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Why were Cuban politics so unstable between 1902 and 1933? Abstract: This paper uses the case of political instability in Cuba between 1902 and 1933 to demonstrate the dynamic between the United States and Cuba that must be considered whenever attempting to understand early Republican politics. Specifically, it seeks to reconcile two predominate trends within the current literature. The first of these sees the United States as culpable for the shortcomings of Cuban politics (Pérez, 1986; Benjamin, 1977; Fermoselle, 1987); the other emphasises Cuban agency in the way its politics evolved (Speck, 2011; Hernández, 1993). To do so, the paper examines the manner by which the Cuban government, the United States and Cuban extra-governmental political groups contributed to the destabilisation of Cuban politics. This paper finds that the cause of political instability in Cuba was neither entirely internal nor entirely external. Instead, it appears that it was the combination of the inherent problems within the Cuban political system with the effects of the ‘restraints from above and without’ and the ensuing ‘pressure from below and within’ (Pérez, 1986: 66) that fermented political instability in Cuba between 1902 and 1933. Thus, the case of political instability during the early Cuban Republic reveals the dynamic that one must always consider when examining the Platt years: one of interaction and response between two countries, each with their own agency, and within a divided and vibrant country; not of a passive colony and its ruler. This conclusion calls for re-evaluations of other realities within the early Cuban Republic so that a fuller understanding of the causes and processes at work during the period can be achieved. Keywords: Cuba; Political instability; United States; Platt Amendment; Radical groups. 1 Cuban politics are anything but an open book. There is little, if any, agreement on how to understand the politics that developed after the American occupation ended in 1902. While some historians like Louis A. Pérez Jr., Jules R. Benjamin and Rafael Fermoselle see the United States as entirely culpable for the shortcomings of Cuban politics, others like Mary Speck and José Hernández emphasise Cuban agency in the way its politics developed. However, the causation of such a fragmented reality cannot be traced to a single root. As a result, the truth lies somewhere in between. The two culprits – the United States and Cuba – did not act independently of each other. The actions of one inherently both responded to and influenced the actions of the other. Additionally, the results of those mutually informed actions in turn perpetuated a scenario to which each was required to respond. As one of the few generally accepted notions about early republican Cuba, the case of political instability provides a perfect representative of this dynamic. Indeed, there can be no doubt that Cuba was politically unstable during the early republic, between 1902 and 1933, when political stability is based on the record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies in relation to the risk of government collapse and the amount of threats that endanger that stability, including coups, domestic violence, economic instability and terrorism.1 The cause of political instability in Cuba was neither entirely internal nor entirely external. It was the combination of the inherent problems within the Cuban political system with the effects of the ‘restraints from above and without’ and the ensuing ‘pressure from below and within’2 that fermented political instability in Cuba between 1902 and 1933. That is not to say that politics were any more stable before or after that period, but that the early Cuban Republic endured a unique experience under the Platt Amendment and must be considered separately. Denise Y. Coleman, ‘Political Stability Index’, Montenegro Country Review (2012), p. 42. Louis A. Pérez Jr., ‘Aspects of Hegemony: Labor, State, and Capital in Plattist Cuba’, Cuban Studies, 16 (1986), p. 66. 1 2 2 The idea that the United States was to blame for Cuba’s political instability rests on the understanding that, if it were not for United States interference, Cuba would have established a stable democratic government.3 That this premise is flawed engenders its conclusion necessarily false. Cuban politics after the occupation did not truly aspire to democracy and thus its instability cannot be held to be a result of the failure of democracy. The corruption that is so often blamed for Cuba’s political instability was not a corruption of a democratic system. In fact, the system of pervasive graft, sinecures and personal use of the national lottery were themselves political institutions that actually helped to stabilise politics during Presidential incumbency.4 Instead, it was the incompatibility of caudillismo politics with governmental consistency that generated political instability. Because caudillismo is based on the protection of a caudillo’s supporters – mostly financially in Cuba’s case, because of the volatile sugar economy – in return for loyalty, government positions were filled only with the demographic that supported the incumbent caudillo.5 The composition of the electorate itself reflected the narrow aim of government. Besides for age, eligibility to vote was based on literacy and wealth – one had to own at least $250 worth of property – representing the Conservatives’ constituency, or on ‘honourable’ service in the Liberation Army prior to 18 July 1898: the embodiment of the Liberals’ supporters.6 No other constituency was represented in government. Out of a population of 3.5 million people,7 only around five per cent was included in the electorate.8 That government employment was so lucrative – a result of the system of graft, sinecures and corruption of the national lottery – mandated that there be some sort of Mary Speck, ‘Democracy in Cuba: Principles and Practice, 1902–1952’, in M. Font (ed.), Cuba Futures: Historical Perspectives (New York, 2011), pp. 1-28. 4 Julia Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, 2009), p. 13. 5 Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940 (Chapel Hill, 2001), p. 18. 6 Steven Hewitt, ‘Republican Ideals and the Reality of Patronage: A Study of the Veterans’ Movement in Cuba, 1900-1924’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wolverhampton (Wolverhampton, 2009), p. 102. 7 Mary Speck, ‘Prosperity, Progress, and Wealth: Cuban Enterprise during the Early Republic, 1902-1927’, Cuban Studies, 36, (2005), p. 51. 8 Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934 (Pittsburgh, 1986), p. 38. 3 3 “free market” in regard to its circulation and availability. However, within the caudillo system, the availability of government positions was choked by the incumbent caudillo and his network of supporters. As Jorge I. Domínguez asserts, ‘incumbents altered the ordinary pattern of circulation of elites, freezing the pattern of office holding and making it impossible for new individuals to come to power’.9 Thus, ‘the politics of incumbency’10 became the supreme concern. Since ‘no incumbent President failed to elect his chosen candidate (often himself) to the presidency’,11 the losing party had no choice but to instigate armed rebellion in order to get their turn. What made the competition between political parties, or rather opposing caudillo networks, even more precarious were the lines along which their divisions were set. The Conservatives’ base was found in ‘the civilian wing of the independence movement’: mostly professionals and educated people who had spent the War of Independence in exile and who expected a high return on their investment in learning new skills and English and gaining political connections. The Liberals’ found their base in the destitute veterans of the independence army who believed that they should be rewarded for their military service and personal sacrifice.12 This socio-economic chasm between the Conservatives and Liberals and their respective sense of superiority intensified their political dissent and their determination to see their opponent fall from power. Thus, there was no understanding that transfers of power should occur so that political, and therefore economic, power was evenly shared. Rather, there prevailed a keen sense of being wronged when one caudillo prevailed over the other. In a system with this kind of winner-take-all dynamic, there was no chance for the kind of bipartisan cooperation that makes party politics work. Because of the insurmountable divisions between individual caudillos and their supporters, ‘Cuban politics [was] characterised 9 Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, 1978), p. 12. Ibid, p. 2. 11 Ibid, p. 40. 12 Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba, p. 19. 10 4 by…low-level political violence, and zero-sum rivalries’,13 rather than by consolidation, inclusion and, therefore, stability. As evident from the structure and purpose of the Cuban government, legitimacy was based on a caudillo’s role in the War of Independence and the degree of economic security he provided. Rather than unconditionally supporting the government, these two sources of legitimacy proved to be seriously manipulative. Though the role a leader played in the War of Independence could not be changed, his dedication to Cuba Libré – the extent to which he represented and promoted the goals of the War of Independence – could be questioned. When the policies or actions of a government were perceived as contradicting the aims of Cuba Libré , such as Gómez’s massacre of Afro-Cubans in the 1912 “race war”, the opposition could use that to delegitimise the incumbent.14 Even more dangerous was the role of the economy in determining legitimacy, due to the volatility of the sugar industry. Tying the government’s legitimacy to the country’s economic welfare guaranteed political instability, as evident in the disastrous political chaos that ensued from the economic devastation of the ‘Dance of the Millions’ after World War One and the Great Depression, which hit Cuba harder than most due to its monoculture economy. Not only did this system create a situation in which political transitions were rarely peaceful and governments were so readily overthrown, putting political stability beyond reach, but it also led to mutability of the very institutions of government. As is common in other countries in which caudillismo politics is the norm, Cuban caudillos were able to change the political institution in order to match their interests.15 The most infamous case of institutional adjustment was when President Gerardo Machado changed the Cuban constitution to lengthen the Presidential term so that he could legally continue in office without contradicting his 13 Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, p. 13. Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba, p. 21. 15 Charles E. Chapman, ‘The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 12 (1932), p. 283. 14 5 promise to not pursue re-election. Another less known, but equally consequential institutional alteration was the placement of the portfolio of the Army and Navy under the purview of the Secretaría de Gobernación during the Menocal administration.16 This administrative change in 1920, though it may seem insignificant compared to the drastic augmentation of power by President Machado in 1928, was arguably responsible for more political instability than Machado’s political continuance. While the continuity of Machado’s presidency sparked one of the biggest political upheavals in Cuba’s twentieth century history – the 1933 Revolution – the imbedding of the military’s role into politics from the 1920 election onwards equipped the political system with a volatile instrument. The military could either serve to guarantee electoral victory for the incumbent administration, thus incurring the retaliation of the losing party, or it could throw its heavily weighted support behind a new authority that promised better reward as it did in September 1933. Nevertheless, a consideration of what happened in 1933 cannot fail to include the role of the United States and this is no less true for contemplation of Cuba’s previous political upheavals. From even before the birth of the new Republic, the United States clearly had more than one finger in the Cuban pie. Though it eventually evolved to include Cuban politics, United States involvement in Cuba was at first limited to its economy. As Cubans became more involved in fighting for independence, more room opened up to American capital. Indeed, concern for US investments in Cuba accounted for three out of the four ‘elements of danger’ that President McKinley invoked when beseeching congress to ‘empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba…’17 The lengths to which the United States went to secure its economic Louis A. Pérez Jr., ‘The Military and Electoral Politics: The Cuban Election of 1920’, Military Affairs, 37 (1973), p. 6. 17 William McKinley, ‘Message of President William McKinley to Congress, April 11, 1898’ in James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1899), v. 10, pp. 13950, reprinted in Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States: 1900-1935 (New York, 1935), p. 268. 16 6 interests in Cuba – going to war against one of the major colonial powers of the day18 – proves that those interests were the foremost priority of United States policy in Cuba. The trend of intervening militarily and politically in Cuba to protect American ‘life, property, and individual liberty’19 was thus set early. In legalising that impulse by passing the Platt Amendment in the American Congress and forcing it into the Cuban Constitution, the United States unwittingly created a situation in which their goal of Cuban political stability was unachievable. The availability of a powerful referee of sorts provided the Conservatives and Liberals a formidable tool for getting their turn in government. A prime example of the Cuban agency that Speck and Hernandez espouse, this use of the United States as a pawn for their own political games reveals how the Cuban factions guaranteed their continued political instability. ‘Virtually every inter-elite conflict between 1901 and 1933 was characterized by political factions trying to curry favor with the United States while blaming their adversaries for political chaos’.20 However, the ability of the Conservatives and Liberals to use the United States against one another finds its root in American actions. When the 1905 vote resulted in the re-election of President Thomas Estrada Palma and the Liberals instigated an armed revolt in response, President Roosevelt was more concerned with ‘establish[ing] peace and order’21 in order to protect his countrymen’s economic interests than in developing a strong reaction against the illegal activities of the insurgents, as he was called upon to do by the Cuban President. As a result, as Enrique José Varona described it in October 1906, ‘The delegates sent by the President of the United States…accepted the basis for compromise to the de jure government of As Piero Gleijeses discusses in ‘1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 35 (2003), pp. 681-719, Spain was considered a very powerful adversary before the SpanishAmerican War; neither the American military leaders nor the public were aware of the depths to which Spain’s military and navy prowess had sunk. 19 Article III of the Platt Amendment to ‘An Act Making Appropriation for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Two’, reprinted in Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 272. 20 Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba, p. 21. 21 Allan R. Millett, The Politics of Intervention (Columbus, 1968), p. 146. 18 7 the Republic. The government of the United States, in other words, demanded that the Cuban Government, which was officially recognized as the legal government of the country, surrender to an armed insurrection’.22 In her haste to end the violence, the United States created a precedent that encouraged further violent insurrections by the losing side of elections for years to come. Not only did the Liberals achieve their goal in removing the Conservatives from power, but when the United States took up the role of occupier once more from 1906 to 1909, the miguelista insurgents were also pardoned, accepted into the occupation government and then took up governance after the Americans left.23 Consequently, though both Cuban political factions are greatly at fault for inducing political instability through their manipulation of the Platt Amendment to obtain American intervention, the United States maintains a degree of liability for making that manipulation so rewarding to the perpetrators. However, since the United States’ primary concern in Cuba was American property and economic interests, it was never clear on whose side she would come down in order to protect those interests. As was the case in 1906, the insurgents sometimes gained the benefits of American intervention. But in other cases, as in the 1917 intervention, it was the incumbent government that was bolstered in the face of opposition forces. This uncertainty exacerbated Cuban political instability. If the outcome was pre-determined, then the use of American intervention could have acted as a control mechanism, ensuring that each political group received its opportunity to govern. However, that was not the case. Moreover, the inconsistency of American policy was augmented by the plurality of sources of American authority. The various arbiters of American policy – the President, the American consul, the Navy and the State Department – compounded the precariousness of the political situation within Cuba. For example, the U.S. support of the incumbent government in 1917 was not unequivocal or coherent. While President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing 22 23 Rafael Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986 (Miami, 1987), p. 110. Ibid, p. 111. 8 instructed the minister to Cuba William Gonzales to give vocal support for President Menocal and instructed the War Department to send physical support in the form of 10,000 rifles and 2 million rounds of ammunition, the Navy embarked on a different policy. Guided by its interests in Oriente, the Navy blocked government ships from entering the Liberal-held Santiago Harbour in an attempt to prevent a damaging battle from ensuing. They then brokered a treaty between government and opposition forces,24 thereby recognising the belligerency of the Liberal faction, contrary to the President and State Department’s actions. Neither the Cuban government nor its opposition could rely on a stable, consistent American reaction, making every entreaty for intervention a gamble for both sides. This highly insecure dynamic – within the Cuban government and between it and the United States – incurred yet another destabilising blow: the ‘pressure from below and within’25 in the form of radical extra-governmental political groups. Unable to assert their voice in government without proper representation and frustrated by American dominance, students, Afro-Cubans and workers sought their outlet through radical activism. Growing discontent and disenchantment with the political, social and economic situation into which they were placed, these demographic groups established associations such as the Partido Independiente de Color (PIC), the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) and the Directorio Estudiantil Universitaria (DEU), the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), the ABC terrorist organisation and multiple trade unions. These new organisations further destabilised Cuban politics by increasing the pluralisation of political pressure as well as by directly instigating instability through outright violent challenges to the state and to American interests. Perhaps the clearest instance of radical activism destabilising Cuban politics was the September 1933 Revolution against the Céspedes government installed by the mediation of emissary Sumner Welles. Although it began as an intra-military mutiny, the DEU turned the 24 25 Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, p. 16-17. Pérez, ‘Aspects of Hegemony’, p. 66. 9 movement into a political coup d’état and established a new government. As discussed above, this was only possible because of the role given to the military as an arbiter of political incumbency, but it was also only possible because of the radicalisation of extra-governmental opposition groups. Though the most dramatic and self-evident, this explicit overthrow of the incumbent government by radical groups previously excluded from government was not the only way that political activists destabilised Cuban politics in the early republic. Like the government factions, many of the new radical groups utilised America’s fixation on property in order to invite American intervention, hoping the result would be in their favour. Just as the Liberals did in 1906, in 1912 the outlawed PIC instigated an uprising of Afro-Cubans, frustrated by their lack of political voice and social justice. However, although the protest did incur American intervention, it was not beneficial to the black Cuban activists. While the Gómez government massacred Cuban blacks, the American marines sailed to Cuba’s harbours to protect not the lives of the Afro-Cubans, but the endangered American business interests. While the 1912 uprising obviously did not accomplish its aims, it did serve to disrupt Cuban politics by inviting American intervention once more and promoting Menocal’s challenge of President Gómez in the 1913 election.26 Radical political groups also created a quagmire for the Cuban government by pushing for goals in exact opposition to those of the United States. For instance, because of the increased militarism and power of labour unions, in 1925 there was a concerted effort to pass the Lombard Bill, a nationalisation law that would have enforced a seventy-five per cent Cuban quota on apprenticeship positions. However, because it was deemed ‘generally detrimental to American business interests and in some respects confiscatory’,27 it was opposed by the United States. This put the government in an insecure, lose-lose situation. Passing the bill would assuage a great deal of the unions’ complaints but provoke a dangerous American response, 26 27 Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba, p. 21. Pérez, ‘Aspects of Hegemony’, p. 62. 10 and dismissing it would further radicalise the trade unions. In the end the bill failed, augmenting the cause for labour activism and perpetuating the cycle of radical action and American response that rocked the Cuban government throughout the early republic. Incontrovertibly, the combination of inherent problems within the Cuban political system, the effects of the United States hegemony and the rise of radical popular politics produced rampant political instability in Cuba between 1902 and 1933. While the very purpose and structure of the Cuban government undermined its stability, the United States pluralised the sources of authority and policy. As a result, the demographic elements theretofore kept out of politics sought ways of voicing their frustration and obtaining their goals that both directly and indirectly compromised political stability. It is debatable whether any of these realities on its own would have maintained the degree of instability Cuba experienced during the First Republic. But the mixture of so many sources of instability makes it difficult to see a way that Cuba could have produced a stable government in those years. Indeed, the record shows hardly a single peaceful transition of power, nor a government that was able to stay in office and carry out its policies without facing the high risk of collapse due to threats such as military coups, domestic violent uprisings, economic instability or terrorism. Thus, the case of political instability during the early Cuban Republic reveals the dynamic that one must always consider when examining the Platt years: one of interaction and response between two countries, each with their own agency, and within a divided and vibrant country; not of a passive colony and its ruler. 11 Bibliography Aguilar, Luis E., ‘Cuba, c. 1860-1930’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), Cuba: A Short History (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 21-55. Benjamin, Jules R., The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, 1977). Chapman, Charles E., ‘The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 12 (1932), pp. 281-300. Coleman, Denise Y., ‘Political Stability Index’, Montenegro Country Review (2012), pp. 42-51. Domínguez, Jorge I., Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, 1978). Fermoselle, Rafael, The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986 (Miami, 1987). Fitzgibbon, Russell H., Cuba and the United States: 1900-1935 (New York, 1935). Gott, Richard, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, 2004). Hernández, José, Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868-1933 (Austin, 1993). Hewitt, Steven, ‘Republican Ideals and the Reality of Patronage: A Study of the Veterans’ Movement in Cuba, 1900-1924’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wolverhampton (Wolverhampton, 2009). Millett, Allan R., The Politics of Intervention (Columbus, 1968). Pérez, Louis A. Jr., ‘Aspects of Hegemony: Labor, State, and Capital in Plattist Cuba’, Cuban Studies, 16 (1986), pp. 49-69. Pérez, Louis A. Jr., Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934 (Pittsburgh, 1986). Pérez, Louis A. Jr., Intervention, Revolution, and Politics in Cuba, 1913-1921 (Pittsburgh, 1978). Pérez, Louis A. Jr., ‘The Military and Electoral Politics: The Cuban Election of 1920’, Military Affairs, 37 (1973), pp. 5-8. Speck, Mary, ‘Democracy in Cuba: Principles and Practice, 1902–1952’, in M. Font (ed.), Cuba Futures: Historical Perspectives (New York, 2011), pp. 1-28. Speck, Mary, ‘Prosperity, Progress, and Wealth: Cuban Enterprise during the Early Republic, 1902-1927’, Cuban Studies, 36, (2005), pp. 50-86 Sweig, Julia, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, 2009). Whitney, Robert, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940 (Chapel Hill, 2001). 12