, and a lord can become a
serf and vice versa?'
'Yes I have heard this Sir.
In Yona and
... having been a serf one becomes a lord'.
'And what strength or support does that
fact give to the brahmanas' claim?'"
4.8.2.
80
.
Secondly, early Buddhism asks how far livelihood
is identical with social differentiation, and on what grounds
the class sytem could be justified:
"The man who earns his livelihood, by
minding cows and fields, he is a farmer,
not a brahmana.
He who works at diverse
craft is an artisan
...
He who plies a
trade for livelihood, he is a trader ...
He who toils in service for another man,
he is a servant
He who lives by
archery, he is a soldier
He who lives
by priestly craft, he is a celebrant
He who own the village, country side, he
.
J.S
a k'J.ng •.• ,81
159
4.8.3.
It is clear from the above passage that class
names are merely conventional designations signifying
occupational differences and, since men are free to change
their occupations, these differences had no hereditary or
genetical basis.
It is said:
"What the world holds as 'name' and
'lineage' is indeed nominal.
Terms risen
here and there by popular opinion"
82
Asvaghosa says that the system of four classes was established
according to the distinction of profession and functions
83
.
In contrast, the brahmanical theory held that each class had
its own set of duties and obligations (sva-dharma) exactly
prescribed and, for the sake of the solidarity and progress
of society as a whole, each class was expected to act up to
the following teaching of the Bhagavad-Gita:
"Better one's own duty (to perform),
though void of merit, than to do another's
well:
better to die within (the sphere
of) one's own duty:
duty of other men"
84
periolous is the
.
It was accepted that there are specific hereditary occupations
suitable for members of each class and they were not free to
choose his occupation.
All Brahmanical legal literature lay
down the specific occupations suitable for members of each
class in an unalterable religious context.
For example, a
son of Sudra's parents must always do a menial job.
The
Buddhist condemnation of this idea is seen where it is said
that one's occupation gives a "class" name (kammana khattiyo
160
vasalo ... hoti) 85 , but it is merely a conventional
designation (samanna eva lokasmim) denoting one's occupation
and is of no genetical significance, since one does not
follow a vocation or have an aptitude for it merely because
one is born of parents who followed the same 86
In the Madhura Sutta 87 , it is pointed out that
4.8.4.
the brahmanas' claim to superiority is a mere propagandist
cry (~hosa)
88
.
It gives four reasons for this.
Among them,
one is that superiority often depends not on one's high birth
but on wealth that one possesses, and illustrates this point.
A wealthy member of any of the four classes would find
members of each of the other three classes to wait upon him
. 89
and serve h 1m .
The Jataka stories give frequent reference
to people who were born in outcastes becoming as wealthy and
even kings
90
.
This shows the fallacy of the brahmanas' view
that members of the four-fold order are obliged to perform
.
spec:t' f ':tc d u t ':tes ass:tgned
to t h em 91 .
4.8.5.
Thirdly, early Buddhism exposed the myth of
the purity of the brahmanas.
They claimed that all of them
are descendants in one line of a particular person through a
determinate number of generations since they have an unbroken
lineage, they conceived the view that they are the highest
class of men.
This view has been condemned as baseless in
many passages of the early Buddhist texts.
4.8.6.
In the Ambattha Sutta
92
, the Buddha exposes
the myth of the purity of class, of which the brahmanas were
so conscious.
Ambattha was a young brahmana who was very
161
aware of his lineage.
He was once involved in a discussion
with the Buddha about the purity of the Brahmanas' lineage.
To the statement of Ambattha that among the four classes the
..
brahmanas are of the highest born, and the other three classes
are of their attendants, the Buddha points out that the
..
so-called purity of ancestry was a myth by tracing Ambattha's
lineage to an offspring of one of the slave girls of a
Sakyan.
"If one were to follow up your ancient
name and lineage, on the father's and on
the mother's side, it would appear that
the Sakyas were once your masters, and
that you are the offspring of one of
their slave girls" 93
The concept of purity of birth is dismissed in
4.8.7.
this
~utta
on the grounds that most people are not aware of
their true facts of their ancestry, and they cannot be certain
that intermarriage strictly within the different groups alone
or outside of it, was observed by their parents and grandparents even up to seven generations
94
This is again well
illustrated in the story of Asita Devala detailed in the
Assalayana Sutta.
Asita Devala,a well-known brahmana priest,
was scorned because of his dark complexion by seven other
priests.
He examined, and cross-questioned these and pressed
for an answer concerning their claim to pure lineage:
"I have heard this:
'Only brahmanas are
of the highest class, all others are low;
only brahmanas are of white complexion,
162
o.ll others are of dark complexion;
only
.
brahmanas are pure, alJ others are impure;
only brahmanas are legitimate sons of
Brahma, born of his mouth •.. heirs to
Brahma'.
'Is that true?'
'Yes, Sir' ..
'But do you know whether your mothers
•
consorted with brahmanas, not with others?'
'No' ..
'And do you know whether your mother's
mothers even up to seven generations
consorted only with brahmanas, not with
others?'
'No'·
'And do you know whether your father
father's fathers even up to seven
generations consorted only with brahmana
women, not with others?'
'No'·
'But do you know how there is & descent
into a womb? •
'Yes, we do know.
When there is a coitus
of the parents, and when it is mother's
season, and when a gandhabba
95
is present.
It is on the conjunction of these three
factors that there is a descent into a
womb'.
'But do you know whether that being to be
16 3
born is a brahmana, or a ksatriya or a
vaisya or a sudra?'
'We do not know'.
'This being the case, we do not know who
we are?'" 96 .
Moreover, to the statement of Assalayana that
4.8.8.
only brahmanas are sons of Brahma ... heirs to Brahma, the
Buddha answers:
•
"But Assalayana, brahmana wives of
brahmanas are known to have their seasons
e>nd to conceive and to give birth and to
give suck,
just like any other women.
Yet these brahmanas, born of woman like
everyone else, speak thus:
'Only brahmanas
are the highest class ... • 97 .
The Commentary explains, with reference to the countries where
(~.supra.
there are only two classes of people
4.8.1), thus:
"If a brahmana and his wife go to trading
in adjacent districts he may die there
leaving no son.
The wife in course of
time may have sexual intercourse with a
slave or workman.
Any son born is a
slave, although. 'pure' on his mother's
side.
If this son goes to trade in the
Middle country and marries a brahmana
girl, any son born will be 'pure' only on
his mother's side•
98
•
164
4.8.9.
The arguments against purity of birth are
well brought out by Asvaghosa.
"'Does a man become a brahmana by birth?'
'Well, now, if you say that when the
mother is not a brahmana, and the father
is a brahmana, the child should be a
brahmana'. ·· I object to thfs because those
who are born from maidservanLs, fathered
•
by a brahmana, will also be entitled to
.
be a brahrnana.
But t.his is not a.greeable
to the brahmanas.
How can this be.
In
these days to find out a father of a
brahmana is very doubtful.
this.
The reason is
From the olden days, since the
time of the first brahmana in the lineage,
it js noticed the wives of the brahmanas
had and still have illicit connection
with men of all classes, even with the
sudras.
So to claim a man is a brahrnana
by birth is absurd" 99 •
4.8.10.
By such criticisms, the brahmanas' claim to
superiority was gradually being weakened.
This process was
expedited by the ra tionc.l argumen Ls put forward by the Buddha.
All in all, the Buddha points out that the pretentions of the
brahmar:as are baseless, and that virtt:,e, which alone leads to
purity, can be cultivated by any of the four classes.
"For whosoever are in the bondage to the
notions of birth or of lineage, or to the
165
pride of social position, or of
connection by marriage, they are far
from the best wisdom and righteousness.
It is only by having got rid of all such
bondage that one can realise for himself
that supreme perfection in wisdom and in
conduct"
4.9.1.
is legal.
100
•
The fourth argument against class distinction
A special emphasis is placed in early Buddhism on
equality before the law.
Early Buddhism regards the law as
an instrument for achieving certain ends, which are held to
be socially desirable 101
Men are judged by the good and
evil they do, and not by the stations of life in which they
are placed by virtue of their birth (2.supra. 4.4.5). ·
4.9.2.
In the brahmanical legal system, there was a
denial of equality before the law.
In fact the effect of the
class system is to be seen very clearly in the administration
of justice.
For example, Manu says:
"Knowing what is expedient or inexpedient,
what is pure justice or injustice, let
the king examine the causes of suitors
according to the order of varna"
102
•
Moreover, the most prominent feature of the brahmanical lawcode is its class legislation.
All brahmanical law-books
prescribe different punishments for different classes for
the same crime and offence 103 .
The brahmanas claimed great
privileges in law, and in every respect they demanded
166
precendence, honour and worship.
They were regarded with
such veneration that they were considered not liable to
capital punishment even if they committed the gravest of
crimes
104
Even though there was some moderation of their
privileges in the later law-books, the brahmanas still
suffered lighter punishments than the other three classes
105
•
All brahma~ical law-books prescribe unequal treatment to the
sudras in both criminal and civil law, and the punishments
laid down for them were in general much more severe.
The
sudras had few privileges and rights, and little value was
set on their life in law.
A brahmana killing a sudra
performed the same penance as for killing a cat or dog
4.9.3.
106
On the other hand, early Buddhism emphasized
the fact that there should be no legal discrimination between
the different classes.
We shall discuss the importance of
this attitude in chapter five.
In the Madhura Sutta it is
said that a criminal, whatever his class, would be equally
subject to punishment for his crime:
"If a noble, or a brahmana, or a merchant,
or a worker, were to break into a house,
or carry off loot, or commit a robbery,
or make an ambush, or commit adultery, and
if the men who had captured him were to
show him to you, and say:
'This, your
majesty, is the thief who is doing evil
to you, decree what punishment you like
for him?' -what would you do to him?"
"We would kill him or ruin him or banish
167
him or deal with him as we liked.
is the cause of this?
What
The designation
of 'noble' or 'brahmana' or 'merchant'
or 'worker' that once he had now
disappeared for him, and he is reckoned
simply as 'thief'.
Indeed this being so,
107
the four classes are exactly the same" · .
4.10.1.
is moral.
The fifth argument against class distinction
There are two main aspects of this argument.
First, early Buddhism maintains that all men are equally liable
to kammic consequences, irrespective of their status.
4.10.2.
According to early Buddhism, the world in
space-time is said to be a causal system, in which there
operate physical laws (utu-niyama) , biological laws (bijaniyama), psychological laws (citta-niyama), kammic laws
(kamma-niyama) pertaining to the order of acts and their
consequences and laws pertaining to spiritual phenomena
(dhamma-niyama)
108
.
These causal laws are said to be neither
.
)1 0 9.
. .
.
( nlyatl
.
. ) or ln
. d etermlnlStlc
. .
.
( a dh lcca-samuppanna
d etermlnlstlc
The operations of kamma are deemed to be of the same sort and
occur in the realm of volitional acts and their consequences
to the individual.
4.10.3.
In these kammic consequences, as described in
the early Buddhist texts, morally good actions (kusalakamma) tend to be followed by pleasant consequences or good
effects to the individual.
On the other hand, morally bad
actions (akusala-kamma) tend to be followed by unpleasant
16 8
consequences or bad effects, and actions which partake of
both good and bad (vokinna - a "mixed" nature) by a mixture
of pleasant and unpleasant consequences or good or bad
effects
llO .
4,10.4.
Since kammic correlations are not deterministic,
kamma is only one of many factors conditioning the nature of
-----
111
.
. ext1ngu1s
.
. h a bl e an d
exper1ence
, wh'l
1 e past k amma 1s
modifiable in the context of one's present actions.
Kamma
is the law of cause and effect, of action and reaction.
This
is not different in principle from a law in the natural
sciences.
Therefore, kamma is not so-called "moral law" or
"reward and punishment" because it does not constitute a
divine command, a categorical imperative or a norm.
Since
every volitional action produces its effects or results,
the individual is responsible for his good or bad actions
(~.supra.
4.4.5).
In this sense, early Buddhism recognizes
that man's conscience is generally aware of right and wrong
even though it is admitted to be sometimes fallible;
but
this does not come about through a supreme Being, who
decides what is right and wrong.
It is said:
"Your conscience is aware whether i t is
truth or falsehood
Therefore be
guided by one's conscience (attadhipateyya)
as well as by public opinion
(lokadhipateyya) and the dhamma or
righteousness (dhammadhipateyya)
4.10.5.
112
.
Accordingly, early Buddhism maintains that
169
human law must have a universally acceptable moral basis.
Every individual is morally responsible for his private or
official actions.
This responsibility is personal and one
is not obliged to perform unrighteous or iniquitous acts
either for the sake of the king or for the sake of one's
parents or children 113 .
4.10.6.
Thus in the operation of kammic laws, there
is no distinction of classes.
The Madhura Sutta and the
Assalayana Sutta point out that a noble, a priest, a
merchant or a worker are subject to kammic recompense
equally, irrespective of their status:
"'If a man is a murderer, a thief, or an
adulterer, or commits other evil actions,
when his body breaks up on death does he
pass on to the Downfall Niraya Hell if he
is a ksatriya,
.'
va~sya,
or sudra, but not
i f he is a brahmana? •
'No, Sir.
In such a case the same kamma
is in store for all men, whatever their
class. '
'And if he avoids evil actions, will he
go to heaven if he is a brahmana, but not
if he is a man of the lower classes?'
'No, Sir.
In such a case the same kamma
effect awaits all men, whatever their
class.
4.10.7.
'·~ 114 .
In the second aspect of the moral argument,
170
early Buddhism maintains that all are equally capable of
moral development and individual differences in good or
evil have little relationship with the classes.
Men e.re
inherently good and they should be educated in right and
wrong so that they may transform t.hemselves from what they
are to what they ought to be.
Early Buddhism insists on the
application of a universal standard of ethics applicabJ.e to
all men and women, irrespective of any class privileges.
4.10.8.
As already pointed out in chapter two and
t.hree, the brahmanas established a rigid morality by
insistence on the universality of ritual and sacrificial
acts.
With the development of the sacrificial cult the
brahmanas fulfil their own aims and strive to establish their
supremacy.
Morality was evaluated on the amount of sacrifice
involved and the motive behind it.
Moreover, the institution
of the four class system and the four stages in life helped
to maintain and raise the stc.ndard of ethics.
The highly
educated brahmanas thus fulfilling their own desires claimed
to be the mediators between man and his gods.
They alone
were capable of attaining the moral heights required for
.
. h God us .
unlon
Wlt
4.10.9.
Early Buddhist ethics is based on the notion
of the perfectibility of man.
The Noble Eight-fold Path and
the Four Cardinal Virtues of early Buddhism, for example, are
intended to transform man, to bring out his inherent goodness.
The essence of early Buddhist ethical teaching is summed up
in the words of Dhammapada:
"To refrain from all evil, to cultivate the
171
good and to cleanse the mind"
116
.
According to this ethical context, a wrong act or an unskilful
(akusala) act is defined as what tends to hinder the selfdevelopment of oneself (atta-vyabadhaya samvattati) as well as
of othen: (pc>.ra-vyabadhaya).
It is said:
"A wise person does not think of hindering
his own self-development, or another's or
both his own and another's selfdevelopment, but he will always think of
the welfare of himself, of ethers, of
both himself and others;
and in fact of
the welfare of the whole world (sabbaloka-hitameva) "
117
.
Furthermore, if one promotes or help others in a spirit of
service and loving kindness, one produces happiness both in
this world and in the next 118 .
The importance of loving
kindness towards all beings is well illustrated in the
Metta Sutta:
"May every living being, weak or strong,
large or small, seen or unseen, near or
far, born or yet unborn- may every
living thing be full of joy.
May none
deceive anothE,r, or think ill of him in
anyway whatever, or in anger or ill-will
desire evil for another.
Just as a
mother, as long as she lives, cares for
her only child, so should a man feel allembracing love to all li vi.ng beings.
should feel boundless love for all the
He
172
world, above below and across,
unrestrained, without enmity.
Standing,
walking, sitting or lying down .•. he
should be firm in the mindfulness of
love.
For this is what men call the
Sublime Mood" 119 .
4.10.10.
In contrast to the principle of love and
understanding towards all beings, the brahmanical morality,
as we said earlier, was based on ritualistic duty.
Apart
from this, the brahmanas promulgated numerous other rites and
rituals.
Some of these rites were called samskaras or
purificatory rites.
They were performed in order to purify
oneself, to absolve oneself of sins accrued by evil actions.
Among such purificatory rites are bathing at holy places,
and springkling oneself with sacred water 120 .
4 .10 .ll.
Early Buddhism condemned such purificatory
rites which the brahmanas considered capable of washing away
evil actions.
The sarcastic remarks of Punna theri, show
the early Buddhist attitude to such purificatory rites:
"What ignorant person has told you ...
that (ritual) ablution in water can free
you from evil actions.
In such a case
all creatures living in water would go
straight to heaven (on death).
Those who
produce evil actions such as butchers
hunters
• ,. - I
"
•
thieves and murderers have
only to splash themselves with water and
•
I
173
they are set free from evil actions.
And if the stream carries away your
evil ... , it should also take your merit,
leaving you naked of both ..... 121 .
4.10.2.
Moreover, there is a magical concept of
purity and pollution associated with the class system.
This
is exposed in the Assalayanasutta:
•
"'What do you think about this Assalayana?
Is it only a brahmana who, taking a backscratcher and bath-powder and going to a
river, is capable of cleansing himself of
dust and mud?
And not a noble, a merchant,
a worker?'
'That is not so ..• a noble, a merchant,
a worker who ... is capable of cleansing
himself of dust and mud.'
'With reference to this then
,. • ,. I
on what
strength and support do brahmanas say that
they are from the best class .•. '"
4.10.13.
122
.
What matters is not even external cleanliness
but the purity of heart or the absence of pollution within:
"Not flesh of fisb, nor fasting, nakedness,
The shaven head, the mat·ted hair, nor sweat,
Nor rough-skin garb, nor solemn celebration
Of sacrificial fire, nor signal penance
Of those who here seek immortality:
Not hymns, ablutions, rites, feasts of the
season
174
Will cleanse a man with doubt not overcome.
With guarded senses, governed faculties,
Fareth the poised in Dhamma finding joy,
Mild, upright, bondless, rid of every ill:
Things seen or heard soil not the rouser
rap t
4 • 10 •.4.
•.. "12 3
A person who practises the "highest life" is
said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing"
"after bathing in the water of love and compassion for one's
fellow beings"
124
•
Moral development is not a prerogative
of people who are specially favoured by their birth, but is
open to all and is within the reach of a11
125
.
Since all
are capable of good and evil, none is to be treated as a
means to an end "like beasts in a sacrifice"
man, whatever his class, is a gift of
grea~
126
.
A virtuous
value:
"As in a herd of cattle, white or black,
red, tawny, dappled, uniform dove-hued,Whatever the hue, - when a tamed bull is
found,
A beast of burden, mighty, fair and swift,
Heedless of hue men yoke him to a load:
So among men, wherever he be born,
Noble or brahmana, merchant, serf, or
castless, Just a mean scavenger, Whatever he be,
He who is tamed, devout, just, virtuous,
Truth-speaking, shamefaced, done with birth
175
and death,
One perfect in the good life, load-free,
Detached from worldly ties, whose task is
done,
Taintless, one gone beyond all states, not
clinging
To anything, one utterly released, To such a one, a dustless, lustless field,
Abundant, fertile offering becomes ...
4.10.15.
.
..
In the Sonadanda Sutta
128
n
127
, the Buddha deals
with the question of what are the: essent.ial characteristics
which makes a man br~mana.
According to the brahma~as, the
essential characteristics of a brahmana, as stated in the
above sutta are:
"A brahmana is well born on both sides
of pure descent;
h~
... ,
is a preacher of the
sacred words, knowing the mystic verses
by heart, one who has mastered the three
Vedas, with indices, the rituals, the
phonology, the exegesis and the legends,
learned in phrases and grammar, versed in
Lokayata sophistry, and in the signs on
the body of a great man;
he is handsome,
pleasant to look upon, inspiring trust,
gifted with great beauty of complexion,
fair in colour, fine in presence and
stately to behold;
increases in virtue;
he is virtuous,
he is learned and
.
176
wise, the first or it may be the second,
among those who hold out the ladle"
129
.
While rejecting the brahmanical conceptions, the Buddha lays
down that virtue, wisdom and intelligence as the most
.
t .ant c h aracter1st1cs
.
.
-h mana 130 .
lrnpor
of a true b ra
Th ese
characteristics are detailed in the Brahmajala sutta
Samannaphala Sutta
0
131 ,
132 , Ambattha Sutta 133 , Lohicca Sutt.a 134
-
•
q
.
an d 1n
t h e Dh ammapada 135
..
4.10.16.
Asvaghosa, dealing with the question of
what makes a true brahmana, says:
"All are mortals and born from the same
place (i.e. produced from the womb).
All
have (wi thi.n them, dirty things, such as)
stools and urine.
All have got the same
senses and the same objects of senses.
So, it is only by good conduct and merit
that men become brahmanas.
If a sudra
possesses good conduct and merit, he
.
becomes a brahmana and if a brahmRna is
without good actions, he is inferior to a
sudra
4.10.17.
... ,136
The word "brahmana" is used in early Buddhism
to denote a pereon leading a pnre c>.nd virtuous life.
Thi.s
is different from the definition of the term by the brahmanas.
The racial sense of superiority associated wj. th the word
"brahmana" is completely eclipsed in early Buddhism by the
moral and spiritual sense of superiority.
In early Buddhism,
177
the word "brahmana" is often synonymous with the word
"arahant".
origin.
This word also is not purely Buddhistic in
Before Buddhism, it was used to describe a person
of high standing, not necessarily on moral or spiritual
grounds.
In its usage in Buddhism, it denotes a person who
had achieved Nibbana and who has gained insight into the
true nature of things 137 .
The use of the words "brahmana''
and "arahant" in the sense of "virtuous", "perfect" is an
eloquent te'stimony to how early Buddhism ignored class
claims and distinctions.
4.11.1.
The sixth argument against class distinction
is religious.
Early Buddhism maintains that all are capable
of attaining salvation or spiritual development and
individual differences in capacities have little relationship
to the classes into which men and women happen to be born.
Man's basic needs are fundamentally the same, though there
are individual variations in their nature, owing to
differences in the impact of his environment and his samsaric
evolution.
Whatever the differences may be, according to
early Buddhism, men should realize their common lot and their
common humanity.
All are subject to disease, decay and death,
but man's quest for security and lasting happiness never
ceases.
This is never satisfied by pandering to his desires,
and yet he is capable of discovering the ultimate good and
happiness. It is in this sense that early Buddhism proclaimed
t he
' .
1
sp~r~tua
4.11.2.
'
un~ty
o f man k'~n d 138 .
In contrast, the brahmanas claimed special
178
prerogatives not only in day to day affairs but also in
religious affairs.
They maintain a monopoly of religion
merely because of their lust for power 139 .
They denied the
sudras admission into their religious orders, and even the
possibility of spiritual and moral development, on the
grounds that the sudras were born to serve and their nature
was untruth itself 140 .
affairs.
The sudras had no rights in religious
The ears of a sudra who hears the Veda are to be
filled with,, mol ten lead and lac.
if he recites it;
His tongue is to be split
his body is to be cut through if he
.
h'~s memory 141
preserves ~' t ~n
God himself has assigned the
exclusive right of teaching to the brahmanas 142 .
considered to be gods in human form.
They were
Manu states that by
his birth alone a brahmana is a deity even for the gods, and
his teaching is authoritative for men because the Veda is its
foundation;
a brahmana, whether he is ignorant or learned,
is a great divinity, just as the fire, whether carried forth
or not
. d f ort h ,
carr~e
.
~s
. .
142
a great d.~v~n~ty
Therefore, it
was considered to be a danger to the social order if they
taught women', or any males not twice-born, or any twice-born
males who did not share their views as to the ethics of
teaching, and as to the privileges and prerogatives of the
.
pr~est
4.11.3.
as teac h er 144 .
The Buddha directed his attack on such
religious exclusiveness and maintained that every one should
be allowed to learn;
that every one, having certain
abilities, should be allowed to teach;
and that, if he did
teach, he should teach all and to all, keeping nothing back,
179
shutting no one out.
But no man should take upon himself to
teach others unless he had first been taught himself, and
had also acquired the faculty of importing to others the
truth he has gained himself 145
Moreover, the dogma of the
efficacy of sacrifice by which the brahmanas gained their
superior power was also criticised by the Buddha.
4.11.4.
(see Ch.2)
In contrast to the brahmanas, who were making
a monopoly ,of religion, early Buddhism advocates a society
in which all men irrespective of their social status are free
to join religious orders and receive equal recognition as men
of religion.
Buddhist monks and nuns ignored class distinction
both within the Sangha and in their relationship with the lay
people and openly preached and practised the doctrine of
equality of man
4.11.6.
146
A man, whatever his class, after becoming a
bhikkhu and joining to an order, received equal respect and
honour from the people.
This is well illustrated in the
Madhura Sutta:
"'What do you think about this, Sir?
If
a noble, a brahmana, a merchant, a worker,
having cut off his hair and beard, having
dressed in saffron robes, should have. gone
forth from home into homelessness, and is
one that refrains from onslaught on
creatures, from taking what has not been
given, from lying speech, is a one-meal
man, a brahma-farer, virtuous, of lovely
180
character- what would you do to him?'
'Good Kaccana, we should salute him or
rise up before him or offer him a seat
or give him robe material, almsfood,
lodgings and medicines, or we should
have proper watch and ward and guard
provided for him'.
of this?'
'What is the cause
'Good Kaccana, the designation
of 'noble',
'brahmana', 'merchant',
'worker' that he once had has now
disappeared for him, and he is reckoned
simply as 'recluse'
'This being so, are these four classes
exactly the same or not?
this seem to you?'
Or how does
'Indeed, good Kaccana,
this being so, these four classes are
exactly the same;
I do not see any
difference between them in this respect' "
14 7
.
This is further illustrated by the simile of the rivers:
"Just as the great rivers:
the Ganga, the
Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu and the
Mahi entering the mighty ocean, lose their
former names and identities and are termed
simply ocean;
even so these four classes:
ksatriyas, brahmanas, vaisyas and sudras,
.
.
going forth from home to homelessness,
into the discipline of dhamma proclaimed
by the Buddha, lose their former names and
181
lineages and are reckoned simply
'recluses'
.. 148
In the Kannakatthala Sutta149 , the B.uddha says
4.11.6.
that all men have the capacity to attain spiritual heights,
irrespective of the class to which they belong, and it is
this search for ultimate happiness which constitutes the
religious quest of man.
The King of Kosala once questioned
the Buddha on this subject:
•
"These are the four classes:
nobles,
.
brahmanas, merchants and workers, and if
they made the proper efforts to achieve
the spiritual heights, would there be
between them any distinction or any
difference?"
The Buddha replies:
"I, Sire, here speak of no difference at
all.
It is as though a man, bringing dry
sticks from a teak tree were to produce
a fire and heat were to result.
Then
another man, bringing dry s.ticks from a
sal tree .•. ,another man from a mango
tree and another man from a fig tree were
to produce a fire and heat were to result.
'What do you think about this?
Because of
the different woods used for the fires,
would there be any difference in what is
produced, in flame as against flame, in
hue as aginst hue, in brilliance as against
182
brilliance? •
'No sir'.
'Even so it is,
with heat created energy, produced by
striving.
I do not recall of any
difference whatsoever herein in regard
to their salvation•• 150 .
4.11.7.
Therefore, it is said that in the supreme
perfection in wisdom and righteousness, there is no reference
to the question of either of birth, or of lineage, or of
'
pride.
It is only by getting rid of all such bondage that
one can realise for himself the supreme perfection
151
.
It
is said that if a man is proud of his birth, of clan, of
his wealth, and of his family and despises his relatives,
he will definitely come to a downfall
4.11.8.
152
.
In all these passages, early Buddhism proclaims
the oneness of mankind and maintains that pride of birth in
a particular class as an obstacle to spiritual progress.
Man should have within him capacities to develop his material
and spiritual welfare without any barriers from fixed social
rules
153
.
Women are also considered to have similar
potentialities to those men.
They are also equally capable
. .
o f atta:Ln:Lng.
N:L'bb-ana 154 .
4 .12 .1.
It is in these arguments that early Buddhism
proclaims the equality of man as a member of society.
However, the spirit of egalitarianism in early Buddhism is
open to some misconceptions.
However, we may mention one
misconception which has been held by some writers, who say
that these arguments are chiefly directed against the
183
pretensions of the brahmanas in particular rather than
against the class system in general.
The early Buddhists,
while fully accepting the brahmanical four-fold class
system, made a change of placing the ksatriyas, the class to
which the Buddha belongs, before the brahmanas in the class
.
h y 155
h :terarc
4.12.2.
If we consider these arguments carefully we
see that they do not merely represent a trend of ksatriya
opposition to the brahmanas' claim to superiority, but to
establish the fact that all men, regardless of their
individual differences, are on an equal footing (samasama).
To uphold the fact that man belongs to a single species, the
early Buddhists directed their attack towards the brahmanas
because the foundation of social inequality was laid down
by the brahmanas, who were formulating the required sanctions
for perpetuating the system, by the methods of theological
persuasion and examples.
Therefore, the early Buddhists
attack on them is quite justifiable.
The Buddha equally
denounced the ksatriya claims to superiority.
He emphatic-
ally pointed out the fact that it is not one's birth, but
one's actions and good conduct that make one a brahmana or a
sudra.
4.12.3.
Though it is constantly pointed out in the
Pali texts that all men are born equal, there is one statement
by the Buddha which has been taken seriously and misinterpreted
by some writers to mean that the Buddha championed the
l55A
superiority of the ksatriyas over the brahmanas.
It occurs
in the Ambattha Sutta:
••
184
.
"The ksatriya is the best of those among
.
those folk who put his trust in lineage.
But he who is perfect in wisdom and
righteousness, he is the best among gods
and men" 156 •
If the statement is carefully studied in its context, it will
be seen that in this discourse the Buddha employs a
dialectical method of argument.
He takes up some of the
..
criteria wJ:rich Ambattha accepts as proof of class superiority
and shows that when they are actually applied to the context
of society they establish the superiority of the ksatriyas
and not the brahmanas- thus proving that the brahmanas'
claim to superiority in respect of these criteria is baseless.
Lineage is of little or no account, but if it is taken as the
criterion then it is the ksatriyas who should claim
.
. t y 157
super~or~
We have seen earlier
(~.supra.
2.5.2) that
even in the Vedic texts there are many passages which
illustrate the de facto inferiority of the brahmanas to the
ruling class.
Such references lend enough historical support
to this deduction.
However, the important fact that we should
note in that statement is that he who is supreme above all is
one "who is perfect in wisdom and righteousness", a supremacy
not based on the claims of birth.
Therefore, it can be
clearly seen that the Buddha or early Buddhism did not
champion the cause of the superiority of the ksatriyas over
the brahmanas.
4.13.1.
Thus we see that early Buddhism stands for a
common humanity or unity of mankind.
Early Buddhism accepts
185
that there are individual variations in the nature of man,
owing to the differences in the impact of his environment
and kammic factors.
in the nature of man.
Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity
He therefore needs to be treated
equally and afforded an equal opportunity for developing his
potentialities and serving the human race which he belongs
to.
Therefore, the early Buddhist conception of equality of
man allows for no chosen class or caste, chosen race, chosen
creed or
c~osen
individual.
186
CHAPTER FIVE
ATTITUDE TO LAW
5.1.1.
In this final chapter, we shall examine the
early Buddhist attitude to law and the internal polity of
the Sangha, as they appear in the early Buddhist texts.
5.1.2.
The organization of the Sangha interests us
because of the importance attached to the value of the
individual ·within the Sangha and the role of law in
furthering the aims and objectives and the life of the Sangha.
The Sangha was modelled on democratic principles, and the
concept of the international Sangha forms an analogy for the
early Buddhist conception of the international political
order.
5.2.1.
We should point out, before taking the matter
up for actual discussion, that some writers have expressed
the view that there is no Buddhist law.
For example, Rhys
Davids writes that in the strict sense of the word, there is
no Buddhist law.
There is only an influence exercised by
Buddhist ethics or changes that have taken place in customs.
No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay
or clerical, has ever created or promulgated any law
(~.supra.
1.4.5.).
5.2.2.
It is difficult to agree with this view.
reasons for this are many.
The
If we ask the question "What is
law?", it is difficult to find a precise answer, and there
are a variety of answers to the question.
The word "law" is
187
used in many different ways and many different senses.
Therefore, it is often associated with unclear meanings.
The best way to see what this word means is to examine how
people in fact have used it in various ways and contexts.
5.2.3.
The early Buddhist texts distinguish between
law and what is morally right, using the words niti, nyaya
or
~inaya
for the former and dhamma for the latter.
This
distinction is to be found in English, which distinguishes
law from right, though in most European languages the terms
for law and right coincide 1
It is not possible, however,
to draw any significant conclusions from linguistic facts,
since we cannot say that those who did make or failed to
make the distinction in language have had more just laws than
2
the others .
5.2.4.
As we have already shown in chapter three,
secular legal texts were composed by Buddhist monks in
countries where Buddhism flourished, and these laws were
adopted by the state.
They were based on Hindu legal texts,
whose content and character were altered in the light of
Buddhist doctrines.
Kings of various Buddhist countries
enacted codes of secular law and formulated constitutions on
the basis of Buddhist moral principles.
Criminal and civil
laws were to some extent transformed in conformity with such
principles.
The attitude to war and the conduct of war was
affected by Buddhism.
There is also a developed philosophy
of the state and law in Buddhist texts and a statement of
the principles that should govern inter-state relations.
188
According to the theory of social contract in early Buddhism,
which we discussed in chapter two, human law is the will of
the human soveriegn.
The capacity of the sovereign to lay
down laws for his subjects derives from the social contract,
which is binding by virtue of dhamma.
foundation of human law.
Dhamma is the ultimate
The sovereign has no legitimate
power but that which was conferred on him by dhamma and the
social contract (see ch.2).
5.3.1.
General views on problems of law and punishment
are to be found in several Buddhist texts, especially in
Jataka stories.
In one of the Jataka stories it is said that
the king should judge a case fairly and justly, without making
3
mistakes and without coming under the influence of self-will .
It is also said that there are four ways of falling into
injustice or untruth.
4
and fear .
They are prejudice, hatred, ignorance
It was felt that in the administration of justice
the judge should administer law without fear, favour, folly
or antagonism.
A king who acts in favour of a false complaint
made by his priest is advised in the Rathalatthi Jataka:
"It is wrong for one who is the fountain
of justice to act without trying the
case.
You should always act after
hearing everything"
5
The following advice testifies to the high standard of justice
recognized by early Buddhism.
"A king should punish an offence.
He should
hear no plea at all without thoroughly
investigating it himself in all points.
189
A king who punishes an offence before he
tries it is like a man born blind, who
eats his food with all bones and flies.
A king who punishes the non-offenders
and let free the offenders is like one
blind upon a rugged highway
He who
examines all well in things and administers
justice fairly and rightly is (truly)
worthy of sitting in judgement ... "
5.3.2.
6
The Mahavastu gives the following advice to a
king who is hearing a lawsuit:
"A king should not fall into the power of
wrath.
Rather let him curb his anger,
forlO king, neither the interests nor the
duty of a man thrive when he is angry.
But when a king is not subject to wrath,
his interests, his duty and his wisdom
always thrive.
his anger.
Hence he should restrain
When a dispute arises, he
should pay equal attention to both parties
to it, and hear the arguments of each side
and actaccording to what is right.
He
should not act out of favouritism, hatred,
fear or folly.
He should hear the
arguments of each side and act according
to what is right"
5.3.3.
7
Inspired by the Buddhist principles of
190
righteousness and equality, Asoka instructed his officials
to employ impartial justice in their judicial dealings.
" ... Just as one entrusts his child to an
experienced nurse, and is confident that
she is able to care for the child
satisfactorily, so my rural officers
have been appointed for the welfare and
happiness of the country people.
In
order that they may fulfil their functions
fearlessly, confidently, and cheerfully,
I have given them independent authority
in judgement and punishment.
But it is
desirable that there should be uniformity
(samata) in judicial procedure and
punishment.
now on:
This is my instruction from
'Men who are imprisoned or
sentenced to death are to be given three
days respite.
Thus their relations may
plead for their lives, or, if there is no
one to plead for them, they may make
donations or undertake a fast for a
8
better rebirth in the next life ... • .
5.3.4.
The brahmanical tradition stressed the
importance of sanctions in law based on the deterrent and
retributive
theories of punishment
that law is force incarnate.
9
It upheld the theory
For example, Manu says:
"For the (king's) sake the Lord formerly
created his own son, Punishment, the
191
protector of all creatures,
(an incarnation
10
of) dharma, formed of brahmana's glory"
.
-----.
The study of law was itself called the "science of punishment"
(da~~a-niti)
11
.
The only way that the whole world might be
kept pure and righteous was by the fear of punishment 12
For
example, the Mahabharata says:
"Force or the fear of punishment rules all
beings, force alone protects them, when
people are asleep it is force that keeps
awake, the wise recognize the law
(dh~)
to be force" 13 .
Ultimately all law and order depends on force or the fear of
punishment.
It is said that wicked people do not commit
crimes for four reasons, fear of punishment by the king, fear
of divine vengeance, fear of the other world and fear of
society
14
5.3.5.
In contrast, early Buddhism holds that although
punishment has a place in law, the law itself is based on
consent resulting from understanding, friendliness and mutual
interest.
As stated earlier in chapter three, it was on the
unsatisfactory nature of private punishment and in the
interest of fairer and more efficient justice that the people
delegated their functions to a king
(~.supra.
3.5.4).
Another fact that we have noted in chapter three is that the
suppression of crime merely through punishment was considered
to be a futile thing, but that the planning of economic
welfare would lead to a happy and peaceful society
3.8.10).
(~.supra.
Moreover, the punishments mentioned are humane and
•
192
confined to reproving, warning and banishment, with no
mention of corporal punishment.
One of the Jataka stories
explains that the kings who followed Mahasammata were so
efficient that they kept crime at a minimum.
There was no
greater punishment than that of beating, warning and
banishment (talana-garahana-pabbajana).
•
There was, indeed,
no cutting off of hands and feet and execution (hatthapada-cchedana-ghatana) .
These things came into existence
after the ancient principles of government were forgotten
during the times of cruel kings
5.3.6.
15
Early Buddhism believed in the inherent
goodness of man.
In this respect the mind of a man is
compared to a piece of gold ore, which is said to have the
defilements of dust and sand, gravel and grit, but when it
is purified it shines with its natural lustre, as he attains
the transcendent mind 16 .
These defilements are classified
as gross, medium and subtle.
The gross defilements are
misconduct with regard to body, speech and mind;
the medium
defilements are lustful and covetous thought, thoughts of
destruction and ill-will and the subtle defilements are
racial and national feelings, and personal or egoistic
pride 17
5.3.7.
The belief in the inherent goodness of man
led to the view that if man is educated in right and wrong,
he is likely to be law-abiding.
The belief in the
possibility of transforming human nature, the need to deal
with criminals with mercy and understanding
18
, and the
19 3
doctrine that officials are morally responsible for the acts
they do even in their official capacities (ra;no rajakaraniyam
hetu)
19
resulted in the abolition of capital punishment.
It
is said that the king must follow a middle course between
extreme severity and laxity in punitive measures, for
punishment was regarded as a necessary evil of kingship
20
However, it is also said that if punishments are necessary,
they should be awarded with careful measures (nissamma),
proportionate to the nature and degree of the offence
committed
21
, but without harsh punishment
5.3.8.
22
It follows from this that the wrong-doer
should be punished primarily with a view to reform and
secondarily for deterrent reasons but never retributively or
. d.~ct~ve
.
1 y 23
v~n
In the Ratnavali
24
, which is a "discourse
to a king" (raja-parikatha) , Nagarjuna expresses his attitude
to criminals:
"You should punish them out of compassion
and from a desire to turn them into worthy
persons as you do as regards worthy sons;
and you should not be moved by hatred or
by desire for material gain"
25
He further adds that as a consequence of compassion, mercy
should be shown to those who are punished, imprisoned or
beaten in accordance with law;
prisoners should be well
looked after, no one should be imprisoned for life, and there
should be no mutilation or execution of criminals, though
. h ment ~s
.
b an~s
.
perm~tte
d26
194
5.4.1.
A careful perusal of the juridical system of
early Buddhism as recorded in the Vinaya texts shows that
the Vinaya rules are not merely metaphorical or figurative.
There are certain rules, which consist of positive moral
instructions, but these also are to be called laws in a
proper sense.
Divine laws, in the strict sense of the term,
have no place in early Buddhism
(~.supra.
5.2.4).
The laws
which are promulgated by the Buddha, as the founder and head
of the Order, consist of enforceable rules of conduct,
precisely stated and codified.
There are also instructions
on juridical procedures laid down in the Vinaya texts for
trial and conviction in case of infringement.
The Vinaya
laws were promulgated to promote the health and longevity
of the Sangha.
Even to-day the Theravada Sangha abides by a
common doctrine known as the Dhamma and a common constitution
and code of laws called Vinaya.
Moreover, the various
Mahayana and Tantric sects, though several of them have much
modified the rules of monastic conduct in practice, still
respect their own versons of the Vinaya Pitaka.
This Vinaya
is considered as binding on all Sanghas, present or future.
5.5.1.
In order to have a better understanding of
the Buddhist Vinaya laws, we must begin with the formation
of the Sangha.
monks
27
At first the Sangha was formed with five
, and, soon after its establishment, it received
considerable support from the mercantile class.
The Sangha
was established primarily to give the individual a training
in the higher morality, the higher thought and higher wisdom
28
At first, admission to the Sangha, like the higher ordination,
195
was given by the Buddha himself and no legislation was
enacted, since, according to the tradition, the Sangha
consisted entirely of monks who had attained Arahantship
29
,
and thus would have no need of rules and regulations.
5.5.2.
At this stage, there were sixty monks.
The
Buddha addressed to them thus:
"Walk, monks, on tour for the welfare and
happiness of mankind, out of compassion
for the world, for the weal, welfare and
happiness of gods and men.
Let not two
of you go in the same direction"
30
.
The monks who went on tour to teach Dhamma brought to the
Buddha persons from various districts and from different
states for admission and ordination.
As this procedure was
cumbersome for all concerned, the Buddha allowed the monks
to admit and ordain new-comers by the repetition of the
.
31
formula of refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha
Apparently this was the second stage in devising regulations
for admitting persons to the Order, the first being
represented by the formula spoken by the Buddha, "Come, monk".
5.5.3.
With the gradual growth of the number of monks
in the Sangha, these methods of admitting and ordaining did
not last very long.
We can see from the statement of the
Buddha himself the need for and the purpose of rules and
regulations and of legislation.
When one of his disciples
wanted to know why the religion of some enlightened teachers
lasted long while that of others did not do so, his reply was
196
that a religious dispensation lasted long because its founder
had given a detailed exposition of his teachings and also
"enacted a code of rules or precepts" (pa;:i;:iattam sikkhapadam)
and "enforce legislation binding on them"
patimokkham)
32
.
(anuddittha~
Whereupon the disciple requested the Buddha
to enact rules and enforce legislation.
The reply given was
that the Buddha does not make known rules or precepts or
enforce legislation until conditions leading to misdemeanours
appear in the Order, and that the time was not yet ripe for
such things.
It was only when the Order had attained long
standing, that misdemeanours would arise.
When this happened
the Buddha would make known the rules or precepts and also
enforce legislation in order to curb the conditions arising
f rom
. d emeanours 33 .
m~s
It is said that at a later stage in
the history of the Sa~gha, towards the end of the Buddha's
life, the number of monks who had attained Arahantship was
porportionally less, but the code of monastic law had
expan d e d
5.5.4.
.
~n
.
s~ze
34
Commenting on the Buddha's reply that the time
was not yet ripe for legislation, but that it would eventually
come, Jayatilleke writes:
"We notice here that legislation is
considered unnecessary or superfluous,
where conformity can be ensured without
it but that legislation makes for the
perpetuity of an institution and the aims
and aspirations for which it stands.
At
the same time there is a constant reminder
197
that legislation alone is of no avail.
Legislation itself contributes to a
legalistic frame of mind. People tend to
conform to the letter of the law forgetting
the spirit in which the laws wereenacted.
Others find ways and means (as happened
in the Sangha during the time of the
Buddha himself, contributing to the
growth of the law) of evading the law by
'
conforming to the letter of the law and
violating the spirit.
The moral that is
generally drawn is that law-abiding
behaviour must result eventually from
charity, love and understanding and not
from a fear of the sanctions of the law•
5.5.5.
35
•
The earliest Vinaya rule, according to the
tradition, was laid down when a certain monk, who had
received initiation and was ordained, had sexual intercourse
. h h"~s f ormer
w~t
"f
w~
e 36 •
Since the establishment of the
Sangha, it had hitherto fulfilled its aims and aspirations
under the instructions of the Buddha.
The way in which
breaches of Dhamma steadily increased, demanding further
legislation on the part of the Buddha, might be interpreted
as a parallel to the beginnings and gradual increase of evil
customs with the decline of the world, according to the
tradition of the Agga~na Sutta, which we have discussed in
chapter two.
As more and more monks infringed the guidelines,
it became necessary to lay down rules in order to regulate
198
the outward conduct of the Sangha.
The term dhamma-vinaya,
used constantly in the Vinaya texts to indicate the two
factors which govern the Sangha.
The word denotes "doctrine-
cum-discipline" or "philosophy-cum-law".
The word Vinaya
in the general sense means "discipline" and in the special
sense, "the law and constitution of the Sangha"
5.5.6.
37
It was only after the misbehaviour of the
uxorious monk, whose example was soon followed by others,
some of whom
had found less worthy objects of sexual desire,
that a situation arose making it necessary to lay down laws
of moral conduct.
These were in the form of "rules of
training or precepts" (sikkapada) voluntarily accepted as
binding by the monks.
There were ten main rules of morality
or precepts (dasasikkhapada) to be adopted by one who is
entering the Sangha, and an increasing number of lesser
regulations, making a final total of 150 in the texts
38
.
The Buddha gives the following reasons for enacting such a
code:
"I am enacting rules of training for the
monks, for the well-being of the community,
for the convenience of .the Community, in
order to curb miscreants, for the ease of
well-behaved monks, in order to restrain
misbehaviour in the present, in order to
check future misbehaviour, in order that
those who have no faith (in this religion)
may acquire faith, in order that those
who have faith may be further strengthened
199
in their faith, in order that the good
doctrine (dharnma) may last long, and for
the promotion of discipline" 39
5.5.7.
The laws of morality are meant to serve the
interests of the Buddhist Community as a whole, making things
easy for those whose behaviour is good and serving as a
deterrent to others.
They are also intended to promote the
discipline of the Order, which is considered a good in itself •
•
They are also laid down in order to seek and promote public
confidence.
The Sangha was dependent on the laity for its
material needs and in .turn it had to perform the duty of
educating the public and giving them moral and spiritual
guidance.
Thus we see a utilitarian and pragmatic motive
behind the legislation, as well as an attempt to maintain the
high standards of conduct required for spiritual progress
5.5.8.
40
Miss Horner makes the following observation,
summarising, as it were, the true relationship that obtained
between the Sangha and lay supporters:
"For the believing laity, though naturally
not to the forefront in the Vinaya, are
in a remarkable way never absent, never
far distant.
They perpetually enter into
the life of the Order as supporters,
critics, donors, intensely interested
It seems that they were deeply anxious for
its success.
Thus the Vinaya does not
merely lay down sets of rules whose
200
province was confined to an internal
conventual life.
This was led in such
a way as to allow and even to encourage
a certain degree of inter-communication
with the lay supporters and followers, no
less than with those lay-people who were
not adherents of the faith.
What was
important, was that the monks should
neither abuse their dependence on the
former, nor alienate the latter, but
should regulate their lives so as to give
no cause for complaint.
With these aims
in view, conduct that was not thought
seemly for them to indulge in had to be
carefully defined, and it became drafted
in rules and precepts• 41
5.5.9.
Later, when the rules or monastic laws were
codified, the set of legally binding rules (patimokkha) was
formally recited every fortnight at a formal meeting of each
Sangha.
The rules were codified and enforced binding on
monks since the central issue of authority and obligation of
the Sangha was raised under the question of obedience and
coercion, in answer to such question as: "Why should a monk
obey the Order?" and "If he disobeys may he be coerced?".
The going for refuge to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha was
abolished from the normal procedure of ordination, but it
was retained as a formula to be repeated when novices and
former members of the other sects were accepted on probation
201
as candidates for ordination
42
•
By abolishing the old
formula, admission and ordination took a more formal
character.
This can be seen from the statement of the Buddha
himself:
"From this day forth, monks, I abolish that
ordination by going to the three refuges
which I allowed.
I allow you, monks, to
ordain by a formal act consisting of a
motion and a resolution put three times"
43
.
According to this statement, it is evident that the Order
along has the authority, the power and the legal right to
. 44
or d a~n .
5.5.10.
In addition, the candidate for ordination now
has to have a preceptor.
After a brief period of probation
and experienced and capable monk, who is well-versed in
Dhamma and Vinaya, of a particular monastery would propose
at a formal meeting of the Sangha that such and such a person
be ordained by such and such a preceptor.
The matter was
placed before the assembly as a formal motion, which was read
thrice, and if none dissented it was deemed to have unanimously
passed.
The formalism of this procedure can be illustrated
as follows:
"The Order should be informed by an
experienced, competent monk, saying:
'Honoured Sirs, let the Order hear me.
This (person) so and so wishes for
ordination from the Venerable so and so.
So and so asks the Order for ordination
202
through the preceptor so and so.
is the motion.
This
Honoured Sirs, let the
Order hear me ...
If the ordination of
so and so through the preceptor so and
so is pleasing to the venerable ones, let
them be silent;
he to whom it is not
pleasing should speak.
And a second time
I speak forth this matter ...
time ..•
And a third
It is pleasing to the Order,
therefore they are silent
.,45
This same formula is repeated to this day as a preliminary to
the ordination of a Buddhist monk;
it vividly illustrated
the legalistic aspect of the life of the Buddhist Sangh.a, a
feature which appeared very early in its history.
It is evident from the Vinaya texts that the
5.6.1.
legally binding rules (patimokkha) were enforced because the
Order was growing and that, in order to meet this expansion,
it had to be carefully controlled
46
the Order, corrupt monks appeared.
.
With the expansion of
These monks caused
disputes, contentions and even brawls.
There were also an
unspecified number of people seeking for admission to the
Order, but there were no proper rules as to .who was eligible
for it.
Therefore the inner life of the Order had to be
safeguarded with planned and carefully arranged rules and
regulations.
At the same time, they were necessary in order
to maintain ties with the secular society
5.6.2.
47
The word patimokkha has been translated variously,
203
and many interpretations have been put forward.
some of them.
"from sins"
48
Let us take
According to Oldenberg, it means freedom
.
He further adds that the list of those
offences which deserved punishment or some kind of expiation
was, at a very early period, drawn up for use at confessional.
meetings.
This list was read out to the assembled monks, and
each one was asked whether he knew himself to be free from
the sins there named.
This list is called the patimokkha 49
Miss Hornercriticises Oldenberg's interpretation and points
out that the monks were not asked, as Oldenberg states,
whether they were "free from the sins there named".
The
word for "free" or "freed" would have been vimutta.
What
they were asked was whether they were parisuddha, pure in
the matter of having kept the rules, therefore outwardly
pure.
Moreover, she points out that the word "sin" is not a
Buddhist conception 50
5.6.2.
The word patimokkha is defined in the Mahavagga
as the "face, head of all good states" 51 , but, as Winternitz
points out, this derivation "is quite impossible"
52
.
He
himself is inclined to explain patimokkha as "that which is
to be redeemed" 53 .
Rhys Davids and Oldenberg say that
according to the derivation of the word pa~i (Skt. prati)
~~
it means "to free one-self, to get rid of";
and it is
precisely through the patimokkha recitation and answering the
questions that the members of the Sangha were set free from
the offences they had incurred.
Therefore, patimokkha means
"disburdening, getting free" 54 .
But Miss Horner points out
that it was not the getting free that was of such importance
204
as the being bound, and that the assumption is that the
rules, as binding, should be followed and obeyed, and that
a monk should be "bound by the restraint of the patimokkha"
55 .
(patimokkhasanvarasanvutu)
5.6.3.
S. Dutt, taking the etymological interpretation
of the word prati as "against" and moksa as "scattering" sees
it as "bond".
He says that it is an
external bond of union
56
. d to convert t h e sect 1nto
.
.
d ev1se
a re 1"1g1ous
Or d er
Rhys
Davids and Stede say that the word has the "sense of binding,
obligatory, obligation", and literally it means "that which
should be made binding"
57
Miss Horner, in her translation
of the Vinaya texts, left the word untranslated, but says
that it means "bond" and refers as "binding legislation"
5.6.4.
58
The P.atimokkha consists of two parts, the
Bhikku-patimokkha and Bhikkuni-patimokkha, for monks and
nuns respectively.
In the first of these, which is the most
important, and upon which the second is based, 227 offences
that may be committed by monks are classified under seven
categories in a descending order.
(ii) sanghadisesa,
(v) pacittiya,
(vi)
(iii) aniyata,
They are:
(i) parajika,
(iv) nissaggiya-pacittiya,
~~idesaniya and (vii) sekhiya 59 .
There
are also a number of other kinds of offences like thullacciya,
dukkata and dubbhasita, which were later additions
5.6.5.
60
.
The worst category of offences grouped under
these seven headings is parajika and the lightest one is
sekhiya.
The parajika offences are:
(ii) theft,
(i)
sexual intercourse,
(iii) murder or abetting of murder and (iv) pretence
205
.
. .
1 per f ect1ons
.
61
o f possess1ng
sp1r1tua
According to the
Vinaya, any monk who violates. these basic commands of
monastic discipline is automatically excluded from the
Order
62
.
Sanghadisesa is a class of offence whose punishment
must be meted out by some formal administration on the part
of the Order 63 .
Aniyata is an offence the guilt of which
uncertain, and which requires the investigation of evidence.
Where the evidence is not clear offences of the other
.
.
64
categor1es
•b ecome an1yata
Nissagiya - pacittiya is a
c.lass of offence which involves the infringement of the rule
that the monk should abandon all, or almost all, his personal
possessions except those few permitted by the Buddha
Pacittiya offences require expiation
66
.
65
Patidesaniya offences
ought to be confessed and are normally pardoned by the Order
. h a warnlng
.
Wlt
not to repeat t h em 67
good breeding.
Sekhiya is a rule of
It gives instruction to be observed by a monk
in his daily life.
Breaches of sekhiya rules are not treated
as offences and no punishment is therefore prescribed for
them
68
.
We do not propose to scrutinize the various types of
offences which are categorized under these seven headings,
as this would divert us from the present discussion.
5.7.1.
The jurisdiction of each Sangha extended only
as far as its geographical boundaries or ''territorial limits"
(sima), which were strictly defined, and this was another
innovation of the Buddha 69 .
These Sanghas extended beyond
the limits of political units and there was constant intercourse between them.
The singular word Sangha was used to
denote all the Buddhist communities collectively and was
206
designated "the Sangha of the four quarters, of the present
and the future"
- .
70
(agatanagatassa catuddisassa sanghassa)
.
They all abode by the same Dhamma andthe same Vinaya,
except for the fact that those rules which were proposed and
adopted by one Sangha and had only a local relevance were not
binding on another Sangha unless that Sangha decided to
adopt them 71 .
5.7.2.
Executive, legislative and judicial powers
were vested in the Sangha
72
, and the decision of the
Sa~gha,
if necessary, were enforced by the secular state 73 , which
did not in any way interfere with the authority or
jurisdiction of the Sangha over its members
74
.
s. Dutt, for
example, writes that the Sangha as it developed became
virtually one of the constituent communities of the body
politic.
It possessed, above all, a well-developed and
well-organized body of laws, which enjoyed state recognition,
and to that extent it was a part of the civil law
5.7.3.
75
.
Authorities on ancient Indian plity,,like
Kautilya, specially advise kings to respect and enforce the
rules made by corporations, religions or secular, for the
discipline of their members, and laid down that infringements
of the laws of such bodies were punishable by the secular
state
76
.
Moreover, there have been many instances where the
secular state came to be involved with the Sangha over legal
matters.
For instance, we are told how the royal officers
accepted the verdict of the Sangha in a case of alleged
theft by some monks
77
.
207
At the same time, the Buddha advises the
5.7.4.
monks to conform their behaviour to the royal wishes
(anujanami bhikkhave rajunam anuvattitum) 78 .
Moreover, the
rules regarding admission to the Order were so based as to
avoid all inconvenience to the secular state, in that
soldiers and slaves were excluded.
For example, we are told
that the monks once ordained "some soldiers.
But this resulted
in a complaint against the monks, and the Buddha thereupon
prohibited•the admission of officers of state to the Order
79
.
This is a clear proof that the monks had to adapt themselves
to certain given situations.
5.7.5.
We are thus assured that the laws of Vinaya
are legally valid, since they received the state's
recognition.
They did not apply, moreover, to a narrow
private body, but to an international institution, the sa~gha
of the present and future
80
.
Four formal sources of law
(cattaro mahapadesa) are mentioned, namely the claim that a
rule was (i) promulgated by the Buddha,
Sangha,
(ii) by a unitary
(iii) by a body of learned experts of the law and
(iv) by a single learned expert of the law 81 , but it is said
that the authority of all four claims should be investigated
and confirmed, and the laws adopted only if they are in
conformity with the spirit of the existing Dhamma and Vinaya
5.7.6.
82
.
The Sangha is deemed a juridical person having
a legal personality of its own, and it has the right of owning
property, which is vested in the monastic community.
The
Sa~gha is a system in which property is held in common.
208
B.K. Mukerjee writes in the following words:
"The Buddhist Sangha was undoubtedly a
juristic person and was capable of
holding property in the same way as a
private person could ... the ordinary
formalities of gifts were observed by the
donor when he wanted to dedicate any
property to the Buddhist congregation,
and the gift was accepted on behalf of
the Sangha by its head or representative.
The property did not become the private
property of the ostensible donee, nor
could it be said to belong jointly to all
the monks who were members of the
congregation at that particular time.
It
was the property of the congregation
itself which could not but be deemed to
be a separate entity for this purpose and
which continued to exist even if all its
members died out or were replaced by
other people"
5.7.7.
83
That all property was vested in the universal
Sangha and lent to the individual for use is clear from
several passages in the Vinaya texts.
For example:
"Monks, the Sangha is the owners of the
bowl and robes of a monk who has passed
away.
But truly those who tend the sick
are of great service.
I approve of your
209
giving through the Sangha the three robes
and bowl to those who tended the sick and
also of your distributing through the
(resident) Sangha in their presence the
light goods and the light requisites that
are there;
but whatever heavy goods and
heavy requisites that are there, these
belong to the Sangha of the four quarters
of the present and future - they are--not
to be disposed of and not to be divided
up"84
5.8.1.
Chapter nine of the Mahavagga contains a
thorough discussion about the validity and invalidity of the
formal acts that the Order can carry out.
To sum up, the
following would be the essential conditions of a valid act.
(i)
The Order must be complete.
(ii)
Those who are unable to attend due
to illness or some other reason
should ask leave to be absent, and
those who are present should not
protest against the proceedings of
the assembly.
(iii) The proposal of the motion.
(iv)
The proclamation of the resolution
once or thrice.
(v)
Consent to the proposal given by
silence.
When there is a division
of opinion, it becomes a case of
210
dispute.
But when the matter is
decided by a valid act, it becomes
fit to stand, and protests against
its validity will be of no avai1
5.8.2.
85
.
Formal acts of the Sangha may be either
disciplinary of non-disciplinary 86
These acts are deemed
invalid if the constitutional procedure laid down is violated.
This would eventually lead to a dispute. The Vinaya texts
•
discuss the methods of conducting trials and settling various
disputes (adhikarana-samatha).
four kinds of dispute.
(il
It is said that there are
They are:
Vivadadhikarana - the disputes which
~
may arise on the interpretation given
to certain specified matters such as
Dharnrna, Vinaya, the teachings,
practices, or ordinances of the
Buddha, and the nature of
ecclesiastical punishments.
(ii)
Anuvadadhikarana - the disputes
which may arise regarding the state
of a monk's opinion, morals,
character, conduct, or manner of
life.
(iii l
Apattadhikarar;a - the disputes
which may arise on the offences
mentioned in section 5.6.4.
(iv)
Kiccadhikarana - disputes which
may arise regarding the procedure
211
of a formal act and the decision
given by the Order, or the duties
and obligation of the sangha
87
Chapter four of the Cullavagga discusses thoroughly the
different methods of settling these disputes 88
5.8.3.
The general method of settling disputes is
confrontation (sammukhavinaya).
It involves four conditions.
First, the trial should be held in the presence of the
accused monk.
It is said:
"Monks, a formal act of censure or guidance
or banishment or reconciliation or
suspension should not be carried out
against monks who are not present.
Whoever should carry one out, there is
an offence of wrong-doing"
89
Secondly, the trial should be held in the presence of the
full assembly authorized to conduct it.
Thirdly, the accused
should be charged according to the letter and the spirit of
the law (i.e. Dhamma and Vinaya) under which he is charged
and an account of the procedure for settlement as laid down
by the Buddha should be recited, and finally, he should be
tried in the presence of the complainant 90
This four-fold
confrontation is necessary for the settlement of all disputes.
If, for any reason, a local Sangha is unable to settle a
dispute by means of confrontation, the case is referred to
another Sangha and it is settled there if the latter agrees
5.8.4.
Another method of settling disputes is
91
212
sativinaya, which is a disciplinary proceeding under appeal
to the accused monk's own conscience.
If a monk is wrong-
fully accused and is found innocent, the Order must
repudiate the charges and must take action against the monk
who brought the false accusation 92 .
If a monk committed an
offence while insane, acquittal on the ground of insanity is
granted.
This is granted under one of three conditions:
(i) the accused confesses the offence committed when reminded
of it,
(ii)• the accused cannot remember it owing to lapse
of memory,
mind
93
5.8.5.
(iii) the accused continues in an insane state of
.
An attempt should be made to secure a
confession by reminding the person of the circumstances in
which the offence was committed, as far as the assembly was
aware.
This method is called pati~natakarana.
.
.
This is
followed by the formal charge, after which the trial preceeds,
giving a full opportunity for the accused to present his
case and point of view 94
5.8.6.
If in the course of the proceedings the Order
feels that it is difficult to come to a decision, it may
appoint a committee (ubbahika) to settle the matter.
"Honoured Sirs, let the Order listen to
me.
While we are investigating this
legal question both endless disputations
arose and of not one speech was the
meaning clear.
If it seems right to the
Order, the Order may agree to appoint a
213
committee to settle this legal question.
This is the motion ...
If the Order is
pleasing to appoint a committee, the
Order should be silent and if any one
is not pleased let him speak .....
5.8.7.
95
If this committee finds it impossible to
decide the matter delegated to it, it should report back to
the Order, who may then settle it by the decision of the
.
.
ma]or~ty
96
This is carried out by members who are fully
ordained after their periods of probation and who have one
vote each.
Voting is always on a resolution formally moved
once or thrice according to the importance of the matter
under discussion.
Voting is by means of marked voting
tickets with different signs (salaka), which are distributed
and subsequently counted and the majority opinion ascertained
97
Moreover, voting is carried out by a secret
5.8.8.
method (gulhaka), open method (vivataka), or by the
.
..
.
whispering method (sakanna-jappaka).
A special officer called
the "arbitrator" (salaka-gahapaka - literally meaning "votetaker"), noted for his impartiality, knowledge of the law and
voting procedure is unanimously elected by a formal resolution
of the assembly to take charge of voting.
The arbitrator,
having marked the voting tickets with different signs,
proceeds to take votes in either of three methods.
either call upon each monk and speak to him:
He may
"This ticket
is for one of such a view, this ticket is for one of such a
view.
Take whichever you like";
when he has taken it, he
.
214
should be told:
"Do not tell anyone about it", or he may
call upon each monk and whisper the same thing into his ear.
After voting has finished and has been counted either by
secret or whispering methods, if the arbitrator finds that
the majority profess what is not Dhamma and thinks that
voting was wrongly taken, the result should be rejected.
On the other hand, if he finds that the majority profess
Dhamma and thinks voting was rightly taken, the result
should be announced.
who profess
Dh~
If the arbitrator finds that those
are in a majority, because of his very
confidence he should take voting openly 98
5.8.9.
The arbitrator, who enjoys the confidence of
the whole Order, has the privileges of deciding how the
voting should be conducted, the right of rejecting the
decision, and also the right to advise members on matters
legal and moral, if he fears a breach of justice.
From the
powers given to him we can see that it is not merely the
consent of the majority that mattered but the conformity of
the decision with the spirit and the letter of law, that is,
99
. h Dh aroma an d Vlnaya
.
Wlt
5.8.10.
These are some of the methods which have to be
followed in conducting trials and settling disputes in the
Buddhist Order.
These proceedings display a healthy and
sound democratic attitude.
The opinions and rights of the
individual are respected and every accused person is given a
chance to express his views.
All in all, these proceedings
show that the principles of justice of early Buddhism, which
215
we discussed earlier (5.3.1- 5.3.7), were scrupulously
observed.
5.8.11.
Miss Horner, who translated the entire Vinaya
texts, points out that the discipline, at the beginning of
the training, "is a teaching of commands (anadesana), being
taught by the Buddha in respect of a multitude of commands
for those meriting commands"
100
She further says:
"Practically every conceivable thing
affecting monastic life for monks and
nuns, practically every conceivable
relation with other human beings, whether
fellow monks or nuns or the laity, are
brought under review and legislated for
in minutest detail
It is a very
complete system, a very precise
organization, marked throughout by the
humaneness and reasonableness of Gotama,
the codifier to whom but few exception
.
. ascrl'b e d"lOl .
every ru 1 lng
lS
5.9.1.
The Sangha was a "system of government formed
by the Bhikkhus, Bhikkunis, Upasakas and upasikas", and it
was a republican democratic institution set up by the Buddha
for the good of its members as well as of mankind in general.
He intended it to continue to function on the same democratic
basis after his death 102 .
The question was raised, during
the last days of the Buddha's life, as to how in the absence
of the Teacher, there could be unity in the Sangha, since he
216
had not appointed a personal successor or head of the Order
to function in his place after his death.
The Buddha
replied:
"So behave that you make yourselves your
own island (dipa)
103
, your own refuge;
and that you seek no other refuge.
So
behave that you rely upon the Dhamma as
your own refuge and that you seek no
other refuge"
104
The assurance given is that the system in itself is capable
of taking the place of the Master in his absence.
Such an
idea was a novel one and was unknown to the political or
. .
.
.
.
re 1 lglous
organlzatlon
contemporary or prlor
to Bu ddh.lsm 105 .
5.9.2.
Early Buddhism was acquainted with both
monarchy and republican democracy, but favoured the latter.
We use this term in the same sense as it is applied to
ancient Greek institutions, implying a system wherein a large
number of citizens had some say in the determination of policy.
There is no need to press the point that such tribal republics
existed in early India.
That Buddhism favours democracy can
be seen from the account of Agga~a Sutta, which conceives of
the state as democratic.
In such a democracy, what is
important, according to early Buddhism, is not merely the
rule of the majority but rule in conformity with the law of
righteousness.
Although early Buddhism favours democracy, it
considers that any form of government is good to the extent
to which it follows the law of righteousness.
217
5.9.3.
The Sangha was set up on democratic
foundation, and the concept of the Sangha appears to have
been derived from that of a democratic political state.
The
early Buddhist texts mention as an example worthy of
emulation the republic of the Vajjians, contemporary with
the Buddha.
The Buddha speaks very appreciatively of the
Vajjian tribe:
"As long as they meet in concord, conclude
their meetings in concord, and carry out
their policies in concord;
as long as
they make no laws not already promulgated,
and set aside nothing enacted in the past,
acting in accordance with the ancient
institutions of the Vajjis established in
olden days;
... as long as they respect,
esteem, reverence, and support the elders
of the Vajjis, and look on it as a duty
to heed their words; ... as long as no
women or girl of their tribes are held by
force or abducted;
as long as they
respect, esteem, reverence, and support the
shrines of the Vajjis, whether in town or
country, and do not neglect the proper
offerings and rites laid down and practised
in the past; ... as long as they give due
protection, deference, and support to the
perfected beings (arahants) among them so
that such perfected beings may come to the
218
land from afar and live comfortably among
them, so long may they be expected not to
decline, but to flourish• 106 .
5.9.4.
This is followed by a longer passage in which
the Buddha is purported to have adapted the seven conditions
of the welfare state to the circumstances of the Buddhist
Order.
In this passage 41 conditions of the welfare of the
Sangha are listed.
The nature of this long list, mostly
'
referring to moral qualities, suggests that it is not
authentically the Buddha's words, but nevertheless it reflects
the ideals of early Buddhism.
Virtues of harmony, affection
(metta) are stressed and strict discipline is commended.
5.9.5.
The reference to the Vajjis is interesting
because of the comment made by Buddhaghosa.
"As for the 'ancient Vajjian constitution'
it is said when a thief was brought before
the rulers, they handed him over to the
judicial officers (viniccaya-mahamatta) .
They investigated the facts and if they
thought that he was not a thief they
released him but if they suspected that
he was a thief, they handed him over to
the magistrates (voharika) without making
any statement themselves.
They in turn
investigated the matters and if they
thought he was not a thief they released
him but if they suspected that he was a
219
thief they handed him over to the
justices (sutta-dhara)
they in turn
to a panel of eight judges (attha-kulika)
.•. they in turn to the president, who
investigated the case and if he thought
that he was not a thief, released him but
if he was convinced that he was a thief
called for the book of precedents (pavenipotthaka) .
There it is written down that
such and such was the punishment for such
and such offence.
The president, there-
upon, compared his offence with those and
ordered the appropriate punishment.
Thus
the people who abode by the "ancient
Vajjian constitution" had no disgruntlement
(against the state) because justice was
done in accordance with the ancient
tradition and they felt that if anyone was
at fault it was themselves and not the
officials (of the state).
And as a result
they performed their task with a sense of
responsibility.
In this way the state
prospered'' 107
5.9.6.
This passage, from a commentary composed almost
a thousand years after the Buddha's death does not certainly
record historical fact, and the Vajjian legal system seems
almost too cumbersome to be possible in a small state.
theless, the passage may depend on an early tradition,
Never-
220
exa99erated in transmission, and at least it reflects the
value placed by Theravada Buddhism on a system of justice
which gives every consideration to the accused, and is
firmly based on precedent.
5.10.1.
The Buddha set up the Sangha, the oldest
international society in history, which was to function after
his death in accordance with its constitution (vinaya), drawn
up for the furtherance of the law of righteousness and the
teachings of the Buddha
108
.
This can be seen from the
statement of the Buddha himself.
Just before his death he
tells Ananda that it was possible that they might think that
after his death they would be without a teacher and adds:
"You should not look at things in this
light.
The Dhamma that has been taught
and the Vinaya that has been laid down by
me should serve as the Teacher after I
pass away"
109
Further, it is said:
"If the Sangha so desires, it may abolish
the minor rules of the Community after my
death"
5.10.2.
110
.
According to the tradition as handed down by
the Theravadins, when the First Buddhist Council was held
soon after the death of the Buddha, there it was questioned
as to which sections of the Buddha's doctrines were to be
rehearsed first.
And, it is recorded, the monks declared that
the Vinaya should be rehearsed first, for "the Vinaya, indeed,
221
is the lifeblood (ayu - "vitalizing factor") of the Buddha
Sasana.
so long as the Vinaya lasts, the Sasana would last"
( ... Vinayo nama Buddha-sasanassa ayu;
thitam hoti.
~·
vinaye thite sasanam
- pathamam vinayam sangayama'ti
. - - Tasma
... ) 111 .
Thus they maintained that the very survival of the Sasana
would depend entirely on the Vinaya.
It is said in the
Mahavagga that "the teaching persists while Vinaya is not
destroyed" (vinaye avinatthamhi puna titthati sasanam) 112 .
These statements indicate the position held by the Vinaya in
Buddhism.
The life of the Sasana, it was unequivocally
acknowledged by the Theravadin, is in the hands of the Order,
whose survival and
Vinaya.
p~rity,
in turn, depended entirely on the
Therefore, it is indispensable for the existence of
the Sasana.
authority.
the Buddha.
The Vinaya, as promulgated, is itself an
It consists of the commands and prohibitions of
Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that
there is no Buddhist law.
222
CONCLUSION
6.1.1.
In the introductory chapter of this thesis,
we stated that we would examine the view that early Buddhism
is incompatible with social and political ideas.
We believe
that we have produced enough evidence to disprove this view.
Though, for obvious reasons, the bulk of the Pali canon deals
with metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and ethical
questions, there is sufficient material in it to show that
the early Buddhists had definite ideas and ideals concerning
social and political life.
In order to show this many
passages have been quoted in extenso.
6.1.2.
These ideas were comparatively rational and
equalitarian.
The early Buddhists rejected the idea of
divine authority and the divine origin of kingship and based
their political thought on a doctrine involving a social
contract, apparently the first doctrine of social contract in
the history of thought.
They strongly maintained that the
fundamental ethical principles which governed all life in
the cosmos - Dhamrna - were valid in social and political as
well as in individual life, and rejected the rather
Machiavelli<'l.n view of the state which is reflected in the
Arthasastra of Kautilya.
6.1.3.
They seem to have set themselves against the
growing tendencies to autocracy, which culminated in the
Mauryan Empire, and, if we are to believe the "seven
conditions for the welfare of the Vajjis" contained in the
Mahaparinibbana Sutta, they tended to idealize the republican,
223
more democratic tribal states which were already declining
in power and influence when the Buddha taught .. They strongly
maintained that the ideal state works for the material and
spiritual welfare of the people, guaranteeing religious,
social, political and individual freedom, as well as economic
security with full employment.
This is the first time in
Indian history that the idea of a "general good" or "a common
good", not only affecting the common man but also pertaining
to the peoples of the world, is envisaged.
Moreover, the early Buddhists strongly
6.1.4.
maintained the idea of a common humanity transcending national
and racial barriers.
In respect of law they maintained that
it must have a universally acceptable moral basis;
they
favoured speedy justice and equality of punishment, and were
not inclined to give advantages to litigants or criminals of
high birth.
All in all, they were concerned with the
reformation of society as well as the perfectibility of the
individual and maintained as an ideal the concept of the
world becoming a single international political order, under
the Cakkavatti.
6.1.5.
Thus we may justly say that the early Buddhists,
though they may not have been rationalists, humanists, or
democrats in the modern sense, did anticipate, in an earlier
more rudimentary form, many of the ideals of modern liberal
democracy.
Their influence on Indian civilization as a whole
was not strong enough to directly affect its political
institutions, but the more humanitarian and paternalistic
224
aspects of Hindu kingship may well owe something to the
influence of early Buddhism, perhaps chiefly mediated by
Asoka.
Several of the social and political ideas reflected
in the Pali canon may be found, in very modified form, in
much later Hindu literature of a didactic nature, such as
the interpolated portions of the Epics and the Dharmasastras.
6.1.6.
Thus we conclude that early Buddhism played a
part in the moulding of Indian political ideas which was by
no means insignificant.
In the social thought of India its
influence was less, since in early medieval times we meet
kings, for instance the Palas of Bengal, who declare themselves
to be Buddhists and at the same time are proud of the fact
that they are upholders of the "rules of class and stages of
life" (varnasrama-dharma) .
In this respect the persistent
class-consciousness of India was too strong for its early
Buddhists critics.
Although early Buddhism had little
permanent influence in the social thought of India, it had an
increasing effect upon the Buddhist nations of Asia in their
social and political life.
6.1.7.
We cannot claim that we have said the last
word on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism.
Nevertheless we may have produced enough evidence to show
that it is not as "frustrating" as some earlier writers have
claimed
C::;:. supra. 1. 3. 3) to discover the basic elements of a
social and political philosophy in the texts of early Buddhism.
There are still numerous gaps in our knowledge., and we trust
that later students may find in our study the stimulus to try
to fill them.
225
ABBREVIATIONS
A.
Anguttara Nikaya
AA.
Anguttara Nikaya Atthakatha (Manorathapurani)
AB.
Aitareya Briihmana
-
-
-
AD.
Apastamba Dharmasutra
AU.
Aitareya Upanisad
BD.
Baudhayana Dharmasutra
B.Disp.
BG.
Book of the Discipline (Translation of the
Vinaya Pitaka)
•
Bhagavad-Gita
BU.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
Cornm.
Commentary
cu.
Chandogya Upanisad
D.
nigha Nikaya
DA.
Digha Nikaya Atthakatha (Sumangalavilasinil
Dhp.
Dhammapada
Dial.
Dialogues of the Buddha (Translation of the
Digha Nikaya)
DPPN.
Malalasekera, G.P., Dictionary of Pali Proper
Names
Dpv.
Dipavamsa
EB
Malalasekara, G.P.
Buddhism
ERE.
Hastings, J.
and Ethics
GD.
Gautama Dharmasutra
It.
Itivuttaka
J.
Jataka
JB.
Jaiminiya Brahmana
KA.
Kautiliya Arthasastra
M.
Majjhima Nikaya
(ed.), Encyclopaedia of
(ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion
226
MA.
Majjhima Nikaya Atthakatha (Papancasudani)
Manu.
Manu Smrti or Manavadharmasastra
Mbh.
Mahabharata
Mhv.
Mahavaffisa
Mhvu.
Mahavastu
Miln.
Milindapanha
MT.
Mahavaffisa Tika
o.u.P.
Oxford University Press
PB.
...
......,
_,.
-
Pancavimsa Brahmana
w.
PED.
Rhys Davids, T.W. and Stede,
English Dictionary
PTS.
Pali Text society
PU.
Radhakrishnan, S., The Principal of Upanisads
RV.
Rg-Veda
s.
samyutta Nikaya Atthakatha (saratthappakasini)
SB.
Satapatha Brahmana
SBB.
Sacred Books of the Buddhists
SBE.
Sacred Books of the East
SBH.
Sacred Books of the Hindus
SED.
Monier-Williams, M., Sanskrit English Dictionary
Sn.
sutta Nipata
SnA.
sutta Nipata Atthakatha (Paramatthajotika)
TB.
Taittiriya Brahmana
TS.
Taittiriya saffihita
TU.
Taittiriya Upanisad
v.
Vinaya Pitaka
VA.
vinaya Pitaka Atthakatha (Samantapasadika)
VD.
Vasistha Dharmasutra
Vi sm.
Visuddhimagga
.
(eds.), Pali
..
,~~ms EA~TEhE~~~x
·sx
~~,O~SE~~BA
'DA
nus>A
'SA
pBS,UEdD
>~~ms
L'G'G
228
*"'·
NOTES
Except where stated in the notes some of the translations
are taken from the PTS and other series, editors and
translators of which are mentioned in the bibliography.
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
No.
1
Page
Curtis, M., ed. The Great Political Theories,
1, ( 1961) , p. 23.
'voi.
2
1
Basham, A.L., The Wonder That was India,
(1954, Rep.l971), p.80.
Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political
!deas, (1959), p.3.
1
3.
Ghoshal, Ibid., p.529.
1
4.
Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the
Mauryas, (1961), p.l41.
Basham, A.L., "The Rise of Buddhism in its
Historical Context", (1966), p.399.
2
5.
0.3.180-93.
2
6.
For example see: Goddard, D., ed. A Buddhist
Bible, (1970), p.645 ff.
3
Coomaraswamy, A.K., Hinduism and Buddhism,
(n.d.), p.48.
3
King, W.L., In the Hope of Nibbana, An Essay
on Theravada Buddhist Ethics, (1964), p.l76.
3
Ibid., p.l77.
4
Life Magazine, Issue on "Buddhism", (7th March,
1955).
4
Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie,
(1921), p.220 ff. trs. Gerth, H.H. and
Martindale, D., (1958), pp.206, 226.
4
"Buddhism" in A Cultural History of India,
(ed. Basham, A.L., 1975), p.97.
5
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
229
No.
13.
Page
Rhys Davids, T.W., Buddhist India,
(1903),
p .132.
ERE, vol. 7, s.v.Law (Buddhist)
5
Indian Philosophy, vol.l, (1948), p.360.
This v1ew is again presented in a preface
written by him in 1956 to 2500 Years of
of Buddhism, (ed. Bapat, P.V., 1956), p.ix.
6
15.
Op.cit., p.45.
6
16.
Buddhism, (1899), p.83.
6
17.
Ibid., 84.
6
18.
Ibid., p. 85.
6
19.
For example see: Law, N.N., Aspects of
Ancient Indian Polity, (1921), p.90 ff.
7
20.
A History of Hindu Political Theories
7
21.
Op.cit., (1959), p.69.
7
22.
"The Principles of International Law in
Buddhist Doctrine", (1967).
8
23.
Ibid., p.534 (94).
9
24.
For examples: Bhagvat, D.N., Early Buddhist
Jurisprudence, (1939). Chan Toon, Principles
of Buddhist Law, (1902), Dutt, S., Early
Buddh1st Monarchism, (1960). De,Gokuldas,
Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha, (1955).
25.
Probably all modern works dealing with ancient
Indian polity have a chapter or two or a few
sections on early Buddhist social and political
ideas. The subject of ancient Indian polity
has been treated by many writers both Indians
and foreign. Early Buddhist social and
political ideas are to be found discussed,
for example, in the following works.
Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), Chs. 4, 14 and 19.
Warder, A.K., Indian Buddhism, (1970), Ch.6.
Ling, T., The Buddha, (1973), Chs. 6-8 of
part 3. Basham, A.L., "Theravada Buddhism"
in Sources of Indian Tradition, (ed. De
Bary, Wm.T., 1958), Ch.6, Section 3. Rahula,
W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959), Ch.8.
14.
26.
For examples: Malalasekera, G.P. and
Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and the Race
Question, (1958). Jayatilleke, K.N. ''Buddhism
9
230
No.
27.
Page
and Peace", (1962);
''Aspects of Buddhist
Social Philosophy'', (1970). Wijesekera,
O.H.de A., "Buddhism and Society", (n.d.).
Gokhale, B. G., "The Early Buddhist View of
the State", ( 19 69) ;
"The Early Buddhist
Kingship", (1966);
"Dhamma as a Political
Concept in Early Buddhism", (1968).
Malalasekera, G.P., ''Buddhist Socialism",
(1972).
Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels of
Dhamma", (1972).
9
Anuruddha, K., Studies in Buddhist Social
Thought as Documented ln the Pall Traditlon,
Unpubllshed PhD thesls, Lancaster Unlverslty,
(1972). Warnasuriya, K.S. Buddhist Social
Philosophy, Unpublished PhD thesis,
Lancaster University, (1974).
9
28.
Op.cit.,
10
29.
Ibid., p.404.
10
30.
Op.cit.,
ll
31.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
32 •.
Gard, R.A., Buddhist Influences on the
Political Thought of India and Japan, (1949),
p.l;
''Buddhist Polltical Thought", (1952),
p.viii.
12
33.
Ibid.,
14
34.
Op.cit.,
35.
"Christianity and Buddhism",
(1966), p.403.
(1972), p.6.
(1967), p.532 (92).
(1952), p.24.
ll
15
(1966), p.395.
(1962), p.3.
15
231
CHAPTER 2:
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND AUTHORITY
No.
1.
2.
3.
39.
.a,r:
Page
Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture,
p.l6.
(1966),
A History of Indian Political Ideas,
p.SO.
18
(1959),
For examples: Spellman, J.W., Political
Theory of Ancient India, (1964), pp.l-24.
Sharma, R.S., Aspects of Political Ideas
and Institutions 1n Anc1ent Ind1a, (1959),
pp.64-76.
~V.l0.90.
1\•Sho.ll., Ojo·C~t..,
k><L·. ~. • 1'1 - ;t:).
c IH""')' I>. 3(, "\'\.• ...
18
18
18
l'l
19
AV.l9.6.6, BD.l.l0.18.2-6, TS.7.1.1.4-6,
PB.6.1.6-ll, Manu.l.88-9l.
20
RV.l0.173-174, SB.ll.l.6.24, AV.3.3-5,
BU.l.4.ll-l5, Manu.l.89, KA.l.3.6.
20
7.
Manu. 7. 2 . 3 .:
20
8.
Ghoshal, Op. cit. , ( 19 59) , p. 2 4. Basham,
A.L., The Wonder That was India, (1954)'
p.243.
20
RV.l.32.
21
TS.8.l.l.4-6, TB.2.3.10.l, PB.6.1.6-ll,
BU.5.2.l.
21
11.
TU.3.3.8.3.
21
12.
Gopatha Uttarabhaga.3.18. cf. Jayatilleke,
K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
(1963) 1 p.l78.
21
13.
BU.l.4.10 1 D.3.28
21
14.
TB.2.2.7.2; 2.2.10.4, PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152,
SB.2.6.3.8, AB.7.17; 8.13, Manu.7.3-l3.
22
15.
Mbh.l2.12.59.
22
16.
TS.2.6.2.5; 5.10.10.3, AB.8.1.4.2, PB.ll.l.2,
Manu.l.93.
24
17.
SB.5.3.3.12; 8.4.15, AB.9.9, TS.2.5.10.l.
24
18.
Op.cit.,(l959),p.32.
24
19.
AB.8.27.
24
5.
6.
9.
10.
\
232
Page
No.
20.
"Spiritual Authority and the Temporal
Power in"''rndian Theory of Government",
(1942), "p.l.
2olj.
21.
Bo..s""""''
Aitareya Brahmana,. (1863), p. 73 ff.
25
22.
Op.cit., (1959), p.25.
26
23.
RV. 8.10 .1.
26
24.
RV.7.18, AV.3.19, AB.8.24-27, SB.4.1.4.6,
Mbh.l2.74.1.12, Manu.7.78, VD.l9.3-5,
YS.312-13, BD.l.l6.18.7.
26
SB.5.3.3.11-13. For a fuller account of
this, see: Coomaraswamy, A.K., Op.cit.,
(1942), p.l ff. Dumont, L., "The
Conception of Kingship in Ancient India",
(1970), p.62 ff. Cf. Vedic Index, vol.2,
pp.5-8, EB. vol.2, s.v. Authority.
27
26.
Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.27-28.
27
27.
AB.l.l4.
27
28.
TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2; 2.10.4
28
29.
TS.2.4.2.1, AB.8.12-14, TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2.
28
Bees'-"-""• op.c.;.t.., c. 1'\S'+4.) p.
la.S
25.
2'/A.
Cp· ~-~-·,
C I'IS4-)
, I>· '::l..lf:?.
@.::<.
24
:l_{i
30.
PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152.
28
31.
AB.8.12-14.
29
32.
SB.ll.l.6.24, Manu.7.3.14-20, KA.l.l3.5-7.
29
33.
Mbh.l2.12.67.
30
34.
SB.5.1.5.14.
30
35.
Manu.7.8.
31
36.
Gonda, J., Ancient Indian Kingship from the
Religious Point of View, (1966), p.l ff.
31
37.
Op.cit., (1959), p.l96.
32
38.
Ibid., p.l97.
32
39.
A History of Hindu Political Theories, (1923),
pp.vli-vlll, 267.
32
40.
Op.cit., (1959), p.36 n.3.
33
41.
Op. cit. , ( 19 2 3) , p. 172 .
33
233
No.
42.
Op.cit., (1970), p. 71.
33
43.
Op.cit., (1964), p.21.
34
44.
Ibid., p.24.
35
45.
Ibid., p.2l.
35
46.
A.4.90, Sn.552, J.l.l89; 1.283.
36
47.
0.3.28, M.2.222, A.l.273, Vism.598.
36
48.
D.l.8; 1.222; 3.28-30, M.l.l; 1.327, A.4.88;
2.24; 3.201, It.l5.
36
'
49.
0.1.221.
36
50.
A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept
of God, (1974), p.215.
37
51.
0.1.1.13; 3.28.
37
52.
This, the Abhassara-devaloka, ranked in the
cosmogony adapted (or put forth) by Buddhism,
as the third celestial stage above that of
the Great Brahma devaloka. Cf. Dial.part 3,
p.26 n.2, PED.DPPN.EB.vol. 1, s.v. Abhassara
deva-loka.
37
0.3.28-30. (tr. Basham in Sources of Indian
Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol.l, 1958),
pp.l27-28. We slightly amend Basham's translation in places, for the sake of easier
understanding in the context.
38
54.
0.3.30.
39
55.
Ibid., 1. 221.
39
56.
8.4.52.
40
57.
Ibid.,
58.
59.
Ibid., 2.24. Cf. Qhar!llaSif:'i, Ibiq,, pp.33-34. 40
M. 1.6'oc:> -.3.23o. t-s. ~:a., vot:·,:~, Li. fi!....-.i..k..,..._:. s.;a -11
ItO
Ibid., 3. 70-73. Cf. Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.224. 40
60.
Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.227.
41
61.
0.1.241. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,), p.227-28.
42
6 2.
Ibid., 243. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,),
p.228-30.
43
6 3.
Ibid., 129 ff.
43
53.
SSil.
<!
Page_
(tr. Dharmasiri, Op.cit., 1974), p.33.
40
234
No.
Page
64.
M.2.222, A.l.273.
43
65.
A.l.l74.
44
66.
J.5.238. (tr. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early
Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,) (196~p.411.
Also The Message of the Buddha, (1975),
p.l08.
45
J.6.208. (tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.,) (1963),
p.411 and (1975), p.llO.
45
68.
M.2.68.
45
69 .
Vism.598.
Cf. EB. vol.3, s.v.Brahma.
46
70.
See Johnston, E.H., The Buddhacarita,
part 2, (1930), p.XXX1 ff.
46
71.
The Jatakamala, 23.38-39.
46
72.
M.2.127-28.
47
73.
0.1.50.
47
74.
Oial.pait 1, p.298.
48
75.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1963), pp.l68-205.
Cf. EB.s.v., vol.2, Authority.
48
A.l.l88, M.l.475; 2.44.
Cf. Jayatilleke,
Ibid., pp.l69-204, 369-402, 427.
48
77.
Op.cit.,
49
78.
For a fuller account of the social contract
theory in Western thought, see Gough, J.,
The Social Contract, (1936).
49
Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.457-59. Prasad,
B., Theory of Government in Ancient India,
(1928), pp.221-25.
50
80.
Ghoshal, Op.cit.,
50
81.
0.3.81-89.
82.
Ibid., 85-86.
p.l29.
(tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958),
83.
Ibid., 86-89.
(tr.Basham, Ibid.), p.l30.
84.
Ibid.
67.
76.
79 .
(1959), p.62.
(1959), p.64, 538.
51
51
52
53
235
No.
85.
Page
Ibid., 89-92.
pp.l30-3l.
(tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958),
54
86.
Ibid., 90.
87.
Ibid., 289.
55
88.
5.4.336, A.2.66.68.
55
89.
0.3.61-67.
56
90.
Ibid., 92-93.
91.
Raja the common Indian word for king is
cognate with Latin Rex and other IndoEuropean words connected with ruling. The
false etymology from the root ranj "to
gladden", "to please" is also sometimes
found in non-Buddhist sources and is
significant of some of the ideas surrounding
kingship. The imagined connection of
khattiya with khetta "field" is also false,
as ~re the e!ymologies of the brahma~a,
vaisya, and sudra in the text. According to
the Buddhist point of view the ksatriya is
regularly mentioned before the brahma~a and
belongs to the highest social order. (see
Ch. 4) .
Also. A.l.87.
(tr.Basham, Op.cit. ,) , p.l31.
55
57
Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l31, Dial.
part 3, p.89 n.2, PED. s.v. Khattiya.
57
92.
D.3.93.
58
93.
The Path of Purity,
94.
Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.258-60, 337-38,
Prasad, Op.cit., (1968), pp.202-20, Lingat,
R., "The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of
Hindu Law in Hinayanist Indo-China", (1949),
pp.284-87.
58
95.
Mhvu. 1. 342.
59
96.
Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha
and the Early History of His Order, (1907),
p.4.
59
97.
Mhv.2.1 ff., Dpv.3.1 ff., MT.l22 ff.
61
98.
Vism.l3.419, DA.3.870, MT.l21.
61
99.
J.2.311; 454.
62
(tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l31.
(1923), pp.484-86.
58
236
No.
Page
100.
p. 19
101.
Nobel, J., ed. (1937), pp.l32 ff.
Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l82-85.
63
102.
Lingat, Op.cit.,
63
103.
"The Principles of International Law in
Buddhist Doctrine", (1967), p.513 (73).
63
104.
Dial. Part 1, p.l07.
63
105.
Studies in Hindu Political Thought,
p.l84.
62
0
(1949), p.284.
(1954),
63
106.
D.3.92.
64
107
Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.512 (72).
Ghoshal, Op.cit., .(1959), p.63. Spellman,
Op. cit . , ( 19 6 4) , p. 2 2 . Sharma, J. P . ,
Republics in Ancient India, (1968), p.25.
64
Spellman, Op.cit., (1964), p.22.
64
109.
J.2.352 ff.;
64
llO.
J.2.353.
lll.
V.l.lll; 3.150.
ll2
chatuhsataka of Aryadeva. 4.77.
65
Ibid.
66
0
108
ll3
0
0
0
5.462;
1.207.
65
Cf.PED.s.v.Sammata.
65
S.l.41. Cf.Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,(l967),
pp.512-14 (72-74)
6 7'
ll5.
J.3.513-14. Cf.Jayatilleke, Ibid., p.528(88).
68
ll6
Ibid.
68
ll4
0
0
0
237
CHAPTER 3:
THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA
No.
Page
l.
Buddhist India,
2.
RV.4.23.8-9.
71
3.
Ibid.,l.2.8, 1.65.2, 1.68.2, 1.108.2, 1.124.3,
4.23.8; 51.7-8.
71
4.
Ibid., 5.85.
71
5.
For a detailed discussion of rta, see:
Keith, A.B., Religion and PhilOSophy of the
Veda and Upan19ads, Vol.l, ( 19 2 5, Repn.nt,
1970) 1 pp.248 ff.
71
6.
Vedic Mythology, (1897), p.ll.
71
7.
Vedic Index, s.v.Dharman; SED.s.v.Dharman.
72
8.
RV.5.83.5; 10.65.11.
72
9.
Keith, Op.cit., p.249.
72
10.
(1903), p.l32.
71
Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, vol.l,
(1923) 1 pp.360-6l.
Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Buddhism,
(n.d.), p.32 ff.
Rhys Davids, T.W., Op.cit., (1903)
1
p.l32.
ERE. vol.7, s.v. Law (Buddhist).
72
"Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early
Buddhism", (1968), p.259.
73
"The Principles of International Law in
Buddhist Doctrine'', (1967), p.488 (48).
73
13.
BU.l.4.l4.
74
14.
GD.l.l-2, BD.l.l.l.l, VD.l.4-5; 6.17 1
AD.l.l.l.l-2, Manu.2.6, YS.l.7.
74
Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge, (1963) 1 pp.l69-204. Cf. EB.vol.2,
s.v.Authority.
78
16.
V.l.4, M.l.l67.
79
17.
Ibid. ,1.4-5.
79
18.
Ibid. ,1.11.
79
19.
M.l.69, A.2.9; 24.
79
ll.
12.
15.
238
No.
Page
20.
V.l.21.
80
21.
Sn.683.
80
22.
A.l.76.
80
23.
Ibid.
80
24.
Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha
and the Early History of Hls Order, (1907),
p.4.
83
25.
D.3.93.
83
26.
Ibid. Cf. Barua, B.M., Asoka and His
Inscriptions, (1968), pp.227-28.
83
27.
Mhvu.l.348.
84
28.
Rockhill, Op.cit., (1907), p.4.
84
29 .
VA.l.lO.
84
30.
D.3.232, M.l.34l-42.
84
31.
D.l.l36-37, J.5.ll2.
84
32.
A.2.74-76.
85
33.
Mhvu.l.227. Cf. Jones, J.J., tr. The
Mahavastu, vol.l, (1949), p.230 n.~
Jayat1lleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.472 (32).
85
34.
A. 3.148-49.
86
35.
J.4.423.
87
36.
Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political
Ideas, (1959), p.69.
87
Gokhale, Op.cit., (1968), p.257, Reynolds, F.,
"The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early
Buddhism", (1972), p.l9.
87
38.
J.5.102-l06; 3.ll0.
87
39.
Ibid., 3.262, 470; 4.110, 176; 5.352.
87
40.
D.3.232, M.l.34l-42.
88
41.
Ibid., 3.228, J.4.402: 5.98, 510.
88
42.
DA.3.849.
88
37.
Cf. J.5.223; 6.94; 224.
239
No.
43.
Page
M.3.47-52, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967),
pp. 502-503 (62-63).
90
Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism,
(1956), pp.73-74.
90
J.260, 282, 399; 2.111, 118, 274, 320, 352,
470; 4.119, 153, 378, 462.
91
46.
Ibid., 6.94.
91
4 7.
Ibid. , 3 .lll.
91
48.
A.2.75.
92
49.
Ibid.
92
so.
S.l.lOl.
92
51.
A.2.74.
52.
J.3.111.
92
53.
D.2.178.
93
54.
Sn.149.
93
55.
It.20.
93
56.
PED.s.v. Metta.
93
57.
Sn.149-5l.
93
58.
M.1.39.
93
59.
1st Separate Edict, (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka
and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.147.
94
60.
The Jatakama1a.8.14.
94
61.
D.3.152, 192. J.5.331, 352. A.2.32, 248.
Cf. PED.s.v. Sangha.
94
62.
J.6.251.
94
63.
D.2.202.
94
64.
Ibid., 1.137.
95
65.
Dhp.21.
95
66.
Mhv.3.68, Norman, H.C., "Buddhist Legends of
Asoka and His Times", Journal of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal, (1910), p.63.
95
44.
45.
Cf. J.3.111; 5.222, 242.
Cf. J.3.456.
92
240
No.
Page
67.
s.l.88.
95
68.
J. 5 .112-114.
96
69.
Ibid., 116-119.
97
70.
Ibid., 120.
98
71.
Ibid., 121-22.
98
72.
Mhvu.l.274-82.
98
73.
Asvaghosa, Buddhacarita, Saundarananda,
Catul)sataka, Aryasura, JatakamaHi. Cf.
Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.337 ff.
98
74.
The Jatakama1a.13.1-3.
98
75.
Basham, A.L., in Sources of Indian Tradition,
ed. De Barry, vol.1, (1958), p.179.
99
suvarnaprabhasa-sutra.132. Cf. Basham, Ibid.,
pp.l82-85, Ghosha1, Op.cit., (1959), p.264.
99
VA.l.10.
p.257.
99
76.
77.
Cf. Ghokha1e, Op.cit., (1968),
78.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 539 (99).
100
79.
0.3.59.
100
80.
A.l.l09.
100
81.
Ibid.
100
82.
Ibid.
101
83.
D.3.58 ff.
101
84.
Ibid., 70-75, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
1967)' p. 536 (96).
104
85.
Ibid., 61.
Cf. Jayati11eke, Ibid., p.537
( 9 7) •
104
86.
Ibid.
104
87.
Mhvu.l.277. (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
1967)' p. 456 (16).
105
88.
D.l.135.
106
89 .
Ibid . , 3 . 6 5 .
107
241
No.
Page
90.
Ibid., 61, 145, J.5.331, $.1.43.
107
91.
5.1.33.
107
92.
Ibid., 58. SA.l.90.
107
93.
D.3.180 ff.
108
94.
Ibid., 191.
108
95.
A.2.66-68.
109
96.
Ibid., 4.281 ff. AA.2.778.
110
97.
H.3.75.
110
9 8.
Ibid.
110
99.
D.3.191.
110
100.
Dpv.6.1.2.
101.
Ibid., 6.2.
111
102.
For a comparison and contrast between the
legends and the edicts see: EB.vol.2, s.v.
Asoka.
111
103.
The Wonder That was India, (1954), p.84.
111
104.
Op.cit., (1961), p.l46.
112
105.
EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.
113
106.
Ibid. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967),
pp.554-55(114-15). "Buddhism and Peace",
(1962), p.S. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959),
pp. 2 9 2-9 4 . Ling, T. , The Buddha, ( 19 7 3) ,
p.l52 ff.
113
107.
Op.cit.,
113
108.
Ibid., p.l57.
114
109.
EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.
114
110.
Ibid.
115
111.
Minor Rock Inscription-Bhaba Inscription,
Cf. Thapar, Ibid., p.261.
115
Minor Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit.,
1958), p.l44.
116
112.
Cf. EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.
(1961), p.l49.
110
242
No.
Page
113.
EB. vol. 2, s. v. Asoka.
117
114.
Ibid.
117
115.
See for example the Upali Sutta in M.l.372 ff. 117
116.
12 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) '
p.l48.
118
13 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) ,
pp.l43-44.
121
117.
118.
Dikshitar, V.R.R., Mauryan Polity,
(1932),
pp.l28~30.
122
119.
Barua, B.M., Op.cit.,(l968), p.285.
122
120.
The Greek kings mentioned in Asoka's 13 Rock
Edict may be identified as follows:
Antiyoka - Antiochus II Theos of Syria
and Palestine.
Turamaya - Ptolemy II Philadephus of Egypt.
Antikini - Antigonus Gonatus of Macedonia.
Maka - Magas of Cyrene.
Alikasundara - Alexander of Corinth or
Alexander of Epirus.
Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1962), p.32.
Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l44 n.3.
122
121.
Basham, Ibid.
122
122.
Op.cit., (1954), p.56.
pp.l80-81.
Op.cit., (1961),
124
123.
s .1.115-16.
124
124.
Mhvu.l.276.
125
~~============================~====~===~
126.
D.l.l9.
126
127.
J.5.489-90.
126
128.
DA.l.93.
126
129.
CU.7.1.2.
126
130.
J.5.240, (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967),
pp.469-70 (29-30).
127
131.
KA.7.1.6.-12. Cf. Kangle, R.P., The Kautiliya
Arthasastra, part 3, (1965), p.251.
·
127
243
No.
Page
132.
Kang1e, Ibid.
128
133.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.551(111).
128
134.
Roy, P.C., tr. The Mahabharata, vo1. 8,
part 1, (n.d.), p.210.
128
135.
Ibid., p.135.
128
136.
Ibid.
128
137.
Ibid., p.214.
129
138.
BG.2.31-32.
129
139.
Ibid., 3.30.
129
140.
Ibid., 2.38.
129
141.
Ibid.
2. 3.
129
142.
J.5.412-15.
130
143.
S.1.83-85.
130
144.
BG.2.37.
130
145.
Mbh. Udyogaparvan.32.65.
130
146.
s.4.308-09.
131
147.
A.3.208.
131
148.
J.2.1 ff.
131
149.
Ibid., 3.
131
150.
Ibid., 4.
132
151.
Jayatil1eke, Op.cit.,
152.
The Jatakama1a.23.68.
132
153.
Ibid.
133
154.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
(110-11).
155.
I
I
(1967)
1
p.550 (110).
8.14.
J.l.263 ff.
132
(1967), pp.550-51
133
133
244
CHAPTER 4:
ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY
No.
1.
Page
The word Arya in Sanskrit and Ariya, Ayira,
Ayya in Pali may be derived from an old IndoEuropean root but its exact etymology has not
yet so far been made clear. The first appearance of this word in an Indian context is in
the Rg-Veda where aborigines are referred to
as Dasa and Dasyu to distinguish them from the
Aryans who had conquered the North Western
part of the Indian sub-continent. In the
Indian context the word Arya was originally
the name of a group of kindred peoples. In
those days the word was more or less racial
in connotation. Later it came to mean a
person who was accepted as a better-class
follower of the dhamma of class and asrama.
In scholarly circles the word is now generally
used to imply a linguistic and cultural group,
rather than a race.
In Pali the word has three meanings: (i)
racial (of white complexion), (ii) social
(noble, distinguished, of high birth) and
(iii) ethical (following the customs and
ideas of one's clan). The word is most
frequently found in the Buddhist texts not
in the first sense, but in the second and
third.
It was natural that this attitude
of equality should have caused the word
Ariya to lose its original sense, in reference to a group of people. But the meaning
of nobleness and truth in the word was
retained and adopted in Buddhism and these
meanings were further enriched by giving
them a Buddhist interpretation. The most
noteworthy uses of the word Ariya appears
in connection with the Buddh1st doctrine
known as the cattari ariya-saccari (Four
Noble Truths) and ariya-atthangika magga
(The Noble Eight-fold Path) . The reason why
these Truths and the Path are called Ariya
is that they considered the noblest and most
righteous of all truths.
PED.s.v. Ariya. EB.vol.2, s.v. Arya. Basham,
A.L., Studies in Indian History and Culture,
(1964), p.20. Malalasekera, G.P. and
Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and The Race
Question, (1958), pp.37-38.
2.
Most writers have treated Dasa and Dasyus as
synonymous. But R.S. Sharma has shown that
Dasa and Dasyus are different groups of the
indigenous peoples (Sudras in Ancient India,
134
245
No.
Page
1958, p.l3 ff.).
However, in Vedic times
they were both non-Aryan people. The Dasas
are referred to having a distinctive colour
of the skin, varna. (RV.3.34.9).
In Pali
the word Dasa is sometimes used to refer to
uncivilized people, or in the same way that
Greeks use the term "Barbarians" .
It is
defined by Buddhaghosa (DA.l.300) as antojato
(base born).
In classical Sanskrit dasa
regularly means "a slave", while dasyus
comes to mean "a robber". Basham, The Wonder
That was India, (1954), p.32 ff.
134
3.
Sharma, Op.cit.,
135
4.
Ibid., pp.9-ll.
135
5.
Ibid., p.l3.
135
6.
RV.l0.22.8.
135
7.
Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
(1958), p.30. Sharma, Op.cit., (1958),
pp.l2-13.
135
8.
RV.l.32, 5.34.6.
135
9 •
Ibid., 3.34.9.
135
10.
Ibid. , 2. 12. 4.
136
11.
Ibid., 4.42.1.
136
12.
Ibid., 8.35.16-18.
136
13.
Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
(1958)' p.30.
136
"On the Translation of the Term Varna",
(1964)' p.l96 ff.
137
15.
Ibid., p.198.
137
16.
"Indian Society and the Legacy of the Past",
(1966), p.l32, n.3.
137
17.
Ibid., p.134.
138
18.
RV.5.10.
138
19.
Manu.l.87-91.
20.
Basham, Op.cit.,
14.
(1958), pp.l2-13.
BG.4.13.
(1966), p.l33.
138
138
246
No.
21.
Page
Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
(1958), p.31.
139
22.
Basham, Op.cit.,
139
23.
Manu.l.91.
139
24.
Ibid., 3.12.13-17.
140
25.
Ibid., 4.81, 10.4; lll; 183.
140
26.
Ibid., 3.156, 4.99, 10.128.
140
27.
Ibid., 8.413-14 .
140
28.
Ibid., 8. 20 ff.
140
29.
For examples: Malalasekera and Jayatilleke,
Op. cit., (1958), p.48 ff.
Jayatilleke,
"The Principles of International Law in
Buddhist Doctrine" (1967), pp.515-518(75-78).
Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism,
(1956)' pp.2-4.
140
Basham, "The Rise of Buddhism in its
Historical Context'', (1966), p.399.
141
30.
(1966), p.l33.
.
31.
Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas,
p.l4l.
31~.
l"o-r
32.
Buddhism,
33.
Dial. part l, p.96.
142
34.
Ibid.
142
35.
M.2.86.
143
36.
Sn.650-652.
143.
37.
The word karma in Sanskrit and kamma in Pali
(derived from the root kr - to do) literally
means action, deed; both subjective and
objective. The law of karma holds that
actions produce their good or bad effect and
result in this life or in a future one.
However, some Indian thinkers like Purana,
Makkhali, and Pakudha appears to have disagreed
with this view, while Ajitha the materialist
evidently denied the existence of karma
altogether. Even among those who accepted it,
we can find differing views. In the earlier
Brahma~ical literature, the word karma is
used mainly in the sense of either religious
'""~r.to.~
r. .......
No\:.4
(1961),
:t'l
(1899), pp.83-84.
141
tJ+I
142
247
No.
Page
rituals or the social functions and duties
of man.
In the latter sense, it came to
be accepted that there are specific
hereditary social and occupational
functions suitable for people born into
different social grades, and since they
needed special aptitudes (guDas) it was
the specific duty and obligation of the
members of these social grades to perform
their assigned duties and occupations and
no other (BG.4.13). Early Buddhism
accepted the prevailing ideas of karma,
though it had an original explanation of
the process whereby kamma operated. In
the Buddhist theory of kamma it has a
specific meaning:
it means only "volitional
action", not all action. Any kind of
volitional action whether mental, verbal, or
physical is regarded as kamma. The law
according to which a good or bad volition
(kusala-akusala cetana) must have its
fruition is the law of kamma, but in order
to have a consequence the action must be
produced by an effect of the volition
"volition alone is kamma" (cetanahm
bhikkhave kammam vadami - A.3.415).
In the
the1st1c rel1gions, every living being
exists by virtue of the manifestation in
him of a universal force, as a transcedent,
an Absolute called God. According to
Buddhism, every living being exists by virtue
of an individual force.
This is kamma. This
is not the law regulating the relat1ons of
individual human beings but it is the law
controlling the relations between the state
of ignorance (which is inevitably attached
to individual human existence and behaviour)
and the way of deliverance from it. These
kammic laws are non-deterministic in the
sense that initial volitional acts are
conditioned but not determined and are
therefore "free" within limits, while the
consequences of these acts may be inhibited,
prevented or promoted by background conditions
such as time, place, opportunity and the
potentialities of later and present volitional
acts. Early Buddhism clearly discounted the
fatalistic notion that all the experiences of
a man in the present life are totally
determined by his previous kamma alone, or
that they are immutably fixed by some divine
scheme, nor did it subscribe to the view that
they are simply fortuitous and happen without
any previous cause.
248
No.
37.
Page
PED.s.v. Kamma. 8ED.s.v. Karma. Jayatilleke,
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963),
pp. 376, 404, 440-41, 460; The Message of
the Buddha, (1975), pp. 139 ff; Op.cit.,
(1967), pp. 481-84 (41-44)' 506-508 (66-68).
Rahula, W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959),
p. 32.
143
38.
M.3.202 ff.
143
39.
Ibid., 203. Cf. Miln. 65. Jayatilleke,
Op.cit., (1963), p. 404; Op.cit., (1975),
pp. 141-42.
.
144
40.
M.l. 414 ff.
144
41.
Ibid., 417.
144
42.
EB. vol. 2, s.v. Authority.
144
43.
8.2.121. A.4.176.
144
44.
A.l.227-28.
145
45.
Ibid., 3-35, 4.39-40.
145
46 .
Ibid. , 4 . 13 8.
14 5
47.
Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958),
p. 33.
145
48.
A.4. 138-39.
49.
Ibid., 1.35. Dhp. 182. 8.1.1o1.
vv.500.
146
Therigatha.
146
50.
8.2.188.
146
51.
Ibid., 5.455. M.3.169.
146
52.
Ibid., 1. 85-89.
146
53.
A.l.254. Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967),
p. 534 (94).
146
54.
Ibid. , 1. 61.
147
55.
Dial. part 1, p. 104.
147
56.
Concepts of Buddhism,
57.
Op.cit., (1958), p. 35 ff.
147
58.
Op.cit.,
147
59.
M.2.196 ff. 8n.594 ff.
(1937), p. 11 ff.
(1967), pp. 516-17 (76-77).
147
148
249
No.
Page
60.
Sn. 600-611.
149
61.
Ibid., 608-10.
149
62.
Op.cit., (1958), p. 37.
150
63.
625.
150
64.
Ibid., 629-30.
150
65.
The vajrasuci of Asvaghosa, (tr.
Mukhopadhyaya, S., 1960); p. 14 ff. VU v
PU. pp. 935 ff.
151
66.
vu. 8.
151
67.
Mukhopadhyaya, (tr.) Op.cit., (1960),
pp. 19-20. We slightly emend Mukhopadhyaya's
translation in places, for the sake of easier
understanding in the context.
153
68.
0.3.82.
153
69.
Ibid., 96.
154
70.
Ibid., 93.
154
71.
The word brahmana is derived in tte Agganna
Sutta from the verb "keep off" (baheti) .
Some people kept off or excluded bad, evil
customs, to keep away from sin. This etymology
is pure fancy. The word derived from brahman,
which in the Rg-Veda generally means supernatural power: In the Buddhist terminology
brahmana is also used for a man leading a pure,
sinless and ascetic life, and many passages
show that Buddhists were encouraged to treat
worthy brahma~as with respect.
155
72.
The text referred to are the Vedic canon.
Ajjhayaka, another name given to the brahmanas,
is here interpreted as "non-meditators". This
also seems to be a false etymology. It means
simply "teacher".
156
73.
D.3. 94-95.
(tr. Basham, in The Sources of
Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol. 1, 1958),
pp. 131-32. We slightly emend Basham's
translation in places, for the sake of easier
understanding in the context.
156
74.
Ibid., 95.
75.
Ibid.
76.
Ibid.
(tr. Ibid.).
(tr. Ibid.).
156
157
157
250
No.
Page
77.
Dial. part 1, p. 107.
157
78.
M.2.147 ff.
158
79.
Yona means Ionian or Greek. If this text
is authentically the words of the Buddha
he must have heard something of the Greeks,
some of whom were living in the Persian
Empire. Kamboja is the mountains region
south of Kabul river, along the present
border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. For
further details see: DPPN.s.v. Yona and
Kamboja.
158
80.
M.2.149.
158
81.
Sn-612-619.
158
82.
Ibid., 648.
159
83.
Mukhopadhyaya,
84.
BG.3.35.
159
85.
Sn.650.
160
86.
(tr.), Op.cit.,
(1960), p.5.
159
.Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958),
p. 43.
160
87.
M.2.84 ff.
160
88.
Ibid., 89.
160
89.
Ibid., 85.
160
90.
J.l.ll4; 326, 2.264; 413, 3.312, 4.38.
160
91.
M.2. 151-52.
160
92.
D.l. 88 ff.
160
93.
Ibid., 92-93.
161
94.
Ibid., 97-99.
161
95.
This is explained as the being who is coming
into the womb ... the being about to enter
the womb ... about to come into that
situation, being driven on by the mechanism
of kamma (MA.2.310). It also means a
"sal!lsaric being in the intermediate stage"
(between death and birth). See: Wijesekera,
O.H·de.A., "Vedic Gandharva and P~li Gandhabba",
(1945)' pp. 73-107.
162
96.
M.2. 15.6-58.
163
251
Page
No.
9 7.
Ibid., 148.
163
98.
MA.3.409.
163
99.
Mukhopadhayaya,
pp. 14-15.
(tr.), Op.cit.,
(1960),
164
100.
D.l. 99-100.
101.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
102.
Manu. 8.24.
165
103.
Ibid., 8.70; 88:99; 279, 11.130-31; 151.
BD.l.l0.19.1. AD.l.9.24. Cf. Basham,
Op:cit., (1954), p. 121.
165
104.
GD.8.13. KA.4.222. BD.l.l0.18.
166
105.
KA.3.9, 4.9.
166
106.
Manu. 11.132.
166
107.
M.2.88.
167
108.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 459 (19);
Op.cit., (1975), p. 146.
167
109.
Ibid., pp. 459-60 (19-20), 482-83 (42-43).
167
110.
M.3.203 ff.
168
111.
A.2.87.
168
112.
Ibid., 1.149-50. M.l.97.
168
113.
M.2.187-88.
169
114.
Ibid., 149-50
169
115.
EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmana, Brahmanism.
170
116.
Dhp.l83. According to the Dhp. the teaching
of all the Buddhas are ethical in character
and centre round avoiding all evil, cultivating the good, purification of the mind,
speaking no ill, not doing any harm, and
restrained in respect of the fundamental
precepts.
(185).
171
A.2.69. (tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967),
p. 495 (55).
171
118.
Dhp.l8.
171
119.
Sn.l43-152.
p. 286.
117.
165
(1967), p. 447 (7).
.
165
(tr. Basham, Op.cit., 1954),
172
252
Page
No.
120.
121.
EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmanism.
- - Therigatha. vv. 239-243.
173
122.
M.2.151.
173
123.
Sn. 249-50.
174
124.
M.l. 39.
174
125.
126.
Malalasekere and Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
(1958)' p. 50.
- Jatakamala, 23-21.
174
127.
A.l.l62.
175
128.
D.l.lll ff.
175
129.
Ibid., 120.
176
130.
Ibid. , 224 ff.
176
131.
Ibid., 4 ff.
176
132.
Ibid., 47 ff.
176
133.
Ibid., 100 ff.
176
134.
Ibid. , 224 ff.
176
135.
Dhp. 383 ff.
176
136.
Mukhopadhyaya,
137.
PED.s.v. Brahmana, Arahant.
138.
Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
pp. 49-51.
172
174
(tr.), Op.cit., (1960), p.22.
176
177
(1958),
177
139.
Sn.315.
178
140.
AB.7.29.
178
141.
Comm.on the Vedanta Sutra, 1.3.38. Cf. Dial.
part 1, p. 285.
178
142.
Manu. 1.88.
178
143.
Ibid., 9.317-19.
178
144.
Dial. part 1, p. 285.
178
145.
D.l.227 ££. Cf. Ibid., p. 287.
179
146.
Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958),
pp. 48,55 ££.
179
253
Page
No.
14 7.
M.2.89.
180
148.
A.4.202. Mi1n. 70.
181
149.
M.2.125 ff.
181
150.
Ibid., 129-30.
182
151.
D.l.99 ff.
182
152.
Sn.102.
182
153.
Ibid., 782.
182
154.
S.1.33; 42; 125.
155.
Basham, Op.cit.,
155'11.
I!ri..L.)'·I:!>b
156.
157.
D.1.99.
j
A.1. 23-26 V.2.253.
182
183
(1966), p. 136.
'"-~r~...... R., Ai.ol< ........,ol 'lv..)<di..,. c$+~
IS3.
184
"'......,.,.'a"',(•~biJ,)>.IJ+t.
Ma1a1asekera and Jayati1leka, Op.cit.,
pp. 59-60.
(1958),
184
254
CHAPTER 5:
ATTITUDE TO LAW
No.
Page
Vinogradoff, P., Common Sense in Law,
(1914)' p. 23.
187
J.ayatilleke, K.N., "The Principles of
International Law in Buddhist Doctrine",
(1967)' p. 487 (17).
187
3.
J.2.2.
188
4.
Ibid., 4.402, 5.98; 510. A.2.18. D.3.228.
188
5.
Ibid., 3.105.
188
6.
Ibid., 4.192.
189
7.
Mhvu.l.275.
189
8.
4th Pillar Edict. (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka
and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961),
p. 263.
190
9.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
190
10.
Manu. 7.14.
191
11.
Mbh. 12.59.78.
191
12.
Manu. 7. 2 2.
191
13.
Mbh.l2.15.2.
191
14.
Ibid., 12.15. 5-6.
191
15.
J.4.192.
192
16.
A.l.253.
192
17.
Ibid., 254.
192
18.
Ibid., 5. 79-81.
19.
M.2. 186-88
193
20.
8.1.116. D.3.64 ff.
193
21.
J.3.105; 154, 4.451.
193
22.
D.l.89. A.4.89.
193
23.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
24.
Tucci, G., "The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna",
(1936)' pp. 237-252, 423-435.
l.
2.
(1967), p. 451 (17).
Cf. D. 3. 236-37.
(1967), p. 507 (67).
192
193
193
255
No.
Page
25.
Ibid.,p. 426 v.36.
193
26.
Ibid., v.32,33,37.
193
27.
V.l.l3.
194
28.
Ibid., 3.23-24.
194
29.
Ibid.
I
l. 20.
195
30.
Ibid.
I
21.
195
31.
Ibid., 21-22.
195
32.
Ibid.
196
33.
Ibid., 9-10. Cf. Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
p. 450 (10).
I
3.8
(1967),
196
34.
S.2. 223-24.
196
35.
Op.cit.,
36.
V.3.17.
37.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
38.
A.l.230.
198
39.
V.3.20. (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967),
p.451 (11).
199
40.
Jayati11eke, Ibid.
199
41.
B. Disp. part 1, pp. xvi-xvii.
200
42.
Ibid., part 4, p.xii.
201
43.
V.l.55.
201
44.
B. Disp. part 4, p.x.
201
45.
V.l.56.
202
46.
Ibid., 350 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4, p.xviii.
202
47.
B. Disp. Ibid., pp.x.xi.
202
48.
V.1.p.xv(Introduction).
203
49.
Ibid.
203
50.
B.Disp. part 1, p. xii.
203
51.
V.l.103.
203
(1967), pp. 450-51 (10-11).
197
197
(1967), p. 448 (8).
198
256
No.
52.
Page
History of Indian Literature, vol. 2,
(1927-33), p. 22, n.2.
203
53.
Ibid.
203
54.
Vinaya Texts,· (tr.) vol. 13, part 1, p.
xxvii.
203
55.
B. Disp. part 1, p.xxvii.
204
56.
Early Buddhist Monachism,
57.
PED. s.v. Patimokkha.
204
58.
B. Disp. part 1, pp. xiii-xviii.
204
59.
Ibid., p. xxiv.
Bhagvat, D., Early Buddhist
Jurisprudence, (1939), pp. 19-20.
204
60.
Bhagvat, Ibid.
204
61.
V.3.21, 44, 70, 89. Cf. B. Disp. part 1,
p. xxvi ff. PED. s.v. Parajika.
205
62.
Ibid.
205
63.
V.2.38, 3.112; 186, 4.110;225.
part 1, p. XXX ff.
(1960), p. 73.
204
Cf.B. Disp.
205
64.
Ibid., 1.112, 2.287. Cf. Ibid., p.xxii.
205
65.
Ibid., 1.196; 254, 3.195. Cf. Ibid., part 2,
p. vii ff.
205
66.
Ibid., 1.172; 176, 2.242. Cf. Ibid., p.xxv ff.
205
67.
Ibid.
205
6 8.
Ibid., 4.185.
69.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
70.
V.l. 305, 2.147. D.l.l45. J.l.93.
206
71.
Jay<ttilleke, Op.cit.,
(1967), p. 521 (81).
206
72.
Ibid.
(1960), p. 143.
206
7 3.
Dutt, Ibid., pp. 143-45.
206
74.
Bhagvat, Op.cit.,
206
75.
Op.cit.
76.
KA. 3.7.40; 10.45.
Cf. Ibid., part 3, pp. v, XXX ff.
Cf. Ibid., p. xxvii ff.
Dutt, Op.cit.,
I
(1960)
I
(1967), p. 521 (81).
(1939), p.v.
pp. 143-45.
205
205
206
206
257
No.
Page
77.
V.3.60.
206
78.
Ibid., 1.101; 138.
207
79.
Ibid., 73.
207
80.
Bhagvat, Op.cit.,
81.
D.2.123-24.
82.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
83.
The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable
Trust, (1952), p. 24.
208
V.l.303-04.
(tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
(1967)' p. 490 (50).
209
Ibid., 312 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4,
p.xviii-xix.
Dutt, Op.cit., (1960),
p. 124-25.
210
86.
Dutt, Ibid.
210
87.
V.3.163 ff.
211
88.
Ibid., 2.73 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 5,
pp. vii -viii.
211
89.
Ibid.
211
90.
Ibid. , 93-94, 4.207.
211
91.
Ibid. , 94.
211
92.
Ibid., 79
212
93.
Ibid. , 1.325, 2.81; 99, 4.207; 351.
212
9 4.
Ibid., 2.83; 102.
212
95.
Ibid. , 9 5.
213
9 6.
Ibid., 96
213
97.
Dutt, Op.cit.,
98.
V.2.97-98.
99.
Jayati11eke, Op.cit.,
100.
B. Disp. part 5, p. XX.
215
101.
Ibid., p. xx-xxi.
215
102.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp. 519-20
(79-80).
Gokuldas De, Democracy in Early
Buddhist Samgha, (1955), p.xv.
215
84.
85.
(1939), p. vi.
207
207
(1967), p. 522 (82).
(1960), p. 131.
207
213
214
(1967), p. 524 (84).
214
258
No.
Page
The word dipa has two meanings:
(i) lamp
and (ii) island.
In this context, it
means "island".
216
104.
0.2.101.
216
105.
Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 520 (80).
Cf. Dutt, Op. cit., (1960), p. 116.
216
0.2. 74-76.
(tr. Basham, in Sources of
Indian Tradition, ed. De. Barry, vol. 1,
1958)' pp. 139-140.
218
DA.2.519.
(tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,
pp. 525-26 (85-86).
219
103.
106.
107.
(1967),
108.
Jayati11eke, Ibid., pp. 451-52 (11-12).
220
109.
0.2.154.
220
llO.
Ibid.
lll.
VA. 1.13.
221
ll2.
V.l.98.
221
(tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.).
(tr. Ibid.).
220
259
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