Download SUEZ: A Foreign Relations Fiasco for the British

SUEZ:
A Foreign Relations Fiasco for the British Empire
Brendan Casavant
December 11, 2012
Senior Seminar in European History
1
The Suez Crisis unveiled to the world the fall of the British Empire. The event
was a diplomatic and military confrontation in 1956 between Egypt and an alliance of
Great Britain, France and Israel, with the latter being forced into a humiliating ceasefire.
For over fifty years, historians have attempted to discover the causes for the invasion,
as well as the reasons for British shortcomings. Suez was a major foreign relations
failure for Great Britain. The crisis exposed Britain’s diminishing influence in Egypt and
the Middle East, led the British into a dishonorable and untrustworthy collusion with
France and Israel, and infuriated the United Nations and the Eisenhower Administration
of the United States.
The historiography of Britain’s role in the Suez Crisis developed in three phases.
The first phase was to establish the sequence of events. Suez was not a conventional
global conflict, thus there was a need to determine if British soldiers entered the Suez
Canal Zone in November 1956 as a participant of collusion with France and Israel, or
were they, as numerous British politicians at the time claimed, peacekeepers,
separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. Anthony Eden, Prime Minister during the crisis,
denied collusion with France and Israel until his death in 1977, maintaining that he was
only trying to preserve peace in the Middle East. 1 In spite of such efforts by former
members of government, historians have successfully challenged the role of the British
as peacekeepers in Egypt. The first British version of the collusion theory appeared to
the public in 1966 when Hugh Thomas, through interviews with Cabinet Ministers from
the Eden Government, detailed how Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd travelled to
Sèvres, France for secret talks with French authorities to negotiate an agreement for
1
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996), 1.
2
collusion against Egypt. Further revelations were made public that same year, when
Peter Calvocoressi, researching the BBC television series “Suez: Ten Years On”,
received the first on-the-record account from Christian Pineau, the French Foreign
Minister during Suez. In 1967, the Former Minister of State in the British Foreign Office,
Anthony Nutting, published a comprehensive account from the vantage point of a British
politician during the Suez Crisis.
The second phase in the historiography of the crisis, beginning in the 1960s, was
the attribution of responsibility for Britain’s failures at Suez. The central figure in this
debate was Eden himself. Curiously, his own memoirs published in 1960 helped fuel the
argument, as he attempted very unsuccessfully to clear himself of any blame. His
mission for vindication caused him to blame others such as the French, other British
politicians, and most substantially, the Americans for undermining his position.2 Eden’s
memoirs caused questions about his motives during Suez to multiply. These included
criticisms about his delusions of grandeur, short-sightedness, and weakness in
temperament.3 Some of the more prominent historical figures to criticize Eden’s actions
and behavior were Nutting, Randolph Churchill, and even former United States
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who defended his administration against Eden’s
allegations of betrayal.4
The Third phase slowly emerged at the start of the 1970s, as a shift from
determining individual blame and instead focused on the reasoning for certain
decisions, and furthermore why these policies were successes or failures. Works in this
2
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996), 2.
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
3
3
third phase weighed British foreign policy implications in the Middle East with the
decision to take action against Egypt. Along with its concentration on Eden’s failures,
Nutting’s “No End of a Lesson”, noted that actions of the British Government changed
their orientation not only upon threats from Egypt but also upon the long-term strategy of
the British alliance with Iraq and Jordan.5 Also within the third phase, historians have
examined the complexities of Suez by studying certain aspects of the crisis. Roy Fullick
and Geoffrey Powell surveyed the development of British military operations; Diane
Kunz and Lewis Johnman examined the effect of Britain’s economic weakness and
dependence upon American finances relative to Suez; and David Devereaux analyzed
the canal’s significance towards Britain’s global strategic planning.6 While French
scholarly advances pertaining to Suez have been limited by the Government’s refusal to
release key documents, Israeli authors have produced constructive studies from their
perspective, and Mohammed Sayed-Ahmed delivered the first scholarly account written
in English from an Egyptian perspective. Although the Suez Crisis broke out over fifty
years ago, Scott Lucas, author of Britain and Suez: the Lion’s Last Roar, noted that “far
from being complete, history is only beginning to capture the intricacies behind an event
that symbolized the end of Britain’s global influence.” The Suez Crisis was a vastly
complex affair. Historians are still making sense of its drastic implications Britain’s for
foreign relations as well as her standing in the world.
5
6
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996), 3.
Ibid.
4
Degenerating Influence in Egypt and Throughout the Middle East
With the Ottoman Empire’s collapse at the conclusion of the First World War,
Great Britain became the dominant influence in the Middle East, and Egypt became the
focal point for regional influence. The British military had occupied Egypt since 1888,
and although Egypt was granted the right to become an independent sovereign state in
1922, British influence and military forces remained. The occupation of Egypt was a vital
measure to ensure the perpetuation of British influence in the Middle East. Occupation
of the Suez Canal Zone was deemed essential to guarantee the flow of oil from the
Middle East to not only Great Britain, but to other west European states as well.
Furthermore it was widely believed that Western Europe’s post-World War II economic
recovery was utterly dependent on the availability of Middle East oil at the existing giveaway prices.7 Starting in 1947, British occupation of Egypt was confined just to the Suez
Canal Zone. The emergence of the Cold War had caused the Suez Canal Zone to
become a front-line in the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently it became Britain’s
largest overseas base, with a capacity to defend the Middle East in the event of a
conventional war.8
The outbreak of the Cold War at the conclusion of the Second World War
coincided with the initiation of decolonization and the loss of the Empire for Great
Britain. Therefore, just as Britain was accepting the loss of her brightest jewel in the
formal Empire, the Indian-Sub Continent, they were taking measures to tighten their grip
7
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 8.
Steve Morewood. “Preclude to the Suez Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Dominance over the Suez
Canal, 1869-1956” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited
by Simon C. Smith. Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 25.
8
5
on the most valuable region of their informal Empire, the Middle East. These measures
amounted to developing a system of “client relationships” for various Middle Eastern
states such as Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Iraq, and establishing a collective defense
organization for the region.9 While some states such as Turkey and Iraq indicated a
willingness to accommodate to such a proposal and even offered their cooperation, one
state in particular was to demonstrate a firm resistance to Britain’s plans for developing
a NATO of the Middle East. Unfortunately for the British, this state was Egypt, the most
influential Moslem country in the region.10 Without the support for a collective defense
pact from Egypt, smaller Middle Eastern nations such as Jordan were inclined to waver
at Britain’s proposal.
With this background on their intentions regarding the Middle East, it is
necessary to determine why Egypt set out to foil British plans for the region, and why
they became a source of antagonism for Great Britain leading to the Suez Crisis. A
major source for anti-British sentiment in Egypt, and throughout the Middle East, was
the creation of Israel in 1948. Egyptians in particular interpreted British support for the
creation of the Israeli state as a betrayal of their support for the Arab cause. Also, the
occupation of Egypt was intended by the British to be temporary in character. Despite
the numerous attempts from 1882 to the outbreak of the Second World War to negotiate
an end to the occupation, British forces remained in Egypt even after the Allied victory,
and this only heightened anti-British resentment.
9
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 10.
Ibid, 100.
10
6
A major turning point in Anglo-Egyptian relations came in July 1952, when the
Free Officers Movement launched a coup to overthrow the pro-western, corrupt and
widely discredited Egyptian monarch, King Farouk. The revolution set in motion the
usurpation of power by a military dictatorship headed by the Free Officers leader, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, who was resolved to end British occupation of Egypt once and for all.
With the change of regime, the British government faced the crucial predicament of
either remaining in the Canal Zone, or reaching out to the new government and coming
to an understanding in order to improve deteriorating Anglo-Egyptian relations.11 The
later was chosen to boost Britain’s standing in the Middle East, and in July 1955 the
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed. This treaty stipulated that all British forces were
required to leave Egypt by June 18, 1956, and that they could return to the Canal Zone
only if an Arab state should be attacked by an outside power, excluding Israel.12 The
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement demonstrated the significance of the Suez Canal to not only
the Middle East, but also to the British Empire’s global strategic planning. In order to
guarantee to the flow of vital resources through the Suez Canal, the British were willing
to make concessions to Egypt.
The ability of the British and Egyptians to come to an understanding for the end
of British occupation of Suez was an anomaly, and relations subsequently returned to
their adverse state. This return to normalcy was evident when Nasser struck a deal with
the Soviet Union, which guaranteed the supply of Czechoslovakian arms to Egypt. The
11
Steve Morewood “Preclude to the Suez Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Dominance over the Suez
Canal, 1869-1956” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited
by Simon C. Smith. Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 28.
12
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 13.
7
arms deal caused the British to become increasingly concerned for their long-term
prospects of regional dominance and cheap oil. A Cabinet meeting on July 20 revealed
Eden understood his Government was in direct competition with the Soviets for Egypt’s
goodwill, and it would become necessary to outbid Soviets. In this meeting, Eden
deemed it was “Nasser’s dependence on the support of the Army” which made his
decision to accept the Soviet offer understandable.13 In order to outbid the Soviets,
Eden looked at allocating the resources necessary to assist Egypt in building their
desired Aswan High Dam. He believed that securing the resources necessary for the
project, “would be of immense importance in restoring the prestige of the West, and
particularly of the older European powers in the Arab world generally”, and even
determined it would be the “trump card” over the Soviets in dealing with their Egyptian
relations. 14 The Eden Government had identified their “trump card” for Egyptian favor
over the Soviets. However, the British were in no position economically to undertake
such an endeavor, thus they turned to their ally, the United States to finance the project.
The Americans understood the necessity of financing the project for maintaining
western influence in the Middle East, and in association with the World Bank, a joint
Anglo-American offer in principle was delivered to Nasser.15
Western financing for the Aswan High Dam could have been crucial in improving
British relations with Egypt. However, Congressional pressure in the United States
forced Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to withdraw the American offer to finance
13
Public Record Office, CAB. 20 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York
(Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 27.
14
Ibid.
15
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 28.
8
the dam. The announcement was both devastating and infuriating to Nasser, and his
next move would irrevocably and inevitably set the stage for the showdown that was the
Suez Crisis. During a speech in Alexandria on July 26, Nasser announced the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, hitherto owned by the Anglo-French Suez Canal
Company. Nasser’s immediate nationalization was a symbolic response to the western
withdrawal of financing, and also served as a message that Egypt was not at the mercy
of American or British decisions. In a letter to Eisenhower on July 27, Eden carefully
presented the ramifications of Nasser’s actions for the West, claiming that “our influence
and yours throughout the Middle East, will, we are all convinced, be finally destroyed”.16
Nasser boldly defied both Great Britain and the United States by nationalizing the Suez
Canal, and Eden understood British influence in the Middle East was now in jeopardy. It
was imperative for Eisenhower to feel American influence in the region threatened as
well, in order to gain the support of the United States for any action against Egypt.
With the threat of British influence being destroyed in the Middle East, a debate
ensued within the government about what actions needed to be taken against Nasser.
The result was the creation of an inner Cabinet ‘Egypt Committee’, consisting of the
Prime Minister and his closest advisers, on July 30 to manage the crisis. At their first
meeting the Egypt Committee agreed that Britain’s goals should go beyond settling their
Canal grievances but also to remove Nasser from power, “While our ultimate purpose
was to place the Canal under international control, our immediate objective was to bring
16
Eden to Eisenhower, 27 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York (Basil
Blackwell Inc., 1989), 113.
9
about the down fall of the present Egyptian Government”.17 While Eden and the Egypt
Committee determined internally that their goal was to remove Nasser, they knew it
would be necessary to use the status of the canal as justification to the outside world for
invasion, “our case before world opinion was based on the need to secure international
control over the Canal”.18 The Suez Canal was an iconic symbol of western dominance
in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. Nasser had overthrown a corrupt and prowestern monarchy, and his main objective as an Arab-nationalistic military dictator, was
to eradicate British dominance over Egypt. The last straw for Nasser regarding Egypt’s
western ties was America’s withdrawal of financing for the Aswan High Dam. Nasser
boldly defied the western world and in particular, Great Britain, when he nationalized the
Suez Canal. Concurrently the Eden Government could not allow Nasser to challenge
Great Britain in such a disobedient fashion without losing influence in the increasingly
important Middle East. Therefore the British decision to take action against Nasser was
complex yet logical, given that their declining influence in the region was at stake.
A Treacherous Collusion is Forged
Initial reactions from London and Washington to Nasser’s nationalization of the
canal, established a reoccurring pattern throughout the crisis. While the Eden
Government formulated justifications for the use of force and requested American
support, the Eisenhower administration was determined to bring about a peaceful
solution. These conflicting intentions were evident when the Egypt Committee
17
Public Record Office, CAB. 30 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York
(Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 39.
18
Public Record Office, CAB. 30 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York
(Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 39.
10
authorized Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to seize Egyptian assets in
Britain, prepared military forces to move to the Middle East, and agreed upon
discussions with France about further action.19 Meanwhile, the Eisenhower
administration sent the Deputy Under-secretary of State, Robert Murphy, to London to
meet with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and French Foreign Secretary Christian
Pineau on July 29. This meeting manifested that it was France, and not the United
States, who had similar aspirations to the British regarding Nasser and Egypt. Pineau
made it clear to Murphy that France was willing to go to war due to Nasser’s support for
rebels in Algeria who were challenging French authority, ‘One successful battle in Egypt
would be worth ten in North Africa.’20 Pineau’s assertion made it evident that France, not
the preferred United States, was the clear and willing partner to take action against
Egypt.
The July 29 meeting between Lloyd, Murphy and Pineau revealed that the
French were more than willing to consider invading Egypt. The next matter of debate for
Eden’s Committee was whether or not to get Egypt’s sworn enemy in the Middle East,
Israel, to participate in collusion. Macmillan was the first British Minister to recognize the
necessities of military co-operation with Israel, as displayed in his letter to Eden on
August 3:
If I were in [Israel’s] position I should certainly intervene and
get all the advantage I could. All history shows that
statesmen of any character will seize a chance like this and
the Jews have character. They are bound to do something.
Surely what matters is that what they should do is to help us
19
Ibid.
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
50.
20
11
and not hinder us. We don’t want them to go off and attack
Jordan.21
Jordan was critical to Britain's balance of influence in the Middle East. Border conflicts
with Israel during the month of July had threatened the stability and security of the state.
Therefore, it was not only beneficial for the British to recruit Israel for action against
Egypt in order to have another participant in collusion, but to also minimize Israeli
pressure on Jordan.
While the British and French accepted American diplomacy publicly, both nations
prepared to strike Egypt on their own privately. The British pursued discussions at the
United Nations as a pretext for invasion and to portray themselves as peacekeepers,
while the French engaged in military planning with Israel. An account of Pineau’s
meeting with Eden on September 23 revealed that the French Foreign Minister asked
the British to join the operations. “Eden showed a good deal of interest; Lloyd a great
deal of reticence... Nevertheless I was unable to persuade them to give a kind of carte
blanche to undertake further negotiations with the Israelis.”22 Pineau’s commentary
demonstrated that Eden was not willing to commit to a cooperative effort. However, it
also indicated that Britain would not prohibit a Franco-Israeli attack upon Egypt.
Although the British were unwilling to engage in collusion against Egypt in late
September, talks for an Anglo-French operation were revived on October 14. Eden
received French Foreign Minister Albert Gazier and General Maurice Challe at
Chequers, and the concept of involving Israel was approved by both sides. It was at this
21
Macmillan to Eden, 3 August 1956, in Macmillan: Volume I, 1894-1956, ed. Alistair Horne. London
(Penguin Books, 1988), 401.
22
Public Record Office, Eden-Pineau meeting, 23 September 1956, in Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez
Conspiracy, ed. Terence Robertson. London (McCelland and Stewart, 1965) 134.
12
meeting that Challe proposed the scenario of encouraging Israel to attack Egypt in a
manner which would enable Great Britain and France to declare the safety of Suez was
in jeopardy, and therefore be able to send troops to Egypt to separate the combatants.
The October 14 meeting at Chequers was the critical moment which led Britain to use
force against Egypt, therefore it is necessary to determine why Eden had changed his
position on collusion since meeting with the French on September 23. Essentially,
France diplomatically backed Great Britain into a corner, with the threat of an Israeli
attack upon Jordan if the British did not join France and Israel.23 Killings on the IsraeliJordanian border, which had threatened war in July, resumed in September. The British
Cabinet Minutes of October 18 revealed that the Israeli threat on Jordan was a
significant and consequential factor in the British decision to agree to collusion:
The political situation in Jordan was unstable, and there
were signs that Israel might be preparing to make some
military move. If the Israelis attacked Jordan, we should be in
a position of very great difficulty...We, on the other hand, had
our separate obligations under the Anglo-Jordan treaty; but it
would be contrary to our interests to act, at this time and
alone, in support of Jordan against Israel. Therefore, his
conversation with the French, [Lloyd] had proceeded on the
basis that every possible effort should be made to ensure
that the Israeli should not at this stage attack Jordan. If they
contemplated any military operations against the Arabs, it
would be far better from our point of view that they should
attack Egypt;24
Deteriorating relations with Egypt increased Jordan’s significance towards Britain’s
position of influence in the Middle East, thus the decision to agree to collusion with
23
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
76.
24
Public Record Office, CAB. 18 October 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York
(Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 141.
13
France and Israel was simple. Britain could not afford to abandon one of its most
essential positions of influence in the Middle East or enter a war against Israel and
France on Jordan’s behalf.
The first meeting for planning the invasion was secretly held on October 22 at
Sèvres, a Paris suburb. The British sent Lloyd to travel incognito to meet with French
and Israeli representatives. This decision would be influential to later developments, as
the British were willing to risk that they may be exposed for engaging in a tripartite
conspiracy against Egypt. Also, the intended role for the British and French as
peacekeepers separating the combatants would be exposed as a dishonorable
falsehood.25 The matters up for debate at Sèvres involved the timing of invasion. Lloyd
adamantly declined to reduce the 48-hour gap between the Israeli invasion and the
British bombing Egyptian airfields. He also rejected any sort of compromising proposal,
such as loaning British bombers to the French for use to aid Israel. Lloyd's reluctance to
compromise infuriated Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who believed that
Britain’s determination to maintain their disguise as peacekeepers rather than allies of
France and Israel, would leave the Israeli military vulnerable to the Egyptian Air Force
during their invasion.26
Sèvres held a second series of secret talks on October 24, at which the ‘Sèvres
Protocol’ was drafted. This document confirmed that Israel was to launch their invasion
on October 29; the next day the British and French governments would deliver an
ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, demanding a ceasefire and withdrawal ten miles either
25
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 63.
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
84.
26
14
side of Suez Canal, while Anglo-French forces would exercise a temporary occupation
of key points along the canal.27 British and French bombing would occur on October 31,
once the Egyptians inevitably refused the ultimatum. Although the British were able to
come to an agreement with the French and Israelis at Sèvres, their conspiracy was far
from unwavering. Once Eden discovered that the Sèvres Protocol had recorded their
collusion, he ordered the British representatives Sir Patrick Dean and Sir Donald Logan
to destroy all copies of the document. Out of suspicion that the British would abandon
the agreement, Ben-Gurion refused Eden’s plea.28
As originally outlined by General Challe, the Israeli invasion began to unfold on
the evening of October 29. Israel launched its pledged assault on Egypt through the
Sinai Peninsula, and caused an immediate threat to Suez by dropping paratroopers
within the vicinity of the Milta Pass, just fifty kilometers east of the Canal.29 As scripted
at Sèvres, the British and French governments sent ultimatums to Israel and Egypt,
instructing them to withdraw ten miles on either side of the Canal to permit AngloFrench occupation. This ultimatum was deliberately favorable towards Israel, as the
main Israeli force was still far from the Canal, and would be able to advance up to ninety
miles inside Egypt while still adhering to the ‘impartial’ allied demand.30 The Egyptians
predictably rejected the Anglo-French ultimatum. Thus, the British and French were now
required to honor their commitments to Israel, and cripple the Egyptian Air Force. An
unexpected problem materialized during the daylight hours of October 31, as American
27
Ibid, 86.
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
86.
29
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 69.
30
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
92.
28
15
citizens were being evacuated from Egypt. This dilemma caused Eden to postpone
British plans for the bombing of airfields, which consequently left the Israeli force
vulnerable to Egyptian airstrikes for several hours.31 Eden’s decision to delay the
bombing was detrimental to Britain’s alliance with Israel, the latter thereafter would
follow their own interests with little concern for their European partners during the
Crisis.32
On November 5, British and French paratroopers landed successfully at the
northern end of the Suez Canal, and the ‘peacekeeping’ troops quickly secured Port
Fuad. The larger Port Said was not taken until the main seaborne task force landed the
next day. Although there was no major armed resistance from at Port Said, there was a
fair amount of Egyptian sniper fire which caused the allied forces to respond in a fashion
that inevitably entangled innocent civilian casualties. The final death toll after November
6 nearly approached one thousand on the Egyptian side, while the British and French
both barely reached double digits.33
Britain’s collusion with France and Israel came to an abrupt end when Israel,
after capturing its own objectives in the Sinai Peninsula, agreed to a ceasefire imposed
by the United Nations. Israel had officially abandoned collusion with Great Britain and
France. Consequently they could no longer portray themselves to the world as ‘peace
keepers’ while seizing assets along the Suez. Left with no conceivable way to continue
military operations without appearing to be a belligerent, the Eden Government
determined it was necessary to announce their own ceasefire on the evening of
31
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 72.
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 72.
33
Ibid, 76.
32
16
November 6. The French Prime Minister Guy Mollet requested Eden for two more days
to seize the rest of the Suez, but Eden only agreed to the British continuing their
operations until midnight.34 Collusion with France and Israel was established on
treacherous terms, significantly as a measure to protect Jordan from conflict with Israel.
Once in Egypt, disputes over schematics caused Israel to pursue solely their own
interests. Lastly, even after Israel agreed to a ceasefire which exposed the AngloFrench facade as peacekeepers, Mollet and Eden still could not come to an agreement
over their own ceasefire.
Western Enmities on the World Stage
The Israeli ceasefire was influential in the British suspension of hostilities,
however, the Suez Crisis was too complex for the action of one nation alone to be
decisive in the entire conflict. The United States along with the United Nations were the
dominant influences behind closed doors, in what resulted as a humiliating British defeat
in foreign relations. Relations between the United States and Great Britain deteriorated
severely during the Suez Crisis. The Eden Government and the Eisenhower
Administration initially appeared to be on the same page regarding Egypt. In late March
they had agreed to a long-term policy of isolating Nasser from the rest of the Middle
East, to be followed by increasing economic and diplomatic pressure for his removal
from power.35 Differences between the two emerged over the Aswan High Dam project.
The American decision to cancel financing was devastating to Britain’s standing in
34
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
103.
35
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
38.
17
Egypt. The United States was the principal financial sponsor and therefore had the
decisive voice on whether or not to proceed with the project. The Eisenhower
Administration and Eden Government understood the necessity of financing the dam in
order to prevent the Egyptians from further affiliating with the Soviets. However,
securing the dam was particularly imperative for the British in order to sustain their
influence in Egypt. Thus, the decision by Congress to withdraw American financing was
not only crippling to the Egyptian economy, but also to Britain’s standing and
commitment to the Middle East.
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company provoked conflicting
reactions from London and Washington. As the Eden Government began to search for
justifications for force, the Eisenhower Administration was intent on a diplomatic
solution. There was serious doubt from the outset about what sentiment America would
take towards the theory that the British and French had suffered such a blow by
Nasser’s nationalization that the use of force was justifiable. Therefore, the Eden
Government was determined at the early stages of the Crisis to win over American
support. A letter written by Eden to Eisenhower on July 27 demonstrated the
government’s determination for American backing:
My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in
the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.
For our part we are prepared to do so. I have this morning
instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan
accordingly. However, the first step must be for you and us
and France to exchange views, align our policies and
concert together how we can best bring the maximum
pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government.36
36
Eden to Eisenhower, 27 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York (Basil
Blackwell Inc., 1989), 113.
18
While Eden privately desired ultimately to use force against Egypt in order to remove
Nasser from power, his reference to using it as a ‘last resort’ had left the door open for
the Eisenhower administration to seek a diplomatic solution. In response, the President
drafted a personal letter for Dulles to hand to Eden on his arrival on July 31:
We have been hopeful that through a Conference in which
would be represented the signatories to the Convention of
1888, as well as other maritime nations, there would be
brought about such pressures on the Egyptian government
that the efficient operation of the Canal could be assured for
the future. For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength
of my conviction that some such method must be attempted
before action such as you contemplate should be
undertaken.37
Eisenhower was clearly against any kind of military action. His insistence for the
convening of an international conference of interested parties further indicated his
determination for a peaceful resolution.
Along with presenting Eden with Eisenhower’s letter, Dulles had been sent to
London to meet with British and French leaders. During his meeting with Eden, the
Prime Minister expressed his Government's sentiment that swift use of force was
necessary, that if Nasser ‘got away with it’, it would be disastrous for British interests in
the Middle East and likewise for the French in North Africa.38 The immediate disputes
were resolved through Dulles’ deliberations with Foreign Ministers Lloyd and Pineau on
August 2. Both Britain and France agreed to the London Maritime Conference on
August 16, in which twenty-four countries, including Egypt and the Soviet Union, would
37
Eisenhower to Eden, 31 July 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York (Basil
Blackwell Inc., 1989), 115.
38
US National Archives, Department of State, Central File, Foster Dulles memorandum, 1 August 1956, in
Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, ed. Scott Lucas. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
52.
19
be invited, “in a genuine effort to enable relevant free world opinion to express itself on
the subject of international operation of the Suez Canal”.39 The decision to agree to a
conference was critical in the development of future events. By agreeing to the
American-led conference, the Eden Government had in effect lost the chance to rally
public opinion in Great Britain behind a straightforward Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt
over the issue of the nationalization of Suez.40 The Eisenhower Administration's tasks
for the London Maritime Conference were straightforward. If the Eden Government
could be guaranteed that the Canal would come under international control, and with
Egypt receiving no profits from the nationalization, then an invasion would be rendered
unnecessary. On the surface the Conference successfully met the American objections.
Twenty-two nations sent representatives, only Egypt and Greece declined their
invitations, and eighteen of the represented nations accepted the proposal for
international operation of the canal.41 The London Maritime Conference could have
conceivably brought about an end to the Suez Crisis, however, after being presented
the eighteen-power plan of the Conference on September 3, Nasser rejected any
diplomatic resolution.
Nasser’s rejection of the eighteen-power plan adopted by the London Maritime
Conference caused Dulles to look towards new diplomatic means for a settlement. His
solution was to create the Suez Canal Users Association. With the formation of the
SCUA, the users would run the canal for themselves, be able to supply pilots for their
39
Public Record Office, Lloyd-Pineau-Foster Dulles meetings, 2 August 1956, in Britain and Suez: The
Lion’s Last Roar. ed. Scott Lucas. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996), 52.
40
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 42.
41
Ibid, 55.
20
ships, and any issues encountered during the passage would be handled by warships
stationed at either end of waterway.42 On September 19, the eighteen nations who
approved the eighteen power-plan at the first London Maritime Conference, reconvened
to consider their next step now that Nasser had rejected their first settlement, and
approve the formation of the SCUA. However, the Users Association also proved
ineffective for attaining a peaceful solution. The SCUA had many shortcomings
regarding its Dulles’ original intention. The Eisenhower administration could not demand
US-owned ships under the flags of other countries to withhold transit dues from Egypt.
Also, Dulles acknowledged that the Users Association was not a device for denying
Egyptian income with respect to the Canal, and that he could not even force Egypt to
accept the Association's pilots on ships navigating Suez.43
With the shortcomings of the SCUA and the inability to gain American support,
the Eden government, along with a skeptical France, decided on September 23 to refer
any question of force to the United Nations Security Council. Referring to the Security
Council placed the Eden Government in a delicate position. The measure was
necessary for Britain to maintain their appearance of fulfilling their international
obligations, and for their image as ‘peacekeeper’ when force was to be used. However,
referring to the Security Council would inevitably draw a negative outcome, for the UN
may have been valuable towards restoring the international status of the Canal, but
42
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
62.
43
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
66.
21
would ultimately be against removing Nasser from Power.44 Security Council
considerations of the issue began on October 5, and from October 9 to 12, Lloyd,
Pineau and the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi engaged in direct negations.
Agreement between the three Foreign Ministers came in the form of ‘six principles’ for a
settlement. These principles were:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
There should be free and open transit through the
Canal without discrimination, overt or covert.
The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected.
The operation of the Canal should be insulated from
the politics of any country.
The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be
decided by agreement between Egypt and the users.
A fair portion of the dues should be allocated to
development.
Unresolved disputers between the Suez Canal
Company and Egypt should be settled by arbitration.
The Security Council adopted the Six Principles on October 14, however, questions of
how to implement the agreement remained to be determined.45
The success of the Foreign Ministers to come to an agreement with the Six
Principles had the potential to bring an end to the Suez Crisis. However, as the series of
secret talks at Sèvres revealed, the British and French were committed to use force
against Nasser and Egypt. The Eisenhower Administration first became suspicious
about British and French activity when the U.S. Embassy in London could not provide
an account of the meeting between Eden, Lloyd, and French officials in Paris on
44
Edward Johnson. “The Suez Crisis at the United Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British
Foreign Policy” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited by
Simon C. Smith, Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 169.
45
Edward Johnson. “The Suez Crisis at the United Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British
Foreign Policy” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited by
Simon C. Smith, Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 73.
22
October 16.46 A cable from Winthrop Aldrich, the U.S. Ambassador in London, to State
Department revealed Lloyd was able to cloud American premonitions further by
flagrantly lying prior to the invasion of October 29. “[Lloyd] was unwilling to believe the
Israelis would launch a full scale attack upon Egypt despite the temptation to do so in
the present circumstances. He also said categorically that his recent conversations with
the French gave him no reason to think the French were stimulating such an Israeli
venture.”47 Lloyd had little option but to lie to Aldrich. The British had already committed
to collusion with France and Israel, had they attempted to back out now, Ben-Gurion
possessed the evidence that they had already taken part in the conspiracy. Thus in
order to prevent any last second intervention from America, it was logical for the Eden
Government to keep the developing collusion a secret. However, this decision, along
with the overall decision to use force against Egypt in unison with France and Israel,
proved to be calamitous for Britain’s standing with America and the United Nations.
After the breakout of the Israeli invasion, the British once again deceived the
Americans about their role. This time, the lying came from Eden in the form of a
telegram to Eisenhower on October 30, “we think that Israel has a case for arguing that
she is acting in self-defence under the ever increasing pressure of certain Arab States
led by Egypt. Nevertheless we would not wish to support or even condone the action of
Israel.”48 Eden’s dishonesty only exacerbated the two nation’s quickly troubling
46
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
87.
47
US National Archives, Department of State, Central File, London to State Department, 29 October
1956, in Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, ed by Scott Lucas. New York (Manchester University
Press, 1996), 88.
48
Eden to Eisenhower, 30 October 1956, in Britain & the Suez Crisis, ed. David Carlton. New York (Basil
Blackwell Inc., 1989), 128.
23
relations, as Eisenhower was not convinced. The President went on in the same day to
complain to Dulles about Great Britain, his “unworthy and unreliable ally”, while
concluding “we will not help them.”49 The Eisenhower Administration's suspicion
regarding British and French activity prior to the invasion was confirmed, they knew
Israel was not acting alone.
Around the same time that Eden was being deceitful to Eisenhower about
Britain’s intentions, British and American delegations were clashing at the United
Nations. British Representative to the United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon, had been
instructed to delay, obstruct, and even prevent the UN from intervening on Suez before
the Canal had been seized, and Nasser’s position weakened to a point where his
removal was feasible.50 On the evening of October 30, United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., introduced to the Security Council a resolution
which demanded an Israeli withdrawal from Egypt and called on all UN members to
refrain from the use or threat of force. Britain and France immediately vetoed the
American resolution, the first time the British had ever used their veto in the Security
Council.
Britain’s behavior at the United Nations was downright shocking to their allies. In
a telegram to the Foreign Office, Dixon noted that Britain’s closest friends were “intently
worried at the possible consequences which might follow if we and the French remained
49
Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 30 October 1956 in Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, ed. Scott
Lucas. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996), 91.
50
Edward Johnson. “The Suez Crisis at the United Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British
Foreign Policy” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited by,
Simon C. Smith, Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 171.
24
for long in open defiance of the United Nations.”51 Britain’s standing in the United
Nations hit an all-time low. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold,
publicly rebuked the British and French for their vetoes. Collective action against both
Britain and France was contemplated, and in the same telegram Dixon claimed that
British allies were concerned that “our open defiance of the United Nations may be
compounded to the point where we have no option but to leave the
organization.”52Britain and France challenged the resolve of the United Nations with
their behavior and the utilization of their veto power. Furthermore they had shaken the
solidarity of the western democracies in the United Nations, which had dire implications
for world order in the midst of the Cold War.
On November 2, the General Assembly voted sixty-five votes to five in favor of a
resolution which urged a ceasefire and for the allied forces to withdraw from Egypt.
Britain’s position of humility at the UN was saved from further embarrassment when
Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and Hammarskjold suggested
the formation of a United Nations Emergency Force, which would police the borders
between Egypt and Israel and protect the international status of the Canal. Although
Britain could only abstain on the vote, Eden, faced with increasing diplomatic pressures,
invited the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to Egypt. The Prime Minister
gambled it would take the United Nations days if not weeks to organize such a force,
51
Telegram from Pierson Dixon to FO, 2 November 1956, no. 1009, in “The Suez Crisis at the United
Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British Foreign Policy” ed. Edward Johnson, in
Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited by Smith, Simon C.,
Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 171.
52
Telegram from Pierson Dixon to FO, 2 November 1956, no. 1009, in “The Suez Crisis at the United
Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British Foreign Policy” ed. Edward Johnson, in
Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, edited by Simon C. Smith,
Burlington (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 171.
25
during which Great Britain and France would be able to proceed with their tactics
against Egypt.53 Diplomatic pressures were only to increase for the British as the
situation at the UN intensified. The General Assembly on November 4 developed a
second resolution which asked Hammarskjold to arrange a cease fire within twelve
hours. The next day the General Assembly voted fifty-seven to none, (Britain, France,
Israel and sixteen other nations abstaining) for a ceasefire, and for a United Nations
Emergency Force to be deployed in Egypt. After a week of diplomatic pressure, the
United Nations had successfully cornered Great Britain. Eden had claimed on
November 1 that British operations would cease when the United Nations was ready to
take over peacekeeping, and by authorizing the UN Emergency Force on November 5,
the General Assembly had successfully called his bluff.54
Although diplomatic pressures were significant in the eventual ceasefire, it was
the economic pressure from the United States which brought Britain to its knees. During
the Suez Crisis, the value of the pound dropped and was on the verge of collapse.
British reserves of foreign currencies and gold had dwindled to such a degree that by
early 1957, Britain would have virtually no foreign currency to pay for essential imports,
such as machinery and agricultural products.55 A dire situation was made worse with the
Suez Canal blocked and a major oil pipeline running across Syria blown up. These
detrimental occurrences in the Middle East caused Britain to need American dollars in
order to import oil from the Western Hemisphere. With the economic calamity and the
53
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
103.
54
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
103.
55
Ibid, 104.
26
diplomatic pressure from the United Nations, the Eisenhower Administration made it
clear to the British and French that any sort of assistance was conditional on
compliance with the UN’s demands regarding the Middle East, and a specified date for
Anglo-French withdrawal.56 Macmillan was assured by his American counterpart, United
States Secretary of Treasury George Humphrey, “that only a cease-fire by midnight
would secure US support” for Britain’s finances.57 The United States would use their
influence to calm hostilities at the United Nations, and bolster the pound if the British
complied to their demands.
The threat of economic collapse and overwhelming diplomatic pressure from both
the United States and the United Nations left the Eden government without any practical
alternative other than to oblige to a ceasefire on midnight of November 6. When Lloyd
arrived in New York on November 13 for discussions with the United Nations, he also
sought to open negotiations with Eisenhower himself. However, the President
adamantly refused to meet him, as Eisenhower had received details of the secret talks
at Sèvres from French sources, and had time to reflect how his administration was
deceived by their most trusted allies in Europe.58 The American discovery of collusion
made it considerably more difficult for Britain to patch-up their deteriorating relations
with the United States in the intermediate term. Relations were to improve only when
Lloyd on December 3 announced in the House Commons the unconditional withdraw in
principle of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. After the evacuation of British and
56
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 84.
Scott Lucas. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. New York (Manchester University Press, 1996),
104.
58
David Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis. New York (Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 85.
57
27
French troops was completed on December 22, the United States provided financial
support to Great Britain and the pound was in-effect saved.
Implications for a Declining Empire
The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a foreign relations fiasco for the already
degenerating British Empire. Historian Scott Lucas could not have put the it in a better
perspective when he labeled the event, “the lion’s last roar”. The post-World War II era
of decolonization had been a challenging adjustment for Great Britain. After
surrendering the most essential regions of her formal empire, the British were
determined to maintain influence in the Middle East, a region essential for guaranteeing
the flow of cheap oil to Britain and Western Europe. Their transition from a colonial to
“client” relationship with the Middle East proved futile. Measures such as the AngloEgyptian Agreement of 1954 and the attempt to secure western financing of the Aswan
High Dam revealed the determination for a continued British presence in the region.
However, by virtue of the British failure to create a collective defense organization,
Egypt’s arm’s deal with communist Czechoslovakia, and Nasser’s nationalization of the
canal, these actions revealed that their influence in the Middle East was rapidly
diminishing. This reality caused Britain to heedlessly commit to collusion with France
and Israel, which proved to be a disaster itself. France and Israel resorted to threats in
order to get the Eden Government to commit, and refused to destroy the evidence of
their collusion in order to keep Britain accountable. The bullying and deceitfulness by
France and Israel indicated that they perceived Britain as a vulnerable and reluctant
partner, unworthy of their complete trust. Furthermore the collusion ended in humiliating
28
fashion when Israel agreed to a United Nations imposed ceasefire, which left Britain and
France vulnerable, since they could no longer portray themselves as the ‘peacekeepers’
seeking to separate Israel and Egypt. Eden’s decision to accept a ceasefire while AngloFrench forces were advancing down the Suez Canal Zone infuriated, Mollet and the
French. This decision was consequently damaging to Britain’s relations with her closest
ally in Western Europe. British collusion with the hated enemy of Egypt, Israel, also was
detrimental to Britain’s relations with the other Arab states of the Middle East. Britain’s
secret conspiracy against Egypt brought about a great deal of hostility from both the
United Nations and the United States. The British lost their moral high ground at the
United Nations, and their standing in the global organization was at an all-time low.
Delegates at the UN even went as far as to compare collusion during the Suez Crisis to
the Soviet’s crushing of the Hungarian Revolution. The most unmistakable revelation of
Suez was Britain’s inability to act against another state without the approval of the
United States. Although the Eisenhower Administration was adamantly against the use
of force, the Eden Government decided to take action anyhow, and the result was
calamitous. Any hope by the British for an equal partnership in the Middle East with the
United States was shattered by Suez. With their economic dependence on the
Americans, any ‘alliance’ between Great Britain and the United States would, from now
on, be controlled by Washington.
29
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(Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989).
3. Foster Dulles, John. Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar. Edited by Scott Lucas. New York
(Manchester University Press, 1996).
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(Penguin Books, 1988).
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31