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Undergraduate Review Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 9 1993 French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1947 Todd Stocke '93 Illinois Wesleyan University Recommended Citation Stocke '93, Todd (1993) "French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1947," Undergraduate Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 9. Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ©Copyright is owned by the author of this document. 26 Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1 2-7 brothel, forcing the realization that it is not just a game. The screams leir reminder of the pain of war invades the fantasies in much the real violence upon the "pretend" French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1947 aeters and their two realities in ~ :tw, chill the reader with their Norld without a God, we too must force, an "other." Pirandello's and IOsitions of involvement in the lives er point in the tug of war of two ;uggest in their respective plays that ;ort of way. The close of World War Two brought new challenges to foreign relations between France and the United States. The Germans' quick defeat of France in 1940 caused a significant drop in French prestige and world power. America, meanwhile, asserted itself as a major agent in foreign affairs, especially in Europe. At the heart of relations between the two countries was the inevitable postwar German question. France, having been invaded by Germany three times in seventy years, greatly feared rebuilding the German menace. No longer could France exist "under the threat of war from a neighboring state which had so often demonstrated its taste and its talent for conquest," wrote Charles de Gaulle) Due to its diminished powers, however, French goals regarding postwar Germany would prove difficult to achieve. In 1945, despite its lowered status, France received a zone of occupation in Germany and a vote on the occupation powers' Allied Control Council. French veto power in the Control Council quickly became the crux of policy disputes between France and the United States. Behind the policies of both nations lay not only a fear of German resurgence, but also the new fear of communism and the Soviet Union. French belligerency during the German occupation was not only a source of American frustration, but also proved to be a factor in the East-West split of Europe and the Cold War which followed. Near the end of World War Two, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States convened in their "Big lllree" conferences to discuss the postwar world. France was not invited to join. France considered non invitation a slight, and, augmented by the personalities of their leaders, it became an nitial source of friction between the United States and France. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Provisional Governme Franklin Roosevelt was the reason France was not included in the Yalta Conference. "I could not doubt," wrote de Gaulle, "that the explicit refusal came from President Roosevelt."2 United States Secretary of State James Byrnes, however, tells a different story of the attitudes toward France at Yalta. During discussion of whether to give France a German occupation zone, he says it was Russian Marshal Stalin who showed open opposition to the French and de Gaulle. Roosevelt apparently had to be persuaded by his advisers to wholly support France, but he was not the force behind Big Three exclusion. Complaining that de Gaulle would soon demand entrance to the Big Three conferences, Byrnes quotes Stalin as saying, s." and beautiful, seems to be chained, you, he and I [Thief, Executioner, going to tum up, if he turns up ... :armen] tied up with me. And with til human beings, tied to you, ..... Todd Stocke 1 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, trans. Johnathan Griffm and Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964),719. 2 de Gaulle, Memoirs, 759. Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993 J. 1 L Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9 28 [Even though] France had not done much fighting in the war, yet de Gaulle has demanded equal rights with the Soviets, the British and the Americans, who have done the fighting. 3 The discrepancy between the memoirs of Byrnes and de Gaulle on French exclusion is evident. It is difficult, however, to remove national biases from the writing of the two men, thus making difficult a definite determination of the cause of French exclusion. The point to understand, though, is the mutual distaste de Gaulle and Roosevelt held toward each other and the ramifications it would have on the two countries' future cooperation. The Big Three met in Potsdam in July and August, 1945, to further discuss the German problem. Once again the French were excluded. The conference created an Allied policy toward Germany despite France's absence, a policy with which the French had grievances. Upon invitation to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers,4 the French Delegation responded to the Potsdam agreements. Specifically, the delegation stated, These reservations refer to the contemplated restoration of a central Government in Germany, the reconstitution of political parties throughout Germany and the setting up of central admin istrative departments headed by State Secretaries whose authority would extend over the whole of German territory.5 It was precisely the exclusion of France from these German decisions which caused great problems in their implementation for the next two years. Simply put, because the French were not at Potsdam, they were not bound to any decisions made there. The veto they possessed on the Allied Control Council proved to be a powerful weaJX?n. French fear of a strong Germany was immense after the war. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault referred to the German peril as a phantom, saying, " ... be aware that if the phantom is given the opportunity, it will once again put on flesh."6 French opposition to the Potsdam agreements focused on not allowing Germany to regain its strength through the resources it possessed within its borders. As Potsdam had not determined the fate of Germany's western frontier, France was determined to use its Control Council veto to block "any action prejUdging that area's future" until the Council of Foreign Ministers made a decision on the matter. 7 Thus, the French chose to block "the establishment of central German 3 James F. Byrnes, Speakina Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),25. 4 China was the fifth country included in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 5 U.S. Dept of State, Foreiin Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: General: Political and Economic Matters: 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 177. 6 Georges Bidault, "Agreement on Germany: Key to World Peace," Foreign Affairs 24:4 (July 1946): 578. 7 U.S. Dept. of State, General: Political and Economic Matters. 179. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9 2 ...... services having their own right considered, particularly by the settlements."8 A crucial problem with the Polish territory into eastern G~ Russia, de Gaulle and Bidault II center of gravity toward the w~ France."9 As the eastern Germa positions on three western Gem security. First, they requested 1 property. Rich in its mining 4 control in the Versailles Treat1 Secondly, the Rhineland-Wesl independently separated from G in the area offered Germany to( "never again be able to serve a: invasion."lO Finally, France ca international economic and po: referred to it as "Europe's iml factories and great coal supply." American authorities wen concerns of France. Documents French obstructionism in the All demanded be considered. The instead became the central Gem to enact. Secretary of State 1 "prejudice the eventual consideJ Additionally, he tried to sooth I the independence of central ( operating under the direction Byrnes also assured Bidault that . security, Bidault replied that the occupation will eventually er opposition to German centrali addressed. As France continued to ve American policy makers became blocking is perhaps best evident i 8 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreian Re Commonwealth· Western and ( Government Printing Office, 1969), S 9 Byrnes, Speakjna Fmnkly, 170. 10 Bidault, "Agreement on Germany Political and Economic Maners. 400 11 Ibid. 12 U. S. Dept. of State, The British ( 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 513. 28 . done much fighting in the war, yet I rights with the Soviets, the British done the fighting. 3 ; of Byrnes and de Gaulle on French however, to remove national biases thus making difficult a definite exclusion. The point to understand, IIle and Roosevelt held toward each I have on the two countries' future in July and August, 1945, to further gain the French were excluded. The , toward Germany despite France's lch had grievances. Upon invitation f the Five Great Powers,4 the French am agreements. Specifically, the the contemplated restoration of a lany, the reconstitution of politi~al and the setting up of central adnun by State Secretaries whose authority of German territory.5 ion of France from these German ~ms in their implementation for the the French were not at Potsdam, they Ie there. The veto they possessed on be a powerful wea~n. . , was immense after the war. ForeIgn to the German peril as a phantom, lDtom is given the opportunity, it will pposition to the Potsdam agreements to regain its strength through the lers. As Potsdam had not determined ier, France was determined to use its action prejudging that area's future" .ers made a decision on the matter. 7 he establishment of central German w York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),25. the Council of Foreign Ministers. the United States. Diplomatic Papers: . '8: 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government ..m my: Key to World Peace," Foreign Affairs rod Economic Matters. 179. Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1 29 services having their own right of decision ... [which] will be generally considered, particularly by the German population, as prejudging future settlements. "8 A crucial problem with the Potsdam agreements was the extension of Polish territory into eastern Germany. Seemingly laced with a fear of Russia, de Gaulle and Bidault argued that he extension "shifted Germany's center of gravity toward the west and therefore endangered the security of France."9 As the eastern German borders had been settled, France offered positions on three western German regions which it considered vital to its security. First, they requested that the Saar region again become French property. Rich in its mining capabilities, the Saar came under French control in the Versailles Treaty and still held economic ties to France. Secondly, the Rhineland-Westphalia region was recommended to be independently separated from Germany. France felt that the raw materials in the area offered Germany too much war potential and wished for it to "never again be able to serve as a zone of passage, arsenal and base for invasion."lO Finally, France called for the Ruhr area to be placed under international economic and political control. Foreign Minister Bidault referred to it as "Europe's immense treasure house" due to its many factories and great coal supply."ll American authorities were notably quiet about the German region concerns of France. Documents of the two year stalemate concentrate on French obstructionism in the Allied Control Council rather the issues they demanded be considered. The issue for United States policy makers instead became the central German administrations they were attempting to enact. Secretary of State Byrnes held that centralization did not "prejudice the eventual consideration of Germany's western frontier."12 Additionally, he tried to sooth Foreign Minister Bidault by downplaying the independence of central German agencies, saying they "will be operating under the direction of the Control Council."13 Although Byrnes also assured Bidault that continued occupation was the world's best security, Bidault replied that the French "cannot ignore the fact that this occupation will eventually end."14 France, therefore, continued its opposition to German centralization until its border concerns were addressed. As France continued to veto centralization in the Control Council, American policy makers became increasingly irate. The effect of French blocking is perhaps best evident in the communications of Lucius D. Clay, 8 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreian Relations of the United States: The British Commonwealth' Western and Central Europe. 1946 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969),513. 9 Byrnes, Speakina Frankly. 170. 10 Bidault, "Agreement on Germany," 572. See also U. S. Dept. of State, General: Political and Economic Matters, 400-404. 11 Thid. 12 U. S. Dept. of State, The British Commonwealth, 497. 13 Thid. 14 Ibid., 513. Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993 3 Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9 30 American Military Governor for Germany. Early in the stalemate, General Gay wrote the War Department that "further delay in establishing central administrative machinery was in fact defeating the purpose of Allied Control Council."15 He then proceeded to recommend bypassing the French through interzonal agreements with Britain and Russia. 16 Clay's frustration with France led him to suggest drastic actions to coerce French compliance. During a food shortage in the French zone, Clay asserted that French cooperation "might well have eased the situation," and suggests that aid should be contingent on "a change of attitude by France to quadripartite government. "17 Nearly three months later, in April 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson in frustration, Recommend French be informed that unless they prepare to concur immediately in establishment of such centralized administrative agencies, all shipments of wheat to French zone of Germany will be discontinued, and furthermore, shipments (of) wheat to France will also be discontinued if French still unwilling to agree. 1S Clay's recommendation was refused. As late as July, 1947, France was still delaying American efforts, this time regarding the setting of a level of indUStry, and of coal organization in the Ruhr. "It is well known we have receded in the face of French position," Clay told Washington, "Soviet propaganda is already capitaliZing."19 General Clay continued by asking to resign, saying, "Two years has convinced me we cannot have common German policy with the French." As long as the French resisted, there could be no economic recovery in Germany.20 Clay's secret communi cations represent the embarrassment and anger American leaders felt which they could not, or would not, betray in their official communications with their allies, the French. Underlying the policies and official statements of both France and the United States was a fear of communism. the Soviet influence, and Soviet military power. As early as September of 1945. Jefferson Caffery. U.S. Ambassador to France. wrote Secretary Byrnes that the French feared a central German government because "such a central government will eventually be dominated by the Russians and they will have the Soviets on their frontiers. "21 The validity of his statement was affirmed two months 15 The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward Smith. vol. 1 (Bloomington. IN: Indiana University. 1974). 85. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.• 152. 18 Ibid.. 190. 19 Ibid.• 386. 20 Ibid.• 387. 21 U. S. Dept. of State. ForeiiD Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers' European Adyisory Commission: Austria: Geonany. 1945 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1968). 878. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9 4 ... later in a conversation he had w. to fight the strong Communist P: their obstructionism, the French I to a planned restoration of Gem the French Communists could B over. American struggles agaill Germany, for, as General Gay Wi almost certain to result in a coml The slow resolution to the st Secretary of State Byrnes' speech Stuttgart speeCh has been desc American policy formulation for relations with France, Byrnes' sp on the French demands regardit conceded the French claims to thl not favor any controls that woull political domination or manipul~ fears, Byrnes also pledged the in( Byrnes found the French wei of their Saar claims and pledge tc and the Americans were in the pi at the time, and Byrnes admitte toward inducing the French to joi politically successful because Rus the Saar. During 1947, Franc autonomous Rhineland and Roo opposition to centralization po March and April of 1947, markaj War. Russian Foreign Minister proposals. which "helped persua West. "29 France had won a moe and eventually would join its zo: The Cold War split had begun; United States. Both the United States and F toward reconstruction of German 22 Ibid.• 890. 23 Lucius D. Clay. 391. 24 John Gimbel, The American OccUJ 1945-1949 (Stanford. CA: Stanford V 25 Byrnes. Speakin~ Frankly, 191. 26 Ibid.• 193. 27 Ibid.• 197. 28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. France an the Present. trans. Derek CollInan (C 29 F. Roy Willis. France. Geonany Cal.: Stanford University. 1965). 19. "._~-,._-.-_-------------- 30 ~rmany. Early in the stalemate, It that "further delay in establishing : in fact defeating the purpose of roceeded to recommend bypassing ments with Britain and Russia. 16 to suggest drastic actions to coerce mortage in the French zone, Clay t well have eased the situation," and on "a change of attitude by France .pril 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and rson in frustration, :med that unless they prepare to ablishment of such centralized ipments of wheat to French zone of 1 and furthermore, shipments (of) i~ontinued if French still unwilling ..s late as July, 1947, France was still regarding the setting of a level of Ie Ruhr. "It is well known we have In,'' Clay told Washington, "Soviet ~ General Clay continued by asking vinced me we cannot have common ; long as the French resisted, there iermany.20 Clay's secret communi t and anger American leaders felt d not, betray in their official ~rench. ,al statements of both France and the sm, the Soviet influence, and Soviet >er of 1945, Jefferson Caffery, U.S. U)' Byrnes that the French feared a ~ "such a central government will IDS and they will have the Soviets on statement was affirmed two months ; Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward fDiversity, 1974), 85. of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: ia;, GermanY· 1945 (Washington: U. S. Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1 later in a conversation he had with General de Gaulle. 22 France also had to fight the strong Communist Party within its own borders. Throughout their obstructionism, the French Government claimed that if they "yielded to a planned restoration of Germany either economically of politically," the French Communists could gain the support of the people and take over. American struggles against communism rode on the saving of Germany, for, as General Clay wrote in 1947, "a communistic Germany is almost certain to result in a communistic Europe."23 The slow resolution to the stalemate over Germany did not begin until Secretary of State Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. The Stuttgart speech has been described as "a landmark or watershed of American policy formulation for the occupation period."24 Significant to relations with France, Byrnes' speech finally announced the U.S. position on the French demands regarding western Germany territories. Byrnes conceded the French claims to the Saar, but then stated that America "will not favor any controls that would subject the Ruhr and Rhineland to the political domination or manipulation of outside powers."25 Easing other fears, Byrnes also pledged the indefinite occupation of American troops. Byrnes found the French were favorable to the United States' support of their Saar claims and pledge to keep troops in Germany.26 The British and the Americans were in the process of merging their occupation zones at the time, and Byrnes admitted that the Stuttgart speech was aimed toward inducing the French to join the merger. 27 His move would prove politically successful because Russia continued to oppose French claims to the Saar. During 1947, France slowly abandoned the idea of an autonomous Rhineland and Ruhr. Bidault also began to relax French opposition to centralization policies. 28 The Moscow conference, in March and April of 1947, marked the final turning point toward the Cold War. Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov opposed French proposals, which "helped persuade France to throw in its lot with the West."29 France had won a modest compromise in acquiring the Saar, and eventually would join its zone with the British and the Americans. The Cold War split had begun and France became a close ally of the United States. Both the United States and France practiced a policy of stubbornness toward reconstruction of Germany. While France repeatedly refused to 22 Ibid., 890. 23 Lucius D. Clay, 391. 24 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of GermanY: Politics and the Military. 1945-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1968),85. 25 Byrnes, Speakin2 Frankly, 191. 26 Ibid., 193. 27 Ibid., 197. 28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present trans. Derek Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 177. 29 F. Roy Willis, France. GermanY and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, 1965), 19. Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993 ----_.C.>", ~ ;;~ 31 5 .. Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9 32 adhere to the Potsdam agreements, America did not falter in its attempts to implement them. Through its stubbornness, however, France regained much of its power and status in world affairs. Considering the numerous French colonies around the globe, it was very important at the time to regain such recognition. The French became a much needed friend to the United States on the European continent. Behind the doctrines of both countries had been the desire to halt communism, and now, for better or for worse, they would stand together on the same side of the Cold War's "containment" policy. II Bidault, Georges. "Agreement ir Affairs 24:4 (July 1946) Byrnes, James F. Speakin2 Fran: 1947. Clay, Lucius D. The Papers of ( .l.2.4.2.. Edited by Jean Ec Indiana University, 1974 de Gaulle, Charles. The Comple1 Translated by Johnathan York: Simon and Schust Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. ~ BeQinniIlQs to the PreseD! Chicago: University of ( Gimbel, John. The Americap Qc Military. 1945-1949. SU U.S. Department of State. :Em:dJ Diplomatic Papers: Gepe ~. Washington: Unitt 1967. U.S. Department of State. F~ DiplQmatic Papers: EurOJ Germany. 1945. Washin. Office, 1968. U.S. Department of State. ~ British Commonwealth: y Washington: United Su Willis, Roy F. France, Germapy; Stanford, Cal.: Stanford 1: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9 6 32 rica did not falter in its attempts to rnness, however, France regained affairs. Considering the numerous vas very important at the time to ~e a much needed friend to the ~Dt. Behind the doctrines of both >mmunism, and now, for better or n the same side of the Cold War's Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1 33 Biblioaraphy Bidault, Georges. "Agreement in Germany: Key to World Peace." Foreign Affairs 24:4 (July 1946): 571-78. Byrnes, James F. Speakina Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Clay, Lucius D. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945 ~' Edited by Jean Edward Smith. Vol. I., Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University, 1974. de Gaulle, Charles. The Complete Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle. Translated by Johnathan Griffin and Richard Howard. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. france and the United States: From the BeginniI1QS to the Present. Translated by Derek Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978. Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Gennany: Politics and the Military. 1945-1949. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, 1968. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: General: Political and Economic MatterS. .l2:1:S., Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates. Diplomatic Papers: European Adyisory Commission: Austria: GermanY. 1945. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: The British Commonwealth: Western and Central Europe. 1946. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969. Willis, Roy F. France. Germany and the New Europe: 1245-1963. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, 1965. Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993 ~;; .: , 'dii< 7