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Undergraduate Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1
Article 9
1993
French Belligerence in the Face of German
Reconstruction: 1945-1947
Todd Stocke '93
Illinois Wesleyan University
Recommended Citation
Stocke '93, Todd (1993) "French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1947," Undergraduate Review:
Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 9.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9
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©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
26
Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1
2-7
brothel, forcing the realization that
it is not just a game. The screams
leir reminder of the pain of war
invades the fantasies in much the
real violence upon the "pretend"
French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction:
1945-1947
aeters and their two realities in ~
:tw, chill the reader with their
Norld without a God, we too must
force, an "other." Pirandello's and
IOsitions of involvement in the lives
er point in the tug of war of two
;uggest in their respective plays that
;ort of way.
The close of World War Two brought new challenges to foreign
relations between France and the United States. The Germans' quick
defeat of France in 1940 caused a significant drop in French prestige and
world power. America, meanwhile, asserted itself as a major agent in
foreign affairs, especially in Europe. At the heart of relations between the
two countries was the inevitable postwar German question. France, having
been invaded by Germany three times in seventy years, greatly feared
rebuilding the German menace. No longer could France exist "under the
threat of war from a neighboring state which had so often demonstrated
its taste and its talent for conquest," wrote Charles de Gaulle) Due to its
diminished powers, however, French goals regarding postwar Germany
would prove difficult to achieve. In 1945, despite its lowered status,
France received a zone of occupation in Germany and a vote on the
occupation powers' Allied Control Council. French veto power in the
Control Council quickly became the crux of policy disputes between
France and the United States. Behind the policies of both nations lay not
only a fear of German resurgence, but also the new fear of communism
and the Soviet Union. French belligerency during the German
occupation was not only a source of American frustration, but also proved
to be a factor in the East-West split of Europe and the Cold War which
followed.
Near the end of World War Two, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
the United States convened in their "Big lllree" conferences to discuss the
postwar world. France was not invited to join. France considered non­
invitation a slight, and, augmented by the personalities of their leaders, it
became an nitial source of friction between the United States and France.
Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Provisional Governme Franklin
Roosevelt was the reason France was not included in the Yalta Conference.
"I could not doubt," wrote de Gaulle, "that the explicit refusal came from
President Roosevelt."2
United States Secretary of State James Byrnes, however, tells a
different story of the attitudes toward France at Yalta. During discussion
of whether to give France a German occupation zone, he says it was
Russian Marshal Stalin who showed open opposition to the French and de
Gaulle. Roosevelt apparently had to be persuaded by his advisers to
wholly support France, but he was not the force behind Big Three
exclusion. Complaining that de Gaulle would soon demand entrance to
the Big Three conferences, Byrnes quotes Stalin as saying,
s."
and beautiful, seems to be chained,
you, he and I [Thief, Executioner,
going to tum up, if he turns up ...
:armen] tied up with me. And with
til human beings, tied to you, .....
Todd Stocke
1 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, trans.
Johnathan Griffm and Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964),719.
2 de Gaulle, Memoirs, 759.
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Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
28
[Even though] France had not done much fighting in the war, yet
de Gaulle has demanded equal rights with the Soviets, the British
and the Americans, who have done the fighting. 3
The discrepancy between the memoirs of Byrnes and de Gaulle on French
exclusion is evident. It is difficult, however, to remove national biases
from the writing of the two men, thus making difficult a definite
determination of the cause of French exclusion. The point to understand,
though, is the mutual distaste de Gaulle and Roosevelt held toward each
other and the ramifications it would have on the two countries' future
cooperation.
The Big Three met in Potsdam in July and August, 1945, to further
discuss the German problem. Once again the French were excluded. The
conference created an Allied policy toward Germany despite France's
absence, a policy with which the French had grievances. Upon invitation
to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers,4 the French
Delegation responded to the Potsdam agreements. Specifically, the
delegation stated,
These reservations refer to the contemplated restoration of a
central Government in Germany, the reconstitution of political
parties throughout Germany and the setting up of central admin­
istrative departments headed by State Secretaries whose authority
would extend over the whole of German territory.5
It was precisely the exclusion of France from these German
decisions which caused great problems in their implementation for the
next two years. Simply put, because the French were not at Potsdam, they
were not bound to any decisions made there. The veto they possessed on
the Allied Control Council proved to be a powerful weaJX?n.
French fear of a strong Germany was immense after the war. Foreign
Minister Georges Bidault referred to the German peril as a phantom,
saying, " ... be aware that if the phantom is given the opportunity, it will
once again put on flesh."6 French opposition to the Potsdam agreements
focused on not allowing Germany to regain its strength through the
resources it possessed within its borders. As Potsdam had not determined
the fate of Germany's western frontier, France was determined to use its
Control Council veto to block "any action prejUdging that area's future"
until the Council of Foreign Ministers made a decision on the matter. 7
Thus, the French chose to block "the establishment of central German
3 James F. Byrnes, Speakina Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),25.
4 China was the fifth country included in the Council of Foreign Ministers.
5 U.S. Dept of State, Foreiin Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers:
General: Political and Economic Matters: 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), 177.
6 Georges Bidault, "Agreement on Germany: Key to World Peace," Foreign Affairs
24:4 (July 1946): 578.
7 U.S. Dept. of State, General: Political and Economic Matters. 179.
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2
......
services having their own right
considered, particularly by the
settlements."8
A crucial problem with the
Polish territory into eastern G~
Russia, de Gaulle and Bidault II
center of gravity toward the w~
France."9 As the eastern Germa
positions on three western Gem
security. First, they requested 1
property. Rich in its mining 4
control in the Versailles Treat1
Secondly, the Rhineland-Wesl
independently separated from G
in the area offered Germany to(
"never again be able to serve a:
invasion."lO Finally, France ca
international economic and po:
referred to it as "Europe's iml
factories and great coal supply."
American authorities wen
concerns of France. Documents
French obstructionism in the All
demanded be considered. The
instead became the central Gem
to enact. Secretary of State 1
"prejudice the eventual consideJ
Additionally, he tried to sooth I
the independence of central (
operating under the direction
Byrnes also assured Bidault that .
security, Bidault replied that the
occupation will eventually er
opposition to German centrali
addressed.
As France continued to ve
American policy makers became
blocking is perhaps best evident i
8 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreian Re
Commonwealth· Western and (
Government Printing Office, 1969), S
9 Byrnes, Speakjna Fmnkly, 170.
10 Bidault, "Agreement on Germany
Political and Economic Maners. 400­
11 Ibid.
12 U. S. Dept. of State, The British (
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 513.
28
. done much fighting in the war, yet
I rights with the Soviets, the British
done the fighting. 3
; of Byrnes and de Gaulle on French
however, to remove national biases
thus making difficult a definite
exclusion. The point to understand,
IIle and Roosevelt held toward each
I have on the two countries' future
in July and August, 1945, to further
gain the French were excluded. The
, toward Germany despite France's
lch had grievances. Upon invitation
f the Five Great Powers,4 the French
am agreements. Specifically, the
the contemplated restoration of a
lany, the reconstitution of politi~al
and the setting up of central adnun­
by State Secretaries whose authority
of German territory.5
ion of France from these German
~ms in their implementation for the
the French were not at Potsdam, they
Ie there. The veto they possessed on
be a powerful wea~n.
.
, was immense after the war. ForeIgn
to the German peril as a phantom,
lDtom is given the opportunity, it will
pposition to the Potsdam agreements
to regain its strength through the
lers. As Potsdam had not determined
ier, France was determined to use its
action prejudging that area's future"
.ers made a decision on the matter. 7
he establishment of central German
w York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),25.
the Council of Foreign Ministers.
the United States. Diplomatic Papers: .
'8: 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government
..m
my: Key to World Peace," Foreign Affairs
rod Economic Matters. 179.
Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1
29
services having their own right of decision ... [which] will be generally
considered, particularly by the German population, as prejudging future
settlements. "8
A crucial problem with the Potsdam agreements was the extension of
Polish territory into eastern Germany. Seemingly laced with a fear of
Russia, de Gaulle and Bidault argued that he extension "shifted Germany's
center of gravity toward the west and therefore endangered the security of
France."9 As the eastern German borders had been settled, France offered
positions on three western German regions which it considered vital to its
security. First, they requested that the Saar region again become French
property. Rich in its mining capabilities, the Saar came under French
control in the Versailles Treaty and still held economic ties to France.
Secondly, the Rhineland-Westphalia region was recommended to be
independently separated from Germany. France felt that the raw materials
in the area offered Germany too much war potential and wished for it to
"never again be able to serve as a zone of passage, arsenal and base for
invasion."lO Finally, France called for the Ruhr area to be placed under
international economic and political control. Foreign Minister Bidault
referred to it as "Europe's immense treasure house" due to its many
factories and great coal supply."ll
American authorities were notably quiet about the German region
concerns of France. Documents of the two year stalemate concentrate on
French obstructionism in the Allied Control Council rather the issues they
demanded be considered. The issue for United States policy makers
instead became the central German administrations they were attempting
to enact. Secretary of State Byrnes held that centralization did not
"prejudice the eventual consideration of Germany's western frontier."12
Additionally, he tried to sooth Foreign Minister Bidault by downplaying
the independence of central German agencies, saying they "will be
operating under the direction of the Control Council."13 Although
Byrnes also assured Bidault that continued occupation was the world's best
security, Bidault replied that the French "cannot ignore the fact that this
occupation will eventually end."14 France, therefore, continued its
opposition to German centralization until its border concerns were
addressed.
As France continued to veto centralization in the Control Council,
American policy makers became increasingly irate. The effect of French
blocking is perhaps best evident in the communications of Lucius D. Clay,
8 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreian Relations of the United States: The British
Commonwealth' Western and Central Europe. 1946 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1969),513.
9 Byrnes, Speakina Frankly. 170.
10 Bidault, "Agreement on Germany," 572. See also U. S. Dept. of State, General:
Political and Economic Matters, 400-404.
11 Thid.
12 U. S. Dept. of State, The British Commonwealth, 497.
13 Thid.
14 Ibid., 513.
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993
3
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
30
American Military Governor for Germany. Early in the stalemate,
General Gay wrote the War Department that "further delay in establishing
central administrative machinery was in fact defeating the purpose of
Allied Control Council."15 He then proceeded to recommend bypassing
the French through interzonal agreements with Britain and Russia. 16
Clay's frustration with France led him to suggest drastic actions to coerce
French compliance. During a food shortage in the French zone, Clay
asserted that French cooperation "might well have eased the situation," and
suggests that aid should be contingent on "a change of attitude by France
to quadripartite government. "17
Nearly three months later, in April 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and
Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson in frustration,
Recommend French be informed that unless they prepare to
concur immediately in establishment of such centralized
administrative agencies, all shipments of wheat to French zone of
Germany will be discontinued, and furthermore, shipments (of)
wheat to France will also be discontinued if French still unwilling
to agree. 1S
Clay's recommendation was refused. As late as July, 1947, France was still
delaying American efforts, this time regarding the setting of a level of
indUStry, and of coal organization in the Ruhr. "It is well known we have
receded in the face of French position," Clay told Washington, "Soviet
propaganda is already capitaliZing."19 General Clay continued by asking
to resign, saying, "Two years has convinced me we cannot have common
German policy with the French." As long as the French resisted, there
could be no economic recovery in Germany.20 Clay's secret communi­
cations represent the embarrassment and anger American leaders felt
which they could not, or would not, betray in their official
communications with their allies, the French.
Underlying the policies and official statements of both France and the
United States was a fear of communism. the Soviet influence, and Soviet
military power. As early as September of 1945. Jefferson Caffery. U.S.
Ambassador to France. wrote Secretary Byrnes that the French feared a
central German government because "such a central government will
eventually be dominated by the Russians and they will have the Soviets on
their frontiers. "21 The validity of his statement was affirmed two months
15 The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward
Smith. vol. 1 (Bloomington. IN: Indiana University. 1974). 85.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.• 152.
18 Ibid.. 190.
19 Ibid.• 386.
20 Ibid.• 387.
21 U. S. Dept. of State. ForeiiD Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers'
European Adyisory Commission: Austria: Geonany. 1945 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office. 1968). 878.
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4
...
later in a conversation he had w.
to fight the strong Communist P:
their obstructionism, the French I
to a planned restoration of Gem
the French Communists could B
over. American struggles agaill
Germany, for, as General Gay Wi
almost certain to result in a coml
The slow resolution to the st
Secretary of State Byrnes' speech
Stuttgart speeCh has been desc
American policy formulation for
relations with France, Byrnes' sp
on the French demands regardit
conceded the French claims to thl
not favor any controls that woull
political domination or manipul~
fears, Byrnes also pledged the in(
Byrnes found the French wei
of their Saar claims and pledge tc
and the Americans were in the pi
at the time, and Byrnes admitte
toward inducing the French to joi
politically successful because Rus
the Saar. During 1947, Franc
autonomous Rhineland and Roo
opposition to centralization po
March and April of 1947, markaj
War. Russian Foreign Minister
proposals. which "helped persua
West. "29 France had won a moe
and eventually would join its zo:
The Cold War split had begun;
United States.
Both the United States and F
toward reconstruction of German
22 Ibid.• 890.
23 Lucius D. Clay. 391.
24 John Gimbel, The American OccUJ
1945-1949 (Stanford. CA: Stanford V
25 Byrnes. Speakin~ Frankly, 191.
26 Ibid.• 193.
27 Ibid.• 197.
28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. France an
the Present. trans. Derek CollInan (C
29 F. Roy Willis. France. Geonany
Cal.: Stanford University. 1965). 19.
"._~-,._-.-_--------------
30
~rmany.
Early in the stalemate,
It that "further delay in establishing
: in fact defeating the purpose of
roceeded to recommend bypassing
ments with Britain and Russia. 16
to suggest drastic actions to coerce
mortage in the French zone, Clay
t well have eased the situation," and
on "a change of attitude by France
.pril 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and
rson in frustration,
:med that unless they prepare to
ablishment of such centralized
ipments of wheat to French zone of
1 and furthermore, shipments (of)
i~ontinued if French still unwilling
..s late as July, 1947, France was still
regarding the setting of a level of
Ie Ruhr. "It is well known we have
In,'' Clay told Washington, "Soviet
~ General Clay continued by asking
vinced me we cannot have common
; long as the French resisted, there
iermany.20 Clay's secret communi­
t and anger American leaders felt
d not, betray in their official
~rench.
,al statements of both France and the
sm, the Soviet influence, and Soviet
>er of 1945, Jefferson Caffery, U.S.
U)' Byrnes that the French feared a
~ "such a central government will
IDS and they will have the Soviets on
statement was affirmed two months
; Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward
fDiversity, 1974), 85.
of the United States. Diplomatic Papers:
ia;, GermanY· 1945 (Washington: U. S.
Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1
later in a conversation he had with General de Gaulle. 22 France also had
to fight the strong Communist Party within its own borders. Throughout
their obstructionism, the French Government claimed that if they "yielded
to a planned restoration of Germany either economically of politically,"
the French Communists could gain the support of the people and take
over. American struggles against communism rode on the saving of
Germany, for, as General Clay wrote in 1947, "a communistic Germany is
almost certain to result in a communistic Europe."23
The slow resolution to the stalemate over Germany did not begin until
Secretary of State Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. The
Stuttgart speech has been described as "a landmark or watershed of
American policy formulation for the occupation period."24 Significant to
relations with France, Byrnes' speech finally announced the U.S. position
on the French demands regarding western Germany territories. Byrnes
conceded the French claims to the Saar, but then stated that America "will
not favor any controls that would subject the Ruhr and Rhineland to the
political domination or manipulation of outside powers."25 Easing other
fears, Byrnes also pledged the indefinite occupation of American troops.
Byrnes found the French were favorable to the United States' support
of their Saar claims and pledge to keep troops in Germany.26 The British
and the Americans were in the process of merging their occupation zones
at the time, and Byrnes admitted that the Stuttgart speech was aimed
toward inducing the French to join the merger. 27 His move would prove
politically successful because Russia continued to oppose French claims to
the Saar. During 1947, France slowly abandoned the idea of an
autonomous Rhineland and Ruhr. Bidault also began to relax French
opposition to centralization policies. 28 The Moscow conference, in
March and April of 1947, marked the final turning point toward the Cold
War. Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov opposed French
proposals, which "helped persuade France to throw in its lot with the
West."29 France had won a modest compromise in acquiring the Saar,
and eventually would join its zone with the British and the Americans.
The Cold War split had begun and France became a close ally of the
United States.
Both the United States and France practiced a policy of stubbornness
toward reconstruction of Germany. While France repeatedly refused to
22 Ibid., 890.
23 Lucius D. Clay, 391.
24 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of GermanY: Politics and the Military.
1945-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1968),85.
25 Byrnes, Speakin2 Frankly, 191.
26 Ibid., 193.
27 Ibid., 197.
28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to
the Present trans. Derek Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 177.
29 F. Roy Willis, France. GermanY and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (Stanford,
Cal.: Stanford University, 1965), 19.
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Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
32
adhere to the Potsdam agreements, America did not falter in its attempts to
implement them. Through its stubbornness, however, France regained
much of its power and status in world affairs. Considering the numerous
French colonies around the globe, it was very important at the time to
regain such recognition. The French became a much needed friend to the
United States on the European continent. Behind the doctrines of both
countries had been the desire to halt communism, and now, for better or
for worse, they would stand together on the same side of the Cold War's
"containment" policy.
II
Bidault, Georges. "Agreement ir
Affairs 24:4 (July 1946)
Byrnes, James F. Speakin2 Fran:
1947.
Clay, Lucius D. The Papers of (
.l.2.4.2.. Edited by Jean Ec
Indiana University, 1974
de Gaulle, Charles. The Comple1
Translated by Johnathan
York: Simon and Schust
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. ~
BeQinniIlQs to the PreseD!
Chicago: University of (
Gimbel, John. The Americap Qc
Military. 1945-1949. SU
U.S. Department of State. :Em:dJ
Diplomatic Papers: Gepe
~. Washington: Unitt
1967.
U.S. Department of State. F~
DiplQmatic Papers: EurOJ
Germany. 1945. Washin.
Office, 1968.
U.S. Department of State. ~
British Commonwealth: y
Washington: United Su
Willis, Roy F. France, Germapy;
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford 1:
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32
rica did not falter in its attempts to
rnness, however, France regained
affairs. Considering the numerous
vas very important at the time to
~e a much needed friend to the
~Dt. Behind the doctrines of both
>mmunism, and now, for better or
n the same side of the Cold War's
Stocke '93: French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 1945-1
33
Biblioaraphy
Bidault, Georges. "Agreement in Germany: Key to World Peace." Foreign
Affairs 24:4 (July 1946): 571-78.
Byrnes, James F. Speakina Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1947.
Clay, Lucius D. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945­
~' Edited by Jean Edward Smith. Vol. I., Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University, 1974.
de Gaulle, Charles. The Complete Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle.
Translated by Johnathan Griffin and Richard Howard. New
York: Simon and Schuster,
1964.
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. france and the United States: From the
BeginniI1QS to the Present. Translated by Derek Coltman.
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978.
Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Gennany: Politics and the
Military. 1945-1949. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, 1968.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States.
Diplomatic Papers: General: Political and Economic MatterS.
.l2:1:S., Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1967.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates.
Diplomatic Papers: European Adyisory Commission: Austria:
GermanY. 1945. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1968.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: The
British Commonwealth: Western and Central Europe. 1946.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969.
Willis, Roy F. France. Germany and the New Europe: 1245-1963.
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University,
1965.
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1993
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