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 Conference Program
Norms and Values
The role of social norms as instruments of value
realisation
1. GOALS OF THE CONFERENCE
Values are constitutive for the self-conception of individuals and
groups. The identification with fundamental values generates
substantial aims and commitments for social communities and their
members. By accepting binding values and striving to realize them
individually and collectively, personal aspirations and social
integration become focused and meaningful.
Some values are practically universally valid: life, health, love, wellbeing, security, social recognition. Other values are embedded in a
certain political order or culture: freedom, autonomy, self-realization,
democracy, authority, duty, self-control, material welfare, sexual
equality. In addition, many values are subject to a more or less
dynamic development and alteration. Today a change in values from
“materialism” to “post-materialism” or from “collectivism” to
“individualism” is frequently diagnosed (Inglehart 2005).
However, independent of the special content and characteristics of
their particular values individuals and communities must find ways
and means to transform their basic value-orientations into individual
and collective actions so that the desired values are actually
implemented. This includes a demand for efficient adaptation
processes in the face of the change and alteration of values. In this
context social norms play a central role: they are motivational drivers,
aligning people's behaviour with the values it is socially supposed to
serve. Seen from this view, social norms are instruments to realize
certain values.
The central topic of the workshop focuses on this relation between
norms and values: to increase our understanding of how norms
succeed or fail to realize desired individual and collective values from
an interdisciplinary perspective; and to suggest how norms should and
could change in the light of changing circumstances. These questions
are not only of theoretical significance. In the face of new challenges
to
democratic
societies
such
as
globalization,
terrorism,
fundamentalism and cultural diversity, they are also of crucial
practical importance.
To see social norms as instruments to realize values and to seek the
conditions under which they can serve this purpose is not a new
approach (Weber 1922; Parsons 1937). But it is a topic which deserves
to be taken up again and to be studied with modern methods and
insights. However, present-day research in this area is fragmented and
isolated. On the one side there are several empirical studies which
deal extensively with values and the change in values, on the other
side theoretical models are developed to explain the emergence and
maintenance of social norms. But seldom do we find the relation and
the transfer-mechanisms between values and norms explicitly
addressed and studied from an interdisciplinary perspective.
The workshop, therefore, aims to bring to bear in a unified way the
resources of analytical philosophy, evolutionary economics, empirical
political science, social psychology and sociology, to address a range
of meta-level questions (concerning the logical and factual relations
between norms and values; the internal aspect of norms; the
evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms; norms and the
emotions; the role of 'deficient' norms; and the social embeddedness
of norms and values). In its applications, the workshop aims to offer
practical suggestions for achieving a better fit between norms and
values in the changing circumstances surrounding: democracy;
security against terrorism; historical justice; sexuality; and belief
formation.
2. THE BRIDGING-FUNCTION OF NORMS
2.1 The bridging problem: values and conduct
Norms are frequently offered as a solution to one central problem of
value theory, which we call the 'bridging problem': how to bridge the
gap between values, on the one hand, and conduct, on the other
(Wallace et al. 2004).
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The bridging problem can be viewed in a number of different lights. It
can be viewed as a conceptual problem. One such version is related to
the principle
'Ought implies can'. Suppose values are making
infeasible demands: then it would make no conceptual sense to say
that we have reason or that it is valuable for us to conduct ourselves in
ways that are unavailable to us (Kant 1997; Brown 1977). A second
version relates to whether it is a conceptual pre-requisite for
something to be a value that it bear some appropriate relation to
conduct: for example, that it be the kind of thing that we can translate
into our everyday conduct (Korsgaard 1996; Smith 1994). If so, the
bridging problem must be solvable in principle for a value even to
count as a value. The conceptual aspects of the bridging problem refer
also to the fundamental philosophical question of how moral and nonmoral values can be justified and in which way justifications of values
can be directly or indirectly transformed into reasons for actions
(Brandt 1996; Hare 1997; Wright 1963a; b).
The bridging problem can also be viewed as a practical problem
concerning conduct. From this perspective it refers to the problem of
which mechanisms values empirically are transformed into actual
behaviour. Fallible human agents can fail to conduct themselves as
they have most reason to conduct themselves due to cognitive and/or
motivational failure. In the first case, agents fail to perceive what they
have most reason to do (Owens 2002). In the second, they fail to be
appropriately motivated by their values and reasons (Fischer et al.
1998; Stroud & Tappolet 2003). They might fail to be motivated by
these values and reasons at all; or values/reasons might simply not
supply enough motivating force, compared with the clamour of other
motivating considerations, to induce the required conduct (Pettit
2003). This practical aspect of the bridging problem is reflected in the
long concern of economics with invisible hands (Brennan & Hamlin
1995; 2000) and institutional development (North 1990), of political
science with institutional design (Brennan 2001a; Goodin 1996;
Ostrom 1990) and of sociology with socialisation and social
integration.
2.2 Formal institutions as instruments of value realisation
Practical aspects of the bridging problem are often seen to be solvable
by formal collective institutions of various kinds. The processes of
collective decision-making might, for example, enhance our
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appreciation of values through information pooling and deliberative
refinement (Cohen 1989; Goodin 2000a). Formal mechanisms of
command and control can also tell us what to do; and formal
institutions of sanctions and incentives can help motivate us to comply
with those collective prescriptions.
But though sometimes necessary, formal institutional sanctioning is
often costly and ineffective (Brennan & Pettit 2004). Moreover, such
institutions typically presuppose that some agents in the system act
already in accordance with the desired values (Brennan, Kliemt &
Gueth 2003; Goodin 2000b); and democratic systems further
presuppose those agents being authorised by a significant majority of
the general population motivated by the appropriate values and
reasons (Habermas 1996). In short, the solutions assume that the
bridging problem has already largely been solved. Institutions which
are designed to enforce the values of a community could only exist
when those values already exhibit sufficient efficacy by themselves as
the basis for these institutions (Baurmann 2000). We should be wary
of 'solutions' to problems that ultimately simply involve assuming the
problem away.
Moreover, formal institutional sanctions might fail in the deeper task
of properly incorporating reasons and values into our everyday
conduct. H. L. A. Hart (1961) famously distinguished between 'being
obliged' in ways that are externally imposed and 'being under an
obligation' in ways that are internally felt. Internalising reasons and
values in our everyday conduct requires the latter; institutional
sanctions on their own provide only the former. They only produce
external incentives to comply with values and therefore support only
an ‘external point of view’ towards them. However, there are good
reasons to assume that a social order is not viable in the long run if
people do not adopt an ‘internal point of view’ in regard to the basic
values of their community (Kliemt 1987).
2.3 Social norms as instruments for value realisation
The systematic failures of formal institutions to bridge the gap
between values and behaviour strongly foster the view that social
norms provide a crucial ingredient in an adequate solution to the
bridging problem (Axelrod 1986; Brandom 1998; Elster 1989b;
Gibbard 1990; Raz 1975; Baurmann 1999). Social norms are
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behavioural prescriptions, designed to (or having evolved to) serve
certain particular reasons and values (Bicchieri 1990; Elster 1989a; b;
Sunstein 1996). They implement an informal social order that is not
imposed externally, but is created and enforced endogenously by the
members of a community themselves. Unlike purely formal
institutional sanctions, norms necessarily have an internal as well as
an external aspect. Not only do we externalise norms by holding
others accountable to them (Horne 2001); we also internalise norms,
taking a critical and reflective attitude towards our own conduct in
light of them (Hart 1961; Elster 1989a). In this way social norms can
transform an internal point of view towards individual and collective
values to an internal point of view towards concrete behavioural
demands.
For the bridging of values and behaviour the aggregation, coordination and co-operation functions of social norms are essential.
Norms fulfil a general aggregation function insofar as they regulate
individual and collective behaviour in such a way that an aggregated
outcome is produced which should incorporate the desired values
(Coleman 1990). Norms can furthermore perform a co-ordination
function if a mutual adjustment of interpersonal behaviour is
necessary to realize common aims and values. Norms enable coordination by helping us to know what to expect of one another,
anticipating others’ behaviour and adapting our own conduct
accordingly (Axelrod & Keohane 1986; Elster 1989a; Ellickson 1991;
Gouldner 1960; Kuran 1998). Norms can also accomplish a cooperation function in situations in which actors risk producing a suboptimal result because of dilemmatic and conflicting incentives. Social
norms demand in these situations that the incentives for opportunistic
behaviour be ignored and a strategy be chosen which leads to an
efficient equilibrium and thereby to a state in which individual and
collective values are achieved to a higher degree than in the case of
unregulated behaviour (Axelrod 1986; Coleman 1987; Goodin 2002;
Ullmann-Margalit 1977).
In the fulfilment of their various bridging-functions, norms themselves
embody values such as fairness, reliability or trustworthiness. That
means that behavioural regularities in interactive contexts can
become infused with value in turn: therefore people become morally
outraged when others act in ways that are inconsistent with the
regular pattern, when others 'violate the norm'. This fact reminds us
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that bridges carry traffic in both directions. Behavioural regularities
may develop value rationalisations, as well as values giving rise to
norms. In an evolving environment, the behavioural regularities can
also persist after the original value rationale has evaporated. Norms
can come apart from the values and reasons that originally justified
them. Not only can norms cease to represent faithfully the underlying
values of which they are putative expressions – but they may well
stand in the way of developing new modes of conduct better fitted to
those values.
3. SIGNIFICANCE AND INNOVATION
Although many theorists across philosophy and the social sciences
have noted that norms seem to play this bridging function, the
question of how and to what extent they are actually capable of doing
so has received only very partial and incomplete answers. Such
discussions have tended to occur in isolated and increasingly
divergent ways across disparate disciplines. The conference is based
on the long-term project to provide a unified account of the bridging
function of norms, employing a perspective that is both philosophical
and social scientific at one and the same time. Recent work in
'normativity' in various corners of philosophy and on the evolution of
norms in economics and (in a very different way) in sociology make
this a timely topic. Those various enterprises, however, pull in
radically different directions. A coherent, unified understanding of
norms is essential in order to 'make norms work', and especially to
change them so they 'work better' in the service of the reasons and
values they are supposed to be serving.
The initiators of the workshop share the conviction that norms are
best considered simultaneously through a variety of disciplinary lenses
and with the relation between practical examples and more abstract
analysis always in view. Different disciplines – law, economics, political
science, moral philosophy – all have a stake in the analysis of norms.
But work on norms from diverse disciplines is rarely brought into joint
focus.
The discussion at the conference will inform, and be shaped by,
specific applications: to norms of democracy; of security; of historical
justice; sexual behaviour; and issues of beliefs (doxastic norms). These
arenas in which norms apply are interesting and important in their
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own right; but they are especially interesting as a sample of the wide
range of instances of the more general and more abstract
phenomenon of normative solutions to the problem of 'bridging'
between values and conduct.
The distinctive feature of this project lies in its multi-level and multidisciplinary approach. Previous work has been radically fragmented
both within and across philosophy and the social sciences. Within
philosophy, work at the general level proceeds in splendid isolation
from work at the specific or applied level, and often vice versa.
Focusing exclusively on the general risks missing important nuances,
with insufficient attention to the different kinds of norms and values in
question and the different ways in which different norms function to
promote and pursue them. Focusing exclusively on the specific and
applied leads to a kind of tunnel vision, rich appreciation of the
particular unconnected to the general.
A second kind of polarisation is along more overtly disciplinary lines:
between those whose aim and method is squarely philosophical and
those whose aim and method is derived from economics, political
science, sociology or perhaps sociobiology. This is equally problematic.
Philosophical inquiry uninformed by social scientific understanding of
how norms function is prone to simplify and mislead. Empirical social
scientific inquiry lacking adequate philosophical underpinning risks
conceptual confusion.
The participants of the workshop are therefore selected according to
the criteria that they have a strong record of operating across
disciplinary boundaries and that each brings a somewhat different mix
of skills and disciplinary orientations to the task.
4. TOPICS
The workshop work will be two-levelled and interactive. At the metalevel, we shall interrogate what norms and values are, and how, given
our moral psychological makeup, norms work to promote and respect
values. These meta-level enquiries will involve both philosophical
analysis (of a metaphysical, epistemological and meta-ethical sort) and
formal tools of economic, sociological and political analysis (decision
theory, evolutionary game theory, graph theory and network analysis,
etc.). At the applied-level, we shall examine certain particular kinds of
norms that seem to pose particularly important challenges. The
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elaboration of these applications can blend a wealth of material from
applied ethics and the social sciences. The conclusions we reach about
particular cases of functioning or malfunctioning norms will then be
used to reflect back on the meta-level, and vice versa.
4.1 The theoretical analysis of bridging.
On which of the
following the workshop will focus in detail will depend upon the
expertise of the participants recruited:
Values as reasons for norms. In which way do values justify norms
and their social enforcement as instruments of value realization? To
answer this question we have to differentiate between conceptual
relations between valuations and prescriptions on the one side and
empirical relations between valuations and the factual acceptance of
norms on the other side. The study of these problems presupposes
explications of the concepts of norms, values and actions and a
philosophical and logical analysis of their interrelation (Dancy 2000;
Hare 1997; Schurz 1997; Wright 1963a; b).
The internal aspect of norms. An important feature of norms is that
they are internalised and externalised (Elster 1989a; Margolis 1990).
But what, more precisely, does this involve? In part this is a
conceptual philosophical question about norms and how they differ
from mere regularities (Hart 1961; Smith 1994). In part it is a social
scientific question about how processes of internalisation and
externalisation occur (Cooter 2000). Drawing on evolutionary game
theory, network analysis and decision theory, our aim is to understand
the way these processes work as well as their underlying conceptual
structure.
The evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms. How do
norms come about? How are they maintained? And how do they alter
(Axelrod 1986; Axelrod & Keohane 1986; Ostrom 2000; Sugden 1989;
1990)? We are particularly interested in how they evolve, are
maintained and alter in respect of fulfilling the bridging function. In
this context it seems fruitful to contrast models which explain
evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms as a result of
interactions between essentially self-interested agents (Elster 1989a;
Mansbridge 1998; Posner 2000; Ullman-Margalit 1977) with models
which operate with extended assumptions as, for example,
dispositional and “virtuous” behaviour (Brennan 2001b; Güth/Kliemt
1994; Peacock & Schefczyk 2005; Vanberg 1994; Baurmann 2002a) or
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behaviour which is motivated by esteem or regard (Brennan & Pettit
2004; Baurmann 2002b).
Norms, voluntary control and guidance. In order for norms to
constitute an adequate bridge between values and conduct, it seems
conceptually required that we possess some kind of voluntary control
over the domain in question. This point is frequently noted, but it is
unclear what kind and degree of voluntary control is required and why
it should be important. The standard answer – that it follows from
'ought implies can' (Alston 1989; Feldman 1988) – is inadequate,
since there are many things we can do, over which we have no
voluntary control. Most conceptions of guidance are either too strong
(e.g. the 'intellectualist' conception associated with Kant and his
followers: e.g. Korsgaard 1996) or too weak (e.g. the 'dispositionalist'
conception). An alternative view associated with Brennan and Pettit
(2004) is the 'virtual' conception. This will also link this up to
questions about responsibility and praise and blame (Strawson 1962;
Beckermann 2005).
Norms, values and the emotions. What is the role of emotions when
we identify with certain values and when we obey or break
corresponding norms? Wilful violations of norms evoke strong
emotional responses (Elster 1996; Frijda 1986). The emotion-evoking
nature of norms is an important way in which they are able to fulfil the
bridging function. When the perpetrator is another agent, the
emotions mobilised include disgust, anger, contempt, blame. When
the perpetrator is the agent him- or herself, the relevant emotions
include guilt, shame, self-disgust (Nussbaum 2004; Frank 1988; Taylor
1985). The impact of emotions can be deleterious as well as beneficial:
anger can blind us, guilt can paralyse us, contempt can make us selfrighteous. In investigating the role of the emotions, we can draw upon
and bring together both recent work in empirical psychology (Haidt
2003), experimental research (Lawler et al. 2000) and work of a more
conceptual and philosophical kind (Arpaly 2000; Jones 2003; Lahno
1995).
Norms and practical/theoretical irrationality. We are irrational
when we suffer from some kind of internal incoherence. Two muchdiscussed kinds are akrasia and compulsion (Fischer et al. 1998;
Stroud & Tappolet 2003). Norms might help reduce and overcome
instances of irrationality (Frank 1988; Schelling 1985). Also in this
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respect they can help to realize individual and collective values. We
are also interested in the comparison between practical and
theoretical rationality. Against the dominant view, we suspect that
there may be cases of theoretical as well as practical akrasia (Owens
2002) whereby one fails to believe what one judges one has most
(epistemic) reason to believe.
The role of 'deficient' norms. A 'deficient' norm is one that is
inadequate to fulfil the bridging function. A norm may be deficient in
either of two ways.
First, the norm might not secure enough
compliance – the motivating elements associated with the norm are
weak, even though they are stronger than the motivating force of the
underlying value. Alternatively, the norm might secure sufficient
compliance, but the norm itself is imperfectly aligned to the
underlying value. We are particularly interested in whether deficient
norms might still serve some bridging-like function, even if they are
not completely (perhaps not at all) behaviour-guiding (Finnemore &
Sikkink 1998). Norms with low-level compliance can still provide
important orientation, they can embody scarcely unattainable “ideals”,
there may be a trade-off between the conformity towards different
norms and it could be that the expectation of norm adherence is more
important than the adherence itself.
The social embeddedness of norms. To make norms work they
must be socially embedded in two respects: on the one side they must
be rooted in socially accepted values – from which they receive their
justification as well as motives for their observance; on the other side
they must be anchored in social relations and structures – by this the
efficacy and adaptability of norms is facilitated. Social norms are
crucially dependent on societal institutions (Ostrom 1990), social
networks (Granovetter 1973; 1985), reciprocity and trust. This kind of
“social capital” (Putnam 1993; 2000) in its diffusion and character is
in turn strongly shaped by the values of a community (Baurmann &
Zintl 2006).
4.2 Applications
Norms of democracy. By this we mean both: the norms that
constitute and are presupposed by democratic rule; and the norms
that emerge from democratic processes, having received reflective
endorsement therein (Brennan & Hamlin 1999; Breannan & Lomasky
10
2000; Goodin 2003; Habermas 1996). We want to focus on how
democratic norms fulfil the bridging function, and the kinds of reasons
and values that democratic norms are capable of respecting and
promoting (Goodin & List 2001; Goodin & Niemeyer 2003). How might
particular democratic norms and practices need to alter over time,
and with shifting circumstances (e.g. cultural diversity, technological
change, international interdependence), in order to serve the deeper
reasons and values that are their targets? Democratic norms are
procedural. They often come into conflict with substantive values and
reasons relating to 'best' outcomes or policies. How those conflicts
might be optimally managed is both a practical problem and a
conceptual one. But the conflicts also arise more generally in the
'paradox of democracy', involving the obligation to abide by collective
decisions that one has voted against and believes wrong (Wollheim
1962; Baurmann 2003).
Norms of security. These are the (moral and legal) norms regulating
what is permissible and impermissible in terms of defending ourselves
from attack (Ignatieff, 2004). Our focus here is on the norms that
pertain to domestic and international security, though we want also
draw analogies with personal security and individual self-defence.
Norms of security constitute a particularly important and challenging
test-case for our approach for at least the following reasons
(McMahan 2004). First, the traditional norms of security – e.g. just
war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) – have increasingly come under
pressure post-September 11 from critics who claim that they have
outlived their usefulness. Second, terrorists (perhaps by definition) do
not share the reasons and values that norms of security are meant to
be promoting and respecting. Third, by the same token, there is a
worry that the emerging norms of security regulating ways of fighting
terrorism are undermining the reasons and values that the fight
against terrorism is supposed to be serving (Boyle et al. 2003;
Dershowitz 2003; Elsthain 2003).
Norms of historical justice. These are norms pertaining to present
attempts to respond to past wrongs. The question how to adequately
treat those wrongs played an important role in many societies in the
last years: Nazi-Germany, GDR, Russia, South-Africa, Australia. There
are a number of familiar obstacles, due to the passage of time, that lie
in the way of an adequate account of historical norms; some are
judicial (Hart 1958), some informational, others motivational (Elster
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2004; Ridge 2003; Waldron 1992). Our aim is to assess the reasons
and values for rectifying past wrongs, and attempt to determine
whether, and if so how, norms can be crafted to surmount these
obstacles.
Sexual norms. By this we mean the norms regulating sexual conduct,
including
but
not
limited
to
pornography,
prostitution,
homosexuality/transsexuality, sexual assault, infidelity, incest and
contraception. Philosophers in the liberal analytic tradition have
tended to ignore sexual norms (Estlund & Nussbaum 1997),
sometimes even going so far as to say that, so long as we are talking
about consenting adults, such norms lie beyond the domain of the
moral (Scanlon 1998). But this is surely not descriptive of the practice
of contemporary states. Moreover, certain feminists (among others)
have challenged the moral status of that view. Here as elsewhere, we
will probe the reasons and values that norms of intimacy are supposed
to serve, and consider how changing social circumstances might
justify – and possibly force – revision in those norms for a better fit to
those deeper reasons and values.
Doxastic norms. These are norms pertaining to what to believe
(Feldman 1988; Miller 1995). Doxastic norms may be moral, rational
or prudential, or epistemic. In the case of this application, questions of
whether there are doxastic norms loom as large as those of what the
content of particular norms ought be. Many epistemologists have
thought there cannot be any doxastic norms because we do not or
cannot have voluntary control over what we believe (Alston 1989). But
this contradicts the social facts as Social Epistemology (Coady 1992;
Goldman 1999) or an Economic Theory of Knowledge (Hardin 1997;
2002) make clear. We will explore what social function doxastic norms
might serve, and what doxastic norms might best be instituted for
translating reasons and values relating to belief into proper action
within the constraints that govern freedom of action in this domain
(Goodin & Brennan 2001).
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