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THESES SIS/LIBRARY R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 FACSIMILE: +61 2 6125 4063 EMAIL: [email protected] USE OF THESES This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF EARLY BUDDHISM BY KALUKOTTEGE KUMAR PIYASIRI THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OCTOBER 1977 without the loving kindness of these two friends, who always took the time to care, to listen and to be concerned. They have looked after me very carefully and their affection has been a constant moral encouragement to me. I wish to express my sincere thanks to D.T. Rajapatirana ,, Dr. H. H. E. Loafs, Dr. J.T.F. Jordens, Professor Q.B. Gibson and to my friends, Mr. John Pflugradt and Mrs. B. Johnstone for many acts of kindness and for valuable and constructive suggestions at every stage of the writing of this thesis. They have always enthusiasti9ally encouraged and willingly helped me in many ways. I wish to thank the Australian National University for allowing me to carry out this research project and I am especially grateful to Mr. C.W. Plowman and Mr. G. Dicker, of the Australian National University administration for their assistance and support, not least in the final stage of preparing this thesis. I must also take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Professor M.B. Ariyapala for his help and co-operation on a number of difficult issues I had with the University of Sri Lanka. Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to my wife Chandra, to whom I owe an enormous debt and from whom I never cease to learn. ''Knowledge" as ~rya§~ra says in the J;takam;l; "is the special cause for receiving presents from persons of high rank". I have been a most fortunate recipient of favours while engaging in the pursuit of it. If the results of the search set out in this thesis give any satisfaction to the learned world, then the purpose of my quest will have been fulfilled. CONTENTS Page CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · 1- 16 Subsections (Numbers here denote paragraphs) 1.1.1 - 1.1.3: Introductory observations. 1.2.1 - 1.2.2: Early Buddhism was a product of social change in ancient India. 1.3.1 1.3.6: Criticism of the view that early. Buddhism does not concern itself with social, political and legal ideas. 1.4.1 -1.4.4: Some views suggesting that the Buddha based his system on the teaching of the Vedas. 1.5.1 -1.5.2: Impression created in connection with early Buddhist social and political ideas and the neglect of such ideas in the context of Indian social and political thGught. 1.6.1 -1.6.5: Previous works on the subject. 1.7.1- 1.7.6: The purpose of the present work, impression created by some modern scholars concerning Buddhist social and political thought and its modern interpretations. 1.8.1-1.8.6: Source materials used and the treatment of the subject. 1.9.1 - 1.9.2: Main topics discussed and the usefulness of the present work. CHAPTER II: POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION Subsections. 2.1.1: Introductory observations. 2.2.1 -2.2.5: Classification of ideas of political obligation and authority in Indian tradition. 2.3.1. -2.3.7: Examination of the theological theory of the Vedic tradition. The first version -monistic view. 2.4.1-2.4.2: A second version -divine invention. 2.5.1-2 .5.6: The third version-magico-religious view. 2.6.1- 2.6.6: Final version of the theological theory - idea of an agreement. 2.7.1 -2.7.2: Summary of the theological theory. 2.8.1-2.8.6: Comments on the Vedic and post-Vedic ideas of the origin of kingship. 2.9.1: The early Buddhist approach to the subject. 2.10.1 -2.10.18: The arguments against a personal creator God. 2.11.1 -2.11.12: The notion of social contract. 2.12.1 -2.12.3: The other versions-different schools of Buddhism and the summary. 2.13.1 -2.13.6: Examination of the meaning of Mahasammata - its narrow explanation. 2.14.1-2.14.5: Its wider explanation, its meaning and its sociopolitical implications. 2.15.1-2.15.3: Important features of the notion of social contract. 2.16.1: Conclusion. 17- 69 Page CHAPTER III: THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA 70-133 Subsections. 3.1.1: Introductory observations. 3.2.1-3.2.5: Dhamma as a word of importance in Indian religious traditions. Its derivations - developments from the days of the Vedas. The words rta, dharman and dharma. 3.3.1-3 .3.8: ·some observation about the assumption that the both concepts, the Vedic dharma and Buddhist dharma, are of the same nature. The Brahma~ic and Upanisadic conception of dharma. Its interpretations - the sources - the various uses in different contexts. 3.4.1-3. 4.9: What is dhamma of early Buddhism in contrast to the Vedic and post-Vedic systems? Some of the fundamental differences between Vedic dharma and Buddhist dhamma. 3.5.1- 3.5.7: Relation of dhamma to the social contract theory of early Buddhism. 3.6.1 - 3.6.4: The authority of dhamma in the sphere of social and political life, and its explanations. 3.7.1- 3.7.13: Principles enunciated to rule in accordance with dhamma. 3.8.1 -3.8.12: The concept of world-ruler. The spiritual and material welfare of the subjects. 3.9.1-3.9.4: Duties of the subjects. 3.10.1-3.10.7: Connection of the early Buddhist account of the world-ruler with the reign of Asoka. Difference of opinion as to whether the idea of the world-ruler in the early Buddhist account is in some way linked with Asoka. 3.11.1 - 3.11.8: Asoka's policy of dhamma and its relationship with the dhamma of early Buddhism. 3.12.1 -3.12.5: Asoka's internal and foreign policy. 3.13.1-3.13.10: The early Buddhist attitude to war. 3.14.1: Conclusion. CHAPTER IV: ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Subsections. 4.1.1: Introductory observations. 4.2.1- 4.2.3: Ancient Indian social order and its origins. The conflict between the Aryans and the Dasas and Dasyus. 4.3.1 -4.3.9: The origin of the four-fold division gf society (varna). The authority of the Brahmanas and the"reasons for their claim to supe~iority. 4.4.1 - 4.4.5: Preliminary observations on the idea of equality in early Buddhism. 4.5.1 -4.5.4: Man's duty in his human existence. 4.6.1 -4.6.6: The classification of the arguments used by the early Buddhists in 134-185 Page support of their attitude to equality. The first argument-Biological. 4.7.1 -4.7.8: The second argument - Anthropological. 4.8.1 -4.8.10: The third argument-Sociological. 4.9.1-4.9.3: The fourth argumentLegal. 4.10.1- 4.10.17: The fifth argument -Moral. 4.11.1-4.11.8: The sixth argument-Religious. 4.12.1 -4.12.3: Examination of some misconception regarding the spirit of egalitarianism of early Buddhism. 4.13.1: Conclusion. CHAPTER V: ATTITUDE TO LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186-221 Subsections. 5.1.1 -5.1.2: Introductory observations. 5.2.1 -5.2.4: Preliminary observations to disprove the view that there is no Buddhist law. 5.3.1-5.3.8: The Buddhists views on the nature of justice, of law, and. of punishment with a comparison of post~ Vedic notions .1 1: General observations on tne Vinaya laws and their place in a context of "law" 5.5.1-5.5.10: The formation of the Saflgha and its prime motive. The purpose of enacting rules and regulations and of legislation. 5.6.1-5.6.5: The codified laws of the Sangha. §orne interpretations of the word patimokkha. An outline of the seven categories of patimokkha. 5.7.1-5.7.7: The jurisdiction of the Sangha. 5.8.1-5.8.11: The juridicial procedure of the Sangha. Discussion about some methods of conducting trials and settling legal disputes. 5.9.1-5.9.6: The democratic foundation of the Sangha. The conception of a welfare state. 5.10.1-5.10.2. Final observations. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222-224 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225-227 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228-258 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259-271 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1.1. It has been observed that most social and political ideas properly began with the Greeks, more importantly, from the days of Plato and Aristotle, and that all succeeding social and political thought is a footnote and a commentary on Greek thought 1 But there is also definite and significant thought on social and political ideas in the Indian context 2 . 1.1.2. .5' *<• The foundation of social and political ideas of the Indian tradition were first laid in the oldest literature of the Vedic period (the Vedic Samhitas and the Brahmanas) . These ideas were later developed through varied channels such as the literature of Brahmanical law- . books (Smrtis), Epics and Puranas, Kautilya's Arthasastra, ------ . unorthodox canonical works of the Buddhists and Jainas, the classical Sanskrit and Tamil literature and the literature of historical records of the later periods 1.1.3. 3 The present work forms a study of the social and political ideas contained in the large body of early Buddhist literature, especially that composed in the Pali language. 1.2.1. In a very real sense, early Buddhism is in part a product of social change in ancient Indian society, and this change is indirectly reflected in its early literature. It reflects the rise to importance in the social order of / 2 classes connected with the production and exchange of goods, whose members seem to have been some of the most enthusiastic supporters of the new religion 1.2.2. 4 If we agree that early Buddhism was in part a product of social change in ancient India, it is also clear that it responded to the needs of the people at a time when material culture was expanding rapidly. Its appeal to the laity was founded partly on the notion of social concern, which encouraged frugality and what in modern economic terms would be called reinvestment, arid partly on the notion of the perfectibility of the individual 5 . 1.3.1. Though such was the case, according to all our evidence, dissentient opinions, to the effect that early Buddhism is incompatible with social, political and legal ideas are often to be found in the writings of earlier scholars of Buddhism. The reasons for this are many. For one thing, it has been commonly assumed hitherto that early Buddhism was almost entirely concerned with individual ethics. Thus, various scholars have maintained that the spiritual uplift of the individual was the chief aim of early Buddhism. Furthermore, they maintained that there is in early Buddhism no place for a genuine social and political theory, because of i·ts doctrine concerning the ultimate end of human striving, for which is prescribed a course of action designed to lead to the Summum bonum of dukhanirodha or Nibbana (Sabbadhammanam uttamatthena varam) . 3 1.3.2. Many views have been expressed to the effect that with such a doctrine early Buddhism was not concerned with social and political problems. In some earlier studies by the Western scholars one may find the view expressed that Buddhism is so lofty and sublime a system that it cannot be practised by ordinary men, because its teaching is directed towards detachment from the worldly affairs, that is, that it is super-mundane (lokottara) 1.3.3. 6 . Along with this, there is an impression created in the Western mind that Buddhism is a mere system of selfdiscipline for monks with no significant message for the ordinary man except that he also should renounce the world, take a yellow robe, and try to attain nibbana. This impression may be summed up in the following statements: "It is in fact surprising that such"a body of doctrine as the Buddhist, with its profoundly other-worldly and even anti-social emphasis ... can have become even as 'popular' as it is in the modern 7 environment" , "one of the features of the study of Buddhism most frustrating to the Western mind is the effort necessary to discover a social philosophy within it. The question suggests itself: Is there any?" 8 The same author proceeds to suggest the answer: "To tell the truth the Buddha had little, either of concern for society 4 as such or of firm conviction of its possible improvability" 9 , "Buddhism generally stands aloof from the affairs of the world" 1.3.4. 10 • There are others who believe that Buddhist teaching is non-political in nature and is a "non-political and anti-political" religion. Among them, Max Weber writes: "Buddhism is a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion, more precisely, a religious 'technology' of wandering and of intellectually schooled mendicant monks ... and it is a 'salvation' religion" 11 1.3.5. Sangarakshita, a Mahayana Buddhist monk, following the same line, writes: "As a teaching aiming at the experience of Enlightenment, Buddhism has no direct concern with the collective life of man on the social and political level. It does not tell its followers how many wives they may have or what form of government they should support. At the same time, as the existence of the monastic order indicates, external conditions are not altogether irrelevant to the development of the wholesome mental attitudes on which the experience 5 of enlightenment depends. A minimum of social and political teaching is, therefore, scattered here and there through the Tripitaka. That, notwithstanding the example of Asoka, they were never taken up and systematically developed in India is perhaps due to the predominantly philosophical and otherworldly tendency of the Indian Buddhist . d"l2 . m~n 1.3.6. With regard to Buddhist legal ideas, another scholar writes: "In the strict sense of the word, there is no Buddhist law; there is an influence exercised by Buddhist ethics or changes that have taken place in custom. No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay or clerical, has ever created or promulgated any law. Such law as has been administered in countries ruled over by monarchs nominally Buddhist has been custom rather than law, and the custom has been in the main preBuddhistic, fixed and established before the people became Buddhist" 1.4.1. 13 . Among other scholars, including some contemporary ones, there is an attempt to review the teaching of the 6 Buddha or early Buddhism in the light of the Vedic (Brahmanic and Upanisadic) system. They maintain that the Buddha restated what was already current among the brahmi.ns and based his system on the teaching of the Upanisads. Thus Radhakrishnan writes: "The Buddha did not feel that he was announcing a new religion. He was born, grew up, and died a Hindu. He was restating with a new emphasis the ancient ideals of Indo-Aryan civilization" 1.4.2. 14 . Similarly, Coomaraswamy writes: "The more superficially one studies Buddhism, the more it seems to differ from the Brahmanism in which it originated, the more profound our study, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism; or to say in what respects, if any, Buddhism is really unorthodox" 1.4.3. 15 . Rhys Davids is of the same opinion: "Gautama was born and brought up and lived .,16 and died a Hindu "Such originality as Gautama possessed lay in the way in which he adopted, enlarged, ennobled, and systematized that which had already been well said by others" 17 . "Buddhism grew and flourished within the field of orthodox belief" 18 . 7 1.4.4. According to this common view, some scholars think that, though early Buddhist literature may contain some social and political ideas, these are not original, but borrowed from Vedic thought or the general political ideas of times 19 . For example, Ghoshal writes: "The Buddhist canonists deal incidentally with a few chosen topics of the state, but they share with the authors of the Dharmasutras and the Arthasas·tra the credit of being the makers of Hindu political theory 1.5 .1. 20 Much has been written about ancient Indian social and political ideas and their development may be traced fairly clearly, but most authors, both Hindu and Western, tend to ignore to a great extent early Buddhist teachings in the context of Indian social and political thought. However, a few writers have been impressed by early Buddhist political thought, for instance, Ghoshal, who writes: "The most important contribution of the early Buddhist canonists to the store of our ancient political thought consists in their 'total' application of the principle of righteousness to the branches of the king' s internal and foreign administration" 1.5.2. 21 However, even by such writers as Ghoshal, early Buddhist social and political ideas are treated very 8 cursorily in lengthy books which are replete with reference to Kautilya's Arthasastra and the twelfth book of the Mahabharata; they tend to think of Kautilya's Arthasastra as a treatise on political science free from religious ideology, though this is a matter for debate. We cannot discuss this problem in detail since it does not directly concern us. 1.6.1. The early Buddhists' teachings on ethico- • religious matters and metaphysical problems are fairly well- known, but their teachings on social and political matters are little known to the West, largely because of the negative views mentioned above. More positive views, however, of the social and political ideas of early Buddhism are not lacking, though they are rare. 1.6.2. Jayatilleke has examined the early Buddhist principles of law, including international law, and has presented arguments against the view that there are no Buddhist social, political and legal ideas, and presented a brief account of them based on material in early Buddhist texts and in earlier studies on the subject 22 . Unfortunately, he died before he was able to make a detailed study of these topics. 1.6.3. He has shown that the early Buddhists had views about the duties of the state, the rights of the people and of individuals, the principles on which civil and criminal law should be founded, the just social order, inter-state relations and world government. 9 1.6.4. One of his concluding remarks was that early Buddhism for the most part respected utilitarian and pragmatic principles. In his own words: "There emerged with Buddhism the concept of a common good, embracing the whole world and conceived as both material and spiritual welfare. Going along with this idea there was the concept of common humanity transcending national and racial barriers The social contract theory of the origin of society, the state and law made it obligatory for the state to serve the best interests of the people and of mankind. Sovereignty was vested in the people and was limited by the requirement of righteousness or dhamma. The conception of the welfare state was conceived for the first time" 1.6.5. 23 . Apart from Jayatilleke's very valuable study, we can find only a few monographs on such topics as the jurisprudence and internal polity of the Buddhist Order as well as one or two chapters in lengthy textbooks few articles and pamphlets 26 25 24 , , and a Two recent studies in the form of doctoral theses of Lancaster University should also be mentioned 27 . These works do not advance our knowledge and understanding greatly beyond what is already known. There are still various gaps in our knowledge in this field. Therefore, in this thesis, an attempt is made to complete 10 the task which Jayatilleke could not finish in detail. 1.7.1. In considering the purpose of this thesis, it must not be forgotten that the main features of early Buddhism are ethico-religious in character and this limits the range of early Buddhist teachings on other aspects of life. In fact, varying ethico-religious systems produce varying patterns of social and political thought and, despite the "ultimate end" which is prescribed by early Buddhism, there is no logical reason why it should not have had a genuine social and political system. 1.7.2. Basham, following the same line as those scholars who maintain that early Buddhism has no social and political doctrines, says: "It is at first sight surprising that this other-worldly movement, with its rather pessimistic attitude towards life, and its emphasis on detachment and the renunciation of most of the material pleasures of life, should have made an appeal to the mercantile class at a time when trade was expanding rapidly" 28 However, he points out that there are other cases of merchants adhering in large numbers to new religious movements of a rather pessimistic kind, which tend to promote frugality, and gives examples such as early . t.lanlty, . . . c h rls Is 1 am an d Ca 1 vlnlsm same opinion: 29 . Reynolds is of the 11 "Religions at various levels of human history have expressed a concern both for the attainment of personal salvation and for the establishment and maintenance of proper order in the world" 30 . 1.7.3. In the light of these interpretations, we wish to emphasise the fact that, apart from the main determinants of early Buddhism, a number of questions relating to social, political and legal ideas are dealt with in early Buddhist literature and have affected social and political life in lands influenced by Buddhism. These ideas may be gleaned from various texts of the Pali canon, and from other early Buddhist literature, and show parallels with those of the West and of other Asian systems 31 1.7.4. Interest has been more closely focussed on the study of Buddhist social and political ideas since the Buddhist nations of Asia regained their political independence after the Second World War. In the long history of those nations, Buddhism has had an increasing effect upon their entire social and political life, and since they achieved political independence it has resumed its previous role in shaping their social and political ideas, now also influenced very strongly by the thought of the West. 1.7.5. It is necessary to mention Gard's observation in this point. He says: "Since its inception in the sixth century B.C., Buddhism has exerted profound and 12 varied influences upon Asian political thought and institutions. For example: in India, for centuries until its decline, Buddhism preserved principles of republican government and legislative procedure, public welfare and national security, conventional law, and elective kingship of headship. In Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia, Buddhism has generally avoided direct interference in politics but at the same time has been a pacifying and civilizing factor in the administration of political authority. In Tibet, Buddhism became the state in both theory and administration (sic). In China, Buddhist monasticism alternately accepted and rejected political jurisprudence. In Japan, Buddhism characteristically sanctioned and administered state authoritarianism or opposed it by becoming a rival political and economic power" 32 1.7.6. Much has already been written on the role played by Buddhism in the contemporary social and political development of the Buddhist nations of Asia. But, while there is an abundance of literature dealing with modern Buddhist social and political ideas, there are only a few studies on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism 13 (~.supra.l.6.2- 1.8.1. 1.6.6). The aim of this thesis, however, is not to produce an exhaustive treatment of the whole theme, but to examine some of the socio-political foundations of the Indian Buddhist tradition. Our inquiry is basically conceptual and therefore should be considered as falling within the scope of the history of ideas rather than of events and systems. A sense of history is a useful possession for a philosopher, but a study of what people in previous generations, more particularly about two thousand five hundred years ago in a different social and political climate from the contemporary world, actually intended by certain expressions does not itself constitute a philosophical examination. we do not intend to establish a form of "Buddhist Modernism", since there are a number of studies on modern Buddhist social and political ideas. Our interest is only in the history of views and therefore the present work is intended to throw light on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism. 1.8.2. Our findings about early Buddhist social and political ideas are primarily based on the source material afforded by the Pali canon. This is studied historically and philosophically in the light of earlier and later literary source material and the findings of other scholars. 1.8.3. It has been observed by many scholars that the Pali canon provides many descriptions and a variety of ideas on the subject. words: Gard, for example, writes in the following 14 "The Mahavagga and Cullavagga are first class documents of institutional literature in the field of public life and social polity. Political science can derive much data from these Vinaya texts both from the viewpoint of institutions as well as from that of theories. The theories of the Sakyan monks in regard to the problem of authority, justice, liberty, individual, democracy and so forth may be gleaned by a careful student of political philosophy out of many passages in this literature" 33 . 1.8.4. We also consider many passages of importance to be found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, though these in most cases represent a later stage of Buddhist thought, not so close to the idea of the Founder as the doctrines of the Pali canon. There are many Buddhist Mahayanist scholars who argue against the above proposition because so much of the Pali canon was obviously composed several generations after the Buddha. This is not the place to trace the arguments by which such scholars have become convinced that Mahayana more closely reflects the doctrine of the Founder of Buddhism than Theravada, but it should be noted that the different treatment of the career of the Buddha by the two schools illustrates in a preliminary way the close relations and the differences between them. We may refer here to the opinions of Basham and Thouless, who say: "The Theravada school more closely reflects 15 the doctrine of the Founder of Buddhism than does any other sect, and ... the Theravada canon contains more authentic reminiscences of the historical Buddha and his times than do the Buddhist Sanskrit sources" 34 , "It seems more likely that Hinay~na was Buddhism as originally taught and the Mahayana was a product of . . ,35 development and conventionallsatlon l. 8. 5 However this may be, according to our prime interest it is not essential that the movement as a whole be brought into focus. And yet, since many modern scholars believe that little or nothing can be confidently ascribed to the Buddha himself, ou·r interest does not lie so much in terms of what the Buddha himself taught, but of what early Buddhists taught. l. 8. 6 Vedic and Sanskrit literature is used to throw light on the historical background and for comparative purposes. l. 9.1 The question of political authority and obligation has always been a fundamental problem of political philosophy. The second chapter of the present work will discuss the nature, grounds and justification of political authority and obligation as criticized and accepted by the Buddhism of the Pali canon. The social and political ideas 16 of early Buddhism are closely tied up with dhamma or the law of righteousness. observe (~.supra. We have seen, as Ghoshal and Jayatilleke 1.5.1 and 1.6.4), the importance of dhamma in its socio-political context. A detailed study of the concept of dhamma will be made in chapter three, covering its social, political and legal senses. In the fourth chapter, "Attitude to Equality", an attempt is made to give the early Buddhists' views on such topical issues as racism, human rights and freedom. The fifth chapter, "Attitude to Law " makes, on the one hand, a study of the Buddhist monastic laws, and on the other, gives a picture of the organization of the Sangha and its internal polity. l . 9. 2 Those who still maintain that early Buddhism is incompatible with social, political and legal ideas may find this work a challenge to their opinions. The social and political ideas of early Buddhism are becoming an increasingly fruitful field for research, and this is reflected in the material used in this work. We hope that our work may also be of interest to scholars of ancient and mediaeval Western thought, because they may find in this study some developments parallel to those in their own fields, as well as differing ones. We also hope that our work may rectify some misconceptions about Buddhism, particularly in the area of its social and political ideas. 17 CHAP'l'ER TWO POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 2.1.1. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the views of early Buddhism on the nature, grounds and justification of political obligation and authority (~.supra.l.9.1), as they appear in the Pali canon and the non-canonical literature of early Buddhism. We shall also be concerned with what thinkers of the pre-Buddhistic era, particularly those of the Vedic and later Vedic (Brahmanic and Upani~adic) period, and post-Vedic thinkers, assumed or accepted in regard to political obligation and authority, in order to obtain a clearer perspective on early Buddhist ideas. This will be followed by a consideration of passages in which political obligation and authority are discussed in the Vedic and Buddhist texts. 2.2.1. Ideas of political obligation and authority, since men attained a certain maturity in the formulation of a variety of expressions of them, can of course be classified in many ways and looked at from a number of points of view. If we confine ourselves to the Indian tradition, we can find a number of ideas of political obligation and authority which were accepted as valid by Indian thinkers. 2.2.2. These ideas have been classified in many ways and looked at under different names by modern scholars writing on Indian social and political ideas. For example, some scholars, like Basham and Ghoshal, have mentioned three 18 different views. According to Basham, they are: Buddhist theory of social contract, tii) theory of quasi- divinity and (iii) theory of divine right 1 . division is different. right theory, (i) the He distinguishes: Ghoshal's (i) the divine (ii) the ethico-religious theory and (iii) the 2 quasi-contractual theory . According to him the Buddhist social contract comes under the last head. An account and discussion of Ghoshal's interpretation will follow in sections 2,.8.3 - 2.8.4. There are also other classifications of the Vedic and Buddhist ideas by many scholars 3 . 2.2.3. From a careful study of different ideas on the problem, however, it is possible to classify them into two groups which may be called the theological theory and the theory of social contract. 2.2.4. The theological theory was accepted by Vedic and post-Vedic thinkers of the orthodox schools. In contrast, the theory of social contract was accepted by early Buddhist thinkers. 2.2.5. It is necessary to point out two things. First, the word "theory" is used here in a rather loose sense: the ideas referred to are mostly put forward in a dogmatic manner and are usually not supported by rational argument. Secondly, the application of the phrase "theological", rather than "divine" in the present context is appropriate, because the Indian doctrine is somewhat different from the Western idea of "divine right"~A 19 2.3.1. Before embarking upon the theory of social contract of early Buddhism, let us examine the theological theory, which was widely accepted by orthodox thinkers. we can distinguish four different versions of this. 2.3.2. The first version of the theological theory is the monistic view. It holds that the authority of the ruler is derived from the sacrifice of the cosmic person, and the subjects are obliged to obey the ruler because he promotes their salvation in accordance with the omnipotent cosmic or divine will of the cosmic person. 3B More particularly, this view is implied by the divine creation of the social order in four classes with distinctive functions. 2.3.3. According to the earliest account of this view, the Primeval Person (PurusaJ , the highest God, who existed before the foundation of the universe, was sacrificed by the gods, who apparently were his sons. From the body of the divine victim the universe was produced. The "Hymn of the Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda, in which this first cosmic • sacrifice is described, tells how the four classes were created by the divine victim when he was sacrificed by the gods. It says: "When the gods divided Purusa, into how many portions did they div1de him? What was his mouth, what were his arms, what were his thighs and his feet called? The Brahmana was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rajanya made, his thighs became the Vaisya, ,_ of his feet the Sudra was produced" 4 20 2.3.4. This Vedic dogma of divine creation of society in four classes were accepted as valid by later thinkers of the orthodox schools and it was developed with slight changes in many texts of the later period 5 In all, the ideas that were accepted can be summarised as follows. Society is a divine institution, owing its origin not to human, but to divine agency. Each class had its own set of duties and obligations (sva-dharma) exactly prescribed by the Creator. The seconcr class (rajanya) was the ruling one. The ruling or warrior class was inferior to the Brahmana, but was superior to the Vaisya and the Sudra. commanded it to protect the people 6 . The Cosmic Person The protection of the people is the divine purpose of the creation of the ruler, 7 because his authority is based on divine ordination . 2.3.5. More importantly, from the tradition of the cosmic sacrifice, a new attitude to the sacrifice developed, leading to new and complex rituals such as the king's inauguration sacrifice (rajasuya) , the horse sacrifice (asvamedha) the drink of strength sacrifice (vajapeya) , and a number of other elaborate sacrifices and rituals. These rites had become a supernatural mystery and had many 8 bearings upon the authority of the ruler . With the development of the sacrificial cult the position of the priestly class (Brahmanas) was consolidated and their social status rose far above those of the other classes. They were considered to be gods in human form, and even rulers were expected to place themselves at their service. They were looked on as supreme social servants because they imagined 21 that they derived their power from the cosmic sacrifice. We shall discuss the significance of these ceremonies and the supreme role played by the priestly class elsewhere in this chapter 2. 3. 6 (~.infra. 2.5.4 - 2.5.5) and in chapter four. The implication of the monistic view and its later elaborations is that the derivation of the authority of the ruler is ascribed to a personal divine being, but there seems to be contradictory views in many passages as to who is that personal divine being. During the Rg-Vedic period, Varuna or Indra were generally credited with the 9 . . task o f creatLng the unLverse By the period of the Brahmanas and Upanisads, however, Prajapati "the Lord of Beings", is thought of as a Primeval Person from whom the universe was produced 10 . This god was often identified with Brahma, the masculine form of the neuter Brahman (Prajapatyo - 11 - - 12 Brahma , Prajapatyo vai Brahma ). In the Brahmanas and in the Upanisads, Brahma is represented as the creator as well as the first teacher of the Vedas, who in the beginning of the world was identified by himself "I am Brahma" 13 (v.infra. 2.10.4). 2.3.7. In whatever way the monistic views were developed, they involved a strong belief that the authority of the ruler was derived from an omnipotent, omniscient Personal Being. The implication is that the subjects ought to obey the laws of the state because they represent the creator's law. 2.4.1. A second version of the theological theory, that of divine invention, also appears in many forms and 22 aspects 14 , one of which is found in the Mahabharata. It tells that in the original state of nature everything was perfect, and men lived together in peace and happiness, having all things in common. Then, at a certa1n stage of the decline of the golden age, men began to commit violence against each other. When this happened everything which was good and righteous was lost; the Vedas were forgotten, the religious rituals were no longer performed, unrighteousness prevailed .. Everything became sinful. The gods, rather than men, were overcome with fear, and the gods, not the men, approached Brahma, the highest God, and asked for help to put things right. on polity. Brahma composed the archetypal treatise After this was composed, the gods went to Visnu, the ruler of heaven, and asked him to ordain a king. Visnu created the first king out of his own mind, a miraculous and supernatural being, to rule over men, and to ensure that they fulfil their religious duties 2.4.2. 15 . Passages such as this, wh1ch can be paralleled by many other extracts, adapt the idea of divine creation of the ruler so as to invest him with divine attributes or even with divinity itself. in other passages What is emphasized in this legend and fou~d in the Vedic Samhitas and Brahmanas is that the authority of the ruler was not a matter of human will, nor was obligation to obey him of human choosing. The ruler is entirely a divine creation and is endowed by the Highest God, and thus his will is finally binding upon men. The authority of the ruler,according to the story,is essentially an emanation of,and a delegation by,divine authority,and there is no obligation on the part of the ruler towards his subjects, except to coerce them into maintaining religious norms. 23 .~ "-- ,, , . . e.-.- ,!;~ 'c-,1;- '-'!"':'~A <.:~~-"" ~- All his rights are divine, his obligation must ultimately be to the Highest God, and the ruler is the servant of God, rather than the servant of men. Furthermore, this story seemec to embody the most extreme form of royal divinity and shows a certain priestly sophistication not found in the other stories of the origin of rulership. 2.5.1. The third version of the theological theory is the magico-religious view, which has in one form or another played an important role in the history of Hindu political ideas. It expresses the idea that the authority and obligation of the ruler is derived from the Most High and it is based on the mutual relationship between the spiritual authority and the temporal power. Two of the best-known expressions of this view are to be found in the early Vedic literature. They are: (i) the authority and obligation of the ruler is primarily based on the cosmic sacrifice and secondarily on his connection with the royal and imperial sacrifice (~.supra. 2.3.5), and (ii) the authority and obligation of the ruler is based on his personal unity and identification with the gods (~.infra. 2.7.2). The same tendency is found in the Brahmanas, which are text-books intended to guide the priests, and it is in the Brahmanas that we find developed ideas of what became for orthodoxy the supreme source of power - the spiritual authority (v.infra. 2.5.4). As we shall see more precisely later, the Brahmanas developed the idea of the two powers in order to gain supremacy over the ruling class. 24 2.5.2. The supremacy of the Brahmanas over the ruling class is expressed in many passages of the Brahmana texts 16 . At the same time, we can find some other passages which in fact the Brahma~as were often point to the conclusion that 17 treated as inferiors by the ruling class. Ghoshal's statement on this issue is quite correct, where he says that the mutual relations of the two powers and the superiority of the Brahmanas over the ruling class are expressed in diverse and even contr~dictory terms 18 . Even with such references, the magico-religious view has occupied the greatest attention of the Brahmanic thinkers through the ages, and they maintained that the priest had a claim to be the dominant class over the ruling class for a number of reasons 2.5.3. (~.supra. 2.3.5). The most illuminating expression of the magico- religious view with regard to polltical obligation and authority is to be found in the words of the marriage ritual: "I am That, thou art This, I am Sky, thou art Earth" 19 This expression was taken out of its context in Brahmanic sources and used to justify the claims of the Brahmanas to supremacy. It is interesting to note coomaraswamy's interpretation of this expression. He says that ''the whole of Indian political theory is implied and subsumed in the words of the marriage formula: I am that ..... 20 . In his statement, the words "the whole of Indian political theory" lmply that this was the case also with early Buddhism. not believe or teach any such idea. But early Buddhism did The Buddha was always critical of the supremacy of the Brahrnanas (see Ch. 4). Therefore, in relation to early Buddhism or other heterodox 25 schools Coomaraswamy's observation is hardly justified. 2.5.4. However, the important fact of the above expression, which we should note is this. It is said that the ruler has to play the "feminine" role in the "marriage" of the spiritual authority (brahma) and the temporal power . (ksatra). In short, what it . tries to justify is the dominating influence of the Brahmana priesthood over the ruling class. For even in the earlier Vedic texts references are to be found indicating the predominance of the priestly class over the ruling class (~.supra. 2.3.5). Throughout the Vedic literature it is evident that the authority of the ruler is theoretically dependent upon the spiritual authority which has been given to the Brahmana priest, the Purohita. Simultaneously with these ideas the priests, while gaining supremacy in social and religious matters, formulated more elaborate rituals and sacrificial ceremonies. These rituals and sacrifices rose to preeminence and came to be regarded as the only means of 20A attaining desired objects and ends. Martin Haug sums up the theory of sacrifice promulgated in the Brahmanas thus: "The sacrifice is regarded as the means for obtaining power over this and the other world, over visible as well as invisible, . . . anlmate as we 11 as lnanlmate creatures ,21 . 2.5.5. As the sacrifice rose in importance, the power of sacrifice became one of the cardinal doctrines of Brahmanism. All were said to be subject to the influence of 26 the .sacrifice. Even the ruler is subject to it, and the Brahmanas, who claimed to be able to understand and correctly perform the sacrifices, emphasize the fact that the authority of the ruler was based upon these sacrifices. Ghoshal sums up the bearing of these ceremonies upon tne authority of the ruler as follows: "The king derives his authority, including his immunity from punishment, from the sacrifice. Further, he acquires his divinity (to the point of identity with the highest deity of the pantheon) by virtue of his participation in the same ceremony" 2.5.6. 22 As already pointed out, temporal authority is guaranteed through the personal relationship in which it gives preeminence over itself to spiritual authority incarnated in the )?urohita. This relationship between temporal power and spiritual authority, even at the time of the Rg-Veda, is explicit in the words of Agni (representing the Purohita) addressed to Indra (representing the ruler); "I go in person before you, 0 Indra ... and if you give me 23 . my share, then through me you shall perform heroic deeds" The implications of the etymology of the word purohita (derived from purah "in front" and dha "to place" - ---. "one put in front", "one who takes precedence") are clear in the above expression. It is said that without the guidance of a spiritual adviser the ruler cannot rule guidance he rules by divine right. 24 . With such The Purohita represents 27 the divine authority originated from the highest sources, namely the eternal Vedas, which were regarded as divine revelation. The Vedas contain a body of rules which is binding upon the ruler in all his actions, and the Pur~hita, who is the custodian of the eternal Vedas, finds religious reasons for obedience to the divine will, rather than to the human will, and these reasons are valid for both the ruler 25 and his subjects . As we shall see later in this chapter (v.infra. ·2.10.10 - 2.10.18), early Buddhism criticised and rejected the authority of the Vedas and the power of sacrifice. 2.6.1. The final version of the theological theory is the idea of an agreement between the ruler and his subjects, with divine approval. The stories of this agreement are repeated in many texts, but they differ in detail 26 and can be interpreted as indicative of ideas of both divine selection and contractual agreement. The most significant passages illustrating the idea of an agreement are to be found in the Aitareya Brahmana and in the Mah~harata. 2.6.2. The former tells how the gods and the demons (asuras) were in battle, and the gods were suffering badly at the hands of their enemies. said: The gods met together and "through our lack of a king our enemies conquer us. Let us make a king". They consented and appointed Soma as their king, with whom the gods reconquered all that they had 1 os t 27 . 7 -hmana, whlch . . t.1r1ya Th e Talt Bra repeats th.lS s t ory in a significantly altered form, says that the ruler was 28 appointed by the Highest God. It says that Prajapati created gods and demons, and when the gods were suffering badly at the hands of their enemies, they did not select a ruler, but sacrificed to the high God Prajapati, who sent his son Indra to become their king, under whose leadership the gods overcame the demons 28 . 2.6.3 In many versions of this legend, Indra was identified as the ruler of the gods 29 . Historically considered, Indra was the most prominent divinity in the Rg-Veda and in the Brahmanas and it seems that Soma,in the . . Aitareya Brahmana's version of the legend, was an early 29A priestly emendation of Indra. It should also be noted that . . in the Brahmanas, Varuna is also identified as the ruler of the gods. He was appointed by the Highest God 30 . It seems that at different periods and in different circles Varuna, Indra and Soma were looked on as the supreme ruler of heaven. 2.6.4. The stories of the divine selection of a ruler suggest that rulership originated through the external insecurity of the gods and military necessity. The ruler appointed by the will and consent of the gods was a war leader, and his first duty was to lead his subjects in battle. The Aitareya Brahmana further says in connection with the great coronation ceremony of Indra that the ruler was appointed by the gods on the grounds of his superior merits. He was the most powerful and the strongest among the gods, who could lead in battle and establish external 29 security 31 All these references show that the above factors furnished the occasion for the popular selection of the ruler. Moreover, the stories of this repeatedly emphasize the vital role played by the Highest God, Prajapati. 2.6.5. Another story reflecting the idea of a contract between the ruler and his subjects is found in the Mahabharata. It tells how at one stage chaos was rife in society and there was a great fear of anarchy because of the passionate and covetous nature of men. the idea of matsyanyaya 32 eating up the little fish. This conforms with - the analogy of the big fish As in this analogy, society at that stage was lacking in values and rules, and it was like a "devil's workshop". Without laws and a king to rule (arajaka) , matsyanyaya operated, and the strong dominated and ruthlessly exploited the weak. When people were over- powered by anarchy, they met together and made an agreement to keep the peace and to expel evildoers. Through the evil passions of men, however, the agreement was not kept and conditions became worse than before. Then mankind in a body went to Brahma, the Highest God, and asked for help. ordained Manu, son of the sun, as the first king. Brahma Manu first refused to become king because he assumed that men are by nature deceitful and cruel and he would himself incur sin by administering punishment. The people, however, persuaded him to be king by promising to give him shares of their crops, a fiftieth part of their animals and precious metals, and the most beautiful of their maidens, to fulfil religious rituals and the like. Manu then accepted their fixed 30 promises and confirmed that he would maintain the security and the welfare of the people 2.6.6. 33 From the above, it is clear that these contractual ideas, while agreeing on the fundamental principle of the divine origin of kingship, differ only in appointed one aspect. The ruler here is a divinely apointed figure, but is appointed by the will of the people and at their request in order to put an end to a state of anarchy and • degeneration, and the people are obliged to obey the ruler because they have promised to do so. 2.7.1. These are the four different forms of the theological theory widely believed by the orthodox schools. The four versions, while agreeing fundamentally upon the divine creation and endowment of kingship, differ greatly in details. All versions of the theological theory sought to explain the authority of the ruler and the limits of that authority, the obedience of his subjects towards him and his obligation towards his subjects by reference to the highest authority, which is attained by virtue of the ruler's connection with the Highest Deity. 2.7.2. Since the derivation of the ruler's authority is from the Most High, all Brahmanical legal literature takes this kind of attitude with varying intensity. For example, at one place it is said: ''The ruler (rajanya) is the visible representative of Prajapati, hence while being one he rules over many• 34 31 Elsewhere we read: "The ruler is a great deity (mahati-devata) in human form; imposed from the Most High without any intervention on the part of mankind themselves" 35 . The masses on the whole, therefore, were led to believe in the divinity of the ruler 36 . 2.8.1. It is clear that there is here no consistent or single principle of the nature and grounds of political obligation and authority, because the four versions of the theological theory, which we have discussed above)are mutually contradictory, and if one is true the other three m~st be false. They are not products of rational or empirical reasoning, but they are mere beliefs, and were never backed by logical arguments. Moreover, none of the four versions provides a genuine notion of a social contract, although occasionally some reference is made to agreements between subjects and rulers. The election of Soma or Indra in the Brahmana legend involves no explicit mutual relationship which could be called a contract, but merely the popular choice of the ruler. In the secomMahabharata story <:::.supra. 2.6.5) the first king isappointed:by the High God, and not by men, as the divine means of meeting human need. The subjects agree to pay taxes to the king in return for his services, but this does not amount to a social contract, because the king's position does not depend on the contract, but OJl divine appointment. 32 2.8.2. Before we leave this topic, it is necessary to note a few comments of earlier writers on Hindu ideas of the origin of kingship. This would enable us to see how early Buddhist ideas differ from those of early Hinduism. '} (1 • ,:_ 11! '-' "'' "V~.J ,_, s -c ., ;.~' c st: ~ s (•\ 0 r; ::::.::1 ,s L:_~_:_L}C' _.\_ ¢ 0\T~l \JOJ~(S~ "At this point the paths of the Brahmanas and the Buddhist thinkers diverge completely. For the former, instead of tracing like the latter the subsequent creation of kingship to a governmental compact between the people and a select individual in their midst, derive it from the will of the creator" ~h~hd ~ ~ 37 - . - further points out that, according to the first Mahabharata story, the original ruler, who was not yet a king, derived his title to rule from the gods. His creation was due to the initiative of the gods themselves, undertaken rather in their own interests than in the interests of the afflicted people. He was created by the will of God the Preserver, supplementing the creation of the science of polity by God the Creator. Preserver 38 . He was moreover a mind-begotten son of the Elsewhere, Ghoshal suggests that the ideas of the king's origin in the Mahabharata and Manusaffihita exhibit a complex blending of ideas formulated deliberately with the object of counteracting the individualistic and antimonarchical tendencies of the Buddhist theory of contract 39 . 33 Moreover, he does not agree with some scholars, like Altekar and Sengupta, who hold that the idea of the king's divinity or divine personality was unknown in the Vedic period 40 Apart from a few exceptional passages, the idea of king's divinity is a well-established fact in the Vedic texts. 2.8.4. While we agree with Ghoshal's criticism of the Vedic ideas of kingship, we do not agree with some of his remarks on the early Buddhist idea of its ori0in. For example he says: "The early Buddhist theory , contract tended to strengthen a not on of social contract which was familiar to Hindu political theory, namely, that the king was an official paid by his subjects for the service of protection" 41 It is true that, according to the Buddhist tradition, the first king Mahasammata was an official paid by his subjects, but his position was not created in the same manner as that of the first king according to Hindu tradition 2.11.11). (~.infra In his examination of kingship in ancient India, Dumont points out that the Buddhist idea of the origin of kingship has an entirely different character and based on a contract binding on all future subjects and future kings, but in the corresponding Hindu versions the divine or quasidivine quality of the king was not excluded 2.8.5. 42 . Some Hindu scholars firmly believe that the contractual ideas of the orthodox schools (~.supra. 2.6.1 - 2.6.6) can be classified under a social contract theory. As 34 we observed earlier, the legend of Manu differs considerably from a tacit or implied contract because it involves divine intervention, and also implies that the kings were treated as gods so long as they obeyed the Creator's law. Spellman is much more specific at this point, when he deals with the contractual ideas of the Hindus. In his own words: "What elements of the contractual theory do we find in this story (the legend of Manu in the Mahabharata)? There appears to be a type of anarchy in which men are living and they are not satisfied with this. Apparently they possess the power to contract. There is an offer to Manu by the people and although we are not told expressly that he accepts it, his actions pursuant to the offer imply that he does. But would Manu have had the power to act independently of this offer? Did he derive his power from the people? did they surrender to him? What In the usual sense of the social contract, the leader derives not only his right, but his power as well, from the people. It is not clear that this was the case with Manu" 43 . Further he says that divine appointment is the prevailing Hindu idea of the origin of kingship and, despite some elements of social contract in the notion of an exchange of 35 taxation and protection, royal power was not derived from an 44 • . h t h e peop 1 e accordlng . . d u tra d'ltlons . agreement Wlt to Hln Moreover, he points out that the most complete Indian version of a social contract theory appears in Buddhist literature 45 . 2.8.6. It is not the author's main intention to examine the theological theory in detail, but only to show, in short, what orthodox thinkers generally accepted on the issue of political obligation and authority in order to gain a clearer ' understanding of the early Buddhist ideas. 2.9.1. Let us now turn our attention to the early Buddhist ideas in regard to political obligation and authority. While rejecting most of the religious and metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers, the Buddha or early Buddhism advocated a critical rationalism in the realm of politics. There were two main bases from which the question of the grounds and justification of political obligation and authority were approached by the early Buddhists. The first was the argument against a Personal Creator God (Issara). Secondly, while rejecting such a God, early Buddhism recognized the authority of dhamma (see Ch.3) and in one of its senses it put forward a social contract of the origin of kingship in contradistinction to the theological theory. 2 .10 .1. Before we proceed to examine the notion of social contract in early Buddhism, let us first consider the Buddhist argument against the creator God. As we sa~ (2.3.6), from the period of the early Upanisads, Brahma was considered 36 to be the creator, eternal, primordial, omniscient, powerful "if not almighty, and supreme. ~' i\ The appellations of Brahma in the Pali texts are the same as those of rsvara in the. early theis· schools. The concept Issara (Vedic Isvara, from Is, to have power) means lord, ruler, master chief . Creat~ve ' De~ty, - 47. Brah ma 46 ; and it also means The concept of a Persona 1 creator God and the attributes which are given to him are criticized directly in the early Buddhist texts. 2.10.2. On this issue the main Buddhist criticism was that the thinkers of the Vedic tradition had no special insight or direct understanding about the nature of Brahma. They believe that God (Brahma) in heaven is the mighty God (Maha-brahma), the omnipotent (abhibhu anabhibhuto)' the > omniscient (annadatthu-daso), the controller (vasavatti), the lord (issaro), maker (!:catta) ,the creator(nimmata) , the perfect or the most high (set tho) , the chief of all (sa'l'ij ita) , the almighty father of beings that are and are to be • 48 . ( vasi pita bhuta-bhavyanam) The early Buddhist reaction to the conception of 2.10.3. a personal creator God was a determined attempt to deny every one of those attributes. In the Buddhist view, those attributes are erroneous, for Brahma is not an eternal being as the ignorant believe him to be. For example, when the monk Kevaddha asks him where the four elements of earth, water, fire and air finally cease without leaving a trace, he has to admit, after a long hesitation, that he does not know 49 . This clearly indicates that Brahma is not omniscient. This fact has been recently analysed very ~ ~ '9-; lucidly by Dharmasiri. 37 He says that a concept of a personal creator God is delineated in terms of its attributes, and he gives five main reasons how the concept of God is meaningless . . ln terms o f lts attrl"b utes 50 . 2.10.4. Early Budchist texts expressly assert that the belief in Brahma is an opinion not based on empirical . . . . . 51 o b serva t lon, lt lS lnaccurate, an d a d angerous l"11 uslon In the Patika sutta, the Buddha exposes the falsity of the --.-;- traditional doctrine that the origin of things comes about through the work of Brahma. The text reads as follows: "There are some recluses and brahmins who declare as a doctrine received from their teachers that the beginning of all things was the work of the god Brahma. I (i.e. the Buddha) have gone and asked them whether it was true that they maintained such a doctrine, and they replied that it was; but when I asked them to explain, they have not been able to answer, and have returned the question to me. have explained it to them thus: Then I There comes a time, sooner or later, ... when the world is dissolved and beings are mostly reborn in the world of Radiance 52 . There they dwell, made of the stuff of mind, feeding on joy, shining in their own light, flying through middle space, firm in their bliss for a long, long time. 38 Now there comes a time when this world begins to evolve, and then the world of Brahma appears, but it is empty. And some being, whether because his alloted span is past or because his merit is exhausted, quits his body in the world of Radiance and is born in the empty world of Brahma, where he dwells for a long, long time. Now because he has been so long alone he begins to feel loneliness, dissatisfaction and longing, and wishes that other beings might come and live with him. And indeed soon other beings ... appear in the world of Brahma as companions to him; and in all respects, they lead a life like his. Then the being who was first born thinks: 'I am Brahma, the mighty Brahma, the conqueror, the unconquered, the all-seeing, the lord, the maker, the creator , the supreme chief, the disposer, the father of all that is or is to be. I have created all these beings, for I merely wished that they might be and they have come here'. And the other beings ... think the same, because he was born first and they later. That is how your traditional doctrine comes about that the beginning of things was the work - 53 of the god Brahma" 2.10.5. Finally, the Buddha tells us that one of the 39 beings in the world of Brahma, by reason of his poor stock of merit, was born on earth. He recalls his former dwelling- place, but does not remember what went before and says: "Brahma, the great Brahma ... he by whom we were created, lives in the Brahma world. He is permanent, constant, eternal, unchanging, and he will remain so for ever and ever. But we who were created by that Brahma are all impermanent, transient unstable, short lived, destined to pass away" 54 In reply to Kevaddha's question Brahma says: " "I am Brahma But Kevaddha replies "I did not want to know all about who you are, I asked you where the four elements cease without leaving a trace". Brahma, unable to answer, and in order to save his face, and not to display his ignorance before all his retinue, says to Kevaddha: front of them. know the answer. like that. 2.10.6. "I did not wish to say this in They think I know everything, but I do not You should not come to me with a question You should ask the Buddha" 55 . It is clear, therefore, from the above accounts that the Buddha strongly disagreed with the view that the beginning of things was the work of Brahma. According to the early Buddhist point of view the world is impermanent. Its central thesis emphasizes that everything is subject to an unceasing flow of change (viparinama-dhamma) . One of his disciples once questioned the Buddha: " 'The wo:r·ld! The world! ' is the saying, lord. 40 How far, lord, does this saying go?" 56 The Buddha answered: "It crumbles away, monk. called 'the world'. Therefore, it is What crumbles away? The eye ... objects ... eye-consciousness tongue .•. body ... mind ... It crumbles away, monk. Therefore, it is called 'the world' ,S?. To the Buddha the world is not a "thing" but only a vast series of evanescent changes. The law of causation as affecting the physical and mental realms is regarded as fully sufficient-to explain this cosmic series of changes 2.10.7. 58 Contradicting thus the conception of Brahma as eternal and as creator, the early Buddhist texts represent it as an illusion on a par with many other illusions which it is S·-l ~- t 0 \!C' '· cor.:ce c o:~_ct1 cs C :~"' Cf:~ s e:·:_)_s c of , 1-1~ strongly maintainS. CJ.l. C. S , ·~ ~ !_':lC£~]." that "one should not overstep the limits 1\ of conventional usage" and sayS that by confusing the usages y of "is, was and will be" one can be led into intricate philosophical muddles 59 Moreover, the Buddha says that the people who talk about God (Brahma) and talk about ways of attaining union with him are making meaningless statementl, because no one can make the concept of a creator God meaningful in any way, no one can give any criteria for discriminating God from other entities. To understand a concept one must have delineating criteria for making that concept meaningful. 41 These criteria can be derived either from knowledge by acquaintance or from knowledge by description 60 2.10.8. The Buddha says that those who believe in Brahma and talk about ways of attaining "union with" or "becoming one with" him do not furnish any of the above criteria. For example "Then you say, Vasettha, that none of the brahmanas, or of their teachers, or of their pupils, even up to the seventh generation, has ever seen Brahma face to face. And that even the sages of old, the authors and utterers of the verses, of the ancient form of words which the brahmanas of to-day so carefully intone and recite precisely as they have been handed down - even they did not pretend to know or to have seen where or whence or whither God is. So that the brahmanas versed in the three Vedas have forsooth said thus: 'What we know not, what we have not seen, to a state of union with that we can show the way, and can say: this is the straight path, this is the direct way which makes for salvation, and leads him, who acts according to it, into a state of union with God'. Does it not follow, this being so, that the talk of the brahmanas turns out to be foolish talk? ... Verily, Vasettha, that brahmanas versed in the three Vedas should be able to show the way to a 42 state of union with that which they do not know, neither have seen - such a condition of things can in no wise be! Just as when a string of blind men are clinging one to the other, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see just even so, the talk of the brahmanas versed in the three Vedas is but blind talk; the first sees not ... The talk then of these brahmanas turns out to be ridiculous, mere words, a vain and empty thing" 2.10.9. 61 Further, the Buddha points out how the path to God becomes meaningless because meaning cannot be attached to the concept of God. "Just as, if a man should make a staircase in the place where four roads cross, to mount up into a mansion. And people should say to him: 'Well, good friend, this mansion, to mount up into which you are making this staircase, do you know whether it is in the east, or in the south, or west, or ... north? Whether it is high or low or of medium size?'. when so asked, he would answer: people would say to him: 'No' . And And 'But then, you are making a staircase to mount up into something - taking it for a mansion - which, all the while, you know not, neither have seen'. And when so asked, he would answer: 'Yes'. Even so, the talk of that man was foolish 43 talk, and in the same way the brahmanas are not able to point out the way to union with that which they have seen ... 2.10.10. As already pointed out (~.supra. n 62 . 2.3.5), one of the cardinal doctrines of Brahmanism was the power of sacrifice. One's whole life is regarded as a sacrifice. There were a number of elaborate and complicated sacrifices such as the Asvamedha, Rajasuya and Vajapeya, which were performed by kings and nobles, and besides these there were numerous lesser sacrifices. The Buddha condemned these elaborate sacrifices, since they involved waste of effort and valuable resources as well as injury to life. In the Kutadanta Sutt~ the Buddha points out what the ideal sacrifice should be. He describes the sacrifices held in the days of yore, wherein no living things was injured; all labour was voluntary and the sacrifice was offered, not only on behalf of the king, but on behalf of all. He explains other forms of sacrifice more potent than the gift of . 1 t h"1.ngs 63 rna t er1.a 2.10.11. Moreover, in the early Buddhist texts, the argument against a personal creator God is based on the transitoriness (aniccata) of each being. Kamma operates even on Brahma, and he is fallible and imperfect. The Brahmanas believe that pleasure and pain, weal or woe or neutral feelings may be due to creation by God 64 . "There are certain recluses and brahmanas who teach thus, who hold this view: 'What 44 so ever weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to the creation of a supreme god'. I (i.e. the Buddha) approached them and asked: 'Is it true, that the venerable sirs hold the view and teach that whatsoever weal ... is experienced, all this is due to the creation of a supreme god?'. Thus questioned by me, they replied 'Yes, we do'. said to them: Then I 'So then, owing to the creation of a supreme god, men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, covetous, malicious and heretical. Those who rely on the creation of a supreme god, those lack the desire, and the energy, to do what is to be done and to refrain from doing what is not to be done. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in them, the term 'recluse' cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves since you live in a state of bewilderment without heed or restraint'" 2.10.12. 65 . The fact of the world's suffering is another argument against the belief that everything is the creation of a supreme god. standpoint. Two arguments are adduced from this The first is the puppet argument. The Buddha argues that if God creates and designs the world with his 45 foreknowledge, he has to bear the ultimate responsibility for every action done by his creatures. The puppet argument is stated as follows: "If God designs the life of the entire world- the glory and the misery, the good and the evil acts, man is but an instrument of his will (niddesa-k~ri) and God (alone) is responsible" 66 The secona argument is the argument from evil. Given the existence of evil in the world, how can there be a God who is benevolent, omnipotent and omniscient? The Buddha criticized the existence God precisely on this ground. His main argument is that if God is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly loving he should have made the world otherwise than it is. The argument from evil has several variants, but it can be summed up as follows: "If God (Brahma) is Lord of the whole world and creator of the multitude of beings, then why (i) has he ordained misfortune in the world without making the whole world happy or (ii) for what purpose has he made the world full of injustice, deceit, falsehood and conceit, or (iii) the Lord of beings is evil in that he ordained injustice when there could have been justice" 2.10.13. 67 It is said, "the world is without refuge and without a God" (attano loko anabhissaro) 68 . Buddhaghosa 46 uses the argument against a personal creator God in his analysis of the paticca-samuppada. He takes the denial of God's existence as the logical implication of "doerlessness", the world is without a "doer", a "soul", a "person". The wheel of becoming is without known beginning, lacking both Maker (karako) such as Brahma and percipient (vedako) ; for each consequent proceeds by reason of its anticedent, and not through the intervention of an almighty deity 2.10.14. 69 All these arguments and more against a personal creator God are also found in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Asvaghosa, using the puppet argument, says: ''So others say that creation proceeds from Isvara. What is the need in that case for action by men" 70 In the Mahabodhi Jataka of the Jatakamala several variants of the above two arguments are given, and there is also another argument, which concerns the question of the creation of dharma. "Further, the sovereignty of the Lord must rest either on the lawful order of things (dharma) or on something else. If on the former, then the Lord cannot have existed before the dharma. If effected by some external cause, it should rather be called 'bondage', for if a state of depending should not bear that name, what state may not be called 'sovereignty'?" 71 47 2.10.15. It is necessary to add, however, that although early Buddhism rejects a personal creator God, it does not reject the existence of supernatural beings, or even of Brahma himself. From the point of view of Patika Sutta, a very powerful supernatural beings known as Brahma really exists, but he did not create the universe, though he imagines that he did (~.supr~. 2.10.4). According to the early Buddhist point of view, the word "Brahma" is used to denote a member of a species of deities inhabiting one of the sixteen high heavens of the Rupa world of the Buddhist cosmography. He is in heaven, a morally perfect being, wise and powerful, chief of all, but he is also subject to the ignorance, delusion and misunderstanding which affect all beings who have not attained supreme wisdom. Therefore, he . no t omn1sc1en . . t or omn1po . t en t 72 1s 2.10.16. In the early Buddhist texts more than one Brahma is described, such as Maha-Brahma, Sahampati-Brahma, BakaBrahma and Brahma-sanankumara. According to the early Buddhist ideas, however, although Brahma is nominally the highest being within the cosmos, he is lower in spiritual status than a Buddha or an Arahant in that he has not attained the transcendent wisdom. The Buddha shows that man can attain fellowship with such a being not by prayer or by calling on his name, or by sacrificing animals but by being "free from anger and malice, being pure in heart and gaining self mastery" 73 2.10.17. In the light of what is said above, it is fully 48 justifiable to claim that early Buddhism rejected the creator-role of Brahma, but the existence of Brahma appears to have been explicitly accepted, though early Buddhists modified the word of Brahma on the lines of their own thought. Rhys Davids, for example, points out that the neuter Brahman of the Upanisads is entirely unknown in the Pali literature, and that the Buddha's idea of Brahma in the masculine differs widely from that of the Brahma of the . d s 74 UpanJ.sa .. 2.10.18. There is also evidence in the early Buddhist texts that, in addition to the divine authority in ethical, social and political life, orthodox thinkers claimed authority in the sphere of knowledge as having been inspired by Brahma. Vedas. He was believed to be the first teacher of the human or divine The Buddha rejects all recourse to authority as worthless 75 . " According to the Buddha, any statement claiming to be authoritative should be accepted or rejected only after one has discovered its truth or falisty after personally verifying it. This is so even with regard to the statements of the Buddha himself 2.11.1. 76 . Rejecting the uncritical religious and metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers and recognizing the authority of dhamma, early Buddhism put forward a social contract theory of the origin of kingship. This notion had much influence on the political life of those days and after, perhaps more than any Vedic or post-Vedic doctrine of the origin of kingship. Ghoshal is quite justified when he says: 49 "The most original contribution of the early Buddhist canonists to the store of our ancient social and political ideas consists in their formulation of a remarkable theory of the origin of man and of his social and political institutions" 77 Moreover, this is one of the world's earliest versions of the widespread contractual theory of the state. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the heyday of the social contract in Western thought, which is especially connected with the names of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 78 . 2.11.2. The early Buddhist theory of social contract begins with an account of man in the state of nature - that is of man outside of or apart from civil society. The original state of nature is variously described by Vedic, early Buddhist and Jaina thinkers. (~.supra. We have seen earlier 2.6.5) the traditionalists' account of the original state of nature, its decline because of man's sin, and the formation of political institutions and of social order by divine ordination. Jainism, while rejecting the doctrine that the universe is created or guided by a divine will or divine mind, postulated a mythical age of perfectly virtuous beings living in complete happiness, free from the whole paraphernalia necessitated by man's dependence upon a nature which was growing progressively less bountiful. With life becoming increasingly difficult owing to the cosmic decline, some form of social organization became necessary, and the people were persuaded to accept the family and social 50 order by their Patriarchs. Man's increasingly sinful actions were only a symptom of cosmic decline. The necessity to labour for food and clothes was another factor that brought about the social order according to Jainism. The formation of a state of society was created by a succession of Patriarchs blessed with superhuman attributes, in order to adjust the people to their changing environment. According to the Jaina account, the state was not instituted by any definite cbntract, but it was virtually protective and paternal. It was instituted by the last patriarch, Rsabha, who, realizing the need of a coercive system to maintain society, persuaded the people to accept his son Bharata as . f.J.rst k.J.ng 79 th eJ.r 2.11.3. Early Buddhism also taught the existence of the golden age, and the process of the gradual decline of humanity on account of their sinful actions. But the description of the state of nature and the way in which men formed their social order and their state differs widely from the Vedic and Jaina ideas on the subject 2 .11. 4. 80 According to the early Buddhist tradition, in the early days of the cosmic cycle mankind lived on an immaterial plane, dancing on air in a sort of fairy-land, where there was no need of food or clothing, no laws, no king and no private property, family etc. Then gradually the process of cosmic decay began its work, and mankind became earth-bound, and felt the need of food and shelter. As men continued in this way, feeding on the earth, they 51 became more solid; different characteristics appeared in them, and in consequence insecurity and conflict appeared among them 2 .11. 5. 81 . In such conditions .men were placed in the more difficult and uncertain position of the state of nature, because some of them, attracted by the beauty, smell and taste of the earth, gradually acquired gross bodies, due to the gradual increase of their greed, conceit and lust coupled with the growing scarcity of the edible earth. "Then a certain being, greedy from a former birth, said: 'What can this be?' and tasted the sweet earth with his finger. He was delighted with the flavor and craving overcame him. Then others followed his example ..• and as they did so their radiance faded; and as it faded the moon and sun appeared, with the constellations and the forms of stars, nights and days, phases of the moon and months, seasons and years ••. ,82 "Beings continued thus, feeding on the sweet earth, •.. and the more they ate the more solid their bodies became, some beautiful and some ugly. And the beautiful scorned the ugly, boasting of their greater beauty. And as they became vain and conceited because of their beauty the sweet earth disappeared. Then growths appeared on the 52 soil, coming up like mushrooms, with colour, scent and flavour like those of the sweet earth ... Then creeping plants arose, growing like rattans; and beings lived on them until the creepers too disappeared ... Then rice appeared, already ripe in the uncultivated soil, without dust or husk, fragrant and clean-grained. And those beings continued to live on the rice •.. ,and their bodies became more and more solid, and their differences in beauty even more pronounced, and the characteristic of the female appeared in women, and of the male in man. The women looked at the men too intently, and the men at the women, and so passion arose, and a raging fire entered their bodies. In consequence they took to intercourse together. When people saw them doing so some threw dust at them; others ashes, others cowdung, and shouted, you foul one! 'Perish, Perish you foul one!! How could one person treat another like that?'" 2.11.6. 83 . The text continues that what was considered immoral in those days is now considered moral. In those days those who had sexual intercourse were not allowed to enter a village or a town for months, and they incurred so much blame 53 for their immorality that they started building huts in or d er to concea 1 . 84 ~t . Thus the gradual decline of humanity began, on account of man's physiological differences and psychological impulses. With the progressive decline of the cosmos, there developed human families and households, on account of passion, desire (kama) and greed (gedha). Agriculture was necessitated by the steady diminution of the fertility of the wild rice which formerly grew in abundance .• In such a state the distinction between dhamma and adhamma was blurred. 2.11.7. In the whole account, there is no involvement of gods or demons, Vedas or sacrifice, or doctrines like matsyanyaya, but we are simply told that man's nature brought about the growth of bad customs. 2.11.8. With the growth of immoral customs, man's psychological impulses dominated him, and there was a change in attitudes and beliefs, desires and purposes. It was at this stage that men entered into a social contract. "Then someone of a lazy disposition thought to himself 'Why do I go to the trouble of fetching rice night and morning? I will fetch enough for supper and breakfast in one journey'. Then another man saw him and said 'Come on, my friend, let us go and fetch our rice'. the first man replied. 'I have got enough', So the second man followed the first man's example and thus 54 gradually others too. And from the time that people took to feeding on stored rice the grain became covered with dust, and husks enveloped it, and reaped stems did not grow again, and there were pauses in its growth, when the stubble stood in clumps. Then the people gathered together and lamented, saying: appeared among us. 'Evil customs have Once we were made of the stuff of mind ... and were firm in our bliss for a long, long time ... But since evil and immoral customs became rife among us, we have degenerated until our grain has become covered with dust ... and the stubble stands in clumps. Come now, let us divide the rice fields, and set up the boundary marks•• 85 . 2.11.9. It is implicit in this account that the transition of man from a state of nature to a state of society is a gradual decline, on account of man's selfish disposition. After the households came into existence food began to be stored, land came to be divided among individual owners and boundaries had to be set up, thus giving rise to rights of property. In the above extract, the thought and action of the man who first stored grain and introduced private property in land were considered evil. One might argue that such actions were in no way evil. They were considered evil because they were inspired by greed and 55 selfishness, and because of those actions ''the grain has become covered with dust and the stubble stands in clumps", that is to say, the fertility of the soil diminished. The chief basis of the economy of the people was in disorder, and lack of co-operation led to difficult circumstances. Early Buddhism in this passage condemns hoarding up food and wealth 86 , since it leads to avarice and wickedness 87 . An individual may righteously (dhammena) earn wealtn and use it righteously, sharing it with others 88 The first man's action arose from a selfish disposition, and since then injustice has entered into human life. To put an end to disorder, man realized the importance of mutual co-operation and assistance in order to preserve individual rights. So the fundamental laws of social relations were established by substituting justice for psychological impulses as the rule of man's conduct, and moral values were associated with man's actions. People then entered into an agreement among themselves and set up the first social institutions. 2.11.10. When men formed themselves into a state of society, there was a remarkable variety of natural dispositions among them. These different dispositions resulted in lack of co-operation and breaches of their first agreement. The strength, the power, and the different passions of the many individuals forming the first society could not be fully harmonized, and in consequence weakness, fear and selfish desires again struck at the very root of their being. According to the early Buddhist point of view, . 56 greedy dispositions among men are never ending and have increasingly grave consequences. By repeated and progressively worse and more sinful actions man will ultimately reduce his life span from hundreds of thousands of years in the earlier age to ten years or less in times to come, when the world-cycle is nearing (samvatta) its close 89 . 2.11.11. With the gradual decline of humanity, on account of its own greed, the people again entered into an agreement to maintain justice and the like. This was the stage at which men formed their second contract with the responsibility of law and order, which may be called a contract of government. "Then someone of_ a greedy disposition, while watching his own plot, appropriated another plot that had not been given to him, and made use of it. said: The people seized him and 'You have done an evil deed in taking and using a plot which was not given to you. Do not let it happen again'. 'Very well', he replied. But he did the same thing again and yet a third time. Once more the people seized him and admonished him in the same words, but this time some of them struck him with their hands, some with clods, and some with sticks. From such beginnings arose theft, blame, false speech, and punishment. Then 57 the people gathered together and lamented, saying: 'Evil ways are rife among the people - theft, blame, false speech, and punishment have appeared among us. Let us choose one man from among us, to dispense wrath, blame, and banishment when they are right and proper, and give him a share of our rice in return'. So they chose the most handsome ... and capable among them and invited him to dispense anger, blame, and banishment. He consented and did so, and they gave him a share of their rice" 2.11.12. 90 . Describing the etymology of words connected with kingship, the text continues: "Mahasammata means approved (sammata) by the people (mahajana) , and hence Mahasammata was the first name to be given to a ruler. He was lord of the fields (khettanam) and . hence khattiya (Sanskrit ksatriya) was his . second name. He pleases (ranjeti) others by his righteousness (dhamma) third name, raja 91 (king) . - hence his This was the origin of the class of ksatriyas, according to the tale of long ago. They originated from those same folk and no others, people like themselves, in no way different; their origin was quite natural and not and 58 otherwise" 92 . The text continues to explain the origin of the other three classes, Brahmana, Vaisya, and Sudra (see Ch. 4). 2 .12 .1. The account of the origin of man and his gradual decline from the state of nature to the origin of kingship is found in all schools of Buddhism with minor and sometimes local variations, and is widely known. In the Visuddhimagga, the comme-ntator Buddhaghosa gives an account parallel to the Agganna Sutta, and differs only in identifying Mahasammata as the future Buddha (bodhisatta) 93 • The Buddhist Sanskrit accounts are to be found in the Mahavastu, in the Vinaya section (the Qulva) of the Tibetan canon, in the Lokaprajnapti, and in Vasubhandhu's Abhidharma-kosa 2.12.2. 94 • If we take, for example, two accounts found in the Mahavastu and in the Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the Tibetan canon, we find slight changes, but they are only in the words and phrases and not in the substance of the account in the Agganna Sutta. For instance, the Agganna Sutta at one place says: "The characteristic of the female appeared in women, and of the male in man ... In consequence they took to intercourse together, when others saw them doing so some threw dust at them ... What was considered immoral (adhamma-sammatam) in those days is now considered moral ... " ly.supra. 2.11.5 - 2.11.6). 59 The Mahavastu says: "The distinguishing characteristics of female and male appeared among them Becoming inflamed with passion they violated one another. And those who witnessed them violating one another, threw sticks at them, and clods of earth and mud ... Then, indeed, this was considered immoral, irreligious and irregular, but now it is considered moral, religious and regular" The Vinaya section (the ~ulva) 95 of the Tibetan canon says: "From eating rice their different organs were developed; some had those of males and others those of females. Then they saw each other, and conceived love for each other, and, burning with lust, they came to commit fornication. Others saw what they were doing, so they threw at them stones, gravel, pebbles, and potsherds, and exclaimed: thus insult us 'Why do you ... And thus it was that what was formerly considered unlawful has become lawful ... ,what was not tolerated in former days has become tolerated ... , what was looked down on ... has become praiseworthy nowadays" 96 60 2.12.3. Such are the accounts to be found in the literature of Buddhism about the origin of the world, of man, and of his social and political institutions. The Agganna Sutta gives a quasi-historical account of the origin of government, describing the development of man from the original state of nature to a fully evolved society, when the first king was approved by the people and was hence called Mahasammata. He was also called khattiya because he was the overlord (adhipati) of the fields (khetta) ' and raja because he pleased the people with dhamma. Dhamma, thus, is finally introduced as a basic constituent of the state (see Ch. 3). Thirdly, it also tells us explicitly that man's social and political institutions have no divine sanction but that they are only measures of human expediency. There was a necessity among human beings to restrict their immoral ways, and their freedom to do immoral acts. For this reason mutual consent was required to set up a king, that is to place one man among them in highest authority. The relationship between the king and his subjects is a contractual obligation in which one commands and the other obeys. The contract is symbolized by the institution of taxation, which is a payment for specific work on the part of the king. In this sense the story explains the grounds and limits of political obligation and authority of the ruler, which are based upon the consent of the people. 2.13.1. Let us now examine what is meant by "Mahasammata". This is the central concept in the social and political ideas of early Buddhism. However, there is no direct inquiry about 61 the implications of the title Mahasammata, in the social and political sense, in the early Buddhist texts or in later writings of the different schools of Buddhism. But the value placed on Mahasammata is so great that some observations about him are inevitable. 2.13.2. Let us first consider the narrower explanations of the word. Most of the later Buddhist commentators attempted to explain Mahasammata in terms of a mythical idea of the origin of kingship. According to the Pali chronicles of Sri Lanka, Mahasammata is the proper name of a king who lived in the beginning of this present age, and who was the original ancestor of the Sakyan family, to which the Buddha belonged. The text gives a list of the dynasties from his day up to the time of the Buddha, to prove that the line was "unbroken• 97 . 2.13.3. Moreover, Mahasamrnata is said to have belonged to the Solar Dynasty and was identified as the Bodhisatta (the future Buddha) , who was born among men after a sojourn in the Brahma worlds. The commentator Buddhaghosa says: "In this cycle, among the beings who had made this resolution (to select a king), the Blessed one, the future Buddha, was then more beautiful ... They approached him, asked his permission, and chose him That wondrous event in the world, the future Buddha, was first man" 98 . An examination of the original Pali version will show that 62 Buddhaghosa's identification is wrong. There are references to Mahasammata in the canonical Jataka, but he does not occur as the future Buddha. For example, the Mandhatu Jataka gives a list of the dynasties from Mahasammata to Mandhata, and there identifies Mandhata as the future 99 Buddha . The fact to be noted, however, is that both the Pali texts and their Commentaries agree that Mahasammata was chosen by the people to put an end to disorder. 2.13.4. On the other hand, the Vimanavatthu Commentary explains that Mahasammata is the name given in the Buddhist sacred books (sasane) to Manu 100 • The interesting point about this late commentarial reference is that it tries to assimilate the early Buddhist legend of Mahasammata to one of the Hindu myths. The form of the legend given in the Vimanavatthu Commentary does have some similarity with the legend of Manu. This would suggest that they are connected in some way and did not arise wholly independently. would then appropriate to pose, by the Buddhist from Manu?, It (i) was Mahasammata adapted (ii) Was Manu adapted by the Hindus from the Buddhist Mahasammata?, adapted from a common original? (iii) Were both Whatever the answer, i t can be pointed out explicitly that the Pali version of the Mahasammata story is the first reference in ancient Indian political thought to a social contract in the proper sense. 2.13.5. Moreover, in the Mahayana texts, there are references to the doctrine of divine right (and duty) of kings. The suvarnaprabhasottama Sutra, for example, speaks 63 . . 10 l . . . o f d 1v1ne appo1ntment of k.1ngs an d even roya l d.1v1n1ty This shows clearly that non-Buddhist political ideologies, including the well-known Hindu doctrine of the divine creation of Manu and his Dharmasastra (i.e. Hindu law), exercised deep influence upon later thinkers of different schools of Buddhism 2.13.6. 102 . The above explanations of Mahasammata do not develop the social and political implications of the story, but are rather concerned with harmonizing it with the prevalent Hindu doctrine of royal divinity. Jayatilleke comments that it would be a mistake to associate the idea of Mahasammata with divinity, for anyone can become a bodhisatta and such a being has to•act with selfless devotion for the good of others 103 . Rhys Davids comments, in spite of its good-humoured irony and its fanciful etymologies, the Agganna Sutta reveals a sound and healthy insight and is 104 much nearer to the actual facts than the Brahmana legends Varma comments that the account of Mahasammata is of considerable sociological significance, but it did not initiate any larger amount of further sociological and political investigation in the writing of later Buddhist . k ers 105 . th 1n 2.14.1. What is meant by Mahasammata is not explicitly stated in the Buddhist texts. But we can gather a number of implications in the social and political sense from them. The Pali version states that Mahasammata means approved by the people as a whole (sannipatitva samaggajatehi mahajanehi 64 . 106 sammanltha kato mahasammata) . . However, thls word has been translated variously as "The Great Elect", "The Great One Chosen by the Multitudes", "The Great Selected One", "The Great Chosen One" 107 . The point to consider is that, in contrasting "chosen one" with "elect", some. writers make 108 . . . a d lStlnctlon Wl'th out d'ff l erence . The two are synonymous. However, there is no clear indication that the ruler was elected by a formal process, and it seems more accurate to use the words "The Great Approved One". 2.14.2. We have a similar account of Mahasammata in the 109 Jataka . . . In one of the Jataka storles the followlng account is given: "The people who lived in the first cycle of the world gathered together, and selected the most handsome, attractive and capable among them as their king. The quadrupeds also gathered together and selected a lion as their king; and the fish in the ocean selected a fish as their king called Ananda ... Then all the birds in the Himalayan region assembled together, crying: 'Among men, among beasts, and among the fish too there is a king, but amongst us no king. We should not live in anarchy (appatissavaso) ; also select a king'. and we must They selected an owl. And a bird made a proclamation that it was necessary to show consent on this matter by 65 saying three times 'We are all agreed' (ath'eko sakuno sabbesa~ ajjhasayagahanattha~ tikkhatum savisi). A crow made a protest. In the end the birds selected a golden goose k'1.ng ,110 . as t h e1.r 2.14.3. Let us now try to find out what is exactly meant by "mahasammata" in the light of the accounts given above. Maha means great. Sammata means approved, authorized, selected or agreed upon 111 Thus Mahasammata means "the great approved one", and it is evident that the king is said to be. the "great approved one" because his kingship was approved "by the people" or "approved by the great body of the people" or "by general consent of the great body of people". On the whole we are of the opinion that the explanation as "chosen by the whole people" is a forced one; and was probably not in the minds of those who first used the word. 2.14.4. According to the tradition, as time went on, the "contract of society" proved inadequate for ensuring property rights (v.supra. 2.11.8). To put an end to disorder and to have greater security than before, the people who had gathered together voluntarily agreed to subject themselves to an authority as the opposing force (pratibala) 112 . By their mutual consent they decided to give the authority to a person among themselves who could administer the law justly and punish the guilty, and in return they promised to give him a share of their harvests 66 in order to enable him to perform his duties. And thus all men, by consenting with others, bound themselves to an authority which had been established by mutual agreement among those who had gathered together. 2.14.5. Consent imposes an obligation. Therefore, it is not necessary to explain how both parties, the king and his subjects, have bound themselves by restricting their freedom to perform duties imposed with their own consent. This is why the Buddhist texts demonstrate that the king is merely primus inter E_ares, a being "like unto themselves and not unlike", because of the equality of man, despite the fact that the king selected has a handsome and commanding personality. Therefore, the king is of the people, is to act in the interest of and for the people, and for this task has been approved by mutual consent. It is said in one Chatu~~ataka of Aryadeva. that the king should not feel any pride because after he has consented to rule he is "the servant of the people" (gana-dasa), and for his services the t axes one-slxt . h o f t h elr . . d uce 113 . . peop 1 e glve ln pro 2. 15 . 1. The important facts that may be noted in the early Buddhist theory of the origin of kingship are the following. First, the theory implies a democratic conception of the state and the law. Secondly, early Buddhism conceived of the king as a human being and did not believe in his divinity. Thirdly, it implies that the king has no authority, legislative, judicial or executive, except by virtue of the fact that he has the people's consent as 67 long as he fulfils his contract, which means that sovereignty in the sense of the supreme legislative power is vested in the people and was limited by the requirement to conform to the law of righteousness or dhamma (see Ch.3). In the Pali Scriptures it is said that the king becomes the 114 . --) o f soverelgnty . . Slgn or sy rob o 1 ( pannanam , wh.lC h lS vested in the people and is ultimately derived from dhamma (v.infra. 2.16.1. Also see Ch.3). He should not be moved by hatred or desire from material gain. While it is the king's first duty to maintain law and order, he has other responsibilities as well, including that of positively encouraging and contribution to the economic and spiritual welfare of the people. His service to the people must be based on the law of righteousness (dhamma). In this sense, the Sutta gives a clear idea of the nature and limits of the duty of allegiance owed by the subjects of the king, and of the rights and duty of the king to maintain law and order (see Ch. 3) . 2.15.2. In this connection, another point that may be noted is that if the king fails to fulfil the promise or contract, which is presumed to exist, and instead of providing good government betrays the trust that the people have placed on him, the people have a moral right to depose the king. In one of the Jatakas the Bodhisatta addresses crowd of citizens who are suffering the tyranny of a wicked king and his Purohita in the following terms: "Let town and country people assembled all give ear. The water is on fire. From 68 safety comes fear. The plundered realm may well complain of king and priest. forth protect yourselves. proves your bane" Hence- Your refuge 115 This passage is evidently intended to show that every individual has the moral right and even duty to engage in rebellion against the king who betrays the contract. The statement "it is up to you to protect yourselves (attagutta viharatha)'is made to the general public (mahajana), who are told that the king is defrauding the people when he ought to protect them and work for their welfare. When the people heard this advice, they thought, "Now we are without protection", so they arose up with sticks and clubs in their hands, and then beat the wicked king and the priest till they died 2.15.3. 116 . Thus the story of Mahasammata gives clear answers to the problem of political authority and obligation. In every respect it implies a novel idea which was not current in any political context before the time of the Buddha. The king's authority is that of human will, and the king holds office by virtue of the general consent of his subjects, to perform his duties and bring happiness to the people by means of dhamma. We shall discuss the king's duties and his other responsibilities in chapter three. 2.16 .1. As we have seen, there was a necessity to appoint a person from among the people and to put him under an obligation. How then was the person appointed put under 69 such an obligation? The people have accepted a lawgiving authority on the understanding that the lawgiving authority should act in a certain way. The appointed ruler has consented to act in just such a way by assuming the power granted to him by the people; obviously then the obligatory force of the general consent comes into effect. But how the law can come into effect, if there is no rule which stands above the ruler? The obligatory force of the general consent cannot stem from the will of the parties alone. Therefore, there must be a rule making the agreement binding on the two parties. According to early Buddhism that rule is dhamma, which we shall discuss in the next chapter (Ch. 3). 70 CHAPTER THREE THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA 3.1.1. The social contract theory of early Buddhism, which we discussed in chapter two, is closely related to the idea of dhamma. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine this concept as the law of righteousness, since it reveals the basis of allegiance in relationships between the ruler and his subjects. We shall then consider its relevance to law and administration of the state, as it appears in the early BJlddhist texts. we shall a.lso distinguish, where it is appropriate, the different uses of the early Buddhist conception of dhamma from the Vedic (Brahmanic and Upanisadic ) e>nd the Hindu conception of dharma, so that we can see the significance of the early Buddhist ideas in clearer focus. 3.2.1. The word "dhamma" in Pali, and the corresponding word "dharma" in Sanskrit, is perhaps the most distinctive and indispensable word in the entire history of Indian thought. Indeed, it may be the best established word in the Indian religious vocabulary. It has several meanings or shades of meaning which have to be understood according to their context, since variations in the interpretation of dhamma are many. Therefore it has been noted that dhamma is a most difficult word to define and is untranstable into any other language. Rhys Davids, for example, writes: "The word 'dhamma' has given, and will always give, great trouble to the trans- 7l lators. It connotes, or involves, so much" 1 . 3.2.2. The word ''dhamma" or "dharma" is derived from the root dhr, which means "to support", "to sustain", "to --. hold together"; thus, according to its derivation, it could mean "that which supports", "that which sustains", "that which holds together". 2 In the Rg-Veda, there is a conception of rta , 3.2.3. -.- which can safely be translated as the regular course of things. Explanations of this concept are given by assuming the existence of wills behind natural phenomena. rta -.- The term comes closest to the idea of a natural physical order, that is, the cosmic order by which the universe, the gods 3 and men are governed , and it was considered to be the law of Varuna, who is the administrator of the cosmic order or 4 law . 3.2.4. At a later stage of the Rg-Vedic period, rta ~ acquired a moral and religious connotation, and was identified with truth (~atya). .- which is essentially a lack of harmony with natural and moral 5 law . Rta was also associated with sacrifice or rite (yajna) --- ~- The chief duty of man is to engage in yajna because the very manifestation of the world as well as its maintenance is the effect of yajna. As Macdonell points out, rta is ~ "order in the moral world as truth and right, and in the 6 religious world as sacrifice or rite" . 72 3.2.5. However, during the Brahmanic and Upanisadic period, :ta gradually became less important, and subsequently the cosmic and moral law was denoted by dharman 7 (an early form of dharma declined as a consonantal noun) , which has connotations similar to rta. -.-- the word It occurs in conjunction with ~rata 8 , which denotes in this context the command 9 or law of a deity . Later the word dharma was developed in its masculine form, and became a key word in the Indian religious vocabulary. 3.3.1. The word "dhamma" is used in early Buddhism with an emphasis rather different from its uses in other Indian religious traditions. But it has been frequently assumed that the two conceptions, early Buddhist dhamma and Vedic dharma, are of the same nature, or that early Buddhism as a protestant movement merely cleared up certain confusions and corruptions that had crept into the Vedicc notion of . 10 d harma at t h e t1me . For example, B.G. Gokhale, in an examination of dhamma as a political concept, writes that the early Buddhist concept of dhamma is related to the Vedic concept of rta {v.supra. 3.2.3 - 3.2.4). -.-- - He defines rta as -.-- "the regular order", and in other terms he thinks ;ta is "the physical order of the universe, the due order of the sacrifice, and the moral law in the world", which appears in the Vedas as an independent authority as well as the possession of some gods, especially Varuna. Gokhale further points out that the early Buddhists were doubtless acquainted with these notions and borrowed parts of the Vedic concept of rta which they interpreted in their own way; -.-- and more 73 especially they applied it to their own political ideas 3.3.2. ations. 11 . We entirely disagree with Gokhale's observFor one thing, we never meet in Buddhist literature the Pali word corresponding to :ta. The word rta must have lost much of its currency in India before the time of the rise of early Buddhism, and it has never been traced in either early Buddhist or Jaina literature. Moreover, dhamma is never associated with sacrifice or rite, or linked with divine prototypes. In many cases, the early Buddhist dhamma has different connotations, or altogether different meanings in different contexts from the Vedic and Hindu conception of dharma. However, this does not mean, as Jayatilleke points out, that early Buddhism did not accept any notions at all from the Vedic system. Early Buddhism appears to have followed the general principles of the moral tradition of the past by taking what was considered to be sound and good and developing it, while leaving out what seemed unsound or evJ.'112 . 3.3.3. Let us examine some of these contexts. The Brahmanic and Upanisadic conception of dharma is closely associated with the omnipotent cosmic or divine will of the cosmic person (purusa) . ---.- This interpretation of dharma is dealt with in the account of the divine creation of social order in four varnas (v.supra. 2.3.3). . - After the creation of: the four varnas, the Highest God created dharma in order to preserve his entire creation and give it stability. said: It is 74 "He was not strong enough. He created still further the most excellent dharma. This is the power (ksatra) of the ruling class (ksatra), viz., dharma. ------ . Therefore, there is nothing higher than dharma. So a weak man controls a strong man by dharma, just as if by a king. Verily that which is dharma is truth. Therefore, they say of a man who is speaking the truth 'He speaks the dharma', or of a man who is speaking dharma, 'He speaks the truth'. both these are the same" 13 Verily . From the above it is evident that the law (dharma) is a divine law, because it is ascribed to the will of God. God alone has the power of creating it for the sa.ke of individual and collective security; and it is binding upon the members of society by virtue of its divine origin. 3.3.4. ' The eternal Vedas (Sruti) are said to be the primary source of dharma, Sacred tradition (Smriti) and good custom or usage or convention (sadacara, sistacara, - -acara, sila, samaya) 14 . thus secondary. They are all divinely created, and They consist of a body of rules and regulations for each member of society. 3.3.5. Let us consider briefly the significance of dharma in a socio-political context. Together with the idea of the divine creation of the four varnas and dharma, the Brahmanical law-books stressed inequalities, laying heavier 75 burdens on Sudras and granting special privileges to the Brahmanas (see Ch.4). For the Sudras there was a divine barrier to social relationships with the higher orders. This was considered final, permanent and pre-ordained. Dharma was believed by the Brahmanas to be a creation of God; but from t.he early Buddhist point of view the Brahmanical class system did not serve the best interests of society as a whole, because it did not prescribe that all human beings should be treated alike (see Ch.4). 3.3.6. Along with the above ideas, dharma, the supreme law of the social order, sets forth concretely the distinctive status and functions of the four varnas in accordance with the divine will. Accordingly, there are various types of dharma, both general and special. Among them, there is a special dharma of varna duties and ----.- positions in an unalterable religious and social scheme (varna-dharma) • There is a dharma for the rules of life for a particular period in one's life (asrama-dharma). At the same time, each individual member of society had his own set of duties and obligations exactly prescribed by the divine will (sva-dharma). Moreover, there is a general dharma applicable to all men and women, despite differences in age or social status (sadharana-dharma or samanya-dharma)' and there is a dharma for the regulation of communities (samaja-dharma). 3.3.7. In a political sense, there is a particular dharma for the king (raja-dharma) , which applies to the 76 regulation of his kingdom. The ruler was conceived to be powerful only so far as he wielded dharma. He should protect dharma, both general and special and its protection is the divine purpose of the Ksatriya varna. ----.- The king's ruling power (ksatra) was believed to be derived from the Most High , but the brahman priesthood claimed to represent the divine authority, and to exert a dominating influence upon the king in all his actions. The Purohita instructs the king on dharma and guides him in the protection of dharma, since he is the custodian of dharma (~.supra. 2.5.6). On such instruction and guidance, the king's duty, among many other things, is to preserve and promote dharma in all its aspects, while punishing those who reject their dharma, thus fulfilling his own. 3.3.8. we do not propose to scrutinize the various types of dharma, as i t would divert us from our present discussion. But, on the whole, it is clear from an exam- ination of Vedic and Hindu dharma, in all its aspects, both general and special, that it is generally believed to be based on divine will. Dharma is used both in Brahmanism and Hinduism to denote sacred law and duty, justice and religious merit, based upon the sacred canon, the eternal Vedas, and usage,. custom or convention. They were all considered to be divine in character because they were derived from God himself, according to the Vedic and Hindu literature. Moreover, dharma refers to the rules of conduct of the divinely ordained social order, and is often designated as the eternal dharma (sanatana-dharma). 77 3.4.1. In many aspects the early Buddhist dhamma differed completely from the Vedic conception of dharma. By refuting and criticizing several uses of the term dharma, early Buddhism enunciated a new philosophy of dhamma. differences between the early Buddhist The dhamma and that of Vedic and Hindu dharma, mainly in a socio-political context, will be explained in this study. 3.4.2. Here we may briefly indicate some of the ' differences between these two concepts. The first and obvious observation is that early Buddhism does not subscribe to a theistic origin of dhamma. (~.supra. As we have seen above 2.10.1 - 2.10.18), the notion of a personal creator God had no place in early Buddhism. According to early Buddhism, dhamma is not God-given as was earlier believed. Since there is no act of creation, dhamma cannot be ascribed to the will of God. always existed. It is supposed to have It is timeless and universal, hence it is the law of nature. Even Brahma, who was considered to be an almighty creator God by the Brahmanas, is subject not only to the judgement of dhamma, but also to the universal laws of impermanence, suffering and absence of any permanent entity, according to early Buddhism. Therefore a personal God cannot have created dhamma, since it is superior and anterior to any God. 3.4.3. Moreover, early Buddhism paid no special allegiance to the Vedas. In fact, early Buddhism criticized, both directly and indirectly, the Brahmanas' claim that the 78 eternal Vedas, which were considered to be the highest source of dharma, were divine revelation and the final authority. In addition to the Vedas, there were a number of other sources of dharma (~.supra. 3.3.4). On the whole, early Buddhism rejected and criticized all doctrines that dharma has any particular source not only as worthless, but even as wholly irrelevant 15 . The early Buddhist dhanuna, therefore, is not based on any theistic assumptions. ' 3.4.4. There is, however, a further point, which is very important. For the early Buddhists dhamma is the law of nature, which regulates and governs the totality of existence. It is also the law of nature of man's inward being or, in other words, it is a governing principle of human activity. The Buddha is represented as a discoverer of dhamma in both these aspects. It was his realization and proclamation of dhanuna which enabled him to attract and maintain the loyality of a large number of very influential members of the mercantile class. Buddhist dh~ Therefore the early to a great extent determined by the Buddha's discovery at the point of his enlightenment - the discovery which became for him a unique feature of his teaching. 3.4.5. According to the tradition, when the Buddha gained enlightenment after six years of experimentation, he was reluctant to teach to the world the dhamma, which he had found with such difficulty. He thought to himself: "This dhamma is not readily comprehensible to those who are given to craving and hate. 79 It goes against the current. It is subtle, profound and difficult to comprehend for those who are enveloped in darkness would not find it easy to see its truth" 16 . Brahma then descended from his heaven and invited the Buddha to teach dhamma to the world, which would otherwise be destroyed saying: "There was a dhamma in the past among the Magadhan peoples, which was not perfect and which was conceived by imperfect seers. Open now the doors to immortality. So that people may listen to dhamma, which has been fully comprehended by the Buddha Teach dhamma. Those who learn your dhamma will become perfect" 17 This statement of Brahma recognizes the fact that the Vedic teaching of dharma was not worthwhile, as it was not conducive to the happiness of mankind as a whole (~.supra. 3.3.5). 3.4.6. The Buddha's teaching of dharma, as he found it, is usually described as "the setting in motion of the supreme wheel of the law" (dhamma-cakka) 18 . The term dhamma-cakka, here translated as "the Wheel of the Law" can be more accurately rendered as "the law of righteousness" since the cakka or the "wheel" is the emblem of authority of the sovereign. It also has the connotation of the kingdom of righteousness since the term Brahma-cakka has been used synonymously with it 19 . But the term Brahma here 80 means the "highest" or "most sublime", and has no theistic connotations. 3.4.7. The Buddha gave his teaching to the world as a way of life, telling men and women how they should employ this existence in order to achieve supreme happiness. The Buddha's dhamma, therefore, appears as a message proclaimed "for the welfare and happiness of the many" 20 , since he himself is said to have been "born in the world of men for welfare and happiness" (manussa-loke hita sukhataya jatol 21 , where the "welfare" is primarily the spiritual and secondarily the material welfare of humanity. 3.4.8. There is in early Buddhism a concept of a world- ruler or world-state,sman(cakkavattiraja), who is likewise said to "be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind" 22 . It is said: "There are those two persons, who in being born in the world are so born for the good and happiness of mankind, for the wealth, good and happiness of gods and men. two? Which The worthy and perfect Enlightened One and the World-ruler" 23 . It is stated that the world-ruler sets up a just social order embracing the whole earth, working primarily for the material and secondarily for the spiritual welfare of humanity on the basis of righteousness (dhamma). We.shall examine the concept of the cakkavattiraja in a later part of this chapter. Bl 3.4.9. We have so far seen a few fundamental differ- ences between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist dhamma. It is clear that early Buddhist dhamma is based partly on the notion of the perfectibility of the individual and partly on that of social consciousness. As well as this, there are many other differences between these two concepts, as is apparent in the early Buddhist attitudes towards social ethics, politics and law. We shall consider them, while discussing,the es.sential features of dhamma as a political concept. 3.5.1. we have now reached a point where we can discuss in detail the nature of dhamma as a socio-political concept. The word dhamma has varied connotations, most of them are of an ethical nature. Several efforts have been made to find suitable English translations of it, for instance, "Normn, "Lawn, "Virtue", 11 Piety", 11 Justice", "The Doctrine", and "Righteousness"; in our discussion it is translated "the law of righteousness" in most 3.5.2. cm;~texts. Let us first consider the importance of dhamma in relation to the social contract theory of early Buddhism, to which reference has been made in chapter two. According to this, it was necessary to appoint a person from among the people to preserve the social order; he was called Mahasammata, and was put under an obligation to do so. the end of chapter two (~.supra. At 2.16.1), the principal questions that we have posed in relation to the obligatory 82 force of the general consent are the following. Is there a law that regulates the relationships between the ruler and his subjects? What is the rule making the agreement binding on the two parties? grounded? On what is the authority of the ruler The answer to all these questions, according to the early Buddhist point of view, is dhamma or the law of righteousness~ ~rhis 3.5.3. conception of "law of righteousness" has a number of implications for the early Buddhist conception of law. It means that the ultimate source of law in the state should reside not in any ruler, human or divine, nor in any body governing the state, nor in the state itself, but in dhanuna or the law of righteousness. This is not to be inter- preted to mean that ;:Ihamma is some sort of mysterious entity, but that it is only to the extent to which the state conforms with dharruna - - - in its .internal and foreign policy that man can achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and happiness. Since man is free to choose and the right to govern is vested in the people, according to the early Buddhist social contract theory, it would be the responsibility of man to set up such a state. 3.5.4 According to early Buddhism, the state of nature in the blissful golden age was governed by dhamma. When the gradual decline of humanity occurred, on account of its own greed and passion, some men infringed dhamma --with unhappy results. Finally, when there ;vas strife and injustice in society, the people needed an impartial 83 authority to lay down and enforce minimum good standards, and bind them to dhamma. This is well-illustrated in the Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the Tibetan canon which states that, before the first appointment of Mahasammata, a person who stole another's rice was arrested and charged with theft. But the thief made a counter-charge, saying: "I have been badly treated in that I have been laid hold of by these people on account of some rice and brought into this assembly".• Then the people in turn warned those who had arrested him, saying: "In bringing him here into our midst you people have done him wrong", since they had no authority to do so. 24 again" . The people let him off, warning him "do not it It was then that, in the interests of fairer and more efficient justice, among other reasons, the people selected a king and delegated their functions to him. 3 •5 •5 • The appointed person or individual is said to have been under an obligation because he had consented to be the authority and to guide the people in accordance with dhamma. It is said: he pleases others by dhamma, hence he " is the king ... (dhammena pare ranjeti kho -.- . . • )"25 . raJa ' The force of dhammena is augmented and emphasized by the explanatory clause "righteously indeed, not unrighteously" (dhammen'eva no adhammena) 26 . The Sanskrit version found in the Mahavastu says: "So originated the idea of Mahasammata He is the king, which means one who is 84 a perfect guardian and protector ... he who achieves security for his people by means of dharma" The Vinaya section (the ~ulva) 27 . of the Tibetan canon says: "Mahasammata ... was a righteous man and wise, and one who brought happiness to mankind with the law (dhamma), he was . - 28 called 'k1ng' or 'raja''' • 3.5.6. The above extracts indicate in the first place the relationship of dhamma to kingship. It is also said that dhamma is the essence of kingship as well as the king's best policy, since power is vested in him by virtue of his being the protector of dhamma 29 . The duty of the king is to maintain law and order for the welfare and happiness of the people as a whole, and this should be in harmony with dhamma 30 The king obtained the right from the people to interpret dhamma in many ways, according to their needs. The ideal king of earlier times was said to obtain the consent of all sections of people in carrying out the affairs of state 3.5.7. 31 . The right of owning property justly acquired, for example, is in accordance with dhamma. case with just punishment. This is also the Part of what is meant here by dhamma is the administration of justice, which involved the punishment of those deserving punishment and the compensation of those deserving compensation. Dhamma, therefore, gives wide scope to the duty of the king. In the first place, it gives the king the authority to rule and calls upon the 85 subjects to obey him so long as he rules in accordance with dhamma. The king should positively encourage and contribute to the economic and spiritual welfare of his subjects. When he ceases to do so, the basis of allegiance is destroyed and . anarc h y Wl"11 relgn supreme 32 Therefore, it may appear, according to early Buddhism, that obedience is a moral principle assumed through a promise, and the authority of the ruler is derived from the will and consent of the people in whose interests he should govern, but his power is subject to the law of righteousness (dhamma) since the "wheel of power turns in dependence on the wheel of righteousness" ' (bala-cakram hi nisraya dharma-cakram pravartate) 33 . 3.6.1. Thus early Buddhism recognises the authority of dhamma in the sphere of social and political life. The social and political dhamma, therefore, needs to be explained here. In the Anguttara Nikaya, the question is asked as to who is the king of a righteous king (dhammikassa dhammaranno raja), the Buddha's reply is that it is dhamma. "It is dhamma, monk. Herein, monk, the king, the wheel roller, a dhamma man, a dhamma raja, relies just on dhamma, honours dhamma, reveres dhamma esteems dhamma; with dhamma as his mandate, he sets a dhamma watch and bar and ward for folk within his realm ... He set a dhamma watch ... for warrior and camp follower, for brahmans and for householder, for town and country folk, for recluse and 86 godly man, for beast and bird alike. Thus indeed, monk, that raja ... setting a dhamma watch ... within his realm, rolls on the wheel by dhamma; and that wheel may not be rolled back by the hands of any h ostJ.'1 e creature" 34 . 3.6.2. This passage, which can be paralleled with many other passages in the early Buddhist texts, especially in the Jataka stories, indicates in the first place that dhamma is the "ruler of rulers" or the "highest in the world". In the second place it recognises that the ultimate criterion of the rightness, justice, legality, propriety etc. of any government policy is dhamma. It should be emphasized, however, that this dhamma differs from the pre-Buddhistic conception of dh~. righteousness, Although the latter emphasized it was placed within an explicitly religious context and expressed in characteristically theological terms (~.supra. 3.3.3 - 3.3.8). Therefore, there is a great different between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist dhamma. 3.6.3. According to early Buddhism, it is dhamma in conformity with which a reigning king should shape his conduct and guide the course of administration in internal and foreign policy. This is explained in many discourses, especially in the Jataka stories. with an example. We may illustrate this In one of the Jataka stories, a king was advised to practise dhamma towards friends and courtiers, 87 brahmans and ascetics, beast and birds, and in war and travel, in town and village, in every land and realm 35 . On this basis, Ghoshal writes: "The most important contribution of the early Buddhist canonists to the store of our ancient political thought consists of their 'total' application of the principle of righteousness to the branches of the king's internal and foreign administration" It was indeed this principle of dhamma, as we shall see, that Asoka sought to embody in so many of his policies. Moreover, the ancient history of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) recorded in the Mahavamsa and Culavamsa shows how this dhamma affected the king's policies. 3.6.4. Therefore, it appears that dhamma is not a mysterious entity, as is often stated 37 , but something comparable to Western natural law doctrine. It is only to the extent to which the king conforms with dhamma in his policies that he can achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and happiness. If the king does not fulfil his primary task of maintaining law and order in society by means of dhamma, and is given to vice (adhamma), the people have a moral right to depose the king 3.7.1. (~.supra. 2.15.2). Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that the king, as the acknowledged head and leader, the refuge and security of the people 38 , should rule in accordance with dhamma in order to gain their goodwi11 39 The actions of 36 • 88 the king should be conducive to the happiness and welfare of the people as well as his own 40 . The king, therefore, should avoid the four wrong courses of life (agatigamana), namely, desire (chanda), malice (dosa), delusion (moha) and fear (bhaya) 41 . Moreover, he should refrain· from all evil and cultivate good behaviour, observing the early Buddhist ethical principles of the ten virtues (dasa-kusala-kammapathadhamma)42. These ten virtues are applicable, not only to the king but to all humanity. 3.7.2. In the Majjhima Nikaya, we find these ten virtues classified according to their expression through the body, through speech and in the mind. They are: "1. He refrains from killing (panatipata) and abides full mercy to all beings. 2. He refrains from stealing (adinnadana) and is honest and pure of heart. 3. He refrains from sexual misconduct (kamesu-micchacara) and does not transgress the social mores (caritta) with regard to sex. 4. He refrains from lying (musavada) and is devoted to truth. On being summoned as a witness before an assembly or a court of law, he claims to know what he knows, he does not claim to know what he does not know, he claims to have seen what he saw and does not claim to have seen what he did not 89 see; he does not utter a conscious lie for the sake of himself or for the sake of others for some trifling gain. 5. He refrains from slander (pisuna-vacaya) and holds himself aloof from calumny. What he hears here, he repeats not there in order to cause factions among people. He is a peace maker, who brings together those who are divided, delights in social harmony and makes statements which promotes harmony. 6. He refrains from harsh speech (pharusavacaya) and uses language that is civil and pleasant to hear. 7. He refrains from idle gossip (samphappalapa) and speaks at the right time in accordance with facts, what is meaningful, righteous and in accordance with law (vinaya-vadi) 8. He refrains from covetousness (abhij jhaya) , does not covet another's property, and is generous in heart. 9. He refrains from ill-will (byapada) and is benovelent. 10. He refrains from holding false view (micchaditthiya) and holds the right philosophy of life, believing in the 90 reality of this world and the next, in moral recompense, moral obligations and values and in religious teachers who have led good lives and have proclaimed by their superior insight, the nature of this world and the next•• 41 . 3.7.3. These ten virtues formed the basis of legislation in some Buddhist countries. For example, the first great king of Tibet, Sron-b-tsan'-sgam-po is said to have "promulgated laws to harmonize with the ten virtues prescribed by early Buddhism" 44 in the seventh Century A.D. It should be emphasized, however, that these ten virtues, unlike the commands of the Decalogue, are not to be interpreted as commandments or laws. They are recommended on the grounds of higher self-interest and expediency. A person can voluntarily decide whether he should take upon himself these ten virtues. If he sincerely and consistently does so, he can root out greed, hatred and ignorance and act out of selfless service, love and understanding towards his fellow beings, according to early Buddhism. 3.7.4. From the standpoint of politics, the pursuit of ten virtues is considered a necessary prerequisite of social stability, international understanding and peace. In addition to the above ten virtues, early Buddhism recommends that the king and his officials should act out of selflessness, rectitude, mercy and the power of wisdom. These characterist- ics are mentioned in the list of ten qualities of the king 91 (dasa-raja-dhamma). l. They are~ Liberality, generosity and charity (dana) . 2. High moral character (sila). 3. Selflessness (Eariccaga). 4. Honesty and integrity (ajjava) 5. Kindness and gentleness (maddava) 6. Austerity in habits (tapa). 7. Freedom from hatred, ill-will and enmity (akkodha). 8. Non-violence (avihimsa). 9. Forbearance and tolerance (khanti). 10. Non-opposition and non-obstruction (avirodha) 45 . Another list of the same name <:::.supra. 3.6.3) mentions the several duti.es of kings towards different classes of persons and beings, including citizens in the town and country, religious teachers and even birds and beasts 3.7.5. 46 . The king with such virtues and qualities will ward off pain and suffering from other beings, whether human or non-human and promote their well-being and happiness. Moreover, when the king follows righteous ways his people will be righteous and peace will reign in his realm 47 . In the Anguttara Nikaya, we find the Buddha explains thus: "Monks, when rajas are righteous, their ministers are aJso righteous. When they are righteous, brahmins and householders, the town folk and villagers are righteous. 92 This being so, moon and sun go right in their courses ... constellations and stars do likewise; days and nights, months and fortnights, seasons and years go on their courses regularly; winds blow regularly and in due seasons. Thus the devas are not annoyed and the sky-deva bestows sufficient rain. Rains falling seasonably, the crops ripen in due season, men who live on those crops are long-lived, wellfavoured, strong and free from sickness" 48 Further the Buddha explains that if the king, who is reckoned best among men, lives righteously, the whole realm dwells in happiness and the people follow him as a herd of cattle follow the. bull 49 3.7.6. . Early Buddhism openly condemns the king who selfishly sits on the throne, indulges in the pleasures of the sense, and is drunk with the intoxication of authority 50 Such a king brings about his own woe as well as that of his subjects. When the king is unrighteous evil consequences, the reverse of those mentioned above follow 51 . (~.supra. 3.7.5.) will One of the Jataka stories explain thus: "At the time of unjust kings, oil, honey, molasses and the like, as well as wild roots and fruits, lose their sweetness and strength, and not only these but the whole realm loses its vigour" 52 93 3.7.7. Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that the king should refrain from evil and cultivate good towards his subjects with loving kindness as a father loves his children 53 . The Buddhist virtue of metta is also said t.o be analogous to a mother's love for her only child: "Just as a mother, as long as she lives, cares for her only child, so should a man feel all-embracing love to all living beings (mata yatha niyam puttam ayusa ekaputtam anurakkhe, evam pi - sabbabhute~u - - - manasam bhavaye aparimanam) 54 . In early Buddhism, the importance of love (metta) is greatly stressed. This may be gathered from the following remark of the Buddha: "None of the good works employed to acquire religious merit is worth a fraction of the value of loving-kindness" 55 The Pali word metta is an abstract noun meaning "love, amity, sympathy, friendliness, active interest in others" derived from the Sanskrit word "mitra" meaning "friend" 56 . The practice of the "highest life" or the "divine life" in this very world is said to consist in the cultivation of the four cardinal virtues, love (metta), sympathy (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita) and impartiality (upekka), towards all beings 57 The person who has successfully developed these qualities· is said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing" after bathing "in the waters of love and compassion for one's fellow beings" 58 Inspired by the Buddhist ideals, Asoka frequently stressed the importance of love in the form of father-child relationship. "All men are my children, and just as I 94 desire for my children that they should obtain welfare and happiness in this world and the next, so do I desire (the same) 3.7.8. for all men" 59 . The nature of a kingdom is said to founded on the "strength of friendliness" (maitri-bala) 60 . Therefore, the king and his officials should perform their duties on the four bases of kindliness (sangahavatthuni) in order to win the hearts of the people. mindness (dana), They are: (i) charitable- (ii) affability (priyavacana), (iii) work for the welfare of society (atthacariya)and (iv) sense of - 61 . equal respect for all (samanattha) One of the Jataka stories states that the king should distribute every morning and evening by public proclamation food and drink, garlands and ointments 1 clothes, umbrellas and shoes to the needy. Moreover, he should not make aged men and outworn domestic animals labour. He should pay due honour to them, because they gave him service when they were strong 3.7.9. 62 Such a king is said to be a successful one, in keeping his people positively happy through his encouragement of and his contribution to their welfare. In the Dlgha Nikaya, Seniya Bimbisara, king of Magadha, is referred as "righteous and ruling righteously, benign to priest and laymen, to town and country folk (dhammiko dhammaraja hito brahamana~ 63 and likewise gahapatikanam negamanan c'eva janapadananca) the text gives a list of eight characteristics of a good king, among which we find the following: 95 "He is a believer (in dhamma), generous benefactor (dayako danapati), keeps open house to all, a welling spring (opana) for the satisfaction of all religious people, the poor and wayfarers, beggars and petitioners. He is a doer of good deeds (pu~~ani) , is intelligent, learned, wise and capable of thinking out matters relating to the past, present and future" 3.7.10. 64 In addition to the above matters·, the king should also base his daily life upon the principle of vigilance (appamada) . The essence of this principle is summed up in the Dhammapada: "Vigilance is the source of immortality and negligence is that of death" (appamado 65 amatapadam, pamado maccuno padam) . It has been suggested • that this principle of vigilance had much effect on Asoka 66 . The Buddha said by way of admonition to the king of Kosala: "If you lead a vigilant life, your court ladies will say: vigilance. 'the king lives in Let us live likewise'. And your court nobles, and your subjects in town and country will say the same. And you living thus in vigilance, yourself will be guarded and preserved, the house of your women, your treasury and storehouses will be guarded and preserved too" 3.7.11. The Jataka stories frequently refer to this 67 . 96 principle of vigilance. The most important statement on not being negligent, but being earnest and ruling in righteousness . occurs in the Tesakuna Jataka. In this story, three wise birds give instructions to a king, who adopts them as his children, in ruling his kingdom in righteousness. The king, in the midst of the crowd of people, questioned the first bird on the duty of a king. Without answering the question directly, the bird reproved the king for his negligence, and then sa.id: "To rule a kingdom righteously, the king should avoid falsehood, anger and levity; he should learn not to do again whatever he has done in the past under the influence of passion and sin; a king who become negligent in his rule loses all his wealth; good luck and fortune delight in a man who is energetic and free from jealousy; ill-luck delights in men of ill-deeds who are afflicted with jealousy and hard-hearted; the king should be a friend and protector to all: he should perform his duties without making mistakes and without coming under the influence of self-will and other passions; he should be earnest in efforts for good; sluggard can attain happiness" no 68 The second bird, replying to the same question, first declares that the duty of a king consists of the acquisition of wealth not acquired and the conservation of what is acquired, and adds: 97 "The king should select ministers who are wise and learned, and free from vices such as gambling and drinking; he should select other officials who would guard him and his treasure; he should steer the kingdom's common weal as a charioteer guides his chariot; he should keep his subjects well in hand; he should himself examine the income and expenditure and should not trust another for a loan or deposit; he should punish those deserving punishment and favour those deserving favour; he should see that nothing is done by himself or by others with overmuch speed; he should never mislead his subjects and he himself should decide his subjects' affairs; way to wrath; he should never give he should not allow unrighteous officials to ruin his substance and his kingdom; he should practise virtuous conduct, for vices lead to a state full of suffering and 69 woe" . The third bird in reply to the king's specific question of "What is the highest of all powers?" said that there are five powers which are in ascending order of importance. (i) the power of limbs, power of officials, (ii) the power of wealth, They are: (iii) the (iv) the power of high birth and (v) the 98 . d om 70 power o f w1s Illustrating the power of wisdom in two examples, he says that if a fool attain a rich and prosperous kingdom, another will by violence seize it in his despite. Even so, if a high born but unwise prince were to attain a kingdom, he would not be able to rule with his whole resources 3.7.12. 71 The Mahayana texts also repeat and develop the same ideas of dhamma as the basic source of kingship. For example, in the Mahavastu, we find the parallel version of the story of the three wise birds and their instructions on the duties of king 72 . Moreover, in the works of Asvaghosa • and Aryasura, we find the same ideas repeated and developed, . . . 73 somet1mes Wlth sl1ght changes . -. . - Aryasura, 1n hls Jatakamala, enumerates the good characteristics of a king: "He was behaving like the embodied righteousness and discipline, and was intent on promoting the welfare of his subjects like a father ... For his administration of justice followed the path of righteousness, and made no difference between kinsmen and the rest of his subjects. It obstructed for his people the road of wickedness Perceiving the welfare of the creatures to be the effect of righteousness, he knew no other purpose than this" 3.7.13. Mahayana 74 . It should be emphasized, however, that in Buddhism ideas of a different kind developed, more 99 especially the mythical attitude towards dhamma 75 . Accord- ingly, there is an interpretation of dhamma in terms of the Vedic ideas of the divine right (and duty) of the king (~.supra. 2.13.5), which lays down the principle that the king is the divinely ordained instrument for the fulfilment of dhamma 3.8.1. 76 . One of the most important contributions of early Buddhism to the history of Indian political thought, if not to the political thought of the whole world, is that of the concept of the world-ruler or world-statesman (cakkavattiraja). He is depicted as a person like the Buddha, who comes at a time when conditions are ripe, and, just as the Buddha works primarily for the spiritual welfare of mankind, the world-ruler works primarily for their material welfare (~.supra. 3.8.2. 3.4.8). The spiritual and material welfare of mankind is conceived symbolically as the rolling onwards of a wheel (cakka) • The world-ruler sets rolling this wheel of material welfare of mankind, under the superior power of dhamma, just as the Buddha sets rolling the supreme wheel of "the law of righteousness" (dhamma-cakka) for spiritual endeavour. In this sense, the "wheel" appears in two forms, one of which belonged to the Buddha (dhamma-cakka), and the other to the 77 . world-ruler (ana-cakka) 3.8.3. The world-ruler, according to early Buddhism, sets up an international social and political order on the basis of dhamma, with a "political philosophy and constitution 100 based on the law of righteousness" 78 , just as the Buddha sets up an international order (sangha) based on dhamma and the constitution and codes of law (vinaya) . Therefore the most important force for the material and spiritual welfare of mankind is that of dhamma, or in other words dhamma is the common and ultimate basis of all social relationships presided over by the Buddha and the world-ruler. 3.8.4. The world-ruler, who works according to the "law of righteousness", is able to extend his authority "over the whole earth girded by the oceans, not by the rod or sword but by the victory of dhamma" (imam pathavim sagarapariyantam adandena asatthena dhammena abhivijjiya) . . 79 . And again, as the Buddha says, the world-ruler sets up "a kingless authority" (so pi nama arajakan cakkan vatteti) 80 . To the question as to who is the world-ruler above the king (ko pana ... ranno cakkavattissa raja), the Buddha replied that it is dhamma: "'Monks, a king who is a world-ruler, a just and righteous ruler, even he is not without a king' . 'At these words a certain monk said to the Buddha: who then is the ruler over a world-ruler?'. 'Dhamma, monk', replied the Buddha" 81 "Monk, a king who is a world-ruler, a just and righteous ruler, in dependence on dhamma, honouring dhamma, respectful and deferential to dhamma, with dhamma as his banner ... as his standard ... as 101 his overlord, keeps constant watch and ward for the folk. Then again, a world- ruler ... keeps constant watch. and ward for the warriors, for brahmins, for town and country folk, for beasts and birds alike. He ... who keeps constant watch .•. rolls the wheel of sovereignty according to dhamma. That wheel of sovereignty is not to be upset by any human being whatsoever, or by any foe that lives. Just so, the Buddha is dependent on dhamma, honouring dhamma, respectful and deferential to dhamma, with dhamma as his banner ... standard as his overlord, keeps constant watch and ward over actions of his body actions of speech and thought ... and keeps rolling the supreme wheel of dhamma ·and that supreme wheel of dhamma is not to be turned back by any recluses or brahmins, - 82 by any god or Mara or Brahma" . 3.8.5. Like Mahasammata, the world-ruler's function is to maintain law and order in accordance with dhamma. The -Cakkavatt:is:ihanada Sutta 83 , which complements the Agganna Sutta, sets out in detail the origin of crime on account of poverty and other economic factors. According to the Aggan;:;a Sutta, it was economic factors such as growing demand, which made it necessary to institute private property; 102 and eventually, in order to safeguard the rights to such property, the people select a king from among themselves. We must assume that the kings who followed Mahasarnrnata were believed to be so efficient and righteous that they kept crime at a minimum. It only reappeared after the ancient principles of government were forgotten. The Cakkavattislhanada Sutta claims to give 3.8.6. the ancient principles of government and to foretell the ' future of society. It tells, in the form of a myth, how a world-ruler of the past provided protection to his subjects but later failed to provide economic security to the needy for their subsistence and maintenance. Hence crime appeared, morality declined, and in consequence the standard of life weakened, owing to the short-comings of a king in his administration of the law by means of dharnrna and his failure to give righteous instructions to the people. The story further tells that this decline will reach its nadir in a catastrophic war in which the greater part of humanity will be destroyed. The remnant who manage to survive, learn the ancient principles of government and proceed to rebuild the just society on firm moral and economic foundations. " ... Thus from goods not accruing to those devoid of goods, poverty becomes rampant. From poverty being rampant, stealing becomes rampant ... the violence ... killing ... lying ... slander ... sexual midconduct ... abusive and idle talk ... covetousness and ill-will ... false views 103 of life ... wanton greed and perverted lust ... till finally filial and religious piety and lack of regard for authority ... Among such humans it is to them who lack filial and religious piety and show no respect for authority that homage and praise will be given. The world will fall into promiscuity ... keen enmity will become the rule, keen ill-will, keen animosity, passionate thoughts even of killing ..• in a father towards his child and a child towards his father Among such humans there will arise a war of seven days, during which they will look on each other as wild beasts. Dangerous weapons will come into their hands and they, regarding each other as beasts, will deprive each other of life ... But to those to whom it would have occured, 'let us not slay each other' - they would betake themselves to dens of grass of dens in the jungle, or holes in trees, or river fastnesses, or mountain clefts, and subsist on roots and fruits of the jungle. And they will do so for those seven days. And at the end of those seven days, coming forth from dens and fastness and mountain clefts, they will ]04 embrace each other, and be of one accord comforting one another and saying: How good it is, my friend, to see you still alive! Then it. will occur to these beings that it was only because they had gotten into evil ways that they had this heavy loss of kin. They will then decide, 'Let us, therefore, now do good' ... So they will practise virtues ... and they will increase in length of life, in comeliness and prosperity ... Among such humans, this India ~iz. the world) will be mighty and prosperous, populous and with plenty of food and having numerous villages, towns and cities ..... 3.8.7. 84 . The above passage clearly indicates the impact of man's economic environment on his life and on society. According to the above passage, economic insecurity was the immediate cause of tension and instability in human society and loss of values and beliefs. Man, whose inner nature is essentially good, eventually comes to regard his fellow 85 1"1t1es. . . . 1nequa . b e1ngs as b eas t s b ecause o f econom1c Therefore, the economic factor is considered as of primary importance for a just social order. ~utta, it is said: let wealth be given" "Whoever is poor in your kingdom, to them (ye ca tata vijite adhana assu tesanca dhanam anuppadajjeyyasi) social stability. In the Cakkavattisihanada 86 , for subsistence is essential for 10 5 3.8.8. The king's duty is, therefore, to maximize the national economy. This should be guided by righteousness a.nd imp<>.rtiality (samena) . In doing so, the king ensures a strong 2nd prosperous kingdom. Concerning economic welfare, for example, we find the following passage in one of the texts: "The world rests on two foundations - the acquisition of wealth not acquired and the conservation of what is acquired. Therefore Require wealth and conserve what you have gained, make firm efforts within the bounds of righteousness. The realm of that king who rules unrighteously becomes weakened and rent on all sides, but. the realm of the king who rules righteously is strong, prosperous, flourishing and populous" 3.8.9. 87 Moreover, according to early Buddhism, prosperity and the elimination of crime are possible only by ensuring full employment and thereby developing the economy. In contrast, the brahmins often advised the king to perform sacrifices to secure such welfare (~.supra. 2.5.5). The Buddha's advice was tt.at such measures were a waste of time and resources. This, for example, is the advice of the Buddha on such issues as levying taxes, assistance to business and agrict•lture and wages. "The king's country, Sirs, is harassed and harried. There are dacoits abroad 10 6 who pillage the villages and townships, and who make the roads unsafe. were the king, so long as that is so, to levy a fresh tax, verily his majesty will be acting wrongly. But, perchance, his majesty might think: 'I will soon put a stop to thE·se scoundrels' game by degradation and banishment, and fines and • bonds on death! ' But their license cannot be satisfactorily put a stop to so. The remnant left unpunished would still go on t.a:rassing the realm. Now there is one method to adopt to put a thorough end to this disorder. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to keeping cattle and the farm, to them let his majesty tte king give food and seed-corn. Whosoever there be ... who devote themselves to trade, to them ... give capital. Whosoever ... devote themselves to government service, to them ... give wages and food. Then those men, foJlowing each his own business, will no longer harass the realm; the country will be quiet and at peace; and the populace, pleased with one another and happy, dancing their children in t.heir arms, will dwell with open cloors" 88 107 The above passage clearly states that the 3.8.10. planning of economic we].fare is the most important function of the king. A~cording to the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, a king provided the care and protection of the land, but neglected the economy, that is to say, he did not provide wealth to those devoid of wealth (dhammikam rakkhavara naguttim samvidhahi, no ca kho ac1hananam dhanam anuppadasi) . . and so poverty became widespread. to his 89 ,. Then the king gave wealth indigent subjects without punishing thosE: who were guilty of theft. The result was that the people began more and mere to commit theft in order to gain wealth from the king. Finally, the king was forced to establish capital punishment for theft. The only result of punishment was the appe:arance of more serious crimes such as banditry and looting. The passage suggests that the suppression of crime through punishment is futile, but the planning of economic ~telfare leads to a happy and peaceful society. 3. 8 .11. Thus giving vrealth to the needy is considered <m important function of the righteous king 90 . ThereforE, the kinq sho«ld base hJ..s policy on the four bases of kindness (v.supra. 3.7.8), work for social utility, and help those in . t ress d 1R 91 . ' ' A k'1ng Ser17 1s d as ment1one . h teous B r1g who redressed the poverty of the poorest in his k'1ng, kin~dor.• and had fresh taxes levied and wealth distributed among the needy 3.8.12. While encouraginq material progress, earJy Buddhism always lays great etress on the development of the n:oral and spiritual welfare of the people. The Buddha, who 92 108 is the spiritual counterpart of the world-ruler, works primarily for moral and spiritual welfare, while his temporal counterpart works for material welfare. But at t:he same time the world-ruler should work for spiritual welfare, following the ethical principles such as the ten virtues and other qualities, which we mentioned earlier (~.supra. 3.7.1. - 3.7.12). The king with such virtues and qualities will provide righteous care and protection to all his subjeohs, inolu.ding birds and beasts, ensure that there is no crime and no unemployment or poverty among the citizens, and work for the good of the people with selflessness, love and understanding, dispensing impartial justice <md promoting both material and spiritt'al welfare on the principles of right.eousness and equality. 3.9.1. While the king has duties to his subjects, the duties of his subjects to each other are summed up in the Sigalovada sutta 9 3 This Sutta is chiefly concerned with the cultivation of virtue in the layman's life, his family and his social relationships. The reciprocal duties of parents cmd children, husbands and wives, teachers and pupils, employers and employees are enumerated. It is said that servants are to be assigned work according to their capacity and ability, supplying them with food <md wages, tending them in sickness, sharing with them unusual delicacies, and gr<mting regular leave. Employees, in their turn, should be diligent and not lazy, honest and obedient • . wor k 9 4 . an c1. earnest 1n t h e1r 109 3.9.2. Moreover, early Buddhism speaks of the happiness of the average man as depending en economic security or sufficient wealth acquired by just and righteous means (atthi-sukha), the enjoyment of one's wealth by himself, his family, his friends and relatives, while rerforming meritorious deeds (bhoga-sukha), freedom from debt (ananasukha), and blameless moral and spiritual life (anavajjasukha) 95 . It should be noted that three of these sources of happiness are economic. Therefore, welfare is conceived in terms both spiritual and material, which is an idea of importance in connection with dhamma. 3.9.3. Furthermore, a layman should be skilled, efficient, earnest and energetjc in whatever profession he is engaged. He should know :it well (utthana-sampada), and should protect his income, which vas earned by just means and by the sweat of his brow, (arakkha-sampada) and from which he derives feelings of economic security. He should have good friends (kalyana-mitta) who are faithfnl, learned, virtuous, liberal and intelligent, who will help him along t.he right: path away from evil. He should spend reasonably, in proportion to his income, neither too much nor too little, without hoarding "lo!ealth avariciously or being extravagant, and should live wj_thin his means (samajlvikata). At the same time, a layman should cultivate his spiritual welfare by faith and confidence in moral, intellectual and spiritual values (saddha), abstaining from destroying life, lying, stealing, sexual misconduct, falsehood and intoxicatinq drinks (panca-sila) , practising charity, generosity, withm:.t 110 attachment and craving for his wealth (caga), and developing wisdom which leads to the elimination of suffering, and to ~~ - the realization of ultimatE: happiness (panna-sampada) 96 . The eight-fold path to happiness and 3.9.4. realization requires that one adopts a "right mode of livelihood" (samma-ajiva) . The "wrong mode of livelihood" (miccha-ajiva) is described <ts that of acquiring wealth with the idea of adding gain to gain by resorting to trickery, ' fraud and hypocritical talk 97 • It is suggested that a good Buddhist should not undertake trade in armaments, slaves, . . . mea t , 1ntox1cants and po1sons 98 Therefore, earning righteously one should accumulate wealth and spend "one portion for enjoyment, two portions for business and the fourth portion should be deposited for the use in times of . need n 99 .. 3 .10. 1. Let us now consider some aspects of Asoka's policy of government. His importance for us lies in the fact that he popularized the idea of ruling by righteousness (dhamma). Therefore, his policy of government is frequently called a policy of dhamma. Asoka is described as a world-ruler, who was 3.10.2. a dhammika dhamma raja, a ruler who ruled in accordance with dhamma 100 • Therefore, it is with l:.im t-.hat v;·e find the special significance of the early B"ddhist account of the world-ruler (cakkavatti-raja) , to which reference has been made above.(v.supra.3.8.1-3.8.12) 111 3.10 3. There is, however, difference of opinion among 0 historians as to whether the cakkavatti idea] was adopted by Asoka from the early Buddhists or the early Buddhists who finally edited the Pali canon a few generations after Asoka adopted it from him. According to Buddhist sources, which give the main body of Asoka's legends, such as the Mahavamsa, Dipavamsa and Divyavadana, Asoka>as a pious Buddhist,ruled his empire in accordance with the Buddha's dhamma, and tried to strengthen and propagate Buddhism in and out of his empire. In the Dipavamsa, there is an attempt to connect the idea of cakkavatti with Asoka. It says" ... the wheel of his power rolled through the great empire of Jambudvipa "101 However, there are a number of discrepancies between the legends and the edicts of Asoka. The legends give a different picture of Asoka in contrast to his own . t s 102 e d 1c . .. 3.10.4. Since there are discrepancies in these two sources, historians have expressed doubts whether the idea of the cakkavatti in the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta (:::_.supra. 3.8.5) is in some way linked with Asoka. Basham, when speaking of this word, says that the interpretation of the data is open to question, but the oldest occurrence of this word appears in the Digha Nikaya. Asoka or was inspired by him. This text either inspired However, the very late character of the cakkavattisihanada sutta of the Digha Nikaya suggests th latterl03 His observation about the very late character of the above sutta is correct, because it records the prophecy of the future Buddha called Metteyya, 112 a late myth particularly popular in Mahayana Buddhism. 3.10.5. Romila Thapar is also of the opinion that it is unlikely that the cakravartin idea was a fully developed political concept in the pre-Mauryan period, or that most of Asoka's ideas were inspired by his ambition to be a cakravartin. Had this been the case he would surely have mentioned it somewhere in his edicts, particularly as he does give expression to many of his ambitions in these 104 • sources . 3.10.6. On the other hand, S. Dutt suggests that it was after his accession to the throne as a cakkavatti that Asoka became a convert to Buddhism, and, after his conversion, he aspired to fill the role of a dhamma-raja ·as described in the Anguttara Nikaya (~.supra. 3.8.4). He gives evidence, following Kosambi and Lanman, that the text named Aliya-vasani, recommended for the study to the monks in the Calcutta-Bairat Edict, corresponds to the fourth nipata of the Anguttara Nikaya and in the same Eoict occurs a phrase borrowed from the text. If Asoka was acquainted with this part of the texts, we may presume his knowledge of a sutta that occurs in it, describing the relationship of a cakkavatti dhammika dhamma raja to dhamma. Therefore Dutt is of the opinion that it was from the text that Asoka picked up the cue for the use of the term dhamma in this way, and its frequent use in various contexts in his edicts suggests that he meant it as a sort of emblem, to betoken the overall character of his rule, that is the rule of a 113 - -105 cakkavattin who was a dhamma raja 3.10.7. However, with all these differences of opinion, we submit that the question forms a historical problem, which is still open to debate. possible. No final answer is But there are two sides to every question, and some common features between the early Buddhist account of the idea of cakkavatti and the character of Asoka's rule, as Dutt suggests, are clear enough . • 3.11.1. What in fact is important for us is to examine Asoka's dhamma and its relationship with the dhamma of early Buddhism. Asoka, in his edicts, repeatedly emphasizes the importance of dhamma and makes use of it as a moral and social force upon society, since he himself professes to follow dhamma and wishes to employ it in all his actions and measures, and has the intention of promoting it. 3.11.2. There is a difference of opinion among scholars as to the exact nature of his policy of dhamma. Some are of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma conforms to the early Buddhist principles and policies of government and betokens the overall character of the rule of cakkavattin, who was a dhammika dhamma-raja others who take the opposite view. 106 There are Among them, Romila Thapar is of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma was . . . 107 h ~s own ~nvent~on . Therefore, it did not necessarily conform to any of the religions. 114 "Had the dharruna conformed to any of the religions, more particularly Buddhism, the institution of the dhamma-mahamattas would have been superfluous. Each religion had either its group of devoted believers or its order of monks who could have ben organized into active propagandists with greater efficiency as they would already have been ardent believers" 3 .11. 3. 10 8 . It is in fact true that Asoka himself introduced new ideas, and some of them were not distinctively Buddhist. But Asoka's inscriptions and edicts, taken collectively and broadly interpreted, show that there is much Buddhist influence in his policy of dhamma. We shall illustrate this with examples. 3 .11. 4. In the fourth Bhabru (or Bairat) rock inscription the following texts are recommended by Asoka. Scholars have identified these texts with parts of the Pali canon 109 . d'1.cate d b e 1 ow: , as 1.n 1. Vinaya samukase (samukkamsika dhammadesana: 8.5.420 ff.) the Buddha's principal sermon concerning the Four Noble Truths. 2. Aliyavasani (dasa ariyavamsa: A.5.29) the ten rules of the noble life. 3. Anagatabhayani (A.3.100 ff.): the five ]15 future dangers to be feared. 4. Munigatha (Muni sutta: sn. 207-221). 5. Moneyasute (Moneyyani: A.l.273): On moral perfection in body, speech and mind. 6. Upatisapasine (Sariputta Sutta or Therapanha Sutta: sn.955-975): Question of Sariputta answered by the Buddha. 7. Laghulovade (Maha-Rahulovada sutta: M.l.421 ff.). to lying 3.11.5. selective. Exhortation in regard 110 In his assimilation, Asoka was frankly After greeting the Sangha, he says: "You know, sirs, how deep is my respect for and faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma and Sangha ... Whatever the Buddha has said is of course well said. Allow me to tell you what I believe contributes to the long survival of the Buddha's teaching"lll This in fact shows how deeply he was influenced by Buddhism. Moreover, Asoka mentions in several other places his faith in Buddhism and his high regard for the Buddha and his teaching. Elsewhere he says: "For two and a half years I have been an open follower of the Buddha, though at first I did not make much progress. But 116 for more than a year now I have drawn closer to the (Buddhist) Order, and have made much progress. rn India the gods who formerly did not mix with men now do so. This is the result of effort, and may be obtained not only by the great, but even by the small, through effort thus they may even easily win heaven, Father and mother should be obeyed, teachers should be obeyed; pity ... should be felt for all creatures. These virtues of dhamma should be practised This is an ancient rule, conducive to long life" 3.11.6. 112 . Asoka himself made public pronouncements about his faith in Buddhism, and evidence of Buddhist influences is not wanting in his Major Edicts. many. The reasons for this are For one thing, he was ruling a country where there existed a great diversity of faiths and sects. For another, as it is evident from his Rock Edict 13, he had a constant source of danger from the wild uncivilized tribesmen of the hills and jungles. S. Dutt is much more specific, when speaking of this problem he says: " ... ruling over a country of people of diverse faiths as an impartial sovereign, even handed in his dealings and policies, he could not exalt one faith over another by his sovereign authority, though the 117 fact that the emperor himself was Buddhist must have given a certain . ht age we~g . h peop 1 e" 113 w~t Ruling over a country where a great diversity 3.11.7. of faiths and sects existed would have been impossible if he did not apply an equal and impartial attitude. He regarded himself as the protector of the people rather than their ruler. The doctrine of loving kindness had a great effect on Asoka (~.supra. 3.7.7). From this it seems that he did not lay great store by his sovereign authority, and saw the practical advantage of applying dhamma to his policies. He interpreted dhamma in the designation of dhammika dhamma raja in a sublimated sense, not as a concrete form of faith, but an abstract ethical ideal that should set and regulate men's pattern of life and conduct 3.11.8. 114 . Asoka in applying the spirit of tolerance and understanding towards other religions was following the early Buddhist principle. The Buddha very often showed great respect to the leaders and followers of other religions and strongly recommended his followers to respect other faiths This precept in fact is what Asoka was following. 115 . He declared: "The Beloved of the gods ... honours members of all sects, whether ascetics or householders, by gifts and various honours. But he does not consider gifts and honours as important as the furtherance of the 118 essential message of all sects. This essential message varies from sect to sect, but it has one common basis, that one should so control one's tongue as not to honour one's own set or disparage another's on the wrong occasions; for on certain occasions one should do so only mildly, and indeed on other occasions one should honour other men's sects. By doing this one strengthens one's own sect and helps the others, while by doing otherwise one harms one's own sect and does a disservice to the others. Whoever honours his own sect and disparages another man's, whether from blind loyalty or with the intention of showing his own sect in a favourable light, does his own sect the greatest possible harm. Concord is best, with each hearing and respecting the other's teachings. It is the wish of the Beloved of the gods that members of all sects should be learned and should teach virtue •.. Many officials are busied in this matter ... and the result is the progress of my own sect and the illumination of dh amma .,116 . 119 3.12.1. Let us examine some of the viewpoints that Asoka adopted from early Buddhism. First, the effect that early Buddhism had on the internal and foreign policy and the abandonment of aggressive war is clearly seen from his statement in one of his Rock Edicts. In Asoka's own words: "When the king, Beloved of the gods and Gracious Mien, had been consecrated eight years. Kalinga was conquered, 150,000 people were deported, 100,000 were killed, and many times that number died. But after the conquest of Kalinga, the B.eloved of the gods began to follow dhamma, to love dhamma, and to give instruction in dhamma. Now the Beloved •.. regrets the conquest of Kalinga, for when an independent country is conquered people are killed, they die, or are deported, and that the Beloved ... finds very painful and grievous. And this he finds even more grievous - that all the inhabitants - brahmans, ascetics, and other sectarians, and householders who are obedient to superiors, parents, and elders, who treat friends, acquaintances, companions, relatives, slaves, and servants with respect, and are firm in their faith all suffer violence, murder, and separation from their loved ones. Even 120 those who are fortunate enough not to have lost those near and dear to th.em are afflicted at the misfortunes of friends The participation of all men in common suffering is grievous to the Beloved ... There is no land, except that of the Greeks, where groups of brahmans and ascetics are not found, or where men are not members of one sect or another. So now, even if the members of those killed and captured in the conquest of Kalinga had been a hundred or a thousand times less, it would be grievous to the Beloved ... He will forgive as far as he can, and he even conciliates the forest tribes of his dominions; but he warns them that there is power even in the remorse of the Beloved ... , and he tells them to reform, lest they be killed. For all beings the Beloved ... desires security, self control, calm of mind, and gentleness. He considers that the greatest victory is the victory of dhamma; and this he has won here (in India) and even five hundred leagues beyond his frontiers in the realm of the Greek king Antiochus, and beyond Antiochus among the four kings, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and 121 A1exander. Even where the envoys of the Beloved ... have not been sent men hear of the way in which he follows and teaches dhamma, and they too follow i t and will follow it. Thus he achieves a universal conquest, and conquest always gives a feeling of pleasure; yet it is but a slight pleasure, for the Beloved ... only looks on that which concerns the next life as of great importance. The Beloved ... had this inscription of dhamma engraved that all his sons and grandsons may not seek to gain new victories, that in whatever victories they may gain they may prefer forgiveness and light punishment, that they may consider the only (valid) victory the victory of dhamma, which of value both in this world and the next, and that all their pleasure may be in dhamma .117 3.12.2. This alone shows the impact of the early Buddhist attitude to war (v.infra. 3.13.1 - 3.13.9) on the - ----language as well as on the policy of Asoka. It appears from the above passage that Asoka was trying to emulate the example of the righteous world-ruler as described in the early Buddhist texts. It seems that he won many victories by the method of "conquest by righteousness" by the sword. (dhamma-vijaya), not It has been held that the concept of dharma- 122 vijaya is found in the Arthasastra 118 , but as we shall see more precisely later {~.infra. 3.13.4), the Brahmanical dharma-vijaya was a conquest by the sword. Barua has shown that Asoka rightly characterized dharma-vijaya as a milder mebhod of conquest, where forebearance and light punishment were to be practised and preferred. The Buddhistic dhamma- vijaya was to be achieved "without the employemtn of the sword or armed force ... " 119 . It also seems that Asoka sent envoys to the five Hellenic kings, whose names are . . d b y Ind1an1zat1on . . . 120 , urg1ng . 1 oose 1 y d 1sgu1se them to accept his policy and his moral leadership. This means that he did not give up his imperial ambitions, but attempted to further . a b enevo 1 ent sp1r1t . . an d w1t . h out recourse to arms 121 . t h em 1n 3.12.3. It was in early Buddhism that there emerged for the first time in Indian history the idea of a universal good embracing. the whole world. edicts of Asoka. This idea is explicit in t.he Their contents reveal the fact that his main consideration was to set up a just social order and work for the welfare of the whole world. The following reforms mentioned in his edicts throw light on social welfare. 1. Forbidding slaughter of animals. Sacredness of all life. {1st Major Rock Edict, 5th Pillar Edict). 2. Establishments for the dispensing of medicine for men and animals, and works of social utility and help extended to those in distress {2nd 123 Major Rock Edict, 7th Pillar Edict) . 3. Appointment of rural administrators and heads of the districts in order to instruct people in dhamma as well as for other purposes (3rd Major Rock Edict) . 4. Appointments of Ministers of dhamma to work for the welfare and happiness of the people without any discrimination whatsoever throughout the empire (5th Major Rock Edict) . 5. Prompt dispatch of business of the kingdom (6th Major Rock Edict). 6. Change in the nature of the king's pleasure trips and the practice of tours connected with dhamma (8th Major Rock Edict) . 7. Recommendation that various ceremonies of dhamma which include regard for slaves and servants, respect for teachers, restrained behaviour towards living beings, and donations to religious people are recommended as of great value (9th Major Rock Edict) . 8. Instruction to the officers and city magistrates to practise impartiality (1st Separate Edict - Dhauli and Jangada) . 124 9. Instruction to the officers to win the confidence of the frontier people, and to work for their welfare and happiness (2nd Separate Edict). 3.12.4. All in all, we can see the application of Buddhist principles to the policy of Asoka's government. They can be compared with many passages of the early Buddhist texts to which reference has been made above. 3.12.5. ~s With all deference to some historians, such Basham and Thapor, who say that the dhamma officially propagated by Asoka was not Buddhism 122 , we wish to submit that Asoka's, as a temporal counterpart of the Buddha (cakkavatti-raja), attempted to rule his kingdom in both his internal and foreign policy in accordance with the humanitarian principles of early Buddhism as he understood them. It now remains for us to deal with the early 3.13.1. Buddhist attitude to war, since this had a striking impact on Asoka. According to early B.uddhism, wars and disputes have their origins in the minds of men. The preoccupation with thoughts of destruction and ill-will, and the subtle defilements consisting of racial feelinqs, national feelings and egotism or personal or national pride are the main causes of wars and disputes. The Buddha said that "it is possible to rule a country in accordance with dhamma without smiting or letting others slay, without conquering or making others sorrow" 123 . One should practise selfless service and 125 and friendliness for the sake of social harmony. This is well illustrated in the Mahavastu: "0 king, do not foster hostility towards neighbouring kings. Whosoever hates will be repaid with hatred by his foe. cultivate ties of friendship with neighbouring kings, ... for other peoples honour kings who stedfast in friendship" 3.13.2. 124 Thus, non-aggression and co-operation are recommended as the best policy for achieving peace, love and understanding. further wars. According to early Buddhism, wars result in The following are sentiments about war and enmity expressed in the Dhammapada: "'He abused me, beat me, overcame me, robbed me' - in those who harbour such thoughts hatred does not cease. 'He abused me ... ' -in those who do not harbour such thoughts hatred ceases. Hatred never ceases by hatred in this world. Hatred ceases by love - this is the ancient law. Other do not know that 'we come to an end here'. But those who know this, have their quarrels calmed thereby. The noblest conqueror is he who would conquer himself ratrer than defeat a hundred thousand men in battle. Self-conquest is, indeed, better than the 126 conquest of all others. Happily do we live without anger among those who are angry. Let us live without anger amongst angry folk. Victory breeds hatred; the vanquished live in sorrow. The peaceful ones live in harmony giving up both victory and defeat. Conquer enmity with amity, evil with good; conquer miserliness with charity and falsehood with truth. Whoso desires his own happiness by inflicting suffering on others is not released from hatred, being himself entangled in the bonds of hatred" 3.13.3. 125 . The early Buddhist attitude to war differs from that of Hinduism. Even in Vedic times there existed a political materialism among some recluses and brahmins, who according to early Buddhist texts taught khatta-vijja or the "scienC'e of power" 126 . Buddhaghosa explains this term in a sense similar to that of khatta-dhamma "the law of ruling or . " 1n . t h e Jata k as 12 7 as n1t1sat "" . th a 128 , wh.1ch po 1 1. t.1ca 1 sc1ence means both "political science and law". This term is mentioned in the Chandogya Upanisad as ksatra-vidya and Sa~kara has interpreted this to mean "military science" (dhanur-veda) 129 . This "science of power" included both military and political science as well as the study of law, considered as an instrument for the retention and advancement 127 of power. Here the principle of expediency based on one's material interests was to be the guiding principles behind military s.trategy, political power and law. inculcates Machiavellian tricks. This philosophy A Jataka story refers to this philosophy as follows: "Fools thinking themselves learned say that there is the "rule of might" (khatta-vijja) in the world; one may kill his parents, elder brother, children and wife if one's material interests demand it (attho ca tadiso siya) ~I'\ 3.13.4. 130 . Following this philosophy, the later classical texts of Hinduism such as the Dharmasastras, the Arthasastra, the Santiparvan of the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita illustrate the ideal of imperial domination by conquest. For example, the entire Tenth and TWelfth Books of the Arthasastra deal with the ideals of conquest. In it there is a formula of Sadgunya which sums up the military strength of any "circle of states" (mandala) as consisting of the six policies. They are: making a treaty containing conditions or terms, that is, the policy cf peace (samdhi), the policy of hostility (vigraha), the policy of remaining quiet (and not planning to march on an expedition) - (asana), marching on an expedition (yana) , seeking shelter with another king or in a fort (_~amsrayal ' the double policy of samdhi with one king and vigraha with another at the same time ( dval'dh'1bh-ava )131 . The general principle is that when one is weaker than the enemy, the policy of peace should be 128 followed, if stronger than he, the policy of hostility should be followed. If both are equal in power, neutrality is the right policy, but if one is very strong, one should march on an expedition. When one is very weak, seeking shelter with another king or in a fort is necessary, while the last is the policy recommended when with help from another source one can fight one's enemf 32 3.13.5. It is clear from this sixfold policy that peace is only a temporary expedient for a kingdom that feels that it is not strong enough to defeat another kingdom. Moreover, it is not a policy of maintaining a balance of power to keep peace 133 All in all, the Hindu texts preach the doctrine that conquering in battle is one of the duties 134 , an d engaglng . . . . . o f a k lng ln a war of aggresslon lS a meritorious deed, It is said: "The kings who perform great sacrifices, who are possessed of a knowledge of the Vedas, and who gain victories in battle, become foremost of those that acquire many blessed regions hereafter by their merit. Therefore, a king who desires to acquire religious merit should engage in battle" 135 . "For without battle, he cannot extend his kingdom and acquire wealth to give away and meet the expenses of sacrl' f 'lees .,136 "A king whose power has been consolidated and who is confident of his own strength 129 should assail a neighbour who is weaker than himself but never one who is stronger" 137 "Consider your own class duty, then too you have no cause to quail; for nothing is better for a man of the princely class than a fight prescribed by law" 138 . "Cast all your works on Me, your thoughts (withdrawn) in what appertains to self; have neither hope nor thought that 'This is mine': cast off this fever! Fight!" 139 "Hold pleasure and pain, profit and loss, victory and defeat to be the same: brace yourself for the fight. bring no evil on yourself" then So you will 140 "Play not the eunuch, for this ill beseems you: give up this vile faint-heartedness. Stand up, chastiser of your foes!" 3.13.6. 141 . Those are some of the sayings about war in the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita. It seems quite clear that they are the antithesis of the sentiments expressed in the early Buddhist texts (~.supra. 3.13.2). This may be further illustrated from the advice of the Buddha. He was placed in a similar situation to that of Krsna on the eve of a war ... between his own people, the Sakyas and their blood brothers, the Koliyas. A dispute arose between these two tribes about the right to the use of the waters of the river Rohini, which flowed between their territories. When the dispute ran high, 130 with words of abuse, the soldiers on each side were assembled (as the Kurus and Pandavas had assembled) fight. for the The Buddha intervened and asked them what the war was about. The answer was that it was over the water. He settled the dispute by peaceful means and said: "Why, on account of some water of little worth, would you destroy the invaluable lives of these soldiers•• 142 . Commenting•on a war between two kings on another occasion the Buddha says: "Victory arouses enmity and the defeated live in sorrow; the victor obtains himself . h er ,.143 a vanqu1s On the other hand, the Hindus believe that 3.13.7. "one who fights with selfless motive incurs no sin, whereas if one fights with selfish motive he would still st2.nd to profit either by gain and honour on earth or by glory in heaven"l44. ' "the warrior who falls in the battleground while . h t1ng . . h eaven ,.145 f 1g atta1ns the opposite ,·iew. The early Buddhists maintain For example, the Buddha answers the question of a warrior-chief in connection with the above beliefs thus: "In the case of a warrior who in battle exerts himself, puts forth effort, he must previously have had this low, mean perverse idea: 'Let those beings be tortured, be destroyed, be exterminated, so that they may be thought never to 131 have existed'. Then, so exerting himself, so putting forth effort, other men torture him and make an end of him. When his body breaks up, after death he is reborn in a hapless condition•• 146 ~ A It is in this sense that early Buddhism condemned the manufacture and sale of weapons of war as a wrong mode of . l"h 1 1ve 1 oo dl47 . • 3.13.8. However, the question as to how a king should meet aggression is also dealt with. There is a mention of two policies, each of which has been pursued by two kings, who "rule their kingdom in accordance with righteousness" .. ) 148 . ( dhammena raJ]am karento in a Jataka story. These principles are enunciated It tells that two kings met in a place where the carriage-road was deeply sunk between two' banks, and there was no room for one carriage to pass another. The question of precedence was raised, since it was necessary for one to give way. Since i t was discovered that the extent of their kingdom, their military strength, economic resources, prestige and the nobility of birth and age of the kings were the same, there was a discussion about their policies. At this stage the policy one is summed up as follows: "He meets force with force, mildness with mildness; he wins over the good with good and conquers the evil with evil" 149 The poli.cy of the other is summed up as follows: "He conquers with kindness, evil with good, greed with charity and falsehood . 132 with truth"lSO 3.13.9. This latter policy was acknowledged as the best and the former voluntarily gave way. The former is the policy of meeting aggression with military force in a war of self-defence without indulging in aggression oneself. It should be noted that early Buddhism did not talk about a Utopian state and did not recommend a policy of disbanding the army 151 . Asoka also continued to govern his kingdom without disbanding the army, since many of his subjects faced a constant source of danger from the wild tribesmen in his kingdom. Despite the peace, security and prosperity of the kingdom, the king must keep his army satisfied and in a state of military preparedness and good humour, according to Buddhism. It is said in the Jatakamala: "A prince who, having no reason to complain of his army, fails to honour it and disregards his military men who have shown their valour on the battle field and are renowned for their skill in the science of arms, surely such a king will be deserted . . b attle" 152 . ·b y v1ctory 1n The army is necessary to meet aggression, but it is said that a king who rules his kingdom on the basis of friendliness is unlikely to be attacked: "On friendliness does his strength rest, not on his motley-bannered army, which he keeps only to comply with custom. He knows no anger, nor does he speak harsh 133 words, protects his land in the proper manner. Righteousness is the rule of his actions, not political wisdom, that b ase 3.13.10. . '153 . sc~ence' Despite the fact that a wise king may counter aggression with military force, passive resistance is held up as the better . ~deal 154 . - The Mahasilava Jataka illustrates the fact that passive resistance would be eventually triumph• ant if tried. It tells how the king of Kosala appeared outside the city of Benares and sent a message to the king of Benares bidding him either yield up the kingdom or give battle. However, the king of Benares had a thousand gallant warriors, who would face the charge even of a rut elephant, but his reply was: "I fight not, let him seize my kingdom". Finally after a series of events when the king was in a position to overpower his foe but did not do so, i t is said that "the usurper's heart was moved within him" and the king . rega~ne 3.14.1. d h'~s k'~ng d om155 Thus it is clear that the political authority is subject to dhamma or the law of righteousness. The king rules in accordance with dhamma and has an obligation of two kinds. First, he should promote the material and spiritual welfare of his subjects in internal policy. Secondly, in foreign policy the king should not commit aggression and co-operate with other kingdoms for the common good of mankind. The keynote of early Buddhism is to reform humanity. 134 CHAPTER FOUR ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY We have seen in chapter three that there 4.1.1. emerged with early Buddhism the conception of a common good, embracing the whole world and conceived as material and spiritual welfare. Of similar importance is the conception of a common humanity or unity of mankind. This view is most closely connected with the idea of equality. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine the idea of equality, as it appears in the early Buddhist texts. In order to understand the early Buddhist 4.2.1. attitude to equality, it is necessary to have a description, however brief, of the ancient Indian social order and its origins. The earliest evidence we have of the Indian social order is to be found in the Vedic literature, the work of the 1 Aryans , who entered India in the Second millennium B.C. Our knowledge of their earliest phase is based primarily on the Rg-Veda. It gives a fairly clear picture of the first - settlement of the early Aryans in ancient India. When the Aryans first entered India, they fought with native peoples, 2 called Dasa and Dasyus , probably originally two prominent indigenous tribes. The main motive of the Aryans was to subjugate and suppress these peoples. Moreover, the Aryans developed a consciousness of belonging to a superior race from the beginning of their conflicts in India. 4.2.2. A number of ways were devised by the Aryans 135 to develop a consciousness of belonging to a superior race, because there was an acute disjunction between the Aryans and the indigenous peoples in several respects. In physical appearance, the Aryans had certain inheritable physical characteristics in common. They were tall men, proud of their fairer skin and disdainful of others whose skin was darker. On the other hand, the Dasas and Dasyus were "dark skinned, noseless and bull lipped" 3 religion. There was also a difference in •The Aryans had a common religion. people did not worship their gods. The darker They were considered to be phallus-worshippers, lawless and lacking devotion 4 Moreover, the language and manners of the two racial groups 5 were different . 4.2.3. The Rg-Veda gives many accounts of the emotions the Aryans felt towards one another and towards the darker people. For example, at one place, it is said: "We are surrounded on all sides by Dasa tribes. They do not believe in anything. They are not men. Kill them. 0 destroyer of foes! 6 Destroy the Dasa race" • The implication of this hymn is that there was intense racial prejudice among the Aryans. The Aryans treated the darker people as an "out group" and looked on them as scarcely 7 human . This extreme prejudice can also be illustrated by another example, the recurring theme of the Aryans praying 8 to Indra for the elimination of the darker people . ~g-Veda The describes how Indra killed the darker people and 9 protected the white colour , and how he trampled down in the 136 caves the darker colour 10 . 4.3.1. There was at first continuous fighting between the Aryans and the darker people. From these fights, the Aryans gained complete victory and settled down in Panjab as the dominant people. When they were fairly well settled, they developed a tendency towards a gradation of society. Among the Aryans themselves birth (jati) in the families (~ulas) of priests, warriors and farmers was beginning to . intensify gradations in their society which may have existed ll . ear l J.er . In the early stage, the Aryans were divided into three groups among themselves - priestly, warrior and commoner, a division in which the three groups were expected to promote spiritual progress, military pre-eminence and cattle prosperity respectively 12 4.3.2. In later times, there was a process of mixing with the darker people in several aspects. Therefore, the notion of social differentiation was recognized, and differences were sanctioned which placed individuals higher or lower in the social scale. In course of time, the system of the four-fold division of society into Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras was fully recognized. This division was accepted as fundamental, primeval, and divinely ordained. The four-fold division of society finally developed within the Aryan race, the suppressed Dasas and Dasyus, or persons partially descended from them, receiving a humble place in . -. the socJ.al order as Sudras, who formed a kJ.nd of helot class l3 . 4.3.3. Each of these groups is referred to as Varna. 137 The word varna (Sanskrit, vanna in Pali) is often confused . ----.- with caste (jati, jat - literally meaning "birth"), since many writers have translated it thus. The word signifies in its basic and general sense "appearance" or "colour", but as shown by Trautmann, in its technical sense it comes closest to the medieval western conception of "order" or "estates" 14 Trautmann writes that the most acceptable translation for varna so far put forward is "class", but this term often has an economi~ connotation. In Indian thought varnas are not essentially economic but sacred. Therefore, to translate varna as "class" is to choose a term much too objective, ---.-15 . . t'f' sc1en 1 lC an d mo d ern 4.3.4. The origin of the caste system cannot be clearly traced historically. There are various hypotheses about the origin of caste, but as shown by Basham, they have no scientific validity. He writes that varnas should never be referred to as castes, since they are not and never have been castes, and traditional view that castes are a result of the fragmentation and miscegenation of the varnas is ----.-- . 16 . qu1' te Wl'th out foun d at1on 4.3.5. Whatever the origin of caste, it is clearly evident from the Pali texts and the Brahmanical literature that caste and the system of the four orders of society did exist, the latter at least in theory. Basham adds that the most outstanding feature of traditional Indian society was caste rather than varna. Usually a brahmana is conscious of being a brahmana, and so is a ksatriya, but the average . 138 member of the two lower orders, which constitute the great bulk of the population, is much more aware of his caste (jati) than of his order (varna). It is his caste, not the orders of society to which he belongs, which gives him a sense of community, of being a member of something greater than . 1 f 17 . h 1-mse 4.3.6. The system of varnas was probably an innovation of the Br~manas themselves. Later this was given a divine sanction by being considered as a creation of the Cosmic Person. As we have seen earlier (~.supra.2.3.3.), the "Hymn of the Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda describes how the four varnas were created by the divine victim. We were also told that horses, cows, goats, sheep and other animals were created from the same victim 18 . 4.3.7. Later, it was believed that, in order to maintain the prosperity of the world, the Cosmic Person declared in due order the sacred laws to each of the four varnas, laying down their specific aptitudes and functions 19 However, it is not made explicit in this religious context, . why all four varnas were not treated equally, as they had a . common origin from the body of the Cosmic Person 20 ; but it is assumed that the various parts of the body of the Cosmic Person were considered nobler according to their height above the ground. As we have seen, later Buddhist authors attacked this myth, claiming that if it is true then the Cosmic Person is full of injustice and prejudice. If he is the Lord of the world why did he not give the sacred laws . 139 without making any discrimination, opening the doors for everybody? and unjust This implies that the Lord's creation is evil (~.supra. 4.3.8. 2.10.2; infra. 4.6.9). In the social context the four-fold division involved a fragmentation of the race 21 The four varnas were looked on as essentially different species 22 . The Sudras were mainly distinguished from the others by race. The practical outcome was that, in the social order, subordinate and superior status, prestige and power, tended to perpetuate themselves from one generation to another. Duties, obligations and roles were recognized and respected. The Sudras originally had no right to social status and they were completely an "out group". The only function that "the Lord" prescribed to them was to serve others 23 . The above four-fold division of society received greater priestly . authority in the time of the Brahmanas and Upanisads. . The concept of dharma was interpreted as being ultimately connected with the divine creation of the social order in four varnas (v.supra. 3.3.3). . - Within this social order, the Brahmanas claimed very high social privileges and supremacy (~.supra. 4.3.9. 2.3.5., 2.5.4. - 2.5.5., 3.3.5 - 3.3. 7). The Brahmanas had a number of reasons for claiming their hierarchy of prestige and power over the others. We have seen some of the claims of Brahmanas regarding their supreme social status - 2.5.6). (~.supra. The main reasons for this are many. foremost was psychological and social. 2.3.5., 2.5.2. The first and The Brahmanas had a 140 great fear of losing their social status and they largely regulated social behaviour through their influence over kings and people. Their most important psychological need was to remain in the superior social position. Moreover, they had a fear of pollution from social contact, and this led to rigid regulations in many fields of human activity. Social intercourse was restricted on the grounds that the four-fold division of society was genetically determined and fixed; ana inter-marriage was condemned as both biologically and socially undesirable . . f re 1 ~g~ous reedom 25 , freedom 27 24 . . . The lowest varna was denied pol~t~cal an d , and equality before law . soc~al 28 . freedom 26 , . econom~c All these beliefs, attitudes and practices were associated with the Brahmanas social and psychological need to preserve their own innovation of social order and to maintain important functions such as their trusteeship for the gods, and to remove their fear of losing their distinguished positions. From the economic point of view the Sudras formed a supply of cheap labour, and thus the institution was important even beyond the ritual and social sphere. 4.4.1. It has been widely recognized that early Buddhism denounced all claims of the Brahmanas to superiority and opened the doors for the welfare of a11 29 . The reasons adduced for this emergence of egalitarian thought are many. For one thing, in ancient India at the time of the rise of Buddhism, there was a rapid change in the structure of life and society. It was evidently a period of expanding material culture with far wider commercial activities and economic 141 . 30 progress However, the commercial classes rapidly gaining 8conomic importance, were socially inferior and they were in practice generally treated contemptuously by the Brahmanas, who claimed every social privileges and supremacy. The Buddha or early Buddhism strongly objected to such social discrimination. Romila Thapar, for example, writes that the social equality preached by Buddhism made a strong appeal to those who were considered socially inferior 31 . 4.4.2. Throughout the Pali literature, no other social problem is referred to so often as the supremacy of the Brahmanas. This was another reason, among many more, why the Pali texts discuss the idea of equality. In this sense most scholars have treated Buddhism as unique among Indian religions because of the central place it gives to the idea . 31A of equality. However, there seems to be some misconception in this proposition. 4.4.3. According to one view the Buddha restated what was already current among the Vedic thinkers. Radhakrishnan and Rhys Davids, for example, have stated that the Buddha was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu or a typical Indian (~.supra. 1.4.1, 1.4.3). Rhys Davids writes: "Such originality as Gautama possessed lay in the way in which he adopted, enlarged, ennobled, and systematized that which had already been well said by others; in the way in which he carried to their logical 142 conclusion, principles of equity and justice already acknowledged by some of the most prominent earlier thinkers" 32 . Elsewhere, Rhys Davids writes: "Some writers on Buddhism do not hesitate to ascribe to the Buddha the role of a successful political reformer, by representing him as having fought for the poor and despised against the rich and privileged classes, and as having gone far to abolish caste. Other writers gird at the Buddha because most of the leaders of his Order were drawn from the ranks of the respectable and well-to-do with an education in keeping with their social position, and disparage him for neglecting the humble and wretched, for not using his influence to abolish, or to mitigate, the harshness of caste rules'' 33 . Giving these two alternatives, Rhys Davids adds that both are equally unhistorica1 4.4.4. 34 . While there are two sides to every question, we shall try to follow the trend of argument. The Brahmanas view of social organization, as we have seen above, was based on the system of four varnas, a system which was divinely ordered. In the thought of early Buddhism, as we have seen in chapter three, the notions of justice, concord, friendship, loving kindness and equal respect for all were seen as 143 essential for the preservation of just social and political order. These notions offered something approaching a true conception of equality. At a time when material culture was developing so rapidly, equal religious, social, political and judicial rights were considered as most desirable to curb the power and prestige of any one class and to allot social responsibilities, not according to any class system but solely on merit. The new emphasis on equality as an ideal is perhaps best seen in the words of the Buddha: "The facts being what they are, the people of all four varnas are absolutely equal and I do not see any difference at all among them .,35 The criteria of equality are: "Not by birth does one become a brahman a, by his action alone one becomes a brahmana, a farmer, an artisan, a trader, a servant, a thief, a soldier and a king" 4.4.5. 36 The assumption here is that men can be judged only by the good and bad actions they do and not by the stations of life in which they were placed by virtue of their birth. It is according to kammic 37 factors that men can be divided into high or low orders. Sutta 38 In the Culakammavibhanga , the Buddha is asked the question: "What is the reason and the cause for the inequality among human beings, despite their being human?". The Buddha's reply is: 144 "Beings inherit their karnma and kamma divides beings in respect of their (various) high and low states" 39 . Although early Buddhism recognizes this variation, it does not assert that everything is due to kamma. The recognition of known inequalities among human beings does not mean that early Buddhism accepted the status quo of a static conception of society or denied the doctrine of equality of mankind. The ethical teachings of early Buddhism revolves round the conception of the destruction or elimination of the evil effects of ka~ by effecting a change in the basis of human motivation from that of greed, hate and ignorance to selflessness, compassion and understanding. In the sphere of moral life, early Buddhism recognises the authority of dharnma. This is clearly stated in the Ambalatthika-Rahulovada Sutta 40 , where it is said that the behaviour of man should be such that i t does not lead to the harm of oneself, of others, or of both. It should be morally good (kusala), yielding happiness (sukhudraya) and resulting in happiness (sukhavipaka) This is the path leading to the destruction of karnmic effects. Hence, here too, dhamma is recognized as the authority, depending on which society is graded 4.5.1. 42 It is necessary to point out, before taking it up for actual discussion, the early Buddhist view of man's duty in his human existence, since it has some relevance to the idea of equality. Early Buddhism holds that the world goes through periods of evolution and dissolution (samvatta . ) 43 and Vlvatta · . The early Buddhist texts state that the 41 . 145 world is gradually declining, on account of man's greed and evil ways, and this decline will reach its nadir in a catastrophic war (~.supra. 3.8.6). It seems from this account, that the function of the Buddha and a world-ruler is to restore the standards of human life, if temporarily. It is with this possibility in mind that the Buddha is said to have "been born for the good and happiness of mankind" (~.supra. 3.4.7), and likewise a world-ruler is said to "be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind" 3.4.8). (~.supra. On a basis such as this, i t is clear that both a Buddha and a world-ruler are believed to stand for the oneness of humanity, the idea of human equality and the spiritual unity of mankind. 4.5.2. Moreover, there are accounts of the origin and extent of the universe and man's place in it. According to the early Buddhist conception of the universe, there are innumerable world systems 44 . In the vastness of the cosmos, the human worlds form a very small part. All beings within the human worlds, however low their state of evolution may be45 ' are said to have the capacity to evolve up to the very highest state; and however high their states may be they are said to be subject to death so long as they remain within the human worlds 46 . The human worlds are always represented as standing midway in the hierarchy of the worlds. Life in these human worlds is a mixture of the pleasant and unpleasant, good and evil, while the pleasant and good traits are intensified in the higher worlds and the unpleasant and evil . ln t h e 1 ower 47 . 146 4.5.3. The span of life of human beings is insignificantly small in comparison with cosmic time and may be compared in its duration to a line drawn on the ear th 48 . However . . . . ~ns~gn~f~cant man may b e f rom a . cosm~c perspective, it is pointed out in the early Buddhist texts that human birth is very valuable in the cosmic scheme. It 49 is said that "birth as a human being is a rare event" . In the course of our samsaric evolution human beings have been born, •it is believed, hundreds of times as animals, and it is rarely that we emerge into a human existence 50 . It is said that it is a difficult thing for a man who has gone down the scale of existence to a subhuman condition to emerge as a man again. The reason given for this is that among the lower animals there prevails no practice of righteousness or equitable living but just cannibalism, the stronger preying on the weaker creature" 51 . 4.5.4. At this rare human level, all human beings have something in common by virtue of the fact that they belong to a common humanity. This being the case, the people of the four varnas and people of "diverse races" - (nanajacca) are said to be equal 52 . species. Man belonged to one Owing to this oneness, of which he is ignorant, egotism or personal and national pride, racial feelings and . 1 nat~ona f ee 1"~ngs are .d cons~ ere d. as . k m~sta en . not~ons 53 . Also, at this human level, whatever individual differences there may be, man has within himself the capacity of gaining the highest knowledge for his salvation. Thus, everyone has a duty to help his fellow beings in their development and no 147 one has any right or valid grounds to despise another. Man has within himself the ability of gaining moral, intellectual and spriritual worthiness by developing and extending mutual help to others 54 . This is the point of departure in early Buddhism for the idea of human equality, looking at the value of human life, which is a rare thing in the cosmos. 4.6.1. The new emphasis on equality as an ideal is best seen in the arguments of the early Buddhists. There are a number of arguments scattered through the Pali texts, but if we take them together and analyse them, we can find six main arguments. However, some writers like Rhys Davids and B.C. Law classified them under three heads. Rhys Davids, they are: According to biological, historical and ethica1 Law also mentions three arguments. occupational and cultura1 56 They are: 55 . biological, On the other hand, Malalasekera and Jayatilleke classified them under three heads biological, sociological and ethico-religious Jayatilleke in his later work adds four more. him there are seven arguments: 57 , but According to biological, anthropological, sociological, legal, moral, ethical and religious or . . 158 spJ.rJ.tua Following Jayatilleke's classification approximately, we submit six main arguments used by the early Buddhists in support of their attitude to equality. 4.6.2. biological. Among these six arguments, the first is It is said that in the case of animals and plants, specific and generic differences are perceptible; but mankind is one species. The distinction is drawn clearly 148 in the Vasettha Sutta 59 . . . Two young brahmanas, Vasettha and . Bharadraja, were discussing what makes a true brahmana. The latter maintained that it was pure descent from seven generations of ancestors, with neither break nor blemish in the lineage. The former maintained that virtue and moral behaviour made a true brahmana. As neither could convince the other, they referred the matter to the Buddha, who is said to have replied in verse as follows: "I will explain to you step by step and accurately the division of living things into species, for species are separated one from another. You should know that grass and trees have no reasoning power, yet they possess the characteristics of their species, for species are separated one from another. Moreover, beetles, moths and ants also have the characteristics of their species, for species are separated one from another. And so it is with four-footed creatures, great and small ... reptiles, snakes, long-backed animals, fish and creatures living in water, birds and winged creatures, they ail have the characteristics of their species, for species are separated one from another. In all these species the specific characteristics are evident, but this is not the case with 149 men .•. Not in the hair, head, ears, mouth, nose, lips, brows, throat, hips, belly, back, behind, sex .organs· or breast ... , is there any specific characteristics (to divide one class of man from another) as there is in other species. There is no distinction in the bodies of men (of different classes) . The difference in men is conventional". Continuing, the Buddha says: "I do not call one a brahmana on account of his birth or his origin from a particular mother" 4.6.3. 60 . The dialogue goes on to show that the apparent divisions between men are not due to basic biological factors but are "conventional classificaton" (samanna), on ·-·-~-~=-== occupational or economical grounds (~.infra. 4.8.2.). The distinctions made in respect of the differences in skin colour, hair, the shape of the head and so forth, are not absolute categories. Therefore men cannot be taken to . represent more t h an one spec1es 61 Malalasekera and Jayatilleke writes: "It would appear that early Buddhism is in accord with the findings of the modern biologists who exploded the doctrines of racism and would urge the biological unity of mankind in support of the concept of a common humanity. So when early Buddhism 150 asks us to treat all men, irrespective of race or caste, as our fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters or as one family, there seems to be a deeper truth in this statement than that of a mere ethical . .62 • recommendat1on 4.6.4. There is also reference to the biological argument in the Divyavadana. Here i t is said that on the application of the biological test, there is seen to be one species among men and all of them possess common characteristics. The Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas and the . . Sudras are all names arbitrarily fixed 63 . One example is given as follows: "If four sons are born in a family and their father chooses to call them by names Nandaka (gladdner), Jivaka (the living), A~oka (sorrowless), and Sataya (the long-lived), the names fixed have no special connotation of their own and have no proof that their bearers will enjoy the blessings mentioned. There are certain qualities, moral, intellectual or occupational, which children should acquire as they grow up; but these qualities cannot be predicated of persons because of their birth to certain parents• 4.6.5. 64 The most impressive and sustained Buddhist 151 attack on class distinction and the pretensions of the Brahmanas in particular is given by Asvaghosa in his Vajrasuci. There is a similar text of the same name among the minor Upanisads, which deals with the system of four varnas. Both texts begin with the following questions: "Who is Brahmana? Is a man Brahmana by his birth or is he Brahmana by his knowledge? Is he Brahmana by following the traditional usages, or by his profession or by his mastery over the 65 Vedas?" . ancient Indian The strength of"- , racial prejudice is clear enough in the Upanisad, where it says: "Brahmana is of the white complexion (sveta-varna), Ksatriya is of the red . . . complexion (rakta-varna), Vaisya •.. tawny complexion (pita-varna) and Sudra . ... dark complexion (krsna-varna)" .. 66 . It is apparent from the Vajrasuci that Asvaghosa's criticisms were chiefly directed against this racial attitude of the Brahmanas • J which the Hindu text(exceptional in this respect) also criticizes. 4.6.6. A number of arguments against class distinction found in the early Buddhist texts are expanded by Asvaghosa. There is reference to the biological argument. Asvaghosa says that the fatherhood of God in which Brahmanas believe should imply the brotherhood of mankind. If all men proceeded .... from God, how then can there be four-fold'. insuperable diversity among men? " Here is a man called Devadatta who gives birth to 152 four sons from one wife, the four sons, having one father and mother, must be all essentially alike. Distinctions of species among beings are broadly marked by differences of conformations and organizations. In this world, we find distinction in the footprints of cattle, elephant, horse, and so of the rest; but we have never heard or seen that the footprint of a Sudra is different from that of a Brahmana. In this world, we find distinction in the male and female 6rgans, in colour, complexion, and form, in stools and in urine, in smell and in voice, of cattle, buffalo, horse, and so of the rest. Those furnish further diagnostics whereby to separate these various animals, but . in all those respects the Brahmanas resemble the Ksatriyas, . Vaisyas and Sudras. Again we find distinction in form, in colour, in furs and in breaks, of the goose, pigeon, parrot, cuckoo, peacock, but there is no such distinction found among the four classes. We find distinction in different kinds of trees, in their stem, leaves, flowers, fruits, barks, wood, seeds, juice and smell; we do not find this to be so in the case of the four classes, neither in limbs, nor in skin, blood, flesh, bones, semen, stools, nor in form and complexion, nor in their issues. Again, as there is similarity in joy and sorrow, in life, in intellect, in functions, in conduct or in behaviour, in birth and death, in sexual enjoyments and in fear, there is indeed no distinction in Brahmana and others. Moreover that there is no distinction of classes among the fruits produced from the same tree. For example, take the fruits of the fig and 153 jack trees. Among the fruits of these two trees, some grow from the stem, or trunk, others from the branches, and some others just above the root. They have no such distinction . . as, this is the Brahmana fruit, that is the Ksatriya fruit, this is the Vaisya fruit and that is the Sudra fruit; they are produced from the same tree. as There is no such distinction among human beings too as they are also born from the same person according to the brahmanical tradition. ' There is another defect. If the Brahmana is born from the mouth, whence is the Brahmana woman born. Certainly also from the mouth. sister. so the brahmanas disregard the convention of licit and illicit intercourse. But this is extremely repugnant to the people of this world. brahmanas are uncertain .. are clearly of one species 4.7.1. Then she is the brahmana's so the social dogmas of the All men are formed alike and 67 The second argument against class distinction is the anthropological one. The Agganna Sutta, to which reference has been made above (~.supra. 2.11.4 - 2.11.12) shows that the claim of the brahmanas to be the legitimate heirs of God is meaningless by giving an account of the evolution of the world, of men and of society. The brahmanas claimed that "only a brahmana is of the best social grade, other grades are low. Only a brahmana is of clear complexion, other complexions are swarthy. Only they are of pure breed, not they that are not of the brahmanas. - 68 children of Brahma, heirs of Brahma" . They are genuine 154 4.7.2. The early Buddhist answer to such claims is that the brahmanas make them in ignorance of the past and they have no basis in fact. Originally all human beings were alike and what later became class distinctions were due to a division of specific occupations but they were not necessarily absolute and were not created by God from the very beginning of time. The early Buddhist condemnation of the brahmanical ideas is further seen where it is said that the class of ascetics was formed by people from all the four occupational classes "despising (the concept of) their own duty" 69 (sakam dhammam garahamano) . Two themes run through the whole account of 4.7.3. the Agganna Sutta. we have seen earlier one theme which describes the origin of the world, of society, and of government. The second theme describes the origin of class from divisions of labour and occupational distinctions which arose with settled society "among beings who were like unto themselves and not unlike" 70 neva no asadisanam) . . (neva sattanam anannesam sadisanam . ~ Since we have seen the origin of the ksatriya 4.7.4. class (~.supra. 2.11.12), let us see the explanation of the origin of the other three classes, brahmana, vaisya and sudra. 4.7.5. The class of brahmanas originated likewise: "Then it happened that some men thought, 'Evil ways are rife among men. Let us give up such evil and unwholesome ways'. And they put away from them such evil ways. 155 The word brahmana implies that they put away such evil ways, and so brahmana became their earliest name ('Eapaka akusale dhamme bahentiti' ... brahmana, brahmana tv eva pathamam akkharam 71 . upanibbattam) . . They went to the forest and lived in huts of leaves, and there they sat and meditated. They had no more use for charcoal or the smoke of cooking, or for the pestle and mortar, but they went to vilJages, towns, or cities, seeking their food, in the evening their supper, in the morning their breakfast. When they had enough to eat they came back and meditated in their huts, and so they were given the second name of mystics because they meditated ( 'jhayantiti' kho ... jhayaka, jhayaka tv eva dutiyam akkharam upanibbattam) . Now some of them grew tired of meditating in the forest, and they went away, settled down in villages and towns, and started compiling texts, which they repeated to others. saw this, they said: When men 'These good folk cannot meditate', and so they were called teachers, and this became their third name ('na dan'ime jhayantiti' kho ... 156 ~jhayaka, ajjhayaka te eva tatiya~ . akkharam upanibbattam) . 72 • At that time these teachers were looked on as the lowest or inferior brahmanas, but now they are considered the best. This was the origin of the class of brahmanas ..• 'I'hey originated quite naturally and not otherwise" 73 . 4.7.6. The class of Vaisya originated likewise: "There were some other people who married and took to all kinds of crafts and trades (visutta-kammante) ; and because they took to various kinds of business they were called Vessa (Skt. Vaisya) ('visutta- kammante payojentiti' kho ... vessa, vessa tv eva akkharam upanibbattam) . This was the origin of this class Vaishyas They originated quite naturally and not otherwise" 4.7.7. 74 . The class of Sudra originated likewise: "Those who remained were hunters. Those who live by hunting have a mean trade, and thus they were called Suddha (Skt. sudral . < 'luddha-cara khuddacara ·ti O kh0 • 0 o SUdda I SUdda tV eve akkharam upanibbttam) . This was the origin of this class of Shudras ... They originated 157 quite naturally and not otherwise" 4.7.8. 75 . It is in this text especially, describing the origin of the world, of society, of government and of the class system, that early Buddhism proclaimed the equality of men on anthropological grounds. This tells us explicitly that neither the state nor the class system has any divine sanction but that they are only measures of human expediency. The text further explains that since such social and functional differences arose among human beings in the collective interest of society, socio-moral ideas were developed, giving rise to a social ethics, which comes to be known as dhamma , in opposition to what is detrimental to the well-being of the community, that is to say, adhamma 76 . Rhys Davids comments: "We may not accept the historical accuracy of this legend. Indeed a continual note of good-humoured irony runs through the whole story, with its fanciful etymologies of the names of the four vanna ... But it reveals a sound and healthy insight, and is much nearer to the actual facts than the Brahmin legend it was intended to replace" 4.8.1. :I, 77 The third argument against class distinction is sociological. This appears in many aspects. First, early Buddhism points out that there are certain peoples among whom there are no rigid divisions of society. Therefore, the four-fold class system has no universal acceptibility. In 158 78 79 . the Assalayana Sutta , Yona and Kamboja are mentioned as places in which there were only two classes of people, namely lords and serfs, and this division too was not rigid since lords sometimes became serfs and serfs lords: "'What do you think about this, Assalayana? Have you ever heard that in the lands of Yona and Kamboja and other adjacent districts there are only two classes, lords and serfs, and a lord can become a serf and vice versa?' 'Yes I have heard this Sir. In Yona and ... having been a serf one becomes a lord'. 'And what strength or support does that fact give to the brahmanas' claim?'" 4.8.2. 80 . Secondly, early Buddhism asks how far livelihood is identical with social differentiation, and on what grounds the class sytem could be justified: "The man who earns his livelihood, by minding cows and fields, he is a farmer, not a brahmana. He who works at diverse craft is an artisan ... He who plies a trade for livelihood, he is a trader ... He who toils in service for another man, he is a servant He who lives by archery, he is a soldier He who lives by priestly craft, he is a celebrant He who own the village, country side, he . J.S a k'J.ng •.• ,81 159 4.8.3. It is clear from the above passage that class names are merely conventional designations signifying occupational differences and, since men are free to change their occupations, these differences had no hereditary or genetical basis. It is said: "What the world holds as 'name' and 'lineage' is indeed nominal. Terms risen here and there by popular opinion" 82 Asvaghosa says that the system of four classes was established according to the distinction of profession and functions 83 . In contrast, the brahmanical theory held that each class had its own set of duties and obligations (sva-dharma) exactly prescribed and, for the sake of the solidarity and progress of society as a whole, each class was expected to act up to the following teaching of the Bhagavad-Gita: "Better one's own duty (to perform), though void of merit, than to do another's well: better to die within (the sphere of) one's own duty: duty of other men" 84 periolous is the . It was accepted that there are specific hereditary occupations suitable for members of each class and they were not free to choose his occupation. All Brahmanical legal literature lay down the specific occupations suitable for members of each class in an unalterable religious context. For example, a son of Sudra's parents must always do a menial job. The Buddhist condemnation of this idea is seen where it is said that one's occupation gives a "class" name (kammana khattiyo 160 vasalo ... hoti) 85 , but it is merely a conventional designation (samanna eva lokasmim) denoting one's occupation and is of no genetical significance, since one does not follow a vocation or have an aptitude for it merely because one is born of parents who followed the same 86 In the Madhura Sutta 87 , it is pointed out that 4.8.4. the brahmanas' claim to superiority is a mere propagandist cry (~hosa) 88 . It gives four reasons for this. Among them, one is that superiority often depends not on one's high birth but on wealth that one possesses, and illustrates this point. A wealthy member of any of the four classes would find members of each of the other three classes to wait upon him . 89 and serve h 1m . The Jataka stories give frequent reference to people who were born in outcastes becoming as wealthy and even kings 90 . This shows the fallacy of the brahmanas' view that members of the four-fold order are obliged to perform . spec:t' f ':tc d u t ':tes ass:tgned to t h em 91 . 4.8.5. Thirdly, early Buddhism exposed the myth of the purity of the brahmanas. They claimed that all of them are descendants in one line of a particular person through a determinate number of generations since they have an unbroken lineage, they conceived the view that they are the highest class of men. This view has been condemned as baseless in many passages of the early Buddhist texts. 4.8.6. In the Ambattha Sutta 92 , the Buddha exposes the myth of the purity of class, of which the brahmanas were so conscious. Ambattha was a young brahmana who was very 161 aware of his lineage. He was once involved in a discussion with the Buddha about the purity of the Brahmanas' lineage. To the statement of Ambattha that among the four classes the .. brahmanas are of the highest born, and the other three classes are of their attendants, the Buddha points out that the .. so-called purity of ancestry was a myth by tracing Ambattha's lineage to an offspring of one of the slave girls of a Sakyan. "If one were to follow up your ancient name and lineage, on the father's and on the mother's side, it would appear that the Sakyas were once your masters, and that you are the offspring of one of their slave girls" 93 The concept of purity of birth is dismissed in 4.8.7. this ~utta on the grounds that most people are not aware of their true facts of their ancestry, and they cannot be certain that intermarriage strictly within the different groups alone or outside of it, was observed by their parents and grandparents even up to seven generations 94 This is again well illustrated in the story of Asita Devala detailed in the Assalayana Sutta. Asita Devala,a well-known brahmana priest, was scorned because of his dark complexion by seven other priests. He examined, and cross-questioned these and pressed for an answer concerning their claim to pure lineage: "I have heard this: 'Only brahmanas are of the highest class, all others are low; only brahmanas are of white complexion, 162 o.ll others are of dark complexion; only . brahmanas are pure, alJ others are impure; only brahmanas are legitimate sons of Brahma, born of his mouth •.. heirs to Brahma'. 'Is that true?' 'Yes, Sir' .. 'But do you know whether your mothers • consorted with brahmanas, not with others?' 'No' .. 'And do you know whether your mother's mothers even up to seven generations consorted only with brahmanas, not with others?' 'No'· 'And do you know whether your father father's fathers even up to seven generations consorted only with brahmana women, not with others?' 'No'· 'But do you know how there is & descent into a womb? • 'Yes, we do know. When there is a coitus of the parents, and when it is mother's season, and when a gandhabba 95 is present. It is on the conjunction of these three factors that there is a descent into a womb'. 'But do you know whether that being to be 16 3 born is a brahmana, or a ksatriya or a vaisya or a sudra?' 'We do not know'. 'This being the case, we do not know who we are?'" 96 . Moreover, to the statement of Assalayana that 4.8.8. only brahmanas are sons of Brahma ... heirs to Brahma, the Buddha answers: • "But Assalayana, brahmana wives of brahmanas are known to have their seasons e>nd to conceive and to give birth and to give suck, just like any other women. Yet these brahmanas, born of woman like everyone else, speak thus: 'Only brahmanas are the highest class ... • 97 . The Commentary explains, with reference to the countries where (~.supra. there are only two classes of people 4.8.1), thus: "If a brahmana and his wife go to trading in adjacent districts he may die there leaving no son. The wife in course of time may have sexual intercourse with a slave or workman. Any son born is a slave, although. 'pure' on his mother's side. If this son goes to trade in the Middle country and marries a brahmana girl, any son born will be 'pure' only on his mother's side• 98 • 164 4.8.9. The arguments against purity of birth are well brought out by Asvaghosa. "'Does a man become a brahmana by birth?' 'Well, now, if you say that when the mother is not a brahmana, and the father is a brahmana, the child should be a brahmana'. ·· I object to thfs because those who are born from maidservanLs, fathered • by a brahmana, will also be entitled to . be a brahrnana. But t.his is not a.greeable to the brahmanas. How can this be. In these days to find out a father of a brahmana is very doubtful. this. The reason is From the olden days, since the time of the first brahmana in the lineage, it js noticed the wives of the brahmanas had and still have illicit connection with men of all classes, even with the sudras. So to claim a man is a brahrnana by birth is absurd" 99 • 4.8.10. By such criticisms, the brahmanas' claim to superiority was gradually being weakened. This process was expedited by the ra tionc.l argumen Ls put forward by the Buddha. All in all, the Buddha points out that the pretentions of the brahmar:as are baseless, and that virtt:,e, which alone leads to purity, can be cultivated by any of the four classes. "For whosoever are in the bondage to the notions of birth or of lineage, or to the 165 pride of social position, or of connection by marriage, they are far from the best wisdom and righteousness. It is only by having got rid of all such bondage that one can realise for himself that supreme perfection in wisdom and in conduct" 4.9.1. is legal. 100 • The fourth argument against class distinction A special emphasis is placed in early Buddhism on equality before the law. Early Buddhism regards the law as an instrument for achieving certain ends, which are held to be socially desirable 101 Men are judged by the good and evil they do, and not by the stations of life in which they are placed by virtue of their birth (2.supra. 4.4.5). · 4.9.2. In the brahmanical legal system, there was a denial of equality before the law. In fact the effect of the class system is to be seen very clearly in the administration of justice. For example, Manu says: "Knowing what is expedient or inexpedient, what is pure justice or injustice, let the king examine the causes of suitors according to the order of varna" 102 • Moreover, the most prominent feature of the brahmanical lawcode is its class legislation. All brahmanical law-books prescribe different punishments for different classes for the same crime and offence 103 . The brahmanas claimed great privileges in law, and in every respect they demanded 166 precendence, honour and worship. They were regarded with such veneration that they were considered not liable to capital punishment even if they committed the gravest of crimes 104 Even though there was some moderation of their privileges in the later law-books, the brahmanas still suffered lighter punishments than the other three classes 105 • All brahma~ical law-books prescribe unequal treatment to the sudras in both criminal and civil law, and the punishments laid down for them were in general much more severe. The sudras had few privileges and rights, and little value was set on their life in law. A brahmana killing a sudra performed the same penance as for killing a cat or dog 4.9.3. 106 On the other hand, early Buddhism emphasized the fact that there should be no legal discrimination between the different classes. We shall discuss the importance of this attitude in chapter five. In the Madhura Sutta it is said that a criminal, whatever his class, would be equally subject to punishment for his crime: "If a noble, or a brahmana, or a merchant, or a worker, were to break into a house, or carry off loot, or commit a robbery, or make an ambush, or commit adultery, and if the men who had captured him were to show him to you, and say: 'This, your majesty, is the thief who is doing evil to you, decree what punishment you like for him?' -what would you do to him?" "We would kill him or ruin him or banish 167 him or deal with him as we liked. is the cause of this? What The designation of 'noble' or 'brahmana' or 'merchant' or 'worker' that once he had now disappeared for him, and he is reckoned simply as 'thief'. Indeed this being so, 107 the four classes are exactly the same" · . 4.10.1. is moral. The fifth argument against class distinction There are two main aspects of this argument. First, early Buddhism maintains that all men are equally liable to kammic consequences, irrespective of their status. 4.10.2. According to early Buddhism, the world in space-time is said to be a causal system, in which there operate physical laws (utu-niyama) , biological laws (bijaniyama), psychological laws (citta-niyama), kammic laws (kamma-niyama) pertaining to the order of acts and their consequences and laws pertaining to spiritual phenomena (dhamma-niyama) 108 . These causal laws are said to be neither . )1 0 9. . . . ( nlyatl . . ) or ln . d etermlnlStlc . . . ( a dh lcca-samuppanna d etermlnlstlc The operations of kamma are deemed to be of the same sort and occur in the realm of volitional acts and their consequences to the individual. 4.10.3. In these kammic consequences, as described in the early Buddhist texts, morally good actions (kusalakamma) tend to be followed by pleasant consequences or good effects to the individual. On the other hand, morally bad actions (akusala-kamma) tend to be followed by unpleasant 16 8 consequences or bad effects, and actions which partake of both good and bad (vokinna - a "mixed" nature) by a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant consequences or good or bad effects llO . 4,10.4. Since kammic correlations are not deterministic, kamma is only one of many factors conditioning the nature of ----- 111 . . ext1ngu1s . . h a bl e an d exper1ence , wh'l 1 e past k amma 1s modifiable in the context of one's present actions. Kamma is the law of cause and effect, of action and reaction. This is not different in principle from a law in the natural sciences. Therefore, kamma is not so-called "moral law" or "reward and punishment" because it does not constitute a divine command, a categorical imperative or a norm. Since every volitional action produces its effects or results, the individual is responsible for his good or bad actions (~.supra. 4.4.5). In this sense, early Buddhism recognizes that man's conscience is generally aware of right and wrong even though it is admitted to be sometimes fallible; but this does not come about through a supreme Being, who decides what is right and wrong. It is said: "Your conscience is aware whether i t is truth or falsehood Therefore be guided by one's conscience (attadhipateyya) as well as by public opinion (lokadhipateyya) and the dhamma or righteousness (dhammadhipateyya) 4.10.5. 112 . Accordingly, early Buddhism maintains that 169 human law must have a universally acceptable moral basis. Every individual is morally responsible for his private or official actions. This responsibility is personal and one is not obliged to perform unrighteous or iniquitous acts either for the sake of the king or for the sake of one's parents or children 113 . 4.10.6. Thus in the operation of kammic laws, there is no distinction of classes. The Madhura Sutta and the Assalayana Sutta point out that a noble, a priest, a merchant or a worker are subject to kammic recompense equally, irrespective of their status: "'If a man is a murderer, a thief, or an adulterer, or commits other evil actions, when his body breaks up on death does he pass on to the Downfall Niraya Hell if he is a ksatriya, .' va~sya, or sudra, but not i f he is a brahmana? • 'No, Sir. In such a case the same kamma is in store for all men, whatever their class. ' 'And if he avoids evil actions, will he go to heaven if he is a brahmana, but not if he is a man of the lower classes?' 'No, Sir. In such a case the same kamma effect awaits all men, whatever their class. 4.10.7. '·~ 114 . In the second aspect of the moral argument, 170 early Buddhism maintains that all are equally capable of moral development and individual differences in good or evil have little relationship with the classes. Men e.re inherently good and they should be educated in right and wrong so that they may transform t.hemselves from what they are to what they ought to be. Early Buddhism insists on the application of a universal standard of ethics applicabJ.e to all men and women, irrespective of any class privileges. 4.10.8. As already pointed out in chapter two and t.hree, the brahmanas established a rigid morality by insistence on the universality of ritual and sacrificial acts. With the development of the sacrificial cult the brahmanas fulfil their own aims and strive to establish their supremacy. Morality was evaluated on the amount of sacrifice involved and the motive behind it. Moreover, the institution of the four class system and the four stages in life helped to maintain and raise the stc.ndard of ethics. The highly educated brahmanas thus fulfilling their own desires claimed to be the mediators between man and his gods. They alone were capable of attaining the moral heights required for . . h God us . unlon Wlt 4.10.9. Early Buddhist ethics is based on the notion of the perfectibility of man. The Noble Eight-fold Path and the Four Cardinal Virtues of early Buddhism, for example, are intended to transform man, to bring out his inherent goodness. The essence of early Buddhist ethical teaching is summed up in the words of Dhammapada: "To refrain from all evil, to cultivate the 171 good and to cleanse the mind" 116 . According to this ethical context, a wrong act or an unskilful (akusala) act is defined as what tends to hinder the selfdevelopment of oneself (atta-vyabadhaya samvattati) as well as of othen: (pc>.ra-vyabadhaya). It is said: "A wise person does not think of hindering his own self-development, or another's or both his own and another's selfdevelopment, but he will always think of the welfare of himself, of ethers, of both himself and others; and in fact of the welfare of the whole world (sabbaloka-hitameva) " 117 . Furthermore, if one promotes or help others in a spirit of service and loving kindness, one produces happiness both in this world and in the next 118 . The importance of loving kindness towards all beings is well illustrated in the Metta Sutta: "May every living being, weak or strong, large or small, seen or unseen, near or far, born or yet unborn- may every living thing be full of joy. May none deceive anothE,r, or think ill of him in anyway whatever, or in anger or ill-will desire evil for another. Just as a mother, as long as she lives, cares for her only child, so should a man feel allembracing love to all li vi.ng beings. should feel boundless love for all the He 172 world, above below and across, unrestrained, without enmity. Standing, walking, sitting or lying down .•. he should be firm in the mindfulness of love. For this is what men call the Sublime Mood" 119 . 4.10.10. In contrast to the principle of love and understanding towards all beings, the brahmanical morality, as we said earlier, was based on ritualistic duty. Apart from this, the brahmanas promulgated numerous other rites and rituals. Some of these rites were called samskaras or purificatory rites. They were performed in order to purify oneself, to absolve oneself of sins accrued by evil actions. Among such purificatory rites are bathing at holy places, and springkling oneself with sacred water 120 . 4 .10 .ll. Early Buddhism condemned such purificatory rites which the brahmanas considered capable of washing away evil actions. The sarcastic remarks of Punna theri, show the early Buddhist attitude to such purificatory rites: "What ignorant person has told you ... that (ritual) ablution in water can free you from evil actions. In such a case all creatures living in water would go straight to heaven (on death). Those who produce evil actions such as butchers hunters • ,. - I " • thieves and murderers have only to splash themselves with water and • I 173 they are set free from evil actions. And if the stream carries away your evil ... , it should also take your merit, leaving you naked of both ..... 121 . 4.10.2. Moreover, there is a magical concept of purity and pollution associated with the class system. This is exposed in the Assalayanasutta: • "'What do you think about this Assalayana? Is it only a brahmana who, taking a backscratcher and bath-powder and going to a river, is capable of cleansing himself of dust and mud? And not a noble, a merchant, a worker?' 'That is not so ..• a noble, a merchant, a worker who ... is capable of cleansing himself of dust and mud.' 'With reference to this then ,. • ,. I on what strength and support do brahmanas say that they are from the best class .•. '" 4.10.13. 122 . What matters is not even external cleanliness but the purity of heart or the absence of pollution within: "Not flesh of fisb, nor fasting, nakedness, The shaven head, the mat·ted hair, nor sweat, Nor rough-skin garb, nor solemn celebration Of sacrificial fire, nor signal penance Of those who here seek immortality: Not hymns, ablutions, rites, feasts of the season 174 Will cleanse a man with doubt not overcome. With guarded senses, governed faculties, Fareth the poised in Dhamma finding joy, Mild, upright, bondless, rid of every ill: Things seen or heard soil not the rouser rap t 4 • 10 •.4. •.. "12 3 A person who practises the "highest life" is said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing" "after bathing in the water of love and compassion for one's fellow beings" 124 • Moral development is not a prerogative of people who are specially favoured by their birth, but is open to all and is within the reach of a11 125 . Since all are capable of good and evil, none is to be treated as a means to an end "like beasts in a sacrifice" man, whatever his class, is a gift of grea~ 126 . A virtuous value: "As in a herd of cattle, white or black, red, tawny, dappled, uniform dove-hued,Whatever the hue, - when a tamed bull is found, A beast of burden, mighty, fair and swift, Heedless of hue men yoke him to a load: So among men, wherever he be born, Noble or brahmana, merchant, serf, or castless, Just a mean scavenger, Whatever he be, He who is tamed, devout, just, virtuous, Truth-speaking, shamefaced, done with birth 175 and death, One perfect in the good life, load-free, Detached from worldly ties, whose task is done, Taintless, one gone beyond all states, not clinging To anything, one utterly released, To such a one, a dustless, lustless field, Abundant, fertile offering becomes ... 4.10.15. . .. In the Sonadanda Sutta 128 n 127 , the Buddha deals with the question of what are the: essent.ial characteristics which makes a man br~mana. According to the brahma~as, the essential characteristics of a brahmana, as stated in the above sutta are: "A brahmana is well born on both sides of pure descent; h~ ... , is a preacher of the sacred words, knowing the mystic verses by heart, one who has mastered the three Vedas, with indices, the rituals, the phonology, the exegesis and the legends, learned in phrases and grammar, versed in Lokayata sophistry, and in the signs on the body of a great man; he is handsome, pleasant to look upon, inspiring trust, gifted with great beauty of complexion, fair in colour, fine in presence and stately to behold; increases in virtue; he is virtuous, he is learned and . 176 wise, the first or it may be the second, among those who hold out the ladle" 129 . While rejecting the brahmanical conceptions, the Buddha lays down that virtue, wisdom and intelligence as the most . t .ant c h aracter1st1cs . . -h mana 130 . lrnpor of a true b ra Th ese characteristics are detailed in the Brahmajala sutta Samannaphala Sutta 0 131 , 132 , Ambattha Sutta 133 , Lohicca Sutt.a 134 - • q . an d 1n t h e Dh ammapada 135 .. 4.10.16. Asvaghosa, dealing with the question of what makes a true brahmana, says: "All are mortals and born from the same place (i.e. produced from the womb). All have (wi thi.n them, dirty things, such as) stools and urine. All have got the same senses and the same objects of senses. So, it is only by good conduct and merit that men become brahmanas. If a sudra possesses good conduct and merit, he . becomes a brahmana and if a brahmRna is without good actions, he is inferior to a sudra 4.10.17. ... ,136 The word "brahmana" is used in early Buddhism to denote a pereon leading a pnre c>.nd virtuous life. Thi.s is different from the definition of the term by the brahmanas. The racial sense of superiority associated wj. th the word "brahmana" is completely eclipsed in early Buddhism by the moral and spiritual sense of superiority. In early Buddhism, 177 the word "brahmana" is often synonymous with the word "arahant". origin. This word also is not purely Buddhistic in Before Buddhism, it was used to describe a person of high standing, not necessarily on moral or spiritual grounds. In its usage in Buddhism, it denotes a person who had achieved Nibbana and who has gained insight into the true nature of things 137 . The use of the words "brahmana'' and "arahant" in the sense of "virtuous", "perfect" is an eloquent te'stimony to how early Buddhism ignored class claims and distinctions. 4.11.1. The sixth argument against class distinction is religious. Early Buddhism maintains that all are capable of attaining salvation or spiritual development and individual differences in capacities have little relationship to the classes into which men and women happen to be born. Man's basic needs are fundamentally the same, though there are individual variations in their nature, owing to differences in the impact of his environment and his samsaric evolution. Whatever the differences may be, according to early Buddhism, men should realize their common lot and their common humanity. All are subject to disease, decay and death, but man's quest for security and lasting happiness never ceases. This is never satisfied by pandering to his desires, and yet he is capable of discovering the ultimate good and happiness. It is in this sense that early Buddhism proclaimed t he ' . 1 sp~r~tua 4.11.2. ' un~ty o f man k'~n d 138 . In contrast, the brahmanas claimed special 178 prerogatives not only in day to day affairs but also in religious affairs. They maintain a monopoly of religion merely because of their lust for power 139 . They denied the sudras admission into their religious orders, and even the possibility of spiritual and moral development, on the grounds that the sudras were born to serve and their nature was untruth itself 140 . affairs. The sudras had no rights in religious The ears of a sudra who hears the Veda are to be filled with,, mol ten lead and lac. if he recites it; His tongue is to be split his body is to be cut through if he . h'~s memory 141 preserves ~' t ~n God himself has assigned the exclusive right of teaching to the brahmanas 142 . considered to be gods in human form. They were Manu states that by his birth alone a brahmana is a deity even for the gods, and his teaching is authoritative for men because the Veda is its foundation; a brahmana, whether he is ignorant or learned, is a great divinity, just as the fire, whether carried forth or not . d f ort h , carr~e . ~s . . 142 a great d.~v~n~ty Therefore, it was considered to be a danger to the social order if they taught women', or any males not twice-born, or any twice-born males who did not share their views as to the ethics of teaching, and as to the privileges and prerogatives of the . pr~est 4.11.3. as teac h er 144 . The Buddha directed his attack on such religious exclusiveness and maintained that every one should be allowed to learn; that every one, having certain abilities, should be allowed to teach; and that, if he did teach, he should teach all and to all, keeping nothing back, 179 shutting no one out. But no man should take upon himself to teach others unless he had first been taught himself, and had also acquired the faculty of importing to others the truth he has gained himself 145 Moreover, the dogma of the efficacy of sacrifice by which the brahmanas gained their superior power was also criticised by the Buddha. 4.11.4. (see Ch.2) In contrast to the brahmanas, who were making a monopoly ,of religion, early Buddhism advocates a society in which all men irrespective of their social status are free to join religious orders and receive equal recognition as men of religion. Buddhist monks and nuns ignored class distinction both within the Sangha and in their relationship with the lay people and openly preached and practised the doctrine of equality of man 4.11.6. 146 A man, whatever his class, after becoming a bhikkhu and joining to an order, received equal respect and honour from the people. This is well illustrated in the Madhura Sutta: "'What do you think about this, Sir? If a noble, a brahmana, a merchant, a worker, having cut off his hair and beard, having dressed in saffron robes, should have. gone forth from home into homelessness, and is one that refrains from onslaught on creatures, from taking what has not been given, from lying speech, is a one-meal man, a brahma-farer, virtuous, of lovely 180 character- what would you do to him?' 'Good Kaccana, we should salute him or rise up before him or offer him a seat or give him robe material, almsfood, lodgings and medicines, or we should have proper watch and ward and guard provided for him'. of this?' 'What is the cause 'Good Kaccana, the designation of 'noble', 'brahmana', 'merchant', 'worker' that he once had has now disappeared for him, and he is reckoned simply as 'recluse' 'This being so, are these four classes exactly the same or not? this seem to you?' Or how does 'Indeed, good Kaccana, this being so, these four classes are exactly the same; I do not see any difference between them in this respect' " 14 7 . This is further illustrated by the simile of the rivers: "Just as the great rivers: the Ganga, the Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu and the Mahi entering the mighty ocean, lose their former names and identities and are termed simply ocean; even so these four classes: ksatriyas, brahmanas, vaisyas and sudras, . . going forth from home to homelessness, into the discipline of dhamma proclaimed by the Buddha, lose their former names and 181 lineages and are reckoned simply 'recluses' .. 148 In the Kannakatthala Sutta149 , the B.uddha says 4.11.6. that all men have the capacity to attain spiritual heights, irrespective of the class to which they belong, and it is this search for ultimate happiness which constitutes the religious quest of man. The King of Kosala once questioned the Buddha on this subject: • "These are the four classes: nobles, . brahmanas, merchants and workers, and if they made the proper efforts to achieve the spiritual heights, would there be between them any distinction or any difference?" The Buddha replies: "I, Sire, here speak of no difference at all. It is as though a man, bringing dry sticks from a teak tree were to produce a fire and heat were to result. Then another man, bringing dry s.ticks from a sal tree .•. ,another man from a mango tree and another man from a fig tree were to produce a fire and heat were to result. 'What do you think about this? Because of the different woods used for the fires, would there be any difference in what is produced, in flame as against flame, in hue as aginst hue, in brilliance as against 182 brilliance? • 'No sir'. 'Even so it is, with heat created energy, produced by striving. I do not recall of any difference whatsoever herein in regard to their salvation•• 150 . 4.11.7. Therefore, it is said that in the supreme perfection in wisdom and righteousness, there is no reference to the question of either of birth, or of lineage, or of ' pride. It is only by getting rid of all such bondage that one can realise for himself the supreme perfection 151 . It is said that if a man is proud of his birth, of clan, of his wealth, and of his family and despises his relatives, he will definitely come to a downfall 4.11.8. 152 . In all these passages, early Buddhism proclaims the oneness of mankind and maintains that pride of birth in a particular class as an obstacle to spiritual progress. Man should have within him capacities to develop his material and spiritual welfare without any barriers from fixed social rules 153 . Women are also considered to have similar potentialities to those men. They are also equally capable . . o f atta:Ln:Lng. N:L'bb-ana 154 . 4 .12 .1. It is in these arguments that early Buddhism proclaims the equality of man as a member of society. However, the spirit of egalitarianism in early Buddhism is open to some misconceptions. However, we may mention one misconception which has been held by some writers, who say that these arguments are chiefly directed against the 183 pretensions of the brahmanas in particular rather than against the class system in general. The early Buddhists, while fully accepting the brahmanical four-fold class system, made a change of placing the ksatriyas, the class to which the Buddha belongs, before the brahmanas in the class . h y 155 h :terarc 4.12.2. If we consider these arguments carefully we see that they do not merely represent a trend of ksatriya opposition to the brahmanas' claim to superiority, but to establish the fact that all men, regardless of their individual differences, are on an equal footing (samasama). To uphold the fact that man belongs to a single species, the early Buddhists directed their attack towards the brahmanas because the foundation of social inequality was laid down by the brahmanas, who were formulating the required sanctions for perpetuating the system, by the methods of theological persuasion and examples. Therefore, the early Buddhists attack on them is quite justifiable. The Buddha equally denounced the ksatriya claims to superiority. He emphatic- ally pointed out the fact that it is not one's birth, but one's actions and good conduct that make one a brahmana or a sudra. 4.12.3. Though it is constantly pointed out in the Pali texts that all men are born equal, there is one statement by the Buddha which has been taken seriously and misinterpreted by some writers to mean that the Buddha championed the l55A superiority of the ksatriyas over the brahmanas. It occurs in the Ambattha Sutta: •• 184 . "The ksatriya is the best of those among . those folk who put his trust in lineage. But he who is perfect in wisdom and righteousness, he is the best among gods and men" 156 • If the statement is carefully studied in its context, it will be seen that in this discourse the Buddha employs a dialectical method of argument. He takes up some of the .. criteria wJ:rich Ambattha accepts as proof of class superiority and shows that when they are actually applied to the context of society they establish the superiority of the ksatriyas and not the brahmanas- thus proving that the brahmanas' claim to superiority in respect of these criteria is baseless. Lineage is of little or no account, but if it is taken as the criterion then it is the ksatriyas who should claim . . t y 157 super~or~ We have seen earlier (~.supra. 2.5.2) that even in the Vedic texts there are many passages which illustrate the de facto inferiority of the brahmanas to the ruling class. Such references lend enough historical support to this deduction. However, the important fact that we should note in that statement is that he who is supreme above all is one "who is perfect in wisdom and righteousness", a supremacy not based on the claims of birth. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that the Buddha or early Buddhism did not champion the cause of the superiority of the ksatriyas over the brahmanas. 4.13.1. Thus we see that early Buddhism stands for a common humanity or unity of mankind. Early Buddhism accepts 185 that there are individual variations in the nature of man, owing to the differences in the impact of his environment and kammic factors. in the nature of man. Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity He therefore needs to be treated equally and afforded an equal opportunity for developing his potentialities and serving the human race which he belongs to. Therefore, the early Buddhist conception of equality of man allows for no chosen class or caste, chosen race, chosen creed or c~osen individual. 186 CHAPTER FIVE ATTITUDE TO LAW 5.1.1. In this final chapter, we shall examine the early Buddhist attitude to law and the internal polity of the Sangha, as they appear in the early Buddhist texts. 5.1.2. The organization of the Sangha interests us because of the importance attached to the value of the individual ·within the Sangha and the role of law in furthering the aims and objectives and the life of the Sangha. The Sangha was modelled on democratic principles, and the concept of the international Sangha forms an analogy for the early Buddhist conception of the international political order. 5.2.1. We should point out, before taking the matter up for actual discussion, that some writers have expressed the view that there is no Buddhist law. For example, Rhys Davids writes that in the strict sense of the word, there is no Buddhist law. There is only an influence exercised by Buddhist ethics or changes that have taken place in customs. No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay or clerical, has ever created or promulgated any law (~.supra. 1.4.5.). 5.2.2. It is difficult to agree with this view. reasons for this are many. The If we ask the question "What is law?", it is difficult to find a precise answer, and there are a variety of answers to the question. The word "law" is 187 used in many different ways and many different senses. Therefore, it is often associated with unclear meanings. The best way to see what this word means is to examine how people in fact have used it in various ways and contexts. 5.2.3. The early Buddhist texts distinguish between law and what is morally right, using the words niti, nyaya or ~inaya for the former and dhamma for the latter. This distinction is to be found in English, which distinguishes law from right, though in most European languages the terms for law and right coincide 1 It is not possible, however, to draw any significant conclusions from linguistic facts, since we cannot say that those who did make or failed to make the distinction in language have had more just laws than 2 the others . 5.2.4. As we have already shown in chapter three, secular legal texts were composed by Buddhist monks in countries where Buddhism flourished, and these laws were adopted by the state. They were based on Hindu legal texts, whose content and character were altered in the light of Buddhist doctrines. Kings of various Buddhist countries enacted codes of secular law and formulated constitutions on the basis of Buddhist moral principles. Criminal and civil laws were to some extent transformed in conformity with such principles. The attitude to war and the conduct of war was affected by Buddhism. There is also a developed philosophy of the state and law in Buddhist texts and a statement of the principles that should govern inter-state relations. 188 According to the theory of social contract in early Buddhism, which we discussed in chapter two, human law is the will of the human soveriegn. The capacity of the sovereign to lay down laws for his subjects derives from the social contract, which is binding by virtue of dhamma. foundation of human law. Dhamma is the ultimate The sovereign has no legitimate power but that which was conferred on him by dhamma and the social contract (see ch.2). 5.3.1. General views on problems of law and punishment are to be found in several Buddhist texts, especially in Jataka stories. In one of the Jataka stories it is said that the king should judge a case fairly and justly, without making 3 mistakes and without coming under the influence of self-will . It is also said that there are four ways of falling into injustice or untruth. 4 and fear . They are prejudice, hatred, ignorance It was felt that in the administration of justice the judge should administer law without fear, favour, folly or antagonism. A king who acts in favour of a false complaint made by his priest is advised in the Rathalatthi Jataka: "It is wrong for one who is the fountain of justice to act without trying the case. You should always act after hearing everything" 5 The following advice testifies to the high standard of justice recognized by early Buddhism. "A king should punish an offence. He should hear no plea at all without thoroughly investigating it himself in all points. 189 A king who punishes an offence before he tries it is like a man born blind, who eats his food with all bones and flies. A king who punishes the non-offenders and let free the offenders is like one blind upon a rugged highway He who examines all well in things and administers justice fairly and rightly is (truly) worthy of sitting in judgement ... " 5.3.2. 6 The Mahavastu gives the following advice to a king who is hearing a lawsuit: "A king should not fall into the power of wrath. Rather let him curb his anger, forlO king, neither the interests nor the duty of a man thrive when he is angry. But when a king is not subject to wrath, his interests, his duty and his wisdom always thrive. his anger. Hence he should restrain When a dispute arises, he should pay equal attention to both parties to it, and hear the arguments of each side and actaccording to what is right. He should not act out of favouritism, hatred, fear or folly. He should hear the arguments of each side and act according to what is right" 5.3.3. 7 Inspired by the Buddhist principles of 190 righteousness and equality, Asoka instructed his officials to employ impartial justice in their judicial dealings. " ... Just as one entrusts his child to an experienced nurse, and is confident that she is able to care for the child satisfactorily, so my rural officers have been appointed for the welfare and happiness of the country people. In order that they may fulfil their functions fearlessly, confidently, and cheerfully, I have given them independent authority in judgement and punishment. But it is desirable that there should be uniformity (samata) in judicial procedure and punishment. now on: This is my instruction from 'Men who are imprisoned or sentenced to death are to be given three days respite. Thus their relations may plead for their lives, or, if there is no one to plead for them, they may make donations or undertake a fast for a 8 better rebirth in the next life ... • . 5.3.4. The brahmanical tradition stressed the importance of sanctions in law based on the deterrent and retributive theories of punishment that law is force incarnate. 9 It upheld the theory For example, Manu says: "For the (king's) sake the Lord formerly created his own son, Punishment, the 191 protector of all creatures, (an incarnation 10 of) dharma, formed of brahmana's glory" . -----. The study of law was itself called the "science of punishment" (da~~a-niti) 11 . The only way that the whole world might be kept pure and righteous was by the fear of punishment 12 For example, the Mahabharata says: "Force or the fear of punishment rules all beings, force alone protects them, when people are asleep it is force that keeps awake, the wise recognize the law (dh~) to be force" 13 . Ultimately all law and order depends on force or the fear of punishment. It is said that wicked people do not commit crimes for four reasons, fear of punishment by the king, fear of divine vengeance, fear of the other world and fear of society 14 5.3.5. In contrast, early Buddhism holds that although punishment has a place in law, the law itself is based on consent resulting from understanding, friendliness and mutual interest. As stated earlier in chapter three, it was on the unsatisfactory nature of private punishment and in the interest of fairer and more efficient justice that the people delegated their functions to a king (~.supra. 3.5.4). Another fact that we have noted in chapter three is that the suppression of crime merely through punishment was considered to be a futile thing, but that the planning of economic welfare would lead to a happy and peaceful society 3.8.10). (~.supra. Moreover, the punishments mentioned are humane and • 192 confined to reproving, warning and banishment, with no mention of corporal punishment. One of the Jataka stories explains that the kings who followed Mahasammata were so efficient that they kept crime at a minimum. There was no greater punishment than that of beating, warning and banishment (talana-garahana-pabbajana). • There was, indeed, no cutting off of hands and feet and execution (hatthapada-cchedana-ghatana) . These things came into existence after the ancient principles of government were forgotten during the times of cruel kings 5.3.6. 15 Early Buddhism believed in the inherent goodness of man. In this respect the mind of a man is compared to a piece of gold ore, which is said to have the defilements of dust and sand, gravel and grit, but when it is purified it shines with its natural lustre, as he attains the transcendent mind 16 . These defilements are classified as gross, medium and subtle. The gross defilements are misconduct with regard to body, speech and mind; the medium defilements are lustful and covetous thought, thoughts of destruction and ill-will and the subtle defilements are racial and national feelings, and personal or egoistic pride 17 5.3.7. The belief in the inherent goodness of man led to the view that if man is educated in right and wrong, he is likely to be law-abiding. The belief in the possibility of transforming human nature, the need to deal with criminals with mercy and understanding 18 , and the 19 3 doctrine that officials are morally responsible for the acts they do even in their official capacities (ra;no rajakaraniyam hetu) 19 resulted in the abolition of capital punishment. It is said that the king must follow a middle course between extreme severity and laxity in punitive measures, for punishment was regarded as a necessary evil of kingship 20 However, it is also said that if punishments are necessary, they should be awarded with careful measures (nissamma), proportionate to the nature and degree of the offence committed 21 , but without harsh punishment 5.3.8. 22 It follows from this that the wrong-doer should be punished primarily with a view to reform and secondarily for deterrent reasons but never retributively or . d.~ct~ve . 1 y 23 v~n In the Ratnavali 24 , which is a "discourse to a king" (raja-parikatha) , Nagarjuna expresses his attitude to criminals: "You should punish them out of compassion and from a desire to turn them into worthy persons as you do as regards worthy sons; and you should not be moved by hatred or by desire for material gain" 25 He further adds that as a consequence of compassion, mercy should be shown to those who are punished, imprisoned or beaten in accordance with law; prisoners should be well looked after, no one should be imprisoned for life, and there should be no mutilation or execution of criminals, though . h ment ~s . b an~s . perm~tte d26 194 5.4.1. A careful perusal of the juridical system of early Buddhism as recorded in the Vinaya texts shows that the Vinaya rules are not merely metaphorical or figurative. There are certain rules, which consist of positive moral instructions, but these also are to be called laws in a proper sense. Divine laws, in the strict sense of the term, have no place in early Buddhism (~.supra. 5.2.4). The laws which are promulgated by the Buddha, as the founder and head of the Order, consist of enforceable rules of conduct, precisely stated and codified. There are also instructions on juridical procedures laid down in the Vinaya texts for trial and conviction in case of infringement. The Vinaya laws were promulgated to promote the health and longevity of the Sangha. Even to-day the Theravada Sangha abides by a common doctrine known as the Dhamma and a common constitution and code of laws called Vinaya. Moreover, the various Mahayana and Tantric sects, though several of them have much modified the rules of monastic conduct in practice, still respect their own versons of the Vinaya Pitaka. This Vinaya is considered as binding on all Sanghas, present or future. 5.5.1. In order to have a better understanding of the Buddhist Vinaya laws, we must begin with the formation of the Sangha. monks 27 At first the Sangha was formed with five , and, soon after its establishment, it received considerable support from the mercantile class. The Sangha was established primarily to give the individual a training in the higher morality, the higher thought and higher wisdom 28 At first, admission to the Sangha, like the higher ordination, 195 was given by the Buddha himself and no legislation was enacted, since, according to the tradition, the Sangha consisted entirely of monks who had attained Arahantship 29 , and thus would have no need of rules and regulations. 5.5.2. At this stage, there were sixty monks. The Buddha addressed to them thus: "Walk, monks, on tour for the welfare and happiness of mankind, out of compassion for the world, for the weal, welfare and happiness of gods and men. Let not two of you go in the same direction" 30 . The monks who went on tour to teach Dhamma brought to the Buddha persons from various districts and from different states for admission and ordination. As this procedure was cumbersome for all concerned, the Buddha allowed the monks to admit and ordain new-comers by the repetition of the . 31 formula of refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha Apparently this was the second stage in devising regulations for admitting persons to the Order, the first being represented by the formula spoken by the Buddha, "Come, monk". 5.5.3. With the gradual growth of the number of monks in the Sangha, these methods of admitting and ordaining did not last very long. We can see from the statement of the Buddha himself the need for and the purpose of rules and regulations and of legislation. When one of his disciples wanted to know why the religion of some enlightened teachers lasted long while that of others did not do so, his reply was 196 that a religious dispensation lasted long because its founder had given a detailed exposition of his teachings and also "enacted a code of rules or precepts" (pa;:i;:iattam sikkhapadam) and "enforce legislation binding on them" patimokkham) 32 . (anuddittha~ Whereupon the disciple requested the Buddha to enact rules and enforce legislation. The reply given was that the Buddha does not make known rules or precepts or enforce legislation until conditions leading to misdemeanours appear in the Order, and that the time was not yet ripe for such things. It was only when the Order had attained long standing, that misdemeanours would arise. When this happened the Buddha would make known the rules or precepts and also enforce legislation in order to curb the conditions arising f rom . d emeanours 33 . m~s It is said that at a later stage in the history of the Sa~gha, towards the end of the Buddha's life, the number of monks who had attained Arahantship was porportionally less, but the code of monastic law had expan d e d 5.5.4. . ~n . s~ze 34 Commenting on the Buddha's reply that the time was not yet ripe for legislation, but that it would eventually come, Jayatilleke writes: "We notice here that legislation is considered unnecessary or superfluous, where conformity can be ensured without it but that legislation makes for the perpetuity of an institution and the aims and aspirations for which it stands. At the same time there is a constant reminder 197 that legislation alone is of no avail. Legislation itself contributes to a legalistic frame of mind. People tend to conform to the letter of the law forgetting the spirit in which the laws wereenacted. Others find ways and means (as happened in the Sangha during the time of the Buddha himself, contributing to the growth of the law) of evading the law by ' conforming to the letter of the law and violating the spirit. The moral that is generally drawn is that law-abiding behaviour must result eventually from charity, love and understanding and not from a fear of the sanctions of the law• 5.5.5. 35 • The earliest Vinaya rule, according to the tradition, was laid down when a certain monk, who had received initiation and was ordained, had sexual intercourse . h h"~s f ormer w~t "f w~ e 36 • Since the establishment of the Sangha, it had hitherto fulfilled its aims and aspirations under the instructions of the Buddha. The way in which breaches of Dhamma steadily increased, demanding further legislation on the part of the Buddha, might be interpreted as a parallel to the beginnings and gradual increase of evil customs with the decline of the world, according to the tradition of the Agga~na Sutta, which we have discussed in chapter two. As more and more monks infringed the guidelines, it became necessary to lay down rules in order to regulate 198 the outward conduct of the Sangha. The term dhamma-vinaya, used constantly in the Vinaya texts to indicate the two factors which govern the Sangha. The word denotes "doctrine- cum-discipline" or "philosophy-cum-law". The word Vinaya in the general sense means "discipline" and in the special sense, "the law and constitution of the Sangha" 5.5.6. 37 It was only after the misbehaviour of the uxorious monk, whose example was soon followed by others, some of whom had found less worthy objects of sexual desire, that a situation arose making it necessary to lay down laws of moral conduct. These were in the form of "rules of training or precepts" (sikkapada) voluntarily accepted as binding by the monks. There were ten main rules of morality or precepts (dasasikkhapada) to be adopted by one who is entering the Sangha, and an increasing number of lesser regulations, making a final total of 150 in the texts 38 . The Buddha gives the following reasons for enacting such a code: "I am enacting rules of training for the monks, for the well-being of the community, for the convenience of .the Community, in order to curb miscreants, for the ease of well-behaved monks, in order to restrain misbehaviour in the present, in order to check future misbehaviour, in order that those who have no faith (in this religion) may acquire faith, in order that those who have faith may be further strengthened 199 in their faith, in order that the good doctrine (dharnma) may last long, and for the promotion of discipline" 39 5.5.7. The laws of morality are meant to serve the interests of the Buddhist Community as a whole, making things easy for those whose behaviour is good and serving as a deterrent to others. They are also intended to promote the discipline of the Order, which is considered a good in itself • • They are also laid down in order to seek and promote public confidence. The Sangha was dependent on the laity for its material needs and in .turn it had to perform the duty of educating the public and giving them moral and spiritual guidance. Thus we see a utilitarian and pragmatic motive behind the legislation, as well as an attempt to maintain the high standards of conduct required for spiritual progress 5.5.8. 40 Miss Horner makes the following observation, summarising, as it were, the true relationship that obtained between the Sangha and lay supporters: "For the believing laity, though naturally not to the forefront in the Vinaya, are in a remarkable way never absent, never far distant. They perpetually enter into the life of the Order as supporters, critics, donors, intensely interested It seems that they were deeply anxious for its success. Thus the Vinaya does not merely lay down sets of rules whose 200 province was confined to an internal conventual life. This was led in such a way as to allow and even to encourage a certain degree of inter-communication with the lay supporters and followers, no less than with those lay-people who were not adherents of the faith. What was important, was that the monks should neither abuse their dependence on the former, nor alienate the latter, but should regulate their lives so as to give no cause for complaint. With these aims in view, conduct that was not thought seemly for them to indulge in had to be carefully defined, and it became drafted in rules and precepts• 41 5.5.9. Later, when the rules or monastic laws were codified, the set of legally binding rules (patimokkha) was formally recited every fortnight at a formal meeting of each Sangha. The rules were codified and enforced binding on monks since the central issue of authority and obligation of the Sangha was raised under the question of obedience and coercion, in answer to such question as: "Why should a monk obey the Order?" and "If he disobeys may he be coerced?". The going for refuge to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha was abolished from the normal procedure of ordination, but it was retained as a formula to be repeated when novices and former members of the other sects were accepted on probation 201 as candidates for ordination 42 • By abolishing the old formula, admission and ordination took a more formal character. This can be seen from the statement of the Buddha himself: "From this day forth, monks, I abolish that ordination by going to the three refuges which I allowed. I allow you, monks, to ordain by a formal act consisting of a motion and a resolution put three times" 43 . According to this statement, it is evident that the Order along has the authority, the power and the legal right to . 44 or d a~n . 5.5.10. In addition, the candidate for ordination now has to have a preceptor. After a brief period of probation and experienced and capable monk, who is well-versed in Dhamma and Vinaya, of a particular monastery would propose at a formal meeting of the Sangha that such and such a person be ordained by such and such a preceptor. The matter was placed before the assembly as a formal motion, which was read thrice, and if none dissented it was deemed to have unanimously passed. The formalism of this procedure can be illustrated as follows: "The Order should be informed by an experienced, competent monk, saying: 'Honoured Sirs, let the Order hear me. This (person) so and so wishes for ordination from the Venerable so and so. So and so asks the Order for ordination 202 through the preceptor so and so. is the motion. This Honoured Sirs, let the Order hear me ... If the ordination of so and so through the preceptor so and so is pleasing to the venerable ones, let them be silent; he to whom it is not pleasing should speak. And a second time I speak forth this matter ... time ..• And a third It is pleasing to the Order, therefore they are silent .,45 This same formula is repeated to this day as a preliminary to the ordination of a Buddhist monk; it vividly illustrated the legalistic aspect of the life of the Buddhist Sangh.a, a feature which appeared very early in its history. It is evident from the Vinaya texts that the 5.6.1. legally binding rules (patimokkha) were enforced because the Order was growing and that, in order to meet this expansion, it had to be carefully controlled 46 the Order, corrupt monks appeared. . With the expansion of These monks caused disputes, contentions and even brawls. There were also an unspecified number of people seeking for admission to the Order, but there were no proper rules as to .who was eligible for it. Therefore the inner life of the Order had to be safeguarded with planned and carefully arranged rules and regulations. At the same time, they were necessary in order to maintain ties with the secular society 5.6.2. 47 The word patimokkha has been translated variously, 203 and many interpretations have been put forward. some of them. "from sins" 48 Let us take According to Oldenberg, it means freedom . He further adds that the list of those offences which deserved punishment or some kind of expiation was, at a very early period, drawn up for use at confessional. meetings. This list was read out to the assembled monks, and each one was asked whether he knew himself to be free from the sins there named. This list is called the patimokkha 49 Miss Hornercriticises Oldenberg's interpretation and points out that the monks were not asked, as Oldenberg states, whether they were "free from the sins there named". The word for "free" or "freed" would have been vimutta. What they were asked was whether they were parisuddha, pure in the matter of having kept the rules, therefore outwardly pure. Moreover, she points out that the word "sin" is not a Buddhist conception 50 5.6.2. The word patimokkha is defined in the Mahavagga as the "face, head of all good states" 51 , but, as Winternitz points out, this derivation "is quite impossible" 52 . He himself is inclined to explain patimokkha as "that which is to be redeemed" 53 . Rhys Davids and Oldenberg say that according to the derivation of the word pa~i (Skt. prati) ~~ it means "to free one-self, to get rid of"; and it is precisely through the patimokkha recitation and answering the questions that the members of the Sangha were set free from the offences they had incurred. Therefore, patimokkha means "disburdening, getting free" 54 . But Miss Horner points out that it was not the getting free that was of such importance 204 as the being bound, and that the assumption is that the rules, as binding, should be followed and obeyed, and that a monk should be "bound by the restraint of the patimokkha" 55 . (patimokkhasanvarasanvutu) 5.6.3. S. Dutt, taking the etymological interpretation of the word prati as "against" and moksa as "scattering" sees it as "bond". He says that it is an external bond of union 56 . d to convert t h e sect 1nto . . d ev1se a re 1"1g1ous Or d er Rhys Davids and Stede say that the word has the "sense of binding, obligatory, obligation", and literally it means "that which should be made binding" 57 Miss Horner, in her translation of the Vinaya texts, left the word untranslated, but says that it means "bond" and refers as "binding legislation" 5.6.4. 58 The P.atimokkha consists of two parts, the Bhikku-patimokkha and Bhikkuni-patimokkha, for monks and nuns respectively. In the first of these, which is the most important, and upon which the second is based, 227 offences that may be committed by monks are classified under seven categories in a descending order. (ii) sanghadisesa, (v) pacittiya, (vi) (iii) aniyata, They are: (i) parajika, (iv) nissaggiya-pacittiya, ~~idesaniya and (vii) sekhiya 59 . There are also a number of other kinds of offences like thullacciya, dukkata and dubbhasita, which were later additions 5.6.5. 60 . The worst category of offences grouped under these seven headings is parajika and the lightest one is sekhiya. The parajika offences are: (ii) theft, (i) sexual intercourse, (iii) murder or abetting of murder and (iv) pretence 205 . . . 1 per f ect1ons . 61 o f possess1ng sp1r1tua According to the Vinaya, any monk who violates. these basic commands of monastic discipline is automatically excluded from the Order 62 . Sanghadisesa is a class of offence whose punishment must be meted out by some formal administration on the part of the Order 63 . Aniyata is an offence the guilt of which uncertain, and which requires the investigation of evidence. Where the evidence is not clear offences of the other . . 64 categor1es •b ecome an1yata Nissagiya - pacittiya is a c.lass of offence which involves the infringement of the rule that the monk should abandon all, or almost all, his personal possessions except those few permitted by the Buddha Pacittiya offences require expiation 66 . 65 Patidesaniya offences ought to be confessed and are normally pardoned by the Order . h a warnlng . Wlt not to repeat t h em 67 good breeding. Sekhiya is a rule of It gives instruction to be observed by a monk in his daily life. Breaches of sekhiya rules are not treated as offences and no punishment is therefore prescribed for them 68 . We do not propose to scrutinize the various types of offences which are categorized under these seven headings, as this would divert us from the present discussion. 5.7.1. The jurisdiction of each Sangha extended only as far as its geographical boundaries or ''territorial limits" (sima), which were strictly defined, and this was another innovation of the Buddha 69 . These Sanghas extended beyond the limits of political units and there was constant intercourse between them. The singular word Sangha was used to denote all the Buddhist communities collectively and was 206 designated "the Sangha of the four quarters, of the present and the future" - . 70 (agatanagatassa catuddisassa sanghassa) . They all abode by the same Dhamma andthe same Vinaya, except for the fact that those rules which were proposed and adopted by one Sangha and had only a local relevance were not binding on another Sangha unless that Sangha decided to adopt them 71 . 5.7.2. Executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the Sangha 72 , and the decision of the Sa~gha, if necessary, were enforced by the secular state 73 , which did not in any way interfere with the authority or jurisdiction of the Sangha over its members 74 . s. Dutt, for example, writes that the Sangha as it developed became virtually one of the constituent communities of the body politic. It possessed, above all, a well-developed and well-organized body of laws, which enjoyed state recognition, and to that extent it was a part of the civil law 5.7.3. 75 . Authorities on ancient Indian plity,,like Kautilya, specially advise kings to respect and enforce the rules made by corporations, religions or secular, for the discipline of their members, and laid down that infringements of the laws of such bodies were punishable by the secular state 76 . Moreover, there have been many instances where the secular state came to be involved with the Sangha over legal matters. For instance, we are told how the royal officers accepted the verdict of the Sangha in a case of alleged theft by some monks 77 . 207 At the same time, the Buddha advises the 5.7.4. monks to conform their behaviour to the royal wishes (anujanami bhikkhave rajunam anuvattitum) 78 . Moreover, the rules regarding admission to the Order were so based as to avoid all inconvenience to the secular state, in that soldiers and slaves were excluded. For example, we are told that the monks once ordained "some soldiers. But this resulted in a complaint against the monks, and the Buddha thereupon prohibited•the admission of officers of state to the Order 79 . This is a clear proof that the monks had to adapt themselves to certain given situations. 5.7.5. We are thus assured that the laws of Vinaya are legally valid, since they received the state's recognition. They did not apply, moreover, to a narrow private body, but to an international institution, the sa~gha of the present and future 80 . Four formal sources of law (cattaro mahapadesa) are mentioned, namely the claim that a rule was (i) promulgated by the Buddha, Sangha, (ii) by a unitary (iii) by a body of learned experts of the law and (iv) by a single learned expert of the law 81 , but it is said that the authority of all four claims should be investigated and confirmed, and the laws adopted only if they are in conformity with the spirit of the existing Dhamma and Vinaya 5.7.6. 82 . The Sangha is deemed a juridical person having a legal personality of its own, and it has the right of owning property, which is vested in the monastic community. The Sa~gha is a system in which property is held in common. 208 B.K. Mukerjee writes in the following words: "The Buddhist Sangha was undoubtedly a juristic person and was capable of holding property in the same way as a private person could ... the ordinary formalities of gifts were observed by the donor when he wanted to dedicate any property to the Buddhist congregation, and the gift was accepted on behalf of the Sangha by its head or representative. The property did not become the private property of the ostensible donee, nor could it be said to belong jointly to all the monks who were members of the congregation at that particular time. It was the property of the congregation itself which could not but be deemed to be a separate entity for this purpose and which continued to exist even if all its members died out or were replaced by other people" 5.7.7. 83 That all property was vested in the universal Sangha and lent to the individual for use is clear from several passages in the Vinaya texts. For example: "Monks, the Sangha is the owners of the bowl and robes of a monk who has passed away. But truly those who tend the sick are of great service. I approve of your 209 giving through the Sangha the three robes and bowl to those who tended the sick and also of your distributing through the (resident) Sangha in their presence the light goods and the light requisites that are there; but whatever heavy goods and heavy requisites that are there, these belong to the Sangha of the four quarters of the present and future - they are--not to be disposed of and not to be divided up"84 5.8.1. Chapter nine of the Mahavagga contains a thorough discussion about the validity and invalidity of the formal acts that the Order can carry out. To sum up, the following would be the essential conditions of a valid act. (i) The Order must be complete. (ii) Those who are unable to attend due to illness or some other reason should ask leave to be absent, and those who are present should not protest against the proceedings of the assembly. (iii) The proposal of the motion. (iv) The proclamation of the resolution once or thrice. (v) Consent to the proposal given by silence. When there is a division of opinion, it becomes a case of 210 dispute. But when the matter is decided by a valid act, it becomes fit to stand, and protests against its validity will be of no avai1 5.8.2. 85 . Formal acts of the Sangha may be either disciplinary of non-disciplinary 86 These acts are deemed invalid if the constitutional procedure laid down is violated. This would eventually lead to a dispute. The Vinaya texts • discuss the methods of conducting trials and settling various disputes (adhikarana-samatha). four kinds of dispute. (il It is said that there are They are: Vivadadhikarana - the disputes which ~ may arise on the interpretation given to certain specified matters such as Dharnrna, Vinaya, the teachings, practices, or ordinances of the Buddha, and the nature of ecclesiastical punishments. (ii) Anuvadadhikarana - the disputes which may arise regarding the state of a monk's opinion, morals, character, conduct, or manner of life. (iii l Apattadhikarar;a - the disputes which may arise on the offences mentioned in section 5.6.4. (iv) Kiccadhikarana - disputes which may arise regarding the procedure 211 of a formal act and the decision given by the Order, or the duties and obligation of the sangha 87 Chapter four of the Cullavagga discusses thoroughly the different methods of settling these disputes 88 5.8.3. The general method of settling disputes is confrontation (sammukhavinaya). It involves four conditions. First, the trial should be held in the presence of the accused monk. It is said: "Monks, a formal act of censure or guidance or banishment or reconciliation or suspension should not be carried out against monks who are not present. Whoever should carry one out, there is an offence of wrong-doing" 89 Secondly, the trial should be held in the presence of the full assembly authorized to conduct it. Thirdly, the accused should be charged according to the letter and the spirit of the law (i.e. Dhamma and Vinaya) under which he is charged and an account of the procedure for settlement as laid down by the Buddha should be recited, and finally, he should be tried in the presence of the complainant 90 This four-fold confrontation is necessary for the settlement of all disputes. If, for any reason, a local Sangha is unable to settle a dispute by means of confrontation, the case is referred to another Sangha and it is settled there if the latter agrees 5.8.4. Another method of settling disputes is 91 212 sativinaya, which is a disciplinary proceeding under appeal to the accused monk's own conscience. If a monk is wrong- fully accused and is found innocent, the Order must repudiate the charges and must take action against the monk who brought the false accusation 92 . If a monk committed an offence while insane, acquittal on the ground of insanity is granted. This is granted under one of three conditions: (i) the accused confesses the offence committed when reminded of it, (ii)• the accused cannot remember it owing to lapse of memory, mind 93 5.8.5. (iii) the accused continues in an insane state of . An attempt should be made to secure a confession by reminding the person of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, as far as the assembly was aware. This method is called pati~natakarana. . . This is followed by the formal charge, after which the trial preceeds, giving a full opportunity for the accused to present his case and point of view 94 5.8.6. If in the course of the proceedings the Order feels that it is difficult to come to a decision, it may appoint a committee (ubbahika) to settle the matter. "Honoured Sirs, let the Order listen to me. While we are investigating this legal question both endless disputations arose and of not one speech was the meaning clear. If it seems right to the Order, the Order may agree to appoint a 213 committee to settle this legal question. This is the motion ... If the Order is pleasing to appoint a committee, the Order should be silent and if any one is not pleased let him speak ..... 5.8.7. 95 If this committee finds it impossible to decide the matter delegated to it, it should report back to the Order, who may then settle it by the decision of the . . ma]or~ty 96 This is carried out by members who are fully ordained after their periods of probation and who have one vote each. Voting is always on a resolution formally moved once or thrice according to the importance of the matter under discussion. Voting is by means of marked voting tickets with different signs (salaka), which are distributed and subsequently counted and the majority opinion ascertained 97 Moreover, voting is carried out by a secret 5.8.8. method (gulhaka), open method (vivataka), or by the . .. . whispering method (sakanna-jappaka). A special officer called the "arbitrator" (salaka-gahapaka - literally meaning "votetaker"), noted for his impartiality, knowledge of the law and voting procedure is unanimously elected by a formal resolution of the assembly to take charge of voting. The arbitrator, having marked the voting tickets with different signs, proceeds to take votes in either of three methods. either call upon each monk and speak to him: He may "This ticket is for one of such a view, this ticket is for one of such a view. Take whichever you like"; when he has taken it, he . 214 should be told: "Do not tell anyone about it", or he may call upon each monk and whisper the same thing into his ear. After voting has finished and has been counted either by secret or whispering methods, if the arbitrator finds that the majority profess what is not Dhamma and thinks that voting was wrongly taken, the result should be rejected. On the other hand, if he finds that the majority profess Dhamma and thinks voting was rightly taken, the result should be announced. who profess Dh~ If the arbitrator finds that those are in a majority, because of his very confidence he should take voting openly 98 5.8.9. The arbitrator, who enjoys the confidence of the whole Order, has the privileges of deciding how the voting should be conducted, the right of rejecting the decision, and also the right to advise members on matters legal and moral, if he fears a breach of justice. From the powers given to him we can see that it is not merely the consent of the majority that mattered but the conformity of the decision with the spirit and the letter of law, that is, 99 . h Dh aroma an d Vlnaya . Wlt 5.8.10. These are some of the methods which have to be followed in conducting trials and settling disputes in the Buddhist Order. These proceedings display a healthy and sound democratic attitude. The opinions and rights of the individual are respected and every accused person is given a chance to express his views. All in all, these proceedings show that the principles of justice of early Buddhism, which 215 we discussed earlier (5.3.1- 5.3.7), were scrupulously observed. 5.8.11. Miss Horner, who translated the entire Vinaya texts, points out that the discipline, at the beginning of the training, "is a teaching of commands (anadesana), being taught by the Buddha in respect of a multitude of commands for those meriting commands" 100 She further says: "Practically every conceivable thing affecting monastic life for monks and nuns, practically every conceivable relation with other human beings, whether fellow monks or nuns or the laity, are brought under review and legislated for in minutest detail It is a very complete system, a very precise organization, marked throughout by the humaneness and reasonableness of Gotama, the codifier to whom but few exception . . ascrl'b e d"lOl . every ru 1 lng lS 5.9.1. The Sangha was a "system of government formed by the Bhikkhus, Bhikkunis, Upasakas and upasikas", and it was a republican democratic institution set up by the Buddha for the good of its members as well as of mankind in general. He intended it to continue to function on the same democratic basis after his death 102 . The question was raised, during the last days of the Buddha's life, as to how in the absence of the Teacher, there could be unity in the Sangha, since he 216 had not appointed a personal successor or head of the Order to function in his place after his death. The Buddha replied: "So behave that you make yourselves your own island (dipa) 103 , your own refuge; and that you seek no other refuge. So behave that you rely upon the Dhamma as your own refuge and that you seek no other refuge" 104 The assurance given is that the system in itself is capable of taking the place of the Master in his absence. Such an idea was a novel one and was unknown to the political or . . . . . re 1 lglous organlzatlon contemporary or prlor to Bu ddh.lsm 105 . 5.9.2. Early Buddhism was acquainted with both monarchy and republican democracy, but favoured the latter. We use this term in the same sense as it is applied to ancient Greek institutions, implying a system wherein a large number of citizens had some say in the determination of policy. There is no need to press the point that such tribal republics existed in early India. That Buddhism favours democracy can be seen from the account of Agga~a Sutta, which conceives of the state as democratic. In such a democracy, what is important, according to early Buddhism, is not merely the rule of the majority but rule in conformity with the law of righteousness. Although early Buddhism favours democracy, it considers that any form of government is good to the extent to which it follows the law of righteousness. 217 5.9.3. The Sangha was set up on democratic foundation, and the concept of the Sangha appears to have been derived from that of a democratic political state. The early Buddhist texts mention as an example worthy of emulation the republic of the Vajjians, contemporary with the Buddha. The Buddha speaks very appreciatively of the Vajjian tribe: "As long as they meet in concord, conclude their meetings in concord, and carry out their policies in concord; as long as they make no laws not already promulgated, and set aside nothing enacted in the past, acting in accordance with the ancient institutions of the Vajjis established in olden days; ... as long as they respect, esteem, reverence, and support the elders of the Vajjis, and look on it as a duty to heed their words; ... as long as no women or girl of their tribes are held by force or abducted; as long as they respect, esteem, reverence, and support the shrines of the Vajjis, whether in town or country, and do not neglect the proper offerings and rites laid down and practised in the past; ... as long as they give due protection, deference, and support to the perfected beings (arahants) among them so that such perfected beings may come to the 218 land from afar and live comfortably among them, so long may they be expected not to decline, but to flourish• 106 . 5.9.4. This is followed by a longer passage in which the Buddha is purported to have adapted the seven conditions of the welfare state to the circumstances of the Buddhist Order. In this passage 41 conditions of the welfare of the Sangha are listed. The nature of this long list, mostly ' referring to moral qualities, suggests that it is not authentically the Buddha's words, but nevertheless it reflects the ideals of early Buddhism. Virtues of harmony, affection (metta) are stressed and strict discipline is commended. 5.9.5. The reference to the Vajjis is interesting because of the comment made by Buddhaghosa. "As for the 'ancient Vajjian constitution' it is said when a thief was brought before the rulers, they handed him over to the judicial officers (viniccaya-mahamatta) . They investigated the facts and if they thought that he was not a thief they released him but if they suspected that he was a thief, they handed him over to the magistrates (voharika) without making any statement themselves. They in turn investigated the matters and if they thought he was not a thief they released him but if they suspected that he was a 219 thief they handed him over to the justices (sutta-dhara) they in turn to a panel of eight judges (attha-kulika) .•. they in turn to the president, who investigated the case and if he thought that he was not a thief, released him but if he was convinced that he was a thief called for the book of precedents (pavenipotthaka) . There it is written down that such and such was the punishment for such and such offence. The president, there- upon, compared his offence with those and ordered the appropriate punishment. Thus the people who abode by the "ancient Vajjian constitution" had no disgruntlement (against the state) because justice was done in accordance with the ancient tradition and they felt that if anyone was at fault it was themselves and not the officials (of the state). And as a result they performed their task with a sense of responsibility. In this way the state prospered'' 107 5.9.6. This passage, from a commentary composed almost a thousand years after the Buddha's death does not certainly record historical fact, and the Vajjian legal system seems almost too cumbersome to be possible in a small state. theless, the passage may depend on an early tradition, Never- 220 exa99erated in transmission, and at least it reflects the value placed by Theravada Buddhism on a system of justice which gives every consideration to the accused, and is firmly based on precedent. 5.10.1. The Buddha set up the Sangha, the oldest international society in history, which was to function after his death in accordance with its constitution (vinaya), drawn up for the furtherance of the law of righteousness and the teachings of the Buddha 108 . This can be seen from the statement of the Buddha himself. Just before his death he tells Ananda that it was possible that they might think that after his death they would be without a teacher and adds: "You should not look at things in this light. The Dhamma that has been taught and the Vinaya that has been laid down by me should serve as the Teacher after I pass away" 109 Further, it is said: "If the Sangha so desires, it may abolish the minor rules of the Community after my death" 5.10.2. 110 . According to the tradition as handed down by the Theravadins, when the First Buddhist Council was held soon after the death of the Buddha, there it was questioned as to which sections of the Buddha's doctrines were to be rehearsed first. And, it is recorded, the monks declared that the Vinaya should be rehearsed first, for "the Vinaya, indeed, 221 is the lifeblood (ayu - "vitalizing factor") of the Buddha Sasana. so long as the Vinaya lasts, the Sasana would last" ( ... Vinayo nama Buddha-sasanassa ayu; thitam hoti. ~· vinaye thite sasanam - pathamam vinayam sangayama'ti . - - Tasma ... ) 111 . Thus they maintained that the very survival of the Sasana would depend entirely on the Vinaya. It is said in the Mahavagga that "the teaching persists while Vinaya is not destroyed" (vinaye avinatthamhi puna titthati sasanam) 112 . These statements indicate the position held by the Vinaya in Buddhism. The life of the Sasana, it was unequivocally acknowledged by the Theravadin, is in the hands of the Order, whose survival and Vinaya. p~rity, in turn, depended entirely on the Therefore, it is indispensable for the existence of the Sasana. authority. the Buddha. The Vinaya, as promulgated, is itself an It consists of the commands and prohibitions of Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that there is no Buddhist law. 222 CONCLUSION 6.1.1. In the introductory chapter of this thesis, we stated that we would examine the view that early Buddhism is incompatible with social and political ideas. We believe that we have produced enough evidence to disprove this view. Though, for obvious reasons, the bulk of the Pali canon deals with metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and ethical questions, there is sufficient material in it to show that the early Buddhists had definite ideas and ideals concerning social and political life. In order to show this many passages have been quoted in extenso. 6.1.2. These ideas were comparatively rational and equalitarian. The early Buddhists rejected the idea of divine authority and the divine origin of kingship and based their political thought on a doctrine involving a social contract, apparently the first doctrine of social contract in the history of thought. They strongly maintained that the fundamental ethical principles which governed all life in the cosmos - Dhamrna - were valid in social and political as well as in individual life, and rejected the rather Machiavelli<'l.n view of the state which is reflected in the Arthasastra of Kautilya. 6.1.3. They seem to have set themselves against the growing tendencies to autocracy, which culminated in the Mauryan Empire, and, if we are to believe the "seven conditions for the welfare of the Vajjis" contained in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, they tended to idealize the republican, 223 more democratic tribal states which were already declining in power and influence when the Buddha taught .. They strongly maintained that the ideal state works for the material and spiritual welfare of the people, guaranteeing religious, social, political and individual freedom, as well as economic security with full employment. This is the first time in Indian history that the idea of a "general good" or "a common good", not only affecting the common man but also pertaining to the peoples of the world, is envisaged. Moreover, the early Buddhists strongly 6.1.4. maintained the idea of a common humanity transcending national and racial barriers. In respect of law they maintained that it must have a universally acceptable moral basis; they favoured speedy justice and equality of punishment, and were not inclined to give advantages to litigants or criminals of high birth. All in all, they were concerned with the reformation of society as well as the perfectibility of the individual and maintained as an ideal the concept of the world becoming a single international political order, under the Cakkavatti. 6.1.5. Thus we may justly say that the early Buddhists, though they may not have been rationalists, humanists, or democrats in the modern sense, did anticipate, in an earlier more rudimentary form, many of the ideals of modern liberal democracy. Their influence on Indian civilization as a whole was not strong enough to directly affect its political institutions, but the more humanitarian and paternalistic 224 aspects of Hindu kingship may well owe something to the influence of early Buddhism, perhaps chiefly mediated by Asoka. Several of the social and political ideas reflected in the Pali canon may be found, in very modified form, in much later Hindu literature of a didactic nature, such as the interpolated portions of the Epics and the Dharmasastras. 6.1.6. Thus we conclude that early Buddhism played a part in the moulding of Indian political ideas which was by no means insignificant. In the social thought of India its influence was less, since in early medieval times we meet kings, for instance the Palas of Bengal, who declare themselves to be Buddhists and at the same time are proud of the fact that they are upholders of the "rules of class and stages of life" (varnasrama-dharma) . In this respect the persistent class-consciousness of India was too strong for its early Buddhists critics. Although early Buddhism had little permanent influence in the social thought of India, it had an increasing effect upon the Buddhist nations of Asia in their social and political life. 6.1.7. We cannot claim that we have said the last word on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism. Nevertheless we may have produced enough evidence to show that it is not as "frustrating" as some earlier writers have claimed C::;:. supra. 1. 3. 3) to discover the basic elements of a social and political philosophy in the texts of early Buddhism. There are still numerous gaps in our knowledge., and we trust that later students may find in our study the stimulus to try to fill them. 225 ABBREVIATIONS A. Anguttara Nikaya AA. Anguttara Nikaya Atthakatha (Manorathapurani) AB. Aitareya Briihmana - - - AD. Apastamba Dharmasutra AU. Aitareya Upanisad BD. Baudhayana Dharmasutra B.Disp. BG. Book of the Discipline (Translation of the Vinaya Pitaka) • Bhagavad-Gita BU. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Cornm. Commentary cu. Chandogya Upanisad D. nigha Nikaya DA. Digha Nikaya Atthakatha (Sumangalavilasinil Dhp. Dhammapada Dial. Dialogues of the Buddha (Translation of the Digha Nikaya) DPPN. Malalasekera, G.P., Dictionary of Pali Proper Names Dpv. Dipavamsa EB Malalasekara, G.P. Buddhism ERE. Hastings, J. and Ethics GD. Gautama Dharmasutra It. Itivuttaka J. Jataka JB. Jaiminiya Brahmana KA. Kautiliya Arthasastra M. Majjhima Nikaya (ed.), Encyclopaedia of (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion 226 MA. Majjhima Nikaya Atthakatha (Papancasudani) Manu. Manu Smrti or Manavadharmasastra Mbh. Mahabharata Mhv. Mahavaffisa Mhvu. Mahavastu Miln. Milindapanha MT. Mahavaffisa Tika o.u.P. Oxford University Press PB. ... ......, _,. - Pancavimsa Brahmana w. PED. Rhys Davids, T.W. and Stede, English Dictionary PTS. Pali Text society PU. Radhakrishnan, S., The Principal of Upanisads RV. Rg-Veda s. samyutta Nikaya Atthakatha (saratthappakasini) SB. Satapatha Brahmana SBB. Sacred Books of the Buddhists SBE. Sacred Books of the East SBH. Sacred Books of the Hindus SED. Monier-Williams, M., Sanskrit English Dictionary Sn. sutta Nipata SnA. sutta Nipata Atthakatha (Paramatthajotika) TB. Taittiriya Brahmana TS. Taittiriya saffihita TU. Taittiriya Upanisad v. Vinaya Pitaka VA. vinaya Pitaka Atthakatha (Samantapasadika) VD. Vasistha Dharmasutra Vi sm. Visuddhimagga . (eds.), Pali .. ,~~ms EA~TEhE~~~x ·sx ~~,O~SE~~BA 'DA nus>A 'SA pBS,UEdD >~~ms L'G'G 228 *"'· NOTES Except where stated in the notes some of the translations are taken from the PTS and other series, editors and translators of which are mentioned in the bibliography. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION No. 1 Page Curtis, M., ed. The Great Political Theories, 1, ( 1961) , p. 23. 'voi. 2 1 Basham, A.L., The Wonder That was India, (1954, Rep.l971), p.80. Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political !deas, (1959), p.3. 1 3. Ghoshal, Ibid., p.529. 1 4. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.l41. Basham, A.L., "The Rise of Buddhism in its Historical Context", (1966), p.399. 2 5. 0.3.180-93. 2 6. For example see: Goddard, D., ed. A Buddhist Bible, (1970), p.645 ff. 3 Coomaraswamy, A.K., Hinduism and Buddhism, (n.d.), p.48. 3 King, W.L., In the Hope of Nibbana, An Essay on Theravada Buddhist Ethics, (1964), p.l76. 3 Ibid., p.l77. 4 Life Magazine, Issue on "Buddhism", (7th March, 1955). 4 Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, (1921), p.220 ff. trs. Gerth, H.H. and Martindale, D., (1958), pp.206, 226. 4 "Buddhism" in A Cultural History of India, (ed. Basham, A.L., 1975), p.97. 5 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 229 No. 13. Page Rhys Davids, T.W., Buddhist India, (1903), p .132. ERE, vol. 7, s.v.Law (Buddhist) 5 Indian Philosophy, vol.l, (1948), p.360. This v1ew is again presented in a preface written by him in 1956 to 2500 Years of of Buddhism, (ed. Bapat, P.V., 1956), p.ix. 6 15. Op.cit., p.45. 6 16. Buddhism, (1899), p.83. 6 17. Ibid., 84. 6 18. Ibid., p. 85. 6 19. For example see: Law, N.N., Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity, (1921), p.90 ff. 7 20. A History of Hindu Political Theories 7 21. Op.cit., (1959), p.69. 7 22. "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967). 8 23. Ibid., p.534 (94). 9 24. For examples: Bhagvat, D.N., Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, (1939). Chan Toon, Principles of Buddhist Law, (1902), Dutt, S., Early Buddh1st Monarchism, (1960). De,Gokuldas, Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha, (1955). 25. Probably all modern works dealing with ancient Indian polity have a chapter or two or a few sections on early Buddhist social and political ideas. The subject of ancient Indian polity has been treated by many writers both Indians and foreign. Early Buddhist social and political ideas are to be found discussed, for example, in the following works. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), Chs. 4, 14 and 19. Warder, A.K., Indian Buddhism, (1970), Ch.6. Ling, T., The Buddha, (1973), Chs. 6-8 of part 3. Basham, A.L., "Theravada Buddhism" in Sources of Indian Tradition, (ed. De Bary, Wm.T., 1958), Ch.6, Section 3. Rahula, W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959), Ch.8. 14. 26. For examples: Malalasekera, G.P. and Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and the Race Question, (1958). Jayatilleke, K.N. ''Buddhism 9 230 No. 27. Page and Peace", (1962); ''Aspects of Buddhist Social Philosophy'', (1970). Wijesekera, O.H.de A., "Buddhism and Society", (n.d.). Gokhale, B. G., "The Early Buddhist View of the State", ( 19 69) ; "The Early Buddhist Kingship", (1966); "Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early Buddhism", (1968). Malalasekera, G.P., ''Buddhist Socialism", (1972). Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels of Dhamma", (1972). 9 Anuruddha, K., Studies in Buddhist Social Thought as Documented ln the Pall Traditlon, Unpubllshed PhD thesls, Lancaster Unlverslty, (1972). Warnasuriya, K.S. Buddhist Social Philosophy, Unpublished PhD thesis, Lancaster University, (1974). 9 28. Op.cit., 10 29. Ibid., p.404. 10 30. Op.cit., ll 31. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 32 •. Gard, R.A., Buddhist Influences on the Political Thought of India and Japan, (1949), p.l; ''Buddhist Polltical Thought", (1952), p.viii. 12 33. Ibid., 14 34. Op.cit., 35. "Christianity and Buddhism", (1966), p.403. (1972), p.6. (1967), p.532 (92). (1952), p.24. ll 15 (1966), p.395. (1962), p.3. 15 231 CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND AUTHORITY No. 1. 2. 3. 39. .a,r: Page Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture, p.l6. (1966), A History of Indian Political Ideas, p.SO. 18 (1959), For examples: Spellman, J.W., Political Theory of Ancient India, (1964), pp.l-24. Sharma, R.S., Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions 1n Anc1ent Ind1a, (1959), pp.64-76. ~V.l0.90. 1\•Sho.ll., Ojo·C~t.., k><L·. ~. • 1'1 - ;t:). c IH""')' I>. 3(, "\'\.• ... 18 18 18 l'l 19 AV.l9.6.6, BD.l.l0.18.2-6, TS.7.1.1.4-6, PB.6.1.6-ll, Manu.l.88-9l. 20 RV.l0.173-174, SB.ll.l.6.24, AV.3.3-5, BU.l.4.ll-l5, Manu.l.89, KA.l.3.6. 20 7. Manu. 7. 2 . 3 .: 20 8. Ghoshal, Op. cit. , ( 19 59) , p. 2 4. Basham, A.L., The Wonder That was India, (1954)' p.243. 20 RV.l.32. 21 TS.8.l.l.4-6, TB.2.3.10.l, PB.6.1.6-ll, BU.5.2.l. 21 11. TU.3.3.8.3. 21 12. Gopatha Uttarabhaga.3.18. cf. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963) 1 p.l78. 21 13. BU.l.4.10 1 D.3.28 21 14. TB.2.2.7.2; 2.2.10.4, PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152, SB.2.6.3.8, AB.7.17; 8.13, Manu.7.3-l3. 22 15. Mbh.l2.12.59. 22 16. TS.2.6.2.5; 5.10.10.3, AB.8.1.4.2, PB.ll.l.2, Manu.l.93. 24 17. SB.5.3.3.12; 8.4.15, AB.9.9, TS.2.5.10.l. 24 18. Op.cit.,(l959),p.32. 24 19. AB.8.27. 24 5. 6. 9. 10. \ 232 Page No. 20. "Spiritual Authority and the Temporal Power in"''rndian Theory of Government", (1942), "p.l. 2olj. 21. Bo..s""""'' Aitareya Brahmana,. (1863), p. 73 ff. 25 22. Op.cit., (1959), p.25. 26 23. RV. 8.10 .1. 26 24. RV.7.18, AV.3.19, AB.8.24-27, SB.4.1.4.6, Mbh.l2.74.1.12, Manu.7.78, VD.l9.3-5, YS.312-13, BD.l.l6.18.7. 26 SB.5.3.3.11-13. For a fuller account of this, see: Coomaraswamy, A.K., Op.cit., (1942), p.l ff. Dumont, L., "The Conception of Kingship in Ancient India", (1970), p.62 ff. Cf. Vedic Index, vol.2, pp.5-8, EB. vol.2, s.v. Authority. 27 26. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.27-28. 27 27. AB.l.l4. 27 28. TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2; 2.10.4 28 29. TS.2.4.2.1, AB.8.12-14, TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2. 28 Bees'-"-""• op.c.;.t.., c. 1'\S'+4.) p. la.S 25. 2'/A. Cp· ~-~-·, C I'IS4-) , I>· '::l..lf:?. @.::<. 24 :l_{i 30. PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152. 28 31. AB.8.12-14. 29 32. SB.ll.l.6.24, Manu.7.3.14-20, KA.l.l3.5-7. 29 33. Mbh.l2.12.67. 30 34. SB.5.1.5.14. 30 35. Manu.7.8. 31 36. Gonda, J., Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View, (1966), p.l ff. 31 37. Op.cit., (1959), p.l96. 32 38. Ibid., p.l97. 32 39. A History of Hindu Political Theories, (1923), pp.vli-vlll, 267. 32 40. Op.cit., (1959), p.36 n.3. 33 41. Op. cit. , ( 19 2 3) , p. 172 . 33 233 No. 42. Op.cit., (1970), p. 71. 33 43. Op.cit., (1964), p.21. 34 44. Ibid., p.24. 35 45. Ibid., p.2l. 35 46. A.4.90, Sn.552, J.l.l89; 1.283. 36 47. 0.3.28, M.2.222, A.l.273, Vism.598. 36 48. D.l.8; 1.222; 3.28-30, M.l.l; 1.327, A.4.88; 2.24; 3.201, It.l5. 36 ' 49. 0.1.221. 36 50. A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God, (1974), p.215. 37 51. 0.1.1.13; 3.28. 37 52. This, the Abhassara-devaloka, ranked in the cosmogony adapted (or put forth) by Buddhism, as the third celestial stage above that of the Great Brahma devaloka. Cf. Dial.part 3, p.26 n.2, PED.DPPN.EB.vol. 1, s.v. Abhassara deva-loka. 37 0.3.28-30. (tr. Basham in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol.l, 1958), pp.l27-28. We slightly amend Basham's translation in places, for the sake of easier understanding in the context. 38 54. 0.3.30. 39 55. Ibid., 1. 221. 39 56. 8.4.52. 40 57. Ibid., 58. 59. Ibid., 2.24. Cf. Qhar!llaSif:'i, Ibiq,, pp.33-34. 40 M. 1.6'oc:> -.3.23o. t-s. ~:a., vot:·,:~, Li. fi!....-.i..k..,..._:. s.;a -11 ItO Ibid., 3. 70-73. Cf. Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.224. 40 60. Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.227. 41 61. 0.1.241. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,), p.227-28. 42 6 2. Ibid., 243. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,), p.228-30. 43 6 3. Ibid., 129 ff. 43 53. SSil. <! Page_ (tr. Dharmasiri, Op.cit., 1974), p.33. 40 234 No. Page 64. M.2.222, A.l.273. 43 65. A.l.l74. 44 66. J.5.238. (tr. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,) (196~p.411. Also The Message of the Buddha, (1975), p.l08. 45 J.6.208. (tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.,) (1963), p.411 and (1975), p.llO. 45 68. M.2.68. 45 69 . Vism.598. Cf. EB. vol.3, s.v.Brahma. 46 70. See Johnston, E.H., The Buddhacarita, part 2, (1930), p.XXX1 ff. 46 71. The Jatakamala, 23.38-39. 46 72. M.2.127-28. 47 73. 0.1.50. 47 74. Oial.pait 1, p.298. 48 75. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1963), pp.l68-205. Cf. EB.s.v., vol.2, Authority. 48 A.l.l88, M.l.475; 2.44. Cf. Jayatilleke, Ibid., pp.l69-204, 369-402, 427. 48 77. Op.cit., 49 78. For a fuller account of the social contract theory in Western thought, see Gough, J., The Social Contract, (1936). 49 Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.457-59. Prasad, B., Theory of Government in Ancient India, (1928), pp.221-25. 50 80. Ghoshal, Op.cit., 50 81. 0.3.81-89. 82. Ibid., 85-86. p.l29. (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), 83. Ibid., 86-89. (tr.Basham, Ibid.), p.l30. 84. Ibid. 67. 76. 79 . (1959), p.62. (1959), p.64, 538. 51 51 52 53 235 No. 85. Page Ibid., 89-92. pp.l30-3l. (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), 54 86. Ibid., 90. 87. Ibid., 289. 55 88. 5.4.336, A.2.66.68. 55 89. 0.3.61-67. 56 90. Ibid., 92-93. 91. Raja the common Indian word for king is cognate with Latin Rex and other IndoEuropean words connected with ruling. The false etymology from the root ranj "to gladden", "to please" is also sometimes found in non-Buddhist sources and is significant of some of the ideas surrounding kingship. The imagined connection of khattiya with khetta "field" is also false, as ~re the e!ymologies of the brahma~a, vaisya, and sudra in the text. According to the Buddhist point of view the ksatriya is regularly mentioned before the brahma~a and belongs to the highest social order. (see Ch. 4) . Also. A.l.87. (tr.Basham, Op.cit. ,) , p.l31. 55 57 Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l31, Dial. part 3, p.89 n.2, PED. s.v. Khattiya. 57 92. D.3.93. 58 93. The Path of Purity, 94. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.258-60, 337-38, Prasad, Op.cit., (1968), pp.202-20, Lingat, R., "The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of Hindu Law in Hinayanist Indo-China", (1949), pp.284-87. 58 95. Mhvu. 1. 342. 59 96. Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of His Order, (1907), p.4. 59 97. Mhv.2.1 ff., Dpv.3.1 ff., MT.l22 ff. 61 98. Vism.l3.419, DA.3.870, MT.l21. 61 99. J.2.311; 454. 62 (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l31. (1923), pp.484-86. 58 236 No. Page 100. p. 19 101. Nobel, J., ed. (1937), pp.l32 ff. Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l82-85. 63 102. Lingat, Op.cit., 63 103. "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967), p.513 (73). 63 104. Dial. Part 1, p.l07. 63 105. Studies in Hindu Political Thought, p.l84. 62 0 (1949), p.284. (1954), 63 106. D.3.92. 64 107 Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.512 (72). Ghoshal, Op.cit., .(1959), p.63. Spellman, Op. cit . , ( 19 6 4) , p. 2 2 . Sharma, J. P . , Republics in Ancient India, (1968), p.25. 64 Spellman, Op.cit., (1964), p.22. 64 109. J.2.352 ff.; 64 llO. J.2.353. lll. V.l.lll; 3.150. ll2 chatuhsataka of Aryadeva. 4.77. 65 Ibid. 66 0 108 ll3 0 0 0 5.462; 1.207. 65 Cf.PED.s.v.Sammata. 65 S.l.41. Cf.Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,(l967), pp.512-14 (72-74) 6 7' ll5. J.3.513-14. Cf.Jayatilleke, Ibid., p.528(88). 68 ll6 Ibid. 68 ll4 0 0 0 237 CHAPTER 3: THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA No. Page l. Buddhist India, 2. RV.4.23.8-9. 71 3. Ibid.,l.2.8, 1.65.2, 1.68.2, 1.108.2, 1.124.3, 4.23.8; 51.7-8. 71 4. Ibid., 5.85. 71 5. For a detailed discussion of rta, see: Keith, A.B., Religion and PhilOSophy of the Veda and Upan19ads, Vol.l, ( 19 2 5, Repn.nt, 1970) 1 pp.248 ff. 71 6. Vedic Mythology, (1897), p.ll. 71 7. Vedic Index, s.v.Dharman; SED.s.v.Dharman. 72 8. RV.5.83.5; 10.65.11. 72 9. Keith, Op.cit., p.249. 72 10. (1903), p.l32. 71 Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, vol.l, (1923) 1 pp.360-6l. Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Buddhism, (n.d.), p.32 ff. Rhys Davids, T.W., Op.cit., (1903) 1 p.l32. ERE. vol.7, s.v. Law (Buddhist). 72 "Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early Buddhism", (1968), p.259. 73 "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine'', (1967), p.488 (48). 73 13. BU.l.4.l4. 74 14. GD.l.l-2, BD.l.l.l.l, VD.l.4-5; 6.17 1 AD.l.l.l.l-2, Manu.2.6, YS.l.7. 74 Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963) 1 pp.l69-204. Cf. EB.vol.2, s.v.Authority. 78 16. V.l.4, M.l.l67. 79 17. Ibid. ,1.4-5. 79 18. Ibid. ,1.11. 79 19. M.l.69, A.2.9; 24. 79 ll. 12. 15. 238 No. Page 20. V.l.21. 80 21. Sn.683. 80 22. A.l.76. 80 23. Ibid. 80 24. Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of Hls Order, (1907), p.4. 83 25. D.3.93. 83 26. Ibid. Cf. Barua, B.M., Asoka and His Inscriptions, (1968), pp.227-28. 83 27. Mhvu.l.348. 84 28. Rockhill, Op.cit., (1907), p.4. 84 29 . VA.l.lO. 84 30. D.3.232, M.l.34l-42. 84 31. D.l.l36-37, J.5.ll2. 84 32. A.2.74-76. 85 33. Mhvu.l.227. Cf. Jones, J.J., tr. The Mahavastu, vol.l, (1949), p.230 n.~ Jayat1lleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.472 (32). 85 34. A. 3.148-49. 86 35. J.4.423. 87 36. Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political Ideas, (1959), p.69. 87 Gokhale, Op.cit., (1968), p.257, Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early Buddhism", (1972), p.l9. 87 38. J.5.102-l06; 3.ll0. 87 39. Ibid., 3.262, 470; 4.110, 176; 5.352. 87 40. D.3.232, M.l.34l-42. 88 41. Ibid., 3.228, J.4.402: 5.98, 510. 88 42. DA.3.849. 88 37. Cf. J.5.223; 6.94; 224. 239 No. 43. Page M.3.47-52, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967), pp. 502-503 (62-63). 90 Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism, (1956), pp.73-74. 90 J.260, 282, 399; 2.111, 118, 274, 320, 352, 470; 4.119, 153, 378, 462. 91 46. Ibid., 6.94. 91 4 7. Ibid. , 3 .lll. 91 48. A.2.75. 92 49. Ibid. 92 so. S.l.lOl. 92 51. A.2.74. 52. J.3.111. 92 53. D.2.178. 93 54. Sn.149. 93 55. It.20. 93 56. PED.s.v. Metta. 93 57. Sn.149-5l. 93 58. M.1.39. 93 59. 1st Separate Edict, (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.147. 94 60. The Jatakama1a.8.14. 94 61. D.3.152, 192. J.5.331, 352. A.2.32, 248. Cf. PED.s.v. Sangha. 94 62. J.6.251. 94 63. D.2.202. 94 64. Ibid., 1.137. 95 65. Dhp.21. 95 66. Mhv.3.68, Norman, H.C., "Buddhist Legends of Asoka and His Times", Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, (1910), p.63. 95 44. 45. Cf. J.3.111; 5.222, 242. Cf. J.3.456. 92 240 No. Page 67. s.l.88. 95 68. J. 5 .112-114. 96 69. Ibid., 116-119. 97 70. Ibid., 120. 98 71. Ibid., 121-22. 98 72. Mhvu.l.274-82. 98 73. Asvaghosa, Buddhacarita, Saundarananda, Catul)sataka, Aryasura, JatakamaHi. Cf. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.337 ff. 98 74. The Jatakama1a.13.1-3. 98 75. Basham, A.L., in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol.1, (1958), p.179. 99 suvarnaprabhasa-sutra.132. Cf. Basham, Ibid., pp.l82-85, Ghosha1, Op.cit., (1959), p.264. 99 VA.l.10. p.257. 99 76. 77. Cf. Ghokha1e, Op.cit., (1968), 78. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 539 (99). 100 79. 0.3.59. 100 80. A.l.l09. 100 81. Ibid. 100 82. Ibid. 101 83. D.3.58 ff. 101 84. Ibid., 70-75, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967)' p. 536 (96). 104 85. Ibid., 61. Cf. Jayati11eke, Ibid., p.537 ( 9 7) • 104 86. Ibid. 104 87. Mhvu.l.277. (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967)' p. 456 (16). 105 88. D.l.135. 106 89 . Ibid . , 3 . 6 5 . 107 241 No. Page 90. Ibid., 61, 145, J.5.331, $.1.43. 107 91. 5.1.33. 107 92. Ibid., 58. SA.l.90. 107 93. D.3.180 ff. 108 94. Ibid., 191. 108 95. A.2.66-68. 109 96. Ibid., 4.281 ff. AA.2.778. 110 97. H.3.75. 110 9 8. Ibid. 110 99. D.3.191. 110 100. Dpv.6.1.2. 101. Ibid., 6.2. 111 102. For a comparison and contrast between the legends and the edicts see: EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka. 111 103. The Wonder That was India, (1954), p.84. 111 104. Op.cit., (1961), p.l46. 112 105. EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka. 113 106. Ibid. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp.554-55(114-15). "Buddhism and Peace", (1962), p.S. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp. 2 9 2-9 4 . Ling, T. , The Buddha, ( 19 7 3) , p.l52 ff. 113 107. Op.cit., 113 108. Ibid., p.l57. 114 109. EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka. 114 110. Ibid. 115 111. Minor Rock Inscription-Bhaba Inscription, Cf. Thapar, Ibid., p.261. 115 Minor Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l44. 116 112. Cf. EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka. (1961), p.l49. 110 242 No. Page 113. EB. vol. 2, s. v. Asoka. 117 114. Ibid. 117 115. See for example the Upali Sutta in M.l.372 ff. 117 116. 12 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) ' p.l48. 118 13 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) , pp.l43-44. 121 117. 118. Dikshitar, V.R.R., Mauryan Polity, (1932), pp.l28~30. 122 119. Barua, B.M., Op.cit.,(l968), p.285. 122 120. The Greek kings mentioned in Asoka's 13 Rock Edict may be identified as follows: Antiyoka - Antiochus II Theos of Syria and Palestine. Turamaya - Ptolemy II Philadephus of Egypt. Antikini - Antigonus Gonatus of Macedonia. Maka - Magas of Cyrene. Alikasundara - Alexander of Corinth or Alexander of Epirus. Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1962), p.32. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l44 n.3. 122 121. Basham, Ibid. 122 122. Op.cit., (1954), p.56. pp.l80-81. Op.cit., (1961), 124 123. s .1.115-16. 124 124. Mhvu.l.276. 125 ~~============================~====~===~ 126. D.l.l9. 126 127. J.5.489-90. 126 128. DA.l.93. 126 129. CU.7.1.2. 126 130. J.5.240, (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967), pp.469-70 (29-30). 127 131. KA.7.1.6.-12. Cf. Kangle, R.P., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, part 3, (1965), p.251. · 127 243 No. Page 132. Kang1e, Ibid. 128 133. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.551(111). 128 134. Roy, P.C., tr. The Mahabharata, vo1. 8, part 1, (n.d.), p.210. 128 135. Ibid., p.135. 128 136. Ibid. 128 137. Ibid., p.214. 129 138. BG.2.31-32. 129 139. Ibid., 3.30. 129 140. Ibid., 2.38. 129 141. Ibid. 2. 3. 129 142. J.5.412-15. 130 143. S.1.83-85. 130 144. BG.2.37. 130 145. Mbh. Udyogaparvan.32.65. 130 146. s.4.308-09. 131 147. A.3.208. 131 148. J.2.1 ff. 131 149. Ibid., 3. 131 150. Ibid., 4. 132 151. Jayatil1eke, Op.cit., 152. The Jatakama1a.23.68. 132 153. Ibid. 133 154. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (110-11). 155. I I (1967) 1 p.550 (110). 8.14. J.l.263 ff. 132 (1967), pp.550-51 133 133 244 CHAPTER 4: ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY No. 1. Page The word Arya in Sanskrit and Ariya, Ayira, Ayya in Pali may be derived from an old IndoEuropean root but its exact etymology has not yet so far been made clear. The first appearance of this word in an Indian context is in the Rg-Veda where aborigines are referred to as Dasa and Dasyu to distinguish them from the Aryans who had conquered the North Western part of the Indian sub-continent. In the Indian context the word Arya was originally the name of a group of kindred peoples. In those days the word was more or less racial in connotation. Later it came to mean a person who was accepted as a better-class follower of the dhamma of class and asrama. In scholarly circles the word is now generally used to imply a linguistic and cultural group, rather than a race. In Pali the word has three meanings: (i) racial (of white complexion), (ii) social (noble, distinguished, of high birth) and (iii) ethical (following the customs and ideas of one's clan). The word is most frequently found in the Buddhist texts not in the first sense, but in the second and third. It was natural that this attitude of equality should have caused the word Ariya to lose its original sense, in reference to a group of people. But the meaning of nobleness and truth in the word was retained and adopted in Buddhism and these meanings were further enriched by giving them a Buddhist interpretation. The most noteworthy uses of the word Ariya appears in connection with the Buddh1st doctrine known as the cattari ariya-saccari (Four Noble Truths) and ariya-atthangika magga (The Noble Eight-fold Path) . The reason why these Truths and the Path are called Ariya is that they considered the noblest and most righteous of all truths. PED.s.v. Ariya. EB.vol.2, s.v. Arya. Basham, A.L., Studies in Indian History and Culture, (1964), p.20. Malalasekera, G.P. and Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and The Race Question, (1958), pp.37-38. 2. Most writers have treated Dasa and Dasyus as synonymous. But R.S. Sharma has shown that Dasa and Dasyus are different groups of the indigenous peoples (Sudras in Ancient India, 134 245 No. Page 1958, p.l3 ff.). However, in Vedic times they were both non-Aryan people. The Dasas are referred to having a distinctive colour of the skin, varna. (RV.3.34.9). In Pali the word Dasa is sometimes used to refer to uncivilized people, or in the same way that Greeks use the term "Barbarians" . It is defined by Buddhaghosa (DA.l.300) as antojato (base born). In classical Sanskrit dasa regularly means "a slave", while dasyus comes to mean "a robber". Basham, The Wonder That was India, (1954), p.32 ff. 134 3. Sharma, Op.cit., 135 4. Ibid., pp.9-ll. 135 5. Ibid., p.l3. 135 6. RV.l0.22.8. 135 7. Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p.30. Sharma, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l2-13. 135 8. RV.l.32, 5.34.6. 135 9 • Ibid., 3.34.9. 135 10. Ibid. , 2. 12. 4. 136 11. Ibid., 4.42.1. 136 12. Ibid., 8.35.16-18. 136 13. Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958)' p.30. 136 "On the Translation of the Term Varna", (1964)' p.l96 ff. 137 15. Ibid., p.198. 137 16. "Indian Society and the Legacy of the Past", (1966), p.l32, n.3. 137 17. Ibid., p.134. 138 18. RV.5.10. 138 19. Manu.l.87-91. 20. Basham, Op.cit., 14. (1958), pp.l2-13. BG.4.13. (1966), p.l33. 138 138 246 No. 21. Page Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p.31. 139 22. Basham, Op.cit., 139 23. Manu.l.91. 139 24. Ibid., 3.12.13-17. 140 25. Ibid., 4.81, 10.4; lll; 183. 140 26. Ibid., 3.156, 4.99, 10.128. 140 27. Ibid., 8.413-14 . 140 28. Ibid., 8. 20 ff. 140 29. For examples: Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op. cit., (1958), p.48 ff. Jayatilleke, "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine" (1967), pp.515-518(75-78). Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism, (1956)' pp.2-4. 140 Basham, "The Rise of Buddhism in its Historical Context'', (1966), p.399. 141 30. (1966), p.l33. . 31. Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, p.l4l. 31~. l"o-r 32. Buddhism, 33. Dial. part l, p.96. 142 34. Ibid. 142 35. M.2.86. 143 36. Sn.650-652. 143. 37. The word karma in Sanskrit and kamma in Pali (derived from the root kr - to do) literally means action, deed; both subjective and objective. The law of karma holds that actions produce their good or bad effect and result in this life or in a future one. However, some Indian thinkers like Purana, Makkhali, and Pakudha appears to have disagreed with this view, while Ajitha the materialist evidently denied the existence of karma altogether. Even among those who accepted it, we can find differing views. In the earlier Brahma~ical literature, the word karma is used mainly in the sense of either religious '""~r.to.~ r. ....... No\:.4 (1961), :t'l (1899), pp.83-84. 141 tJ+I 142 247 No. Page rituals or the social functions and duties of man. In the latter sense, it came to be accepted that there are specific hereditary social and occupational functions suitable for people born into different social grades, and since they needed special aptitudes (guDas) it was the specific duty and obligation of the members of these social grades to perform their assigned duties and occupations and no other (BG.4.13). Early Buddhism accepted the prevailing ideas of karma, though it had an original explanation of the process whereby kamma operated. In the Buddhist theory of kamma it has a specific meaning: it means only "volitional action", not all action. Any kind of volitional action whether mental, verbal, or physical is regarded as kamma. The law according to which a good or bad volition (kusala-akusala cetana) must have its fruition is the law of kamma, but in order to have a consequence the action must be produced by an effect of the volition "volition alone is kamma" (cetanahm bhikkhave kammam vadami - A.3.415). In the the1st1c rel1gions, every living being exists by virtue of the manifestation in him of a universal force, as a transcedent, an Absolute called God. According to Buddhism, every living being exists by virtue of an individual force. This is kamma. This is not the law regulating the relat1ons of individual human beings but it is the law controlling the relations between the state of ignorance (which is inevitably attached to individual human existence and behaviour) and the way of deliverance from it. These kammic laws are non-deterministic in the sense that initial volitional acts are conditioned but not determined and are therefore "free" within limits, while the consequences of these acts may be inhibited, prevented or promoted by background conditions such as time, place, opportunity and the potentialities of later and present volitional acts. Early Buddhism clearly discounted the fatalistic notion that all the experiences of a man in the present life are totally determined by his previous kamma alone, or that they are immutably fixed by some divine scheme, nor did it subscribe to the view that they are simply fortuitous and happen without any previous cause. 248 No. 37. Page PED.s.v. Kamma. 8ED.s.v. Karma. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963), pp. 376, 404, 440-41, 460; The Message of the Buddha, (1975), pp. 139 ff; Op.cit., (1967), pp. 481-84 (41-44)' 506-508 (66-68). Rahula, W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959), p. 32. 143 38. M.3.202 ff. 143 39. Ibid., 203. Cf. Miln. 65. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1963), p. 404; Op.cit., (1975), pp. 141-42. . 144 40. M.l. 414 ff. 144 41. Ibid., 417. 144 42. EB. vol. 2, s.v. Authority. 144 43. 8.2.121. A.4.176. 144 44. A.l.227-28. 145 45. Ibid., 3-35, 4.39-40. 145 46 . Ibid. , 4 . 13 8. 14 5 47. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p. 33. 145 48. A.4. 138-39. 49. Ibid., 1.35. Dhp. 182. 8.1.1o1. vv.500. 146 Therigatha. 146 50. 8.2.188. 146 51. Ibid., 5.455. M.3.169. 146 52. Ibid., 1. 85-89. 146 53. A.l.254. Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 534 (94). 146 54. Ibid. , 1. 61. 147 55. Dial. part 1, p. 104. 147 56. Concepts of Buddhism, 57. Op.cit., (1958), p. 35 ff. 147 58. Op.cit., 147 59. M.2.196 ff. 8n.594 ff. (1937), p. 11 ff. (1967), pp. 516-17 (76-77). 147 148 249 No. Page 60. Sn. 600-611. 149 61. Ibid., 608-10. 149 62. Op.cit., (1958), p. 37. 150 63. 625. 150 64. Ibid., 629-30. 150 65. The vajrasuci of Asvaghosa, (tr. Mukhopadhyaya, S., 1960); p. 14 ff. VU v PU. pp. 935 ff. 151 66. vu. 8. 151 67. Mukhopadhyaya, (tr.) Op.cit., (1960), pp. 19-20. We slightly emend Mukhopadhyaya's translation in places, for the sake of easier understanding in the context. 153 68. 0.3.82. 153 69. Ibid., 96. 154 70. Ibid., 93. 154 71. The word brahmana is derived in tte Agganna Sutta from the verb "keep off" (baheti) . Some people kept off or excluded bad, evil customs, to keep away from sin. This etymology is pure fancy. The word derived from brahman, which in the Rg-Veda generally means supernatural power: In the Buddhist terminology brahmana is also used for a man leading a pure, sinless and ascetic life, and many passages show that Buddhists were encouraged to treat worthy brahma~as with respect. 155 72. The text referred to are the Vedic canon. Ajjhayaka, another name given to the brahmanas, is here interpreted as "non-meditators". This also seems to be a false etymology. It means simply "teacher". 156 73. D.3. 94-95. (tr. Basham, in The Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol. 1, 1958), pp. 131-32. We slightly emend Basham's translation in places, for the sake of easier understanding in the context. 156 74. Ibid., 95. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. (tr. Ibid.). (tr. Ibid.). 156 157 157 250 No. Page 77. Dial. part 1, p. 107. 157 78. M.2.147 ff. 158 79. Yona means Ionian or Greek. If this text is authentically the words of the Buddha he must have heard something of the Greeks, some of whom were living in the Persian Empire. Kamboja is the mountains region south of Kabul river, along the present border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. For further details see: DPPN.s.v. Yona and Kamboja. 158 80. M.2.149. 158 81. Sn-612-619. 158 82. Ibid., 648. 159 83. Mukhopadhyaya, 84. BG.3.35. 159 85. Sn.650. 160 86. (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), p.5. 159 .Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p. 43. 160 87. M.2.84 ff. 160 88. Ibid., 89. 160 89. Ibid., 85. 160 90. J.l.ll4; 326, 2.264; 413, 3.312, 4.38. 160 91. M.2. 151-52. 160 92. D.l. 88 ff. 160 93. Ibid., 92-93. 161 94. Ibid., 97-99. 161 95. This is explained as the being who is coming into the womb ... the being about to enter the womb ... about to come into that situation, being driven on by the mechanism of kamma (MA.2.310). It also means a "sal!lsaric being in the intermediate stage" (between death and birth). See: Wijesekera, O.H·de.A., "Vedic Gandharva and P~li Gandhabba", (1945)' pp. 73-107. 162 96. M.2. 15.6-58. 163 251 Page No. 9 7. Ibid., 148. 163 98. MA.3.409. 163 99. Mukhopadhayaya, pp. 14-15. (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), 164 100. D.l. 99-100. 101. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 102. Manu. 8.24. 165 103. Ibid., 8.70; 88:99; 279, 11.130-31; 151. BD.l.l0.19.1. AD.l.9.24. Cf. Basham, Op:cit., (1954), p. 121. 165 104. GD.8.13. KA.4.222. BD.l.l0.18. 166 105. KA.3.9, 4.9. 166 106. Manu. 11.132. 166 107. M.2.88. 167 108. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 459 (19); Op.cit., (1975), p. 146. 167 109. Ibid., pp. 459-60 (19-20), 482-83 (42-43). 167 110. M.3.203 ff. 168 111. A.2.87. 168 112. Ibid., 1.149-50. M.l.97. 168 113. M.2.187-88. 169 114. Ibid., 149-50 169 115. EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmana, Brahmanism. 170 116. Dhp.l83. According to the Dhp. the teaching of all the Buddhas are ethical in character and centre round avoiding all evil, cultivating the good, purification of the mind, speaking no ill, not doing any harm, and restrained in respect of the fundamental precepts. (185). 171 A.2.69. (tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967), p. 495 (55). 171 118. Dhp.l8. 171 119. Sn.l43-152. p. 286. 117. 165 (1967), p. 447 (7). . 165 (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 1954), 172 252 Page No. 120. 121. EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmanism. - - Therigatha. vv. 239-243. 173 122. M.2.151. 173 123. Sn. 249-50. 174 124. M.l. 39. 174 125. 126. Malalasekere and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958)' p. 50. - Jatakamala, 23-21. 174 127. A.l.l62. 175 128. D.l.lll ff. 175 129. Ibid., 120. 176 130. Ibid. , 224 ff. 176 131. Ibid., 4 ff. 176 132. Ibid., 47 ff. 176 133. Ibid., 100 ff. 176 134. Ibid. , 224 ff. 176 135. Dhp. 383 ff. 176 136. Mukhopadhyaya, 137. PED.s.v. Brahmana, Arahant. 138. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., pp. 49-51. 172 174 (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), p.22. 176 177 (1958), 177 139. Sn.315. 178 140. AB.7.29. 178 141. Comm.on the Vedanta Sutra, 1.3.38. Cf. Dial. part 1, p. 285. 178 142. Manu. 1.88. 178 143. Ibid., 9.317-19. 178 144. Dial. part 1, p. 285. 178 145. D.l.227 ££. Cf. Ibid., p. 287. 179 146. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), pp. 48,55 ££. 179 253 Page No. 14 7. M.2.89. 180 148. A.4.202. Mi1n. 70. 181 149. M.2.125 ff. 181 150. Ibid., 129-30. 182 151. D.l.99 ff. 182 152. Sn.102. 182 153. Ibid., 782. 182 154. S.1.33; 42; 125. 155. Basham, Op.cit., 155'11. I!ri..L.)'·I:!>b 156. 157. D.1.99. j A.1. 23-26 V.2.253. 182 183 (1966), p. 136. '"-~r~...... R., Ai.ol< ........,ol 'lv..)<di..,. c$+~ IS3. 184 "'......,.,.'a"',(•~biJ,)>.IJ+t. Ma1a1asekera and Jayati1leka, Op.cit., pp. 59-60. (1958), 184 254 CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDE TO LAW No. Page Vinogradoff, P., Common Sense in Law, (1914)' p. 23. 187 J.ayatilleke, K.N., "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967)' p. 487 (17). 187 3. J.2.2. 188 4. Ibid., 4.402, 5.98; 510. A.2.18. D.3.228. 188 5. Ibid., 3.105. 188 6. Ibid., 4.192. 189 7. Mhvu.l.275. 189 8. 4th Pillar Edict. (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p. 263. 190 9. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 190 10. Manu. 7.14. 191 11. Mbh. 12.59.78. 191 12. Manu. 7. 2 2. 191 13. Mbh.l2.15.2. 191 14. Ibid., 12.15. 5-6. 191 15. J.4.192. 192 16. A.l.253. 192 17. Ibid., 254. 192 18. Ibid., 5. 79-81. 19. M.2. 186-88 193 20. 8.1.116. D.3.64 ff. 193 21. J.3.105; 154, 4.451. 193 22. D.l.89. A.4.89. 193 23. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 24. Tucci, G., "The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna", (1936)' pp. 237-252, 423-435. l. 2. (1967), p. 451 (17). Cf. D. 3. 236-37. (1967), p. 507 (67). 192 193 193 255 No. Page 25. Ibid.,p. 426 v.36. 193 26. Ibid., v.32,33,37. 193 27. V.l.l3. 194 28. Ibid., 3.23-24. 194 29. Ibid. I l. 20. 195 30. Ibid. I 21. 195 31. Ibid., 21-22. 195 32. Ibid. 196 33. Ibid., 9-10. Cf. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., p. 450 (10). I 3.8 (1967), 196 34. S.2. 223-24. 196 35. Op.cit., 36. V.3.17. 37. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 38. A.l.230. 198 39. V.3.20. (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967), p.451 (11). 199 40. Jayati11eke, Ibid. 199 41. B. Disp. part 1, pp. xvi-xvii. 200 42. Ibid., part 4, p.xii. 201 43. V.l.55. 201 44. B. Disp. part 4, p.x. 201 45. V.l.56. 202 46. Ibid., 350 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4, p.xviii. 202 47. B. Disp. Ibid., pp.x.xi. 202 48. V.1.p.xv(Introduction). 203 49. Ibid. 203 50. B.Disp. part 1, p. xii. 203 51. V.l.103. 203 (1967), pp. 450-51 (10-11). 197 197 (1967), p. 448 (8). 198 256 No. 52. Page History of Indian Literature, vol. 2, (1927-33), p. 22, n.2. 203 53. Ibid. 203 54. Vinaya Texts,· (tr.) vol. 13, part 1, p. xxvii. 203 55. B. Disp. part 1, p.xxvii. 204 56. Early Buddhist Monachism, 57. PED. s.v. Patimokkha. 204 58. B. Disp. part 1, pp. xiii-xviii. 204 59. Ibid., p. xxiv. Bhagvat, D., Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, (1939), pp. 19-20. 204 60. Bhagvat, Ibid. 204 61. V.3.21, 44, 70, 89. Cf. B. Disp. part 1, p. xxvi ff. PED. s.v. Parajika. 205 62. Ibid. 205 63. V.2.38, 3.112; 186, 4.110;225. part 1, p. XXX ff. (1960), p. 73. 204 Cf.B. Disp. 205 64. Ibid., 1.112, 2.287. Cf. Ibid., p.xxii. 205 65. Ibid., 1.196; 254, 3.195. Cf. Ibid., part 2, p. vii ff. 205 66. Ibid., 1.172; 176, 2.242. Cf. Ibid., p.xxv ff. 205 67. Ibid. 205 6 8. Ibid., 4.185. 69. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 70. V.l. 305, 2.147. D.l.l45. J.l.93. 206 71. Jay<ttilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 521 (81). 206 72. Ibid. (1960), p. 143. 206 7 3. Dutt, Ibid., pp. 143-45. 206 74. Bhagvat, Op.cit., 206 75. Op.cit. 76. KA. 3.7.40; 10.45. Cf. Ibid., part 3, pp. v, XXX ff. Cf. Ibid., p. xxvii ff. Dutt, Op.cit., I (1960) I (1967), p. 521 (81). (1939), p.v. pp. 143-45. 205 205 206 206 257 No. Page 77. V.3.60. 206 78. Ibid., 1.101; 138. 207 79. Ibid., 73. 207 80. Bhagvat, Op.cit., 81. D.2.123-24. 82. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 83. The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, (1952), p. 24. 208 V.l.303-04. (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967)' p. 490 (50). 209 Ibid., 312 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4, p.xviii-xix. Dutt, Op.cit., (1960), p. 124-25. 210 86. Dutt, Ibid. 210 87. V.3.163 ff. 211 88. Ibid., 2.73 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 5, pp. vii -viii. 211 89. Ibid. 211 90. Ibid. , 93-94, 4.207. 211 91. Ibid. , 94. 211 92. Ibid., 79 212 93. Ibid. , 1.325, 2.81; 99, 4.207; 351. 212 9 4. Ibid., 2.83; 102. 212 95. Ibid. , 9 5. 213 9 6. Ibid., 96 213 97. Dutt, Op.cit., 98. V.2.97-98. 99. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 100. B. Disp. part 5, p. XX. 215 101. Ibid., p. xx-xxi. 215 102. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp. 519-20 (79-80). Gokuldas De, Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha, (1955), p.xv. 215 84. 85. (1939), p. vi. 207 207 (1967), p. 522 (82). (1960), p. 131. 207 213 214 (1967), p. 524 (84). 214 258 No. Page The word dipa has two meanings: (i) lamp and (ii) island. In this context, it means "island". 216 104. 0.2.101. 216 105. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 520 (80). Cf. Dutt, Op. cit., (1960), p. 116. 216 0.2. 74-76. (tr. Basham, in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De. Barry, vol. 1, 1958)' pp. 139-140. 218 DA.2.519. (tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit., pp. 525-26 (85-86). 219 103. 106. 107. (1967), 108. Jayati11eke, Ibid., pp. 451-52 (11-12). 220 109. 0.2.154. 220 llO. Ibid. lll. VA. 1.13. 221 ll2. V.l.98. 221 (tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.). (tr. Ibid.). 220 259 BIBLIOGRAPHY l. ORIGINAL SOURCES A. Pali Texts and Translations. Anguttara Nikaya, eds. Morris, R. and Hardy, E., 6 vols. and 1ndex, (PTS, London, 1885-1910). trs. Woodward, F.L. and Hare, E.M., The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 5 vols., (PTS,London, 1932-36). Culavama, ed. Geiger, W., 2 vols., (PTS, London, 19261927). tr. 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