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The British Empire: Catalyst for the Demise of the Zulu Kingdom
Sara Housworth
On January 22, 1879, the army of the powerful British Empire suffered its worst defeat
since the Crimean War (1854-1856). In about six hours, the British army lost over 1,300
of the 1,700 men in the battle. 1 The defeat was not at the hands of a rival European
power, but of one of the last independent African kingdoms: the Zulu. At this battle, on
the slopes of a small mountain in southern Africa called Isandhlwana* (figure 1), Zulu
impi (soldiers) left only sixty British and about three hundred African auxiliary
survivors.2 According to a report of the battle in the New York Times, in addition to the
death of so many of its soldiers, the British lost “…a valuable convoy of 102 wagons,
1,000 oxen, 2 cannon, 400 shot and shell, 1,000 rifles, 250,000 rounds of ammunition,
60,000 pounds weight provisions and the colors of the twenty-fourth regiment.”3 These
human and material losses, which marked the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War that
would last until the 4th of July 1879, destroyed Britain’s ability to fight in southern Africa
for a full three months.
The Battle of Isandhlwana made the Zulu famous across the Western world—they were
already well known in the southern third of the African continent—for their fighting
ability and determination. Isandhlwana sticks up out of the South African lowveld some
ten miles north of the Buffalo River, which formed the border between Zululand and the
British colony of Natal (see figure 1 for photo of Isandhlwana). The battle resulted from a
British invasion of Zululand and declaration of war. Sir Bartle Freer, British High
Figure 1: The Small Mountain of Isandhlwana (background) 4
Commissioner for Southern Africa, instigated the 1879 war to eliminate the Zulu threat
and force the Zulu to accept Britain’s confederation policy for southern Africa.5 The
defeat of such a large portion of British forces resulted in Frere’s and Britain’s
humiliation, while proving to the world the military capabilities of native peoples.
*
Although there have been several spellings of Isandhlwana since the British-Zulu battle, for purposes of
clarity and cohesiveness the narrative of this paper will spell the hill and battle-- Isandhlwana. Other
spellings from newspapers, letters, maps, and other scholarly works use the following spellings: Isalwana,
Isandlwana, and Isandula. These spellings still all refer to the same place and battleground.
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Although the Battle of Isandhlwana demonstrated Zulu fighting potential in a single
battle, the Zulu kingdom was not capable of sustaining its momentum and continuing
ultimately to win the war. The Zulu inability to follow through on this battle is evident in
Britain’s victory in a battle at Rorke’s Drift, only a few hours after Isandhlwana, and the
subsequent massacre of Zulu soldiers at Kambula, near the northwestern Transvaal-Zulu
border, which preceded the ultimate destruction of the Zulu army at the Battle of Ulundi
on July 4th. Contrary to popular opinion of the time and later, the Zulu failure to continue
its success over British forces in the Anglo-Zulu War was not the result of Britain’s
superior weaponry or tactical ability, nor was it due to the determination of Great Britain
to build an ever-large empire in Africa. The British won the war and, in the end,
destroyed the Zulu kingdom because of exiting fissures in Zulu society, created by an
unstable political structure and a conservative military organization.
One cannot identify the fault lines in Zulu society without examining the creation of the
Zulu kingdom and then viewing the kingdom in light of Britain’s foreign policy. What
such an examination reveals, is not a technologically superior British Empire brutally,
and perhaps even casually (as the poet Rudyard Kipling might have wanted one to
believe in such poems as “Fuzzy Wuzzy”6), destroying another independent African
kingdom. Instead, one sees a British Empire serving primarily as a catalyst for actions
already occurring within the Zulu kingdom, which led quickly to its collapse.
The Zulu kingdom was barely half a century old on the eve of the British invasion in
1879. The Zulu are descended from Bantu-speaking settlers who migrated to southern
Africa in the early Common Era. By the 1600s, descendants of these Bantu settlers
politically and socially controlled two-fifths of the land suitable for agriculture in
southern Africa.7 They practiced a form of mixed farming, herding cattle and sheep
while growing such crops as sorghum.8 Labor was divided along gender lines: women
cultivated crops, men herded cattle. Once the Zulu incorporated other chieftains into
their sphere of control, in the early nineteenth century, they used these labor roles to
define an individual’s place in the Zulu military and social structure. Men took on the
role of soldiers in addition to their herding duties; women were responsible for providing
food for the army in addition to raising children.9 Therefore, the establishment of the
Zulu military kingdom did not create an entirely new kind of society, but instead built on
existing societal customs.
The second and third decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the Zulu into
a centralized state, which amounted to a politically organized region dominated by the
Zulu royal family and the Zulu military system. 10 Specific geographic boundaries
marked the region once white settlers began claiming territory and making land
agreements with Zulu kings. Before centralization, political structures in the area were
based on chiefdoms, wherein a chief ruled with the help of his kinsmen and councilors.11
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The Zulu were originally one of the smaller chiefdoms of southern Africa’s Nguni*
region, but through conquest and alliances, the Zulu were able to incorporate most
northern Nguni chiefdoms under a central ruling family. This family was descended
from Shaka Ka Senzangakhona.** Shaka was the eldest (though illegitimate) son of chief
Senzangakhona. His enlistment in the Dingiswayo’s Mthethwa army about 1810 marks
the beginning of Zulu power and dominance.12 It is during this time that the Zulu
structures and practices were established.
The first major change in Zulu practice involved the realignment of loyalties. Ian Knight,
an Anglo-Zulu War expert, explains that Shaka and Dingiswayo created a political and
military structure that took away loyalties from local chiefs and refocused them on a
king.13 This was possible through intertwining military might with political control. If
the Zulu were going to exert power over others, their leaders needed to create a highly
militarized state. This they accomplished through military innovations and a
restructuring of the Zulu army.
The introduction of improved weaponry and suitable military tactics allowed the Zulu
army to evolve into a deadly fighting force. As one of Dingiswayo’s high commanders,
Shaka led the innovations by forcing his impi warriors to adopt new fighting techniques
and strategies. One of his major innovations was the development of the assegai, a short
stabbing spear with a long double-edged blade. 14 This gave the Zulu impi considerable
advantage over the traditional long spear used by others. The close-combat capabilities
of the assegai were more effective in inflicting casualties and forcing the enemy to
retreat. The long spear was comparatively ineffective, since it was traditionally used to
throw at the enemy from a distance and could easily miss its intended target. The
introduction of the assegai turned the long spear into a secondary weapon, used only for
the initial Zulu attack, when the enemy was out of the assegai’s deadly range.15 Shaka’s
innovation created a bloodier type of warfare, which inflicted a considerably higher death
rate in battle than in previous engagements. A climate of fear resulted among other South
African clans or chieftains. This climate created the Mfecane, which enabled Shaka to
incorporate other groups into the Zulu Kingdom or forced groups to flee, leaving their
land in Zulu control.16
With the introduction of new weaponry, the Zulu army needed a new military strategy.
Again, Shaka provided the solution through a battlefield strategy designed to take full
advantage of the assegai’s close combat deadliness. His strategy was known as the
“izimpondo zankhomo or horns of the beast” attack formation17 (diagram 1). This
formation allowed the impi to encircle the enemy, closing off any routes of escape. The
surrounding Zulu army would then use the assegai to stab to death the trapped enemy
*
Technically, Nguni is a sub-group of the larger Bantu language family. Speakers of the language inhabit
a fertile corridor of land between the Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean.
**
Shaka has also been spelled Chaka and Tshaka. “Ka” in Zulu was used to denote “son of.”
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army. Symbolic of a bull’s charge, the formation contained three primary groups of
warriors (diagram 2). The isifuba, or chest, consisted of the most mature and experienced
men, who led a frontal assault on the enemy. The izimpondo, or horns, consisted of
young men who were experienced in battle. They were divided into the right horn and
left horn. Their purpose was to encircle the enemy, cutting off all escape routes.
Frequently, one of these horns would use southern Africa’s terrain to conceal its
movements until in position to encircle the enemy. The third group, called the umuva, or
loins, was composed mostly of older men and inexperienced young men. These warriors
were held as a reserve force. They filled the gaps in the formation created by fallen
impi.18 Shaka’s “horns of the beast” military strategy became the central fighting
technique of the Zulu army. It played an important role in both Zulu victories and defeats
throughout the rest of the history of the Zulu kingdom.
The second way Zulu power and dominance was established involved the remolding of
the region’s traditional military system. Age groupings of men already existed across
Zulu society, but Dingiswayo molded these groupings into age regiments (amabutho*),
which became a defining feature of his army.19 After Dingiswayo’s death and Shaka’s
ascension to the height of Zulu power, Shaka continued the use of age regiments in order
to unify the Zulu and incorporate groups under a signal political authority. The
amabutho system allowed the Zulu king to extend his authority over all young men.20
The change in loyalties from local chiefs and local army units to the Zulu king and to an
assigned impi regiment was vital to effectiveness of the amabutho system.21 An age
regiment, or ibutho, was created every three to four years and consisted of all eighteen
and nineteen-year-old men. As a right of passage, assignment into an ibutho marked a
young man’s coming of age. Members of an ibutho were required to leave their local
homesteads and join their regiment at the royal kraal (homestead). This residence
continued over the next ten years as the ibutho provided the king with active military
*
Amabutho: (plural) age regiments
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service. Active service was not complete until the king granted the entire regiment the
right to marry. In Zulu society, marriage marked the completion of a man’s transition
into adulthood.22 Once married, his focus turned to creating his own households,
acquiring wives and cattle, and creating the next Zulu generation. Hence, the age
regiments were an integral feature of Zulu society, since they provided Shaka and
successive Zulu Kings with a vehicle to maintain order and control.
Through his age regiments and a climate of fear, Shaka was able to demand complete
allegiance and obedience to his rule as King of the Zulu. However, the political cohesion
Shaka had created was fragile because of the numerous enemies he had made during his
claiming of the Zulu crown and subsequent reign. In 1828 his half-brother, Dingane,
murdered him and succeeded him in ruling the Zulu.23
Over the next fifty years, similar kinds of factionalism continually worked to undermine
Zulu kings. Factions developed in Zulu society because royal succession was not a linear
process. Unlike most western European royal successions, the eldest male heir did not
automatically inherit the kingdom from his father. For the Zulu, succession was
contingent on which member of the royal family could raise the most military support for
his claim to the crown. As a result, rival members of the royal family repeatedly created
personal forces to challenge current kings.24 This factionalism illustrates an inherent
weakness in the Zulu political structure in which kings did not necessarily have complete
control of their armies and kingdoms.
This factionalism played an important role in the establishment of the Zulu political
leadership present during the Anglo-Zulu War. Actually, it was through this factionalism
that King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande claimed the throne in 1872 after defeating his brother,
Mbuyazi.25 Two of Cetshwayo’s objectives dominated all the years of his reign: his
desire to maintain military superiority over potential rivals, and his desire to maintain
amicable relations with the British in Natal. These two objectives appeared together
during the Anglo-Zulu War and led to Cetshwayo’s downfall.
To achieve his first objective, Cetshwayo needed allies. John Dunn, a white trader raised
in the frontier environment around Algoa Bay, provided the political and military
assistance that Cetshwayo needed to secure his reign. In an analysis of the relationship
between Dunn and Cetshwayo, historian Charles Ballard argues that problems with Zulu
succession allowed white frontiersmen like Dunn to advance their careers. Dunn in
particular provided Cetshwayo with such vital resources as strategic trade routes and
firearms, which were essential to his securing his authority.26 Cetshwayo was able to use
the guns obtained through Dunn to intimidate his rivals into accepting him as King.
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Cetshwayo’s second objective, to maintain amicable relations with British Natal, also
involved Dunn. For the Zulu king, once he was in power, “Dunn preformed the duties of
a de facto foreign minister and private secretary,” writes Ballard.27 It was through
correspondence between Dunn and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of Native Affairs
in Natal, that Cetshwayo accepted Shepstone’s offer to preside over Cetshwayo’s 1873
coronation ceremony.28 For Cetshwayo, Shepstone’s presence at the coronation gave
greater recognition to his right to the Zulu crown, while establishing a friendly
relationship with the British official. For Shepstone, the ceremony allowed him to
proclaim “coronation laws,” which proclaimed, “‘indiscriminate shedding of blood’
should cease,” all Zulu should be given the right to appeal to the king before execution,
and minor crimes should be punishable only by fines.29 Cetshwayo’s acceptance of these
laws marked the beginning of a period of Zulu cooperation and goodwill towards Britain
and Natal.
This cooperation and goodwill did not last however, British colonists in Natal came to
view the Zulu kingdom as a threat, and British foreign policy quickly fell in line with
such thinking. In order to remove this perceived Zulu threat, the colonial government
had to propose several justifications for an invasion of Zululand by forces of the larger
British Empire. British officials soon began criticizing Cetshwayo’s reign for failing to
uphold the human rights guarantees of the coronation laws. The colonial government
maintained that this gave the British government the right to declare war against the Zulu.
Direct responsibility for the start of the Anglo-Zulu War falls of the shoulders of Frere.
An experienced imperial proconsul, Frere was assigned the task of implementing the
British government’s confederation policy in southern Africa.30 This charged the High
Commissioner for Southern Africa with extending an indirect form of British rule to the
two Boer Republics—the South African Republic (or the Transvaal) and the Orange Free
State— and areas of African occupation. 31
Great Britain’s reasons for wanting to unify southern Africa fell into three categories.
The first is apparent in an 1879 Colonial Office dispatch: “The scheme of
confederation… affords the only hope of establishing a safe and coherent native policy,
and so avoiding periodical wars, [that could endanger]… the British….”32 The British
government and many of its white settlers in the colonies feared an uprising from within
their colonies. Frere was convinced that the existence of a strong and independent
African kingdom emboldened, other Africans to rebel within the colonies.33 Constant
uprisings would threaten the white political establishment and drain away valuable
resources from the governments’ economic development plans. These plans were at the
center of Britain’s second reason for supporting confederation. Through a unified
southern Africa, Britain could fully exploit the region’s mineral wealth, such as the
recently discovered diamonds in Kimberley and suspected gold on the highveld.34 This
exploitation of course, would greatly enhance the wealth and prestige of the British
Empire. The third reason Britain sought confederation was to ensure that southern Africa
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was secure from a newly posed Russian threat. The Balkan Crisis of 1876-78 highlighted
the inadequacies of the British defense of their African colonies. Natal and Cape Colony
would again become vital to the British Empire if a war with Russia closed the Suez
Canal, since British traders and transports would need a secure harbor to replenish
provisions as they steamed around Africa to the Indian Ocean. These three lines of
reasoning convinced Frere and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, that unification
was vital to the defense of British interests.35 Frere’s view of the Zulu was thus colored
to the point that he viewed their kingdom as the major obstacle to the success of
confederation and British defense.
Frere determined that the forceful neutralization of the Zulu Kingdom—a euphemism for
overcoming and subduing the Zulu army— was necessary for the removal of the obstacle
the Zulu presented. He knew, however, that the British government was extremely
reluctant to become embroiled in an African war, a position he learned of through his
correspondence with the government’s Colonial Office. In one directive, his supervisors
ordered him explicitly to “avoid taking any decided step [in regards to the Zulu
Kingdom]… until you have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.36
This put Frere in the position of having to find a way to justify to the British government
and public the invasion of an independent kingdom. He found his justifications in
missionary testimony on Cetshwayo’s tyrannical behavior, a Transvaal-Zulu border
dispute, and the so-called Sihayo affair.
Missionaries provided Frere with stories of atrocities that Cetshwayo supposedly
committed. In 1877, the Natal Mercury reported, “‘abundant evidence to prove that Kafir
residents at mission stations are being constantly killed in cold blood.’” The historian R.
L. Cope explains that other reports claimed “Cetshwayo was killing his heathen subjects
too, at a rate of fifty a day,” and that Cetshwayo had promised his reign would shed more
blood than Shaka and Dingane combined.37 One missionary, Robert Roberson, was
particularly vocal in denouncing Cetshwayo’s rule. In The Natal Colonist (1877), he
wrote:
“Ever since the present King [Cetshwayo] came to power– I mean undivided
power – things here have steadily been going from bad to worse. For many years
before the death of his father he was the de facto ruler of the country, but his
father’s court acted to a certain degree as a drag upon him. Now that he has the
reins altogether in his own hands he has come out in his true colours. It is
difficult to give you an accurate idea of the state of misrule and terrorism which
prevails here.”38
Missionaries like Robertson argued that Britain had a moral duty to end this wanton and
unjustified destruction of human life.39 Frere latched onto these reports, since they gave
him the evidence he needed to convince the British of their obligations. On moral
grounds, he argued that the British had to intercede on behalf of suffering Africans. Frere
characterized the history of Cetshwayo’s rule as one “‘written in characters of blood’”
and labeled the Zulu king an “‘irresponsible bloodthirsty despot.’” This stirred British
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spirit and rationalized the Anglo-Zulu war as a humanitarian mission.40 The missionaries
also gave Frere an argument for Britain’s political obligations in Zululand. They claimed
that Cetshwayo’s “misrule” and “terrorism” were a violation of his coronation
promises.41 If the British did not intercede and enforce those coronation laws, British
authority in southern African would be tarnished. Thus, Frere was able to move the idea
of a Zulu war onto a higher plane, which provided the British a moral and political
rationalization for invading an independent kingdom.
Another means Frere found to justify the Anglo-Zulu War involved a border dispute
between the Transvaal and Zululand. Since the Boers had begun migrating
northeastward from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, they had been in conflict with various
African groups, particularly the Zulu, for control of land and cattle. Once the South
African Republic (or Transvaal) was established, a piece of land north of the upper
Mzinyathi River became a source of contention for both sides.42 During this dispute, the
British Empire under Shepstone’s direction had supported Zulu claims against the Boers.
All that changed in 1877 when Shepstone annexed the Transvaal, ostensibly in order to
save it from being invaded by the Zulu. Shepstone then undermined British support of
the Zulu by claiming to have found new evidence to support the Boer claim to the land.43
This shift in support spread Zulu distrust from their Boer neighbors to their British
neighbors. With Zulu-British relations in decline, Frere could stress the tenuous position
the British would hold if the Zulu and Russians attacked simultaneously.44
After British-Zulu relations declined and Cetshwayo’s character had been ravished, Frere
needed only an inflammatory incident to justify going to war. This came in the form of a
minor border transgression that Frere unilaterally declared a “violation of British
territory.” This violation was the work of the sons of the Zulu Chief Sihayo, who sought
to take revenge on two of their father’s wives who had committed adultery. In the
official notification of the basis for military operations to be undertaken in Zululand,
Frere explained that the men entered British Natal and “took away two refugee women…
[who] were dragged over the border into Zululand” to be killed.45 Frere reacted
aggressively to this perceived violation of Natal sovereignty. On the 6th of January 1879,
the Natal Colonist reported Frere’s presentation to Cetshwayo with an ultimatum that
demanded he surrender the perpetrators for trial in Natal. Particularly galling, Frere gave
the Zulu king thirty days to pay a non-compliance fine, dismantle the Zulu amabutho
system, fulfill his coronation promises to end killings, allow missionaries complete
freedom to preach in Zululand, and accept a British resident at his royal homestead.46
Compliance would have inevitably led to the destruction of Cetshwayo’s kingdom, and to
no one’s surprise, the Zulu king allowed the deadline to expire. On January 11, British
troops invaded Zululand and the Anglo-Zulu War was on.
At the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War, geographical features defined the borders of the
Zulu kingdom. It stretched between the eastern coast of Southern Africa and the
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Kahlamba Mountains.* The Pongolo River, the Lebombo Mountains, and the
Maputaland flats created the kingdom’s northern border; while, the Tugela and Buffalo or
Mzinyathi Rivers mark most of the southern border. The Intelligence Branch of Britain’s
Quartermaster General Department provided these geographical definitions, which are
important for understanding the tensions between the Zulu and white settlers, which Frere
had used to justify the war. 47
The two European political entities, which also defined Zululand’s borders, each played
its own role in the Anglo-Zulu War (map 2). The South African Republic shared
Map 1: Southern Africa, 187048
Zululand’s northwestern border, and as discussed, the Republic provided Frere with one
of his reasons for declaring war. The other European entity, Natal, shared Zululand’s
southern border. Bishop Colenso, an outspoken opponent of the British invasion of
Zululand, argued that Natal had always maintained friendly relations with the Zulu,
unlike the South African Republic. Colenso further argued that it was only after 1878,
when Frere began his push for war, that relations soured. 49
Once war was declared, Frere mobilized British troops, and Baron Chelmsford, otherwise
known as Lieutenant-General Sir Frederic Augustus Thesiger, led the invasion. A
shortage of transportation and slow supply lines limited Chelmsford’s war strategy.
Since the British Army always carried with it all of its equipment, ammunition, medical
supplies, and food, it was imperative that Chelmsford secured enough transport vehicles
to maintain his field force. 50 Unluckily for the Lieutenant-General, the army stationed in
*
White explorers and settlers referred to these as the Drakensberg or Dragon Mountains.
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southern Africa did not maintain enough transport wagons to make the campaign
successful. In addition, the transport wagons it did possess had problems navigating the
undulating African veld. Chelmsford was forced to use large quantities of civilian
transport wagons, large, steady, and sturdy vehicles that each required a minimum of 16
oxen to pull a full load.51 Such a large number of livestock caused delays and grass
shortages along the trail, resulting in the death of many oxen. These supply
complications forced the British invasion to progress at a snail’s pace, which made the
British army especially vulnerable to attack. The inability of the Zulu military to exploit
this weakness reveals the fissures that led to their kingdom’s demise.
For his invasion of Zululand, Chelmsford’s offensive strategy involved a three-column
attack (map 2). Under the command of Colonel C.K. Pearson, the first column was
assigned to the British right flank and ordered to invade not far in from the eastern coast.
The center column was to provide the main thrust of the assault by invading Zululand at
the Rorke’s Drift mission station. Although Colonel R.T. Glyn of the 24th Regiment
technically commanded the center column, Chelmsford chose to accompany this column
and made all the column’s command decisions. The last part of Chelmsford’s offensive
strategy involved the left flank, under the command of Colonel H.E. Wood, invading
northern Zulu territory. Each column would proceed through
Map 2: Three-columned British Invasion of Zululand, 187952
Zululand until their forces joined at Ulundi,* Cetshwayo’s royal residence.53 Through
this approach, Chelmsford sought to entice the Zulu to attack a position in which they
would be exposed to concentrated rifle and artillery fire.
*
Ulundi is also referred to in sources by the following spelling: oNdidi.
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The Zulu were well aware of the British preparations for war occurring on their borders.
Cetshwayo and his counselors prepared to defend their kingdom by amassing most of the
40,000 man Zulu Army at the royal homestead of Ulundi. Cetshwayo’s strategy involved
the distribution of his army to the areas of the kingdom under attack, after the British had
revealed their points of invasion.54
The first major battle of the Anglo-Zulu War occurred at Isandhlwana on the 22nd of
January, 1879. It was an unmitigated disaster for the British. Chelmsford and the rest of
his command failed to “laager” their wagons and entrench their position at the bottom of
the Isandhlwana hill.55 Boers had introduced the laager in the early nineteenth century
and the tactic had been particularly successful during the 1838 Zulu attack on an
encampment at what the Boers came to call Blood River. Laagering involved all wagons
being drawn into a connected circle with all the animals and human inhabitants housed
inside the ring. Once the ring was formed, brush was used to fill in areas under and
around the laager. From this secure position, a small group of Europeans armed with
rifles could effectively defend against thousands of charging Africans through
concentrated firepower.56 Without a laager and entrenchment, the British army at
Isandhlwana was unable to hold off the large Zulu force. Consequently, when the British
line began to collapse, the lack of obstacles in their path allowed the Zulu impi to pour
into the camp and use the assegai on most of the British soldiers.
Ironically, during the battle, both Chelmsford and Glyn were on a reconnaissance mission
to locate the Zulu army. In the aftermath of the British defeat, Chelmsford reported that
the destruction of the British center column was so complete that “every record
connected with the several corps…” at Isandhlwana had been lost, so “an absolutely
correct list of all those who perished” was difficult to determine.57 The Battle of
Isandhlwana provides compelling evidence of the Zulu’s capacity to defeat the British.
Superior technology could not in itself repel the Zulu Army when engaged in an open
field dominated by hand-to-hand combat. The “horns of the beast” attack formation
effectively surrounded the British position, resulting in the Zulu victory.
The Zulu capacity to win a battle did not automatically translate into an overall Zulu
victory, however. Within a matter of months the Zulu would lose the Anglo-Zulu war.
They lost because they were unable to capitalize on their victory, even though the British
army had been decimated and Natal was left in an extremely vulnerable position. This
inability was the result of the unstable Zulu political and military structure, which
fragmented their war effort.
The shadow of political instability had darkened Cetshwayo’s reign from the beginning.
The factionalism that had brought Cetshwayo to power now threatened the existence of
his kingdom. The king’s position was so tenuous, according to John Dunn, that “‘he
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[Cetshwayo] knew that he had not the whole nation on his side, but only a small portion,
and that if he suffered the slightest defeat the whole country would turn on him….58
Such uncertainty and powerlessness led Cetshwayo to pursue a conservative military
strategy. Instead of taking advantage of the Zulu victory at Isandhlwana by orchestrating
an attack on the now vulnerable Natal border, Cetshwayo sought to maintain his authority
by presenting himself as “a victim of British aggression.”59 He hoped that such a
moderate stance would prevent the British from further retaliation against his people and
allow him to reach peace with the British before the war progressed.
This strategy was not enough. His efforts were thwarted by the actions of his own impi
warriors, who demonstrated his lack of control over his kingdom in several key
engagements when they disobeyed his direct orders. The first instance of this was at
Isandhlwana. The battle began as an impulsive attack in response to a British scouting
party stumbling onto the encampment of 25,000-impi warriors.60 Even though the Zulu
won the day, the Zulu army acted contrary to the king’s and his commanders’
instructions, for they had planned an attack for the following day that was never carried
out.
Isandhlwana was only the first example of the breakdown of political authority in the
Zulu kingdom. In two other significant battles, royal authority would be further eroded
as Zulu regiments continued to disregard Cetshwayo’s orders. Only in these cases, the
Zulu were decisively defeated. After the battle of Isandhlwana, Zulu reserve forces
attacked the Rorke’s Drift mission station after they had been ordered to quit the field of
combat and return home.61 These regiments sought to enhance their own glory, since
they had largely missed out on the victory at Isandhlwana. The New York Times reported
that about eighty British soldiers, who barricaded themselves within the station and used
their firepower to repeal the Zulu attack, were successful in guarding the station. As a
result, the “…Drift was strewn with Zulu dead, 351 bodies lay thick about the
barrage,…bodies further away were estimated at between 600 and 700.”62 Although this
defeat was important in reviving British military confidence, it is more significant to note
that these Zulu impi who attack at Rorke’s Drift defied Cetshwayo’s instructions.
Cetshwayo had lost firm control of his military forces, resulting in a sharp decline in his
effectiveness as Zulu political leader. Without the obedience of his army, any military
strategy he intended to carry out was doomed to failure.
At the battle of Kambula, again the Zulu attacked a British encampment against the
orders of the king. Cornelius Vijn, a Dutch trader during the British invasion of
Zululand, who was with Cetshwayo when the king learned of his army’s disobedience
and subsequent defeat, wrote:
“When the King heard of the lost battle, he was exceedingly angry, and asked:
‘Who had given the word for his people to be allowed to fight against the Whites
who had already entrenched themselves, since even in the open field one White
Housworth 13
man was nearly as good as ten Zulu?’ …for the King’s plan had always been,
whenever the Whites entrenched themselves, to make his army pass them, in
order to bring the Whites into the open field, or else surround them from a
distance, and make them die of hunger. But his people had not the patience for all
this….”63
The historian J.J. Guy explains that if the Zulu had carried out these instructions the
“effect on the British would have been disastrous,” since Chelmsford’s supply problems
continued to hamper his progress through Zululand. 64 If the Zulu Army had followed the
king’s plan, the Zulu would have been able to attack the slowly moving supply trains
instead of having to charge the entrenched position. This would have allowed the Zulu to
take full advantage of their larger numbers, fighting techniques, and knowledge of the
land. Unfortunately for the Zulu and Cetshwayo, this did not occur. It was Cetshwayo’s
own people, rather than his foreign enemies, who neutralized his authority. Thus, the
battles of Rorke’s Drift and Kambula demonstrate the breakdown of Cetshwayo’s
command. His inability to force his people to uphold his political authority ultimately led
to defeat.
In addition to Cetshwayo’s loss of political control, the conservative military structure of
the Zulu Army failed to take advantage of available firearms and incorporate those
weapons into its military tactics. Firearms had been present in southern Africa since
before the time of Shaka. For all his insight as a military innovator, Shaka failed to
recognize the advantages of European guns and continued to advocate the use of his
“horn of the beast” attack formation with the assegai as the primary offensive weapon.
He only advocated the use of firearms as a means of instilling fear in his subjects and
enemies—through smoke and noise. 65 Shaka’s successor, Dingane, was also aware of
this fear as seen in his statement, “if the white people were to come here to fight us, they
need not fire at us, as the report from their pieces would strike you with terror, and while
you ran one way, the Malongoes [whites] would drive off your cattle the other.”66 In
spite of this fear, Zulu kings were able to amass their own arsenals, as firearms became
known throughout the kingdom.
The Zulu process of collecting weapons began in earnest in the late 1860s when great
numbers of firearms began to enter Zululand. These were usually outdated weapons
discarded by European militaries as they rearmed with metallic-cartridge breechloaders.67 Sources differ, but anywhere from 8,000 to 20,000 firearms were present in
Zululand at the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War.68 What is significant is that even these
inferior weapons, if actively employed in the Zulu war effort, could have done
considerable damage to the British. But, Zulu military leaders were unwilling to view
firearms as a primary offensive weapon.
This unwillingness was shaped largely during Cetshwayo’s initial reign. At this time,
firearms were assigned a specific purpose in Zulu society. This did not involve
Housworth 14
replacement of the Zulu’s main offensive weapon, the assegai, in the larger actions of the
army. Instead, it involved Cetshwayo monopolizing firearms so they would become a
status symbol of his wealth and power. To create this symbolism, Cetshwayo prohibiting
firearms sales to his brothers’ rival fractions.69 The symbolism of firearms can be seen at
the Battle of Isandhlwana, in which firearms were mostly carried by older, experience
impi who had the wealth (cattle) to purchase weapons.70 After his coronation and his
brothers’ recognition of his authority, Cetshwayo allowed Dunn to sell firearms
throughout his kingdom. But by then it was too late.
Thus, the Zulu military remained grounded in the half-century-old weaponry and tactics
of Shaka. In every battle of the Anglo-Zulu War, the Zulu employed their “horns of the
beast” attack formation against the onslaught of British firepower, with their own
firearms regulated to secondary status, similar to the way they relied on the long spear.
Firearms for the Zulu merely augmented the assegai. The Zulu discharged their firearms
at the British in order to give their regiments a chance to rush forward until they could
engage the enemy in close combat. 71 A British survivor of the attack at Isandhlwana
wrote, “Every ten or fifteen yards the first line would halt and a shot would be fired, and
then with an unearthly yell, they would rush on with a sort of measured dance.”72
Although this tactic provided the Zulu with a means to fight their traditional style of
warfare, it came at a horrendous human cost. At Isandhlwana alone, just reaching the
British lines cost the Zulu 1,000 men.73 Their failure to implement tactics that took
advantage of their firepower was a major contributor to their defeat.
Even the infusion into the Zulu firearm arsenal of 1,000 Martini-Henry rifles (the most
superior firearms of the time) and 500,000 rounds of ammunition from Isandhlwana had
only a minor affect on Zulu military strategy.74 Admittedly, on a few exceptional
occasions, the Zulu used these advanced weapons to engage in guerrilla warfare. But,
Zulu military training did not focus on marksmanship, so the result in each case was
ineffective fire. Guerrilla warfare most likely could have been a successful tactic if the
Zulu had fully integrated it into their strategy, especially with the long, slow supply lines
for the British troops. Instead, the Zulu used this type of warfare merely to harass the
British from a distance, when they could not mount a massive attack. 75
Ironically, it was in this manner that the Prince Imperial of France, who had joined the
British army to gain military experience, was killed. Special correspondent of the Daily
Telegraph Phil Robinson described how deadly Zulu firepower could be when combined
with ambush tactics:
“…Concealed by the deep donga…some 40 or 50 Zulu were…completely
concealed by the rank vegetation, along the water’s edge…the word [order for the
British to mount] was hardly spoken when, with a startling crash, there burst
through the cover a volley from some 40 rifles…”
Housworth 15
In the ensuing chaos, the prince lost his horse. Twelve or thirteen assegai-armed Zulu
thereupon chased the prince, on foot, until catching him and stabbing him to death.76 The
case of the Prince Imperial demonstrates how effective Zulu firepower could be when
engaging the British. In this incident, the British party was routed and their leader killed
without loss of a single Zulu life. Nevertheless, the conservative structure of the Zulu
failed to adopt this strategy into their main military plan.
The British were fully aware that the Zulu had not incorporated firearms into their basic
military tactics. An 1879 British Intelligence report, issued to all officers before the
invasion of Zululand, stated, “…the Zulu ‘method of marching, attack formation, etc.,
remain the same as before the introduction of firearms among them.”77 With this
knowledge, the British set out, after Isandhlwana, to force the Zulu to attack their
fortified positions. Cetshwayo was forced to pursue a defensive strategy in response, not
only because of the political fissures in Zulu society, caused by the undermining of his
authority, but also because of the failure of his military to use firearms effectively to
break through British defenses.
The underlying weakness of the Zulu military tradition in 1879 amounted to its
inadaptability to the demands of the Anglo-Zulu war. The amabutho system still worked
well when the Zulu were engaged in isolated battles with white settlers or in wars with
African groups who had similar military traditions; however, this system was not
effective in dealing with the prolonged war required to repel Britain’s invasion. Bishop
Colenso summed up the Zulu military’s weakness in his observation that the Zulu “‘were
merely an armed people, not a standing army.’”78 As an armed people, young Zulu men
had responsibilities outside military service that were also pivotal to their kingdom’s
survival. This meant that, typically, the Zulu army dispersed after every battle. This
dispersal was ingrained in the amabutho system, since an impi was only required to
provide a finite amount of military service. After an engagement, that service was
completed and warriors returned home. There they attended to their cattle-keeping
duties, helped bring in the harvest, and performed important purification rituals.79
According to this defined system, if the king wished to fight another battle, this cycle had
to be repeated with a recall of service obligations and the inevitable dispersal of the army
after the battle. As a result, Cetshwayo could win a particular engagement, as he did at
Isandhlwana, without leading to a larger military victory. 80 A full military victory
required winning consecutive battles, but the Zulu amabutho system was not designed to
accommodate that need. By the time the army reassembled, the opportunity to build on a
pervious victory had been lost.
As the Zulu political and military structures failed, Cetshwayo hoped to hold back the
British advance long enough to reach a peace settlement. He was unsuccessful, and by
July 1879, Chelmsford, pushing his dangerously thin supply lines, engaged and soundly
defeated the Zulu at Ulundi Cetshwayo’s capital.81 News of the probable termination of
the war was carried to Europe and the United States on steamers. The New York Times’
Housworth 16
account of the defeat declared, “Lord Chelmsford defeats the savages, causing great loss
to them—Ulundi burned— Zulus surrendering—Reported flight of Cetshwayo.”82
Chelmsford’s victory restored the British Empire’s prestige in the eyes of much of the
world. It also upheld the European belief that their superior technology would ultimately
triumph, no matter how numerous and brave the enemy. Not surprisingly, historians have
long supported this thinking as the main reason for the Zulu defeat. An example of this is
found in Leonard Thompson’s A History of South Africa, published in 2000. Thompson
explains that although several leading Zulu chiefs defected to the British during the war,
technological factors were decisive in the ultimate British victory over the Zulu. His
evidence comes from the Zulu’s inability to make “effective use of their guns....”83
While this statement is based in fact, J.J. Guy argues it is simplistic and misleading “to
emphasize the role of firearms… in the Anglo-Zulu War, and to ignore the broader social
and political issues involved.”84
Analysis of the political and military structures of Zulu society shows that the superiority
of European technology is only a mitigating factor in Britain’s defeat of the Zulu. Zulu
society was mired in the political and military institutions implemented by Shaka five
decades before the war. This resulted in a polarized political climate and conservative
military strategies.
The polarized climate prevented Cetshwayo from having complete control of his army.
His regiments continually disregarded his instructions, a fact which led to the disastrous
battle of Rorke’s Drift and Kambula. If his soldiers had followed his strategy and obeyed
his commands, Cetshwayo and the Zulu could have had a greater opportunity to turn the
conflict into a long and costly war. Public pressure may have resulted in the British
government agreement to peace terms. Most likely, such terms would not have insisted
on the “unconditional surrender” of the Zulu and the payment of an “indemnity to
England for the cost of the war.”85 More equal peace terms could have provided the Zulu
with a means to maintain their independence. In the eyes of Cetshwayo, a stable political
structure was more essential to the survival of the Zulu. Therefore, the fact that such a
structure did not exist caused more damage to the Zulu War effort than British firepower.
The conservative Zulu military organization also handicapped their war effort. They
needed an adaptive structure that would use the large supply of firearms at their disposal.
There is truth in Thompson’s argument that the Zulu failed to integrate guns into their
military strategy; however, this fact is not the main reason for the Zulu’s defeat. The
amabutho system simply was unable to fight against an army employing tactics suitable
to late-nineteenth century firearm technology; the system did not allow commanders to
adapt.
Housworth 17
The Zulu were victorious over the British at Isandhlwana and at several other isolated,
smaller engagements, but could not capitalize on these victories and win the war. The
struggle strained the already fragile internal structure of the kingdom. This allowed the
British unconsciously to exacerbate the fissures in Zulu society created by an instable
political structure and conservative military organization. Thus, the British Empire’s role
in 1879 in the demise of the Zulu kingdom is most correctly viewed as a catalyst. An
instable political structure and conservative military organization already existed before
the British invasion. The Empire’s war effort, however brief, set in motion a chain of
events that revealed these significant problems and inadequacies. Once revealed, the
Zulu political and military structure made it nearly impossible for the Zulu to claim
victory in the Anglo-Zulu War, and to survive as an independent kingdom.
Housworth 18
1
Ian Knight, Isandlwana: The Great Zulu Victory, ed. Lee Johnson and David G. Chandler (Oxford:
Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2002), 86.
2
Knight, 86.
3
“A British Column Routed, Disastrous Fighting in South Africa: The Zulus Annihilate a Strong Column
of British Troops, and Capture Large Quantities of War Material – Forty-nine English officers and 500 men
killed – The Loss of the Zulus 5,000 – Lord Chelmsford Forced to Retire,” New York Times, February 11,
1879, Pp. 1, column 7.
4
Knight, 82.
5
“Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the Course to be Taken,” New York
Times, February 23, 1879, Triple Sheet edition, Pp. 5, column 4.
6
The Kipling Society, http://www.kipling.org.uk/kip_fra.htm, Two lines of which read, “We’ll come and
have a romp with you whenever your inclined”
7
Lamar, Howard and Leonard Thompson ed., The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa
Compared (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981): 19.
8
Lamar, 18.
9
Thompson 21-28.
10
Adam Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African
History 34, no. 3 (1993): 496.
11
Lamar, 18.
12
Leonard Thompson , A History of South Africa (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000),
82-83.
13
Knight, 23.
14
Knight, 26.
15
Knight, 26.
16
N.E. Davis, A History of Southern Africa (Essex: Longman Group Ltd, 1978): 60.
17
Knight, 26.
18
Knight, 26.
19
Thompson, 83.
20
Knight, 23-27.
21
Knight, 23.
22
Knight, 24.
23
Thompson, 85.
24
Thompson, 123.
25
Thompson, 97.
26
Charles Ballard, “John Dunn and Cetshwayo: The Material Foundations of Political Power in the Zulu
Kingdom, 1857-1878,” The Journal of African History 21, no.1 (1980): 91.
27
Ballard, 89.
28
Cope, R.L. “Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1872-9,” The
Journal of African History 36, no. 2 (1995). 249.
29
Cope, 249.
30
Knight, 11.
31
Rebecca Fraser, The Story of Britain – From the Romans to the Present: A Narrative History (New York
and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003): 580-581.
32
United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “The Annexation of the Transvaal,” by R.G.W. British Foreign and
State Papers, African, no. 171, 879: 15. 1879.
33
Ballard, 249.
34
Thompson, 110-111.
35
O’Connor.
36
United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “Draft to Sir Bartle Frere,” British Foreign and State Papers,
African, no. 172, 879: 15.
37
Cope, 253.
38
Cope, 254.
39
Cope, 253.
40
Cope, 347.
Housworth 19
41
Cope, 254.
Knight, 11.
43
United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “The Annexation of the Transvaal,” by R.G.W. British Foreign and
State Papers, African, no. 171, 879: 15.
44
O’Connor.
45
New York Times – Triple Sheet, “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the
Course to be Taken,” February 23, 1879, Pp. 5, column 4.
46
New York Times – Triple Sheet, “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the
Course to be Taken,” February 23, 1879, Pp. 5, column 4.; Knight, 11.
47
United Kingdom. Intelligence Branch. Military Map of Zulu Land: compiled from most recent
information, Quarter Master General Department, March 1879.
48
Davis, 81.
49
New York Times, “The Petty Causes of the Zulu War,” July 21, 1879, Pp. 8, column 6.
50
Knight, 30.
51
Knight, 30.
52
Knight, 32.
53
Knight, 31-32.
54
Knight, 33.
55
D.C.F. Moodie. Zulu 1879: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 from contemporary sources: First Hand
Accounts, Interviews, Dispatches, Official Documents and Newspaper Reports. compliers Leonaur Editors,
(Leonaur Ltd, 2006):35-36.
56
Thompson, 71,90-91.
57
United Kingdom. War Office. “From the Lieutenant General Commander in South Africa, Lord
Chelmsford, to the Secretary of State for War,” British Foreign and State Papers, African, 8 February
1879, 2: 776.
58
Ballard, 84.
59
Knight, 90.
60
Knight, 48.
61
Knight, 89.
62
New York Times, “The Disaster at the Cape: The Gallant twenty-fourth. The terrible affair at Rorke’s
Drift – Eighty Soldiers Resist a Zulu Army and Kill Ten Times Their Own Number – Pervious Record of
a Heroic Regiment,” March 6, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1.
63
Guy, 566.
64
Guy, 566.
65
J.J. Guy, “A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War,
1879,” The Journal of African History 12, no. 4 (1971): 557-558.
66
Guy, 557.
67
Guy, 559.
68
Ballard, 89. ; Guy, 560.
69
Ballard, 89.
70
Knight, 26.
71
Guy, 563.
72
Guy, 562.
73
Knight, 86.
74
Guy, 562.
75
Guy, 563.
76
Moodie and the Leonaur Editors, 171-174.
77
Guy, 561.
78
Guy, 564.
79
Knight, 90.
80
Guy, 565.
81
Knight, 91.
82
New York Times, July 24, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1.
83
Thompson , 124-125.
42
Housworth 20
84
Guy, 570.
New York Times, “Zulu Peace Negotiations: Unconditional surrender and Indemnity Demanded by the
British – The Success of the Negotiations Hoped for,” July 4, 1879, The Latest Foreign News section. Pp.
1, column 3.
85
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Housworth 21
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Housworth 22
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Publishing Ltd, 2002.
Kuper, Adam. “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Africa
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