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Working paper No.71 Transition to Market Economies in Former Centrally Planned Countries:A case of Vietnam by Duong Thi Nguyet Researcher Development Strategy Institute Ministry of Planning and Investment Government of Vietnam January 1999 Department of Research Cooperation Economic Research Institute Economic planning Agency Tokyo, Japan Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the institution to which the authors belong. Introduction After more than 10 years of economic reform and renovation, Vietnam exhibits an impressive economic performance. In the late ’80s with difficulties has been faced such as socio-economic crisis, cessation of close economic relations with former Soviet Union, the collapse of former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and the US embargo, Vietnam has escaped and has achieved a success in its transition. The Doimoi policy has really created a good opportunity and environment for economic development. The GDP growth rate has been high compared to that of the regional countries, it was 8.2 per cent annually in period 1991-1995 and over 9 per cent average in the two years 1996 and 1997 and more than 5.8 per cent in 1998. The inflation has controlled, it was a reduction from three-digit in 1996 to single-digit figures in recent years, and exchange rate has been stable. These achievements have been expected to target Vietnam to a new stage of development-industrialization and modernization. Up to now, prettily success in Vietnam economic development mainly depends on liberalization under Doimoi policy and large inflow of foreign capital relative to GDP. Vietnam has also embarked on a process of internationalization and insertion in to the global economy. As the outcome, Vietnam has already resulted in a normalization of relations with the US, membership in the Association of South-East Asian Nation (ASEAN), and will become a full member of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and join World Trade Organization (WTO) in the near future. Vietnam has now reached a stage of economic development, that further growth depends significantly on whether Vietnam can success on transition process in which policy actions can strengthen its market economy as initial “spurt effect” decreasing gradually. The urgent task of Vietnamese Government is to prepare necessary economic and institutional conditions to turn high growth rate into sustainable development based on investment, technology absorption and productivity improvement. Beside that Vietnam has to create a new environment to integrate deeply with the rest of the world through trade and investment. -1- Foundation for Vietnam’s success in transition has been a combination of liberalization, stabilization, institutional renovation and some structural reform. However, even recently Vietnam economy has high growth rate, it not means that, Vietnam does not face challenges. Vietnam still suffers difficulties such as: poverty, big gap between different regions, low level of domestic saving, lack of infrastructure and series of under developed problems of the market economy. Doimoi is a revolution of transition process from centrally planned economy to a market economy - this is a very complicated process, related to all respects of socio-economic activities. What distinguishes transition from reform in other countries is the systematic changes involved: reform must penetrate to the fundamental rules of the game, to the institution that shape behavior and guide organization. This makes it a profound social as well as an economic one. In the common scene, transition is the common nature of process of movement in historical development toward to complete efficiency, however, it has specific characteristics in different transition economies. Therefore, this report focus on discovering the transition model in Vietnam economy, the policies that were applied, and the reasons, sources for the country’s success and failures to reconfirm again the necessary of deeply comprehensive reform in order to turn the initial “spurt effect” in to sustainable long-term growth. The report contain 3 part: Part I of the report overviews the transition process to market economy in former centrally planned countries, while part II provide a detail description of Vietnam’s transition process, this is to serve as a general background for the presentation of the specific policies and the stages of transition of Vietnam. After a summary of a recent economic performance of Vietnam, the report describes the various policy goals and the broad measures of Government of Vietnam to the next stage of reform and Vietnam’s policy response to external and financial shocks. Then go to more detail on Vietnam’s socio-economic development and stabilization policy. Part III: summary and conclusion. -2- Part I Overview of transition to market economies from some centrally planned economies. 1 - Situation and procedures of transition. In many international seminars and workshops [14,15] economists agreed that transition process is complicated and more time consuming than expected. Through scientific studies for transition, authors in the world came to common conclusion for overall characteristics and procedures of reform steps which were considered as most rationality as show in table 1 below: [7] Table 1: Procedures of transition steps. Averages points Reform order 1. Establishing legal framework 1 1 2. Socio-economic stabilization 1.6 2 3. Price liberalization 2.2 3 4. Privatization 2.3 4 5. Trade liberalization 2.5 5 6. Domestic financial market reform 3.0 6 Sources: [16,17,18] Reality of transition economies shows that, reform is necessary but not easy, most of transition economies have experienced their own specific itinerary, they are very different in speed and procedure from each other, some countries success but other failure, most of them have paid the cost, some countries have confronted with socio-economic and political turmoil, even in some countries, civil war, and Ethnic group conflict have been happened. Up to now, the results of transition have large positive effect to human life such as increasing standard of living and improvement people’s welfare. In the transition light, every where the rules of game for economic have been basically changed. And not only specific for the economics and institutions but also relations between people as well as their socio-political life have been changing [9]. Transition process over the last few years from a centrally planned to a market economy system of Socialism countries has had common economic characterized phases and can be described as follows: -3- Before 1989: initial transition characterized by a gradual decline in production 1990-1993: break down of the productive sectors with drastic economic decline 1994-1997: beginning of a partial economic recovery and development from 1998 : Facing new challenge and need a more comprehensive reform program. 2 - Factors impact into transition process in centrally planned economy. 1. T he State-owned economic sect or in centrally p lanned economy have become gradually unacceptable. Resources distributed into these sectors have been inefficient. In most cases state sector actually exhausted country’s economy while that those are attributed into private sector have had more efficient and created jobs for labors. 2. When the economy directs by supply and demand, it should be go to more efficient. Reality demonstrated that, under the regime of the command economy, private economic activities introduced more active, more efficient and played important role in improving living standard. 3. International integration became indispensable process; the collapse of socialism system made many countries lost important their export market which are established by the countries under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 4. Transition process is the one vital factor for politic stability in certain period of international globalization and changing. 3 - Some models of transition economies China and other countries in Indo-Chinese Peninsula. China and other countries on Indo-Chinese Peninsula have implemented transition by grad ually pr oc ed ure of r eform based on p olitic al sust ainabilit y. Dist inguished characteristic of this way of proceeding transition is to renovate the economy by “market orientation”, it means, gradually increasing the share of market regime. China has approached the reform by a procedure “from easy to complicate”: rapid carried out all easy problems but carefully with the complicated ones. First , they carried out reform in rural area, next, reform took place for all economic units in different areas and then created healthily environment for continued comprehensive and deeply reform. Target of Chinese transition is to establish a “Socialism Market Economy”, pushing rapid each step of reform and open door to the world economy in order to bring transition in to a new stage. -4- China has been successful, its GDP growth rate was high and significantly in changing economic structure. Main sources of economic growth rate has been (i) decollective, (ii) liberalization in agriculture sector and (iii) high domestic saving rate. Like China, Vietnam and other countries in Indo-Chinese Peninsula with stagnation in agriculture, conducted transition by gradually procedure, targeted into improving living standard of people. This will be discussed more detail in below, regarding part for Vietnam. Former Soviet Union and other Central and East Europe. By contrast with China, these countries have implemented transition by “shock therapeutics” approach; that is reform based on carrying out financial and monetary policy to step up rapidly and thoroughly transition process, without consideration carefully for “political sustainability”. Former Soviet Union Economy has been a commanded, with very large scale, centrally planned was large and deep in all its cells and all respects of socio-economic activities. These characteristics together with continuously uncertainty on political force have been the reasons creating complication for transition. The transition results of Former Soviet Union have not provided appropriate macro economic policy, resulting to large budget deficit, serious hyper-inflation. It has not only made the market forces weak but also has multiplied negative aspects of market economy activities. Some other Central and East European (CEE) typical for Hungary, have implemented gradually reform, through “learning by doing” method. At this time the beginning transformation of the economy could build on the experience gained including through the established international business contacts. For Hungary, the industrial culture, the contacts and partnerships with western companies and the knowledge gained of foreign markets and business practices were certainly far more advanced in other Central and East European economies at that time. Economic performance in transition process of those economies even have some bad signs, however, the Macroeconomic balance has been controlled. -5- Part II Transition to a market economy: case of Vietnam 1 - Stages of transition Vietnam has gone from stagnation under centrally planned economic regime to marketoriented economy. Until now, the transition process can be described through 5 main stages. The first stage : At the end of ’70s, Vietnam’s economy has been in jeopardy socioeconomic crisis [1]. This forced Central Committee of Vietnamese Communist Party to take new measures in economic management, accept elements of market economy. Vietnam authority has recognized that, economic benefits and material encouraging are the most important motives. They promulgated some policies to stimulate production and improve standard of living such as setting up two price system; allowed enterprises and agencies to build third plan, mobilizing additional resources to make extra benefits to improve of all individuals revenue to supported their life and their family. The second stage of reform: There were many changes in economic management policy to reduce Bureaucratic, Subsidies c haracteristic in system, however, Vietnamese economy not only did not improve but also sunk in to the crisis, inflation became serious from 50 per cent in 1984 to 190 per cent in 1985. As the result Central Committee realized their own mistake, then “changes the way of thinking”, and has taken steps of comprehensive socio-economic reform [1,2]. Hence, the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 decided that: “building and developing economy into a system of multisectors market economy with government regulation”. This stage of Doimoi, a thorough renovation of both the political and economic system has been carried out. However, the economy still be dominated by the state, but the role of the supplementary private sector was acknowledged and the country was opened up to foreign investment and foreign trade. The third stage started in 1989 [18, 20]. The main tasks of Government is gradual build up of new institutions and mechanism required for economic development in an open market system. The macro-economic stabilization and the resumption of overall growth constituted key goals for the medium term. These goals have achieved by undertaken -6- many policy reform such as: price and exchange rate liberalization, increasing in nominal interest rates, and implementing positive real interest rate. This is also a small “shock therapeutics”. The main feature of this stage was that, Government has controlled closely economy through state economy. Starting from this time, the reform has shown important initial positive economic performance. However, until in the early two years of decade 90, the economy has not escaped from Socio-economic crisis. The economy develop slowly and uncertainly. The characteristic of economy in this stage can draw as following picture: - GDP growth rate has been 3.9 per cent average of the period 1986-1990, in which agriculture accounted for 3.5 per cent, industry and services accounted for 3.2 and 6.2 per cent while population growth rate reached to 2.3 per cent. - Government budget deficit made up 8 per cent of GDP; trade deficit was very high as export turn-over make up only 54 per cent of turn-over of import. - Inflation has been reduced but at high level, 67 percent. - Vietnamese people faced difficulties in their life; unemployment increased step by step made up more than 10 per cent of labor forces. - Infrastructure has been downgraded both in economic and social area. - External environment: The collapse of Former Council for mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) so close economic relation with former Soviet Union and Central Europe countries have been cessation reducing many traditional markets and United State continue embargo. The fourth stage: In the context of economic performance is mentioned above, the Seven Party Congress in 1991 of the Vietnam Communist Party introduced the Platform for building Socialism of Vietnam; strategy for socio-economic development and Stability to the year 2000. The main tasks of period of this five-year plan are: development and stability the economy, carry out the multi-sectional policy and build a market economy with Government regulation. Moreover, Resolution of 8 th Congress of Vietnamese Communist Party and other Central Committee Resolutions pointed out that Vietnam has to move continuously to a new stage of reform. In this stage of reform (1991-1997) the “doimoi” policy has related mainly to economic liberalization and large inflow of foreign capital in t he form of offic ial d evelopment assistanc e (ODA) and foreign dir ect investment (FDI). Thank to these factors, Vietnam has obtained high economic growth rate; the inflation has controlled; exchange rate has been stable. -7- The fifth stage: New challenges since there has been regional monetary and financial crisis [21]. Since July 1997 the regional financial and monetary crisis has began and its has been gradually causing negative impacts on Vietnam’s economy, especially on following number of fields: - Export market have been reduced in quantity, and export price have declined, pushing pressure on the exchange rate system; - Foreign Direct Investment has been strongly reduced in the amount of new investment funding as well as in the number of projects; the implementation of many licensed projects have been abandoned or delayed; - Services activities have been reduced, especially airline, tourism and telecommunications services. Consequences, production and business in some sectors have been reduced, put on pressure to many Macroeconomic imbalances; and increasing in unemployment have created more social issues. As the result of all above negative sign, in 1998 the Vietnam’s economy has revealed some bad symptoms: - The strong acceleration of trade balance deficit, total ODA disbursement reduction; and inefficiency in economic management. - Trade reform constituted the other challenges. - Problems of new policies on management of exchange rate, interest rate as well as inflation. - Obligations with international commitment as join AFTA, APEC and WTO. - Weaknesses in trade liberalization and competitiveness of enterprises. - As the result, investment capital and production were restricted, imbalance in macroeconomic accounts, unemployment increased, these make social problem more severe. In this situation, solution at the 4 th meeting section in the X-National Assembly in October, 1998 decided to take measure of Socio-Economic stability by focusing to develop industries which have comparative advantages, enhancing economic efficiencies and competitiveness, and creating necessary condition for development for the next period. -8- 2 - Economic achievements In general, the achievements of Vietnam transition has been manifested in high economic growth rate, Macroeconomic stabilization and rapid structure changes as well as in establishing legal framework and international integration. ・ Economic growth rate The most impressive success of Vietnam economy under the reform policy and global integration has been manifested in high economic growth rate. GDP growth rate has accelerated rapidly at the early of ’90s and sustained until 1997. As the result, GDP per capita grew from 123 US$ in 1990 to 312 US$ in 1997. Table 2 shows the overall picture of Vietnam economic performance with increasing trend of growth rate, excluding the year of 1998. The agriculture grows slowly but stable, while industry and services are the main sources of overall economic growth increase with double-digit figures. From second half of 1997, Vietnam suffer severe natural disaster such as: flooding, drought caused uncontrolled damages for agriculture; indirect effect of regional monetary and financial crisis, then Vietnam’s economy slightly slowdown with GDP growth rate 5.83 per cent in 1998. Table 2: GDP growth rate (%) 86-90 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 GDP 3.9 5.1 5.9 8.7 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.34 8.8 5.83 Agr, forest and fishery 3.5 1.6 2.2 7.1 3.8 3.9 4.7 4.4 4.45 2.73 Industry and con. 3.6 2.9 9.0 14.0 13.0 14.0 13.9 13.85 13.07 10.25 Service 6.2 10.8 8.3 7.0 9.2 10.2 10.9 9.3 8.29 4.22 est. sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Ministry of Planning and Investment. Thank to good points of growth rate in sectors, the economic structure has been changed in positive direction, the share of agriculture in GDP reduced from 38.7 percent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 1998. While the share of industry in GDP was 22.7 per cent grew up to 32 per cent and services also accounted for from 38 per cent grew up to 42 per cent in respectively years. -9- The economic growth rate of Vietnam has been in tune with that of the regional countries. (see table 3). However, because of low starting points, the high GDP growth rate of Vietnam is still not yet a good potential premise for economic sustainable development in the near future. Table 3: GDP growth rate in some regional countries. (%) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 China 4.3 3.9 9.3 14.2 13.5 11.8 10.2 10.5 8.8 5.5 Thailand 12.2 11.6 8.5 8.1 8.3 8.9 8.7 6.7 -0.4 -0.8 Philippine 6.2 3.0 -0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.8 5.5 5.1 -0.6 Indonesia 7.5 7.2 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 7.8 4.6 -13 Singapore 9.2 8.8 7.3 6.2 10.4 10.5 8.8 6.2 7.8 0.0 Korea 6.4 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.5 9.0 7.0 Pakistan 4.8 4.6 5.6 7.7 2.3 4.5 4.4 6.1 - - Vietnam 2.7 4.9 5.9 8.7 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.3 8.8 5.83 Sources: ADB - ASEAN Economic outlook 1997 and 1998 10/1998 IMF, World Economic outlook ・ Macroeconomic Stabilization - Results of reform, which were the most impressive economic achievements such as rapid industrialization, high economic growth rate, etc. have been related to macroeconomic stabilization. Therefore the most important problem which has been paid attention by Vietnam’s Government is the reduction of inflation rate. From 1986 to 1990 the inflation reduced drastically from over 700 per cent to 67 per cent and then has been controlled stable in single-digit until recently. So, compared with other transition economies, Vietnam economy has been more successful in its high economic growth rate and low inflation. Table 4: CPI Index Inflation rate 1986 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 700 67 17.6 5.2 14.4 12.7 4.5 4.0 9.2 Sources: Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam -10- - Other success of reform has been the consolidation of the government budget, where the overall budget deficit has been brought down from a chronic diseases to 8 per cent of GDP in 1990 then to 4.2 per cent in 1997 and 3.8 per cent in 1998. The improvement of budget revenue and strengthening of public finance due to an increase in tax and fee revenue, also one important achievement of reform policy. In general, differ to other transition economy as show in table 5, Vietnam economy has obtained convincing achievements: high export volume and economic growth rate, low inflation and attracted good foreign direct investment capital. Table 5: Main macro-economic indicators of Vietnam to 1998. In million USD. GDP growth rate Export Import Investment/GDP Inflation Foreign Direct Investment Budget revenue/GDP Budget expenditure/GDP Exchange rate Money flow,M2/GDP 1991 1995 1997 1998 5.9 % 2087 2338 15% 68% 165 13.5% 14.2% 9274 0.264 9.5% 5449 8155 27% 13% 2236 23.9% 23.2% 10970 0.229 8.8% 8700 11700 30.4% 4% 1930 21.3% 22.2% 12375 0.239 5.83% 9300 11200 27% 9.2% 1250 20% 23.6% 13500 - sources: IMF, WB, Vietnam’s General statistic office and Ministry of Planning and Investment MPI ・ International integration. Vietnam has taken part in the process of regional and international integration with the understanding that this is a long-term process that will allow an increasing move in this direction. Since Vietnam is a full member of ASEAN, Vietnam has participated in all political, economic and trade cooperation of ASEAN. Active preparation made by Vietnam for negotiation to get admitted to WTO has been highly appreciated by the leadership of WTO and public opinion, and it is believed that Vietnam will soon become a member. In February 1998, Vietnam becomes an official member of the forum on AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Despite the financial and monetary crisis occurring in the region, and its impact caused difficulties that emerged on development, -11- however, Vietnam is following its plan of integration into the international tradeeconomic organization of the region and of the world [29]. 3 - Vietnam to the next stage of reform and Vietnam ’s policy responses to external and financial shocks. The above new opportunity would advantage develop and the challenges would not serious and can be deal with if there were not Thailand’s monetary financial crisis in July 1997 and then it has pervaded in the regional countries. The crisis has been taken place in the regional countries with various levels and indirectly impact on Vietnam for foreign investment capital as well as requirement of export of raw material will be reduced, and competitions of export manufacturing commodities between the regional countries will be more severe (see table 5). The monetary, financial crisis has influenced on Vietnam most basically and clearly in the trade field, preliminary estimated in 1997 only the price diminished of the main export commodities made Vietnam lost over US$ 400 Millions. Moreover, it has strongly impacted on FDI flow in to Vietnam, causing less financial investment of many Vietnam’s enterprises. As the economy confronted with new and severe difficulties, Vietnam’s economy appears some shortages: - There has been gradually appeared some weakness of economy in context of international integration with low competition and inefficiencies. - Because of monetary and financial crisis, export and foreign direct investment has been restricted, pushing pressure to the exchange rate system, external account. - Many other weaknesses of the economy have been gradually emerging and can now be seen clearer, these include: not using the comparative advantages of the country; limited flexibility and innovation in enterprises; limited involvement of the people to use domestic resources which still have great potential; low efficiency in international cooperation; market mechanism in Vietnam is still at the preliminary stage and not comprehensive, especially the financial and monetary market which has had limited developed; and the State management system is not highly efficient yet and bureaucratic processes have not been eliminated. Carefully studied on impacts of the regional monetary, financial crisis and the uncertain in other regional economies, Vietnam Government has decided that necessary to conduct -12- continuously Doimoi process, based on efficient using domestic and external resources for development. Following are more general targets of the rest time of five year plan 1996-2000: first, focusing force to develop agriculture and rural economy to create basis for stability and socio-economic development under all the circumstances (propose total investment for agriculture and development will increase with 75 per cent in 1999); to develop industrial sector and service by prior direction to serve agriculture, and other export oriented sectors. Second, expanding trade market both domestically and overseas, but attach much importance to domestic market, increasing expenditure for production and consumption. Third, encouraging invested abilities of people, carry out financial reform to eliminate subsidy regime in capital investment. Fourth, to take measure to make national financial sector become healthy: new regime for saving, reform in exchange rate, interest rate and banking management, applying new tax system and initial preparing for exchange market. Fifth, enhancing equitization process to build up state-owned enterprises (SOEs); develop multi-ownership and private economy. Sixth, resolving hot social problems, administration reform, maintaining stable in policy, consolidation defense system etc.[29]. Following are some Vietnam’s reform policies for socio-economic development and stabilization. 4 - Vietnam ’s socio - economic development and stabilization policy. 4.1. Investment [22] In order to direct economy to develop in the right direction and more efficient, it is necessary to create environment for attracting foreign investment and readjust structure for investment. The decisive ideology is to overcome the disperesive situation, focusing investment prior for project which has high efficiency, especially direct for agriculture, to be expanded expected big export volume; cut off or suspend the project in nonproduction sector which has less necessity; encouraging investment under the form of BOT, BO and BT; promulgating policies for encouraging private sector involved into joint venture activities; eliminating gradually the discrimination the interests between foreign and local investors, and more toward to one investment policy. Table 6 shows that the decline in development investment in 1998 compare with last year around 5 per cent is mainly caused by reduction of foreign investment, especially the -13- Foreign Direct Investment. It led investment capital /GDP in 1998 accounts for only 27.2 per cent, while this figure in 1997 was 30.4 per cent. Table 6: Development investment in the national economy. Billion Vietnam dong in 1995 prices 1996 1997 Total Foreign investment Domestic investment 72.8 31.3 41.5 80.7 36.3 44.4 1998 (estimate) 76.3 31.8 44.5 1. State budget 2. Investment credit 3. Investment from SOE’s 4. Private investment 5. Foreign Direct Investment 15.5 6.6 10.4 16.5 23.8 15.9 11.4 11.9 14.3 27.2 16.0 13.7 13.3 14.8 18.5 The main reason for this reduction is the impact caused by Regional monetary and financial crisis, because two thirds of this capital sources come from investors in the region. Disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has increased 46 percent in comparison with that of 1997, however, it can not compensate for the reduction of FDI. In this situation, the exploitation of domestic financial capital is very important. It can be done mainly by using attractive interest rate to enhance financial resources into the State-credit fund and into Banks. The large amount of direct investment form made by enterprises and individuals, which is very flexible and highly efficient, has slowly increased. The following are some major issue and problems that Vietnam Government has paid attention to solve the problems [29]: - To mobilize the financial resources of people into production and business. In line of that spirit the Law on encouragement of domestic investment has been amended and has been approved by the National Assembly at the Meeting in early 1998. There is no restriction of economic activities in the form, the scope or the area of activity in the sectors that are allowed under Law. The government has promoted the program to strongly and c omprehensively impr ove inst it utions and pr oced ur es r elating t o environment and conditions for production. In 1998, regulations were issued on simplifying procedures for establishment of enterprises and for business registration. The government is now addressing activities to amend the Law on private enterprises and -14- company Law. The amendments of these two Laws will be submitted to the National Assembly in 1999. In the context of the amendment of Land Law, the government also recommends that the National Assembly rationally solve the issue of land use rights of non-agricultural enterprises-a factor causing constraints to business development. - Attracting investment capital through the selling of shares to people is only at the starting stage. The process of equitization of the State-owner enterprises has been carrying out, followed by developing new shareholding companies and establishing a security market. The government has established the State Security Committee and promulgated a decree on securities and the security market. - The government fund from the State budget has been mainly used to fund public interest projects that are unable to get back the investment made should be drawing on funding mobilized from the relevant enterprises and from credit borrowing. - Up to now, by administrative, politic forces, State budget has been distributed in the wrong direction, creating wasteful. Large amount investment of this sources have invested in to infrastructure, real estate and into some project that produced the commodities which are less export ability. This made excess production capacities and left unsolved goods such as: cement, steel, motor-cars, and sugars etc. - Regulations on financial resources management have not been implemented seriously and leakage of resources is still substantial. - The result of wrong financial investment distribution led to production be brought to a standstill, left unused production capacity created unemployment and increased the fully high presser for rural area. To overcome the above situation, since 1998 the Government has implemented a program to reexamine investment projects. -To attract Foreign Direct Investment, Vietnamese Government has found what must be done to further improve the environment and conditions for more attraction. As well as publicizing the list of projects expected to be funded by Foreign Direct Investment, trying to create more favorable conditions for foreign investors. In 1998, further simplification of procedures was done, including reducing the time for considering the issuing of an investment license, reducing rental of land, and solve problems on importing equipment and on suppliers used on implementing project. The government is also promoting the need to amend regulations to create favorable conditions for foreigners who work in Vietnam, abolishing or reducing differences between some prices applied to foreigners and to Vietnam. -15- 4.2. Foreign trade and exchange rate reform policies. Recently, Vietnam’s export has been decreasing, export growth rate increase slowly while import has been continue grown up and trade deficits become more serious. The main reason for this reduction is the impact caused by low prices of exported product, weak competitiveness and low efficiency in comparison with that in other ASEAN countries where have low real exchange rate. In order to overcome the international balance of payment deficit, in the context of reduced foreign investment, we are making great efforts to promote export and at the same time control imports to reduce the trade deficit. The trade deficit was 16.6 per cent of GDP in 1996 and has reduced to 9.78 per cent in 1997, and 7.2 per cent in 1998. To overcome the above situation, Vietnam’s Government has decided to take measure related in following issue: Recovering and maintaining tradition market which has large turn-over such as: rice, rubber, coffee, seafood and garment; expanding market to former CMEA countries; exempting rice export and other commodities exported duties; establishing the export supporting and financial-exporting funds. Since July 1998, all enterprises have the right to export the items listed in their certification of business registration and there is no longer a need to have an export license. The Government established an inter-agency working group to review all regulations in the custom sector in order to abolish those that are unnecessary, reduce duplication between management agencies of different sectors and rationalize customs procedures in line with the international standards and practices. In the context of above difficulties, the Government of Vietnam has also concerning close examination, and finding out that: there is a big potential for Vietnam’s agriculture, it is not only can meet domestic demand but also provide excess for export (annually 3-4 million tons of rice for export). Almost all the rubber, coffee, tea, cashew nuts and sea products go to the export and there is a big potential for other agricultural product for export such as: meat, vegetables and fruits products. Since 1997, the government of Vietnam has reformed export mechanisms, regulated rice export quotas to ensure National food security and increased the export ratio for local companies and private enterprises. These measures ensure that farmers benefit greatest when market price increases and hence strongly encourages production in rice in the delta -16- areas. However, attention continues to be paid to the reorganization of production and transport and the search for consumer markets for each of the key agricultural products. Depreciation of currencies of some countries in the region made their export products much cheaper, therefore, in the near future, many industrial product from Vietnam will have to face more severe competition pressure. The basis and long-term direction is to increase the competitive strength of Vietnam products both in quality and price. However, because of pressure on the foreign exchange rate, the Government of Vietnam has found it necessary to implement contextual measures to protect domestically produced products. It also has adjusted the steps of the process to liberalize trade, without going against commitments made when Vietnam entered AFTA and the necessary preparations to enter WTO. In early 1998, the Government approved the commitment for the first stage of Framework of General Agreement on Cooperation in the Service Sector of ASEAN. Together with promulgation of schedules to gradually reduce tariffs, the Government has paid attention to policies and measures to promote enterprises to develop under competition and not to rely on the protection of the State. In respond to overvaluation and Asian’s currency crisis, the Government has gradually shifted the focus of exchange trade policy from stability to more flexible. Recently, since February 1998 the official exchange rate was adjusted from 11,175 to 11,800 increased 5.6 per cent, but kept the bandwidth 10 per cent as before. With this depreciation the Vietnam competitive position gradually improve. According to some economists the exchange rate need to be in the best balance between exchange rate stability and sustainability. Regarding to the exchange rate regime, Vietnam’s Government has responded by regulation in purchasing and selling foreign currency of business enterprises by strengthened controlling measure. All companies, enterprises have obligation to deposit all their foreign currencies into banks, there 80 per cent of deposits automatically converted to Vietnamese dong. Those companies are allowed to buy back their foreign currencies after they can explain the actually need of foreign currencies. After two above measures of exchange rate, the Vietnam market exchange rate gradually stable from 13,000-13,050 dong/US$. The gap between two official and black market exchange rate systems in certain period has created corruption abilities. -17- Since mid-1997, through some adjustment of foreign exchange rate by various means, the value of the Vietnamese dong has depreciated about 20 per cent in relation to the US dollar. These methods to solve this issue have quickly reduced the pressure of a changing exchange rate, without causing shocks in the monetary market. 4.3. Financial and monetary sector. Beside of above measures Government of Vietnam has readjusted domestic interest rate to more flexible; the financial and banking activities have been corrected. Vietnam banking system is very weak and ill equipped to meet demands of an emerging market economy, so the urgent task that must be taken was banking sector reform to mobilize domestic saving. Main measures, that will be applied to prevent the possibility of partial collapse in this sector are following: - Implementing of banking Law that have been approved in 1998 to bring the circulation of currencies and credit activities into order. - To increase control of activities of commercial banks based on the banking Law and reorganization of some inefficient commercial banks. - Organize separately banks that implement State credit policy, which are separated from State-owned commercial banks whose operations are based on the credit and banking service business system - Reduce administrative interference into credit activities. - Controlling credit interest through indirect measures increasing competition between the commercial banks and credit organization. -To build credit insurance funds. 4.4. Reform of State-owned enterprises [29]. In order to encourage development investment of non-government sectors, including household economies, enterprises, and private companies, cooperatives and foreign funded enterprises, Government of Vietnam has been implementing series of measures and reformed policy. However, there is at the same time a requirement to reform Stateowned enterprises. In Vietnam State-owned enterprises has been dominated and acc ounted for over half of t ot al ind ust rial pr od uct ion (exc luding Oil and Gas Corporation) of the economy, therefore, reorganization, equitization and renovation of these economic sector are great significance for doing efficient business with the -18- competitive strength. In 1998, the Government divided enterprises into three groups for the purpose to apply appropriate reforming measures for each group. - The first group is Enterprises where 100 per cent of their capital is owned by the State. They are enterprises operating mainly for public interest and enterprises that providing services that relate directly to national security. Such enterprises will be corporatized to become Limited Companies. The government will develop appropriate management mechanism to be applied to enterprises that have monopoly status to prevent them from abusing their status. - The second group is enterprises that can be equitized, based on the newly promulgated degree on equitizing State-owned enterprises. In 1998, a list of 178 enterprises has approved by Government to be equitized and it is estimated that about 500 enterprises will be equitized next year apart from being equitized, Small-scale enterprises can be leased or sold to cooperatives or the private sector. Until now almost all enterprises that have become equitized companies have after a period of operation clearly increased their business efficiency, have increased their more financial resources and more jobs for labors. - The third group is the loss making enterprises, which have an inability to pay their debts and an inability to rehabilitate production. They will allow to go bankrupt, based on bankrupt Law. In order to develop further the potential of industry and service sectors, it is necessary to effectively solve many issues and problems. This is especially so for the reforming of institutions and policies that link with administrative reform, improving and increasing the safety of the macro-economic environment and creating a favorable atmosphere for public opinion. -19- Part III Summary and conclusions It is evident that Vietnam now has gone through the most difficult stage of the reform in term of establishing the basis policy and institutional framework for a market-oriented economic development system. During the more than ten years have passed since the introduction of comprehensive market-oriented economic reform, Vietnam’s Macroeconomic performance has been remarkable. The GDP growth rate has been high, inflation has been controlled and investment has raised as a result of increased domestic saving, large inflows of Foreign Direct Investment and increasing disbursements of Official Development Assistance. However, it is argued that initial “spurt effect” of part of reform are nearly exhausted and that further changes is needed to direct toward building Vietnam’s real economy and institutions in order to turn to sustainable, Macroeconomic stability and high growth rate. Following are some of the major reforms undertaken from 1989-1997. 1. De-collectivization of Agriculture and new land Law providing security of land tenure. 2. Price liberalization, including removal fully of all administered prices; interest liberalization and applying positive interest system and exchange rate unification. 3. Liberalization of foreign trade and investment. 4. Establishment of a legal framework for the encouragement of private sector led growth. 5. Opening up the financial sector to local and foreign private bank. These reforms made Vietnam escaping the economic decline of the 1980s and also made Vietnam to become one of the fastest growing-economy. 1. GDP growth rate reach to an average rate of 8.9 per cent during 1992-1997. 2. Inflation reduced from 700 per cent in 1986 to 67 per cent in 190 and then controlled stable in single-digit until recently. 3. Ratio of investment/GDP rising from 12 per cent in the late of 1980s to 30.4 per cent in 1997 and 27 per cent in 1998. 4. Drastic growth in foreign investment flows to about more than 7 per cent /GDP in 1997 from zero. -20- 5. Domestic saving increased from 3 per cent to 19 per cent by 1997. 6. Major export boom, with export growing at over 30 per cent up to 1997. 7. Drastic growth in Agricultural production has moved Vietnam from a food deficit to become a large exporter of rice. However, during the last two years, Vietnam has been hit by the impacts of the East Asian crisis, therefore has faced following difficulties: ・ Vietnam has lost competitiveness. ・ Weak banking system poses a real threat. ・ Growth in investment, output and employment has slowed (GDP growth rate in 1998 by 4-6 per cent). ・ Export growth and foreign investment flows have fallen sharply; term of trade have deteriorated. - Slowdown in export growth was due to the collapse of regional market and devaluation on regional currencies also made it difficult for price sensitive non-traditional Vietnam’s export commodities (garment, foot ware, marine etc). - Foreign investment flows have fallen by 40 per cent in 1998 due to some factors: (a). Asian countries account for two-thirds of FDI stocks. (b). Slowdown in foreign investment in tourism and real estate sector. (c). Crisis makes Vietnam look less attractive to investors from foreign countries. ・ As the result GDP growth rate fall to 4-6 per cent; macroeconomic stability is threatened; Inflation increasing up. In context of all above difficulties, without further reform Vietnam will loss momentum and improving the sustainability of long term growth. There are following Vietnam’s policy responses. 1. To improve competitiveness and to raise productivity - Gradually shifted the focus of exchange rate policy from perfect stability to more flexibility. Through some adjustment the value of Vietnamese Dong has depreciated about 20 per cent in relation with the US dollar, but Vietnam bilateral real exchange rates remain appreciated vis-à-vis the crisis countries then Vietnam product become less competitive in comparison with others - Fully freed domestic trade in rice; private sector export in rice has been partially liberalized -21- - Further simplifying the process of registering a non-state enterprises, allowing private firms have the same land used rights as the state one, and allowing firm to import after registration. 2. Enhancing the financial system. Implementing banking reform: new policies on accounting, training, modernizing etc be directed toward to these banks so that they will begin to function as mobilizer of domestic savings and provider of long-term investment funds 3. Reform of State owned enterprises. Eguitization and privatization process have been implementing, however, still very slowly. 4. Accelerate rural development. 80 per cent of population and 90 per cent of the poor living in rural area then rising rural income means poverty reduction 5. Promotion social equity. - Assistance for the poorest of the poor - Setting up socio-economic development program for 1,700 poorest communes. 6. Reform public administration. - Transparency in the use of funds - Increasing decentralization A key feature of Vietnam economy in transition period has been deeply integrated with the rest of the world, on the one hand it benefit from integration, especially on foreign investment inflow, but on the other hand it accelerated the obligation, with international commitment as it has to join international organizations. The open door policy has made trade development, Vietnam export have grown rapidly during 1990-1997, import growth has been even faster, resulting to large trade deficit. This suggests that it may be necessary to reform trade policy more rapidly and more thoroughly than what has been agree so far. The trade situation of Vietnam raised the question that trade imbalances is affected a sound long-term growth strategy or assign of some fundamental structural problem in the economy. Even though, Vietnam is a membership of AFTA, and soon enter in the WTO and introduced some unilateral trade reforms with support from many world organizations and foreign countries. However, relatively little trade liberalization has taken place to date. The fact that, the cost of trade liberalization will growth large enough to force Vietnam to restrict some part of the agreement, therefore, to confirm the commitment to liberalization trade, Government of Vietnam could declare a unilateral ambition to meet -22- the AFTA targets and decision to move toward the date for the fulfillment of AFTA commitments; this would constitute a very clear signal to domestic and foreign producers and investors about the future policy environment. The experiences of the other Asian countries suggest that, the cost of trade reform - in term of unemployment, lower budget revenue, slower growth - will be unacceptably high if the export sector is not able to employ some of the capital, labour and skill that will released from shrinking import substitution industries, that the competitiveness of domestic export are likely to be of central importance. One another evidence suggest that export promotion should be based on neutral incentives rather policies targeting specific industries. The reforming results of Vietnam especially for macro-economic stabilization most related to banking system reform. Most banks of Vietnam focus primarily on commercial banking activities, particularly short-term deposits and loans, trade finance, letter-ofcredit services, foreign exchange, remittance etc. must become the main channel through which domestic saving are mobilized. Vietnamese banks in particular lack the technical expertise and resources to expand the scope of their activities, whilst foreign banks are particularly keen to minimize their expose to long-term financing due to the lack of creditworthy guarantee and unreliable financial records. Thus, long-term domestic financing has been and is expected to remain a problem for both local and foreign companies. Reform of banking system must be a core of development of financial institutions. Regarding SOEs, the state sector continues to dominate the Vietnam economy it should fist is noted that together with the development of the country’s external accounts, SOEs has recently revealed weaknesses. Due to their low profitability (nearly two-thirds of 6000 stated-owned enterprises are loss-making in 1997) many SOEs have been faced to borrow capital from the banks and other sources then obligated in big amount of debt. It has already been seem that these debts are threatening the stability of the bank system in which one thirdth of the total debt is internal to the SOEs sector. Although the equitization and privatization process have been implementing, however, still very slowly. During the process of enhancing transition of Vietnam, it can be argued that reform of SOEs sector is the most important and its success still constitutes the other major -23- improvement in financing accounting capabilities and effectiveness to achieve goals of a rich population, a strong country and a fair and civilized society. Vietnam is not only a country in transition from central Planning to a market economy, but there is also that State-owned enterprises should retain a dominant position in industry. At the same time as socialism is a leading ideology and the state sector is expected to lead economic development, the role of the state has emerged as a central point. Equitization is t he key issue, however, alone will not solve the problem; equitiz ation will be effect ive only if tec hnology, c apit al sim ulat ion, marketing, management, policies and Law are also addressed. As a result of the “doimoi” reform, the land used right has returned to farmer and they are viewed as basically production unit in agricultural sector. This is one of impressive success in doimoi process. Consequences, collective agriculture was abolished in the late 1980s and the sector is now the most privatized part of the Vietnamese economy. From 1999 Government decides to concentrate more resources to implement the task of developing agriculture and the rural economy, which will be a base for the stabilization and the socio-economic development in all situation. So to have appropriate law and policies are also adequately addressed. In the near future, Vietnam will obtain some progress and achievement of agriculture and rural development; new market will be opened with America, however, in order to turn initial effect of reform to a sustainable development in the long term and to make the fiveyear development plan more feasible, Vietnam should take effective measures to mobilize domestic saving - one way is to reform taxation system and another way is to reform the banking system. Moreover, to overcome severe structure problems and to build up again impressive economic growth rate, attract necessary foreign investment to bring country in the road of high growth rate and sustainable, Vietnam should to actively implement thorough transition reform especially for strengthening the trends of policy deregulation, trade liberalization and privatization with the core that Stated-owned Enterprises downsizing so as to allow the market forces to fully utilize the vast opportunities offered by the globalised economy. However, all above reforms are closely related and mutually reinforcing, implementing one measure alone without significant improvement on other fronts will not only be effective but also positively risky [21]. -24- References [1] - Vietnam Communist Party: Document of the sixth National Congress of delegates, National Politic Publishing House, Hanoi, 1986. [2] - Vietnam Communist Party: Document of the seventh National Congress of delegates, National Politic Publishing House, Hanoi, 1991. [3] - Vietnam Communist Party: Document of the seventh middle National Congress of delegates. National Politic Publishing House 1994. [4] - Vietnam Communist Party: Announcement on the forth Congress of the seventh Central Party executive committee, Nhandan newspaper, Hanoi, 1994. [5] - Vietnam Communist Party: Document of the 8th National Congress of delegates. National Politic Publishing House 1998 [6] - Hoang Minh Tu - Transition models in some centrally planned economies and orientation applied in Vietnam. National politic publishing house. Hanoi 1997. [7] - Le Dang Doanh - Scientific foundations of economic transition process of Vietnam. National politic publishing house. Hanoi 1997. [8] - From plan to market - World development report 1996, published for the world bank - Oxford University press. [9] - World Bank - World development Report, Washington D C. 1991, Page 146. [10] - World Bank - Vietnam transition to the market, Washington D C. September, 1993. [11] - Arikokko and Mario Zejan - Vietnam at the next stage of reforms. Stockholm Sweden, April, 1996. [12] - Arikokko - Managing the transition to free: Vietnam trade policy for the 21 st century. Hanoi, May, 1997. [13] - John R. Dodsworth, Erich Spitallen, Micheal Braulko, Keon Hyok Lee, Kenneth Miranda, Christian Mulden, Hisanobu Shishido and Krishna Srimvasan. 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Paris 7-8 December 1998. -27- Working Paper No.1 Industrial Transition and Policies in the Development Process of the Korean Economy Park Joon Kyung, July 1991 No.2 Retrospects and Prospects of Thailand’s Economic Development Somchai Jitsuchon, July 1991 No. 3 A Perspective on Philippines Economic Performance and Development Strategies Josef T. Yap, July 1991 No.4 The Japanese Economy during the Era of High Economic Growth, Retrospect and Evaluation Akira Sadahiro, July 1991 No.5 Structure of the Economy and Financial Policy: The Role of Structural Policy in Realizing Market-Oriented Reforms Mikhail Ksenofontov, April 1992 No.6 Social Security and Social Network in Japan Shuzo Nishimura, April 1992 No.7 Savings in Asian Developing Countries -- What Measures Could be Taken to Stimulate Private Savings in Thailand? Jun Saito, September 1991 No.8 Possible Lessons for the Transition to a Market Economy and Durable Economic Growth with the Reference to the Postwar Japanese Economy Akira Sadahiro, April 1992 No.9 An Introduction of the Market Mechanism into the CIS Economy Katsuhiro Miyamoto, April 1992 No.10 Experience of East Asian Newly Industrializing Economies Fumihira Nishizaki, May 1992 No.11 Monetary Policies and Money Markets in Indonesia Masaaki Komatsu, July 1992 No.12 The Structure and Function of Distribution Industry in Korea Lee, Jae-Hyung, November 1992 No.13 Some Issues on Privatization and Policies for Promoting Export of Vietnam Dinh Thi Chinh, November 1992 No.14 Mongolian Reforming Process to a Market Economy Budsuren Tumen, November 1992 No.15 Economic Reform in Russia, Present and Future Eugene E. Gavrilenkov, November 1992 No.16 Deepen the Economic Reform and Opening Market Tie Jun Lee, February 1993 No.17 Economic Reform in Czechoslovakia Vratislav Izak, May 1993 No.18 Economic Reforms in Belarus, Present and Future Alexander N. Potantsev, May 1993 No.19 Ukraine: The Road to National Statehood Creation Igor Bourakovskii, May 1993 No.20 The Russian Economy: Present Problems and Prospects for Reconstruction Vitali G. Shvydko, May 1993 No.21 Reform of Macroeconomic Policy in Cambodia Chhieng Yanara, May 1993 No.22 Rapid Growth and Step by Step Reform in China Ning Jizhe, May 1993 No.23 Patterns and Effects of Financial Sector Reform in Indonesia Mubariq Ahmad, May 1993 No.24 The 1993-1998 Medium-term Development Plan; Its Financial Resources Requirements Edita A. Tan, May 1993 No.25 Philippines: Macroeconomic Agenda and Prospects for the Medium Term Charito D. Arriola, May 1993 No.26 Conditions for a Successful Economic Reform in Indochina and the Role of Thailand Somsak Tambunlertchai, June 1993 No.27 Recession, Restructuring and Recovery - What Japanese Experience Suggests to the Romanian Economy - Shoichi Kojima, June 1993 No.28 Development in Chile: Some Facts and Thoughts Felipe G. Morande, June 1993 No.29 A Note on the Chinese Economy: Current Conditions and Prospects Yasuko Takayanagi, July 1993 No.30 Korea’s Economic Development Strategy and Economic Policy Direction of the New Government Sung-Taik HAN, August 1993 No.31 Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in the Asia-Pacific Region - A Lesson from Financial Deregulation in Indonesia - Hiroyuki Taguchi, August 1993 No.32 Regional Cooperation between Thailand and Indochina Area Pruittiporn Nakornchai, November 1993 No.33 Economic Reform in Mongolia Lkhagvagiin Demberel, March 1994 No.34 Same Theoretico-empirical Aspects of a Transition Economy Sambuugin Demberel, March 1994 No.35 Economic Reform in Poland, 1989-1993 (Structural Transformation) Jarzy J. Kropiwnicki, March 1994 No.36 Chile’s Structural Adjustment: Relevant Policy Lessons for Latin America Luis A. Riveros, May 1994 No.37 社会主義国家の経済改革の比較研究 -アジア圏と東欧圏がどうして違った発展をするのか- 李鎬 徹, June 1994 No.38 AFTA, WTO AND PHILIPPINE SMES Manuel D.Cantos, October 1994 No.39 Currency Market, Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Situation of Russia in 1994 Lubov D. Dolzhenkova, April 1995 No.40 Government Plan of Financial Stabilization for Russia in 1995 Andrei Illarionov, May 1995 No.41 Implications of G.A.T.T. on the Philippine Agriculture Sector Doreen Carla E. Erfe, June 1995 No.42 The Transition to Market Oriented Economy : Case of Romania -the Present Facts and Situations- Cernei Florin Ovidiu, June 1995 No.43 The Japanese Labour System -A Critical Analysis- David M. Berry, July 1995 No.44 Moral Hazards in Japan’s Main Bank System Luke Gower, October 1996 No.45 Economic Policies for Macroeconomic Stabilization and Sustainable Economic Growth in Russia (an experience of radical reforms in Russia) Volkov Vladimir Nikolaevich, November 1996 No.46 Review of Economic Relations between Russia and Japan, in Particular Future Relations between the Russia Far East and the Asia-Pacific Region Varlamov Victor Sergeevich, November 1996 No.47 Long-Term Economic Growth Strategy Abelin Alexander Pavlovich, November 1996 No.48 Structural Adjustment in Indonesian Economy Arief Ramelan Karseno, February 1997 No.49 Thailand’s Development Strategies and Prospects for the Twenty-first Century Athipat Bamroong, February 1997 No.50 Financial Stabilization in Russia on 1992-1995: Policy and Results Alexey Ulyukaev, February 1997 No.51 Russian Enterprises: System Failure and External Problems Yaroslav Kouzminov, February 1997 No.52 Privatization in Russia: Announced Success and Real Failure Nikologorskiy Dmitriy Yurevich, February 19 No.53 A Characterization of The Chilean National System of Innovation Jose Miguel Benavente H., March 1997 No.54 Korea’s Efforts in Official Development Assistance Ho-Chul Lee, March 1997 No.55 韓国における国民福祉年金の導入延期措置の経済効果 Bae Jun-Ho, March 1997 No.56 Asian Regional Economic Development: How Important Have Economic Policies Been? Moreno Bertoldi, September 1997 No.57 Economic Outlook of Polish Economy for 1998 Witold Skrok, Katarzyna Zajdel, November 1997 No.58 Comparison between Russia and Other economies in Transition Vladimir N. Volkov, February 1998 No.59 Dynamics and Structure of Production As Result of Economic Reforms Alexey V. Koltsov, February 1998 No.60 Long -term Economic Development with Consideration to the Changes of Policies and Factors in the Russian Economy Galina E. Maslovskaya, February 1998 No.61 Chilean and Japanese Health Insurance Systems : An Overview Viviano Esteban Carrasco Zambrano, March 1998 No.62 The Brazilian Economy-1980/97 : From Hyper-Inflation to Stabilization Claudio Monteiro Considera, March 1998 No.63 Foreign Direct Investment in Mongolia, Focusing on Japan’s Role Davaadorjiin Delgertsogt, March 1998 No.64 The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan and Current Economic Ajustment, and Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Eighth Plan Wichayayuth Boonchit, Sununtha Natenuj, March 1998 No.65 北朝鮮の経済動向と南北経済協力の展望 洪 範植、May 1998 No.66 Estonian Foreign Trade in the Framework of Integration into the World Economy Alari Purju, June 1998 No.67 Recent Economic Development and Fiscal Performance of Estonia in 1995-1997 Mai Talvik, June 1998 No.68 Financial Market Segments Development with Reference to Japan, Perspectives in Armenia Armine Khachatryan, June 1998 No.69 Debt and Financial Instability in Korea Kim Joon-Kyung, November 1998 No.70 Capital Flows, Crisis and Adjustment: The Case of Brazil Paulo Mansur Levy, Nov 1998