Download Paradoxes of Omnipotence

Evil and Theism
Proofs of Non-existence
• There are two ways to prove non-existence:
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Logical Nothing is X because X is impossible; its
concept involves a contradiction.
Evidential It is likely that nothing is X because we
don’t see evidence Y and we would expect
to see Y if X existed.
Logical non-existence arguments try to show that things
like square-circles or the Barber of Saxony cannot exist
for purely conceptual reasons.
Evidential arguments try to show non-existence based
on an absence of evidence; when we see flags and leaves
not moving, we infer an absence of wind.
Evidential arguments are only good to the extent that
we would expect to see the evidence; not seeing germs
does not give you good evidence against the existence of
germs.
Arguments from evil against the existence of God have
taken both logical and evidential forms.
The Initial Probability
• We have discussed earlier in the class how evidence
needs to update based on prior probabilities.
• In the absence of evidence one way or another, one
might think that one should just stick with an initial
probability judgment.
• This raises the question, what initial probability should
one assign to the claim that God exists?
The Initial Probability
• One suggestion is that we should always start 50/50,
not assuming truth or falsity.
• This is famously countered by the example of Russell’s
teapot:
Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to
disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is,
of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars
there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody
would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that
the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.
But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it
is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should
rightly be thought to be talking nonsense.
–Bertrand Russell
• In many cases, such as the teapot, or fairies, or
leprachauns, we want to assign a much lower probability
than 50% (though probably not 0).
The Initial Probability
• One suggestion is that we should always start 50/50,
not assuming truth or falsity.
• A second suggestion would be to assume the
non-existence of things and require evidence to move
you towards believing in existence.
• However, this also seems false.
• Consider a glass of milk which has sat on the counter
for two days at room temperature. What probability
should you assign to there being harmful bacteria in the
milk?
• If you follow the principle of always assuming
non-existence until you have evidence to the contrary,
then you should assume there is no harmful bacteria
(and hence you should be willing to drink the milk), but
clearly this is crazy.
The Initial Probability
• How do we reconcile intuitions about the teapot and
the bacteria?
• One suggestion is that it is explained by our beliefs
regarding how certain things came to be.
• A teapot is an artifact−something made by people
• If a teapot is orbiting the Sun, then it must have
somehow gotten launched there by someone, and we are
able to assign incredibly low probabilities to the various
scenarios in which we can imagine that happening.
• Similarly, we can assign low probabilities to leprechauns
because we assign low probabilities to the scenarios in
which evolution brings about a creature with the
abilities of a leprechaun.
The Initial Probability
• How do we reconcile intuitions about the teapot and
the bacteria?
• One suggestion is that it is explained by our beliefs
regarding how certain things came to be.
• On the other hand, we think it quite easy for bacteria
to come to be in warm milk, so we assign that a
relatively high probability.
• Such an account says that we should assign higher
initial probability to a sasquatch or the Loch Ness
monster than to leprechauns, since the scenarios that
bring them about are more likely than the scenarios
which bring about Leprechauns.
The Initial Probability
• What should we then assign as the initial probability of
the God hypothesis?
• If God is taken to be the creator of the whole universe,
then we struggle to apply our “origin” criterion to God.
• Also, many think that if God exists, God’s existence is
necessary, and we can really only assign initial
probabilities to contingent things.
God
• People have tried to disprove God in both the
Evidential way and the Logical way
• For the sake of having an agreed upon target,
philosophers generally agree that there is a God if and
only if there is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient,
and omnibenevolent.
• While it is not always clear exactly how much these
properties line up with various religious traditions, it
seems that most classic monotheisms would say that
God is unbounded with respect to good things, and
that power, knowledge, and moral goodness are all good
things−hence the definition.
• There have been attempts to show that each of the
omni-properties is impossible.
• If one shows that it is conceptually impossible for there
to be an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, then
one has given a logical argument for the non-existence
of God.
The Paradox of Omnipotence
(1) If God is omnipotent, then there is nothing he cannot
do.
(2) Either God can or cannot create a rock so big he cannot
lift it.
(3) If God can create a rock so big he cannot lift it, then
there is something he cannot do.
(4) If God cannot create a rock so big he cannot lift it, then
there is something he cannot do.
(5) Therefore, there is something God cannot do (2, 3, 4)
(6) Therefore, God is not omnipotent (1, 5)
Omnipotence
The biggest question about the argument is, how should we
understand omnipotence? Consider these potential
definitions
1. X is omnipotent iff every sentence is such that X could
make it true.
2. X is omnipotent iff every meaningful sentence is such
that X could make it true.
3. X is omnipotent iff X can any action that is broadly
logically possible.
4. X is omnipotent iff X can do anything suitable to a
perfect being (so X cannot sin, tempt, etc.)
Responses 2 and 3 try to say that an omnipotent being can
do everything, but that there is a sense in which ‘making a
rock so big God cannot move it’ doesn’t count as a thing.
The Liar Paradox
• Some people have attempted to use the liar paradox to
solve the omnipotence paradox
• The Liar Paradox: “this sentence is false.”
• Clearly we cannot say that the sentence is true, but if it
is false, then it is true, so we cannot say it is false.
• One response is to say that it is meaningless. It is just
as meaningless as “ ’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
did gyre and gimble in the wabe.”
• It seems weird that individual meaningful words could
combine to be meaningless, but perhaps this is the case.
• If one takes this route, then it is plausible that “rock so
big God cannot move it” is meaningless.
The Paradox of Omnipotence
(1) If God is omnipotent, then there is nothing he cannot
do. ?
(2) Either God can or cannot create a rock so big he cannot
lift it.
(3) If God can create a rock so big he cannot lift it, then
there is something he cannot do.
(4) If God cannot create a rock so big he cannot lift it, then
there is something he cannot do.?
(5) Therefore, there is something God cannot do (2, 3, 4)
(6) Therefore, God is not omnipotent (1, 5)
• There are seemingly unlimited ways to argue from the
existence of evil to the non-existence of God.
• Some forms of the argument are Logical problems which
say that, even if the concept of God is not contradictory,
the concept of a God that allows evil is contradictory.
• Others merely argue that if there were a God, we would
expect to see a world much different than our own, so
we have strong evidence of the non-existence of God.
• We will look at a version of each
The Logical Problem of Evil
(1) If God exists, then God is all good, all powerful, and all
knowing and allows there to be evil in the world.
(2) If God is all good, then he would want to eliminate evil.
(3) If God is all powerful, then he can eliminate evil.
(4) If God is all knowing, then he is aware of any evil that
exists.
(5) Evil exists.
(C) Therefore, God does not exist.
Is this valid?
The Logical Problem of Evil
(1) If God exists, then God is all good, all powerful, and all
knowing and allows evil.
(2) If God is all good, then he would want to eliminate evil.
(3) If God is all powerful, then he can eliminate evil.
(4) If God is all knowing, then he is aware of any evil that
exists.
(5) If there is a being that knows about all evil, wants to
eliminate evil, and is able to eliminate all evil, then that
being would not allow there to be any evil in the world.
(6) Evil exists.
(C) Therefore, God does not exist.
Should we think that premise 5 is true?
The Logical Problem of Evil
(5) If there is a being that knows about all evil, wants to eliminate evil,
and is able to eliminate all evil, then that being would not allow there
to be any evil in the world.
• (5) is a very strong claim. It claims that the concept of
an omni-God that allows evil is just as contradictory as
a square-circle.
• Most responses take the form: God really wanted (and
had good reason to want) X, and God couldn’t get X
without allowing evil.
• Various things have been posited for X; among them are
free will, love, character development, interesting
stories, virtue, and beauty.
• Note how crucial a well-defined concept of omnipotence
is here−God God cannot get the thing he wants without
allowing evil.
The Logical Problem of Evil
(5) If there is a being that knows about all evil, wants to eliminate evil,
and is able to eliminate all evil, then that being would not allow there
to be any evil in the world.
• God really wanted (and had good reason to want) X,
and God couldn’t get X without allowing evil.
• To show that (5) is false, all one needs to do is show
that there is something that could fill in for X,
regardless of how implausible.
• If there is some scenario, no matter how implausible, in
which an omni-God allows evil, then (5) is just false.
• Thus, we need some X which explains all evil, which is
valuable enough for God to reasonably want it even at
the cost of allowing evil, and was such that it could not
be had without evil.
The Free Will Defense
For all we know:
1. Free will is a great enough good as to outweigh all the
negative value of evil in the world. (Value thesis)
2. Free will requires the ability to misuse free will.
(Libertarian thesis)
3. If free will requires the ability to misuse free will, then
not even God can create free creatures which are unable
to misuse free will. (Omnipotence thesis)
4. All evil is the result of free will. (Scope thesis)
5. Therefore, all evil is justified because it comes from the
great good of free will.
6. Therefore, God is justified in creating a world with the
evils of our world.
• If this is possibly true, then there is no contradiction
in the description of an omni-God that allows evil.
Value
• Should we think free will is valuable enough that it
justifies God allowing evil?
• We said a few weeks ago why free will is incredibly
valuable: moral responsibility, rationality,
consciousness, identity; many also add the ability to
form relationships and love.
• One important question is, is this better than a world
with none of the suffering we have.
• Even if that is granted, there is a different question
about whether God could be justified in allowing evil in
order to have free will
• Is it fair for God to allow some people to suffer in order
to make a great universe?
• Does free will have to be very good for the person
suffering, or just good for the universe as a whole?
• Why think free will is so good?
• What is Ivan Karamazov’s response? Is it good?
Scope
• A different problem for the free will defense is the
problem of explaining all evil.
• Free will, for instance, seems like a plausible
explanation of ISIS attacks or various other moral evils
humans do to each other, but it is difficult to see how it
could explain hurricanes, disease, starvation, and
various other natural evils
• One may want to offer some other explanation for these
than free will (character-building, beauty, etc.)
• However, if one is looking for a defense purely based on
free will, she can try to explain these in terms of the
free will of non-human persons (demons) or by saying
that they are a natural consequence of the abuse of
human free will (the fall)
• Recall again that, at this state, one only needs to show
a logically possible way for there to be a God that
allows evil
The Evidential Problem of Evil
• One may grant that the theist has provided a logically
possible way for there to be a God that allows evil, but
it may still be the case that evil is powerful evidence
against the existence of God.
• Here is one way to phrase an evidential argument from
evil:
(1) If God exists, then we would expect to see justification
for evil in the world.
(2) There is evil for which we see no justification.
(3) Therefore, there is no God.
• Is premise (1) true?
The Evidential Problem of Evil
• If there is a God, should we expect to see justification
for the evil in the world?
• There are various reasons people have thought the
answer is no:
We have no reason to think we could understand God’s
reasons (parent analogy)
We have no reason to think we could know all the
various cause and effect relations across human history
(especially if chaos theory is true of history)
We have no reason to think we could know all the
various goods and evils that there are in the universe
• The fear of going down this road is that it could lead to
moral skepticism−we never know if something is good
or bad.