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Napoleon Napoleon AlanForrest ForRosemaryandMarianne FirstpublishedinGreat Britainin2011by Quercus 55BakerStreet 7thFloor,SouthBlock London WIU8EW Copyright©2011Alan Forrest ThemoralrightofAlan Forresttobeidentifiedasthe authorofthisworkhasbeen assertedinaccordancewith theCopyright,Designsand PatentsAct,1988. Allrightsreserved.Nopartof thispublicationmaybe reproducedortransmittedin anyformorbyanymeans, electronicormechanical, includingphotocopy, recording,oranyinformation storageandretrievalsystem, withoutpermissioninwriting fromthepublisher. ACIPcataloguerecordfor thisbookisavailablefrom theBritishLibrary eBookISBN978085738 7592 PrintISBN978184916410 8 10987654321 Youcanfindthisandmany othergreatbooksat: www.quercusbooks.co.uk Contents Introduction 1:Paris,1840 2:CorsicanBeginnings 3:SonoftheRevolution 4:BonaparteinItaly 5:LureoftheOrient 6:FirstConsul 7:FromConsulatetoEmpire 8:QuestforGlory 9:AVisionofCivilSociety 10:TheReinventionof Monarchy 11:FromthePeninsulato Leipzig 12:TheHundredDays 13:YearsofExile 14:LifeafterDeath Notes Bibliography Acknowledgements Index Introduction Biographycanbean inflexiblemedium,especially forthehistorian.Itshapesa period,acountry,aculture aroundthelifeofasingle individualwhomayormay notberepresentativeofit.It chooses,almostunavoidably, asitschronologicalspanthe datesofthatindividual’slife andbirth,tellingthestoryof theseyearsthroughtheprism ofhisownexperienceas though,byimplication,that experiencehadanimportance thatwaswider,moreallencompassing,thanthelifeof asingleman,thatit contributedinsome significantwaytothehistory ofhistimes.And,inthecase ofNapoleonBonaparte,itcan helptogiveweighttoa mythology,addingtothe alreadywell-established impression,createdbyahost ofhistoricalandbiographical writingsacrossthedecades, thatwhatmatteredwasthe manhimself,hisvisionand hisambition,morethanthe timeshelivedinorthe circumstanceshe encountered.Fewhistorical charactershavehadsomuch writtenaboutthem,andfew havebeendepictedinsuch emphaticallypersonalterms, totheextentthatthehistory ofawholeeraisoften presentedasthereflectionof oneman’spowerandpursuit ofglory.Fewhavemixed historyandlegendmore promiscuously.Forthat reasonitmaybewiseto pauseandbeginthisbook withsomethingapproachinga healthwarning. Therearetwowaysof writingaboutNapoleon.One istopresentthestoryofa titanicfigurewhodictatedthe historyofhisageandwhose willalonedeterminedthe destinyofacontinent.‘Inthe beginning’,asGoethe famouslywrotewiththerise ofGermannationalismin mind,‘wasNapoleon.’The otheristofocusonthe Empire,thepoliticaland economicsystemwhichit createdandthecultural dynamicwhichitencouraged. Goetheprobablydidnot intendthehistoryofthese yearstobetakenoverbythe personallifeofoneman,as manyhistoriansand biographershavetendedto do.AndtheEmpire, stretchingacrossmostofthe Europeancontinent,was certainlynottheworkofone man.Itwasacollaborative enterprisethatdependedon theeffortandvisionof thousandsofadministrators, armyofficers,juristsand educators,asystemthatmay havebeenconceivedby Napoleonasanextensionof Frenchpower,butwhich couldonlyworkwiththe activecollaborationofothers, GermansandItalians, BelgiansandDutchand Poles.TheEmpireasithad developedby1806was multinational,and multilingual,too.IfNapoleon dreamedofrecreatinga Europeonthescaleofthe CarolingianEmpireand lookedbackforinspirationto ClassicalRome,othershadto buyintothatdream. Theseweretumultuous years,dominatedinFrance andbeyondbytheFrench Revolutionandbythewarsit unleashed,eventsoverwhich thefutureEmperorhadthe mosttangentialinfluence. This,too,shouldmakeus pauseandreflecton Napoleon’srole,onthe degreetowhichhewasthe productofthemore individualistic,meritocratic societywhichtheRevolution created,theproductofhis timesasmuchastheir creator.Thehistoryofthis periodisoftenpresentedas thereflectionofhisambition, hisvision,andhis extraordinaryimagination.It isaworldconceivedinthe personoftheEmperor,held togetherbyhiswordsand actions,asheliveditandas herecordedhisreflectionsin hismemoirs,dictatedtohis companionsonSaintHelena. Thesedogivetheimpression ofacoherentandconsistent programme,andofanideaof EuropeandtheEmpirewhich hefirstforgedandthen ruthlesslyenacted.Yeteven interpretingthesewordsand givingcredencetohis judgmentsisadelicate exercise;Napoleon’s reflectionsonhiscareerand hisroleinhistorywere writtentoformopinion,not toreflectit.Iftherearefew actualliesinhisaccount, faithfullycopiedand publishedafterhisdeathby EmmanueldeLasCasesas theMémorialdeSainteHélène,itissuggestive,often criticalofothers,andalways highlypartisan.Itmustnever beforgottenthatNapoleon fullyappreciatedthepowerof thewrittenwordandthathe usedittotellingeffect:his despatchesfromthearmy, likehislaterlawsand decrees,werepennedwith deliberationandaneyetohis audience.Hesurrounded himselfwithjournalistsand spin-doctorslongbeforeit becameatraditionofpolitics, awareoftheimportanceof publicopinioninthenew polityhewascreating.He wrotetoimpresshisgenerals andhispoliticalallies,andto forgetheviewsofthe politicalelites,bothinFrance andabroad.Buthealso,from anearlyage,wrotewith futuregenerationsinmind, determinedtoprovide justificationforhisactions andtoburnishhisimagefor posterity. Seeingthehistoryofthese yearsthroughNapoleon’s eyesoffersacoherence forgedbyoneman’sideas andvision,butthismaybe deceptive.Itmaybemore usefultothinkoftheEmpire lessasthepersonificationof Napoleon’swilland imaginationthanasa complexpoliticalsystem characterisedbya sophisticatedlegalcodeanda developedadministrative structure,whichdependedfor itssuccessonthecooperation ofothersandonthe convergenceofambitions.Of courseNapoleon’sown ambitionplayedacrucialrole here,justashismilitary prowessandhisvisionof Empirewerecriticaltothe successoftheenterprise.But seeninthislight,theEmpire wasmuchmorethanone man.Itwasamilitaryand civilsystemofgovernment,a triumphofconquestand administrationthatdemanded alliesandcollaborators, kindredspiritsanddisciples. Itwastheresponseofa generationoflawyers, politiciansandgeneralswho hadlivedthroughthe revolution,whohadinmany casesadministeredand directedthatrevolution,but whohadnow,inthefirst yearsofthenineteenth century,concludedthat revolutionaryinstitutionshad runtheircourseandthatwhat Franceneeded,aboveallelse, wasorderandstability. Napoleon’smajor achievementwastocreatea civicandlegalorderthat inspiredloyaltiesand,in manypartsofEurope, survivedafterhehimselfhad beenbanishedtoSaint HelenaandtheEmpirewas nomorethanamemory.It waslesstheworkofoneman, howevergrandiosehis ambitionsforempire,thanthe creationofagenerationof Frenchmenbroughtupona dietofenlightenmentand humanism,andtrainedto regardgoodgovernmentand justiceasessentialattributes ofamodernstate;a generation,moreover,that hadcometomaturityand had,inmanycases,been givenundreamt-of opportunitiesduringthe decadeoftheFrench Revolution.Theydidnotfind themselvesheldbackby questionsofprivilegeor preventedbythechanceof theirbirthfromtakingtheir placeintheserviceofthe state.Norweretheyamong thosewhomtheRevolution pickedoutforpersecutionor excludedfromcitizenship: thosewhosawtheir allegiancetotheKingas morebindingthantheir loyaltytotherepublic,who ratedtheirCatholicloyalties abovetheirdutiesas Frenchmen,whoputprivate profitbeforepublicservice, orwhoallowedthemselvesto beluredbythetemptationsof counterrevolutionor federalism.Forsome,clearly, theFrenchRevolutionhad speltdangerandpersonal catastrophe,anditsplitentire communitiesalongfactional lines.Butforthevast majorityofFrenchmen,and forsomeatleastamongthe educatedelitesofEurope,it broughtunrivalled opportunity,expandedthe publicsphereandofferedthe possibilityofadvancement.It wastothisgenerationthatthe youngNapoleonBonaparte instinctivelybelonged,a generationreadyandeagerto grasptheopportunitieswhich meritocracyheldouttothem. InFranceandacrossthe Empirejuristsandpublic officialsrespondedtothe challenge,acceptingpostsin theimperialadministration, andbringingjustice,theCode andefficientbureaucracyto peopleswhohadneverbefore benefitedfromthem.Thereis littledoubtthatformanythe advantagesofNapoleonic rulefaroutweighedthe burdensofstatetaxesorthe shameofdefeatandinvasion. Theyrespondedtothe challengestheywereoffered andacceptedtheirroleinthe modernisationofthepolity, identifyingwiththeEmpire andassumingtheirpartin implementingtheNapoleonic dream.Thehistoryofthese yearswasacollective enterprise,asmuchtheirstory ashis. Itisnot,however,assuch thatitisprimarily remembered.Napoleon inspiredgreatloyaltyand equallygreathatred,among contemporariesandfor posterity,andfromthe momentofhisdeathin1821 hisreputationcontinuedto grow,asamanofthepeople andthesaviourofhisnation. Storiesabounded,some claimingthathehad superhuman,even supernaturalpowers. Rumourscirculatedthathe wouldrisefromthedead,and returntoleadFranceto furtherexploitsandglory. Amongformersoldiersofthe GrandeArméeacultofthe Emperordevelopedwhich spreadtocivilians,to novelists,andtopoliticians oncetheBourbonshadbeen dethronedandexpelledin 1830.Thenewking,LouisPhilippe,soughttolinkhis ownreputationtothatofthe Emperorinabidtoextend hispopularityamong peasantsandartisansandin thesmalltownsofprovincial France.Napoleon’swords,as theyhadbeenrecordedbyhis companionsonSaintHelena, weredissectedbyhis admirersastheytoldand retoldthestoryofhis campaigns,astorythat rapidlybecamesubsumed intolegend.In1836Parisians flockedtoadmirethenewly unveiledArcdeTriomphe, honouringthemenwhohad diedinNapoleon’sservice. Fouryearslatertheyturned outagaintowelcomehim home,ashisashes,exhumed fromhisislandgraveand conveyedbyshipfromthe SouthAtlantic,werecarried withduepompanddignityup theSeineandthroughthe heartofParistoafinal resting-placeattheInvalides. 1 Paris,1840 Parisiansturnedoutinforce tohailtheirEmperor’sreturn, onacoldDecemberdayin 1840,whenhisbodywas solemnlycarriedona riverboatfromCourbevoieon itsfinaljourneytothe Invalides.Itwasamoment thatParishadeagerly awaited,thoughwhenitwas firstannouncedithadmet withamixtureofjoyand surprise.Manyfearedthatthe Britishwouldseektokeep theEmperor’sbodyunder theircontrolratherthanrisk thenewexplosionofFrench nationalismwhichhis memorymightrekindle.They doubtedthattheirking, Louis-Philippe,wouldtake suchapoliticalriskatatime whenhisregimewasunder attackfromrepublicans, legitimistsandBonapartists: wasthisreallyawayto reconcilethedifferent politicalfactions,theyasked, orwouldtheceremony furtherunderminehisown legitimacy?1 Infact,Louis-Philippe’s politicaljudgmentwassound –atleastintheimmediate term–inthattheReturnof theAshesredoundedtothe creditoftheOrleanistregime; andatthesametime succeeded,albeittemporarily, ineclipsingother,less gloriousforeignpolicyissues inthenationalheadlines.And thoughtheirEmperor’sreturn mayhaveencouragedsome oftheelectoratetoindulgein nostalgicdreamsofglory, mostFrenchmenbelievedthat thegovernmentwasfulfilling adebtofhonourincarrying outNapoleon’sfinalwishes. Hadhenotfamously declared,inacodiciltohis will,thathewantedhisashes tobereturnedtoFranceand buried‘bythebanksofthe Seinesurroundedbythe FrenchpeoplewhomIhave lovedsodearly’–aphrase thatwassuretoendearhimto mostofhisfellow countrymen?InlifeNapoleon hadbeensomewhat preoccupiedbythoughtsof hisdeathandofhisfinal restingplace,andPariswas certainlyoneofthesiteshe hadsingledout.Butthere wereothers,mostnotablyby thesideofhisancestorsinthe cathedralatAjaccio.What reallyalarmedhimwasthe thoughtthattheBritishmight trytoburyhiminLondon andmakepoliticalcapitalout ofhisdeath.Aftermurdering himinSaintHelena,he declared,theleasthis enemiescoulddowasto ‘returnmyashestoFrance, theonlycountryIhave loved’.2Hiswordswould leaveapowerfulmarkon futuregenerationsof Frenchmen. Napoleon’sfinalreturnto hiscapitalwasminutely plannedandchoreographed. Itrequiredtheexhumationof hisbodyinSaintHelena, whichwas,ofcourse,the propertyoftheBritishcrown; thedespatchofanavalvessel tobringtheEmperor’sashes backtoFrance;andalong andpotentiallyhazardoussea voyageofseveralthousand milesfromtheSouth Atlantic.Theplaninvolved diplomaticnicetiesaswellas considerablelogistical subtlety.Thevoyagewas preparedinfullconsultation withtheBritishgovernment, withtheFrenchPrime Minister,AdolpheThiers, takingoverallchargeofthe mission.3 Theventuredidnotcome cheap.Louis-Philippeput asidethesumofamillion francsfromthe1840budget forthetransportationof Napoleon’sremainstoParis andtheconstructionofhis tombinthetraditionalresting placeofmilitaryheroes,the ChurchoftheInvalides, whereupontheChamberof Deputies,overcomewith patrioticemotion,votedto doubleit.Thechoiceofthe Invalideswasexplainedby theMinisteroftheInterior, CharlesdeRémusat,ina statementtotheChamberon 12May.Napoleon’sbody,he explained,neededa‘silent andvenerablelocation’, whichruledoutthechoiceof apublicsquareincentral Paris.‘HewasanEmperor andaKing;hewasthe legitimaterulerofour country.Inthisregard,he couldbeinterredatSaintDenis.’But,theMinister wenton,anordinaryroyal sepulchrewasnotfully appropriateforNapoleon.He must‘stillreignand commandintheprecincts wherethesoldiersofour countrygotorepose,and wherethosewhoarecalledto defenditwillalwaysgofor inspiration’.4Hisfinalresting placeshouldbebotha statementofhislegitimacy andareflectionofhis patriotism. Otherpossibledestinations hadbeenconsideredand rejected,andthechoiceof restingplacehadbeenwidely debatedinthepress.Itwasa matterofgreatpublicinterest andcausedaflurryof pamphletandnewspaper campaigns.Inhisreportto theChamberon26May, MarshalClauzeloutlinedthe mostobviouscandidates:‘... thePantheonwhichishome toallgreatmen;the Madeleine,whichiscurrently unclaimedandcould justifiablybereservedfor Napoleon;theArcde Triomphe,whichwould providehim,asanepitaph, withthenamesofallhis generalsandalistofallhis victories;theColumnwhich washisworkandhisalone and,finally,theBasilicaof Saint-Deniswhichhasclaims onhimasalegitimate sovereignandwhichhas stoodreadyforthirtyyearsto receivehimintothetomb whichhehimselfhad ordered’.Buttherewere strongreasonsforpreferring theInvalides.Itprovideda dignifiedandprestigious settingthatdiscouraged tumultandprotest,and, besides,Napoleonhadhada longassociationwiththe building.Hehadorderedthat France’sgreatmilitaryheroes VaubanandTurennebe buriedthere.Hehad decoratedthechurchwiththe flagsofhisvictories.Andhe hadchosenthebuildingfor theveryfirstceremonyto confertheLegionof Honour.5Itwasaneasy decisiontotake. Creatingatombforthe Emperorthatwouldfit seamlesslyintooneofParis’s mostfamouschurchesposed majorproblemsfortheman whoemergedtriumphant fromthepubliccompetition toselectadesignforthe monument:LouisVisconti. Thechurchwaspartofa coherentgroupofbuildings thatformedtheHôteldes Invalides,designedbythe architectJulesHardouinMansarttoreceiveandcare forFrenchofficersfrom LouisXIV’swars,andwas oneofthemostprestigious buildingprojectsinlate seventeenth-centuryParis.It wasarecognisedmasterpiece ofbaroquearchitectureand oneofthegreatdomedspaces ofEurope,tobecompared withStPeter’sinRomeor WestminsterAbbeyin London.6Itwasintothis spacethatViscontiwas chargedin1842toinserta commemorativetombtothe Emperorandadignifiedlast restingplaceforhisashes– onethatwouldtestifyto Napoleon’sgreatnesswithout jeopardisingthedignityofthe baroquebuilding. Itwasadifficult commission,especiallyasthe popularmoodin1840risked sinkingintoajingoistic adulationofNapoleonand themilitarygloryhehad broughttoFrance.The Emperor’sashesweretorest underthegreatdomewithits 1706paintingofSaintLouis, aCrusaderkingwhohad broughtcivilisationto heathensandinfidels.7Inthe wordsoftheroyaldecree, ‘Thetombwillbeplaced beneaththedome,whichwill bereserved,alongwiththe foursidechapels,forthe burialplaceoftheEmperor Napoleon.’Anditwas stipulatedthattheareashould foralltimebedevotedtothis purposeonly:noothercoffin couldbeplacedtherein future.8Visconti’scrypt wouldnotbecompleteduntil 1861,eightyearsafterhis death.Napoleonwasnotonly beingbroughthometoParis atstateexpense,buthewas alsobeinggiventhedignity ofastateburial.Therewere somewhoarguedthatthe choiceoftheInvalideswasan ambivalentonewhich,while reflectingNapoleon’s militarygreatness,played downanyclaimsto legitimacywhichmighthave beenembarrassingtoLouisPhilippe.Whatiscertain, however,isthathehadbeen accordedapermanentplace inthecollectivememoryof thenation. Thefirststephadbeento persuadetheBritish governmentthatitwasin theirowninteresttoallowthe FrenchtobringBritain’s greatestenemyhometo Europe,despitetheriskthat thecelebrationsthatwould accompanyNapoleon’sreturn mightunleashnewwavesof nostalgia,anddreamsof imperialglorysuchashad unitedtherestofEurope againsttheEmperorinhis lifetime.Thiersbriefedthe Frenchambassadorin London,FrançoisGuizot, himselfafutureprime minister,towhomhehanded fullresponsibilityfor negotiationswiththeBritish. HeinformedGuizotthatthe Kingwascommittedtothe plan,andthathecountedon thecooperationoftheBritish government.For,Thiers explained,Louis-Philippe couldseenohonourable reasontorefuseFrance’s request,since‘England cannottelltheworldthatshe wantstokeepacorpse prisoner’.Thierswenton, rathercuriously,toexpandon thisview.‘Whena condemnedmanhasbeen executed,hisbodyisreturned tohisfamily.AndIask pardonofheavenfor comparingthegreatestof mentoacriminalhanging fromthescaffold.’9 Guizottransmittedhis government’srequest, emphasisingthecompassion duetothosewhohadfought forNapoleonandwishedto seehimreturnedtohisnative soil.Itwaspresentedasa humanitarianappealfromone monarchtoanother.The Frenchking,explained Guizotinhisdespatchtothe ForeignOffice,verymuch wishedtoseeNapoleon’s remainsreturnedtoFrench soil,to‘thislandwhichhe defendedandwhichhe renderedillustrious,and whichmaintainswithrespect themortalremainsofso manythousandsofhis companionsinarms,both officersandsoldiers,who devotedthemselvesathis sidetotheserviceofour country’.10TheBritish governmentagreedwithonly aminimumofdelay.Lord Palmerstonaddedrather mischievouslythatsuchrapid cooperationshouldbetaken asasignofBritain’s willingnesstowipeawayany lingeringtracesofthe animositybetweenthetwo nations,which‘duringthe lifetimeoftheEmperorhad pittedtheFrenchandBritish nationsagainsteachotherin war’.11Morepertinently,it wasalsoanolivebranch throughwhichPalmerston hopedtowinFrench cooperationintheLevant overacurrentpoliticalcrisis. ThePashaofEgypt, MehemetAli,wasseekingto extendhissomewhatfragile hegemonyinSyria,amove thatmetwiththesupportof theFrenchgovernmentbut withconsiderableopposition fromBritain.Forboththe BritishandtheFrench, therefore,thereturnof Napoleon’sashescouldserve asausefuldiversionata momentofhighpolitical tension.12Infact,asFrance wouldsoondiscover, Palmerstonhadnointention ofallowinghimselftobe distracted;intheweeksthat followed,Britainwouldpull offadiplomaticcoupby gettingRussia,Prussiaand Austriatojoinherinissuing anultimatumtoMehemetAli and,intheprocess,leaving Louis-Philippedangerously isolated. Oncethesediplomatic exchangeshadbeen completed,theexpeditionto SaintHelenacouldbe mounted.Twovessels,the frigateBelle-Pouleanda smallercorvette,LaFavorite, leftToulonon7Julyforthe SouthAtlantic.Inchargeof thisdelicatemissionwas Louis-Philippe’sson,the PrincedeJoinville,whoheld therankofship’scaptainin theFrenchnavy,andwho waspulledoutofactive serviceintheAlgerian campaigntoheadthe expedition.Thecrew numberedaroundfive hundredmen,andthe expeditionincludedanumber ofthosewhohad accompaniedNapoleon duringhisexile,mostnotably twooftheEmperor’smost loyalmarshals,Generals BertrandandGourgaud;his priest,FatherCoquereau;five ofhisformervaletsand personalservants;and EmmanueldeLasCases,the sonofNapoleon’ssecretary onSaintHelena,whohad beenaboywhenhehadlast beenontheislandin1821. Thetwoshipsanchoredon8 Octoberintheharbourat Jamestownbeforea substantialwelcomingparty ofislanders,whohadbeen informedoftheirarrivalsome daysbeforebythecrewofa passingBritishship.Las Casesexpressedwhathefelt ashelookedaroundthe islandattheobjectsthat surroundedhim,scarcely daringtobelievehiseyesand ‘feelingwhatyoufeelwhen youwakeupfromadream: mymemorieswereasacute andasrealasifthecaptivity hadonlyendedtheprevious day’.13Onthefollowingday deJoinvilleobtainedthe agreementofthegovernor thatthehonoursduetoa monarchshouldbeextended toNapoleon’sbodyandthat thecoffinshouldbeopened toallowofficialverification oftheidentityofthecorpse.14 Thiscontrastedsharplywith theEmperor’searlier intermentin1821,inan obscuregraveshadedbytwo willowtrees,inalittlevalley onSaintHelena.Onthat occasion,ontheinstructions oftheBritishColonial Secretary,LordBathurst,the onlyhonourshewas accordedwerethosethat wereroutinelygiventoan officeroftheBritisharmy.15 Therealwork,thatof exhumingthebody,thengot underway,overseenbythe surgeonoftheBelle-Poule, Rémi-JulienGuillard,who leftbehindadetailedaccount ofwhathappened.Digging wascarriedoutatnightwhen theairwascoolest,and rumoursthatthegravemight havebeendisturbedwere soondiscounted.Henoted that,astheearthandstones wereremovedfromthe ground,theyencountered neitherfoulsmellsnoran exhalationofgas;andwhen thechamberwasopened,he wentdowninsideitand foundtheEmperor’scoffin, intact,below.‘Themahogany planksthatformedthecoffin stillretainedtheircolourand theirhardtexture’,he reported,‘andtherewas neithersolidnorliquidmatter arounditontheground.The outercasingwasheldshut withlongscrewswhichwe hadtocutinordertoremove thelid;underneathwasalead casket,whichwasclosedon allsidesandenvelopeda mahoganycasketthatitself wasperfectlyintact;afterthat wasafourthcasketiniron whoselidwassolderedonto supportswhichfoldeddown inside.’Guillardthen describesthecarewithwhich theyapproachedthebody. ‘Thesolderingwasslowly cutopenandthelidcarefully removed;thenIsawawhitish cloththathidtheinsideofthe coffinandpreventedusfrom seeingthebody;itwas quiltedsatinandwasusedto decoratetheinsideofthis casket.Ilifteditbyacorner, and,rollingitbackfromthe feettothehead,exposed Napoleon’sbody,whichI immediatelyrecognisedasit hadbeensowellpreserved, andhisfaceretainedsucha lifelikeexpression’.16Such decayashadtakenplacewas entirelyconsistentwiththe effectofnearlytwentyyears inthesoil,thedoctor confirmed,andhenotedthat iftheuniformNapoleonwas buriedinhadbecomedull andblackenedduringits yearsintheground,his goldencrownandhiscrossof anofficeroftheLegionof Honourstillretainedmuchof theirglitter,whilethetwo silvervasesthathadbeen buriedwithhim,oneofthem cappedwithanimperial eagle,wereclosedandintact. Havingexhumedthebody andsatisfiedthemselvesthat ithadnotbeentampered with,theFrenchsecureditin sixdifferentcoffinsand casketsandloadeditonboard theBelle-Poulefor repatriationtoFrance.17 WithNapoleon’sbodyon board,theBelle-Pouleheaded directlybacktoEurope, completingthevoyagein aroundsixweeksbefore dockingatCherbourg,where theEmperor’scoffinlayon boardforaweekbeforebeing transferredtoariver-steamer, theNormandie,forits journeyuptheSeine.In Cherbourg,morethana hundredthousandpeople cametokneelbythe catafalque,whichthecity councilhadvotedtoadorn withagoldencrown.18From Cherbourg,riverboatstook over,andthevoyagebeganto resembleafestivalparadeas theyescortedthecoffinby plannedstagestowardsParis. Ateverystaging-point, crowdsgatheredtojoininthe celebrations;flagswere flown,andprogrammesof patrioticcelebrationswere organised.TheNormandie carriedthecoffinfrom CherbourgtoLeHavreon8 Decemberand,onthe followingday,toValdela Hayewhereitgavewaytoa flotillaofriverboatswitha shallowerdraughtforthelast stagesupstreamthrough Vernon,Mantesand MaisonsLaffitte,arrivingin Courbevoieon14December. Throughoutthejourneyhuge crowdslinedtheriverbanks andbridgeswereturnedinto triumphalarches;salvoswere fired,unitsofnational guardsmenparaded,and militarybandsplayedmartial music.Theseven-dayjourney hadthejoyousatmosphereof apublicfestival,andthose townswheretherewasno scheduledstop–notably Rouen–protestedloudlyat whattheysawasacrueland deliberateslight.19Their Emperorwascominghometo France,andeveryone,it seemed,wantedpartofthe action. Prominentamongthose whotookpartinthese celebrationswereNapoleon’s formersoldiers,their enthusiasmfortheirold leaderseeminglyundimmed afteraquarterofacentury. Alongtheroutethey crammedontolanding-stages andlineduponbridges; manyofthemfeltthatthis wastheirday,atimeto celebratetheirvictoriesand sacrificesandtodrawthemto theattentionofthecivilian population.Butitwas primarilyamomenttopay tributetotheirEmperorand torememberthegloryand dramaofthelongyearsthey hadspentcriss-crossing Europeinhisservice.At Courbevoie,freezinginten degreesoffrost,LouisPhilippe’snewPrime Ministerkneltbeforethe coffin,deepinthoughtand reminiscence:JeandeDieu Soultwho,inanearlierlife, hadbeenpromotedby NapoleontobeMarshalof France,whowasathisright handatAusterlitz,anda major-generalatWaterloo.20 Progressonthislaststageof theEmperor’sjourneyhad visiblyslowed,inlarge measuretoallowthe architectsandanarmyof tradesmentimetocomplete theirworksothatNapoleon’s bodycouldbereceivedwith duepompanddignity.Butit alsoallowedordinarycitizens andlocalauthoritiesalongthe routeachancetopaytheir ownrespectsandtoproduce celebrationsworthyofan emperor. InParis,asnewsarrivedof theapproachoftheflotilla, excitementspread,notleast amongsurvivorsofthe GrandeArmée.Amongthose veteranswhowerehousedin theInvalides,itwasreported that‘joyspiltoverinto lunacy:itseemedthatthey werebeingtakenbacktothe battlesandglorytheyhad beeninvolvedinbefore.The pooroldwoundedsoldiers forgottheirpainandtheir suffering;theysang,laughed, brushedtheiruniformsand polishedtheirswordsas thoughtheywereabouttobe reviewedbytheirgreat commander’.21 Bytheendoftheweek, whentheflotillahaddocked inCourbevoie,alleyesturned toParis.Thedayassignedfor thefinalcortegeandthe burialofNapoleon’sashes, 15December,wouldbeone ofhugepompandcelebration asthefuneralprocession passedthroughthecity. Contemporaryreportsare unanimousindescribingthe popularenthusiasmacross Parisandthejoyandpride thatwerereflectedinthe facesofthecrowds.Asthe cortegemovedthroughthe streetsofthecapital,this enthusiasmattimesrisked becomingpoliticised,with someofthecrowdbursting intoprolongedchantsof ‘Vivel’Empereur’asaway ofexpressingtheir displeasurewiththegrey worldtheyhadcometo associatewiththemonarchy. ButmostParisiansdidnot dwellonthepolitical significanceoftheevent, preferringtotreatitasan additionalholidayandrevel inthecolour,themusic,and theartilleryfire.Theysawthe momentasonetocelebrate, asapopularfestivalinwhich theyhadaparttoplay.Some wentfurther,seeingitasa momentofnational reconciliation,amilestonein forgingFrance’scollective memoryandestablishingthe identityofthepostrevolutionarynation.The republicanandleft-wing pressreflectedthegenerally popularenthusiasmand patriotismandpraised Napoleonbothasamilitary commanderandastheheirto France’srevolutionary traditions.Onlythe monarchistRighthadreason toquibble,remindingtheir readersthatthereturnofthe ashesdidnothingtogive Napoleonlegitimacy,andthat forthemhewouldalways remaina‘tyrant’anda ‘usurper’oftheBourbon throne.22 Pariswassumptuously deckedoutforthefuneral processiononamorning whenthebarometerrecorded fifteendegreesoffrost.Even someofthesoldiersassigned totheceremonyfoundtheir resiliencesappedbythecold. Yetthefreezingtemperatures didnotdeterthecrowds,who turnedoutintheirhundreds ofthousandstowatchthe Emperorparadeinthemidst ofhispeople.Thiswasthe traditionalroleofroyal funeralsofthesortFrance hadbecomeaccustomedto witnessduringthe Restoration,andwhich customarilyhadareligiousas wellasapoliticalcharacter, linkingtherecentdeathofa monarchorhismartyrdom duringtheRevolutiontothe promiseofsalvationin anotherworld.Underthetwo Bourbonkingstheyhadbeen calledtocelebratemembers oftheRoyalfamilylosttothe Terror:thetransferofLouis XVIandMarie-Antoinetteto Saint-Denis,thestatefunerals forLouisXVIandtheDucde Berry.23 InNapoleon’scase,of course,thepromiseof eternitymaynothavebeen themessagethatthe authoritiesmostwishedto convey,butthiswasthe meaningthatwasusually encodedintheceremonialof theseroyaloccasions,and wouldcertainlyhave reflectedwhattheonlookers readintoit.Therewas anotherdifference,though,in thattheEmperorhadlong beendead,andthattherewas nocauseforlamentation. Thiswasnotafuneralinthe strictsenseoftheterm,buta reburialonFrenchsoil; onlookerswereentitledto treatitasasourceof celebrationandjubilation ratherthanofmoretraditional mourning. Napoleon’sasheswere carriedintheircasketona funeralbarge,beforebeing transferredtoahugegolden coachdrawnbysixteen horsesanddrapedinpurple clothdecoratedwithImperial bees,withthefiguresof fourteenarmedVictories,and withImperialeaglesin submissivepose.Itwasover thirtyfeethighandweighed thirteentons,andwas, dependingonthetasteofthe individualspectator,either dazzlinglymagnificentor overlyheavyand cumbersome.Itcertainlyhad thedisadvantageofhiding fromviewwhatmosthad cometosee–Napoleon’s coffin.24Butthecoachsurely impressedthecrowdsasit rumbledacrossthe cobblestonespasttheArcde Triompheanddownthe Champs-Elyséesbefore crossingtheSeineonitsway totheInvalides.Thestreets werethickwithonlookers,all hopingforafinalglimpseof theEmperorasthelongand colourfulfuneralcortege passedby.Appropriately, perhaps,inthelightof Napoleon’sachievements,the processionwas overwhelminglycomposedof soldiers,whosebright uniformsandmartialmusic addedtothesenseof spectacleandtopublic enjoymentoftheoccasion. Thedecorationofthe streetsmatchedthe celebratorymood.Inthe symbolismandimageryof thedecor,prominencewas giventoNapoleon’svictories andtohisacknowledged statusasamilitaryhero,the imageoftheEmperorthat livedonintheNapoleonic legendandinthepopular imagination.Thiswasthe heroofMarengoand Austerlitzratherthanthe originatoroftheUniversity andtheCodeNapoléon.The streetsalongtherouteandthe bridgesovertheSeinewere lavishlydecoratedwith symbolicstatuaryand triumphalarchesthat reflectedthemoodofthe occasion.Oneachsideofthe Champs-Elysées,eighteen wingedstatuesofVictory alternatedwithcolumns bearinganImperialeagle. ThePontdelaConcordewas decoratedwithfourtriumphal columnsandeightstatues representingthe achievementsoftheFrench people–Wisdom,Strength, JusticeandWarononeside, Agriculture,theArts, RhetoricandTradeonthe other–beforethecortege reachedtheLeftbankofthe riverwhereitwasmetbya hugestatuerepresenting Immortality.Infrontofthe Invalides,astheprocession approachedfromtheSeine,it passedabronzestatueofthe Emperorhimself,whilealong theEsplanadethirty-two hastilycreatedplasterstatues ofpastFrenchheroesgazed downapprovingly. Thechoiceofthose honouredasheroeswas instructive,ifsomewhat eclectic.Monarchswerewell represented,goingasfarback asClovis,HughCapetand CharlesMartel,thoughthere wasnonemorerecentthan LouisXIV.Militaryleaders ofthepasttooktheirplaces besidethemintherollof honour:JoanofArcwas there,ofcourse,alongwith DuguesclinandBayard, CondéandTurenne.The greatspecialistinsiege warfare,Vauban,wasthere too,aswasNapoleon’s greatestrivalintheFrench revolutionaryarmies,Lazare Hoche.Butso,more significantly,weresevenof Napoleon’smarshals,the generalswhohadservedhim inhisgreatcampaignsinItaly andGermany,Spainand Russia.They,too,appeared asheroestobecomparedto thegreatsoldiersofthepast. Kellermann,Jourdan,Lannes, Masséna,Mortierand Macdonaldwereallincluded intheguardofhonour,as, moresurprisingly,wasNey, executedfortreasonfor supportingNapoleonduring theHundredDays,butnow rehabilitatedfortheoccasion byLouis-Philippe.25Inall, themanufactureofthe decorationsandsculptures hademployedfiftyof France’sleadingartistsofthe day.26 Theceremonycontinued insidethechurchwiththe solemnhandingoverofthe ashesbythePrincede Joinvilleandtheiracceptance byLouis-Philippe‘inthe nameofFrance’.Bythis gestureNapoleonwas acceptedbackintothenation, anactwhich,hissupporters argued,gavehimanew legitimacyintheturbulent historyofFrenchpolitical regimes.Onthecoffinwere placed,withanalmost religiousdedication,three objectssacredtohismemory: acrossoftheLegionof Honour,thefamoushathe hadwornatEylau,andthe goldenswordhehad brandishedatAusterlitz. Then,oncethecoffinhad beenplacedinthecatafalque, thefuneralservicecould begin,tothemusicof Mozart’smassforthedead, performedbysixhundred musicians,singersand choristers.27Ithadbeenan eventfulday.Whathadbegun asamemorableeffusionof popularjoyendedinamood ofalmostreligioussolemnity. TheReturnoftheAshes offerseloquentproofofthe Frenchpeople’scontinuing fascinationwiththeEmperor, andmanyinthecrowdmade nosecretoftheiradmiration forwhatNapoleonhad achievedortheirnostalgic memoriesoftheGrand Empire.Thecelebrations wereetchedsharplyonthe publicmemory,andthey werepassedontofuture generationsinpaintings, lithographs,poemsand popularsongs.Paristheatres offeredoperaswhichexalted thestyleandgloryofthe Empire,andtheyplayedto packedhouses.Morethana hundredpoemswerewritten andpublishedtomarkthe ceremony,themostfamous byVictorHugo,andthevast majoritysingingthe unquestioningpraisesof France’sdeadhero.28Painters viedwithoneanotherto depictthesceneat Napoleon’sgravesideon SaintHelena,thearrivalof theBelle-PouleinCherbourg, andthecolourandpageantry ofthefinalprocessionacross Paris.Someemphasisedthe beautyofthelandscapeand thedignityoftheceremonial toaddlustretotheoccasion. Othersturnedtoallegoryto giveamoreexplicitly politicalinterpretationof events,oftenmixingrealand fictionalcharactersor presentingthemartyred Napoleonasanewsaintin theChristianpantheon.29 ArtistssuchasFrançois TrichotandHoraceVernet suggestedthatNapoleoneven possesseddivineattributes: theypresenthimrisingfrom thedead,resurrectedlikea newChristtoreturntohis people,ordrawninachariot byaneagletowardsan eternalparadise.30 Caricaturistsprofitedfrom themomenttorecallthe gloriousvictoriesofthe GrandArmyortocontrastthe achievementsandambitions oftheEmperorwiththose,far moremodest,ofthecurrent regime. Thereadyavailabilityof printsandlithographsmeant thatwithinhoursofthe eventsinParis,imagesof themwerebeingdistributed inallpartsofthecountry, thusinvolvingthepeopleof provincialtownsandrural hamletsinamomentof Napoleonicfantasyfrom whichmanyfelttheyhad beenunfairlyexcluded.The exploitsoftheEmperorhad longbeenafavouredtheme ofthepopularprints producedbyCharlesPellerin inEpinalanddistributed throughoutpeasantFranceat fairsandmarkets.Pellerin usedtheopportunitytodepict tohisfellowcountrymenthe fullwonderofthe ceremonial,thesizeand opulenceofthefuneral carriage,andthehugeand enthusiasticcrowdsthathad linedthestreetsandblocked offcentralParis.Nodetail wasomitted,ensuringthatthe ReturnoftheAshesbecame oneofthebest-knownand best-lovedscenesin nineteenth-centuryFrench history,onethathelpedkeep theNapoleoniclegendalive forfuturegenerations.31 Thelegendhadgained renewedpopularityfollowing Napoleon’sdeathin1821.It wasconstructedaroundhis illustriousandmulti-faceted lifeassoldierandstatesman, arevolutionarygeneralwho hadgoneontoconquer Europe,amanoftalentwho rosefromtheranksofthe armytobecomethe unchallengedleaderofhis countryafterthedivisionand factionalismofthe revolutionarydecade. Thatlifebeganin1769,on theislandofCorsica. 2 CorsicanBeginnings Lappedbythewarmwaters oftheMediterranean,and withalandscapedominated byruggedmountainsand precipitousravines,Corsica couldappearasecretive place,wildandevenhostile, totheeighteenth-century travelleraccustomedtothe undulatinghillsidesof TuscanyortheRomansites oftheMidiortheRhône valley.Cloudsoftenobscured themountaintops,andthe richscrublandvegetationof theinteriorprovidednatural coverforguerrillasand partisans,tosaynothingof brigandsandoutlaws.The island,indeed,already enjoyedasomewhatlurid reputationforitsfiery individualism,itslackof governability,andthe people’spropensityto insurrectionandrebellion. Thesewerenotjustpolitical affairs:violencebetween individuals,familiesand communitieswasendemicin eighteenth-centuryCorsican society–towhichthe persistentlyhighmurderrates bearwitness–andvendetta andbanditryhadalready becomecentraltothepopular imageoftheisland. Intheearlynineteenth centurythisimagewouldbe popularisedinromantic literature,withFrenchwriters fromMaupassanttoMérimée takingpleasureindescribing theplaceoffamilyhonourin dailylifeinwhattheytermed ‘thelandofthevendetta’.1 Courtrecordsconfirmthis image.Themurderrateon theislandwasregularlyfour orfivetimesthatof departmentsinmetropolitan France,andcomparableonly withthoseotherheartlandsof Mediterraneanhonour,Sicily andSardinia.Longintothe nineteenthcentury,Corsican societyremainedsteepedina traditionofbloodvengeance whichlingered,indefianceof allFrenchattemptstopunish honourkillingsanderadicate thecultureofthevendetta. Thecentralplaceoffamily honourwasinscribedin proverbsandfolklore;andthe onlywaytorepairdishonour, andwipeawaytheshame whichitbroughtonthe family,wasto‘washitaway byblood’.2Itwouldtake manydecadestoundermine valuesthatwereacentral plankofCorsicanculture. Indeed,StephenWilson suggeststhatFrance’searly attemptstocontrolfamily feudingbyintroducinglaws andstatecontrolsintothe establishedsystemofblood vengeanceonlyservedto exacerbateviolence,atleast untilpolicingand administrationbecame sufficientlyrespectedto replacethesocialcontrols imposedbyfamilyandclan loyalty.3 Duringitsturbulent history,Corsicahadbeen seizedandannexedby successivestatesandempires, belongingatonetimeor anothertotheEtruscans,the Carthaginians,the Byzantines,theSaracens,and thePapacy.Yetnoneofthese invadershadsucceededin imposingonCorsicaany enduringtraditionof administration,policingor justice;andsincethemiddle ofthesixteenthcenturytheir placehadbeentakenbythe republicancity-stateofGenoa onthewestcoastofItaly, which,afterlongyearsof strife,didmanagetoimpose somesemblanceoforderon thepopulationin1551.Butit remainedmoreofa semblancethanareality. Foreigngovernmenthad neverbeeneasilyacceptedby theislanders.Corsica remainedtornbyfactionfightingandclanrivalries,a landofpriestsandwarlords whosestruggleswere,bythe eighteenthcentury,tingedby morethanasuggestionof ideologyintheformof Corsicannationalism.This wasaplacewhereitwould neverbeeasytoestablish peaceorachieveconsensus, andwithitsstrategicvalue cleartoallitslarger neighbours,itwasnever likelythattheywouldleave theislanderstotheirown devices.Longbefore1789 Corsicawasanideological battle-groundformore powerfulneighbours;indeed, justasthe‘EasternQuestion’ wouldengagetheEuropean powersinthenineteenth century,therewasa ‘CorsicanQuestion’ throughoutmuchofthe eighteenth:aquestionthat wouldresurfaceeverytime themajorEuropeanpowers foundthemselvesatwar.4 Sinceatleastthemiddleof thesixteenthcenturyFrance had,unsurprisingly,been concernedtocontrolCorsica. Indeed,withthelongseries ofdynasticandcolonialwars thatcharacterisedeighteenthcenturyEurope,itwas perhapsinevitablethatthe islandshouldonceagain becomeapawninrelations betweenthegreatpowers. Corsicawassituatedtooclose totheFrenchcoastand offeredtoogoodavantage pointacrossthewestern MediterraneanforFrench governmentstoleaveitinthe handsofpotentialrivals. Britain,inparticular,was suspectedoflookingfor furtherbridgeheadsandnaval basesintheMediterranean and,asFrance’smost powerfulcommercialand colonialrival,wouldhave beenathreateningpresence soclosetoFrance’ssouthern flank.Underthe circumstances,Genoese ownershipmightalmosthave seemedtoofferanacceptable solutioninthatitdidnotpose athreattotheFrench,yet usefullyfilledapotential powervacuum.Britain,in turn,viewedFrance’sinterest inCorsicaasdeeplysinister, proofofdesignsinVersailles tobuildupFrenchnaval dominanceinthe Mediterranean,andhenceto attackBritain’spositionin India. Conflictsimmeredjust belowthesurface.In1731 Englishshipsarrivedcarrying suppliesforCorsicanrebels; in1738Londonreacted swiftlywhenthereweresigns thattheFrenchmightbe preparingtoinvadethe island;andin1755,onthe eveoftheSevenYearsWar, Corsicaagainfiguredhighin GreatPowerdiplomacy.In responsetoanEnglishattack ontheFrenchfleet,the FrenchMarshaldeNoailles sentadvicetotheFrenchking thathemusthitback strongly,attackingBritish shippingandfortifying Dunkirkandthecolonies. Noaillesaddedthatitwas vitallynecessarytosecurethe Mediterranean,‘totakeearly measuresinorderthatthe EnglishdonotseizeCorsica’, whichtheFrench,withaneye totheLevantandtoIndia, rightlysawasapawnina widerAnglo-Frenchimperial struggle.5 Genoadidnothave sufficientmilitaryauthorityto offerasuredefenceofthe island,andwhentheGenoese wentontobecomeembroiled inEuropeanwarfareCorsica waslefttothemercyof others.Besides,Genoeserule didnotgounopposedamong theCorsicansthemselves. Administrationandjustice werepoorlyenforced, policingwasprimitive,and theislandwasoftenleftprey towarringfactions.The threatofviolenceand rebellionwasneverfaraway. In1729theCorsicanshad riseninrevoltagainstthe Genoese–arevoltthathad maturedintoafull-blown,if unsuccessful,revolution– andyearsofwarringand factionalismhadfollowed until1755,whenbothFrance andGenoaweredistractedby thewiderconflictofthe SevenYearsWar.Itwasthen thattheCorsicansseizedtheir independencebyarmed struggle.Thiswas,quite naturally,acampaignwaged notbymodern,disciplined armies,butbyarmedbands, villageguerrillas,brigands andsmugglersturned freedom-fightersinsupportof atraditionalwarlord.Yetin Corsicanhistoryasitwould bewrittenandcelebratedby theislanders,thestruggle assumedtheguiseofa nationalawakening, embodiedinthepersonof Corsica’sgreatnationalhero, PascalPaoli.Forthenext thirteenyears,until1768,the Corsicanswouldhavetheir owngovernment, independentandliberalif somewhatpaternalistic,under Paoli’sleadership.The guerrillaleaderwasrapidly transformedintoastatesman andconstitutionalist. Paolibecamelionisedby hisfellowCorsicans.They admiredhismilitaryprowess aswellashisgiftsasa lawgiver,hiscouragein fightingbothGenoeseand French,andhisrolein establishingCorsicaasan autonomousrepublic.Hewas seen,too,asathinkerand philosopherofEuropean standing,whohadmastered andadaptedthekeytextsof theFrenchEnlightenment.6 Corsicanswerefascinatedby thelegendofoneoftheirown whohadrisentobecomethe toastoftheenlightened world,amanwhohadmade Corsicaastateanditspeople anation;whohaddrafteda constitutionthathadattracted theadmirationofRousseau, andwhohadwonplaudits frommenoflettersandfrom enlighteneddespotsfrom acrossEurope.Frederickof Prussia,whowascounted amongPaoli’smore enthusiasticadmirers,praised hisworkasalawgiverand honouredhimwiththegiftof asword.Paoliwasroutinely describedashavingsteeped himselfinthedemocratic traditionsoftheAncient Worldandasbeinganatural successortotheleadersof classicalAthensandSparta. Hisimageenteredpopular culture,too:hewasdepicted inoverahundredandsixty paintingsandetchings, alwayswithhisfaithfuldog athissidetosignifyhis unquestionedstatusasaman ofthepeople.7Andwith Paoli’simage,thatofCorsica alsoenjoyedanewvogue. Foreighteenth-century Europeans,Corsicanswere notonlywildshepherdsgiven tofeudingandclanwarfare, butalsothekindofprimitive savageswhoweresoadmired insalonsociety,whetherin theAlpsortheApennines,in IrelandortheScottish Highlands.Theywere characterisedalsobya stronglyrepublicanand constitutionaltraditionthat markedthemoutasoneof themostprogressive countriesinEurope. Paolienjoyedaparticular cultfollowinginBritain.No doubtthiswaspartlybecause hewasanAnglophileandan impedimenttoFrench expansionistambitions;but partlyalsobecauseofhis closefriendshipwiththe biographerofSamuel Johnson,JamesBoswell. Boswellspentthreeyearson theislandduringthe1760s, duringwhichhedevelopedan affectionforand understandingoftheCorsican people,andhisJournalofa TourtoCorsica,whichhe publishedonhisreturn, capturedthemoodofthe momentfortravelliterature andforatasteofthewildand exotic.TheJournalwasan instantbest-sellerinBritain, goingthroughthreeeditions in1768and1769alone;there werealsothreeIrisheditions ofthebook,andtranslations followedinGerman,Italian, Dutchand,despiteopposition fromVersailles,French. Boswelldidnothingtohide hisloveofCorsicaorhis admirationforthespiritof sturdyindependencewhich, hemadeclear,was personifiedbyPaoli.The bookexcitedtheimagination ofaEuropeanreadershipthat wasmoreandmoreattracted totheidealoftheromantic hero.ItensuredthatPascal Paolibecameahousehold nameacrossGreatBritain andmuchofWesternEurope, andhisCorsicaabeaconof hopeandfreedominaworld stilldominatedbypower strugglesanddynastic ambitions.Inaperiodmarked byrevolutioninthecity-state ofGenevaandviolent colonialresistancein America,itmadethecauseof PaoliandCorsica synonymouswiththedesire ofmeneverywhereforthe pursuitoflibertyand independence. Corsica,inotherwords, hadestablisheditsplacein Europeanconsciousnessand intheEuropeanimagination –aplaceitowedinpartto theEnlightenmentandinpart tothespiritofromanticism whichwallowedinitsrugged landscapeandtalesof feudingandbanditry.But independenceprovedshortlived;Francefoundit impossibletostandbyand allowsuchastrategicisland torallyforeignsupportand becometheplaythingof Europeandiplomacy.In1769 thirtythousandFrenchtroops invadedCorsicatosuppress theindependencemovement, winningadecisivebattleover Paoli’sarmyatPonteNuovo andannexingCorsicato France.Corsicannationalists weredismayedatthedemise oftheindependenceproject, lamentingthedeathofPaoli’s regimeastheendofa democraticrepublicanidyll. ButwiththeFrenchregime establishedinBastiaand Paolihimselfforcedinto exile,thepatrioticmovement waseffectivelydead, abandonedtoitsromantic dreamsandpoeticnostalgia. TherestofEuropehadnot intervenedtohelp,assome hadidealisticallyhoped;from thispointonCorsicawould remainapartofmetropolitan France,withnorealprospect ofregainingitsindependent status. NotallCorsicans, however,viewedthe annexationinaspiritof negativity,sinceforsomeit speltaccesstothecultural andcareeropportunities whichmetropolitanFrance couldoffer,including postingsinthearmyand serviceinthestate administration.Totake advantageoftheseitwas,of course,necessarytobeof noblestock,justasitwasfor theFrenchthemselves;for CorsicafollowedFrancein beingasocietystratifiedby legallydefinedestatesthat wereaccordedgreateror lesserlevelsofprivilege.The principalprivilegeswere accordedtothenobility,who couldnotbetaxedandwho enjoyedamonopolyof officesinthearmyandthe royalservice.AsinFrance, nobilitydidnothavetobe justifiedongroundsofmerit orutility;itwasself-evident tothosewhopossessedit,and passedondownthe generations.InWilliam Doyle’swords,itwas‘a qualityinherentinpersons andtheirprogeny,and inalienableexceptinclearly definedcircumstancesof forfeiture’.Itwas,he continues,‘agenetictrait inheritedatbirth,and extinguishedonlywithlife itself’.8Nowherewasthis traitmoreconsistently defendedthanintheofficer corpsofthearmy.In1781,in anattempttolimitentryto officerranktoscionsofold militaryfamilies,these restrictionswerefurther tightened,allowingaccessto theofficerclassonlytothose withfournoblegrandparents. Franceclearlyoffered opportunities,butthesewere reservedforanelitefew withinCorsicansociety,and forthosewhowereprepared totradetheirCorsican patriotismforanew metropolitanidentity,a politicalpricewhichbitterly dividedthepopulationand whichmanysawas unacceptable.Andnotall were.Thecauseofnational independencewasnot confinedtoromanticsand intellectuals;indeed,for manyCorsicans,theirstatus asanationhadbeenamatter ofprideandhonour,whose losstheycontinuedtoresent aftertheFrenchannexation. Menfromallsocial backgrounds,includingfrom someofthemostprominent familiesontheisland,wereto befoundamongPaoli’s supporters.Amongthemwas Napoleon’sfather,Carlo Bonaparte,alawyerin Ajaccioandamanof reasonablycomfortable means,whohadbeenoneof Paoli’sclosestconfidantsat Corteduringthe independenceyears.Hehad neverdoubtedhisCorsican rootsordeniedhisstrong culturallinkswithItaly,and hadcountedhimselfasa Corsicannationalist.Hespelt hisfamilynameintheItalian manner,‘Buonaparte’,ashis sonwouldcontinuetodo throughouthisadolescence, onlyamendingittoamore characteristicallyFrench spellingin1796.9Butlike manyothers,Carlohadnot followedPaoliintoexile;he hadpreferredtostayonin Corsica,testingthepolitical moodandattemptingto furtherhislegalcareerunder Frenchrule.Hewasnot preparedtoputapolitical causeabovethematerial interestsofhisfamily, intereststowhichhedevoted himselfwithcommendable single-mindedness. TheBonapartesbelonged tooneoftheoldest establishedfamiliesof Ajaccio,onethathad producedalonglineof lawyersandpublicofficeholdersinthecity,andwhose ‘nobility’hadbeen recognisedsincethemiddle ofthesixteenthcentury–at leastintermsthat commandedrespectonthe island.Itisindicativeofthe ambiguousstatusofCorsican nobilitythatitwasonly impreciselydefinedinlaw anddifficultforoutsidersto interpret.Afterannexation, theFranceofLouisXVhad beenforcedtofaceuptothis problem,andinsistedthat thoseCorsicanswishingto claimprivilegedstatusmust provetheirclaimsand producedocumentationthat wouldsatisfyFrench officials.Carlohadlittle difficultyindoingso;hewas anestablishednotableonthe island,andrecognisedassuch inGenoaandbeyond.In 1768heobtainedfromthe ArchbishopofPisatheright tousethetitle‘nobleman’ andwasdeclareda‘patrician ofFlorence’.10Andin1771 hisnoblestatuswasofficially recognisedbytheupper councilofCorsica,which allowedhimtoenjoya noble’sprivilegesandtobe electedtotheEstatesof Corsica11asadeputyforthe nobilityofAjaccio. Thissoundedgrand,of course,butthereis considerabledoubtabout whatitmeantinpractice. Corsicandefinitionsof nobilitywerenotcomparable totheFrench,andthe Bonapartefamilyhadneither thecredentials,noryetthe resources,thatwouldallow themtoberecognisedas noblesonthemainland.They belongedtoaneducatedelite foundedinjudicialand militaryofficeinasociety wheresuchdistinctions, combinedwithadegreeof materialcomfort,were enoughtodefinenobility.But theywerenotwealthy, certainlynottothedegree thatFrenchhighsociety woulddemand:Carlowas paidasalaryofninehundred livresayearasassessorfor theroyaljurisdictionof Ajaccio.12Andthefamily certainlydidnot‘livenobly’ accordingtothecriteria demandedofthenobilityin France.Inreality,atvarious momentstheyfelldeeplyinto debt,andCarloexpendeda greatdealofeffortin petitioningtheFrench authoritiesforgrantsand subsidies,mostparticularlyin ordertogivehissonsa respectableFrencheducation. Withalargefamilyto support,andconcernedto maintainappearancesand mixintherightsocialcircles, CarloBonaparteflagrantly livedbeyondhismeans.13 Thoughhewasnotthe irresponsiblespend-thriftthat somehavemadehimoutto be–familylegendhaditthat tocelebratehisdoctoratehe threwapartythatcostnearly twicehisannualincome14– bythetimeofhisuntimely deathfromstomachcancerin 1785,attheageofonly thirty-eight,helefthisfamily drainedofresourcesand dependentonthesupportof others.Lateinhislife, Napoleonwouldhimselfjoin hisfather’scriticswhenhe noteddisapprovinglythat Carlohadgoneoffontoo manycostlytripstoParis whichfurtherdamagedthe family’ssomewhatprecarious finances.15 Thiswastheworldinto whichtheyoungNapoleon Bonapartewasbornin1769, inAjaccio,oneofonlytwoor threetownsofanysizeonthe island.Ifwebelievewhathe himselfwouldlatersayabout hisCorsicanupbringing, thereislittlereasontodoubt thathisearlyyearswere happyones.Hischildhood wasblessedbyanatural playgroundintheCorsican landscape,andhewas surroundedbyalargeand supportiveextendedfamilyto whichhelaterdeclared himselfdevoted.Hismother wasLetiziaRamolino,a womanofgreatconviction whowouldbeoneofthe defininginfluencesofhis childhood,andasourceof supportandstrengthinthe familythatwouldbeallthe morenecessaryaftertheearly deathofhisfather.OnSaint HelenahisbiographerLas Caseswouldclaimthatthe youngNapoleonlearnedfrom hereverythinghewouldever knowaboutprideand fortitude,andNapoleon continuedtoacknowledge throughouthislifehisdebtto thequalitiesshownby ‘MadameMère’.Shewasby allaccountsaforceful woman,determinedand passionate,andsheinstilled manyofthesequalitiesinto herchildren.Levelsofinfant mortalityintheeighteenth centuryremainedhigh throughouttheMediterranean world:ofCarloandLetizia’s thirteenchildren,onlyeight survivedchildbirth. Napoleonwasthesecond childinthefamily,though twoelderchildrenhad alreadydiedininfancyand thenexttwochildren(both girls),bornin1771and1773, didnotlivemorethanafew months.Theothersurvivors werehisolderbrotherJoseph, bornayearbeforehimin 1768;threeyoungerbrothers, Lucien,LouisandJérôme; andthreesisters,Elisa, PaulineandCaroline.Ofthe youngerchildren,Lucienwas bornin1775,Elisain1777, andLouisthefollowingyear; theothersdidnotarriveuntil thenextdecade,withJérôme, theyoungest,notbornuntil 1784.16Thedifferencein theirageswassuchthatthe youngNapoleonspentthe greaterpartofchildhoodwith Joseph,towhomhefeltthe greatestlingeringloyalty;by thetimetheyoungerchildren werebornhehadalreadyleft Corsicaforschoolingin France.Familytieswould provestrong,however,as wastraditionalinCorsican society,andonceinpower Napoleonwouldnotforget theloyaltyheowedtohis family.Hewasconcernedto maintainhissistersinstyle andcomfort,whileallfourof hisbrotherswouldbe promotedtoduchiesor kingdomsacrossEurope duringtheyearsoftheFirst Empire. TheBonapartefamily,as wehaveseen,enjoyed considerableprestigein Corsica,partlythrough Carlo’sroleinpubliclifeand hisfriendshipwithPaoli.His socialambitionwasnot withoutasuspicionof politicalopportunism,and aftertheannexationitwould beamongtheFrench,notthe Corsicannobility,thathe soughttoestablishthe reputationofhisfamily.By 1779hehadcommitted himselfpoliticallytoFrance, droppingtheItalian‘Carlo Buonaparte’infavourofthe aristocraticFrench‘Charles deBonaparte’,inthehope thathisclaimstonobility wouldberecognisedin metropolitanFranceaswell asontheisland.Hedidnot hesitatetoseekoutpowerful Frenchpatronstofurtherhis ambitions,themostnotable ofwhomwastheComtede Marbeuf,theFrenchmilitary governorofCorsica,whose brutalrepressionofany vestigeofrebellionagainst Frenchrulein1769lefta longlegacyofbitternessand anti-Frenchsentimentonthe island. From1770,Marbeufand Napoleon’sfatherappearto havebecomefriendsand politicalallies,thegovernor recognisinginCarlothekind ofCorsicannoblemanwho mightberipeforintegration intotheFrenchnobility.Itis clearthatMarbeufmade generousgiftstoCarloand hisfamily;thathevisited theirhomeinAjaccio;and thathewasaparticular admirerofhisyoungwife. Indeed,therewerestrong rumoursthathehadanaffair withLetizia,whowasnearly fortyyearshisjunior,andin whosepresencehewasnoted takingtheair,playingcard games,andattendingsocial gatherings,amongthem receptionsatthegovernor’s houseinCorte.17The inevitablegossipfollowed. Marbeufwouldcontinue totakeaninterestinthe family’seducationafter Carlo’sdeath;indeed,itwas hisinterventionthatfinally providedNapoleonwiththe royalbursarythatwouldtake himtothecadetschoolat Brienne,nearTroyes,where hismilitarycareercouldbe saidtohavebegun.Butthat stilllayinthefuture.Carlo sorelyneededMarbeuf’s patronage,sincehisfamily’s prestigewouldnotinitself haveopeneddoorsforhimin France.Hisrelative prominenceintheclosed societyofAjacciocounted forlittleoutsideCorsica.It wouldhavebeeninsufficient, forinstance,togethissona placeintheroyal administrativeserviceor entrytoofficerrankinthe infantryorthecavalry–a socialdisadvantageofwhich thefutureEmperorwasonly toowellaware.Forthis reasonCarlodirected Napoleontowardsthe artillery,sincethiswasthe onebranchofthemilitary whereafirmmasteryof mathematicsandengineering wasindispensable,andwhere educationalattainmentcould compensateforalackoflegal privilegeornoblestatus. Officerrankintheartillery wasacareertowhichmenof bourgeoisbackgroundsmight legitimatelyaspire,even before1789,alwaysprovided thattheirambitionwas backedbyrealability.To takeonedistinguished example,LazareCarnot,the futurerevolutionarygeneral andMinisterofWar,wasa prize-winningmathematician inprovincialDijonwho succeededinmakingasolid careerintheartilleryofLouis XVI,gainingsuccessive promotionsbutstillfailingto risetotheverytop, somethingthathehimself attributedtohisstatusasa commoner.Butatleast Carnotcouldenjoyacareer asanartilleryofficeratatime whenhecouldnotevenhave imaginedbeingreceivedinto aninfantryoracavalry regiment.Intheevent,hehad towaittill1789andthelegal abolitionofprivilegeunder theearlyRevolutionbefore hiscareerreallytookoff.18 Itwasintheartilleryand intheserviceofFrancethat CarloBonapartesoughta careerforhissecondson.To thisendtheyouthhadtobe givenagoodFrench education,whichhisfather sawasfarsuperiorto anythingthatwasavailablein Corsicaitselfatthattime. Andsoin1778,stilllessthan tenyearsold,young Napoleonsetsailforthe mainland–‘thecontinent’,as itwasreferredtoinCorsica– accompaniedbyhisfather andhisbrotherJoseph.For Carlothemissionwaspart political,partfinancial.Asa deputyforthenobilityof Ajaccio,hewenttoVersailles topressCorsicaninterestson theFrenchgovernment,while atthesametimetryingto obtainscholarshipstocover thecostofhissons’education inFrance.Bothboyswere admittedtothelocalcollege inAutun,whereJosephwas tostarthisstudiesforthe priesthoodandNapoleonto prepareforentrytomilitary academy.Hedidnothaveto staythereforlong.Within threemonthshisscholarship applicationwassuccessful, andthebrotherswereparted. JosephstayedonatAutunin thecareofthepriests,while Napoleonmovedtothemore prestigioussurroundingsof themilitaryacademyat Brienne–oneofthetwelve provincialcadetschools establishedbySaint-Germain in1776–tobeginhis secondaryeducationand worktowardsacommission intheroyalcorpsofartillery. Thefiveyearshespentat Brienneweretoprovecritical bothforNapoleon’s intellectualdevelopmentand forhissenseofidentity:a senseofwhohewasandof wherehisfutureloyaltieslay. Thebroad-ranging curriculumincludedthree languages(French,Latinand German),andanumberof artisticandculturalsubjects thatpreparedtheyoung studentsforsomeofthe socialdemandsofthe officers’mess(music, dancingandfencing).19 Napoleonisportrayedtous ashavingbeenan enthusiasticstudent,atleast inthosesubjectsthatfiredhis imagination.Heenjoyed readinghistoryand geographyandexcelledin mathematics;histeachers, membersofanorderof Franciscanfriars,were universallycomplimentary abouthiswork,whileseveral ofhiscontemporariesrecalled hiscommitmenttohisstudies andhisvoraciousappetitefor reading. Buttheschoolwasnot notedforitshighacademic standardsoritsoutstanding teaching,andNapoleon’s educationremainedlimited. TheThirdRepublic schoolbooksthatportrayed himaloneintheschoolyard, holdingbackfromthegames ofhisclassmatestodevour someclassicaltext,mayhave beenexaggeratedfor educationaleffect,as schoolmasterstriedto persuadetheirreluctant chargesofthecrucial importanceoftheir schoolwork;20buthis studiousimagedidspellout oneessentialtruth.Theyoung Bonapartehadmadehisway inlifeandinhismilitary careerthroughhardworkas muchasthroughfamilyties orhisfather’sassiduous socialnetworking.AtBrienne thereweresuggestionsthathe wassomethingofaloner,a rathersullenanddepressive youngmanwhopreferredthe companyofhisbookstothat ofhisfellows;othersclaimed thattheyoungCorsican remainedtaciturnandangry. Buttheseaccountswere generallywrittenmanyyears aftertheevent,mostoften afterthefalloftheEmpire, bywhichtimefew commentariesonhis formationandpersonality wereneutralorunbiased. Sufficeittosaythathe survivedhisschoolyears, performingadequatelyin mostsubjectsandshowing promiseinsome.Andhewon thehighestaccoladesfrom histeacherswhen,in1784,he leftBrienneandgainedentry totheprestigiousÉcole MilitaireinParis,atwhich pointhewasreplacedatthe schoolbyhisyounger brother,Lucien.21 Thedecisiontoseeka militarycareerintheservice oftheFrenchcrownwasin nosenseaninnocentone.For theBonapartefamilyit representedaconscious choiceastheypreparedtheir sonsforhonourand advancementinFrance.It wasachoicethatwouldhave momentousconsequencesfor bothJosephandNapoleon; andadecisionthatwould leadthembothtoassumenew identitiesasFrenchmen,in theprocessabandoningthe causeofCorsican nationalism.Therewas,of course,analternativefor youngmenofgoodCorsican familiesbornaroundtheend ofthe1790s,whichthe Bonapartebrotherscould havechosen:theycould,as theirfatherhaddoneinhis youth,haveassertedtheir Corsicanrootsandjoined Paoli’sresistancetoFrance’s imperialambitions.Andthere isplentyofevidencein Napoleon’sownyouthful writingsthatthechoicehe wasmakingwasadifficult and,attimes,apainfulone; thatheremaineddeeply Corsicaninhisemotionsand hispsychology,deeplyaware ofwhatdistinguishedhis islandfromtherestofFrance. Inparticular,heremained resentfuloftheelitismof Frenchsociety,especiallythe societyheencounteredat Brienne,withitssneering contemptforhis impulsiveness,his emotionalism,andhis fracturedFrench.Hefelt pangsofhomesicknessina Francewhich,tohiseyes, neverwhollyacceptedhim. Hisexperiencewasnot alwayseasy.Itseparatedhim fromhisfamilyandhis childhoodfriends.It presentedhimwithnew challengesbutalsoexposed himtojeersandridicule,not leastonaccountofhis imperfectFrenchandhis Mediterraneanaccent.The sonsoftheFrencharistocracy whopassedthroughBrienne wereoverwhelminglyfrom theprovincesofcentraland northernFranceandcouldbe unremittingintheirmockery. Napoleoncontinuedto studythehistoryofCorsica bothfromexileinFranceand duringhissojournsonthe island.HereadBoswell’s JournalofaTourtoCorsica withevidentenjoyment–the bookhadachievedanew popularityinitsFrench translation22–andin1786he wrotetoabooksellerin Geneva,PaulBarde, beseechinghimtosendhim thelatervolumesofthe Histoiredesrévolutionsde CorsebyAbbéGermanes, addingratherplaintivelythat ‘Iwouldbeobligedifyou wouldletmeknowofany worksyouhaveontheisland ofCorsicaorwhichyou wouldbeabletogetforme promptly.’23Heshoweda passionateinterestinhis Corsicanroots–indeed,his firstknownpieceofwriting, in1786,wasasketchonthe historyofCorsicainwhichhe alignedhisloyaltiesfirmly withhisownpeople.The Corsicans,hedeclared,‘had beenable,bypursuingallthe lawsofjustice,toshakeoff theyokeofGenoa,andthey candothesametothatofthe French’.24 Theambivalencein Napoleon’sloyaltiesatthis stageofhislifeisclear,andit isatleastplausiblethatthe painandresentmentofthese earlyyearswereimportant factorsindevelopinghis personalityanddeepeninghis commitmenttohisnew nation.Notmanymengetto choosethestatetheywill serve,andtheyrarelydoso withsuchdeliberation,or suchconsequence,asthe futureEmperor.Thoughhe neverrejectedhisoriginsand retaineddeepaffectionfor boththeislandandthe membersofhisimmediate family,hemadenosecretof thefactthathenowsawhis futureinFrance.Hisambition tobeanarmyofficer,tohold commandandseekpersonal glory,wasonethatrequired himtocommithimselftohis adoptivecountry.Itcouldnot besatisfiedinanindependent Corsica. InParisattheÉcole MilitaireNapoleon’s educationbecamemore technical,morefocused,in preparationforacareerasan armyofficer.Hewasno longeraschoolboy:the studentsweretaughtabout thescienceoffortification, andtheirstudieswere supplementedbyclasseson drill,musketry,and horsemanship.Atfirstsight hisresultsmightappear unremarkable.Therewere twohundredandtwo candidatesinhisyearfrom thevariousmilitaryschools inFrance,ofwhomone hundredandthirty-sixpassed thefinalexamination, fourteenofthemforthe artillery.Fifty-eightwere admittedtotherankof secondlieutenant–inmost officers’eyestherealproof ofquality–andNapoleon wasamongthem,classed forty-secondinthe promotion.25Thiswasan impressiveachievementfora youngmanwhohadspentso littletimeinclassesandon thetraining-ground.Whereas ittookmostcadetstwoor threeyearsofstudytoqualify foracommission,theyoung Bonapartepassedoutatthe endofhisfirstyear,atthe ageofonlysixteen.26 On10January1786,less thaneightyearsafterhehad firstarrivedinFrance,he passedoutasacommissioned officer,asecondlieutenantin theartilleryregimentofLa Fère.Hisfirstarmypostings involvedfairlyroutine peacetimework–garrison dutiesinmodestprovincial townslikeAuxonneand Valence,postingswhich inevitablybroughttheirshare oflethargyandtedium.Nor dohisdutiesthereseemto havebeenparticularly exacting,ashewasabsent fromhisregimentforlengthy periods.Withinmonthsof assuminghisposthereceived permissiontoreturnhometo Corsicatodealwithfamily mattersthathadlain unresolvedsincehisfather’s death.Hewouldstaythere foroverayear,onlyreturning tohisregimentinSeptember 1787.Butagainhisservice wasofshortduration,ashe wasgrantedafurthersixmonthleaveinDecemberand immediatelywentbackto Corsica. Hewouldreturntothe islandforathirdvisitfrom September1789tillFebruary 1791,visitingfamilyand immersinghimselfinwriting, andagain,forafourthand finaltime,fromSeptember 1791toMay1792.During theselatervisitshetookan interestinthepolitical situationinCorsica–hehad notyetatthisstageofhislife losthisyouthfulpassionfor Corsicaanditshistory– writingbothtoPaoliandto theroyalistleader,Matteode Buttafoco,andattemptingto gainPaoli’sconfidence.He tookpartintheelectoral campaignof1790,and manoeuvred,unsuccessfully, togethisbrotherJoseph electedtotheLegislative Assemblythefollowingyear. Hetookhisplaceinthe battalionoftheNational GuardinAjaccio,wherehe waselectedlieutenant-colonel andsecond-in-command.But there,anyvestigesof sympathyforCorsican autonomyceased.HisGuard battalion,calledouttodefend thecitizenryofAjaccioand theirpropertyagainstviolent attack,wasforcedtoconfront riotsinthecity,andthe memoryofhisusingviolence againsthisownpeoplefinally destroyedanylingeringbond hemayhavehadwiththe Corsicanpeople.Ofhisfirst sixyearsintheFrencharmy hespentnearlyfourbackin Corsica.27Theseyearsproved aformativeperiodinhislife andlefthimdisillusioned withPaoliandthenationalist cause,whichheincreasingly dismissedasromantically unrealisticinitsambitions. Theycementedtheearlier decisionbyhisfamilyto throwintheirlotwithFrance. Throughouthisyouth Napoleon’sreadingreflected hiswiderinterestsin philosophyandpolitical sovereignty–hereadand rereadRousseauduringthe later1780s–andmost especiallyinhistory.InprerevolutionaryFrancehecould notbutbeaffectedbythe literaryandpoliticaltastesof thetimes,andhisearly writingsincludeshortworks ofpoliticalphilosophyofa generallyradicaland enlightenedpersuasion.This outlookdistinguishedhim frommostoftheyoung noblemenheencounteredat schoolatBrienne.Whereas theyexpressedroyalistbeliefs andobediencetotheCatholic Church,thefutureemperor wasalreadyexpressing humanistsentimentsandanticlericalprejudices.He savouredthegreatclassical authorslikeCiceroand Caesar,andenlightened worksbyVoltaire,Diderot, andtheAbbéRaynal,often addinghisownresponsesto theirtextsandpraisingthe virtuesofpatriotism.Inall theseearlyreflectionshe showedconsistencyin arguingtheneedforastrong statetoprotecttheweakfrom theexploitationoftherich andpowerful,and demonstratedahealthy scepticismoftheclergyand theirteachings. In1817,hewouldtell BertrandonSaintHelenathat hiscrisisoffaithhadcome early,whenhehadlistenedto aCatholicsermonatschool whichdeclaredthatCato, Caesarandothergreatfigures ofAntiquitywerecondemned toeternaldamnation.Hewas, hesaid,nomorethaneleven yearsold,butithadleftan indeliblemark.‘Iwas scandalisedtohearthatthe mostvirtuousmenof Antiquitywouldbeburnedin perpetuitybecausetheydid notfollowareligionofwhich theyhadneverheard.’28The clergyheheldindisdainfor theircondemnationofthe Enlightenmentandofmen whomheregardedas progressiveandpatriotic, menwhoseopinionshe respectedandcherished.For Napoleonalreadythoughtof himselfasawriter,andofhis earlyworksascontributions toabroaderhumanistdebate. Attheageofeighteenhe wrotetothefiercelyanticlericalRaynal,whomhe regardedassomethingofa mentor,introducinghimself asayoungauthor,a philosopherwhoneeded adviceinordertoget established.Heclaimedto sharemanyofRaynal’sviews andwentontosubmitoneof hismoreseriousyouthful works,hisCorsicanLetters, tohimforadviceand feedback.29 Thoughinlaterlife Napoleonundoubtedly exaggeratedtheextentofhis beliefinenlightenedideas, thereseemslittledoubtthat hereadwidelyinthe philosophyofthedayand formulatedhisownviewson publicevents.Inhisearly writingswefindhim declaimingagainstthe Churchandtheiniquitiesof theclergy,denouncing religionasaforcefortyranny whoseideasrancounterto thelibertiesofthepeopleand obstructedthewillofthe people,anddeclaringhis beliefin,andlovefor,his patrie,whetherFrenchor Corsican,withallthepassion ofthelateeighteenthcentury. Hedeclaredthattheclergy wereindependentofthestate anddestructiveofitsunity. Moreover,heargued,‘from thefactthatChristianity breakstheunityofthestate shouldwenotconcludethatit hasbeenattherootofthe manytroublesthathave destabilisedChristian countries?’30Theseideas werenotuncommoninthe eighteenthcentury,and Bonapartemaynothavebeen themostoriginalofwriters– manyofhispoliticalviews seemhighlyderivative–and theviewsheexpressedwere oftensharedbyalarge numberoftheeducatedyouth ofhisgeneration.Buthewas largelyconsistentinhis opinions.Hewasimpatient withtheworldaroundhim, radicalandoftenangryinhis denunciationoftheelitesand theirreluctancetoseizethe initiative,theirtendencyto lassitude.Hewascriticalof authoritywherehethoughtit hadfailed,butwasnofriend toanarchyordisorder.Inthis hesharedtheviewsofmany wholostpatiencewiththe Bourbonregime. Inoneofhisbest-known tracts,his‘Dissertationon RoyalAuthority’,writtenin 1788,herepeatedRousseau’s viewthatforaStatetoenjoy authorityitmustrepresentthe generalwill;and,more memorably,hedeclaredthat monarchywas,almostof necessity,aflawedsystemon whichtoconstructthe governmentofapeople. ‘Thereare’,hedeclaredwith acertainflourish,‘veryfew kingswhohavenotdeserved tobeoverthrown.’31Already theyoungBonapartehad evolvedaconfidentrhetorical style,bornoftherationalism oftheEnlightenmentand turnedagainsthisenemies,a rhetoricthatwouldcontinue toservehimwellintheyears ahead.32 Hehadalsodevelopeda suspicionofestablishedelites andascornfortheirprudence thatledhimtopraisemenof actionlikeFrederickthe Great,toidentifywiththe newrevolutionaryregime after1789,andtohitchhis startotheJacobincause.This hewoulddomostexplicitly in1793,inSouperde Beaucaire,aplayhe publishedaboutthepolitical frictionthathaddevelopedin theSouth,inwhichhedid nothingtoconcealhis republicansympathies.33But itwouldberashtogofurther, ortosuggestthathewasin anywayacommitted Jacobin.Thereisnoevidence thathejoinedanypolitical club,ordeclaredhisspecific affiliations,duringthe republicanmomentof1792– 94. Alreadyinhiswritings duringthelastyearsofthe OldRegimewecanseethe limitationsofhispolitical visionandhisimpatience withtheacceptedviewsof others.Bonapartewasneither acommittedrepublicannora terriblyoriginalthinker,but asanavidreaderwitha capacitytodevourwhole libraries–whichAnnie Jourdanhascolourfully describedas‘bulimic’34– oncehehadmadeuphis mindonanissuehewould defendhisopinionwitha consistencythatattimes approachedstubbornness. Aboveall,heshowedan earlyinterestinthesortsof issuesthatwoulddominate thepoliticalagendaduring therevolutionarydecade:in particular,questionsof constitutionalrightsandthe roleofgovernmentinthe pursuitofafairersocietyand auniversallyrespectedlaw. Tothatextent,hisearly writingsaresuggestiveboth ofhispoliticalideasandof therestlesstemperamentthat laybehindthem.Buttheydo notadduptoapolitical manifesto.Manyofhis youthfuloutpouringsbefore theRevolutionwiselysteered awayfrompolitics, concentratinginsteadonthe saferworldofancienthistory andtheClassics.Onceinthe armyhecontinuedtowrite aboutthosethingsthat affectedhimorwherehefelt hehadexpertise–Corsica,of course,butalsomilitary regulationandthe deploymentoftheartillery. Butitdidnotgobeyondthat, andyearsofabsencemeant thathewasonlysuperficially informedofthenuancesof thenewpoliticalsituation. Nowthathewasbackin Francehehadtodecidehow hewouldalignhimselfwith thenewpoliticsoftheFrench Revolution. 3 SonoftheRevolution Napoleon’sriseowed everythingtotheFrench Revolution,toitsidealsof libertyandequality,the meritocracythatlayatits roots,andthehuge institutionalchangesthatit wrought.Withouttheevents of1789,Francewouldhave retainedtherestrictivelegal orderoftheOldRegime,with itsemphasisonprivilegeand inheritance,itspassionfor nobilityandhierarchy,anda socialorderthat–while cherishingideasofhonour– excludedcommonersfrom positionsintheofficercorps ofthearmyorintheroyal administration.InprerevolutionaryFrance, Napoleon’shorizonswould havebeenlimitedandthe boundsofhisambition severelycurtailed.1789 thereforewasayearofhope, ayearwhensocialwallsand barriersseemedtofallwitha devastatingeasethatechoed thedramaticsurrenderofthe Bastillebeforetheonslaught ofthePariscrowd. ForNapoleonand thousandslikehimthe changesthatwerebeingmade inthenameoftheFrench peopleopenedthedoorto brilliantcareersandrapid socialadvancement–as Napoleonhimselfbeganto realise.Hehadspenthis schooldaysinthecompanyof thesonsofFrencharistocrats, whoweredestinedforofficer rankinthemilitary,andhe encounteredthesamesortsof meninthearmy–menwhose socialvalueshecouldnot shareandwhosedisdainand snobberyhebitterly resented.1Therewasmuch aboutancienrégimeFrance forwhichhehadlittle affectionandwithwhichhe couldnotidentify.Theideals oftheearlyRevolutionwere farfrombeinganathemato theyoungofficer. Napoleon’slettersduring thesummermonthsof1789 maytalkdeprecatinglyof lootingandpillagebythe populacesince,asasoldier, heemphasisedtheimportance ofkeepingorder,andthusthe needtosidewiththe authoritiesagainstpopular violence.Inthetownof Auxonnewherehisregiment wasstationed,riotershad soundedthetocsinfromthe parishchurch,attackedpublic officialsandburnedthetax registers;moreover,manyof thetroopssympathisedwith therioters,andinAugust soldiersinNapoleon’s regimentmutiniedand indulgedinanorgyof drunkenviolence.2Hismain duty,hewrotetohisbrother Joseph,hadbeentocontain theviolenceaftertherioters hadbrokendownoneofthe gatesofthetown,andhis generalhadgivenhim responsibilityforharanguing themutineers,subduingthe rebelsandsafeguarding propertyinthecity.3Noarmy officercouldcondonesuch indiscipline,andNapoleon didnotseektodoso;buthe couldnotentirelyconcealhis excitementattheimplications ofwhatwashappening aroundhim.Writingto JosephfromAuxonnein earlyAugust,reporting rumoursthatwerecirculating amongstthegarrison,he announcedthat‘allover Francebloodhadbeenspilt’. But,headded,‘almost withoutexceptionitwasthe impurebloodoftheenemies ofLibertyandtheNation, thosewhohadlongbeen gettingfatattheirexpense. WehearthatinBrittanyfive peoplehavebeenkilledand theirheadssenttoParis’.4 Thetoneofhisletterismore oneofwondermentthanof condemnation,arealisation thatthemeetingofthe Estates-Generalheraldeda newpoliticaleraandthatthe eventsunfoldingaroundhim weremorethanjustanother banalmanifestationofthe rebelliousnessoftheFrench. Itmustberemembered thatatthistimeNapoleon’s worldstillrevolvedaround Corsica,anditwastoCorsica thathisthoughtsimmediately turned.There,talkofliberty meantsomethingvery differentfromthenew meaningsithadacquiredin France:itmeantthe independenceandpolitical autonomyoftheisland, freedomfromFrenchcontrol, andtherightoftheCorsican elitestoruletheirislandin accordancewiththeirown traditions.Tomanyislanders, thatlibertyhadbeen synonymouswiththe nationalistrhetoricofPaoli, nowlivinginexilein London,andtheysawinthe Frenchpatriotsin1789and 1790menwhomighthelp themtoachievetheirgoals. Inevitably,Corsicanreaction toeventsinVersaillesand Pariswascolouredby Corsicans’ownaspirations; formanyofthemliberty remainedinextricablylinked toadesireforCorsican independence. Napoleon,fromhisarmy postinFrance,expressedhis hopesforthefuturefreedom ofhisislandinaletterhe wrotetoPaoliinearlyJune. Clearlyhismindwasstillon Corsica;hisdreamswereof givingtheCorsicanpeople thesortoflibertythatwas beingsowidelydiscussedin metropolitanFrance.And despitetheirdifferences,he didnotconcealhishopethat Paolimightreturnfromexile toprovidetheCorsican peoplewiththeleadership andinspirationtheynow lacked.‘General’,hewrote, withreferencetoCorsica’s lossofsovereigntyin1768,‘I wasbornatthemomentwhen ourcountryperished.Thirty thousandFrenchmenthrown uponourshores,drowning thethroneoflibertyinwaves ofblood,thatwastheodious sightthatfirstmetmyeyes.’ WhenPaolileftCorsica, wroteBonaparte,‘allhopeof happinesswentwithyou; slaverywasthepriceofour submission;oppressedbythe fettersofthesoldier,thejurist andthetaxcollector,our fellow-citizensfind themselvesdespisedbythose whoadministerthem’.And whilethepurposeofhisletter wasmodest–toseekPaoli’s approvalforthehistoryof Corsicawhichhehadwritten duringhisperiodsofleisure fromthearmy–thelanguage inwhichheexpressed himselfandthebluntnessof hiscondemnationofFrench ruleimpliedthat,inthenew politicalcontextprovidedby theoutbreakofthe Revolution,hehadnotlost hisyouthfulfaithinthe patriotleader.5Thathestill wrotetohimmayseem surprisinginviewofPaoli’s earlierpoliticalcareerand Napoleon’sowndecisionto throwinhislotwithFrance. Itwasscarcelythelanguage ofaloyalofficerinthe Frencharmywhose commitmenttothecauseof theFrenchpeopleseemed unquestioning. ByJune1789that commitmentwasindeedfirm, buthekepthiscontactsin Corsica,whereheappearsto haveretainedpolitical ambitionsofhisown.Asthe sonofanotablelocalfamily, recentlyreturnedfromthe mainlandandwellconnected tothemostprominent politicalfactionsonthe island,Napoleonenjoyed somethingofapublicprofile. Asmentionedbefore,since receivinghiscommissionhe hadspentmoretimein Corsica,throughaseriesof extendedleaves,thanhehad inFranceitself. BySeptember1789he wasbackinAjaccio,engaged inpoliticswithother membersofhisfamily, helpingtoformalocalunitof theNationalGuard, welcomingPaolibackfrom exile,andestablishinga patrioticclubonthemodelof thepopularsocietiesthat werebeginningtoappear acrossFrance.Locally,public opinionwasvolatile,readyto respondtooutsidechallenges andaggravations,andnews ofdevelopmentsinFrance onlyservedasacatalystfor furtherdemands.Popular angerwasarousedbyhigh grainpricesandthescarcity ofbread,asitwas everywhereintheFrench provinces,buttheangeralso reflectedmoreparochial Corsicanconcernsandsocial antagonismsinheritedfrom theancienrégime.Corsica usedthelanguageofthe FrenchRevolutiontoexpress itselfpolitically,butits leadersanditspolitical prioritieswereoftenspecific totheCorsicannation.The youngarmyofficer, Napoleon,knewhowto appealtolocalinterestsand tointerpretthefactional politicsoftheRevolutionon theisland. Enthusiasmformore radicalpoliticscamewith newsofthefalloftheBastille andoftheNightof4August, whenmembersofthe privilegedordershad excitedlyforswornprivilege beforeapackedsessionofthe NationalAssembly.Thecity ofBastia,inspiredbythe Corsicandeputytothe Assembly,Christophe Saliceti,cametobeseenas oneofthemostradicalised citiesinprovincialFrance.6 Byreturningtotheisland, Napoleonwasableto exerciseapoliticalinfluence thatwouldhavebeendenied himonthemainland.Buthe wasalsoabletounderstand therealityofCorsica’s politicsandtheconservative positionofmanyCorsicans.It wasthisthatledhimto understandthathefaceda choice,andultimatelyto breakwithPaoli.Italsoledto hisfirstandmostpolemical politicalpamphletinthe Corsicancontext,hisLetterto MatteoButtafocoof1791,in whichhemadeclearhis unshakableattachmentto FranceandtoFrenchideas.7 HecastigatedButtafocofor hiscontinuedadherenceto monarchyandtofeudal values:‘Yourfavouriteplan’, hewroteaccusingly,‘wasto shareouttheislandbetween tenbarons.Notcontentwith helpingtoforgethechains withwhichyourcountrywas restrained,youwantedtogo furtherandsubjectittothe absurdregimeoffeudalism!’8 Inbothhisrhetoricandhis politicalideas,theyoung Bonapartedisplayeda passionthatwasnolonger capableofentertainingany hintofcompromise;hehad becomeacommitteddevotee oftheRevolution,evena convincedrepublican,and thereforeontheradicalwing ofrevolutionarypoliticsata timewhenFrancewasstilla constitutionalmonarchy. AlreadyinJune1790,in Ajaccio,hewasdrivenbyhis radicalconvictionstosupport popularactionandparticipate directlyinapopularuprising. Thisexpressionof revolutionaryenthusiasm couldonlydriveafurther wedgebetweentheyoung armyofficerandhiserstwhile hero,Paoli,whoseantiParisianposturingswere increasinglycomingtobe identifiedwiththepolitical Rightandtherejectionof republicanism.9 Intheearlyyearsofthe Revolution,duringwhichhe continuedtoenjoylong periodsofleavefromhis regiment,Bonapartedivided histimebetweenFranceand Corsica,findinginspirationin theideologicalandpolitical changesvotedininParis whilepushingforwardthe revolutionarycauseonhis nativeisland.Heretherewere signsofpragmatismtowhich othermembersofhisfamily, inparticularhisbrother Lucien,were temperamentallyunsuited:a desiretoappeaseopposing factionsandaccommodatean increasinglyintransigent Paoli.ButwhereNapoleon hadnointentionof compromisingwasoverthe completeintegrationof CorsicaintoFrance–a processthatwasconcluded bythedecreeof20January 1790–andthepolityofthe FrenchRevolution. Increasingly,hemovedaway fromhispreviousCorsican patriotismtoadoptthenew revolutionarymodelthatwas emanatingfromParis.There wasnolongeranyplacefor eitherautonomyor independencefortheisland, nospecialstatuteor devolutionaryconcession:it wastobeadepartmentof France,likeanyotherareaof theinterior. TheCommitteeof Divisionrecognised, however,thatCorsicadid presentuniquechallenges:it hadsufficientterritoryto justifyitsdivisionintotwo departments,whereasithada sparsepopulationthatcould beencompassedinone. Besides,therewerefew townsofanysizeonthe island;itseconomywas underdeveloped,anditwas divideddownthemiddlebya chainofmountains.Finally, theNationalAssembly concludedthatCorsicashould beasingledepartment,with itsadministrativecentrein Corte,butdividedintonine districtsinordertotake accountofitssocialand economicdiversity. IntegrationintoFrance,itwas hoped,wouldhelpendthe excessivepovertyand depopulationthat characterisedCorsicanlife, andprovidethebasison whichtobuildaprogramme ofeconomicregeneration.10 Inacceptingthislogic, Napoleoncouldnotbutlose thesympathyoflarge sectionsoftheCorsican electorate.Itmeanttaking sideswiththeFrenchagainst mostoftheCorsican warlords,foremostamong themPaolihimself,now alliedtotheBritishinwhat wasbecominganinternecine fightbetweenpowerbrokers andbanditleaders. ForNapoleon,itwasa dangerousenvironmentin whichtooperateandaneven moredangerousoneinwhich toleavehismotherwithher tribeofyoungchildren,and theBonapartefamilydidnot emergeunscathed.Bythe summerof1793theyfound themselvescaughtincrossfire betweentheopposing factions,andthefamilyhome inAjacciowasattackedand pillaged.Letiziaandher childrenwerewarnedbya friendlybanditleaderthatit wastimetogetout,andthey rapidlyfoundthemselves reducedtothestatusof refugees,homelessand pennilessandhurriedly leavingtheislandforthe southofFrance.Itwasa harrowingmoment:the motherandheryoungfamily, scurryingthroughthenightto theprotectionofaFrench ship,oneofseveralhundred Corsicanfamiliesforcedto fleetothemainland, abandoningalltheir possessionstobepillagedby Paoli’shenchmen.Theytook refugeinthesmalltownof Saint-Maximin,notfarfrom Toulon,withthehelpof fundsobtainedthroughthe goodofficesofSaliceti.11It hadbeenadisturbingand disruptiveexperience,and thoughhewasnottherein person,Napoleonwasdeeply affectedbyit.Hewashurt andbruisedbyhisrejection fromhisownpeople,while thememoryofhisfamily– fearful,shiveringandreduced totemporaryindigence– wouldcontinuetohaunthim. Intheearlyperiodofhis career,Napoleonfoundthe desireoftherevolutionary authoritiestopasssweeping measurestorenewthefabric ofthenationrefreshingand energising.Hewasa convincedbelieverinthe benefitsofmeritocracyand applaudedtheboldnessofthe revolutionariesinabolishing nobility,sellingchurchlands andreformingasociety rootedinprivilege.Inprint, hemockedthecorruptionof theoldorderandlambasted theprivilegedidlenessof manymembersofthe nobility;andtherewas nothinginhisactionsto suggestthathewas disaffectedwiththe revolutionaryregime.Hedid notemigrate;hecontinuedto serveinthearmy;hetookthe oathofloyaltytothe constitutionof1791.12With thepassageoftime,however, hisletterssuggestagrowing disquietattheviolenceand extremismofsomeelements ofthepopulation,in particulartheJacobinsand thePariscrowd.InJune 1792,inalettertoJoseph,he quotedLafayette’smoderate stancewithobviousapproval, andsidedwiththearmy againstthemoreradical factionsintheAssembly. Lafayettehadwrittentothe Assemblywarningofthe extremismoftheJacobin Club,awarningthat Napoleonfound‘very powerful’.Hewentonto explainthat‘M.deLa Fayette,amajorityofthe officersinthearmy,all honestmen,theministers, andthedepartmentofParis areononeside;themajority oftheAssembly,theJacobins andthepopulaceareonthe other’.TheJacobins,in Napoleon’sview,were ‘madmenwhoarelackingin commonsense’.Theyhad abusedLafayetteandhad stirredupthecrowd;indeed, theydidnothesitateto promotepopularviolence. Onlyadayortwobefore,he noted,anarmedcrowdseven oreightthousandstronghad forceditswayintothe Tuileriesanddemandedan audiencewiththeKing, forcinghimtodrinktotheir causeandtowearared libertycap.Whenheheardof Louis’humiliation,Napoleon wrotethatsuchactionwas bothunconstitutionaland dangerous.Thecrowdwas armedwithaxesandpikes, sticksandguns;andallthat theNationalGuardcoulddo wastostandbytomakesure thattheKingwasnotharmed. ‘Itremainsverydifficultto guesswhatwillbecomeofhis authorityinsuchastormy atmosphere.’13 Althoughheremaineda Frenchpatriot,seemingly committedtothe revolutionarycause,herehe wrotewiththeuneaseand confusionofamanwhofelt thathewasbeingovertaken byastreamofeventswhich werechangingthepolitical landscapebeforehiseyes.14 Inparticular,thatimageof thecrowd–threatening, insultingandvolatile–was onethatremainedwithhim throughouthislife.Hemight havebeenaJacobinin Corsicanpolitics;butbackin Francehecomesacrossasa moderaterepublican,aman oforder,protectiveof authority,andwithanabiding distrustofpopularviolence. Hewasalso,ofcourse,a careerofficer,withaneyeon promotionandakeen concernforhisposition withinthearmy.Politics, evenCorsicanpolitics, remainedsecondaryto militaryquestions,andfrom 1792theconditionofthe armybecamemorepressing withthedeclarationofwar againstAustriaandPrussia, tobefollowedthenextyear byitsextensiontoinclude BritainandSpain.TheFrench militaryseemedpoorly equippedtotakeontherest oftheEuropeancontinent,in largemeasurebecausethe armywhichhadservedthe Bourbonmonarchywasso ill-suitedtothedemands placedonitbythe revolutionaries.Theofficers, aswehaveseen,wereall drawnfromthenobilityand hadtakenapersonaloathof loyaltytothemonarch. Wouldtheyfightwithequal alacrityforthesovereign people–especiallyafterthe Kingwassuspendedandput ontrialandthecountry turnedintoarepublicin September1792?Theanswer quicklybecameobvious: nobleofficersresignedtheir commissionsduringthefirst yearsoftheRevolution,many passingdiscreetlyacrossthe AlpsorthePyreneestospend therestoftherevolutionary decadeinpoliticalexile.By 1792,athirdofarmyofficers hadalreadytenderedtheir resignations,oftenin responsetoparticularstimuli –theabolitionofnoble privilege,theendingof seigniorialdues,the institutionofconstitutional monarchy,ortheexampleset bytheKingwhenhefled fromParisinJune1791,only tobeinterceptedbythe NationalGuardat Varennes.15 Themoraleofthemenin therankswasoftennotmuch better.Wholeregiments mutiniedin1790atNancy, Perpignanandelsewhere,in protestagainstlowpayand poorconditionsofservice; othersagain,senttoimpose orderduringcrowdtroubles andmarketdisturbances, madeitclearthattheir sympathieslaywiththe peopletheyweresupposedto police.IftheRevolutionwas tocreateanarmythatwould becapableofdefeatingthe finestregimentsinEurope, andonethatwasnotwholly incompatiblewiththevalues andideologyoftheregime, root-and-branchreformwas urgentlyneeded.16Thearmy oftheBourbonshadfailed toooftenintheEuropean warsoftheeighteenth century.NowFrancewould beplungedintoaseriesof conflictsthatwouldseethe greatpowersofEuropejoin forcesagainstherina successionofcoalitionsthat wouldlast,almostunabated, forovertwentyyears;warsso costlyanddrainingofthe country’sresourcesthat historianshavecompared themtotheGreatWarof 1914–18andbeentemptedto callthem‘thefirsttotal war’.17 Warwasnotimposedon Franceagainstthewishesof herleaders;indeed,those whospokeoutagainstitwere largelyconfinedtoradicals likeMaximilienRobespierre, whofearedthatitwould leavethedooropento counter-revolutionand conspiracyathome.Hiswas aminorityvoiceinlate1791 andtheearlymonthsof1792, whenmanyinParis clamouredforwar,seemingly confidentthatthe revolutionaryspiritofthe Frenchpeoplewouldmake theirarmiesinvincible.Or else,likesomeoftheKing’s ministers,theysoughtwarfor tacticalreasons,toincrease royalauthorityanddeflect attentionfromfailuresat home.ButtheAustrianand Prussianleaders,too,had everyreasontowelcomea warwithFranceatamoment whentheFrencharmywasso obviouslyweakenedthat victoryseemedassured.The firstengagementsinthe summerof1792confirmed theworstfearsoftheFrench commanders;aftertheir armiescapitulatedatLongwy andVerdun,theroadtoParis layunprotectedforthefirst timesincetheseventeenth century.France’sfrontiers werebreachedandthe Revolutionitselfwas endangered,spreadingboth rumourandpanicinthe streetsofthecapital.The situationwassaved, temporarilyatleast,by doggedFrenchresistanceat ThionvilleandMontmédyin theeast,andbythefailureof theDukeofBrunswick’s Anglo-Prussianarmytopress homeitsadvantageovera poorlytrainedFrenchforceat ValmyinSeptember.Itwas notaclassicmilitaryvictory –someninehundredlives werelostoneachside–but theAustrianarmyscattered, Pariswassaved,andValmy wentontoenjoyaspecial placeinFrenchrepublican mythology.18 Thoughthenewarmywas graftedontothelinearmy inheritedfromtheoldregime, itwouldprovetobeavery differentanimal,bothinthe ranksandintheofficer cadres.Before1789soldiers wererecruitedforlong periods,usuallyfromamong thepoorestandmostrootless membersofsociety;they werepressedintoserviceat fairsandmarkets,luredbya signing-onbounty,ortrawled frompoorhousesandprisons. Manyweremercenariesfrom othercountries,pressedinto theserviceoftheFrench king.Voltairewasnotalone indismissingthemenwho foughtinEurope’sarmiesas thelowestofthelow,the dregsofcivilsociety.But thesemethodswere insufficienttoprovideeither thenumbersthenewarmies required,ormenwhocould betrustedwiththemissionof defendingtheRevolutionand thenation.From1791, therefore,therevolutionaries calledforvolunteers;by1793 theyweredemandingmass leviesfromacrossthe population;andin1799they turnedtofull-blown conscriptionwithouteventhe possibilityofbuyinga substitutetofightinone’s place.Theprofessional backgroundandsocial configurationofthetroops changeddramatically,andthe army,forafewshortyears, becamepredominantly Frenchasthegovernment reliedonitsownpeople where,previously,ithad boughtsoldiersfromother states.Theidealofthe ‘nationinarms’was proclaimed,andwithitthe notionthateverycitizenhada dutytoplayhispartinthe defenceoftherepublic. Forofficers,too,change wassuddenandtangible. Juniorofficerswereelected bytheirunits,andtherewas, forthefirsttime,direct promotionfromtheranks. Officerrankwasnolonger restrictedtonoblemen,but wasconferredonthebasisof experienceinthefieldand merit.Aristocraticconcepts ofhonourwerealsorevised, andwerereplacedby conceptsofpersonal internalisedhonourandby thereputationoneestablished withone’speers.19Because ofthehighturnoverof officers–boththroughheavy casualtyratesinbattleandas aresultofresignationsand emigration–promotioncould comerapidlyandatavery youngage.Recognitionwas theretobewonforthosewith flairandtalent,andanew generationofofficers,men likeHocheandMoreau,did nothingtoconcealtheir professionalambitionortheir thirstforglory.They identifiedstronglywiththe FrenchRevolution,with Frenchpatriotism;theydid nothidetheirrepublican sympathies;theysought patronsamongthecountry’s politicalelite,andthey competedtoservetheNation atthehighestlevel. Prominentamongsuch officerswasNapoleon Bonaparte,whocamebackto Francein1793toreportfor dutywiththeFourthArtillery regiment,stationedinNice. Therehewasfortunatetofind ashiscommandingofficer JeanduTeil,whosebrother hehadknownduringhis earlygarrisondutyat Auxonne.Napoleonquickly gothimselfnoticed,andhe wasassignedtoAvignonto organiseammunition supplies.20 Thepoliticalclimatein Francewastenseinthe summermonthsof1793,a perioddominatedbyan uncompromisingstruggle betweenthetwoprincipal republicangroups,the GirondinsandtheJacobins, whichendedinviolenceand theJacobinseizureofpower. Duringthisperiodthe governmentfoundits authoritychallengednotonly bytheforeignarmiescamped alongthefrontiersbutalsoby dissensioninmanypartsof theFrenchprovinces. Alreadyinthespringa Spanishforcehadbroken throughinCataloniaand brieflycapturedthecityof Perpignan,whileinthenorth Dumouriezhadabandoned hisarmyandgoneovertothe Austrians.21IntheVendée andalongthevalleyofthe Loirethecountrysidehad eruptedintoopenwarfare, withacounter-revolutionary forcedeclaringitselfloyalto ChurchandKing,defyingthe Revolution’srecruitment demandsandunitingthe greaterpartoftheWest againstthegovernment.It wouldtakemilitary interventionandruthless repressiontorestorelawand ordertotheregion. Meanwhile,severalof France’slargestcitieshad riseninrevoltinthesummer againstwhattheysawas oppressionfromParis,with CaenandBordeaux, MarseilleandLyonalltaking backtheirshareofnational sovereigntyanddeclaringthat theynolongerfeltboundby thedecisionsofthe republicanassemblyinParis, theNationalConvention.It wasAugustbeforemostof theserevolts,condemnedby theJacobinsas‘federalist’ andaimedatdestroyingthe unityoftheRepublic,could besuppressed,andthe retributionthatfollowedwas oftenbloody.Thereweresix hundredexecutionsin Marseille,twothousandin Lyon,asthesecitieswere restoredtotheauthorityof thestate.Rightacrossthe Miditheatmosphere remainedhighlycharged. Wasthereadegreeof cynicisminNapoleon’s professedrepublicanismand hispreparednesstoidentify withJacobinslikeSaliceti, whohadshownfavourtohis familyandhelpedtoadvance hismilitarycareer?Werehis expressionsofpolitical attachmentsalsoexercisesin opportunism?Whileitis clearthatheremained sympathetictomanyofthe idealsoftheRevolution,itis impossibletodismissthese accusationsentirely.Hewas consciousoftheimportance ofpatronageandshowed himselfskilfulinusingit.He tookcaretopayduehomage tothoseinpoliticalauthority, andsuchattentionshelped bringhisnametothenotice oftheCommitteeofPublic SafetyinParis.Andevenat thisearlystageofhiscareer heshowedsymptomsofthat giftforself-publicitythat wouldbecomesoimportant intheyearsahead.Itwould bewise,therefore,to approachNapoleon’spublic utterancesonpoliticswitha degreeofcaution–especially themostfamous,Souperde Beaucaire,thepamphlet whichhepublishedwithin weeksofhisreturntoFrance. Itisinmanywaysaworkof theromanticimagination,a dramatiseddiscussion betweentheauthor,asoldier inthearmyofGeneral CarteauxintheMidi,and threeothercharacters,from Marseille,Nîmesand Montpellier,whohad witnessedthepolitical convulsionsinthesouthand livedthroughthefederalist interlude.Butinit,healso takescaretoshowhisown politicalcoloursby denouncingtheextravagant ambitionsoftheMarseillais inchallengingtheauthority ofParis,andbywarningof theconsequencesthatawait themiftheycontinuetodefy theforcesoftherepublic. Theworkisnotableforthe openexchangeofviews whichitpresents,evenviews favourabletotherebelcities, thoughinevitablyitisthe opinionofthesoldierandthe pragmaticpatriotismof Napoleonhimselfwhich emergestriumphant.He makesitallsoundsoeasy. ‘Shakeofftheyokeofthe smallnumberofrascalswho areleadingyouintocounterrevolution’,headviseshis newfriendfromMarseille; ‘re-establishyourlegal authorities;acceptthe Constitution;givethe deputiesbacktheirfreedom, sothattheymaygoupto Paristointercedeonyour behalf;youhavebeenmisled, anditisnotnewthatthe peopleshouldbemisledbya smallnumberofconspirators; sincethebeginningoftime theignoranceandcompliance ofthemasseshavebeenat therootofmostcivilwars’.22 Itmaysoundlikecommon sense;butitwasalso extremelypartisanadvice, andexactlywhatParisand theJacobinswantedtohear said. Carteauxsucceededin retakingMarseilleon24 August,andterrorandmass executionsfollowed.The lessonwasclearlyspeltout thatthegovernmentwould toleratenofurtherdissent fromprovincialrepublicans, andthatinsurrectionwould bemetwithsevere punishment.Thecapitulation ofMarseilleleftonlyone majorcityintheMidiinthe handsoftherebels:Toulon, themainMediterraneannaval port,wherethefederalist authoritiessoughttoensure theirsafetybyhandingover thedockyardandtheport installationstotheBritishand Spanishfleets,amovewhich wasseenbyParisasacraven actoftreacherythatmustbe defeated.Itspotentialto inflictcatastrophicdamageon theFrenchnavycannotbe doubted.WhentheRoyal NavyandAdmiralHood reachedToulontheyfound anchoredintheGrandeRade, equippedandreadytosail,a Frenchfleetofseventeen shipsoftheline,fivefrigates andelevencorvettes. RefittingintheNewBasin wereafurtherfourshipsof thelineandafrigate;whilein theOldBasin,invarious statesofrepair,wereeight moreshipsoftheline,five frigatesandtwocorvettes. Hoodwaspresentedwiththe opportunitytoknockoutata strokeamajorpartofFrench navalstrength,thoughinthe eventtheBritishandtheir Spanishalliesleftthejob onlyhalfcompleted.Manyof theshipssurrenderedat Toulonwererepairedand wouldsailagainunderthe Frenchflaginlater campaigns,23buttheFrench wereinnopositiontoforesee thisoutcome,andthey respondedwithapredictable showofforce.Inthelater summerof1793Carteaux’s army,aroundtenthousand strong,wasdirectedagainst Toulonanditsrebel authorities. Theexpeditionagainst ToulonpresentedNapoleon, newlypromotedtotherank ofcaptain,withhisfirst majoropportunitytoimpress hissuperiorsintheheatof battle.Toulon,protectedbya seriesofdetachedforts,was oneofthestrongestdefensive positionsinEurope,yet Carteauxhadonlya weakenedarmyandwoefully inadequateartillery.Inall,he hadafewfieldguns,two twenty-four-pounders,two sixteen-poundersandafew mortars;hehadexpectedto attackbybombardingthe Alliedfleet,butthatproved tobebeyondtherangeofhis guns,andtheFrenchplans seemedhighlyflawed. Carteauxwasabraveand experiencedofficer,buthe wasnoexpertintheuseof artillery,andhefailedtogive hisgunnerssufficient resources.Thiswas Napoleon’sopportunity.He intercededwiththedeputieson-missionfromthe Convention,explaininghis tacticalideasandstressing theadvantageofsurpriseand thevalueofartillery,given thetopographyofToulon. Andthoughmanyinthe militaryremaineddubious aboutthesetactics,the deputiesgavehimtheir support,andNapoleonwas rewardedwiththepostof ‘commandantoftheartillery ofthearmybeforeToulon’, anappointmentthathe interpretedasgivinghim absoluteautonomyoverthe artilleryanditsdeployment. Athiscommand,gunsand supplieswerequicklyshipped infromacrossProvence, gunnersweretaughttoman them,andyoungofficers learnedtotakecommand.His planwastotaketheEnglish positionsandgaincontrol overtheroadswithout resortingtoasiege;he preferredtotakeadvantageof themanoeuvrabilityofhis lightartilleryandtodirect maximumfireattheEnglish redoubttodislodgethem fromtheirpositionofstrength onthehilltopofLeCaire.24 Executingthisplanwas necessarilyriskyand involvedgreatfeatsof bravery,butonthenightof 16DecembertheBritishwere finallydislodgedfromtheir fort,andonthefollowingday theRepublicansentered Toulon.PhilipDwyerisright tonotethatinthedispatches fromthecitytheprincipal creditisgiventothe commandingofficers,most notablyDugommier,thenew commander-in-chief.25But thevictorywasNapoleon’s, andhistalentcametothe noticebothofhisarmy superiorsandhispolitical masters.Hewasrewarded withpromotiontotherankof brigadier-general(généralde brigade). TheRevolutiondemanded notonlytalentfromits officers,butalsopolitical loyalty.Thepolitical leadershiphadhadtoomany painfulexperienceswith officerswhoproved untrustworthy,socially conservative,orwhose loyaltywastothekingorto theCatholicChurchbeforeit wastotheFrenchpeople. Thereislittlereasontodoubt thatNapoleon’sreputationas agoodrevolutionary,evenin somecirclesasaJacobin, helpedsecurehisrapidrise. Toulonhadbeenahighly politicalcampaign,thesiege ofaFrenchcityinrevolt,an actinacivilwarwhichpitted Frenchmanagainst Frenchmanandwhere politicaldisaffectioncould easilyleadtodefectionor treason.That,too,hadits dangers.Inthesouth-east Napoleonreliedonhis standingwith–and,toa degree,hiscultivationof– severalkeyJacobins,among themdeputies-on-mission fromParis,whosereputations wouldbescarredbythe brutalityoftherepressive measuresunleashedagainst Toulononcethecity surrendered.Attheheightof theTerroritwasclearly usefultohavemenlike FréronandSaliceti,Paul BarrasandAugustin Robespierre,amonghis cheerleadersandprotectors. ButwhentheJacobinswere intheirturntoppledbya palacerevolutioninthe ConventionontheNinthof Thermidor(27July1794),the politicallandscapewas transformed.Theyounger Robespierrewassenttothe guillotinewithhisbrotheron thefollowingday;while BarrasandFréron,after successfullyconspiring againstRobespierre,scurried torealignwiththeantiJacobincause. Napoleonfoundhis politicalpositiondangerously exposed,andhisfriendship withAugustinRobespierrea particularsourceof embarrassment.Forafew dayshislifemayevenhave beenindanger:hisarrestwas orderedonachargeof treason,andhespenta fortnightunderhousearrest. Heexpressedhisoutrageina lettertodeputies-on-mission tothearea,protestingthatthe chargethathungoverhim wasanattackonhishonour andreputation.‘Declaringa patriotsuspect’,hedeclared, ‘robshimofhismost preciousattributes,public confidenceandesteem’.26 Butthemomentofcrisis passed,thanksonceagainto theinterventionofSaliceti andtothepraiseheapedon himbyhisarmycommander. Napoleoncouldpointtothe sacrificeshehadmadeforthe Revolutionandthesupporthe hadprovidedinpursuitofits goals.Hecouldalsoshow thathiscontributiontothe fallofToulonhadbeena purelymilitaryone,andthat hehadnottakenpartinthe oftengratuitouscrueltythat followed.Intheeventhewas exoneratedanddidnothave tostandtrial.27 Therevolutionofthe NinthofThermidordidnot immediatelyabolishthe1793 constitution;noryetdidit underminetherepublican characteroftheregime.What itdiddowastopurgethe Conventionofthosedeputies mostcloselyidentifiedwith thepoliticsoftheTerrorand toridFranceofthe exceptionallawsand jurisdictionsthathaddefined it.Infact,theregime remainedstronglyrepublican, intolerantofthearistocracy andtheclergy,and profoundlycommittedtothe idealofasecularstate.Over sixtyofMaximilien Robespierre’sclosestallies werepurged–purgingwasa favouredploy,thefigurative cleansingofthebodypolitic –yetsomeofthemenwho hadservedundertheJacobins werecalledbacktooffice, whilemoremoderate republicans,amongthem manywhohadsympathised withtheGirondins,resumed politicallife.Ontheother hand,thenewregime remainedsuspiciousofthose whomitadjudgedtobe taintedwithterrorism,orwith violencethathadbecome closelyassociatedintheir eyeswithJacobinextremism. Theiraimwastoendthe spiralofrevolution,todraw upanewandlasting constitution,endthestateof emergency,andcreatea republicanstabilitywhichso farhadeludedFrench lawmakers.28 Thearmy,becauseofthe dangeritposed,was subjectedtoclose surveillance,andofficers deemedtoocloseto Robespierrewere investigatedorstooddown, especiallythoseradicalsansculotteswhohadbeen promotedin1793and1794. TheThermidorianslooked insteadtoappointmenof provenmilitarytalent,but alsomenonwhomtheycould depend,whowouldnot questiontheirordersand couldbetrustedtofightinthe nameoftheRepublic.This wouldbecomeevenmore pressinginthemonthsthat followedwhentheregime wasthreatenedbymilitary plots–fromtheRightas muchasfromtheLeft–and thearmywasexposedtothe blandishmentsofroyalists andcounter-revolutionaries. Itwasimperativethatthe officerclassshouldremain loyaltorepublican institutionsatatimeof increasingpolitical turbulencewithinFrance, whentherevoltintheVendée hadnotyetbeenextinguished andpopularviolence threatenedinParis. Afterhissuccessin Toulon,Napoleonmighthave hopedtoprofitfromthenew order,buthiscareerwas anythingbutassured.He dreamedofspreading revolutionarywaracrossItaly andencouragingthepeople ofGenoatothrowoffthe yokeoftheHouseofSavoy. Butthiswasnotthe government’saim,and LazareCarnotassignedthe Italiancampaigntoolder,less headstronggenerals,leaving Napoleonoutinthecold,his futureuncertain.Thenew MinisterofWar,Aubry, showedparticularvigilancein removingthosewithknown Jacobinsympathies,and despiteinterventionsonhis behalf,Napoleonwasdenied thecommandhefelttobehis due.Andwhenhedidreceive anassignment–tocommand aninfantrybrigadeinthe civilwarintheVendée–he madenoefforttohidehis disappointment,protesting abouttheunsuitabilityofthe postingandevenengagingin abitteraltercationwith Aubrywhichhemusthave knownhecouldnotwin. Therewaslittleglorytobe gainedfromthecampaignin theVendée,essentiallyby thisstageafinalclearing-up operationagainstthelastof therebels,andNapoleonfelt littleenthusiasmforthekind ofworkitentailed.Hedidnot gototheWest,buttook refugebehindpermissions andsicknotes,stayingonin Parisintothesummerof1795 withsuchfellowofficersas JunotandMarmont,and enjoyingtheartisticand sociallife–theatreandopera, salonsandcafésociety–that thecityoffered.His enjoymentwasnot,however, unqualified.Whathereally aspiredtowasmilitaryaction andacommandinItaly. Hewasrescuedfromthis enforcedidleness,andfrom facingapossiblechargeof insubordination,bythe intercessionoffriendsand politicalallieswhowereto playanincreasingly importantpartinhiscareer. Themostsignificantofthese wasPaulBarraswho,like himself,hadstartedoutasan officer-cadetintheroyal armyofthe1780s,before resigninginfavourof marriageandtherather spendthriftlifestyleofa youngnobleman.Withthe adventoftheRevolution, Barrashadthrownhimself intoradicalpolitics,getting himselfelectedtothe Conventionandvotingforthe King’sdeathin1792.Inthe followingyearhewasin Toulon,asaJacobindeputyon-mission,whenhe encounteredBonaparte,was impressedbyhiscourageand temperament,andpromoted himtocaptain.Thetwomen remainedongoodtermsafter BarraswasrecalledtoParis, whereheplottedagainst Robespierreandhelpedto overthrowhim,takingpower himselfasoneofthefive Directorsin1795.Hewould proveavaluableand powerfulally:hetrusted Napoleonandhelpedto advancehiscareer.29 InAugust,Barras’ interventionledto Napoleon’sappointmentto thenewTopographical Bureauofthearmyunder GeneralClarke.Thiswasa groupthathadresponsibility forstrategicplanningand whichreporteddirectlytothe CommitteeofPublicSafety. InNapoleon’seyesthiswas nomorethanastop-gap appointment,butatleastit mightserveasastepping stonetosomethingbetter,and itdivertedhim,atleast momentarily,fromthoughts ofresigninghiscommission. Hisangeranddepression returned,however,lessthana monthlaterwhenhefound thathisnamewasomitted fromtheofficialarmylistof generals.30Thesewere nervousanddeeply unsatisfyingmonthsin Napoleon’smilitarycareer, monthswhenhismoralewas atitslowestebbandwhenhe seemstohavecontemplated suicide.31 Yetbytheendof1794his prospects,andwiththemhis temperament,hadmuch improvedand,thanksagainto hispoliticalprotectorBarras, hiscareerseemedtobeback ontrack.Theoriginsofhis changedfortuneswereonce againpolitical,asthe Conventionwasfacedwitha popularuprisinginParisin Vendémiaire(5October),the latestinaseriesofpopular journées,daysofriotingand violencethatmarkedthe historyofthecapital throughouttheRevolution. Thesejournéesgenerallytook theirnamefromthemonthin whichtheyoccurred,as expressedinthenew revolutionarycalendarwhich theRepublichadintroduced in1793inabidtorationalise thedivisionoftime.Notonly wasthenewcalendarstripped ofallreligiouscontext;italso purportedtobemorelogical andscientific,withtheyear dividedintotwelvemonthsof thirtydays,andeachmonth subdividedintothreeten-day units,ordécades.Sundays andSaints’dayswere abolished,andFrenchmen werenowgivenonedayoff inten,onthedécadi,which provedscantcompensation. Butitwasnotpurelya propagandisticdailyreminder tothepopulationthatthey werelivinginrevolutionary times.TheJacobinGilbert Romme,whohadproposedit totheConvention,tookpains totiethecalendartothe astronomicalyear;eachyear wouldbeginon22 September,whichhadboth naturalandideological significanceasthedateofthe autumnequinoxaswellasthe startoftheFirstRepublic. Interestingly,thecalendar outlastedtheRepublicand remainedinuseuntil1806 when,persuadedthatFrench commercewassufferingfrom timedifferencesacross Europe,Napoleonreturnedto thesameGregoriancalendar whichtheRevolutionhad abandoned.32 Thedisturbancesin Vendémiairehadtheirroots, aswassooftenthecase,in thegovernment’sfailureto controltheeconomy,leading touncontrollableinflation andhighbreadprices.Seven ofthecity’ssections–the forty-eightlocaldistrictsinto whichPariswasdividedin 1790andwhichnow controlledlocalpolitical assembliesandunitsofthe NationalGuard–roseinarms againstthegovernment.The differencethistimewasthat thecrowdwasmanipulated bytheroyalistRight,notthe JacobinLeftasattheheight oftheTerror,sothatthe Republiconceagainwasin peril.Tomakemattersworse, theNationalGuardseemed likelytojointherebels,thus increasinglevelsofviolence andleavingshopsandhomes unprotected. PaulBarrashad responsibilityforpublicorder inthecapitalanditwashe whoorderedtheregulararmy tosuppresstheinsurrection; heturnedforsupportto formerJacobinsand convincedrepublicansofthe kindwhohadbeenlargely excludedaftertheNinthof Thermidor.Napoleonfellinto thatcategory;besides,Barras knewhim,andadmiredhim forhistacticsinToulon. Napoleontookfulladvantage oftheopportunityhewas given,takingcareto demonstratehisvaluetothe government.Heresponded efficientlyandeffectively, showingatVendémiaireboth thetacticalabilitytocurb civildisorderandaclinical concerntomaintainthe peace,evenatconsiderable costinhumanlife.Tothe Thermidorianadministration heprovidedevidencethathe wasamanwhowouldnot flinchbeforeunpleasantor sensitivemissions:several hundredParisiansdiedinthe fighting,andNapoleonwould longbeidentifiedinthe capitalas‘Général Vendémiaire’.Itwasthefirst timetheRevolutionhadused thearmytoquellpopular agitationinParis,andits impactwasbothimmediate anddramatic.Thedaysofthe revolutionarycrowds,as GeorgeRudéremindsus, were‘overformanya year’.33Thepolitical landscapeinthecapitalwas permanentlyalteredby Napoleon’s‘whiffof grapeshot’,sincethearmy wouldremaininoccupation throughouttheyearsofthe Directorywhichfollowed.As forNapoleon,hehadproved himselfthemanofthe momentandinasingleday reconstitutedhisfailing militarycareer. Napoleon’smonthsin Parisweresignificant,too,in hispersonallife:duringthis periodwelearnfarmore abouthissentimental relationswithwomenthanis knownofhisearliercareer.It istruethathehadwritten someratherponderousprose aboutthenatureoflove, ratherinthesamestyleashis earlyenlightenedwritings. Butatthistimeweknowthat hebecameromantically involvedwithDésiréeClary, thesixteen-year-olddaughter ofasoap-merchant,whomhe hadmetinMarseille.His correspondencewithher revealsasensitiveromantic spiritthathadpreviously remainedlargelyconcealed. Inhislettersthereisa pleadingqualitywhich suggeststhathewaspining forhercompanyandseeking reassurancesofherloveand fidelity;thoughthereismuch, too,thatseemsrather stereotypedanddrawnfrom theworldofliteraryconceit. InAprilthepairapparently becamebetrothed,though theirrelationshipwasnever straightforward,andwas complicated,notleastinher father’seyes,whenhewas facedwithasecondproposal ofmarriagelinkingthetwo families,betweenDésirée’s oldersisterJulieand Napoleon’sbrotherJoseph.34 IntheeventNapoleon’s fondnessforDésiréedidnot resultinmarriage,thoughhe wouldcontinuetovisitherin Marseille,whereasJoseph andJulieweredulymarried inAugust1794.Napoleon seemsnottohavebeentoo upsetbytheoutcome. Marseillewasalongway fromParis,where,duringhis monthsofleisure,hissocial horizonswerebeing considerablywidened. ItwasinParisthathewas inductedintometropolitan highsocietyandaworldof clubsandsalons,andofsalon hostessessuchastheactress ThérésiaCabarrus.She,by then,wasMadameTallien, who,asthewifeofaleading Thermidorianpolitician,was wellconnectedtothecream ofFrance’spolitical leadership.Itwasatimeof extravagantballsandparties, glamorousdressesand exaggeratedcoiffures;atime whenParisiansocietydanced atthewhimofthejeunesse doréeandswoonedbeforethe merveilleuses.Napoleonin laterlifewoulddenouncethe sumptuousfashionsandthe extravagantexpenditure,as wellasthesocialelitismand disdainforordinarypeople, thatwerecharacteristicof theseyears.Headmittedto friendsthathehadoftenfelt ill-at-easeinhighsocietyand thatheattimesfeltshunned byaworldwherehisrough Corsicanaccentand occasionallyclumsymanner withwomenhadnoplace.In comparisonwithothers,he believed,hewasunluckyin love. Perhapshewas.Buthedid makefriendsinParis,and evenfemaleconquests.The mostspectacularofthesewas ayoungwomanofCreole stock,RosedeBeauharnais, sixyearshisseniorandnowa widow,whosehusband Alexandre,aformerpresident oftheNationalAssemblyand oftheParisJacobins,had beenguillotinedtheprevious yearforallegedlyallowing Mainztofalltotheenemy. Rose–bornMarie-JosephRosedeTascherdeLa Pagerie,onasugarplantation inthecommuneofTrois-Ilets inMartinique–belongedto theminornobilityofthe island;herfather,JosephGasparddeTascher,had cometoMartiniquefromthe Perche.35Rose,too,mightbe thoughtvulnerabletoarrest asaformernoble:indeed,she hadspentsometimeinprison attheheightoftheTerror, andonbeingreleasedshe seemstohavethrownherself intoagiddyroundofballs andparties.Napoleonsawher frequentlyatMadame Tallien’shouseandat Barras’shome;hequickly fellforherbeautyandher noblebearing,theauraof balancedcalmwhichheso muchadmired.Incontrast, DésiréeClary,rathercruelly perhaps,wouldfindherself rejected,lefttofallbythe wayside.Rosewasnowthe soleobjectofNapoleon’s desire,thepersononwhom helavishedhisloveand attention.Itwashewhotook tocallingher,affectionately, Josephine,andbyMarchof thefollowingyear,1796,they wouldbecomemanand wife.36 Napoleonhadfoundthe partnerhehadsolongcraved, andhislettersoverthe followingyearswouldleave littledoubtthathiswasa genuineloveaffair,onethat wouldsurvivethelong absencesthatanofficer’sway oflifeentailed.37Josephine’s feelings,however,remain somethingofamystery,as shewrotefewlettersand showedlittleinterestinhis, sometimesnotevenbothering toopenthestreamof passionateeulogiesthathe senther.38Herinterest,it seemed,waslessinNapoleon asamanthaninhiscareer, hispotentialsuccess,and whatsheassumedwouldbe hisfuturewealth–inshort, thesocialkudoswhichher associationwithhimwould bestow.Thereislittle evidenceofaffectiononher part,farlessofloveor devotion.Whenshemet Napoleonshewasdrifting roundtheParissalons,her reputationsomewhat damagedbyaseriesofshorttermromancesandone-night affairs.Nordidsheshowthe leastinclinationtofollowhim toItaly,preferringtoremain inthebeaumondeof DirectorialParis.Noneof this,ofcourse,helpedto reassuretheBonapartefamily –particularlynotLetizia– whodidnothingtohidetheir disappointmentwithhisnew bride. ButneitherNapoleonnor Josephinewastobedeterred. Heclearlywasinfatuated withherandwasblindtoher faults.AsforJosephine,she hadthemarriageshehadset outtoachieve.Shehad shownlittlehesitationin acceptingtheadvancesofthe young,ratherdashing Corsicangeneralwhose charmwasspicedwith unpredictabilityandperhaps justawhiffofdanger.39 Bonapartecertainlywould notdisappointherambitions. Thewidowofthedisgraced revolutionarygeneralhad alreadytakenherfirststeps onaroadthatwouldleadher totheimperialthrone. 4 BonaparteinItaly HowevermuchNapoleon Bonaparte’sthoughtsmight turnbacktoParisandto Josephine,thesewouldbe yearsofrelentless campaigningfortheyoung general–campaigningthat kepthimawayfromFrance forlongperiodsoftime. Fromlate1795hismilitary careertookoffquite dramatically.Thelong monthsofenforcedidleness inParis,andhistendencyto depressionandmelancholia thataccompaniedthem, becameanincreasingly irrelevantmemory.Forwhile therepressionoftheroyalist insurrectioninVendémiaire maynothavebeentruly significantfromthe viewpointofmilitary strategy,whatitdid demonstratewashis willingnesstoservethe politicalleadershipoftheday loyallyandunswervingly, evenagainsthisownpeople. Hisperiodofdisgrace–his refusaltoserveinthe Vendée,evenhisabrupt removalfromthelistof officers–wasnowover,and thegossipandcalumnythat hehadsuffereddamagedhim less.Buttherumours persisted,somuchsothaton SaintHelenahecould reminiscethatoncehe becameamajorpolitical figure,hewasstillattacked forhispartintheTerror,with odiousclaimsmadeabouthis responsibilityforthe bloodlettingatToulon.To answersuchlies,hedeclared, woulddegradehimfurther,so heremainedaloofandsilent, takingsolaceinthe promotionsandtheshowsof publicesteemthatrained downonhim.1 Ontheverydayofthe insurrectionhehadbeen restoredtohispreviousrank ofbrigadier-general,and madesecond-in-commandof theArmyoftheInterior. Beforethemonthwasout,a ratherjitterygovernment, preparingtoapplythenew constitutionandmakeway fortheDirectoryand desperateforanarmyon whomitcouldrely,rewarded Bonapartewithfurther responsibilities.Firsthewas promotedtotherankof généraldedivisioninthe artillery,hiscommand extendedtoafulldivision ratherthanasinglebrigade; then,onlytendayslater,he foundhimselfpromotedfora secondtime,togénéralen chefoftheArmyofthe Interior.Forthisposthe remainedinParis,sincethis wasthearmythatdealtwith incidentsofinsurrection, publicdisorderandcounterrevolutioninFranceitself.It wasahighlysensitiveposting inpoliticalterms,onethat mightatanymomentinvolve fightingandkillingfellow Frenchmenindefenceofthe Directoryandtheinterestsof theFrenchstate.Theposition couldnotbeentrustedto anyonewhoseloyaltywasin anywaysuspect.Thus,from beingarelativelyobscure youngofficerwhose reputationstemmedlargely fromasolitarysuccessat Toulon,Napoleonsuddenly foundhimselfinapositionof realpowerinthearmy,a positionwhichreflectedhis politicalsupportandwhich attractedenviouslooksfrom thosewhofeltthemselves outmanoeuvred.2 October1795wasamonth ofheadychangeanda seeminglyvertiginousrise, thoughhisletterstoJoseph seemcalmandfactual, betrayinglittleofthe excitementhemusthavefelt ortheambitionwithwhichhe issooftencredited.‘Youwill havereadinthepublicprints everythingthatconcernsme’, hewroteon11October, shortlyafterhisfirst promotion.‘Ihavebeen appointedbydecreeas second-in-commandofthe ArmyoftheInterior’.Then, inthenextbreath,headded thewords‘Barrashaving beenappointedcommanderin-chief’.PaulBarraswas Bonaparte’spatron,his supporterinthecorridorsof power,avoiceandasource ofintercessiononwhomhe believedthathecouldrely. Barraswasimportanttohim, asthecontinualreferencesin hiscorrespondencewithhis brothersurelydemonstrate. On20October,hediscusses theelectionsthatarebeing heldtorenewtheConvention, showinghiscloseinterestin thepoliticsofthemoment andnoting,quitespecifically, that‘Barras,Chénierand Sieyèshavebeenselectedin severaldepartments’.He himself,hesays,without complaint,isbeingkeptvery busy;hisresponsibilitiesare preventinghimfromwriting atgreaterlength.3Buthe clearlyenjoysthem,relishing thetrustthathasbeenplaced inhim,andkeepingaclose eyeonthepolitical manoeuvresinthecapital.On 1November,forinstance, afterbarelydrawingbreathto tellJosephthathehasbeen placedincommandofthe ArmyoftheInterior,heturns onceagaintothepolitical situationinParis:‘The councilsof250and500have nowmet.Thefirstofthese hasalreadydrawnupitslist ofcandidatesforthe Directory’,hetellshim, adding,almostincidentally, thatamongthosenominated wasPaulBarras.4Thetoneof hiscorrespondencewith Joseph,thebrotherwith whomhehadmostin commonandwithwhomhe wasmostlikelytosharehis feelings,showsnotashrill triumphalism,butaquiet satisfactionwithhischange offortuneandarealistic concernforthepolitical futureofthenation.Nothing intheseletterswassuggestive ofvaultingambitionorofthe politicalcareerthatlayahead. Perhapsluckilyforhis militarycareer,Napoleondid notstaylongwiththeArmy oftheInterior,whichwasin somewaysapoisoned chalice,arolealwayslikely tobeseenbytheRepublic’s enemiesasideologically driven.Reliabilityandloyalty totheDirectorywere paramount,andin Bonaparte’scasewereonly accentuatedinthepublicgaze byhisassociationwith Barras,amanwidelyseenas lackingrealpolitical principle,amanipulatorand power-mongertaintedbya suspicionofcorruption.In ParisNapoleonhadnochoice buttobethegovernment’s man.Duringtheshortperiod ofhiscommandthere,he orderedtheclosureofthe neo-JacobinPantheonClub, supervisedthepolicingofthe theatres–oneofthe traditionalfocalpointsof oppositionpolitics–and purgedroyalistsandrightwingersfromtheWar Ministry.5TostayinParistoo longwouldofnecessitymean acloseidentificationwiththe regime,onethatwouldrisk himlosingpopularityand publicesteem.Inthe meantime,Frencharmshad chalkedupsomenotable successesalongthefrontiers, sothatawarwhichhad startedoutasadesperate defenceoftheRepublicfrom theassaultsofitsneighbours hadturnedintooneof invasion,occupationand annexationbyatriumphant Republic. Francehadfirstaimedto securethenaturalfrontiersof theRhineandtheScheldt, whichhadbeenthe traditionalforeignpolicy objectiveofeverymonarch sinceLouisXIVandhad essentiallybeensecured undertheJacobins. Thereafter,themainfocusof attackwastheGermanlands acrosstheRhine,electorates andcitystateswhich progressivelycameunder Frenchdomination.Byearly 1796,theFirstCoalitionhad largelycollapsed,sothatonly Austria,Britainand, somewhatwaveringly, Piedmontremainedatwar withFrance.The internationalsituationhad swungdramaticallyin France’sfavoursincethe desperatedaysof1793,when theSpanishhadbesieged Perpignanandthe Conventionhadhadtoturn itsarmiesagainsttherebels oftheVendéeandthe federalistsofLyon. TheWarMinister,Carnot, sawexpansioneastofthe RhineasFrance’sprimary target,overrunningthe varioustemporaland ecclesiasticalterritoriesthat blockedtherouteofthe advancingarmies,annexing somedirectlytoFrance,and elsewherecreatingaseriesof bufferstates,orsister republics,inwhatarenow BelgiumandHolland.Most oftheterritoriestheyentered, fromAachentoMainzto Cologne,hadbeenpartofthe nowbadlyfadingHoly RomanEmpire,andhence dependentonAustrianarms fortheirdefence.Itwasfor thisreasonthat,inthespring of1796,Carnotdreamtof openingupanotherfrontin ItalytoattackAustria’s possessionsbeyondtheAlps –especiallyMilanandthe richLombardplain.Anew ArmyofItalywas established,aforceofsome fiftythousandmen,to complementthemainFrench armiesinGermanyandattack theAustriansintheirnorthern Italianfastnesses.Itwasto thecommandofthisarmy thatBonaparte,doubtlessto hisconsiderablerelief,now foundhimselftransferred.His ambitionsforanItalian offensivewerewellknownin Paris,andBarraswasonce againinstrumentalinpressing theclaimsofhisprotégéwith thepoliticalleadership.For Bonaparteitwasthechance toopenanewphaseofhis career,offeringhimthe possibilityofvictory,of riches,andofmilitaryglory. Lookingback,hewouldsee thismoveascritical,since therecouldhavebeenno futureforhiminParis.‘A younggeneraloftwenty-five couldnotremainanylonger attheheadoftheArmyofthe Interior’,wastheterse, almostdismissiveepitaphon hisfirstcommandthathe wrotetwentyyearslater.6He wasperhapstwenty-sixrather thantwenty-fiveinthespring of1796,butotherwisehis assessmentsurelystandsasa measureofhisrestless ambition. Itisdifficultnottobe struckbytheenormityofthe riskthattherevolutionary authoritiesseemedtobe takinginchoosingtheyoung Corsicanforhisfirst operationalcommand. Bonapartemightbefavoured atcourtbyBarrasandhis immediatecircle,butthatwas hardlyaguaranteeofsuccess onthebattlefield.Hewasstill onlytwenty-six–notinitself adisadvantageinthe revolutionaryarmy,which hadsomethingofatradition ofpromotingitsofficers young–buthewaslittle knowninthehighcommand, hehadnofieldexperience, andhisonlyprevious campaigninghadbeenagainst uprisingsandinsurrections insideFrance.Itmightnot seemthemostappropriate preparationfortheplainsof Lombardyorthesteep mountainpassesoftheAlps, wherebarbets–guerrilla troopsindistinguishablefrom thebanditgangsfromwhom theywererecruited–waited toambushtheadvancing Frencharmies.Yetnotallthe augurieswereunpropitious. By1796theFrenchwerein theascendantinGermany, havingprogressedfrom defencetooffenceduringthe monthsoftheTerrorandnow pushingeastwardsbeyondthe Rhine.AndtheArmyofItaly, thoughdeemedtheleast importantofFrance’sfive armiesandhencetheleast favouredinmattersofsupply andequipment,hadatleast themeritofbeingundefeated onthebattlefield.Itslow moralewasduetohungerand neglectratherthantomilitary experience. Napoleonwasaware,too, ofotherproblemshemight facewithhisownarmy.The productofarevolutionary amalgamein1793,ithad broughttogetherinthesame unitslinesoldiersfromthe 1780s,triedandbattlehardenedintheserviceofthe King,andthevolunteersand requisitionedmenofthe revolutionarylevies. Disciplinecouldoftenbelax, andthecommitmenttodrill andtraininguncertain. Besides,theArmyofItaly hadnecessarilybeenthrown togetherhastily,withsoldiers transferredfromotherfronts which,astheFrenchhad learnedintheVendée,was notalwaysaprovenmeansof assemblingthebestandmost committedtroops.7Intheory Bonapartehadoversixty thousandmenathisdisposal, butinpractice,theirnumbers decimatedbydiseaseandthe fatiguesofwar,theyseldom amountedtomorethanthirtyeightthousandfitforactive service.Atanyonetime manythousandswereabsent, sentbacktoFrancetohasten theirrecovery.8Thismeant thattheywere,numericallyat least,nomatchforthe Austriansandthe Piedmontesewithwhomthe newyoungcommander wouldhavetoengage.Nor weretheywellequippedor supplied.Here,asinmanyof theFrenchrevolutionary armies,toolittleattentionwas paidtomilitarylogistics; thereweretoofewcartersand horses,andinsufficientmules tocarryheavysuppliesacross theAlps.Therewerereports oftroopswithoutshoes, deprivedofadequatestores, andpaidmonthsinarrears. Supplyproblemsboth underminedmilitary effectivenessanddrainedthe soldiers’morale.9 Butweshouldnotdwell overlyontheshortcomingsof thesituationNapoleon inherited,fortherewas promise,too.Itsleaderswere menwho,likehimself,had achievedtheirpromotionson meritratherthanthrough birthright.Napoleon understoodtheirattitudesand commitment,qualitiesthathe waspreparedtodevelopand exploitsincehecametohis commandimbuedwithmany ofthereformistinstinctsof thelatereighteenthcentury, theredraftingofmilitary ideasthathadbeeninitiated bysuchnotedauthorsand practitionersasGuibert, ServanandGribeauval.He feltunconstrainedbythe moreconservativetacticsof theBourbonarmy,believing insteadinthevirtuesofrapid movementandthetacticsof surprise,whichhefound especiallyvaluableasa responsetotheslow-moving andlargelypredictable Austrians.Napoleonwaswell awareoftheweaknessesof theAustrianarmythatwas rangedagainsthim,andhe believedthathecouldexploit them:ashortageofofficers comparedwiththenumbers intheranks,aformalismthat couldleadtoalackof flexibilityonthebattlefield, andarathercumbersome administrativestructure.The Austrianarmymovedslowly andstolidly,inparttheresult ofitslaboureddecisionmakingand communication.10 Healsobelievedquite unshakablyinhisown judgement,inhisinborn talentasastrategistonthe battlefield,andthisbelief enabledhimtobeboldand incisiveinhisdecisionmaking.Onceinstalledatthe headofhisnewarmy,helost littletimeinimposinghis authorityonthoseunderhis command,inparticularonthe olderandmoreexperienced officerswhosurroundedhim, andwhomighthave maintainedtheirowncliques andcoterieshadtheybeen givenanyleewaybytheir newcommander.He impressedthemwithhis knowledgeandbentthemto hiswill,avitalstepifhewas tomaintainunityintheranks andguaranteeasingle, effectivecommand.Andhe gavethemresponsibilityin battle,responsibilitywhich theyoungerofficers,in particular,acceptedwith relish.ForItalywasnotjust thesceneofsomeof Napoleon’sgreatesttriumphs; itwasalsothebreeding groundforfuturemarshalsof theimperialarmylike AugereauandLannes, SérurierandMasséna,who servedunderhimas divisionalcommanders. Butitwasnotjusthis officerswholearnedtotrust hisjudgement;Napoleon also,andfamously,tookgreat caretocultivatethemenin theranks.Hedidnotforget thattheytoohadfearsand frailties,andhesoughttowin theiraffectionanddevotion, playingonhisimageasa generalwhohadrisen throughtheranksandwho sharedtheirfearsand apprehensions.Hemadeclear tohistroopsjustwhathe expectedofthem.Heset beforethemclearmilitary objectivesandstrategicgoals; andheknewhowtoflatter themwhenflatterywas requiredtogivethemtheselfbelieftheysobadlyneeded. Anarmythathasnotbeen paidandlacksadequatefood suppliescannotbeexpected torespondtohollowappeals topatriotism,ashewell understood.Soheharassed suppliersandmilitary commissioners,exacting suppliesforhismen;in March1796,forinstance,he notedwithsatisfactionthat severalcompanieswerenow activelyprovidingsuppliesof meat,grainandhayforhis troops,whilesixteenhundred muleswerearrivingtoassist theartillery.11 Heturnedtooratory,too, inpersuadinghismenthat theyhadageneralwhowas oneofthem,whosharedtheir hardshipsanddiscomforts andwhounderstoodtheir everydayconcerns.Ina speechtothetroopswhichhe latercraftedintoaresounding –butsadlyapocryphal– declaration,hedescribedthe plainsofLombardyasaland ofconquestwheretheywould findalltheriches,allthefood anddrinkthattheycould dreamof.Hiswordshave becomefamous–or,atleast, thewordsthathelater recordedforposterity: ‘Soldiers,youarehungryand naked.Thegovernmentowes youmuch;itcangiveyou nothing...Iwanttoleadyou intothemostfertileplainson earth.Richprovinces,great townswillbeinyourpower; thereyouwillfindhonour, gloryandriches.’12Itwasnot quiteaninvitationtoplunder, butitcameclose.Itwasa messagethatanunpaid,ill- nourishedsoldierwould surelyappreciate.Later,as thearmypreparedtheassault onMantua,hewouldadd anotherpromise,thatof peace:‘ThepeaceofEurope, thehappinessofyourparents, thesewillbetheresultsof yourcourage.Letusdoonce morewhatwehavedoneso ofteninthepastandEurope willnotchallengeourclaim tobethebravestandmost powerfulnationonearth.’13 Buthedidnotpromise richesalone;healso emphasisedthathewould leadthemtohonourand glory,whichcouldonlyresult fromsuccessinthefield.For soldiers,victoryisnotjust aboutmedalsandpromotions, thoughNapoleonwasquick topromisethese,too.Itwas alsothekeytosurvival.Like allsoldiers,everywhere,they admiredageneralwho lookedaftertheirneedsand rewardedthemwithvictory onthebattlefield,largely becausevictoryraised morale,reducedcasualties andsavedneedlessslaughter. BeforearrivinginItalyhe hadstudiedboththe geographyofthecountryand pastcampaignsthathadbeen conductedinthattheatreof war.Hehadalsotakenthe firststepsinsecuringthe coasttrafficonwhich militarysupplywould depend,14andverysoonhe wouldachieveadazzling reputationasageneralinthe field.Indeed,itwasthe Italiancampaignthat providedNapoleonwithhis credentialsasagreatmilitary leader,amanwhocouldturn abattlebybrillianttactical deployment,asharp-witted strategistwhocouldreada battlefieldlikeabookand outpacehisopponent.Itwas notthathistacticshad fundamentallychangedfrom traditionalOldRegime armies:thecompositionof thearmieswaslittledifferent fromthatintheSevenYears War;theirweaponry remainedlargelyunchanged, andthedrillmanualswerethe sameasunderLouisXV. Whathadchangedwasthe speedofFrenchmanoeuvres andoftheirresponseto attack,alightningspeedthat repeatedlytooktheenemyby surpriseandwhichlayatthe veryheartofNapoleon’s battleplan.Itwouldunderpin anunprecedentedseriesof victoriesasNapoleonthrust intoLombardy,firstdefeating thePiedmontese–thus endinginthespaceoftwo weeksastubbornwarof attritionthathadlastedfour years–beforeturningagainst themainAustrianarmy.15 Tacticallyitwasan impressivestart:hemoved hisarmyspeedilyand incisively,takingadvantage ofitsgreatermanoeuvrability andtheresorttolighter artillerytocutoffenemy advancesandmountsurprise attacks. Hehadhadtoactquickly. TheAustrianstriedtopre- empthisoffensivewitha surpriseattackthatresultedin Napoleon’sfirstrealbattle,at Montenotte,on10April 1796.Victoryhere,andthe seizureofthestrongholdsof Alba,FossanoandCherasco, notonlycementedtheselfbeliefoftheFrenchbut providedthemwiththe suppliesandprovisionsthey sobadlyneeded.Theythen crossedthePoandtookthe importantcrossroadscityof Alessandria.Forthe Austrians,too,the psychologicalimpactwas important,for,evenifthe Frenchusuallyensuredthat theywentintobattlewith superiornumbers,thisseries ofdefeatssappedAustrian moraleandlefttheir commandersdejectedand bewildered.Theyhadlostthe fortressesthatcouldslow downtheFrenchadvance, andhadlefttheroadtoMilan exposedandundefended. Besides,newsofthisrapid seriesofdefeats,combined withthefearspreadbylurid storiesoflootingandplunder bytheFrencharmies,led KingVictorAmadeusof Sardiniatosueforpeace,and towithdrawhisarmyfrom thecoalitionagainstFrance. AsNapoleontoldhis victorioussoldiers,theyhad achievedgreatthings: winningsixvictories,taking enemypositionsand capturingtherichestpartof Piedmont.Theyhadtaken fifteenthousandprisonersand killedorwoundedmorethan tenthousandmen.Andthey haddonesoinconditionsof greatdeprivation.‘Youhave wonbattleswithoutcannon, crossedriverswithout bridges,madeforcedmarches withoutshoes,drinkor bread.’16Buttheywerenot finished.Milanwas Napoleon’snextobjective, thecaptureoftheLombard capitalbeingseenasa decisivestrikeagainst Austrianpowerinnorthern Italy. TheFrenchmarchon Milanwasinterrupted, however,byanAustrian defenceofthebridgeatLodi, overtheriverAdda,and battlewasjoined.For posterity,thiswouldbecome oneofthekeyengagements oftheyounggeneral’s militaryrise,andNapoleon himselfwouldmakemuchof it.Buthistoriansareagreed thatthiswasarelatively minorbattle,involvingsmall forcesandcomparatively containedlosses;andifit mustcountasavictory,with theFrenchleftincontrolof thebridgeandthetown, Bonapartedidnotachieveall hisobjectives.Hisarmyhad beenheldupontheirmarch, andtheAustriancommander, Beaulieu,managedtoescape withhistroops;Lodicannot besaidtohaveendedthewar inLombardy.Ontheother hand,Bonapartecouldnow enterMilan,whileMurattook Genoa.Bytheendofthe year,hehadtakenModena, signedatreatywithNaples, andsecuredVerona.Hehad alsoengagedtheAustriansin themoreconclusivebattleat Arcola,thesiteofanother bridgewhichhiscampaign wouldmakefamous,andtook thetownafterthree exhaustingdaysofcombat. Thewargroundon throughoutthewinter betweentwotiredand batteredarmiesuntil,in February1797,Napoleon playedhismastercardat Rivoli,dispersingthe Austriansintothe surroundingmountainsand capturingtheheavily defendedforttownof Mantua.Theconsequences weredecisive.AnAustrian garrisonofthirtythousand mensurrendered;Napoleon forcedthePopetosigna treatyatTolentinowhereby heagreedtoofferAustriano furtheraid;andhemadeasif tomarchagainstVienna itself.AtfirsttheAustrian Archdukerefusedanytruce orofferofpeace,butinApril hereluctantlyacceptedthe termsthatNapoleonheldout tohim.TheAustriansagreed tocedeBelgiumandHolland toFrance,alongwiththewest bankoftheRhineandthe IonianIslands;theyalso agreedtorecognisethe Cisalpinerepublic,thesister republicwhichNapoleonhad fashionedoutoftheAustrian landsinLombardy.Backin Paristhesetermswerehailed astestimonytothebrilliance oftheyounggeneral,though therewerethoseinItalywho feltthatthetreatyhadbeen drawnuptoimpresspublic opinionbackinFrance,with littleconcernforItalian interests.Inparticular,there wasangerthatVenicehad beensacrificedinthepeace negotiationsbybeinghanded backtotheAustrians–some wouldevenusetheword ‘betrayed’–sothatthedeal couldbequicklysewnup. Thepeacetreatywas finalisedthefollowing autumnatCampoFormio–a rareinstanceofadiplomatic treatyseeminglydictatedbya generalinthefieldwithout referringbacktoParis.17It wasamomentthat demonstratedNapoleon’s impetuousnatureandhis disdainforconventional nicetiesorquestionsof diplomaticprecedence.In conductingpeace negotiationshewascertainly exceedinghisauthorityasa general.Butitalsohintedat somethingelse:politicalas wellasmilitaryambition.He waskeentoachievea settlementandtopresent Pariswithadiplomaticcoup toaddtohismilitarytriumph, atriumphthatwouldshow himinanewanddifferent light.Alreadyhehadforgeda highreputationasasoldier. Nowhewasalsoadiplomat andapeace-maker. ItwasinItalythat Napoleonestablishedhis claimstomilitarygenius,in hisownmindasmuchasin themindsofthosewho servedunderhim.Afterhis victoryatLodi,hewould laterrecount,‘Inolonger regardedmyselfasasimple generalbutasamancalled upontodecidethefateof peoples.Itcametomethen thatIreallycouldbecomea decisiveactoronournational stage.Atthatpointwasborn thefirstsparkofhigh ambition’.18Andthoughthis mayseemanimplausible claim–therewereplentyof hintsbeforeLodithatthe youngBonapartehadalready haddreamsoffuture grandeur–itjustifiescloser examination.Forwhathad Napoleonachievedatthis earlystageintheItalian Campaignthatcouldturnhis headtothisextent?Whatdid Lodimeantohim?Inmilitary termsitisalmostcustomary todismissthebattleasa minorengagement,yetit cametobeattheheartofthe Napoleonicmythwhichhe himselfdidsomuchto propagate.Itwasahard- foughtbattle,butnotamajor engagementofthetwo armies.Andyetitwasafirst successfulillustrationofthe rapiddeploymentwhichwas Napoleon’sownversionof Blitzkrieg,andassuchit couldbeseentohavehada widersignificance. TheEnglishmilitary historianSpenserWilkinson, whodoesnothidehis admirationforBonaparteasa tactician,describesthe significanceofLodiin unambiguousterms,claiming that: Thefourweeks’campaign thatendedatLodirevealeda greatcommander.It containedthegerm,andmore thanthegerm,ofallhis futureexploits.Itexemplified allhisprinciples:theoriginal distributionofthetroopsinto threegroupsorcampsabout twelvemilesdistantfromone another;theirswift concentrationbyaforward marchbegunbeforedawn; theseizureofacentral positionfromwhichtostrike theseparatedportionsofthe enemy;theaimatthe enemy’scommunications;the spreadingofthedivisionslike anettoenclosetheenemy’s flanks;thedrawinginofthe nettoenveloptheenemy;the combinationofafrontal attackwithasurpriseattack ontheflank;theuseofariver tomaskamovementagainst theenemy’srear;the collectiononthebattlefieldof asuperiorforce;aboveall, theunprecedentedrapidityof movement,andtheincessant, never-endingenergyofthe action.19 IfWilkinsonisright,then itisnotdifficulttoseewhy Napoleonattributedsuch greatimportancetothebattle, noryetwhytheItalian campaignofferedhimsuch opportunitiesforbuildinghis reputationbackinFrance, bothwiththeDirectoryandin theeyesofawiderpublic. Theprocessof mythologising,whichwould consumemuchofNapoleon’s energythroughouthiscareer, hadalreadybegun. Ofhismanyachievements duringtheItaliancampaign, hisadroitmanipulationofthe newsandhiscommandof propagandawerearguablyas significantashisskillsonthe battlefield.Alreadyhewas demonstratingacommandof wordsandanappreciationof theimportanceofheroic imagesthatwouldnothave shamedapoliticalleaderofa muchlaterandmoremediaconsciousage,acapacityto chooseatellingphrase,or spinastoryinaparticular waythatwasguaranteedto capturethepublicmoodof themoment.Hissenseofthe popularpulserarelydeserted him;inthatsense,asinmany others,hewouldprove himselftobeasingularly modernfigureinanageof authoritarianmonarchs, narrowlydefinedelitesand restrictedelectorates. Notably,oncehewas establishedinpower,he wouldmanipulateboththe artsworldandthemedia, settingthetopicsforart competitions,leaningheavily onjournalists,orrestoringthe monopolyoftheParisbook trade.Foramanwhohad claimedinhisyouthtobea truesonofthe Enlightenment,hewould showapowerfuldesireto controlexpression,andhe tooklittleinterestin encouragingfreespeech. In1796inItalyhisinterest inthemediawasrather different.Hesoughttobolster hispublicimage,tolayclaim toheroicstatus,andto establishhimselfinthepublic imagination.Andhebelieved thatthevariousmediathatlay athisdisposalhadan importantmilitaryroleto play,whetherinappealingto civilians,dampeningenemy morale,orbolsteringthe confidenceofhissoldiers. Hisresorttopropagandawas, thenaslater,multi-layered. Addressestohistroops, proclamationstothe inhabitantsofbesiegedcities, andnewspaperarticles strategicallyplacedinthe officialParisnewspaper,the Moniteur,wereallpartsofa strategiccampaignofselfpromotion.20 Napoleon’smessagewas quitedeliberatelydirectedat differentaudiences,andfor differentpurposes,too.First andforemostwasthearmy itself,whereBonaparte showedhimselftobea creativepublicist,usingwellchosennewsstoriestobestow praise,raiseconfidenceand improvemorale.Themilitary presswasnothisinvention: theRevolution,and especiallytheJacobinyears, hadseentheriseofatradition ofnewspaperswrittenbyand forthearmy–paperslike Carnot’sSoiréeducamp, whichdistributeditshighly politicalmessageamongthe troopsinallofFrance’s armies,andthemorelocal papers,limitedintheirnews andcirculationtoasingle army,andoftenasingle frontier.Thepapersfed upbeatreportsof developmentselsewherein thewar;soldiersreadthem eagerly,andtheyplayeda significantpartinspreading confidenceandreassurance.21 During1797Napoleon himselfcreatedandfinanced twosuchpapers,bothwritten fromwithinthearmy–first theCourrierdel’Armée d’Italie,then,somedays later,themoreephemeralLa Francevuedel’Armée d’Italie,bothofwhich circulatedamongthetroops, thoughtheywereaimedalso atapoliticalreadershipand excerptsandarticleswere reprintedfromtheminthe Parispress.22 Thepapersweresubtly differentintone:ifthe Courriercourtedthenew revolutionaryelite,heissued asecondpaperspecificallyto reassuremoretraditional elementsinbothFrenchand Italiansociety.23These papershelpedtoinculcatea spiritofprideand professionalisminthetroops, andtokeepthemabreastof theprincipalpolitical developmentsbackinFrance. Inthepressthatwas producedfromwithinthe army,andalsointhe confidentproclamationshe issuedtohissoldiers, Napoleonestablisheda powerfulmediumthrough whichhecouldcommunicate directlywithhismenandstir theirdeepestemotions.This wasthetraditionalfunctionof newspapersinwartime:to reaffirmsoldiers’confidence inthecauseforwhichthey werefighting,whiletroubling andunderminingthe confidenceoftheenemy.24It requiredaspeciallanguage, onethatcreatedaspecial rapport.25 Butthetroopswere seldomNapoleon’sprincipal targetforpropaganda,evenas battlesragedaroundhim.The newspapersalsoservedto informthepublicbackhome ofthearmy’sexploitsin Italy,andindoingsothey presentedanimageof Napoleonthatcamecloseto thatoftheclassicalhero.He wasportrayedasasupreme strategistwhowouldlead themtoglory;asamilitary thinkerwhocouldoutwitany opposinggeneral;andasa mancapableofsometimes impetuousbutalwaysincisive decisionsthatcouldturna battleanddecidethefateof thousands.Asapolitical appointeehimself,fully awareofhisdebttomenlike SalicettiandBarrasforhis rapidpreferment,he understoodhowimportantit wastomakehis achievementsknownbackin Paris:hisdaringstrategies, hisblisteringtroop movements,hisdecisive victoriesintheserviceof government.Hewasastute enoughtorealisethevalueof asupportivepress,onethat wouldkeephisnameonthe frontpagesandinthepublic eye.Italywasnotthe Directory’sprincipaltheatre ofwar,andwithoutthe oxygenofpublicity Bonaparteriskedbeing relegatedfromtheheadlines, dismissedasthegeneralofa minorarmyinasecondary conflict.Hehadnointention ofallowingthistohappen. Hechoseashiseditorsmen withexperienceofboth journalismandrevolutionary politics,menwhostill retainedconnectionsinthe capital–theformerJacobin Marc-AntoineJullienforthe Courrier,andthemore moderateRegnaultdeSaintAngélyforLaFrance.26 Newsitemswere strategicallyplacedin nationalnewspapersbackin Parisatmomentsthatwould achievemaximumimpact. Thepolicywascarriedout withalmostmilitary precision.Fromthemoment whentheItaliancampaign beganinApril1796 Bonaparte’sarmyappearedin theFrenchpressmoreoften thananyotherinthefield. Itemsfeaturedintheofficial Moniteurasamatterof course,buttheywerealso placedinmorepolemical newspapers.Duringthe monthsfollowingSeptember 1796,forinstance,the conservativeNouvelles Politiques,whoseeditorialists includedthehighlyinfluential CharlesLacretelle,waswell connectedwithapowerful groupofmoderateright-wing deputiesonthelegislative councils,andwashenceseen asanidealconduitfor Napoleon’sexercisesinselfaggrandisement.27Itgave newsfromallFrance’sfronts, mentioningallfourarmies thenoncampaign.Butthe highestnumberofmentions wasreservedfortheArmyof Italy,whichwasalludedtoin sixty-sixseparateissuesof thepaperinasix-month period.Andinthirty-oneof theseBonapartewasreported asannouncingsomesortof victory.Therewerefew indicationsofdefeatsor setbacks,withtheresultthat itwasdifficultforreadersof thepapernottoassociatethe Italiancampaignwithan unbrokenseriesofFrench advances,ortoidentifyits younggeneralwithvictory andmilitaryglory.28 This,ofcourse,was Bonaparte’sintentionfrom theoutset.Usingthepapers hecontrolledorfinanced throughthearmyasa shamelesssourceofselfpromotionensuredthat,inthe bitterfaction-fightingthat characterisedDirectorial politics,hisnamewasnot allowedtobecome besmirchedor,worse, forgotten.Tointensifyhis presscampaignhelauncheda furtherpaperinFebruary 1797,withthesuggestivetitle JournaldeBonaparteetdes hommesvertueux,printedand distributedinParis.Againthe paperheapedpraiseonthe ArmyofItalyandits victoriouscommander,and madethespeedofthearmy, itsstyleofcampaigningand thebraveryofitsmenits recurrentthemes.Asfor Bonapartehimself,his despatchesarefaithfully reproduced,andhisgenius lauded.Fromtheveryfirst issuethemastheadofthe paperwasadornedwitha captioncomparinghimtoa legendarygeneralof Antiquity(`Hannibalsleptat Capua,whereasBonaparte doesnotsleepinMantua’).29 Italsotalkedoftheenemiesit waschallenging:royalists, withwhomiturgedno compromise,andémigré priestswho,inBonaparte’s view,couldsafelybeleft aloneastherewasnolaw againsttheirpresenceinItaly. Fromtimetotimethepaper didnothesitatetocriticisethe Directory,ortocomparethe inactivityofFrance’s politicians,andtheir corruption,withthevigour andincisivejudgementof Napoleonhimself.30The paperwasrightlyseenasfar morethanavectorof informationtoanadmiring public.Itwasamouthpiece forBonaparte’sgrowing politicalambitions,withthe qualitieshedisplayedinItaly beingvauntedasthoseofa leaderandvisionary,aman ofgrandeuranddestiny. Healsoturnedtothe talentsofothers,ofartistsand menofletters.Poetsused theirliterarylicenceto burnishhisimage,using wordslike‘invincible’and ‘immortal’inodesand eulogiesaddressedtohim, whileonthebattlefieldhis impactwaspresentedas immediateandalways decisive.AfterArcola, indeed,theunbeatenarmy wastransformedintoan unbeatableone,withthevery appearanceofBonaparte sufficienttodeterminethe outcome.Hewasbeing recreatedasaprovidential figure,theimageattheheart oftheMythoftheSaviourof lateryears.‘Enemiesflee, kingssurrender,everything evaporatesandtremblesat theverysoundofhis name.’31Whatpoetscoulddo inprint,playwrightscould provideforthestage,forthe worldoftheParistheatre whichhadbecome,duringthe Revolutionandthe ThermidorianRepublic,a hotbedofpartisanpolitics andsatiricalattack.Evenat thisearlystageofhiscareer Bonapartetookanactive interestintheParistheatre, andwasawareofthe significanceofhis representationthere.Theyear 1797alonesawawholeraft ofplaysaboutBonaparte’s victoriesinItalyorsetaround thecapitulationofMantua,as thegloryandcolourofevents inItalywerewelcomedasa distractionfromtherather drabpoliticalscenebackin France. By1798,however,Paris theatregoerswereequally enthusiasticinlaudingthe endofthewarandthe signingofpeaceatCampo Formio.ManyinParis seemedtotireofbattlesand killing;itwastheprospectof peacethatmostvividly capturedthepublic imagination,apeacewonby militaryprowessandaspark ofindividualgenius.32The Napoleonicmythassumed newforms,ashewas increasinglyhailedasthe greatpeace-makerofhisage. Paintersandartistsalso playedtheirpartin popularisingtheyoung general’sachievementsand turninghisportraitintoa widelyrecognisableicon amongtheFrenchpublic. Althoughatthistime Bonapartelackedthe opportunityandresourcesof theimperialyears–whenhe wouldcommissionthefinest artistsinEuropeandsetthe themesforprizesatthe Academy–theglamourand excitementoftheItalian campaignwassufficientto attractpaintersandengravers toItaly,mostontheirown account,eagertopaint portraitsofthevictorious generalsandtodepictthe mostdramaticbattlescenes. Indeed,whilehewasstillin Italy,engravings,bustsand statueswereappearinginthe salonsofParis,andsome wentontobeimitatedby popularcolouristseagerto profitfromthemoodofthe moment.Noothergeneral couldcompetewithhis popularityorhisartistic exposure.InItaly,Napoleon wasabletoattracttheinterest ofseveraloutstandingyoung painters,amongthemthe MilaneseartistAndrea Appiani,andtheyoung Frenchmanandstudentof David,Antoine-JeanGros. Appianiproducedthefirst portraitoftheyoung Bonaparte,animagewhich byearly1797hadbeen engravedandwidely commercialised. AsforGros,hewas carefullycourtedby Napoleon,andmore especiallybyJosephine,and becameasortofofficial portraitist,aregularinthe elitecircle,ratherlikearoyal court,thatsurrounded Bonaparteatthepalaceof Mombello.Hisprincipal outputinthisperiodwasa seriesofportraitsofthose closetoBonaparte,most notablyJosephineand Berthier,andtheiconicimage ofBonaparteontheBridgeof Arcolethathangsinthe Louvre.33Thispaintingso pleasedNapoleonthathe offeredGrosasumof250 louistohaveengravingsofit made,andtheseinturn helpedpopularisethefuture Emperor’sportraitacross Europe.Butitdidnotappear intheParissalonuntilthe Consulate,in1801.34 ThesigningoftheTreaty ofCampoFormio,withthe congressatRastadtthat followed,did,ofcourse, bringNapoleon’smilitary activitytoanabrupthalt,and peacewasnotsomethingthat necessarilyauguredwellfor anambitiousgeneral.There wassomediplomaticworkto beconcludedandthe DirectorysenthimtoRastadt withfulldiplomaticpowers. Andnodoubthehadsome personalmatterstosortout, too.Fromthemomentheleft forItaly,threedaysafterhis marriage,persistentrumours circulatedthatJosephinedid notreturnhisaffection–she certainlydidnotreplytohis letters–andthatshewas openlyleadingthelifeofa socialiteinParis,publicly admittingherlackoffidelity toherhusbandandseeking sexualgratificationwherever itwasoffered.Bythetimeof theirreturnfromItalyshehad takenalover,ayoung lieutenantinthehussarsby nameofHippolyteCharles,to whomsheremaineddevoted foratleastanothertwoyears; shewouldbreakwithhim onlyinthesummerof1799, whileherhusbandwasaway, thistimeinEgypt.35Itall madeforanuneasy homecomingforBonaparte, despitetheprofusepraisethat wasbestowedonhimandthe adulationofthePariscrowds. Hehadafearofidlenessand adesireformilitaryaction thatmadeanyprolonged periodoffurloughhardto bear;meanwhile,thereis evidencethatsomeatleastof theDirectorswerewaryof hispopularityandhisability tomobilisepoliticalsupport. Buthowcouldhebest,and mostsafely,bedeployed? Theyfirstthoughttoplace himattheheadofthenew armythatwasbeingprepared foraninvasionofEngland,a forcethatwastoincorporate manyofthosewhohad foughtinnorthernItaly. ButinMarch1798there wasasuddenvolte-face.The ideaofacross-Channel invasionwasdropped,and theDirectorydecidedto pursueanotherformofattack onBritainandherEmpire, onethathadtheadded advantagethatthearmy’s mostoverbearinggeneral couldbesentstillfurther afield,beyondthelimitsof Europeitself.Todisruptthe BritishintheIndiansubcontinent,anewrouteto Indiahadtobefound,one thatcouldbeaccessed withoutgoingroundAfrica andtheCapeofGoodHope. SotheDirectoryturnedits attentionstotheEast,andthe Mediterranean.InAprilit decreedthecreationofthe ArmyoftheOrient,with Bonaparteasitscommanderin-chief. On19May1798,hesailed outofToulonforEgypt. 5 LureoftheOrient Thedecisiontodespatch BonapartetoEgypt,andto concentratesomuchof France’srenewedmilitary effortonacolonialwar, seemedbizarretomany, especiallysincetheDirectory haddevotedsomucheffort duringthepreviousmonthsto planningafull-scaleinvasion ofBritain.Britainhad become,forthecountry’s politicalleaders,themost dangerousanddeterminedof France’senemies,acolonial powerpreparedtouseits greatwealthtodenyFrench expansiononthecontinent andtoassumetheroleof paymasterto counterrevolutionacross Europe.Andthe circumstancesforanassault onBritainhadseemed auspicious,withevidenceof Radicalsubversionin London,thenavalmutiniesat theNoreandSpithead,and constantmurmursofrebellion fromIreland. TheDirectorshadhad goodreasontobelieve,in 1796and1797,thattheir momenthadcome,andthat theymightatlasthopeto breaktheresistanceof France’smoststubbornand affluentenemy.Theywere alreadypursuinganeconomic waragainstBritain,andthey hadbecomeincreasingly intolerantofwhatthey interpretedasBritish intransigenceoverpeacemaking,arefusalto compromiseoverFrench gainsinnorthernItalyand, especially,alongtheestuary oftheScheldt.Thiswasthe contextinwhichBonaparte hadbeenappointedtohead theArmyofEngland,andto prepareinvasionplans.But by1798therewasgood reasontofearthatthat moment–ifithadindeed everexisted–hadpassed, andthatasuccessfulinvasion ofEnglandwouldrequirethe mobilisationofhuge resourcesthatwerebeyond thecapabilitiesoftheFrench navy. Theconditionofthenavy gavecauseforalarmand Bonaparte,onatourof inspectionofthenavalports, wasquicktoconcludethat theideaofadirectfrontal assaultfromtheseawasrisky atbest,and,atworst,sadly misconceived.Ontheother hand,ashereportedtothe DirectorsinFebruary1798, therewereperhapsmore hopefulalternativestrategies forattackingtheBritishand theirinterests.Byland,he argued,themorepractical policywouldbetoattack HanoverandHamburg, whichwouldharmBritish commercialinterestsin GermanyandNorthern Europe;orbyseaEngland’s coloniesabroad,wherethe RoyalNavywouldbeless concentratedandBritain’s armiesmorestretched.The thirdstrategy,Napoleon suggested,wouldbetomount anattackontheLevantthat woulddisruptBritish commandoftheEastern Mediterraneanand‘threaten hertradewiththeIndies’.1At thismomenthegavenohint ofhisownpreference,buthe hadsowntheideainmany people’smindsthatoneway ofstaunchingtheflowof wealthtoBritainwastocut offitscommunicationswith itscolonialpossessions, especiallytherichestamong them,India.Anattackon Egyptcouldbeamechanism fordestroyingBritishpower intheIndiansubcontinent;it wouldalsoprovideFrance withadeliciousdoseof revengefortherepeated colonialdefeatsshehad sufferedatthehandsofthe Britishinthecourseofthe century.TheDirectors–orat leastamajorityamongthem –wouldseemtohavebeen convincedbythisargument, especiallysincethenumber ofshipsandmobilisationof resourcesrequiredforan attackonEgyptwasa fractionofwhathadbeen discussedforaninvasionof England. SincethereignofLouis XIVtheFrenchhad periodicallydreamedof conqueringEgypt.Choiseul hadconsidereditfollowing thelossofFrenchCanadaand ofcoloniesinIndia; Vergennes,though,had opposedtheidea,preferring toofferFrenchsupporttothe Americancolonistsagainst Britainin1778.2Bonaparte himselfwasclearlyattracted bytheideaofleadinga militaryassaultonEgypt, whetherinordertoadvance hisowninterestsorto promoteanewcolonial policythatcouldbeachieved withoutresorttoslavery.His enthusiasmforthispolicyis attestedtobycontemporaries, andespeciallythoseinhis moreintimatecircle.Oneof themostfaithfulofthesewas Bourrienne,aformer classmateatBrienne,who wentontobecomehis personalsecretaryandwho leftwhatheclaimedtobea faithfulaccountofhis master’sthoughtsand utterances,thoughmanyof thesehavebeenexposedas purefiction.3Alreadyin 1797,hehasBonaparte claiming,withapparent prescience,that‘thetimewas notfardistantwhen,ifweare reallytodestroyEngland,we mustseizecontrolofEgypt’; andwritingtotheDirectory’s newforeignminister, Talleyrand,remindinghimof thestrategicvalueofEgypt andaddingthatitwasa powervacuumwaitingtobe occupied,aterritorythat ‘belongsonlytoGod Himself’.4Whatiscertainly trueisthatNapoleonwasan earlyconverttothestrategy ofmountinganassaultonthe EasternMediterranean.Even whilehewasstillinItaly, preparingthetermsofCampo Formio,heisreportedbya muchmorereliablesource, MiotdeMelito,tohavebeen discussingapossibleinvasion ofEgypt.5 Talleyrand,everthe schemer,wasaneagerplayer inthisparticulardiplomatic game,quicklywonoverto thegranddreamofmaking theNileintoaFrenchcontrolledwaterwayandthus cuttingEnglandofffromits richestcolonialpossessions. Herealised,too,thatfor politicalreasonsitmustbehe himself,andnotBonaparte, whotookpolicyinitiatives, sincetheDirectorswere jealoustoguardpolitical powerforthemselvesand instinctivelydistrustedthe younggeneralwhohad dictatedpeacetermsat CampoFormio.Theywere not,ofcourse,sonaïveasto bedeceivedbythepolitical manoeuvresofTalleyrand, whichwerefairlytransparent, noryetbythetworeportshe submittedtothem exaggeratingthethreatposed byTurkeytojustifyaFrench attackontheLevant.6But theydidallowthemselvesto beconvincedofthevalueofa campaigninNorthAfrica, though,whentheyfinally gavetheirconsenttothe expedition,theydidsowith thedeepestmisgivings. Napoleonhadmadenosecret ofhisboredombackinParis orhisimpatienceforanother gloriouscampaign.Thelast thingtheycouldaffordwasto handthepoliticalinitiativeto theirover-ambitiousgeneral. ButwheredidNapoleon’s owndreamsoftheOrient– andhisapparentpassionfor theideaofanEgyptian adventure–originate?The wholeenterprisewasfar removedfromthemilitary worldheknew,aworldof landarmiesandlong marches,ofartilleryattacks ontownsandfortifications– aworldpunctuatedbyAlpine passesandthewideplainsof Lombardy.Nowhisarmy wouldfaceanentirely differentandveryunfamiliar landscape:alandscapeof sandanddesert,butalsoof templesandpyramids,tombs andsphinxes,andmarchesin ablazingheatthatfew Europeanshadexperienced. TheEgypttheysailed towardswasnotjustaforeign country.Itwasacultureof whichtheFrenchunderstood little,butwhichheldaunique fascinationforthem;an ancientcivilisationofclosely heldsecretsandstrange religiousrituals,locked housesandwalledcourtyards, veiledfacesandsweeping robes.Itwasaboveall,as Napoleon’sfriendand culturaladvisor,theengraver VivantDenon,observedafter landinginAlexandria,aland ofdeepsilence.Therewas,it seemedtotheFrench,no conversationinthestreets,no laughter,noscampering childrenorbarkingdogs. Egyptseemedprofoundly melancholy,unwelcoming andinward-looking,andfor manyoftheFrenchsoldiers thiswasthedominantimage theywouldretainofNorth Africa–particularlyofIslam. ‘Thefirstimagethatcame intoview,’Denonwroteof Alexandria,‘wasofavast cemetery,coveredby countlesstombsofwhite marbleagainstawhitesoil;a fewskinnywomen,drapedin long,tornclothing,werelike ghostsastheywandered amongthesemonuments;the silencewasbrokenonlyby thescreechingofkitesasthey circledoverthissanctuaryof death.’Itwasableakimage that,inthemindsofthe French,contrastedstarkly withthecolourandgaietyof theEuropeancitiestheyhad leftbehind.7 Butthatimageonlytook shapeoncetheFrencharmy hadreachedEgyptand becomeacquaintedwiththe countryanditspeople.Before theyleftFrenchsoilthereis abundantevidencethat–like Napoleonhimself–they sharedthefascinationwith theOrientthatsotypified WesternEuropeinthesecond halfoftheeighteenthcentury. Theywerenottalkingofa poorsociety,oranunderdevelopedone:Egyptinmidcenturywasarichand artisticallysophisticated nation,partoftheTurkish Empireoftheday,and carriedonaflourishingtrade withEurope,especially France.Thecountrywas famedforitsdelicatecarved woodworkanditsskilled craftculture,andvisitors fromEuropereturnedhome withtalesofopulentpalaces andbustlingmarkets,most particularlyinthecitiessuch asCairo,Rosettaand Alexandria.Cairo,indeed, wasatruesoutherncapital,a greattradingcitywith commerciallinksallround theMediterranean.Butthese privilegedconditionswere changingrapidly,a consequenceofchronic politicalinstability.Theold Egyptianempirehadlong givenwaytoruleasa provinceofTurkey,with instabilityapermanentthreat. In1766thecountrywasrent bytherisingofEmirAliBey tothrowofftheTurkishyoke andestablishhisown autocraticrule.Politicalcrisis followed:hewasassassinated in1773,resultinginfurther politicalinstabilityand economicdecline,and leading,in1786,toashortlivedattemptbytheTurkish ruler,theSublimePorte,to re-establishhisnation’s control.Asaconsequence,by thetimeNapoleonandhis menarrivedtheyfoundnot theluxuryandgeneral prosperitytheyhadread aboutinearliertravellers’ accounts,butaneconomyin tattersandapopulace reducedtodirepoverty.8 Manyhadnurturedhopesof findinganexoticparadise steepedinpreciousobjects andgildedfabrics;theywere tobebitterlydisappointed. Napoleonundoubtedlyleft Francewitharomanticised notionofwhathewould encounterandanimperial visionofthegreatcivilisation hewasabouttoconquer.His readingofhistoryhadstood himingoodstead:heknew abouttheancientcivilisations ofEgyptandPersia,justashe hadreadthegreatclassical authorsofGreeceandRome, andhewasalreadyconscious oftheawesomestephewas takingintryingtoannexan ancientempiretothe ascendantstarof revolutionaryFrance. Bonapartewasnotmodest abouteitherhistalentsorhis ambitions.Incorrespondence hecomparedhimselfto AlexandertheGreat, imposinganew,modern civilisationinplaceofone thathadbecomedecadentand outmoded.Indeed,thebelief thatWesternEuropewasan empireintheascendant, facingthelastcorrupt vestigesofpastcivilisations, wouldseemtohave intoxicatedhim.9Whenhe leftfortheOrienthetook withhimanimpressivearray ofthegreatworksofhisown century,notablythoseof Montesquieu,Voltaireand Rousseau,aswellassomeof theauthorsofAntiquity. Thesemayhavebeen predictable,thestandardtexts ofanywell-readmanofthe Enlightenment,butitis interestingthathethoughtto readthemoncampaign.He alsotooktheVoyagesof CaptainCook,oneofthe mostinfluentialtextsof explorationandthediscovery oftheexotic;Goethe’s romanticandmelancholy SorrowsofYoungWerther; and,significantly,theKoran, withwhichhesoughtto familiarisehimselfbefore beginninghistalkswiththe Egyptians.Allinall,itwasa fairlycatholicmixture,but onethatshowedaman immersedinthetransnational cultureofthelateeighteenth centuryandexcitedbyan encounterwithagreat, thoughpoorlyunderstood, extra-Europeancivilisation.10 Therewasfarmoretohis fascinationwithEgyptthana desiretocutBritainofffrom itscolonialpossessions. Hisfascinationwiththe cultureoftheOrienttook otherforms,too,andthough hiscriticshaveoftenbeen deeplycynicalabouthisreal motives,athirstformilitary gloryandanenlightened curiosityaboutoneofthe world’sgreatcivilisationscan sometimesgohandinhand. WeknowthatNapoleon’s youthfulreadingofthe Classicshadleftadeepmark onhim,andthatitwasnot outofcharacterforhimto readLivy,PlutarchorTacitus oncampaign.Norwasitso exceptional,inanagewhen theofficercorpsofEuropean armieswerestillmoulded witharistocraticvalues,for armycommanderstobe cultivated,andsometimes well-read,men.Inthe Peninsula,forinstance, Britishofficersreadthemost recentnovelsofWalterScott; whilethemostliteraryof France’sgenerals,Choderlos deLaclos,isperhapsbetter rememberedastheauthorof oneofthemostprovocative novelsoftheeighteenth century,LesLiaisons dangereuses.Laclosmay havebeenalibertineand,in theeyesofhisdetractors,a pornographer,buthewas also,untilhisdeathin Napoleon’sservicenear Naplesin1803,adedicated artilleryofficer.11Tohis contemporariestherewas nothingstrangeor contradictoryaboutthese roles.So,withNapoleon,few wouldhavepointedtoany tensionbetweenhissuccess asanarmyofficerandhis avowedinterestinthe AncientWorld,anymore thanitwouldhaveseemed strangethatanartillery officershouldclaimtobea talentedmathematician. Whatisclear,however,is thathewenttosomewhat excessivelengthstoensure thathisintellectualgiftswere recognisedbythepublic,and towinsuchesteemandkudos asassociationswithscience couldconfer.Thusin1797, followingthedepartureof Carnot–afellowartillery officer–Bonaparteassumed theseathevacatedatthe FrenchAcademy;he thereaftertookcare,whenin Paris,tobeseeninthe companyofthemost prominentintellectualsofhis day.Intheeyesofmanyof hisbiographers,andsome contemporaries,thiswasa steptoofar,adistinctionthat couldinnowaybejustified, butablatantattempttowin overFrance’sintellectual elite.12Suchcriticisms countedforlittlewith Bonapartehimself;he flauntedhismembershipof theAcademyandroutinely placed‘Memberofthe Institute’firstamonghis varioustitlesandhonours, evenbeforehismilitary rank.13 Forallthisthough,the mainobjectiveofthe Egyptiancampaignwasthe conquestofafarawayland, verydifferentfromthe revolutionarymantraof defendingthefatherland,of fightingforlapatrieen danger.Someofthemore revolutionaryofthegenerals remarkedonthis,andthereis littledoubtthatthosesuchas Kléber,whostillheldfirmly torepublicanideals,were uneasyaboutthemoralityof thisnewdevelopmentin Frenchdiplomacythat condemnedthemtofight whattheysawasimperialistic wars,warsthathadno evidentsignificanceforthe safetyoftheFrenchcivilian population.14 ButNapoleonallowed himselfnosuchdoubts.He wouldtalkafterwardsofthe Egyptiancampaignasawar conductedintheinterestsof civilisation;andinhis correspondenceatthetimehe didnotconcealhisdesireto beunderstoodbytheArab worldasthesaviourofa gloriouscivilisation.Writing fromCairototheGovernorof Syria,AhmedDjezzar,in August1798,heexplained,in apassagethatrecallsthe sensibilitiesofthe Revolution,thathewasin Egyptnottoattackthepeople ortheirbeliefsbutonlyto punishtheirrulers.‘Ihave not,’hesaid,‘cometomake waronMoslems.’Whenhe hadlandedinEgypt,he added,‘Ireassuredthepeople andofferedprotectiontothe muftis,theimamsandthe mosques.Thepilgrimsto Meccahaveneverbeen welcomedwithgreater warmthandfriendship,and theFestivaloftheProphet hasbeencelebratedwith moresplendourthanever.’15 Theintendedinferencewas clear:herewasaWestern leaderwhodidnotcomewith assumptionsofinnate superiority,whohadstudied theKoranandwouldtreat Islamastheequalof Christianity,andwhocould betrustedtorespectthe culturaltreasuresofAncient Egypt.Itmadeforapowerful propagandaoffensive,though itdidnotdeceivethe Egyptiansforlong. Therewascertainly somethingmildlyexotic aboutthemilitaryexpedition thatsetsailfromFranceon somethreehundredshipsin thespringof1798,an expeditionwhichNapoleon hadassembledand,inthe caseofmanyofits participants,personally inspired. Thethirty-sixthousand troopsincludedunitsdrawn fromthearmiesinGermany andItaly,armieswhichhad hadverydifferenttraditions andwhoserelationswere markedbyadegreeof rivalry.Theywerewell suppliedwithofficers,over twenty-twohundredinall. Bonaparte’sownentourage, unsurprisingly,wasdrawn fromofficershehadcometo knowandtrustinItalyand whocontinuedtooperateas aninnercircleonthisnew campaign.16Theywere competent–oftenbrilliant– soldiers,whosucceededin theverychallengingtaskof adaptingquicklytothe fightingconditionsthey encounteredinNorthAfrica. Butitwasnotthepresence ofthearmythatwasmost remarkeduponinToulon,but rathertheincorporationof aroundahundredandsixtyof France’smostdistinguished scientists,archaeologistsand engineers,menwhoseduties inEgypthadnothingtodo withtheprogressofthe military,butwhowere chargedwithexploring Egyptianmonumentsand pyramids,archaeologicalsites andancientinscriptions. Theirtaskwastoinvestigate everyaspectofAncient Egyptianculture;torecordits splendoursandcatalogueits remains,totranscribeits languagesandidentifyits speciesofanimalsandbirds. Theyweretherebecauseof Bonaparte,andBonaparte alone.Itwashisideatoadapt theexpeditionforculturalas wellasmilitarygoals,andhis personalprestigewhichhad ledscientistsfromallover Francetoagreetoparticipate inthefirstplace.Itwashis conception,too,thatfromthe outsetmilitaryconquestand scientificdiscoveryshouldbe closelyassociated,twin pillarsofthesameimperial enterprise.Theideawasnot whollywithoutprecedent. Theeighteenthcenturyhad beenaperiodofambitious scientificexploration, includingcircumnavigations oftheworldbytwogreat Frenchmen,Bougainvillein 1766–69,andLaPérousein 1785–88.17Andtherewere, ofcourse,classical precedentstofollow: Napoleonwasveryconscious ofthefactthathewas followinginthefootstepsofa greatpredecessor,andthatin hismarchestoEgypt,Persia andIndia,Alexanderthe Greathadtakenwithhima bandoflearnedmenand philosopherstoexplorethe landstheypassedthrough. Thereislittledoubtthat Napoleonsawhimselfasa newAlexander.18 Noteveryoneinthearmy waspersuadedofthewisdom ofthisapproach,whichthey interpretedasadilutionof theirmilitaryendeavour, especiallysincetheirgeneral seemedtofavourlessavants andtheirworkoverthe militarytargetsofthe expedition,whilethecostsof archaeologicalworkand hiringartiststorecordthe monumentscameoutofthe militarybudget.Butthere wasalonger-termpolitical goalherewhichcannotbe overlooked,sinceitwasthis thatallowedBonaparteto presenthimselfnotjustasa militaryconquerorbutasthe bearerofcivilisation.Indeed, almosthisfirstactionon arrivinginNorthAfricawas tocreateanInstituteofEgypt inCairo,aplacewhere scholarscouldmeetand discussculturalmatters,and whereanewscienceof Egyptologycouldbe evolved.19Therewasmore thanahintofdiplomacyin this,aswellasanimmediate publicitycoup.Hecameto Africawithanunderstanding ofcultureandantiquity, concernedtodiscoverand cherishAfrica’sheritage, whereastheBritish–whose fleethadwithdrawnfrom Egyptonlythepreviousyear –werepresentedasnew barbarians,atradingpeople whoseonlyinterestinAfrica layinopportunitiesforprofit andcommercialexploitation. Ofcourse,inreality, Napoleon’sownmotives werefarmorecomplexandin nosensealtruistic.Forhimit wasaboutcontrol,andpower: whatEdwardSaidwould representastheEuropean pursuitofthetotalknowledge ofandtotalcontroloveran Orientalsociety,as‘the originalsininthemodern nexusofhegemonicWestern powerandknowledge’.20 Themilitarycampaigndid notgosmoothly;thiswasto benorepeatoftherapid successionofvictoriesthat Napoleonhadenjoyedagainst theAustriansinLombardy, althoughthefirstactionofthe advancingfleetwasan undoubtedtriumph.The Frenchbulliedandbribedthe KnightsofStJohnto surrendertheirfortresscityof Vallettaandseizedthe strategicallyplacedislandof MaltaforFrance.Theythen sailedontothecoastof Africa,wheretheyfaceda verydifferentarmy,aforce ofMamelukeswith traditionalbattletacticsand littlesenseofEuropean strategy.Theywere distinguishedinEuropean eyesbytheiroriental uniforms,theircurved scimitars,andtheir disorganisedconductonthe battlefield.Againstthemthe Frenchwonsomenotable battles,foughtagainst memorableandexotic backdrops,mostparticularly theBattleofthePyramidsin July1798,whereFrench lossesofthreehundred contrasteddramaticallywith theMamelukes’twoanda halfthousand.Inopenbattle theFrenchenjoyedaclear advantage,whichthey maintainedevenafterthe Portedeclaredwarandthey hadtofaceTurkishaswellas Egyptianforcesinthefield. In1799,forinstance,they celebratedcomprehensive victoriesatMount-Taborand Aboukir,pressinghometheir advantageinasuccessionof engagements. Butthesewerethehigh pointsofacampaignthat speltmixedmilitaryfortunes forNapoleon.Hisnavywas effectivelydestroyedbythe BritishunderHoratioNelson whenthetwofleetsmetatthe BattleoftheNileinthefirst daysofAugust1798.Asa consequenceofthese victoriestheBritishwere handedeffectivecontrolof theEasternMediterranean anddeniedtheFrenchthe possibilityofgettingsupplies andreinforcementstotheir armies,whichproveda decisiveblow.Onland Bonapartefoundhistactical optionsdramaticallyreduced. Hewasforcedtomovenorth intoSyriatofacetheTurks, buthefoundhisarmyfatally weakenedbyfeversand, worstofall,bybubonic plaguewhichstruckhis troopsinJaffa.Morale plummeted,desperationset in,andtheywerecutofffrom suppliesoffoodandwater. HebesiegedSaint-Jean- d’Acre,butthistimehis temerityandincisiveness werenotenough,forthecity wassuppliedbytheBritish fromthesea.Itwasagalling defeatforBonaparte,andone whichledhimtorenouncehis objectiveoftakingAcreand retreatwiththeremnantsof hisarmyacrossthesun-baked deserttoCairo.Anexpedition thathadstartedso promisinglyhadendedin failure,despitethefactthat theFrenchhadwonaseries oflightningvictoriesandhad destroyedtwoTurkish armies.Inmilitarytermsit hadbeenanimpressive performance,thoughthe workofthearmywas underminedbyFrenchnaval weakness,andbythe crushingBritishnavalvictory attheNile.ButNapoleon couldjustlyfeelthathis achievementwentbeyondthe purelymilitary.Inhis dealingswithcivilsocietyhe hadimpresseduponEgypt anditspeoplehisinterestin themandtheirland,his concernfortheruinsoftheir past,andhisevidentinterest inIslam.Justasimportantly, hehadbuiltupsolidworking relationswithlocalpeople, andhadlaidthefoundations ofaFrenchcolonyinEgypt. YettheretreatfromAcre wasthatofabeatenarmy: stragglerswerecutdownby Turkishfighters,whilemany ofthemen,theirbodies weakenedbyplagueor raddledbydisease,fellbythe wayside.Dyingsoldiers soughtopiumtoendtheir sufferings;others,indespair atwhattheywereliving through,committedsuicidein frontoftheirofficers.At Jaffa,sometwelvehundredof themostseriouslyillwere placedonboatstobe transportedtohospitalin Damietta.Thosewhowere abletowalkwereforcedto marchon,withthe bedraggledanddemoralised remnantsofthearmy, blowingupthedefencesof everytowntheypassed throughandtakinghostages fromamongthelocal population. Whentheyfinallyreached Cairo,theyweredirty, exhausted,andoftenmortally weakenedbyplague,glad onlythattheirhellwasover andthatfoodandachangeof uniformawaitedthem.The campaign,itmightseem,had endedindisaster,sufficiently soforBonapartetoorderthe burningofsomeofthe expedition’srecords.Butthat wasnotthewayitwasmade toappear.Attheapproachto Cairo,theFrenchwere greetedasconqueringheroes: Napoleonhadalreadytaken stepstoensurethatthe impressionofvictorywas maintainedwhateverthetrue costofthecampaignmight havebeen,andthatthesheiks ofCairowereoutsidethe gatestowelcomethemwith giftsofhorses,camelsand slaves.Hissoldiersmusthave beenconfusedtohearthat theirshadbeenabrilliant triumph,that‘theenemy armywhichwasmarchingto invadeEgyptisdestroyed’;or thatthedecisionhadbeen takentoturnbackfromthe castleofAcrebecauseit‘is notworththelossofany moretime’.21Itwasall untrue,ofcourse,but Napoleonhadalreadylearned theprincipalruleofthe propagandist:thatheshould neverfeelconstrainedbythe truth.Hisreputationfor invincibilitywasinjeopardy –allthemoresowhenhe thenabandonedhisarmy, defeatedanddemoralised,in EgypttoreturntoFrance.He understoodtheimportanceof winningoveropinionback home,ofmakinghisfellow Frenchmenawareofwhathe hadachievedinNorthAfrica andproudtocountthe campaigninEgyptasa notableFrenchsuccess.But todothathehadtoconduct anothercampaign,one shapedinwordsandimages. Ashadbecomeclearin Italy,Napoleonwasever awareoftheesteemand kudosthatcouldaccruefrom hismilitarytalents,andhe hadneverhesitatedtomake themostofhisachievements, paradingthembeforethe armyandtheFrenchpeople alike.ButinItalyhehadhad asuccessionofremarkable victoriestopresenttoan admiringpublic,whereas presentingEgyptinsimilarly triumphaltermsmightseem well-nighimpossible. However,theverydistance betweenParisandCairo,and thecolourandexoticismof thedesert,werepeculiarities oftheEgyptiancampaignthat hecouldmanipulate,and whichultimatelyplayedinto hishands.Herehedidnot needtodwellatlengthonthe outcomesofbattles,butcould putaddedemphasisonthe culturalmissionwhichhe sawhimselffulfilling,a missionthatensuredFrance’s placeamongthegreat civilisationsoftheworld. AshehadinItaly,he publishedtwonewssheets fromEgypt,eachwitha distinctaudienceinmind. TheCourrierdel’Egyptewas targetedprimarilyatthe troops,whichallowed Bonapartetopresenthisown versionofeventsandto dismissdamagingrumours. Again,therewasaclear emphasisonculturalpolicy, withhistoricalandcultural articles,piecesaboutthenew improvedadministration,and articlespraisingthehigh qualityoftheIslamicelites andboastingoftheircordial relationswithFrance.But aftertheinitialissues, publishedinFranceinthe weeksbeforethefleetsailed toNorthAfrica,poor communicationsandlong distancesensuredthatthe Courrierwaslittlereadback home,thoughexcerptsfromit weresometimesreprintedin theMoniteur,alwaysto Napoleon’sadvantage.His secondpublication,La DécadeEgyptienne,was moreuncompromisingly scholarly,itsmissionto reportontheworkof Napoleon’sInstitutd’Egypte andtodiscussEgyptian antiquitieswiththescientific communityinFrance.22In bothpapersNapoleonwas depictedasamulti-talented figure,atoncesoldierand diplomat,religiousand culturalleader,andthe representativeofcivilisation inaforeignland.Against exoticbackcloths,surrounded byMamelukes,sphinxesand pyramids,herepresented Franceandthespiritofthe GrandeNation,the embodimentofFrench republicanvaluesexportedto far-flunglands.23Science stoodsidebysidewith ancientarchitecture,religious faithwithexoticism.His supporterswouldevenclaim thathe‘workedmiraclesin Egypt’,goingsofarasto implythathe‘wascloseto beingtalkedofasasuccessor toMahomet’.24 Itisinterestinghowthe strangenessofthelandscape andtherichnessofEgypt’s heritagecontributedtothe constructionofNapoleon’s newidentity,andhowfarhe hadcomesincethedays whenhewasseenexclusively asabrilliantgeneral.For alreadyinEgyptitisclear thathewasseekingtopresent himselfasastatesman,a diplomat,amanofhonour andcompassion,andaleader totallyateaseinthediverse culturesoftheworld.Hewas aidedinthisbyVivant Denon,whoserealinterests werealwaysmoreartistic thanmilitaryandwho confessedthat,close-up,he foundlittleinwarthatwasof realbeauty.Denonwas overwhelminglygratefulfor theprivilegeof accompanyingtheexpedition. Thepublicationofhis journal,detailingthe wondrousdiscoveriesthey hadmadeandtheantiquities theyhaduncoveredintheir marchesacrossEgypt,wasa majorliteraryeventinParis, andplayedasignificantpart inpopularisingOrientalismin WesternEurope.Napoleon lavishedpraiseonthe ingenuityofthescientistsand menofletterswhohad accompaniedtheexpedition, andbysodoinghehelpedto introduceFrenchreaderstoa hithertounknownworldof Egyptianantiquities.25Anew generationofImperialartists wouldperpetuatethesense thatNapoleonhadconducted himselfintheLevantasa civilisedFrenchman:aman oftheEnlightenmentanda manofreasonandsensibility. TheParisartmarket, liberalisedduringthe Revolution,wasrestructured intheearlyyearsofthe nineteenthcentury,with government-inspiredthemes forcompetitionsattheSalons andgenerousprizesdonated bythestate.Large-scale historypaintingswereagain invogue,andartistsviedwith oneanothertopresent Bonaparte’svictoryatthe BattleofthePyramids,for instance.Suchasubject offeredaheaven-sent opportunitytocombinea eulogytotheregimewitha splendidlyexoticbackclothof Arabhorsesandscimitars, palmtreesandcamels.Or elsetheyrushedtoportray victoriesatAboukirand Nazareth.Thesewerebattle scenes,butbattlescenes enrichedbytheirnoveland exoticsetting.Napoleon’s artistsdidnot,however, restrictthemselvesto questionsoftacticsor militarytriumph.Theyalso capturedmomentsof generosity,sympathy,or forgivenessthatsuggested symptomsoftruegreatness. Twoincidentsthatwere takenfromthecampaignin theLevantprovidedstriking examplesofanothersideto Napoleon’snature.Onewas hisreadinesstoforgivehis enemiesoncetheyhad surrenderedtohim–a principletowhichhedidnot religiouslyadherethroughout thecampaign,thoughafter theinsurrectionagainstthe FrenchinCairo,therewas onesuchmoment.Itwaswell capturedinNapoleon PardoningtheRebelsof Cairo,acanvasof1808by Pierre-NarcisseGuérin, whichunderlinesthesimple nobilityofthepardon,and thepoweroflifeanddeath thathadlaininBonaparte’s hands.26Inaseriesof pictures,manyinspiredby Denon’ssketches,AntoineJeanGros,apainterwhowas fascinatedbytheEastand deeplyregrettedthathehad notbeenaskedtotakepartin theexpedition,paidhisown tributestoNapoleon.The mostmemorablefocusedona secondincident,when Bonapartehadvisitedthesick anddyinginthehospital duringtheoutbreakof bubonicplagueatJaffa, evidencingheroismofaquite differentkind.Inhis BonaparteVisitingthe Plague-strickeninJaffa,Gros depictstherevolutionary generalconsolingplague victims,speakingtothem abouttheirwoes,even touchingtheirwastedbodies. Itwasanextraordinarily iconicimage,whichwouldbe repeatedmanytimesin popularlithographsandcheap prints.AndforNapoleonic art,too,itwouldhave importanteffects.The enormouspopularsuccessof thepaintinginthe1804Salon ‘establishedonceandforall theviabilityoflarge-scale propagandistic representationsof contemporaryeventsdepicted inthelanguageofclassical historypainting’.27Bythen Napoleonhadbecomefully awareofthevaluehecould extortfromrepresentationsof thiskind. Butsciencewasabout morethanpropaganda,and thereisnoreasontosuppose thatBonaparte’sinterestin Egyptstemmedfromnothing morethancheapcynicism. Hesharedtheenthusiasmof hislinguistsandartistsforthe treasuresofEgypt,thetombs andtemples,gatesand sphinxes;heexpressed curiosityaboutitslanguages andinscriptions;andhe revelledintheexotic landscapeofthePyramids. Themostenduring,andin manywaysthemost impressive,outcomeofthe wholecampaignwasthe publicationbackinParisof theDescriptiondel’Egypte,a seriesoftwenty-fourlavishly illustratedvolumesproduced bythesavantsaftertheir return.Thesedetailedthe scientificdiscoveriesmade duringtheexpeditionand unveiledtotheworldthe wealthoftheantiquitiesthat hadbeenunearthedbythe FrenchinEgypt.Mostofthe antiquitiesremainedinEgypt, thoughsomewereseizedby theFrenchandbroughtback toParisforexhibitioninthe Louvre;themostfamousof all,theRosettaStone,would beplunderedforasecond timebytheBritishaspartof thefinalpeacetreatyand wouldfinditshomeinthe BritishMuseum.The Descriptionisaworkof breathtakingambition, introducingtoEuropeaworld oftemplesandtombs, inscriptionsandsculpture,of whichtheyhadlittle knowledge.Oftheforty-three authors,onlytwowere speciallyco-optedafterthe expeditionreturned;the otherswereallveteransof thosemonthsinthedesert, pioneerswhohadvolunteered toaccompanyBonaparteon thisgreatadventureandwho hadexploredancient Egyptiancivilisationfromthe Mediterraneancoasttothe desertoftheinterior,andup theNiletoLuxorandKarnak. Theyproducedhundredsof engravingsandentire volumesofplates,dividing theworkintothreediscrete sectionson‘Antiquities’, ‘TheModernState’,and ‘NaturalHistory’,and showingasgreataninterest inrecentchangeandthe modernisationoftheIslamic worldastheydidinthe remainsofaworldlong lost.28 Thepropagandavalueof theDescription,likethatof theartists,wouldbegreatest infutureyears,whenitwould helptocementNapoleon’s imageoncehehadalready seizedpoliticalpowerin France.Bythenitplayedona familiartheme,forit conveyed,inafullerand morescientificform,the samemessagethatheandhis acolytesweresendingbackto ParisfromEgyptatthetime, amessagethatpraisedhis diplomacyasmuchashis soldiering,hisappreciationof ancientruinsandexotic cultures,histactand understandingandwisdom. Thismessagewouldhavea powerfuleffectonopinion backhome,quiteapartfrom fulfillingthemoreobvious taskofensuringthathewas notforgotten,exiledbeyond thefurthestextremitiesof Europeandabandonedto oblivion. Thecorrespondencefrom theArmyofEgyptcould itselfbeturnedtothepurpose ofglorifyingNapoleon’srole, andofemphasisingthehigh levelofrespecthe commandedamongthe Egyptianelite.On23July 1798,forinstance,the nationalnewspaperLe Publicisterananitemonthe hymnofpraisesungbya CopticchoirintheGrand MosqueofCairo‘tocelebrate theentryintothecityof Bonaparteattheheadofthe BravesoftheWest’.The paperobliginglyhailed Bonaparteasthe‘new Alexander’andcommented thatthestyleofhisletters wasasinimitableasthatof JuliusCaesarhimself.29 These,wemaysafely conclude,arecomparisonsof whichNapoleonwouldhave approved;hemayevenhave suggestedtheminthefirst place.Theyplayedan importantpartinpreparing thereceptionthatwould awaithimwhenhe disembarkedinFréjusfrom theshipthatborehimanda fewselectedcounsellorsback acrosstheMediterranean. Theywouldalsoservea valuablepurposeinpreparing theNapoleonicmythfor futuregenerations. Thoughthemilitary expeditionendedindefeat– Bonapartewasneverableto offsetthecripplingblow inflictedbyNelsonat AboukirBay,whichlefthim unabletoguaranteethe supplyofhisarmy–the Egyptianadventurecannotbe dismissedasasimplefailure. Thescientificachievements wouldensurethattheFrench andtheiryounggeneral continuedtobeseenas explorers,humanists,menof sciencebringingtheglories ofanancientcivilisationto thenoticeofthemodern world.Administrativelyhe broughttoEgyptmanyofthe benefitswhichhehadalready bestowedonItaly:laws, courtsofjustice,readyaccess toadministration,andan administrationthatwasnot sappedbycorruption.Andin thelongertermtheexpedition helpedtoreshapeFrance’s relationswithEgyptlonginto thenineteenthcentury. Frenchengineersstayedon afterthearmypulledoutand helpedtostaffthecountry’s administrations.30So,inthe shortterm,didKléberand Menou,leftbyNapoleonto maintainFrenchrulein Egypt,andtheirregimewas talkedofasbringingprogress andmodernity.They succeededinfinding Egyptiansreadyandwilling toserveFrance;butthey couldnotturnaroundthe war,ordetertheBritishfrom attackingthelastremnantsof theFrencharmy.Inall, Frenchrulelastedamerenine months.Kléberwastodiein Egypt,murderedbya patrioticstudentattheAzhari mosqueinCairoafter repressingapopularrisingin thecity;31Menou,onthe otherhand,wasableto negotiatethesafedeparture ofthelastunitsoftheFrench armybeforereturningto Francein1802.32Theyleft behindatraditionof administrationthatwas honestandefficientsothat, tenyearslater,whenMehmet AlirantheMamelukesoutof Egyptandestablisheda strong,authoritarianstate,he didnothesitatetoborrow fromtheadministrative practiceswhichBonaparte hadestablished.33 InthisrespectNapoleon’s Egyptianlegacywasnot destroyedalongwiththe remnantsofhisarmies.He helpedtoestablishFrench interestsandgovernment practicesinEgypt,andhehas someclaimtobe acknowledgedasan innovatorandasapioneerin colonialgovernance.Some Frenchhistoriansduringthe firsthalfofthetwentieth centurywentratherfurther, seeinginthecolonisationof Egyptthebeginningsof France’snineteenth-century empireandaprologuetothe colonisationofAlgeriain 1828.34 6 FirstConsul ThoughNapoleon’s propagandamachine proclaimedtheEgyptian campaignaresounding triumph,itwasadifficult boasttosustaininreality.He hadsufferedsignificant reversesandhisthrustnorth intoSyriahadproved unexpectedlycostlywiththe lossofaroundsixthousand mentotheenemy,plagueand physicalexhaustion.Hehad beenforcedtoacceptdefeat atAcreandhadretreated south,onlytoseetheBritish navylandanOttoman expeditionaryforcenear Alexandria.Thegloomwas onlyliftedbythebrilliant cavalrychargeunleashedby MuratagainsttheOttoman armythathadoccupied Aboukir,anattackthat scatteredtheenemyand deliveredthecity.For Bonaparteitatleastmeant thathiscampaigninEgypt hadendedwithavictory whichwouldraisespiritsand confirmhisreputationbackin Paris;asusualhemadesure thattheParisnewspapers buzzedwithexcitementabout thescaleofhissupposed triumph.Buthecouldn’tfool himself.Hehadalready concludedthatthiswouldbe alonganddifficultcampaign, punctuatedbysetbacksand reverses,andthisrealisation mayhavecontributedtohis decisioninthelatesummerof 1799toreturntoParisand thefaction-riddenpolitical worldoftheDirectory.He appointedGeneralKléberto takemilitarychargeinNorth Africa,informedthe Directoryofhisdecision,and emphasisedtheimportanceof EgypttoFrenchsecurity.And inthemostpaternallanguage hepassedhissoldiersinto Kléber’scare,writingtothe Generalthus:‘Thearmy whichIamentrustingtoyou isentirelycomposedofmy children;eveninthemidstof theirgreatestsufferingsI havealwayshadmarksof theiraffection;maintainthem inthesesentiments;youowe methatbecauseoftheesteem andthespecialfriendshipin whichIholdyou,andforthe realfeelingsofattachment thatIhaveforthem’.1The messagewas,ofcourse,sent ontoParis;Napoleon’ssense ofpublicitydidnotdesert him.Thesoldierscouldbe excusedifmanyofthem judgedhisdeparturerather moreharshly. HesetsailforFranceon 23Augusttogetherwithhis chosencompanions,among themseveralofhisfuture marshals,inasmallflotillaof navalships,consistingofjust twofrigatesandtwosloops, commandedbyaFrench vice-admiral,Ganteaume.2 Heleftbehindthebulkofhis armyandamajorityofhis officersandscientific advisers.Heevenabandoned PaulineFourès,hismistress duringhistimeinEgypt (Josephine,itwouldappear, didnotenjoyamonopolyon infidelity);itwaswidely rumouredthatsheresponded defiantlytohisactof desertionbytransferringher affectionstothenew commander,Kléber.3When theyheardthenewsofhis returnandrealisedthathehad abandonedthemontheother sideoftheMediterranean, manyofthetroopswere understandablyindignant, thoughtheyweresoonwon overtohissuccessor,who commandedawidedegreeof respectintheranksandwho manyhopedmightnegotiate themareturntoFrance. Butwhatarewetomake ofBonaparte’sactions? Despiteallegationsthathe hadbetrayedhismen,hehad donenothingwronginterms ofmilitaryetiquette,and couldreasonablyarguethat hewasnowmoreurgently requiredinEuropethanin Egypt,wheretherewaslittle thathecouldnowachieve. Thoughsomehistorians continuetopresenthis departureasashameful retreat,onethatsalvaged Bonapartehimselfbutlefthis armyatthemercyofthe Egyptians,theTurks,and increasinglytheBritish,he hadother,morepositive reasonstoreturntoFrancein thesummerof1799.InEgypt hefeltmarginalisedfrom Directorialpoliticsand decision-making,evenfrom regularnewscontactwiththe mainland.Indeed,duringthe seventeenmonthshespenton thecampaigntoEgypt,he wasoftendependentfornews onchanceencounterswith foreignmerchantsor,after thesurrenderatAboukir,on thepacketofEuropean newspapershereceivedfrom SidneySmith,theBritish navalcommanderwhose shipshadsuppliedthe besiegedgarrisonatSaintJean-d’Acre.4These containedworryingnews aboutthepursuitofthewarin Europe;helearned,most notably,thatFrancefaceda secondcoalitionofhostile powers,andthegainswhich hehadmadeinItalyseemed increasinglytohavebeenput atrisk.Ashereportedtothe DirectoryfromAixtheday afterhisreturntoFrenchsoil, itwasthroughthesepapers– Englishpapers–thathehad learnedofthedefeats sufferedbyJourdanin GermanyandSchérerinItaly –defeatsthatleftFrance’s sister-republicsintatters(′I leftimmediately,thatvery hour,’hewrotesomewhat melodramatically).5 Bonapartewasprobablyright tobelievethathecould contributelittlemorefrom Egyptandthathistalents couldbemoreusefully appliedbackinEurope.He foundhisisolationfrom politicsincreasingly insupportable,andhisreturn wasmotivatedlessbyhis desiretofleethewarin Africathanbyambitionsthat couldonlybesatisfiedin France. HisshipdockedinFréjus, alongthecoastfromToulon, on9October,havingmadea briefstopinCorsicatoallow himtovisithisrelatives.It wasthelasttimehewould eversetfootontheisland,a finalglanceattheboyhood worldhehadcometoreject. Fromnowonhisfocuswould befirmlyonFrance,its governmentand governability,itssecurity and,especially,itspursuitof war. ForNapoleonhadalways beenapoliticalgeneral, keenlyawareofthecausein whosenamehefoughtandof theimportanceofpolitical powerstrugglesbackinParis. Throughcontinued propagandaandseizing opportunitiesforself- publicityhehadensuredthat hisnameremainedonthe frontpagesoftheParisnews sheets;andhisupbeatreports onhiscampaignsinEgypt andSyriaensuredthathe remainedincontrolofthe popularpulsebackinFrance. Asaconsequence,he returnedtoFranceahero,just ashehadfromtheItalian Campaign,aconquerorwho hadtakentheFrenchstandard tothemostexoticlandsofthe Orient.HislandingatFréjus andhistriumphantreception inAixwereonlythestartofa hero’sreturn;inLyon,they evencomposedaplayinhis honour,titledTheReturnof theHero.6Bythetimehis entouragereachedParis,the peopleofthecapitalwere expectantandexcited;what JeanTulardhastermed‘the mythofthesaviour’–amyth thatwouldsustainNapoleon throughthenextsixteenyears –wasborn.7Thepolitical classweredrawntohim, whiletheworkersoftheParis faubourgssangstreetsongs tofêtehisreturn.Warhad madehimanationalfigure andsuppliedhimwiththe reputationhenowneededto makehismarkonpolitics. Warhadelevatedhimtoa positionandastatusabove politics,andatthesametime hadhelpedtoundohis possiblerivals.Ofhisfellow generals,JoubertandHoche weredeadby1799,while Moreauwasseverely compromised.Atatimewhen theDirectoryappeared increasinglyjadedandstale, thecardsseemedtohave beensomewhatfortuitously stackedinhisfavour.8 Bonapartewentoutofhis waytoreassurethepolitical classthathisreturntoFrance wasnotpartofaplot,thatit wasnotpremeditated,notthe consequenceofvaulting politicalambition.His decision,ashepresentedit, wasanimmediateresponseto apoliticalcrisiswhichhehad readaboutinthenewspapers passedtohimbySidney Smith;these,heclaimed, providedthecatalystthat inducedhimtoabandon NorthAfrica.Whathetermed ‘extraordinarycircumstances’ hadpersuadedhimtoreturn toEurope.Therenewalofthe waronthecontinenthad turnedpublicattentionaway fromEgypt,whilethefact thatthearmyinEgyptrisked defeatmadeitscontribution seemsuddenlyperipheral. Napoleonwasnotslowto expresshiscontemptforthe politicianswhohadsentit there.Hedismissedtheir capabilitieswithasingle strokeofthepen:‘Everything isignorance,stupidityor corruptionwiththem.Iam theone,Ialone,whohave carriedtheburden,andwho, throughastringofsuccesses, havegivenpurposetothis government,which,without me,wouldneverhavebeen abletoraiseitselforto maintainitselfinpower.With meabsent,everythingwould crumble.Letusnotwaituntil thatdestructioniscomplete: thedamagewouldbe irreversible’.9 Thesewordsarerevealing, butdotheyreallyexplainthe circumstancesofNapoleon’s returnfromNorthAfrica? Whattheydoconveyishis arroganceandhiscomplete faithinhisownabilities;they mayalsosuggestsomething ofhissenseofhisown destiny.Buttheideathathis returnwasasudden, impulsivegesture,adecision takeninaninstantonthe basisofafewnewspaper cuttings,isfarlesscredible, especiallygiventhepublicity trailhehadcarefullylaidin advanceofhisreturnandthe webofplottingintowhichhe wasdrawnassoonashe reachedParis.10Onceinthe capital,hedidnotretireinto privatelifeorseektoescape theglareofpublicattention. Hehadanumberoffriends andallieswhohelpedhimto keepintouchwiththe popularmood,tofeelthe pulseofthenation.Andthat pulsetoldhimtwothings: thatpeopleweretiredofa politicswhichthey increasinglyequatedwith drift,self-interestandthe abandonmentofrepublican ideology;and,evenmore strongly,thattheyweretired ofwarandreadytoturnto anyonewhopromisedto restorepeaceandnormality. Asforthepoliticalclass, theystillsawBonaparteas ‘GeneralVendémiaire’,the militaryleadertowhomthey hadturnedearliertosavethe conservativeRepublicagainst itsradicaladversaries.Thisof itselfmadehimapolitical figure.Now,whenhe returnedandsurveyedthe politicalscene,hefoundthat muchofthesenseofpurpose thathadcharacterisedthe earlyRepublicwassadly lacking.Theyearsofthe JacobinRepublic, characterisedbyahatredof privilegeandaruthlessdesire topurgethebodypoliticof counter-revolutionariesand politicalmoderates,had endedintheexcessesofthe TerrorandtheRepublicof Virtue;andsince1794much ofthegovernment’senergy hadbeengivenoverto establishingpoliticalstability andconsolidatingrepublican institutions,aspoliticians whohadpreviouslybeen bitteropponentsunited aroundanewconstitution. Butstabilitywaseasierto talkaboutthantoenact.The processofendingtheTerror hadbeenfraughtwith difficulty:memorieswere longandpoliticsbecame enmeshedinvengeanceand recrimination.11Thelower houseofthelegislature,the ConseildesCinq-Cents,was seriouslyrentbyfaction,with theregimeoncemoreaprey tobattlesbetweenthemore conservativerepublicanslike Sieyèsandneo-Jacobinslike JosephFouché.Therenewed strengthoftheJacobincause duringtheearlymonthsof 1799arousedanxietyamong conservatives,achange signalledinParisbythenew andcentralroleplayedbya politicalclub,knownfirstas theSociétéduManège,later (takingitsnamefromthe streetwhereitmet)asthe SociétédelaRueduBac, whichgavethemovement greatercohesionandwasa symptomofitsmore developedorganisational capacity.12Neo-Jacobins wereespeciallystronginthe upperechelonsofthearmy, whereradicalandoften highlycapablemen, frustratedbypoliticalhorsetradingorthreatenedwith exclusionfromthepolitical forumafterthefallof Robespierre,hadsoughtto makeanewcareerandserve theRepublicinadifferent way.Theirpresenceinthe armygavethemanewform ofpowerandauthority,as Napoleonwasonlytoo aware.13Italsothreatenedto destabilisestillfurtherthe alreadystutteringDirectory. ItwasnotBonapartealone whomastermindedthe conspiracythatoverthrewthe DirectoryinBrumaireof YearVIII.Whenhereturned toParis,thatconspiracywas alreadybeingplannedby someoftheDirectory’smost prominentpoliticians, republicanslikeSieyèsand FouchéandNapoleon’sold associate,PaulBarras–men whobelievedthatchangewas neededtorestorethe authorityofthegovernment. TheysawtheDirectoryas fatallyweakenedbythe compromisesithadbeen forcedtomakeafterprevious periodsofcrisis,most especiallyaftertheviolent insurrectionsof18Fructidor and30Prairial,andbelieved thatitsclaimsto constitutionalityweresorely flawed.AsFouchénoted,the constitutionofYearIIIhad becomeinoperable,sothat ‘fromapurelyconstitutional regimewehadmovedtothe dictatorshipoffivemen:and thathadnotproved successful’.Worse,inhis eyes,waswhathadfollowed, for‘nowthattheveryessence oftheexecutivehasbeen mutilatedandweakened, everythingindicatedthatwe wouldpassfromthe despotismofafewmentothe turbulenceofthecrowd’if somethingwerenotdone aboutitwithoutdelay.14 Inparticular,Sieyèsand hisfellowplotterswantedto endtheinfluenceofthetwo Directorsmostclosely associatedwiththeneoJacobins,GohierandMoulin, whosepromotionhad symbolisedtheDirectory’s lurchtothelefttheprevious year,andtheywereprepared tostageacoupinordertodo so.There-emergenceof Jacobinismasacredible politicalforcefrightened manyinthecentreaswellas ontherightofthepolitical spectrum,asMadamede Staëlrecognised,whenshe wrote,‘Itwasnottheexternal reversessufferedbyFrance thatproducedthefatal attractiontoBonapartein 1799,butratherthefear inspiredbytheJacobins insidethecountrywhich workedsopowerfullyinhis favour.TheJacobinshadfew resourcesattheirdisposaland theirreappearancewasno morethanaspectrewhich stirredintheashes;butitwas sufficienttorevivethepanic theyhadgeneratedinthe past.’Asaconsequence,the Frenchnation‘threwitself intothearmsofBonaparte, simplytoescapefroma phantom’.15 Theplottersneededtobe surethattheyhadmilitary supportbeforetheylaunched theirconspiracy.Theycould notriskfacingthecollective strengthofthearmy,andthey thereforehadtowinoverto theirsideageneralwho commandedtherespectof otherofficers.Someofthose whowouldhavebeen consideredthemoreobvious candidates,notablyLazare Hoche,weredead;and Joubert,themanonwhom theyplacedthegreatestfaith inthemonthsbefore Brumaire,waskilledinbattle in1799.Moreauand Pichegruwereconsidered; Macdonaldwasapproached, butrefused.Itwasonlythen thattheplottersturnedto Bonaparte,thechoiceas muchtheeffectofchanceand circumstanceasofpurposeful planning.16 Inthisregardthetimingof hisreturnprovedcrucial, sinceitsuddenlymade availableageneralwith whomsomeofthemenjoyed goodrelationsandwho, behindastaunchlyrepublican façade,wasknowntobea manoforderonwhomthey coulddepend.Hispartin whatcametobeknownasthe insurrectionof18Brumaire (9November1799)was intendedtobequitespecific: toprovidemilitarymusclein thestreetsofParisand,if needed,inthetwochambers ofgovernment.Indeed,onthe morningofthecoup Napoleon’sentouragewas almostentirelymilitary.It consistedoftroopsfrom everyregimentinParis,many ofthemveteransoftheItalian Campaign,aswellasforty adjutantsoftheParisdivision oftheNationalGuard.17 Theirinvolvementwasvital totheplot’ssuccess,since theywouldimpose emergencymeasuresinParis duringandimmediatelyafter thecoup,andsohelpto initiatethenewregime.At thatpoint–itwasnaively believedbysome– Bonapartewouldstandaside andthepoliticianswould assumepower.Butthosewho thoughtthatBonapartewas nothingmorethanamilitary manweresoontobe disillusioned.Hiscontrolof thearmymeantthatpower washistoretainorrelinquish ashechose;andfromthe momentthecoupwas launchedhewasinnodoubt astowhowouldreallybein command.18Themuch- anticipatedbattlefor influencebetweenBonaparte andSieyèsnevertookplace: theformerrevolutionary generalimposedhiswillon thosearoundhim,and impressedwithhisdynamism andenergy. Napoleonplayed mercilesslyonhispopularity duringthetwodaysofthe coup,assuminganactiverole inboththeconstitutional manoeuvresof9November andthemilitaryuprisingthe followingday.Thegiftfor publicitythathehad demonstratedinItalyandin Egyptdidnotdeserthim.He hadthewallsofParis plasteredwithposterssinging hispraises,andurgingthe implementationofhis solutionstowhatwasnow openlyseenasapolitical crisis;solutionsinvolvingthe resignationoffourofthefive Directorsandleavinga gapingvoidattheheartofthe polity.Atthesametimehis brotherLucien,whohadbeen electedtotheCinq-Centsthe previousyearandwasatthe timeofthecoupitspresident, providedfurtherammunition bydistributingapamphletin Pariswarningofasupposed Jacobinplotagainstthe Directoryandofthedangers ofanarchy.19 Toresolvethiscrisis Napoleonproposedastronger andmorecompactexecutive, threeconsulsinplaceoffive directors,butnothingthat impliedanyweakeningof republicanprinciple.Theplan wasrapidlyenacted,andthe newconstitutional arrangementsputinplace.On 9Novembertheassemblies weretransferredoutofParis totherelativesafetyofSaintCloud,andBonapartewas appointedcommanderofthe armyinthecapital.The followingdayhewasin Saint-Cloud,wherehe addressedthetwoassemblies, orderingthedissolutionofthe Directoryandthecreationof aprovisionalconsulate.On 11Novembertheprovisional Consulatemetandanew governmentwasformed.A newconstitution,preparedin advancebyDaunou,was adoptedon12November, whichestablishedthe Consulateinitsdefinitive form.20Thishadallbeen accomplishedinfourdays. Napoleonwasverycareful todonothingthatwould alienaterepublicanopinion. Hewentoutofhiswaytowin supportforthecoupinthe ranksofthearmyandthe NationalGuard,twonotably republicaninstitutions,and presentedtheoustingofthe Directorsasanecessary measuretosweepaway corruptionandprotectthe foundingprinciplesofthe Republic.Indeed,ina proclamationissuedon12 November,heandtheother consulswentsofarastocall ontheFrenchpeopletotake anoathofloyaltyto‘the Republic,oneandindivisible, foundedontheprinciplesof equality,liberty,and representativegovernment’.21 Althoughhewasalliedto menofaconservativebent, orsotheargumentwent, therewasnoreasonfor republicanstofearthenew regime.He,Bonaparte,was stronglycommittedtothe republicanidealandthecoup wascarriedoutinamoodof constitutionalpropriety.A fewdisagreedpubliclyand violently;Bernadottein particularbrokewith BonaparteoverBrumaireand fledfromthecapital, threateningtoreturnwith troopsathisback.22Buthe didnotcarryouthisthreat, andmostFrenchmenseemed togoalongwiththechange ofgovernment;iftherewere someoutburstsofprotest fromthemoreradicalclubs, theywerequicklysilenced, andtheConsulatewas installedwithoutadropof bloodbeingspilt–arare achievementinFrance’s republicanhistory. EvenParis,soreadyinthe recentpasttomeetpolitical protestwithviolence, remainedsingularlycalm. Indeed,thesalientmood wouldappeartohavebeen oneofunconcernandpublic indifference,mingledwithan ill-disguisedhopethatthe newregimewouldbringthe politicalandcommercial stabilitythatcoulddeliver economicprosperity.Above all,thepeoplewantedpeace, andthepresenceamongthe Consulsoftheall-conquering generalcontributed, somewhatperversely,totheir confidence.TotheParis masses,Napoleonwasahero, aconqueror,theprotectorof theRepublicand,aboveall, someonewho,bydeliveringa rapidvictory,couldbringthe peacetreatytheycraved.23 Themanymessagesof supportfromlocalauthorities intheprovincesprovided somecomforttothenew regime.‘Theechoesofthe Alpsredoubleourapplause,’ gushedthedepartmental authoritiesinGap,while otherauthoritiesgreetedthe Consulateasaneffective defenceagainstroyalist reaction.24Butthese endorsementscannotberead asevidenceofreal enthusiasm;sincetheearly yearsoftheRevolution, mayorsandlocalofficialshad learnedthatitwaswisetobe cautious,andmany,like ElbeufinNormandy,ensured theirownsurvivalby congratulatingtheorganisers ofeveryvictoriouscoupand sidingwiththeleadersof everyincoming government.25Overthe previoustenyearsFrenchmen hadseentoomanyfalse dawns,toomany constitutionsandsupposed guarantees,toomany governmentswelcomedon onedayonlytobejettisoned thenext.Theywerethus unlikelytosuspendentirelya degreeofwell-tried scepticism.26 Thelackofwidespread oppositioncanalsobe explainedbythetactfulway inwhichthenewregime presenteditselftothepeople. Continuitywasemphasised, aswastheessential republicanismofthe Consulate,arepublicanism whichothershadputatrisk. TheConseildesAncienshad providedthatcontinuityby acceptingamovetoSaintCloud,awayfromthe turbulenceoftheParis populace,andthismovehad beenpresentedtothemasone thatwouldhelpguarantee constitutionalgovernment. TheConseildesCinq-Cents hadbeenlesscompliant, requiringanimpassioned speechfromLucien Bonaparteandthethreatof militaryinterventionbefore evenarumpofdeputiesvoted fortheprovisionalConsulate, buttheirstubbornnesscould beblamedondangerousneoJacobinelementswhosought anarchyandthedestruction ofthestate.Inthetensehours thatfollowed,propaganda waseverything.The Brumairianspresented themselvesasresponsible men,anxioustoavoid violenceanddisruption.Ifthe institutionsguaranteedunder thepreviousconstitutionhad beendissolved,anddissolved byforce,wasthereanything tosuggestthatthiswasmore radicalthanothercoupsof theDirectorialperiod?The Directorsthemselveshad eitherresignedorwerenow forcedtoresign–inGohier’s caseafterbeingheldagainst hiswillintheLuxembourg Palaceforforty-eighthours. Thedeputiesofthelower housewereunceremoniously drivenoutoftheirmeeting hallbyBonaparte’stroops, andtherumpofthedeputies obedientlyvotedforthe dissolutionoftheDirectory itself. Butthegovernmentthat replacedthemwasnotso differentinkind.A provisionalConsulateofthree wasnotsodifferentfromits five-manpredecessor,andits membership–Bonaparte, SieyèsandRoger-Ducos,two ofthemformerDirectors– didnotofitselfspreadalarm inthecountry.Andthe Consulateseemedtopromise manyofthesamegoalsthat theDirectoryhadbeentrying todeliverfortheprevious fouryears,tomakeFrance’s parliamentarysystemworkin permanentlytesting circumstances.ThelongertermaimsoftheBrumairians wereleftunclear–alwaysa wisetacticinmomentsof crisis–andthelanguagethey useddidnothingtodispelthis ambiguity.Bonapartein particularshowedgreat diplomacyandtact.So,for example,whereSieyès advocatedapre-emptive strikeagainstsomeofthe mostprominentJacobinsasa measureofstatesecurity,he opposedit,eagerbothto distancehimselfpublicly fromSieyèsandtomaintaina germofconsensus.27The Consulatehadtoappealto morethananarrow ideologicalconstituencyifit wastowinpublicsupport. Thepreviousgovernment, declaredFouchéinthedays following,wasthevictimof itsownshortcomings.Ithad beenvacillatingand ineffective,hesaid,‘tooweak tomaintainthegloryofthe Republicagainstoutside enemiesortoguaranteethe rightsofcitizensagainst domesticfactions’.28This aloneprovidedjustification forregimechangeand,at leastintheshortrun,the majorityofthepopulation seemedwillingtoaccepthis assessment.Bonapartetold thedeputieson19November thattherepublicnolonger hadagovernmentatall;to saveitrequiredintervention, andinterventionbackedby force. TheConsulshammered homethesamepointintheir proclamationtwodayslater. ‘TheConstitutionoftheYear III,’theyinsisted,‘wasdying. Itcouldneitherguarantee yourrightsnorassureitsown existence.Repeatedassaults wererobbingitofthe people’srespect.’29They weredeterminednottorepeat thismistake.Underthe ConstitutionofYearVIII whichfollowed,Francewas giventwolegislative chambers:aTribunatewith onehundreddeputiesagedat leasttwenty-five,anda LegislativeBodywiththree hundredmembersagedat leastthirty.Theseage restrictionswereimposedto ensureresponsibilityand avoidtheintemperate passionsofyouth,though– giventhelimitedpowersthat wereextendedtothe assemblies–theymightseem tohavebeenscarcely necessary.Forneitherthe TribunatenortheLegislature wasdirectlyelectedbythe population;theywere nominatedbytheSenate,the thirdelementestablishedby theconstitution:itwas composedofsixtynotables– careerpoliticians,generals, admirals,scientistsand magistrates–largelychosen bySieyès.Throughthe Senatehehadhopedtocreate anelementofconstructive opposition,andhenceoffer sufficientprotectionagainst tyranny.30ButtheSenatewas adeeplyconservativebody, andtheauthoritygiventothe threechamberswasstrictly limited.Inparticular,they hadnopowertointroduce legislation,oreventopropose amendments,rightsthatwere reservedtotheFirstConsul andtheCouncilofState.The Tribunatemightdebatelaws thatwerepresentedtoitand offeritsopiniontothe LegislativeBody,which woulddiscussthat recommendationinitsturn. TheLegislaturewastomeet annuallyforthispurpose,its sessionlastingfornomore thanfourmonths.31Cynics talkedoftyranny;certainly, byanymeasure,itwas scarcelyarecipeforarobust parliamentarysystem. Noteverybodywas impressedbythenew institutionalframework, especiallyinthoseareas whereJacobinclubshadbeen reinstatedorwherethethreat ofaroyalistrevivalseemed imminent.HeretheantiJacobintoneoftheConsulate didnothingtoreassurelocal people,andtherewerewidely heldfearsthattheConsuls’ realaimwastosubvertthe Republicanditsvalues.The firstdaysofthenewregime hadtobecarefullyhandled, anditwasinthosesamefirst daysthatBonaparteeclipsed theotherConsulsand imposedhiswillonthe polity.Anumberofthe addressesthatweresentto Parisweresurprisingly criticaloftheregime, expressingtheiruneaseabout thesafeguardsfordemocracy. Someinitiallyrefusedto publishthedecreeof19 Brumairesettingupthe provisionalConsulate,and oneeasterndepartment,the Jura,wentasfarasto denounceNapoleonasa ‘usurper’whorode roughshodoveressentialcivil rightsguaranteedbythe Assembliesofthe1790s.32 Onceinpower,the Consulsdideverythingthey possiblycouldtoensurethat theerrorsoftheDirectors wouldnotberepeatedand thattheauthorityofthestate commandedtherespectofall. Tothisendtheysoughtthe supportofthosepowerful interestgroupsonwhom stabilitywoulddepend,in particularthesocialelitesand thearmy.Thesupportofthe armywas,asBonaparte recognisedbetterthanmost, criticaltothesuccessofthe project,andestablishingthe loyaltyofothergeneralswas theessentialfirststepin securingpublicacceptanceof theregime.Herealisedthat therewouldbejealousiesand brokenambitionsamongthe highcommand,jealousies accentuatedbyhisown elevation,andheknewthat hecouldnotsimplyattack themhead-on.Insteadhe soughttosecuretheloyaltyof thearmytohispersonby respondingtosomeofthe long-standinggrievancesof thetroops:invokingthe promiseofbetterpayand pensions,raisingthequestion ofafurtherdistributionof landtoservingsoldiers,and takingmoreseveremeasures againstdesertersandthose whoshirkedtheirmilitary duties.Therewastobe increasedsurveillanceofthe conductofsoldiers,too;more rapidmilitaryjustice,and tighterdiscipline.Behind thesemeasureswasa determinationtoraisethe moraleandpublicimageof thearmy,torewardbravery andinculcateasenseof honourandprofessionalism. Itwouldbringitsrewardon thebattlefieldinanewsurge againsttheCoalitionpowers. Andofcoursetherewasa politicalpurpose,too.‘In cafésandonpublic thoroughfares,’statesJeanPaulBertaud,‘theFirst Consulpaidarmyveteransso thattheycouldcombatthe activityoftheJacobinsinside thearmyandactaspublicists forGeneralBonaparte’.33 Armyofficersenjoyed newinfluenceandprestige duringtheConsulate,butit wasnotamilitaryregime,nor yetcanitbechargedwith militarism,sincecivil authoritiesremainedfirmlyin chargeofpoliticaldecision making.Thearmy,underthe Consulate,andtheEmpire thatfollowedit,wasthereto carryoutordersandenforce policy;itwasanarmofthe state,andarmyleaderswere activelydiscouragedfrom holdingpoliticalviewsof theirown.Theaimwasto makethearmymore professionalandless ideologicallydriventhanin themoreradicalmomentsof the1790s.Government remainedinthehandsof politicians,notsoldiers.Its legitimacywasgroundedin lawandoneoftheConsuls’ firstprioritieswastoestablish thatlegitimacythroughanew constitution.Thiswasquickly achieved:theconstitutionwas short–thedocument consistedofninety-five clauseswhereitspredecessor hadhadnearlyfourhundred– andittooklessthanseven weekstoprepare.Gonewas anyreferencetotherightsof man,whichwasaconstant featureofalltheconstitutions oftherevolutionaryyears. Thenewdocumentplaceda strongemphasisonthe powersoftheexecutiveatthe expenseofthelegislative body,theobjectionsof constitutionallawyerslike Sieyèsbeingcurtlyswept aside.Votingforthe Legislaturewastobe indirect:adultmaleswould voteforcommunallistsof meneligibletostand,who,in turn,wouldchoosesomeof theirnumbertositat departmentalandthenat nationallevel.Thisproduced alistofsomefivetosix thousandmenwhowere eligibleforelection.Itwasa systemthatavoidedanyrisk ofturbulentelectoral meetingsandguaranteeda stableelectorate.34Butin practicethenewlegislative countedforlittle;itsprimary functionwastodemonstrate thelegitimacyofthenew regime.Powerpassedfrom thelegislaturetoanexecutive ofthreeConsuls,whom Sieyèshadthehonourof naming,thoughinrealitythe choicewasBonaparte’s;of thethree,onlytheFirst Consulexertedrealpower, retainingdirectcontrolover mostaspectsofFrench foreignanddomesticpolicy, includingmattersof diplomacyandwar.Inthese taskstheFirstConsulwasto beassistedbyaCouncilof State.TheSecondandThird Consulsbothhadhada revolutionarypast–the republicandeputyJeanJacquesCambacérèsandthe moderateroyalistCharlesFrançoisLebrun–buttheirs wastobeaconsultativerole: theirfunctionwastoadvise, nottogovern.TheFirst Consul,ofcourse,was NapoleonBonaparte,who identifiedtheinstitutionsof thestatesounequivocally withhimselfandhisrulethat theConsulatehasevenbeen describedbysomescholarsas astepbackfrom republicanismtowards monarchicalgovernment.35 Guaranteeingstabilitywas alwaysamoreimportant objectivethanspreading democracy. Thenewconstitutionwas approvedbyplebiscite,a formofelectoralconsultation thatappealedtoNapoleon becauseitavertedelectoral disorderandexaggeratedthe appearanceofpopular consensus.TheConsulswere eagertodemonstratethe popularityofthenew Constitutioninorderto enhancetheirlegitimacy,and, thoughonlyoneinfourof thoseeligiblechosetovote, theauthoritiesquiteopenly inflatedthenumberto demonstratethatthenew orderwasmorepopularthan eithertheJacobinregimeor theDirectory.Theyplaced greatemphasisonthevery smallnumberofvotescast againsttheConstitution,an outcomethatcanoccasion littlesurprisegiventhat votingwasnotsecret,and wasdonebyindividualballot. Itwouldhavetakenabrave man,orafoolhardyone,to expresshisoppositiontothe regimesoopenly.Itwasfar easiertoabstain,ortostay away,whichtheydid,intheir millions.36Butthatwasnot whattheFrenchpeoplewere toldbytheirnewrulers. Turnoutwaslow:nomore thanabouttwentypercentof theelectorateendorsedthe constitution,butLucien Bonapartepublishedvery differentfigurestosuggest thattheregimehadbeen welcomedbysixmillion voters.Itwasalie,butavery effectiveone,which persuadedmanyFrenchmen thattheirgovernmentruled withpopularsupport.37 Thiswouldbethefirst signamongmanythatthe FirstConsulhadlittleinterest inthenicetiesofdemocratic government.Hewas concernedtotakeeffective actionagainstperceived enemiesandopponents,and provedtobecontemptuousof establishedinterestgroups. Hewasalsoastaunch defenderofpropertyrights, whichendearedhimtomen ofsubstance,whilehis masteryofpropagandahelped ensurethatheenjoyedagood pressinParis–thoughhere hetooknochances,closing downoppositionjournalsand limitingthenumberof newspaperspublishedinthe capitaltoonlyeight.(Atthe heightoftheRevolutionthey hadbeennumberedin hundreds).Atthesametime heincreasedcensorship,and controloftheParisbook trade;andheshowedlittle tolerancetowardsthosewho brokethelaw.Inparticularhe turnedthepowerofthestate againstbanditry,condemning thehighratesofcrimeand violencethatcharacterised theFrenchcountrysideand wereendemicinmanyparts oftheMidi.Inthelast monthsoftheeighteenth centurypolicepatrolswere steppedup,gendarmessent intodissidentvillages,and militarypatrolsestablishedto roundupbrigandsandarmy deserters.Inanattemptto rootoutresistanceinthe badlandsoftheRhônevalley, Bonapartegavespecial powerstoGeneralFérinoto combinenationalguardsmen withunitsoftheregulararmy toform‘flyingcolumns’ againstoutlawbands.He authorisedthemtoexecute anybrigandswhofellinto theirhands,andsetupa SpecialMilitaryTribunalat Avignon–oneofthirty-two thatwerecreatedin metropolitanFranceand acrossBelgium,Piedmont andtheRhineland38–where thosearrestedcouldbegiven militaryjustice,withoutthe benefitofajury.Férinodid notstampoutviolenceand banditry;andhisexcesses mayhaveaddedtothe government’sunpopularityin thelawlessSouth-east.But hisruthlessapproachtothe problemandhisdisregardfor judicialprocedures demonstratedtheConsulate’s determinationtoimposeorder atalmostanycost.In1801 alone,extraordinarymilitary commissionswere responsiblefortwohundred andthreedeathsentences, andwithinafewyearseven themostfearedroyalist brigandsintheregionhad beenroundedupand guillotined.Napoleonwas unconcernedbytheviolence thatthispolicyinvolved. Securityandorderhadbeen restored,andthesewerehis paramountconsiderations.39 Paramount,too,wasthe successfulpursuitofawarin ItalyandGermany,whichthe Directoryhadbeenindanger oflosingandwherethe Frencharmiesseemedto havelosttheinitiativethat hadprovidedBonapartewith hisgreatesttriumphsinthe monthsleadingtoCampo Formio.TheFirstConsulwas desperateforanemphatic victorythatwouldreestablishhisauthorityin Europeandallowhimto appeartohisownpeopleasa manofpeace.Hesucceeded ingettinghisvictorywhenhe encounteredtheAustrian armyontheplainofthePoat Marengo,butinunusual circumstances,sinceitwas oneofthefewbattleswhere heallowedhimselftobe outnumberedandtheenemy toattack.Thereisno doubtingthathewaslucky, andthatforatimeherana seriousriskofdefeat.Inthe end,heowedvictorytothe timelyarrivalof reinforcementsandthe braveryofyoungergenerals likeDesaixandKellermann ratherthantohisowntactical awareness. TheBattleofMarengo cannotbeseenasatriumph ofbattlefieldmanoeuvres. Nonetheless,itturnedthewar withAustriainFrance’s favour,especiallysince Moreaufollowedupwith victoryatHohenlindenin southernGermany,whichhad theAustrianssuingforpeace. Thatpeacewasdulysigned, firstwithAustria,thenwith Britain,inthetreatiesof LunévilleandAmiens,in 1801and1802respectively. Thebattlequicklybecamea centralelementinthe Napoleonicmyth,one perpetuatedinDavid’s paintingoftheGeneral crossingtheAlpsonhiswhite charger.ButNapoleon’sown versionoftheBattleof Marengoremainslargely fictional.DavidChandler,in commonwithothermodern historiansofthebattle,sees thingsratherdifferently,and claimsthat‘therealattritional natureofthestruggle,thefact thatfewplanssurvivedthe firstminutesofbattle,the partsplayedbysheergood luckandinspired subordinatesinachieving victory,and,aboveall,the graveerrorsofNapoleon’s judgement–thesefeatures werecarefullyhiddenbeneath successivelayersofmyth’.40 Forthepresent,however, theFirstConsulhaddelivered thepeacethatsomany Frenchmencraved,the longestperiodofpeacethat wouldbeachievedinallthe yearsuptoWaterloo.Intruth itwasafragilestructure, leavingneithersidesatisfied, anditwasalwayslikelythat thecontinentwouldagainbe plungedintowar.Butitdid provideanimportant breathingspace,toNapoleon asmuchastohismost persistentadversaries,Austria andBritain,andthisallowed himtoconcentrateonaseries ofdomesticreformswhich, together,constitutedthebasis fortheNapoleonicstate. Policing,aswehaveseen, waspartofit,therootingout oflawlessnessandinternal dissentbyaruthlessdisplay oflawenforcement.Butit wasonlyoneelementina processbywhichNapoleon soughttoturntheoften rebelliouscitizensofthe Directoryintoobedientand cooperativeadministrés,men andwomenwhowouldbe acquiescentincarryingout theirlegalobligationsand fulfillingtheirresponsibilities tothestate.Tothisendhe builtontheachievementsof therevolutionaryyears,the financial,administrativeand judicialreformsthathadgone before.Butwhereasthe revolutionarieshadfeltbound bytheprincipleofelection, theaccountabilityofpublic authoritiestolocalpeoplein towns,districtsand departmentsacrossFrance, theFirstConsulwasmore concernedwithefficiencyand thesmoothrunningofan administrativemachine.And wherethemenof1793had oftenbeenforcedtopass emergencymeasurestodeal withshort-termcrises,adding newlawstotraditionallegal codesthattheyinheritedfrom theOldRegime,Napoleon soughtamoreambitious, morepermanent,more rationalreformofthelaw. Therevolutionarieshadnot hadthetimeorspaceevento dreamofcodifyingtheentire legalsystem,creatinga commonlawcodeforall. Napoleon,ontheotherhand, dreamedintheseterms,and hehadboththepersonal authorityandthebureaucratic meanstocarryitout. CentraltoBonaparte’s conceptofefficiencywasthe ideathat,ascitizens,menhad obligations,andthatthese couldnotbeevaded.These obligationswerequite separatefromideological commitment;theywerethe dutiesthatthestatehadthe righttoexpectallitscitizens toperform,regardlessof politics,andwereimposed uponthemaccordingly.The paymentoftaxes,serviceon juries,militaryrequisitions andconscription–aboveall, conscription–thestatecould imposeofright.These impositionswerethepricethe individualmustpayfor membershipofthepolitical community.Administrators, prosecutors,judgesand publicofficialsmustbeloyal tothestatebecauseofthe natureoftheiroffice,not becausetheybelievedinthe state’sprecepts;inshort,they wereservantsofthe government,bureaucratsin themodernsenseoftheterm. Thischangedidnotoriginate withtheConsulate;the Directoryhadalreadybegun tosteerFranceinthis directionandtorelyoncivil servantsratherthanon militantsans-culottesor Jacobinidealiststocarryout itspolicies.41 Napoleon,however,took thisprinciplefurther,building onwhattheRevolutionhad achieved,yetunafraidto incorporateelementsof practiceborrowedfromthe OldRegimewherethese seemedtoservehimbest. Thusheretainedtheprinciple ofdirecttaxationwhichthe revolutionarieshad introduced,butsupplemented itbylessprogressiveindirect taxesofthekindthathad beenleviedintheeighteenth century.Hereformedthe secondaryschoolsystemto trainaneducatedeliteforthe newregime,introducing lycéesinmajorcitiesand centralisingthecurriculum throughthenewUniversityof France.Andhetookthe systemoflocalgovernment whichtheRevolutionhad createdin1790–thesystem ofdepartments,districtsand municipalitiesthatessentially remainsintacttothisday– andreformedittomakeit moreclearlyanswerableto centralgovernment. Theprincipleofelection wasplayeddown,andthe newofficeofprefectcreated toensurethatprovincial governancereflectedthe wishesofParis,notpressures fromlocalpeople.Adecree of1800replacedelected representativesinthe departmentswithco-opted members,whosefunction wasthenreducedfrom administrationtosimple deliberation.Somehaveseen theinstitutionoftheprefect asareturntotheOld Regime’sroyalintendants, butthenewsystem–where thesub-prefectswerechosen locallysoastohaveinside knowledgeofthedepartment, whereastheprefectalways camefromoutside,bringing theobjectivitywhichthat guaranteed–wasamuch moreeffectivetoolof centralisation.Theinstitution layattheheartofthe Napoleonicsystem.As NicholasRichardsonwrites, ‘Authoritarianandhighly centralised,theprefectoral corpswasatypically Napoleonicinnovation: indeed,ifgovernmentwasto meannotonlyParisbutthe provinces,itwastheessential innovation.’42Napoleon appliedtheprefectoralsystem tothesisterrepublicscreated undertheDirectory,andin theyearsthatfollowedto furtherterritoriesthatFrance cametooccupyacross Europe. Administrativeand judicialreformswenthandin handastheFirstConsul soughttocodifytherights andobligationsofcitizenship. Perhapsthegreatestsingle initiativeoftheConsular period–andcertainlytheone ofwhichBonapartehimself wasmostproud–wasthe CivilCode,whichwasthe principallegalreformofthe Consulate,thoughitonly cameintolawinMarch1804. Napoleonwasnotthefirstto dreamofcodifyingthelaws ofthenewRepublic,orof bringingsomecoherenceto themassofRomanand commonlaw,constitutional lawandstatutelawwhichthe FirstRepublichadamassed. Asearlyas1792a commissionofjurists–on whichBonaparte’sfuture allies,Cambacérèsand MerlindeDouai,were alreadyprominent–hadbeen establishedtocodifycivil laws,andtherehadbeen repeatedattempts,rightupto Brumaire,tobringorderto thelegalcode.Oncein power,theFirstConsul appointedacommitteeof fourlegalluminariestodraft acomprehensivecodeof laws,adraftofwhichwas producedwithinfourmonths. Itwasstalled,however,by discussionsintheTribunate, delayswhichangered Bonaparteandledhimto purgeitsmembership,before theCodewasfinallypassed intolaw.43 Hereafter,theCodewould becentraltoeverythingthat Napoleondid,andwouldbe imposedonallpeopleswho wereintegratedintohis Empire.Itwasasubstantial achievement:itconfirmed propertyrights,announced thedisappearanceofthe feudalaristocracy,andplaced greatvalueonthefamilyand ontheinterestsofthestate.It alsoadoptedthesocial principlesof1789,suchas individualliberty,equality beforethelawandthe secularisationofthepolity. Thatinturnexplainsthe immediateimpactitmade, bothinFranceandbeyondits frontiers.ForGeorges Lefebvre,itwasalandmark moment;it‘sweptthrough Europeasthesymbolofthe Revolution,andheralded, whereveritwasintroduced, thefundamentallawsof modernsociety’.44 BehindtheFirstConsul’s reformslayadouble objective–thedesireto controlandadminister effectively,andtheambition tounifythepeoplebehind himandthusendsomeofthe ideologicalsplitsthathad doggedtherevolutionary years.In1800rebellionbroke outagainintheVendée,and hisresponsewastelling–a decisivemilitaryintervention tosuppresstherisinganda refusaltotoleratearmed rebellion,combinedwithhis desiretoendanyfurther threatofreligiousschism.He recognisedthatthe Revolution’sattemptstocurb theCatholicChurchhad helpedtomobilisethedeeply religiousWestagainstits policiesandhadbeenoneof theprimarycausesof rebellion.Thiswasa political,notaspiritual, decision,andtheConcordat whichhesignedwithRome wasatheartapoliticaltreaty, deliveringpeacewithRome whilebestowingthe governmentoftheFrench Churchonacarefully selectedadministrativeelite ofbishopsandarchbishops, responsibleforclerical recruitment,pastoral oversight,administration,and clericalfinances.45 Bonapartehimselfgave littlehintofreligiousbelief; hiseternalsoulwasnotin danger,andhecouldaffordto regardtheChurch,andindeed thePapacy,aspiecesonhis politicalchessboard.Buthis politicalinstinctstoldhim thattherewasmuchtogain fromreconciliationwith Rome,andPiusVIIappeared gratifyinglywillingtomake concessionstoregainforthe Churchtherichestcountryin CatholicChristendom.When agreementwasfinally announced,aftereighthard monthsofnegotiations,Pius achievedhismostimportant aim:Catholicismwas recognisedas‘thereligionof thegreatmajorityofthe Frenchpeople’,andFrench Catholicscouldagain worshipfreely.ButthePope paidahighprice.Thenumber ofbishopricsandparishes wasseverelyreduced,andthe bishopswhohadembraced counter-revolutionwereleft outinthecoldwhilesomeof thosewhohadsworntheoath totheCivilConstitutionwere retained.Aboveall, Bonaparteenjoyedtheloyalty ofthisnewclergy,aloyalty hewouldexploitbrutallyin theyearsahead.Royalists wereatastrokedeprivedof theirmostpowerful ideologicalsupport,while anti-clericals–stillalarge majorityoftheFrench population–wereappeased. Besides,Napoleoncouldnow countonsupportfromthe PapacyinthoseCatholic territoriesthatFrance annexedoroccupied.46 Inhisdomesticreforms Bonapartecouldpresent himselfasamoderniser,as theonemancapableofgiving Franceanewandstable politythatwoulddeliver goodlawsandinstitutional stabilityathome,andearn esteemabroad.Thosewho hademigratedorfledfrom FranceduringtheRevolution werepardonedandallowedto return–oncondition,of course,thattheynowswore loyaltytotheneworder; thosewhocontinuedtoplot andcampaignforaroyalist restorationcouldexpect,and received,littlemercy. ConsularFrancewasa meritocracy,wheremen couldmaketheirfortunesand berichlyrewarded,butwhere thehighesthonourswere reservedforservicetothe state.Itwasinthisspiritthat, in1802,theFirstConsul institutedtheLegionof Honourforthosewhohad providedthemostmeritorious serviceorwhohad distinguishedthemselvesin thepursuitofnational objectives.Theawardcould bemadeequallytocivilians andsoldiers,thoughin practiceitistruethatmostof thefirstrecipientswerearmy officers,andthatmostofthe adjudgedmerittooktheform ofmilitaryvalour.Tothat degreeitcanbeseenthatthe Légiond’Honneurbuiltupon theearlierawardofthearmes derécompensetomen servinginthearmiesofthe Directory,orthearmes d’honneurwhichtheConsuls themselvesestablishedin 1800.Therealdifferencelay initsprestige:theLegionof Honourwasinstantly recognisedasthemost importantacknowledgement ofmeritinanyfield,whereas theotherordersthat Napoleonwouldcreate subsequently,likethe CouronnedeFer, commandedfarlessprestige andpassedintoalmostinstant oblivion.47Thesethings matteredtoBonaparte.He believedthatmencouldbe luredandinspiredbysuch symbolsofesteem,andsaw themasnecessaryifthe FranceoftheRevolutionwas tobenudgedtowardsstability andorder. Therewasonepolicyof theseyears,however,which marredhisreputationasa moderniserandseemedto pullFrancebacktoitsprerevolutionarypast.In1801, afteryearsofwarand insurrection,theblackleader andformerslaveToussaint Louvertureseizedcontrolin theFrenchWestIndian colonyofSaint-Domingue, knowntodayasHaiti,and promulgatedanew constitutionindefianceofthe French.ManyoftheFrench plantersontheislandfled, eitherbacktoFranceortothe UnitedStates–Philadephia orNewOrleans–ortoother sugarislandsintheCaribbean wheretheycouldestablish newplantations,notably Cuba,wheretheslave economycontinuedto flourishacrossmuchofthe nineteenthcentury.The questionNapoleonfacedwas howtorespondtoan insurrectionthatthreatenedto destroyFrance’smost valuablecolonialpossession andtoleaveBritainwithan unchallengeablepositionin theCaribbean.Heplanneda newtrans-Atlanticstrategy thatwouldallowFranceto regainsomethingofher formerpowerintheregion, andin1802hemountedan expeditiontorecapturethe islandforFrance. Heorderedasizeablefleet andaroundnineteenthousand soldierstotheCaribbean, withinstructionstoimpose Frenchruleonthecolony, usingwhateverforcewas needed,captureToussaint andtheotherHaitianleaders, andtobringthembackas prisoners.Healsolethimself bepersuadedbythepowerful coloniallobbythatthiswas anopportunitytorestoreboth slaveryandtheAtlanticslave trade,bothofwhichhadbeen abolishedeightyearsearlier bytheConvention.48It provedamisguideddecision. Histroopsweredecimated, bothbyfeverandinbattle againsttheformerslaves, whilethethreattorestore slaveryspreadhavocand disorderacrosstheFrench Antilles.Toussaintwasduly capturedandtakenbackto Francetodie,butlittleelse wasachieved.TheFrench causewaslostontheisland until,on1January1804, JacquesDessalinespublished adeclarationofindependence thatabolishedtheFrench nameandbroughtintobeing theworld’sfirstblack republic,Haiti.49In neighbouringGuadeloupe, whereFrancedidrestore order,slaverywasreinstituted in1802,butanyFrench dreamofanewconquestof Haitiwasdoomedtofailas Bonaparteturnedhisback, notjustontheCaribbeanbut onthewholeoftheAmerican hemisphere.Thesaleof LouisianatotheUnitedStates wasthelogicalnextstep,one thatnotonlyavoidedanew warinAmericabuthelpedto disguisetheextentof France’sfailureinthesugar islands.50Itrepresented, however,somethingofa volte-faceforNapoleonic foreignpolicy,aquickand radicalchangeofdirection thattookeventheAmerican negotiatorsbysurprise.The salebroughtFrancesome eightymillionfrancsandleft Napoleontofocushis ambitionsontheEuropean continent.51 Theyearsfrom1799to 1803werecriticalfor Napoleon.Itwasinthose yearsthathelaiddownthe broadlinesofpolicywhich hewouldpursue,bothat homeandabroad.Inspiteof continuedroyalistagitation, heentrenchedhisauthority overdomesticpolitics,andin 1802anotherplebiscite confirmedhimasFirst Consulforlife,achangethat provedonesteptoofarfor someofthemorecommitted republicans.Theywerealso criticalyearsforNapoleon personally:hewasreunited withJosephineandatlast seemedtofindsomestability andfulfilmentinhis relationshipwithher.In Egyptithadseemedthathis expressionsofaffectionwere unrequitedandthatJosephine wasafreespiritwhocould notbereinedin.Buthis fortunesinlovechanged dramaticallyafterhisreturn toFranceandhisriseto politicalpowerinParis. Josephine,whohadthrown herselfwithsuchabandon intothehighlifeof DirectorialParis,andwhose affairwithHippolyteCharles hadbeenthestuffofgossipin allthesalonsofthecapital, nowlivedamoreretiring– thoughfarfromchaste– existence.Shewasdeeplyin debt,however,inpartdueto thethreehundredandtwentyfivethousandfrancsshehad lavishedonthechâteauof Malmaison,nearSaintGermain-en-Laye,adebtshe trieddesperatelytohidefrom herhusband.Butatleastshe seemedpleasedtoseehim, wasathissideduringthe eventsofBrumaire,and showedsuitablealarmatthe supposedattemptonhislife atthetimeofthecoup,an event,intheverychamberof thelegislature,whichwas probablyinvented,likeother attemptsondeputies’livesin theyearssinceRobespierre’s fall.52Theywereapartagain, ofcourse,duringNapoleon’s enforcedabsencewiththe army;butafterMarengo, whenhereturnedtoParis theylivedinapparent harmony,firstinthe Luxembourgpalace,thenat Malmaison. Napoleon’ssecretary, Bourrienne,paintsanidyllic pictureofthisperiodofhis master’slife,livedintasteful surroundings,withawife withwhomhewasclearly deeplyinlove.Helavished attentiononthechateau, buyingartworksand orderingrareplantstopander toJosephine’stastes.Heeven boughtaroundfivethousand acresofsurroundingfarmland andimprovedtheestate. ‘Exceptonthefieldofbattle’, wroteBourrienne,‘Inever sawBonaparteashappyashe wasatMalmaison.’53Of course,itwouldnotlast.As Josephinebecameawareof herinfertilityandrealisedthat thismustputthefutureof theirmarriageatrisk,she begansufferingdeepattacks ofdepression.ForNapoleon thiswasanenchantedperiod intime,butthoseclosetohim realisedthatevenashe cavortedwithhisfamilyon thelawns,thestormclouds werealreadygathering. 7 FromConsulateto Empire ThoughmuchofNapoleon’s reformingagendaasFirst Consulhaditsrootsinthe FrenchRevolution,withhis administrativeandjudicial reformsextendingand codifyinglawspassedduring thepreviousdecade,his conceptionofpersonalliberty wasstrictlycircumscribed. ThroughouttheConsulatehis concerntoprotectthe authorityandtheinterestsof thestatewasmaintained,and therewasanunmistakably authoritarianstreakinhis approachtogovernmentand inhisresponsetoanyhintof opposition.TheFirstConsul mightspeakthelanguageofa republican;butwhenhe foundhimselfchallengedhe frequentlybetrayedthe instinctsofadictator, silencingopponentsand concentratingpoweronthe smallbodyofmenwhomhe felthecouldtrust.Hehad littlepatiencewithlibertarian notions,eventhoseexpressed byhisfriendsandallies;and iftheConsulatewasaperiod markedbyimportant measuresofjudicial, educationalandreligious reform,itwouldalsobe rememberedasaregimethat drasticallyerodedthecivil libertieswhichhadbeen grantedin1789bythe NationalAssembly. ThebehaviouroftheFirst Consulandhiscollaborators contributedsignificantlyto thaterosionincensoringthe printmedia,extendingthe powersofthepolice,and makingliberaluseof preventivedetentionto containopponentsofthe regime.1Thesemeasures madeamockeryoftheir claimstoactasdefendersof ‘publicliberty’,andhelpto explaintheincreasingly frequentportrayalof BonaparteinBritainand otherEuropeancountriesasa usurperandatyrant.They mustalsocastdoubtonhis claimstobearepublicanwho wascarryingforwardthe legacyoftheFrench Revolution.Britishwriters emphasisedhissupposed excessesofcruelty,citinghis behaviouratJaffawherehe allegedlyorderedthe poisoningofhisownplagueriddentroopstopreventthem fromfallingintoenemy hands.2Hewasroutinely comparedtoCromwell,to WilliamtheConqueror,orto those‘greatbadmen’of Antiquity,Alexanderand Caesar.Thesheerdifficulty theyfoundinplacing Napoleoninanysingle politicalcategoryleft pamphleteerssearchingfor exoticwaystoexplainhis contradictions.Inapamphlet of1802hewasintermittently describedasa‘monster’; whilefortheMorningPostin 1803hewassimply‘an unclassifiablebeing’, slippery,elusiveand enigmatic.3 Hecertainlylovedpower, andshowedlittletastefor delegatingittoothers.Hehad nopatiencewithlong,drawnoutdiscussions,orwith debatingthemeritsof individualmeasuresor heedingtheoscillationsof publicopinion.TheTribunate attractedparticularscornasa time-wastingtalkingshop, andNapoleon’scontemptwas increasedbytheinclusionin itsmembershipofanumber offormerJacobinswhowere readytodefendthelegislative gainsoftheRevolution.4In placeofthelegislators,he turnedtoasmallcircleof trustedcounsellorsinwhose handsheconcentratedwealth andpower,andwhobecame loyalspokesmenforhis policies.Severalofthosewho wouldbecomethemost powerfulpoliticalfiguresof theEmpireemergedto prominenceunderthe Consulate,provingtheir usefulnesstoBonaparteand helpingmaintainsome pretenceofpluralisminthe decision-makingprocess. Theyalsosymbolisedthe continuitiesthatboundthe Consulatetotherevolution thatprecededit,since,almost bydefinition,thosewhorose toapositionofpowerin1800 hadservedinoneorotherof therevolutionary administrations.Napoleon wouldappeartohavecared littleabouttheirpast affiliationsaslongasthey offeredhimunswerving loyaltyandbroughttheir legalandadministrativeskills totheserviceofhisregime. Andtherewasplentyoftalent tobetapped.Thegeneration thathadgovernedFrance undertheRevolutionwas bothhighlytalentedandmore mature;andindividual careers,likehisown, reflectedthesudden explosionofopportunitythat hadcomein1789. Threeexampleswill sufficetoindicatetherange oftheirexperience. Napoleon’sright-handman, Cambacérès,waschosenfor hisundoubtedqualitiesasa cautiousandpunctilious administrator.Alawyerfrom Montpellier,hehadbeen electedtotheNational Conventionin1792andwent ontosupporteachsuccessive phaseoftheRevolutionasa highlycompetentmemberof committeesandamoderate butloyalrepublican. Cambacérèsfirstsupported theGirondinadministration, then,whentheGirondins wereoverthrown,heaccepted theirdownfallandthe Jacobinseizureofpower.5 Talleyrand,whohadcharge offoreignaffairs,wasfarless transparent.Anephewofthe ArchbishopofReims,hehad spentthemonthsofthe JacobinTerrorinexilein London,returningafter Robespierre’sfalltotake overtheforeignministryin 1797.Itwasinthiscapacity thathehadfirstmetGeneral Bonaparte,withwhomhe correspondedatlengthin Italyandwhosecareerhehad helpedtoadvance;hewas amongtheconspiratorsat Brumaire,andBonaparte rewardedhimrichly.6 Talleyrandcouldcertainlynot havebeenmoredifferent fromthestaunchlyJacobin JosephFouché,towhom Bonaparteentrustedoverall controlofpolicing.Fouché hadenjoyedareputationfor beingaferociousterrorist, bothintheConventionand onmissiontoLyonin1793, buthadthenhelpedto overthrowRobespierreand hadbeenMinisterofPolice undertheDirectory.Asa formerOratorian,educated forthepriesthood,he reservedaparticulardislike fortheCatholichierarchyand washappytohelptheFirst Consulforgealargelysecular state. Lookingbackonalong career,thefutureDukeof Otrantodisplayednohumility inlistinghismany achievements.Duringthe Revolution,hewouldremind readersofhismemoirs,he hadbeen‘solelyindebtedfor thehonoursandpowerwith whichhewasinvested,and, inshort,forhisdistinguished fortune,tohisownprudence andabilities’.Under Bonaparte,Fouchéwouldgo ontoenjoyadazzling politicalcareeras‘an ambassador,threetimesa minister,asenator,aduke, andoneoftheprincipal directorsofstateaffairs’.7He wasamongthefewinthe innercirclewhocounselled cautionatkeymoments, attemptingtodissuade Napoleonfromgettingtoo deeplyinvolvedinSpainin 1808,fromfurther antagonisingtheBritishin 1810,orfromlaunchinghis expeditionagainstRussiain 1812.8Hecommanded respectforhispolitical wisdom,buthewasan opportunistwhodidnot invitetrust.Napoleonknew whathewasdoingin investingauthorityinFouché: hewasamanwhosepridehe couldexploitforhisown ends. Itisinstructivetolingeron JosephFouché,notbecause hebroughtasinisteror vengefulstyletopolitics–he appearstohavebeensuave andurbane,andtohaveleda blamelessprivatelifeasa goodfamilymanwithhis wifeandfourchildreninan apartmentontherueduBac9 –butratherbecauseofthe crucialrolehegaveto policinginNapoleonic France.Heextendedthe manpoweratthedisposalof thepolice,especiallyinParis, andsupplementedthemwith anetworkofsecretagents, informersandpolicespies whokepthiminformedatthe firstsignofdisaffectionor publicdisorder.Theywere drawnfromacrosssociety: menofwealthandsubstance –whenthesecouldbe inducedtoinform–butalsoa varietyofpeopleofhumble stock:pedlarsand hairdressers,valetsand servants,bartendersand prostitutes,onwhompolice pressurecouldbebroughtto bear.10Fouché’smethods earnedhimnotorietyinthe eyesofliberalsanddefenders oftherightsofindividual citizens.Hisspiesweregiven officialstatuswithinthe policeforce,andfrombeing, initially,privatepolicemen paidforoutofspecialfunds, theyweresubsequentlygiven therankofinspectorandpaid bythestateorbythecity authority.Theywere authorisedtoshadow suspects,openprivatemail, andcollectwitnessstatements frompassers-by;inshort, theycollectedinformationon thosetheypursued,passingit totheministrytobeentered inthesystematicanddetailed filingsystemwhichFouché constructed.Thesefileswere notjustoncriminalsand insurgents,butonspiesand ministers,radicalsand royalists,armyofficers,state officials,even,itwasalleged, onNapoleonhimself.11 Itisunsurprisingthat Fouchémadesomany enemies,notleastamong rivalsforpowerlike Cambacérèsandmembersof theBonaparteclan,who,with thesoleexceptionof Josephine,regardedhimwith acertainrevulsion;his relationswithLucien Bonaparte,whoasMinister oftheInteriorranhisown spynetwork,wereespecially strained.12ButNapoleon’s repressiveapparatusdidnot stopwiththepolice.The Consulatewasalsotheperiod whenhemadegreatestuseof militarycourtsandspecial tribunalsinabidtocrush brigandageandimpose summaryjusticewithout recoursetoajury.In1801 specialtribunalswerecreated intwenty-sevendepartments, largelyinthebadlandsofthe SouthandtheWest;another ninecametobeaddedover thefollowingtwoyears,until theycoveredmorethana thirdofthecountry.13 Napoleon’smeasuresto controlthepopulationand curboppositiondidnotpass withoutcriticismandhe neededtojustifythem–not leasttothepoliticalclass.He wasconsciousofthedangers ofpoliticalinsurrection,of thepossibilityofarenewed outbreakofroyalistintrigue intheWest,ofneo-Jacobin intriguesinthecapital. Recentattemptedcoups– Fructidor,evenBrumaire itself–showedhow vulnerablethegovernment couldstillbetofactional plotsandundercover manoeuvres.Butitwas difficulttojustifywhatmany sawasrepressivelawsonthe basisofmerespeculation. Then,quitedramatically,the FirstConsulwashimselfthe victimofanactofterrorism thatkilledatleasteight peopleandinjuredover twentywhenahugebomb explodedafterhiscarriage passedalongtheRueSaintNicaiseinParisonChristmas Eve,1800.Bonapartewas travellingtotheOpera,his coachescortedbyacompany ofmountedtroops,whenhis waywaspartlyblockedbya seed-merchant’scart.The coachmandidnothesitate, butcontinuedathisusual galloparoundtheobstruction, adecisionwhichalmost certainlysavedtheFirst Consul’slifeandrescuedthe Consulatefromconstitutional crisis.Napoleonimpressed thosearoundhimby pretendingthatallwascalm andgoingaheadtothe performance.Buttherewas nodenyingtheseriousnessof whathadhappened.The regimewasconfrontedbya breakdowninsecurityandthe possibilitythatitmightnow faceaseriesofassassination attempts. The‘infernalmachine’ inspiredthegovernmentto unleashanewwaveof repressivemeasuresas Napoleonturnedhisanger againsttheneo-Jacobins, orderingtheclosureoftheir remainingclubsandpressing fortheirprosecution. Fouché’sposition,too,was undermined,bothbecausehe hadfailedtounearththeplot intimeandonaccountofhis ownJacobinconnections.In theevent,patientpolicework andFouché’sfileswould exoneratetheJacobinsand theLeftfromany responsibilityinthebombing, whichwastheworkof embitteredroyalists.The perpetratorsweredulytried andexecuted.Butthe consequenceofthe‘infernal machine’wasfarmoredeep- seated.ItallowedtheFirst Consultojustifynew measurestoprotectpublic order,includingafull-frontal assaultontheremaining neoJacobinactivistswho, thoughtheyhadcommitted nocrimeundertheConsulate, weredeemedtoconstitutea futurethreattotheregime. Onehundredandthirtyof themwerearrestedand deportedwithouttrialinan unprecedentedshowofpolice power.14 TheaffairoftheRue Saint-Nicaisewasultimately rememberedmoreforits legacythanforthedamageit didatthetime.It demonstratedthattheFirst Consuldidnothesitatetoturn thelawagainstthosehe perceivedashisopponents, justashewaspreparedto rideroughshodoverlegal nicetieswhenitsuitedhimto doso.Thefailed assassinationattemptmerely providedhimwiththe justificationheneeded.Italso playedtohisauthoritarian nature,sincethedeportation decreewasanactofabsolute power–andanundisguised abuseofthatpower–that wascleartoall.Italsohad morefar-reaching implicationsforsocietyat large,contributingtoamore authoritarianatmospherein theTribunateandtheCouncil ofState,whereitdiscouraged opendiscussionandsilenced criticismoftheregime. Perhapsbecausehisvictims wereJacobins,associatedin thepubliceyewiththebloodlettingoftheTerror,their victimisationmayhave causedlessofanoutcry abroad.Butitwasa significantmomentin Bonaparte’spolitical evolution,thefirsttimethat hehadactedindefianceof thelaw,andanactof vengefulspiteagainstthose whohaddaredtochallenge hisauthority.Thetimid responseofthedeputiesonly provedtohimthathehadgot awaywithit,alessonwhich hewasnotslowtotaketo heart.TheConsulatebecame moreandmorepersonalised, ‘ademocracy’,inthewords ofoneofitschampions, Cabanis,‘purgedofallits disadvantages’.15 Otherplotsfollowed.After theuncloakingofthe royalistsresponsibleforthe ChristmasEvebomb,Fouché andthenewPrefectofPolice forParis,LouisDubois, concentratedtheir investigationsonright-wing groups,royalists,Breton rebels(chouans),andothers whoseaimwastodestroythe republicanregimeandrestore themonarchy.Therewere,as always,constantrumoursof conspiracy,themajorityof themsaidtobeplannedfrom Londonorfundedbythe Britishgovernment’slavish secretservicefunds.These hadbeenusedthroughoutthe revolutionaryperiodto financemilitaryand diplomaticmissionsagainst France,includingtheill-fated expeditiontoQuiberonunder theDirectory.Duringthe trucefollowingAmiens, HenryAddingtonhadsought toextendthesecretservice campaign,stirringuproyalist discontentandoffering succourtoanydissident generalswhocouldbe persuadedtotopple Bonaparte’sgovernmentfrom theinside.16Themost threateningoutcomewasthe so-called‘GrandConspiracy’ of1803,inwhichtheKing’s brother,theComted’Artois, wascomplicit,andwhich Britainfinancedtothetuneof aroundamillionfrancs.The RoyalNavyalsosmuggled theconspiracy’sleaders,the dissidentGeneralPichegru andtheroyalistGeorges Cadoudal,acrosstheEnglish ChanneltotheFrenchcoast. Butatthatpointthe conspiracylostmomentum. Followingthebombattackon Napoleon’slife,theFrench policewereactiveinhunting downchouans,anumberof whomwerearrestedinParis inOctober1803.Theywere hauledbeforeamilitary commissionandsentencedto death,butoneofthem,to savehisskin,madea confessionthatimplicated Cadoudal,withwhom,he said,hehadlandedfroma BritishshipatDieppefive monthsearlier.Thenetwas closing,especiallyoncethe policeweregivenfurther names,amongthemthoseof twoFrenchgenerals,Moreau aswellasPichegru.The conspiracy,itseemed,was gainingforcebytheday,and itwasonlythesharpwitsof theParispoliceandthe willingnessofothersto informontheirleadersthat cametoBonaparte’said.He showedlittlemercytothose whowerefoundguilty. Moreau,whodeniedany involvement,mayhave escapedwithatwo-year sentence,buthewasthe exception.GeorgesCadoudal, ArmanddePolignac,the MarquisdeRivière,with seventeenoftheir accomplicesandseveralother conspirators,weresentenced todeath.AsforPichegru,he wasfounddeadinhiscell, thevictim,inthewordsofthe policereport,of‘self-inflicted strangulation’,nodoubthis wayofescapingtheclutches oftheexecutioner.17 Indemandingthe punishmentofthe conspirators,Napoleonwas unyielding,butitcouldbe arguedthathewasnotunjust: theyhadplottedhis overthrowandconspiredwith ahostilepower,sothattheir sentencesdidnotseem incommensurate.Duringhis interrogation,Cadoudalhad notconcealedthepurposeof theconspiracy:hemadeit clearthathehadplannedto useforceagainstNapoleon, addingthathisambitionwas ‘toputaBourboninplaceof theFirstConsul’,and identifyingtheBourbonin questionas‘Louis,Xavier Stanislas,formerlyknownas Monsieur,recognisedbyus asLouisXVIII’.18There couldbenoambiguity,but theexposureofthe conspiracyandthe seriousnessoftheroyalist threatraisedfurtherquestions towhichtheFirstConsul demandedanswers.Cadoudal hadindicatedtothepolice thathehadbeenalonein Paris,lyinglowuntilitwas timetoattack,since‘Iwas onlytoattacktheFirstConsul onceaFrenchprincehad arrivedinParis,andheisnot yetthere.’Butwhowasthis mysterious‘prince’?Itwasa questionthatconsumed Bonaparte,asitdidhis investigators. TheDucd’Artoishimself wasruledoutbecausehewas inexileinEngland;and suspicionfellontheyoung Ducd’Enghien,thesonofthe PrincedeCondéwhohad commandedtheémigréarmy. Therewaslittleevidenceto supportthechargethat d’Enghienwasanactive conspirator–littlemore, indeed,thanvaguestatements ofadmirationfromanumber ofcondemnedrebelsand knownroyalists.Oneofthe finalactsoftheConsulate, andamongitsleast honourable,wastoarrange forhimtobekidnappedfrom Ettenheim,intheneutral territoryoftheDuchyof Baden,andbroughtbackto Francetofacetrumped-up chargesofconspiracyand treason.Therewasno evidencethathehadhadany roleintheconspiraciesofthe previousyear;buthewasan emblematicfigureforthe counter-revolution,a Bourbon-Condéonhis father’sside,descendedfrom LouisXIV’sgreatestfield commander,andonhis mother’sfromPhilippe d’Orléans,whohadservedas regentduringLouisXV’s minority.AmongtheDuke’s directancestorshecould countHenriIV,andnewsof hisbirthin1772hadbeen announcedimmediatelytothe KingatVersailles.19The condemnationofthisman waswidelyseenacross Europeasanactofblatant injustice,devisedtoshowthe worldthateventhemost powerfulfamilyconnections nowcountedfornothing. Fromtheverybeginning, theFirstConsultooka personalinterestintheaffair, readingcountlessdespatches andsendingdetailed instructionsaboutthe measurestobetaken.To Réal,whomhechargedwith theinvestigationofthe Pichegruconspiracy,heeven listedthequestionswhichhe wantedtheinvestigatorsto puttotheirprisoner.All pointedtohisinvolvementin treasonableactivity.Hewas tobeaskedwhetherhehad bornearmsagainsthis country;ifhewasinreceipt ofpaymentfromtheEnglish; ifheknewofpaymentsby theEnglishtoémigrés campedalongtheRhine;and whetherhehadproposedto raisealegionoftroopsby encouragingdesertionamong thesoldiersoftheRepublic. Therewereotherquestions, too,inBonaparte’s catechism,abouttheletters theDukehadsentand received,andabouthis contactswithknown conspirators,allsuggestiveof hisinvolvementina conspiracyagainstthe regime.20Bonaparteknewhis man:fortheDukewas notoriouslyimpolitic, consigningtoomanyofhis thoughtstopaper,dreaming ofseizingAlsaceand invadingFrancefromthe east.Hewasknownabroad, too,andsomeofhis correspondencehadeven beenquotedintheBritish press.21Findingevidenceof hiscounter-revolutionary sentiments,oroftheawein whichhewasheldinroyalist circles,wouldnotbedifficult, andbythetimeheappeared beforeahastilyassembled militarycommission, d’Enghienwasalready doomed. Theyoungprincewas executedbyfiringsquadat themilitaryfortressof Vincennes,totheeastof Paris,andalmost immediatelyhewas immortalisedinromantic legend.ForChateaubriand theexecutiondidnotonly offerproofofNapoleon’s cruelty,orofhisdespotic nature.Itspreadaglacial fear,hewroteinMémoires d’outretombe,fearofareturn tothereignofRobespierre. ‘Paristhoughtitwasseeing againoneofthosedaysthat onlyhappenonce,thedayof LouisXVI’sexecution’.22 Napoleon,ofcourse,saw thingsdifferently.OnSaint Helenahewouldjustifyhis decisiononthebasisof nationalemergencyand naturallaw,andwouldtryto blamethosewhohadplotted hisassassinationforwhathe seemedtoadmitwasanactof vengeance.‘Agreatnation hadplacedmeatitshead,’he explained.‘Almostallof Europehadacceptedthis choice;myblood,afterall, wasnotmadeofmud;itwas timetoshowthatitwasthe equaloftheirs.’23 Napoleon’scriticsargued thatthed’Enghienaffairwas notjustamomentary aberration,butproofofthe degradationofpublic accountabilityduringthe Consulate,thedangerous concentrationofpowerinthe handsofoneman.Indeed, thereisampleevidencethat thecharacteroftheregime hadchangedsincethedays afterBrumaire,withtheFirst Consulbecomingless answerabletothepublic,and thechecksandbalancesof Sieyès’originalconstitution lessrespected.Thestate mightstillberepublicanin form,butthemoveto personalpowerwas unmistakable.Fromthevery beginningsomehad harboureddoubtsaboutthe Consulate,perceivingits potentialtoturnintoa dictatorship;andthe replacementoftheoriginal candidatesforSecondand ThirdConsulwithCaulaincourtandLebrun,known moderatesandmen favourabletoNapoleon, confirmedthesuspicionthat theonlyvoicethatreally countedwasBonaparte’s. Besides,theconstitutiongave himunprecedentedauthority: hewasauthorisedtoappoint themembersofthelegislative bodiesaswellasgovernment ministers,ambassadors,and armyandnavalofficers.24 Thibaudeau,oneofthemost astuteofhiscritics, recognisedhowfarthiswas anassaultontheprincipleof representativegovernment. Sincethecoupof18 Brumaire,hewroteinanote totheFirstConsul,‘things havecometothepointwhere nofreeconstitutionis possibleunlessyou specificallywantit.’Andif Napoleonweretodisappear fromthescene,whatwould remainofthebravenew worldtheyhadbuilt? ‘Nothing’,hereplied. ‘NothingoftheRevolution, ofliberty,ofthegloryofthe nation,ofyourownglory, nothingotherthanbitter memoriesandlacerations.’25 Becauseexecutive authoritywasstrongand politicalfactionalism discouraged,theFirstConsul couldleavePariswith relativeequanimitywhenhe wentoncampaign.Buthe clearlystillwantedmore recognition,morestability, morepower;andin1802, followinghismilitary triumphsandthesigningof peace,themomentseemed ripeforsomeexpressionof thenation’sgratitude.What followedisdeeplyinstructive aboutNapoleon’spolitical ambition.TheSenate,eager topleasehimandanxiousnot tolosehisservices,votedto extendhistermofofficebya furthertenyears,which wouldhavekepthiminoffice till1820.Butthisdidnot suffice;somesuggestthatthe FirstConsulevenfoundthe offerinsulting.Whatis certainisthatCambacérès, doubtlessreadingNapoleon’s wishes,persuadedtheSenate towithdrawitsofferand, instead,toputtothepeoplein aplebiscitetheproposition thatBonapartebemadeFirst Consulforlife,thereward whichhereallysought. Obedientlytheydidso,and obediently–andpublicly,for therewasnothingsecret abouttheballot–the electoratevoted.Theresult, Cambacérèsreported,wasa resoundingtriumph.Ofthe 3,577,259Frenchmenwho casttheirvote,3,568,885 votedforthelifeconsulate. Forgoodmeasure,the Senateaddedexpressionsof affectionanddeference.In proclaimingNapoleon BonaparteFirstConsulfor life,theydeclaredthatthey wishedtoexpress‘the confidence,loveand admirationoftheFrench people’;and,withoutany apparentsenseofirony, decreedthat‘astatueof peace,holdinginonehand thelaurelsofvictory,inthe othertheSenate’sdecree,will bearwitnesstoposterityof thegratitudeoftheNation’.26 Butweneednotbedeceived. Votinginplebiscitesduring theConsulateandtheEmpire wasconductedinpublic,and fearplayeditspartin harvestingvotesforthe regime.Soldiers’votesalso helpedtoboostthe appearanceofenthusiasmfor Napoleon,whilelistsof votersweredrawnupby prefectsandsub-prefects, consciousoftheneedto producefiguresthatsustained hisauthority.Recentresearch hasdemonstratedthatthe figuresweresystematically manipulated,thatthedeclared resultoftheplebisciteonthe ConstitutionoftheYearVIII wassimplywrong,andthatin somedepartmentspolling waskeptopenforadditional daysuntilenoughpeoplehad beendragoonedintovoting.27 Therewereotherchanges, too,inthenewconstitutionof YearX,allreinforcing Napoleon’sexecutive authority:thenumberof deputiesintheTribunatewas cutanditsfreedomofaction reduced;andtheFirstConsul couldnowsigntreaties withoutlegislativeratification andexercisetheprerogative ofmercy.Most controversiallyofall,hewas giventherighttonamehis successorandthus, potentially,tofounda dynasty–though,atthis stage,thelawdidnotrulethe posthereditary.28Formany republicans,however,this wasasteptoofar,astepthat unmistakablypointedinthe directionofmonarchyand representedabetrayalofthe valuestheyhadfoughtfor throughouttheprevious decade.Thibaudeau,inhis notefortheFirstConsul, statedterselythatthe executiveappearedtobe armingitselfattheexpenseof publicliberties.‘Theword stabilityistheorderofthe day;Iamastonishedthatitis notreplacedbyeternity.’29 Napoleonpaidlittleheed tosuchfears,acceptingthe newpowersconferredonhim andofferinghisthankstothe senators.Thelanguageofhis replyon3August1802is gracious,andseemingly consistentwiththeidealof theRepublic.‘Thelifeofa citizen’,hebegan,‘belongsto hiscountry.TheFrench peoplewishthatminebe entirelydevotedtoit.Iobey itswill.Ingivingmeanew pledge,apermanentpledgeof itsconfidence,itimposeson methedutyofconsolidating itssystemoflawsonwellfoundedinstitutions.Bymy effortsandyourcooperation, CitizenSenators,andwiththe assistanceofallthe authorities,withthe confidenceandwillofthis immensepeople,theliberty, equalityandprosperityof Francewillbeshelteredfrom thecapriceoffateandthe uncertaintyofthefuture’.30 Therewaslittleinhiswords tofrightenhislisteners,or implymonarchicalambitions. Therewas,though,more thanasuggestionoftheregal aboutthesenewpowers, whateverthelanguagein whichtheywerecouched. TheboyfromAjacciohad alreadytakenalargestep towardsthethrone,and contemporariesnotedthatthe FirstConsulsurrounded himselfwithmuchofthe panoplyofamonarch.There islittledoubtthatheenjoyed thepompandluxuryof office.Histasteforlavish displayhadfirstaroused commentduringtheItalian campaign,whenhe sometimesseemedtoactless likearepublicangeneralthan arulerinhisownright, insistingonanelaborate etiquettethatwasredolentof courtceremonial.Whenhe stayedatthePalazzo SerbelloniinMilan,thepoet AntoineArnaultcompared hisdrawingroomtothefoyer oftheParisOpera,and observedthat‘neverdida militaryheadquarterslook morelikeacourt’.31Atthe castleofMombelloin1797, MiotdeMelitoobservedthat heheldcourtlikeaking, receiveddiplomatsand ambassadorslikeaking,and evendinedinpubliclikea king,drawinganadoring gazetohisperson.Asa consequence,remarksPhilip Dwyer,‘Italianswhocameto catchaglimpseofthe conquerorofItalywere allowedintothegalleriesto watchwhileheateina remarkablepublicdisplayof theselfreminiscentofLouis XIV’sperformancesat Versailles’.32Thistastefor displayandhisconcernfor thenicetiesofetiquette continuedtomarkhispublic appearances–hisexcursions intoParis,hispresenceat lavishdinnersattheTuileries –duringtheConsulate.The household,whetherat Josephine’spalaceat Malmaison,oratSaintCloud,wheretheConsulate hadbeeninaugurated,was increasinglylikenedtoaprerevolutionaryroyalcourt.33 Ratherinthemannerofa monarch,Bonaparteshowed aconsistentconcernto furthertheinterestsofhis familyand,evenasFirst Consul,appearedtogive thoughttohereditary succession.Hisfamily remainedimportanttohim– notjustthenuclearfamily thatmightonedayproduce anheir,butalsothewider Bonaparteclan,whilehis mother,Letizia,wasstill frequentlyconsultedbyher son.Theolderbrothers, JosephandLucien,hadbeen amonghissupportersat Brumaire,andtheycontinued toplayasignificantpartin thepoliticsoftheConsulate. Josephhadbeennamed CommissionerofWarforthe ArmyofItaly,ahighly lucrativepostthatenabled himtoaccrueasubstantial fortuneandestablishvaluable literaryandartisticcontacts whichheputattheserviceof theregime.Lucien,whose relationswithNapoleonwere alwaysuncertain,wasbriefly rewardedforhisloyaltywith thepostofMinisterofthe Interior,butafterarowwith hisbrotherhefoundhimself dismissedfromhisposition anddespatchedas ambassadortoMadrid.34Nor didLucieningratiatehimself withNapoleonwhenin1800 heauthorisedthepublication ofLouisdeFontanes’heavily ambiguouspamphletoffering whathetermedaParallel betweenCaesar,Cromwell, MonkandBonaparte,a comparisonrepudiatedbythe FirstConsulinspiteof Fontanes’conclusionthat,of thefour,onlyhecouldbe classedatruehero.35 Thecomparisonitselfwas, inmanypeople’seyes,a damningone,sincetomost FrenchmenCromwellwasa tyrantandusurper,andnot theguarantorofEnglish liberties,36andNapoleon viewedthepublicationwith distaste,seeingitasfurther evidenceofLucien’s unreliability.Luciendidnot seemundulyperturbed,and madeitclearthatwhilehe washappytoworkwithhis brotheringovernment,he baulkedatservingunderhim. Itisdoubtlessnotwithout significancethatunderthe EmpirethreeofNapoleon’s fourbrotherswouldbe rewardedwithkingdomsto rule(JosephinNaples,Louis inHolland,andJeromein Westphalia);onlyLucienwas givennothing.Napoleonwas onlytooreadytoberatehim forwhathedeemedtobe frivolity,alackofthe seriousnessthathis membershipoftheConsular firstfamilydemanded. Increasingly,hesawsuch failingsasareflectionupon– ifnotadirectinsultto–his ownstandingintheeyesof thenation. Thepromotionofhis brotherstopositionsof authorityinthestate,and latertothestatusofkingsin theirownright,wasaflagrant instanceofnepotismwhich demonstratedjusthowfarhe waspreparedtogotofurther theinterestsofhisfamily. Butthatdoesnotmeanthat hisbrotherswerewithout talent,orill-suitedtothehigh officesbestoweduponthem. Theproblemdidnotliein theirreluctancetoaccept responsibility,noryetintheir abilitiesasrulers.Joseph madeadecentjoboftwo well-nighimpossible missionsinNaplesandSpain, whileLouiscouldclaimthe remarkableachievement,for anoutsiderimposedonthe Dutchpeopleagainsttheir will,ofprotectingtheir interests,attimesindefiance oftheinstructionshereceived fromParis.Rather,the problemlaywithNapoleon, whowantedtocontrolthem, tomanagetheirgovernance, andtoimposepoliciesand economicobligationsonthem thatwouldalmostcertainly haveledtotheirrejectionby thenationstheyruled.Itwas soonclearthatNapoleon expectedhisbrothersto rewardhimwiththeir undividedloyalty.But,like Lucien,theysoonfollowed theirowninstincts.They werenotpreparedtobemere puppetsoftheEmperor. Louisturnedouttohave quiteatalentforkingship, despitethefactthatthe timingandcircumstancesof hisappointmentasKingof Hollanddidnothingtoendear himtotheDutch.Inthefour yearshewasallowedto remainonthethrone–before Napoleonhadhimremoved in1810,angrythatLouishad donenothingtostopthe widespreadsmugglingthat waslettingBritishgoods enterthecontinent–he establishedareputationasa conciliator,doingwhathe couldtostampoutpolitical factionalismanddemonstrate thathewaspreparedtostand upforDutchinterests.Hedid notcompletelysucceed,of course:Hollandremainedat peaceduringtheseyears,and therewerenonational crusadesthatwouldhave allowedhimtoemergeasa Dutchnationalheroandthus wintheaffectionofthe people.Inanycase,theDutch werenotaccustomedtobeing ruledbykings,notkingswith realpowersandauthority. Butitwouldbeharshto adjudgehisreignatotal failure,sinceittookplace againstthebackdropofa muchlarger,pan-European war,conditionsthatmadeit impossibleforhimtooppose hisbrother’swishes. Domesticallyhehadreal achievementstohiscredit.He simplifiedthepolity, improvededucational provision,strengthenedand modernisedthestate.These weresignificantstepsina countrywherepowerwas largelydecentralisedand decisionslefttoprovinces andtocommercialelites.Of coursepeoplegrumbled,but iftherewassomepopular resistancetotaxesand conscriptionduringhisreign, therewasnogeneral insurrection.AndtheDutch inthenineteenthcentury lookedbackonLouis’reign withoutalastingsenseof grievance.37 Joseph,whosegentle natureandgenuine commitmenttomanyofthe idealsoftheRevolution irritatedtheFirstConsul–he confessedtohatingthewar andseekinghappinessin nature–foundhimself continuallyatloggerheads withhisbellicosebrother,for whomthemajorroleofa kingwastoextractmenand moneyfortheFrenchwar effort.38Theirdifferences becameclearin1802,when Napoleonhadofferedto placeJosephattheheadof thenewlycreatedCisalpine Republic.Itwastrue,Joseph isquotedassaying,thathe hadbeenofferedthepost, ‘butatthesametimehe wantedtochainmetoit,and –knowingmybrotheras perfectlyasIdo,knowing howheavilyhisyokecan weighonedown–Ifelt,asa manwhohasalways preferredtheobscurityof privatelifetotheroleofa politicalpuppet,obligedto turnitdown.Iaskedhim, though,totellmewhathis conditionswouldbehadI accepted...Iinsistedthat Piedmontbereunitedtothe Italianrepublic,thatIbe givenfreedomtoreestablish theprincipalfortresses,and thathewithdrawFrench troopsfromtheterritory,and especiallyGeneralMurat’.39 Josephmightbemildmannered,buthewasnot spineless. Thispersonalisationof politicsliesattherootofthe moveawayfromrepublican traditionsandtowardsthe declarationoftheEmpirein 1804.Linkedtoitwas Napoleon’sdesireforanheir, hisinsistencethattheregime beperpetuated,andhis frustration,whichhemade littleattempttoconceal,that Josephinehadnotsucceeded inbearinghimason.The decreegrantinghimtheLife Consulatewasclearlya turningpoint,withthe monthsthatfollowedmarked byadiscernibleemasculation oftherepublicansymbolism andpublicceremonialon whichtheDirectoryhadbeen soinsistent.Instead,public festivalsbecamemoremartial intone,celebratingvictories inbattleandthereturnof triumphantarmiesfromwar, ratherthantherightsof citizensorthefallofthe Bastille.Cambacérès observedthealarmexpressed byanumberofprefectswho wereconvincedthateventhe NationalDayof14July mightbesacrificed,and republicanopinion outraged.40Thelistof festivalscelebratedinone provincialcity,Nantes,gives substancetothesefears.The republicanthemesappearto havebeendeliberatelyplayed downinfavourofthemilitary andthepersonofBonaparte. In1801therewerepublic celebrationsofthe proclamationofpeace,both onlandandatsea;in1802a festivaltocelebratethe elevationofNapoleontothe LifeConsulate;in1804 festivitiestomarkthe uncoveringoftheconspiracy againsthislife.41The emphasisonhisvictoriesand hispersonwasredolentofthe expressionsofthanksgiving thatwereroutinelyauthorised bytheBourbonmonarchy,or eventhepubliccelebrations thathadbeenpartofthe sustainedcampaignmore thanacenturyearlierto establishtheauthorityof LouisXIV.42 TheSenatetookstepsto encouragethemovetoa hereditarysystem,sending theFirstConsulloyal addressesandurginghimto completehispoliticalproject. Someofthesenatorsheld monarchistviews,andmany wereadvocatesofa conservativesocialorder whichlentitselfeasilytothe hereditaryprinciple.Among them,too,weremenwhohad seenserviceunderthe Directory;Talleyrand belongedtothispersuasion; so,vociferously,didRegnaud deSaint-Jeand’Angély,who announcedwithsatisfaction that‘TheSenatehas presentedanaddresstothe FirstConsul,finishingwith therequestforahighcourt forthenationandfor institutionsthatcould consolidatehiswork,sothat, havingrepairedthedamage fromthepast,hemightnow guaranteethefuture.’43Those pushingforchangeincluded someofhismosttrusted advisers,andnotallofthem canbedismissedastoadying sycophants. IfBonaparteharboured personalambitionstobea dynasticruler,hewasgiven plentyofencouragementby thosearoundhim,andbythe winterof1803–04the momentseemedripe.The truceinthewarhadallowed himtoregroup,hisarmywas preparingtoattackBritain, andtheplotsagainsthis personhadbeendestroyed. WithinFranceheappearedto enjoyunparalleledpopularity. Theonlyquestionmustbe whetherhedidindeed harbourtheseambitions: whetherhiscoronationas emperorwascarefully plannedinadvance.The answermustsurelybeyes. Theobsessivedetailofhis politicalinterventions,the increasinglyauthoritarian natureoftheregime,the diminutionofthepowersleft toelecteddeputies,the apparentcontemptforpublic opinionandthevoteofthe lifeconsulate:allcontribute toacoherentpictureofaman who,impatientwiththe nicetiesofconstitutional government,wasmoving perceptiblytoamore personal,moremonarchical styleofrule.Bonaparte consistentlydeniedthis,of course,andeveninexilehe continuedtomaintainthathe hadbeenfollowingnoclear planandhadnoambitionsto overthrowtheRepublic. ‘DuringtheConsulate’,he insistedonSaintHelena,‘my truefriendsandmost enthusiasticchampionswould askme,withthebestof intentionsandfortheirown guidance,whereIwas heading.Ialwaysanswered thatIhadnottheleast idea.’44Thefactthathe arguedinthiswaydoesnot, ofcourse,meanthatitwas true. Theimperialconstitution wasestablishedinMay1804, apparentlyinresponseto populardemandfromaround thecountry.IntheTribunate, speakerafterspeakerhailed the‘hero’Bonaparteand citedempireasadeviceto securehispowerratherthan asabetrayaloftheRepublic. Indeed,evenasthey conferredtheimperialtitleon Napoleon,theyseemed illogicallyloathtoletgoof theirrepublicanidentity.‘The governmentoftheRepublic,’ assertedtheratherconfused wordsofthelaw,‘is entrustedtoanemperor,who takesthetitle“Emperorofthe French”.’Thecreationofthe Empirewasentirelypersonal, aseamlesstransferenceof authoritythatwasarewardto oneman:‘Napoleon Bonaparte,currentlyFirst ConsuloftheRepublic,has becomeEmperorofthe French.’AndunliketheLife Consulate,theimperialtitle washereditary,ratherasthe thronesofkingswere hereditary. Thesecondclauseofthe decreeestablisheddynastic succession:‘Theimperial dignityishereditaryinthe direct,natural,legitimate lineageofNapoleon Bonaparte,frommaleto male,byorderof primogeniture.’45Infact,for aslongashehimself remainedchildless,his naturalheirswerehis brothers,thoughonebyone hedisinheritedthemfortheir waywardness,theirunsuitable marriages,ortheir disobedience,tillthedecree named‘LouisBonaparteand hisdescendants’as successorsto‘theimperial dignity’.ToLouis’dismayit thencloudedtheissueby leavingopenanotheroption, thatNapoleonmightchoose hissuccessorbyadoption. ‘NapoleonBonapartemay adoptthesonsorgrandsons ofhisbrothers,providingthat theyhavereachedtheageof eighteenyearsandthathe himselfhasnomalechildren ofhisownatthetimeof adoption.’46Thelawwas suppleenoughtobeadapted toNapoleon’swhimsand preferences. Surprisingly,thepromise ofaBonapartedynasty causedlesstroublewiththe electoratethanitdidinside thefamily.Menwhohad previouslydeclaredtheir loyaltytotheRepublic swallowedthiscontradiction withapparentease.Only Carnot,theformerJacobin who,asWarMinster,had deliveredthevictoriesof 1793and1794,hadthe couragetospeakoutagainst themeasureanddecrythe Empireasabetrayalof republicanprinciples.As ThierryLentznotes,thenew constitutionwasverbally sanitised.Thereisnohintthat sovereigntyrestsinthe Frenchpeople,aphrasethat hadbecomesomethingofa mantraforthe revolutionaries;andany wordswithastrongly republicanconnotation,like ‘nation’and‘people’,areno longerpartofthelexicon.47 Theimperialtitleandthe principleofhereditywereput tothepeopleinaplebiscitein June.However,aswehave alreadynoted,sincevotes wereopenandNapoleon controlledboththepoliceand themedia,itwouldberashto thinkofthisasameaningful formofpublicconsultation. Theresultconfirmedthis impression,withonly2569 votersrecordingtheir opposition.TheRepublicwas allowedtodiewithbarelya whimper. Thecoronationceremony thatfollowedinDecemberin Notre-Damewaslavishand sumptuous,heavywiththe symbolismofstateauthority andpersonalpower.Ithad manyofthetrappingsofa royalcoronationexceptthat, unliketheBourbonswho weretraditionallycrownedin Reims,NapoleonchoseParis, attheheartofthenation.He wasquitepreparedtobreak withtraditionhere,foritwas nottotheBourbonsthathe lookedforprecedentbut furtherbackintime,to CharlemagneandtheHoly RomanEmpire,athreadof continuitywhichhesawasa sourceoflegitimacy. Thedécorwassolemn, andthecostumesofthe EmperorandEmpress suitablylavish.48Theirrobes weredesignedtorecallthe antiquesplendourofimperial Romeaswellastoproducea senseofaweamong onlookers.Napoleonwas attiredintheimperialmantle ofcrimsonvelvet,lavishly decoratedwiththegolden beesthatwerehisinsignia; whileJosephineworea heavilyembroideredrobein matchingcolours,itstrain carriedbyfiveimperial princesses,including Josephine’sdaughterand Napoleon’sthreesisters.49 Theprocessionentered Notre-Damethrougha temporaryportico,specially enlargedfortheoccasionand constructedinwood, cardboardandstuccoina neo-Gothicstyleto complementthecathedral’s architectureandconceal damagedonetothebuilding duringtheanti-clerical excessesoftheRevolution.50 InMarshalMarmont’swords, itwasimpossibletoconceive ofanyscene‘moremajestic ormoreimposing’.Nothing, heclaimed,waslackingfrom theceremony.‘Thegloryof arms,thetriumphof civilisation,andtheinterest ofhumanity,allcontributed toitsmagnificenceandits adornment.’51 FollowingtheConcordat, theCatholicChurch,too,was presentinallitspomp,to giveitsblessingtothe Emperor.Thefactthatthe Popehimselfattendedmadea deepimpressionon onlookers,sinceitwasarare honourforapopetoattenda coronation,stilllesstotravel outoftheVaticantodoso. Charlemagnehimselfhadhad togotoRomein800tobe crowned;yethere,before theireyes,wasPiusVII, passingthroughParisatthe headofacortègeofcarriages glowingwiththebright clericalrobesofarchbishops andcardinals–asightmany hadbelievedunthinkable duringtheanti-clerical fervouroftheRevolution.52 ThePontiff’spresencewas adiplomatictriumphfor Napoleon,theresultof monthsofhardnegotiation and,attimes,brutalthreats.It wasamomentheavywith symbolicpower,itspolitical messagecarefullytailoredto itsintendedaudiences. Internally,itwasconceived ofasagestureof reconciliation.ForFrance’s millionsofCatholics,andfor therebeldepartmentsofthe west,itdemonstratedpapal approvalforthenewregime andconferredtheblessingof theChurchonthepersonof theEmperor.Forforeign rulers,especiallythoseof CatholicEurope,itwas calculatedtoofferadegreeof legitimacytoaregimethat remained,intheireyes, foundedonaregicide.Butit didnotconveyanyspiritof submissionorallegiance.Just astheConcordathadbeena politicalagreement,drawnup betweentwounequal partners,inwhichthestate’s interestwasparamount,so thecoronationceremonywas asymbolicaffirmationthat powerwasnowNapoleon’s. Famously,hedidnotallow thePopetoplacethecrown onhishead;theChurch’srole intheceremonywas restrictedtothatofblessing theImperialcouple. Napoleonrefusedboth ConfessionandHoly Communionforhimself,and keptPiuswaitingforawhole hourinthechurchbeforehe andJosephinearrivedforthe ceremony.Nordidhekneel beforethealtarinNotreDame.Thatwouldhave impliedacceptanceofthe authorityoftheChurch, whichhehadnowishto acknowledge.53 ThroughoutPius’extended stayinParis–hedidnot leavehisassignedquartersat theTuileriesuntilApril1805 –Napoleontreatedhisguest withastudiedlackofrespect, constantlyremindinghimthat he,notthePapacy,now commandedtemporal authority,andthattemporal poweralwaystook precedence.Intruth,Pius managedtoextractfew concessionsfromhishoston thematterswhichhe consideredimportant,most notablythecontinued employmentofexconstitutionalbishopsand revolutionarylawsonsecular marriageanddivorce.54 Napoleonwascarefultogive littleaway,forhisviewofthe worldremained fundamentallyirreligious.He wasasonofthe Enlightenment,amanforged inthespiritoftheRevolution, andinhiscoronationoathhe wentoutofhiswayto confirmmanyofthegainsof theRevolution.Hesworeon theGospel‘tomaintainthe integrityoftheterritoryofthe Republic;torespectandto imposerespectforthelawsof theConcordatandthe freedomofreligiousworship; torespectandimposerespect fortheequalityofrights,for politicalandcivilliberty,for theirreversibilityofthesales ofnationallands;toraise taxesandimposedutiesonly inaccordancewiththelaw;to maintaintheinstitutionofthe LegionofHonour,andto governtoadvancethe interests,thehappinessand thegloryoftheFrench people’.55Nowhereamong hisprioritieswasthereany specialstatusfortheChurch ofRome. Forallthis,thestepshe wasbeginningtotakemade manyaskthemselveswhere Napoleon’srealaimslay. Hadhereallyturnedhisback onthefoundingprinciplesof theFrenchRevolutioninthe pursuitofpersonalgloryand dynasticambition?Backin 1799,inaproclamationtothe Frenchpeople,thethree Consulshadrecommended theirnewconstitution, claimingthatitwas‘founded onthetrueprinciplesof representativegovernment, onthesacredrightsof property,equalityand liberty’.Theyhadconcluded withthehighlyambiguous claimthat‘theRevolutionis establisheduponthe principleswhichbeganit.It isended’.56Historianshave longdiscussedthemeaning oftheseseeminglyportentous words.Didtheyimplythat theirpurposewastooverturn theRevolutionandreverttoa morestable,more authoritarianregime?Ordid theyseetheRevolutionas beingcomplete,itsgains acquired,allowingFranceto enditslongyearsofturmoil anddisruption?Their ambiguityallowedmanyof thosepresenttobepersuaded, oncemore,togoalongwith measureswithwhichthey profoundlydisagreedorof whichtheyweredeeply suspicious. Foronedeputy,however, themeaningofthenew powersbestowedon Napoleonandofthe monarchicalgrandeurofthe coronationceremonywas clear.LazareCarnothad knownNapoleonlongenough tofeelthatheunderstoodhis ambitions,andtheywerenot fortheRepublic.Addressing hiscolleaguesinthe Tribunateon1May1804, Carnotexpressedthefears thatmanyofthemmust surelyhavefelt.Theyhad,he remindedthem,witnessedthe creationofahostof institutions,oneafterthe other,thatwerequite obviously‘monarchical’in spirit,butoneachoccasion theyhadbeenreassuredthat theyhadbeendevisedto protectliberty.Andnow,he declaimed,‘wearebeing calledupontopronounceon theformalpropositionto restorethesystemof monarchyandtoconferthe hereditaryimperialtitleon theFirstConsul’.Fora republicanlikehimselfthis wasonesteptoofar.While carefullyexpressingnodesire toreturntoaworldof politicalpartiesandfactions, hehadhadenough;he preferredtogointopolitical exileratherthanservethe Empire.‘Atthetime,Ivoted againstthelifeconsulate;and inthesamewayIshallvote againstthere-establishment ofmonarchy,asIbelievemy positionasamemberofthe Tribunateobligesmetodo.’ Headdedanoteofperceptive regretashesurveyedtheway inwhichtherevolutionary decadehaddisintegrated.The previousdynasty,he remindedhislisteners,had lastedforeighthundred years.Nowanewonewas beingborn.Hismainregret wasthat‘wehavenotbeen abletoestablishthe republicanregimeamongus, howeverhardwehavetried inasuccessionofmoreor lessdemocraticforms’.57 Withthesewordstheformer MinisterofWarcasthisvote againsttheimperial constitutionandbrought downthecurtainona remarkablepoliticalcareer. 8 QuestforGlory ThepeacesignedatAmiens inthespringof1802was alwaysfragile,andwithina yearNapoleonwasonce moreatwarwiththecountry thatheidentifiedashismost determinedandmost dangerousenemy,Great Britain.Therewaslittle surprisewhenthepeacewas broken.Bothgovernments recognisedthatnothing substantialhadbeenresolved inthetreaty,andthatithad beenatruceinhostilities ratherthanaresolutionof differences.TheBritish,in particular,wereresentfulthat theyhadgainedsolittlefrom theirefforts.Coloniesthat hadbeentakenbybothsides werehandedback,while Francewasleftasthe predominantlandpowerin WesternEurope, complementingthepowerof Russiaintheeastand effectivelyexcludingBritain frominfluenceonthe continent.TheFrenchstill controlledthestatestotheir east,fromHollandand Belgiumtotheplainsof LombardyandnorthernItaly. Austriahadbeenweakened, perhapsterminally.Through theFamilyCompacttheyalso hadadefensivealliancewith theSpanishthrone.Napoleon couldwellfeelfairlysatisfied withhiswork,for,asThierry Lentznotes,hehadexceeded themostoptimisticwaraims andhadrealisedthe traditionalforeignpolicy objectivesofthekingsof France.1 Amiens,likethesister treatywhichNapoleonsigned withtheAustriansat Lunéville,gavebothsidesa much-neededbreathing space.FranceandBritainhad beenexhaustedbywar,both wereinneedofsome economicrebuilding,and bothclearlyderivedbenefits frommonthsofprosperity andgoodharvests.The Consulateevenfoundthe resourcestodevelopthe economyandexpandthe country’sindustrialbase, returningtoalevelof prosperitytowhichthe Frenchpeoplehadbecome unaccustomed.Atthesame timefewdoubtedthatthetwo governmentswerepreparing forarenewalofhostilities. Newshipswerelaiddown, andlargeordersplacedin ironfoundriesandarsenals. Yetpeacewasbarelygivena chancetoflourishbefore BritaindeclaredwarinMay 1803,havingalready respondedtothegrowing tensioninthespringofthat yearbycallingoutthemilitia toraisemenforhome defence.2TheFrenchquickly retaliatedbysendingtroops intoGeorgeIII’sotherstate, Hanover,andorderingthe arrestofthesubstantial numbersofBritishnationals whohadtakenadvantageof thetrucetovisitFrance, manyofthemastourists curioustoviewatfirsthand theresultsoftheFrench Revolution.Why,itmaybe asked,didFranceandBritain returntothebattlefieldso precipitately,andatatime whentheothercontinental powersremained,however uncertainly,atpeace?The twoneighbours,whohadso regularlylinedupon opposingsidesacrossthe eighteenthcentury,foundit impossible,itseemed,to sustaintheideaofpeace. Forsomehistoriansthe answertothisquestionis self-evident:Napoleon’s restlessnaturemadeit impossibleforhimto renouncewar,whileFrance’s militaryeconomycriedout forfurthercampaigns,further territorialgains,andfurther conquests. Thisviewisespecially heldinBritain–thetargetof somuchofNapoleon’s spleen–wherethe‘Black Legend’,representing Bonaparteasacallous warmongerwillingtosend countlessthousandsofmento theirdeathsinthesinglemindedpursuitofhismilitary ambitions,hasproved particularlypersistent. Indeed,persistenttothe extentthatsomeareinclined todiscounthisperiodic attemptsatdiplomacyand attributealltheblameforthe warstohim,andhimalone.3 ToPaulSchroeder,for instance,Napoleon’speace manoeuvreswereallabout gainingadvantage,‘tacticsof divisionandmanipulation’, andhadlittletodowith establishingalastingpeace. ‘TheBritishwenttowar,’ Schroederargueswitha satisfyingfinality,‘simply becausetheycouldnotstand beingfurtherchallengedand humiliatedbyBonaparte; Francewenttowarbecause Bonapartecouldnotstop doingit.’4 ThetermsofAmienswere themselvespartofthat ‘humiliation’;forpeaceto hold,Napoleonwouldhave hadtomakeconcessions,and thatwentagainstmanyofhis mostbasicinstincts.Yetit wasBritainthatdeclaredwar, Britainthatformallyviolated thetreaty,andBritainwhich, duringthemonthsofthe truce,interpretedNapoleon’s everymoveasanactof provocation.Frenchtroops werestillstationedin‘sister republics’inHollandand Switzerland,andinItaly wheretheCisalpineRepublic wasrestructured,Piedmont andElbawereannexed,and Parmawasinvadedafterthe deathofitsduke–all initiativeswhichBritain denouncedascontrarytothe spiritofthetreaty.Andthat wasonlyinEurope. ThroughouttheArabworld, fromAlgiersandTripolito DamascusandMuscat, Frenchagentswerebusily tryingtosealpactswith nativeleaders,andDecaen sailedforIndiain1803with sufficientstafftoestablish sepoyregimentsinFrench service.5Britainwas understandablyfearfulof FrenchambitionsinIndia, andinresponserefusedto honouritsownobligation underthetreatytoreturn MaltatotheKnightsofSt John,arefusalwhich Napoleonseizeduponasa tellinginstanceofBritishbad faith.6Eachsideregardedthe otherwithdistrustandsought tomakethegreatest propagandagainsatthe other’sexpense. Sohowresponsiblewas Napoleonfortherenewalof thehostilitiesin1803?Itis verytemptingtofollowthe exampleoftheBritishpress andBritishcaricaturistsof theseyearsinlabellinghimas awarmongerandausurper whoputthesecurityof Europeatrisk.Certainly, Napoleonhadmadenosecret ofhisexpansionistambitions, bothinEuropeandoverseas, andhadboastedofhis willingnesstoshedtheblood ofhistroopsinpursuitof them.Butwarwasforhima meanstoanendratherthan anendinitself.Hisambition wastocreateaEuropeunited underFrenchhegemony, liberatedfromfeudalismand absolutismbyhisarmies,a Europestretchingfromthe AtlantictotheUralswithat itscoretheoldCarolingian heartlandofLotharingia,that sliverofCentralEurope stretchingfromtheRhineland acrosstheAlpsintonorthern Italy.Napoleonhadnot forgottenthelessonsofthe Enlightenment,norturnedhis backonthehumanismofthe Revolution.Hehadsteeped himselfinclassicalauthors andinEuropeanhistory,had studiedtheriseandfallof greatempires,anddidnot hesitatetotalkofhimselfas thenewCharlemagne,a lawgiverandadministrator bringingbenefitstohis peopleasmuchashewasa soldierandheroonthe battlefield.Forhis coronation,indeed,hehad replicasmadeof Charlemagne’scrownand swordwhentheAustrians refusedtoreleasethe originals.Thesymbolism surelycouldnothavebeen moretransparent.7 Therewasanothermatter thatpushedNapoleon towardsaresumptionofwar withBritain,however,and thatwashisparticular animositytowardstheBritish andhisdesiretoremoveall vestigesoftheirinfluence fromtheEuropeanmainland. Thispersistenthatredcould notbutinflamethealready strainedrelationsbetweenthe twocountriesand,somefeel, gavethenewBritishPrime Minister,HenryAddington, littlealternativebuttogo backtowar.Healsohaddone nothingtoencouragetrade betweenBritainandFrance, whosecommercialadvantage heresentedandcorrectly identifiedasthemajorreason forherstrengthinwar.For Britishmerchantsthiswasa keyissue;theyhadhoped,at theveryleast,toforceFrance toacceptafreetradetreaty alongthelinesoftheEden Treatyof1786,whichwould havegiventheirmanufactures entryintoFrance’sprotected markets.Thesegrievances hadcutlittleicewiththeFirst Consul,however.Napoleon neverceasedtobeamilitary manatheart;heunderstood thecultureofthemilitaryand soughtmilitarysolutionsto internationalproblems.His temperamentremainedthatof ageneralonthebattlefield, impatientforresultsand victories;impulsiveattimes, andwithatendencytoanger thatgrewmorepronounced withtime. Butsuchpersonal characteristicsalonedonot explaintheresumptionof hostilities;norwasFrance aloneguiltyofstirringupthe embersofwar.Theother Europeanpowers,Britain included,hadshown themselvestobeaggressive intheirownforeignpolicy objectives,whetherin opposingFrenchambitions, inexploitingtheweaknessof theAustrianEmpire,orin expandingtheircommercial andcolonialempiresatone another’sexpense.The Frenchwarswerenot France’salone;theywere Europeanandworldwars, expandingacrosswhole continents,towhichDavid Bellandothershaveapplied thetwentieth-century descriptorof‘totalwar’.8 Andbecauseoftheir characterasnationalwars, theseconflictsbecame closelyentwinedwithwider processesofpoliticaland culturalnation-building acrossEurope.9 ButinAugust1804these widerconsiderationswerefar fromNapoleon’smind.The newlycrownedEmperorhad onceagainturnedhis attentiontohisfavoured target,amilitaryinvasionof Britain–thesamemission thathadbeenunderminedby stormsduringtheyearsofthe Directory.Herightly recognisedthatBritainwas hismostsingle-mindedand persistentenemy,andhesaw thatFrance’scontinental interestswereconstantly blockedbyBritish intransigence.Andso,asin 1798,hedreamedofsending hisarmyacrosstheChannel todisembarkonthebeaches ofKent;thoughhewould findthat,asin1798,that dreamwasagainthwartedby thepresenceoftheRoyal Navy,withitsbasesat PortsmouthandChatham. Whilethetimingwasnot idealforBritain,whichhad takenadvantageofthetruce toundertakeasignificant ship-buildingprogramme, thereisnodoubtthatthe Frenchnavywasinmuch worseshape,splitamonga numberofdockyardsalong theAtlanticandthe Mediterranean,and effectivelyrestrictedtoport bythedeploymentofBritish squadrons.TheFrenchwere showntobeimpotent:over halftheirnavywasstillinthe Caribbean,andwhat remainedofthebattlefleet wasunabletoofferany resistance;indeed,theBritish warshipsthatblockadedBrest tooktwoFrenchshipsas prizes.10 Theproblemswere magnified,however,by Napoleon’sunbridled optimism,andhiswillingness tobedivertedintoother adventures–againstJamaica, forexample,andotherBritish islandsintheWestIndies. Therealthreatposedto Britainwastiny;yetthe militiawasputonstandby, fortificationsaroundthesouth coastwerestrengthened,and newspapersandprintshops resoundedtoacacophonyof invasionscares.London enjoyedanewformof propaganda,theinvasion squib,whichpouredscornon theFrench,showingtheir shipsblownoffcourseby stormsorsinkingsedately intothemudoftheThames, orJohnBullhurlingdefiance fromatopthecliffsof Dover.11Atthesametimethe Britishgovernmentpumped additionalfundsintoantiFrenchpropaganda,including savagepersonalattackson Napoleon’scharacter.In 1803theyalsohelpedtofund theviciousFrench-language pressofright-wingémigré journalistslikeRegnierand Peltier,buyingupbulk subscriptionsand encouragingtheexpansionof theémigrépressacross Europe.12Pro-French journalists,ontheotherhand, wereexpelledunderthe provisionsoftheAlienAct, whichNapoleonviewedas furtherevidenceofBritish hypocrisyandmalevolence.13 ButNapoleon’smilitary manoeuvresdidnot disintegrateintofarce,ashis Britishopponentslikedto claim.Itistruethathewas forcedtoabandonhis invasionplansinthefaceof Britishnavalsuperiority,but hedidtaketheopportunityto displayhismilitarymightto theworld.Heassembledan armyofaroundeighty thousandmen–theArmée desCôtesdel’Océan, successortotheArmyof EnglandwhichtheDirectory haddecreedin1797atthe timeofanearlierinvasion plan–atthehugemilitary campwhichhesetupat Boulogne,lookingoutover theChanneltowardsEngland. ThespectacleoftheCampde Boulognetookitsplaceinthe mythologyofImperial France,andactedasastark warningtotherestofEurope. Forthere,inAugust1804,at aceremonytodistribute eaglestohislegionsandthe covetedLegionofHonourto hisofficers,Napoleonheld themostdazzlingmilitary festivalofhisentirereign.He decoratedtwothousandnew membersoftheLegion,all butadozenofthemsoldiers, inatimelyreminderofthe centralimportanceofmilitary values,oftheplaceofhonour andgloryinwarinthenew polity,andinthesocietyof theEmpire.14Atthesame time,thetrucegave Napoleon,athisheadquarters atPont-de-Briques,the breathingspaceheneededto planhisnextmove.These monthssawthegenesisofthe keymilitaryinstitutionofthe Napoleonicyears,theGrande Arméewhichwouldsoon marcheastwardsandtakethe waronceagaintotheheartof CentralEurope.15 ForatimeNapoleonalso succeededinseizingthe diplomaticinitiativetoleave Britainisolatedfromthe Europeanmainland,an importantstepsinceBritain couldneverachieveher foreignpolicyobjectives unaided.ForPittand Addingtonthedefeatof Francewasalwaysthemost urgentconcern,thesingle causetowhicheverything mustbesubordinated;butthe powersofCentraland EasternEurope,freshfrom theirstrugglesoverthe partitionofPoland,saw thingsverydifferently.Their attentionwasnotgluedtoa supposedFrenchthreator blindedbythespectreof Napoleon,norwasfearof imminentFrenchinvasion theirprimarydrivingforce. PrussiaandAustriaviedfor predominanceinGermany, andwerefearfulofany expansionistambitionsby Russiatowardsthewestand south.Asaresultnoneofthe threemajorstatesofthe region,Austria,Prussiaand Russia,waswillingto concentrateonhelping BritainagainstNapoleon whentheyhadmorepressing anxietiesclosertohome. Besides,theyhadnoreason totrustBritain’sownmotives inresumingthewaragainst France.Likethemaritime powersonthecontinent,they sharedasuspicionof Britain’scommercialand colonialambitions,and fearedthatLondonwas preparedtoshedtheirblood inwarsoastosecurea monopolypositioninthe AmericasandIndia.Inthe eyesofmanycontinental powers,Britainblatantly mixedmilitaryand commercialambitionsand usedwar,ruthlesslyand selfishly,tofurtherherown economicgoals.Theyneeded tobepersuadedthattheyhad aninterestinsupporting Britain’scause. Russia,inparticular, harboureddeepdoubtsabout Britain’scommercial ambitions.In1801,following thedeathofCatherinethe Great,sheadoptedanew commercialpolicy,forminga BalticArmedNeutralityto opposeBritain’sclaiminthe North.Thisserved Napoleon’sinterestswell,as itbothopeneduppointsof tensionbetweenBritainand herpotentialalliesandplaced Britishdiplomacyata disadvantagewhenshetried– asshedidbetween1803and 1805–toconstructanew coalitionagainstFrance.The French,ofcourse,played uponsuchtensions,often withconsummateskill: Franceofferedrewardsand inducementstootherstatesin theformofblocksofterritory shehadconquered,orraised fearsofBritishmaritime predominanceinwhat MichaelDuffyhasidentified asa‘skilfulgameofdivide andrule’.16 Thewareffectively resumedinMay1803,when theBritishPrivyCouncil orderedtheimplementation ofnavalwarfareagainst Franceandauthorisedthe detentionofFrench commercialvessels.But Britainwasaloneand vulnerable;theBritish governmenthadtoworkhard between1803and1805to attractalliesandestablisha ThirdCoalitiontopursuewar onlandaswellasatsea. Theyhadoneargumentin theirfavourthathadnot previouslybeenavailableto them:thefactthatFrance couldnolongerrealistically presentherselfasanidealistic orrevolutionarypolitythat couldhopetoattract sympathyfromliberalsacross Europeorigniterebellionin Britainitself.Napoleonwas nowunambiguouslya conqueror,Franceacountry withimperialambitions;and Britainplayedonthefearsof Europeanrulersthatwhat theywerewitnessingwasthe emergenceofanewandmore dangerousversionofLouis XIV.17Therewassome justiceinthisclaim, especiallyasNapoleoncould nowcallonSpain,andonthe Europeanstateshehad invaded,toprovideadditional forcestohelpoilhismilitary machine.Aswascustomary, thedebatewasnotconducted exclusivelybymeansof argumentandpropaganda. Londonwasreadytopay substantialsumstobuythe supportofthealliesBritain needed,thoughthe negotiationswithRussia, PrussiaandAustriaproved protractedandoften acrimonious.When1805 dawned,therewasstillno agreementandthusnoformal allianceagainstFrance. TheThirdCoalitionthat waseventuallysignedlater thatyearowedlesstoBritish goldthantoNapoleon’s bellicosebehaviour.InApril, BritainandRussiasignedan agreementthatcommitted Russiatowarunlessthe Frenchadheredtotheterms ofAmiensandLunéville. Shortlyafterwards,Austria wasmovedtojointhemafter Napoleonhadarbitrarily annexedtheItaliancitystates ofGenoa,Parmaand Piacenzaandhadseized controlofLucca.His coronationasEmperorin 1804hadalertedsometohis pretensionsbut,forAustria andmanyinCentralEurope, itwashissecondcoronation inMarch1805,asKingof Italy,thatprovokedthe greateroutrage.Heldin Milan,thatcoronation bristledwithimperial imagery,linkingNapoleon– inthepopularimagination– totheHolyRomanEmpireof Charlemagne.Butitwasalso aceremonydirected specificallyattheItalians.To thisendhehadhimself crownedwiththehistoriciron crownoftheLombards,the crownthathadbeenwornin LombardybyeveryHoly RomanEmperorsince FrederickBarbarossa.18The symbolismwasnotloston theAustrians,whotookpride inthethousand-yearhistory oftheHolyRomanEmpire, howevermuchitseffective authorityhadfadedwiththe years.Inthefollowingyear, afterNapoleon’svictoriesat UlmandAusterlitz,theHoly RomanEmpirewouldbe expungedfromthemap.19 Inalltherewerefive partnersintheThird Coalition–Austria,Britain, Russia,NaplesandSweden– butitsoonbecameapparent thatnotallhadthesame priorities.Severalofthe Allieslaiddownconditions fortheirentryintothewar. TheSwedeswouldnotmove unlessthePrussiansdidso, whiletheRussiansheldback partoftheirarmyforusein theBalkans–which weakenedboththe Coalition’sresolveandits readinessforbattle.20Inthe meantimeNapoleonwasstill planningtoluretheRoyal NavyawayfromtheEnglish Channelinordertoleavehis armyfreetoinvade.Theruse, ofcourse,failed,withthe Frenchfleetdefeatedtwiceby itsBritishrival,firstina relativelyminorengagement offCapeFinisterreinJuly, then,decisively,byHoratio NelsonatTrafalgarin October.Theimpactof Trafalgarprovedcrucialin severaldifferentways. Internally,ithelpedtoundo someofthedamagedoneto navalstrengthbyLordSt Vincent’smisguidedreform ofnavaladministration, reversingaprocessof attritionwhichhad jeopardisedBritain’snaval superiorityoverFrance.The battle,itshouldbenoted,did notdestroyFrenchseapower orendthethreattoBritain’s maritimesupplyroutes,butit lefttheRoyalNavywith effectivecommandofthe seasandenhancedBritain’s economicsuperioritywithout theneedforfurthervictories. Orastheleadingnaval historianoftheperiodseesit, Trafalgar‘restoredwhatwe mightcallthenormal mechanismofBritishsea power,whichsecuredhome defence,protectedtradeand openedstrategicpossibilities allovertheworldoutside Europe’.Napoleon,onthe otherhand,was unquestionablyweakened. TrafalgarexposedFranceto navalattack,removed possibilitiesfortradeand wealthgeneration,and restrictedherambitions outsidetheEuropean sphere.21 Napoleonwasalso compelledtochangehis militaryprioritiesandto abandondreamsofinvading Britain.Instead,asthe Austrianarmymovedagainst neighbouringBavaria,hewas forcedtoturneastwards, transferringaroundtwo hundredandtenthousand menatdramaticspeedfrom theircampatBoulogneto positionsinCentralEurope. TheAlliesmounted offensivesagainsthimin Hanover,Lombardy,andon theDanube,whichwaswhere Napoleonhimself concentratedhisforces,while MuratandLannesgrouped theirforcesintheBlack Forest,andGouvionSaintCyrstagedadiversionagainst Naples.22Hisarmywaswell prepared,witharoundtwo hundredthousandtroops organisedunderseven seasonedcommanders. CampedatPfaffenhofen beforeengagingthemain Austrianforce,Napoleon remindedhismenofthe forcedmarchestheyhad undergone,thesacrificesthey hadmade,andtheplansthey hadhadtopostpone.Without theinterventionofthe Austrianarmytheywould nowbeinLondon,he insisted,andremindedthem that‘tomorrowyouare fightingagainstthealliesof England’.Hecalledonthem toinflictagreatdefeat,atotal annihilationoftheenemy,for whichposteritywouldforever rememberthem–wordsof inspirationwhich,asalways, headdresseddirectlytothe soldiers.23 Theeventsofthe followingdayamplyjustified hisconfidence.Inaseriesof attacksfromthenorth,south andwest,theFrencharmy surroundedtheAustriansat Ulm,cuttingtheirsupply linestoViennaandtheir contactwiththeirRussian allies.Theyforcedthe unfortunateAustrian commander,GeneralMack, tosurrenderwithtwenty-six thousandmen,withoutfiring ashot.Furtherdisasters followed.Archduke Ferdinand,escapingtowards Bohemia,wascutoffand defeatedbyMurat,whilea furthersixthousandAustrians surrenderedtoSoultin Memningen.Onlythefifteen thousandtroopswhofled towardsKemptenmanagedto escapecapture.24Having destroyedthemainAustrian forcenorthoftheAlps, Napoleontookthecapital, Vienna,beforeturning againsttheadvancing Russians.Ulmhadbeena spectacularstrategicvictory, atriumphofplanningthat inflicteddefeatand humiliationinequal proportion.Butitdidnotend thecampaign.TheAustrians quicklyregrouped,the Russiansreceived reinforcements,andthe Allies,boostedbytheir numericalsuperiority, counter-attacked.Grouped aroundOlmutz,tothenortheastofVienna,thejoint AustrianandRussianarmy numberedsomeninety thousandmen.Napoleon riskedfindinghisarmyover- exposed. Thebattlethatfollowed,at Austerlitz,isjudgedbymany tobethegreatestof Napoleon’smilitarycareer. Thistimehewas outnumbered,withonly seventy-fivethousandmen linedupagainsttheninety thousandofAustriaand Russia.Hisvictorycannotbe putdowntogoodfortune– althoughheenjoyedan elementofthat–butto overallmilitarysuperiorityin battle.Hetooksomeinspired tacticaldecisions,showed superiorbattlefield deployment,hadexcellent corpscommanders,anda well-honedcorpssystem whichheusedtotelling effect.Thebattlefield,just southofthetownofBrünn (whatistodayBrno),had beenselectedbyhis opponents,whosoughtto turntheFrenchrightflank andcutthemofffromthe mainroadtoVienna,which theysawasvitaltoFrench supplyandcommunication. ButNapoleon,despitehis smallernumbers,took advantageofspeedof manoeuvreanddeployedhis menagainstspecificunitsof theenemy,effectivelycutting themofffromthemainbody oftheirarmytodrivehome hisadvantage.Aroundthe villagesofTelnitzand SokolnitztheFrenchmarked oneoftheirmostremarkable victories,whensomesix thousandsixhundredFrench troopshelduptheadvanceof nearlyfortythousand Austrians,pinningthem downandgivingNapoleon thechance,asthesunrose anddispelledthemorning mist,toattacktheonlyhigh pointonthebattlefield,the plateauofPratzen.Byeleven inthemorningSoult’stroops weremastersoftheplateau, defendedwiththecavalryof theImperialGuard,which Napoleonhadkeptbackfor thepurpose.Meanwhile, otherunitsscatteredthe Russianarmy,drivingthem intothemuddyterraintothe southofthebattlefield.From thatmomentthebattlewas won.Inthewordsofthe Frenchmilitaryhistorian JacquesGarnier,‘The remainderofthebattlewas nomorethanapursuit.The Russiansretreatedthrough thefrozenlakestothesouth ofthebattlefield.Theice broke,theguncarriagesgot stuckinthemud,andmen drowned.’25 WhileNapoleonmay indeedhavecontributedtohis victorybydeceivingthe Russianleadersintothinking thatheplannedtowithdraw, thiswasabattlewonby tacticalacumen,notby deception;byquickthinking onthespurofthemomentas muchasbyanygrand advanceplanning.Justashe haddoneatToulonandin ItalyduringtheWarsofthe Directory,atAusterlitzhe provedhisvirtuosityasa militarycommander, somethingwhichhis detractorswouldneverbe abletodenyhim.26Itwas alsoadecisivemomentinthe war,ensuringthatPrussiadid notsendreinforcementsand effectivelyendingtheThird Coalition.TheTreatyof Pressburgwhichfollowed allowedNapoleonto consolidatehispositionin CentralEurope,most especiallyinGermany,where hetookadvantageof Austria’shumiliationto distributelargessetohisnew allies,Bavaria,Badenand Württemberg,andbindthem morecloselytothe Napoleonicsystem.Two rulers,inBavariaand Württemberg,becamekings, withNapoleon,nottheHoly RomanEmperor,now guaranteeingtheirfreedoms. OutsideGermanytheTreaty strippedAustriaofterritoryin Italy,theTyrolandDalmatia, preparingthewayforfurther restructuringinthefollowing months.In1806Napoleon groupedanumberof Rhinelandstatesintoaloose ConfederationoftheRhine, againunderhisprotection; whiletheextentofhiscontrol overItalywasenhancedby theinvasionofNaples,also in1806.Withtheextinction oftheHolyRomanEmpirein thesameyear,hisdominance ofWesternandCentral Europeseemedtotal,andhis foreignpolicyobjectives mightappeartohavebeen achieved.27 Oddly,perhaps,the settlementwasundermined lessbyNapoleon’sambition thanbyPrussia’simpatience andsenseofbetrayal.Inthe courseofhisreconfiguration ofGermany,Napoleonhad offeredHanovertoBritainas agoodwillgestureinreturn forpeace,butPrussiaalso hadclaimstoHanoverand resentedhavingherinterests ignored.Justasimportant wasthereadingofthe internationalsituationbythe Prussianking,Frederick William.Hehadnowishto berelegatedtothestatusofa Frenchpuppet-state,and, havingreachedanagreement withRussiaandBritain, enteredintoaFourth CoalitionagainstNapoleonin 1806.Then,inOctober,he tookthesurprisinginitiative ofdeclaringwaronFranceat atimewhenhisarmywas stillinapoorstateandhehad receivednocommitments fromhisnewallies.Itproved afatefulblunder.Prussiawas lefttofightaloneagainst Franceandsufferedan overwhelmingdefeatinthe linkedbattlesofJenaand Auerstedt,duelargelyto deficientorganisationand mediocreleadership.Recent scholarshipsuggeststhatthe Prussianarmywasessentially sound,whateverthe shortcomingsinitstraining andpreparation.Therewas noshameimpliedinbeing beatenbyaformidable opponent.Whatwasreally humiliatingwasthecollapse thatfollowedastheFrench droveacrossPrussia, roundingupwhatremained ofthearmyandforcingthe surrenderoftownsand fortresses,leavingNapoleon ensconcedinBerlinand masterofallhesurveyed. Thedefeatonthebattlefield hadturnedintoaroutbecause ofthechaosofthedaysthat followed,andthealarming demoralisationofboththe soldiersandthecivilian population.28 Jenadestroyedthe Prussianarmy,butitdidnot endthewar.Frederick Williamandtheremnantsof hisarmyfellbackintoPoland wheretheyjoinedupwiththe Tsar,anditwasthere,in February1807,that Napoleon,inpursuit,engaged themoncemoreatEylau.It wasabloodyandrelentless battle,foughtinabiting Februaryblizzardbyaround seventythousandmenon eachside.Itwasalso,inspite ofNapoleon’sattemptsto claimitasaFrenchvictory,a grimstalemate.TheFrench armysustainedthehighest lossesofanybattleinthewar tothatdate–areminderthat gloryinthemud-drenched fieldsofaneasternEuropean wintercouldonlybebought ataprice.Thesoldierswho hadfoughtandsufferedat Eylauknewthistoowellto bedeceived,andNapoleon’s militaryBulletins,routinely soupbeatandtriumphant, suddenlytookonamore sombretone.‘AftertheBattle ofEylau,’remarkedthe64th bulletinon2March,‘the Emperorpassedseveralhours eachdayuponthebattlefield, ahorriblespectacle,but whichdutyrendered necessary.Itrequiredgreat labourtoburyallthedead.’ TheBulletin,almost inevitably,placedthegreatest emphasisontheRussian losses,andonNapoleon’s showofcompassion.‘Forty- eighthoursafterthebattle, therewerestillupwardsof 5,000woundedRussians whomwehadnotbeenable tocarryoff.Brandyand breadwerecarriedtothem, andtheyweresuccessively conveyedtothehospital.’29 Butthewordscouldbarely concealtheshockand depressionthathadhitthe French,too,atthescaleof deathsandinjuries. IfEylauwaspresentedas avictory,itcouldonlybea Pyrrhicvictory,wonatthe costofcountlessFrenchlives. WhenthepainterAntoineJeanGrosconsigneditto canvas,heoutragedsomein theAcademybyshowingthe unmentionableinthevery foregroundofhiswork:the contortedcorpsesofdead soldiers,piledhighbeforethe eyesoftheEmperor.30Itwas animagethatcouldnotfailto shock,ortocauseoffence. Thesameharrowingimageis repeatedintheeye-witness accountsofthebattleinthe lettersandmemoirsof soldierswholivedthrough thatday.OneofNapoleon’s surgeons-in-chief,Baron Percy,doesnotconcealthe gloomhefeltwhenhe surveyedthescene.‘Atthe backofthecemetery,towards theplain,bloodhadflowedin terriblequantities;itwasthe bloodoftheRussians. Aroundthechurch,inthe town,inthecourtyards, houses,everywhereyousaw onlybodiesanddeadhorses; carriagespassoverthem;the artillerywagonsmowthem down,crushingtheirlimbs andtheirskulls.’31Forthe victorsasmuchasthe vanquished,thebattlelefta memoryoflossand overwhelmingsadness. Butamuchgreatervictory laybeyond.Napoleonmoved rapidly,seizingthecitiesof DanzigandKönigsberg beforeengagingtheRussians atFriedlandon14June, wherehesplittheRussian armyintwoandinflicted twentythousandcasualties. Followingthisdefeat,the Tsarfelthehadnochoicebut tonegotiate.Thetwo EmperorsmetatTilsit,ona raftontheRiverNiemen, wheretheydividedthe continentintotwospheresof influence,oneFrench,the otherRussian.Tilsitmarked thezenithofNapoleon’s power,andhesavouredthe moment,displayinghis militarystrengthtoa bemusedEurope.Foroncehe didnotimposeharshpeace termsonadefeatedenemy, preferringtoflatterAlexander Iandwinhissupportfora futurestruggleagainst Britain.Inreturnheaccepted Russianexpansionalongthe DanubeandinFinland,while extendingFrenchinfluencein theregionthroughanew DuchyofWarsaw.In contrast,Prussiasuffered badlyatTilsit,beingstripped ofalmosthalfitsterritoryand forcedtopayaheavy indemnitytotheEmperor. AfterthehumiliationofJena, PrussiafounditsGreatPower statusseriouslyundermined. Napoleon’sdiplomatic ambitionswerenowclear, andtheyimpingedon GermanCentralEurope,an areawhichPrussiaregarded asherhemisphere.Having imposedhiswillonAustria thepreviousyear,hehadnow defeatedPrussiaand establishedhisauthorityin thenorth-eastofthe continent.Todrivethepoint home,hewentoninthe autumnof1807tooccupy SwedishPomerania.32 Thereremained,ofcourse, inNapoleon’seyes,one obstacletohisdominationof thecontinent:Britain,whose commercialstrength continuedtoposeathreatto hismilitaryambitionsand whosemachinationshesaw behindeveryactoftreachery. Britain,hedeclaredin1806, hadsought‘toexcitePrussia againstFrance,topushthe EmperorandFrancetothe end’.Andwhatwasthe outcome?‘Shehasconducted Prussiatoherruin,procured thegreatestgloryforthe Emperorandthegreatest powertoFrance.’Hewenton towarnthatFrancemight declareEnglandinastateof Continentalblockade,asking ‘isitwithbloodthatthe Englishhopedtofeedtheir commerceandrevivetheir industry?’33AfterTrafalgar andthedefeatsinflictedon FranceandSpainatsea,the Britishnavylookedtomake gainselsewhereinEurope andinthecolonies,turning itsgunsonavarietyoftargets fromCopenhagentoIstanbul andCapeTowninanattempt toexpanditscommercialand colonialdominance.Then, fromMay1806,Britainused hernavalstrengthmore directlyagainstFrenchtrade andprosperity,imposingbya seriesofOrdersinCouncila blockadeontheEuropean coastlinefromtheElbeinthe easttotheAtlanticinthe west,andthreateningtoplace astrangleholdonFrench commerceandshipping. Napoleon’sresponse–the establishmentofthe ContinentalSystem–was immediate:firstintheBerlin Decreein1806,thenatTilsit andintheMilanDecreeof November1807,hesoughtto closethewholecontinentof EuropetoBritishgoodsinthe hopethatthiswouldstifle Britain’stradeandforceher tosueforpeace.TheBerlin DecreedeclaredtheBritish Islestobeunderblockade, andforbadealltradeand communicationwiththem;it alsoprovidedNapoleonwith ajustificationforimprisoning anyBritishcitizens,whether merchants,ships’captainsor simpletourists,whostrayed ontotheEuropeancontinent. TheMilanDecreeturnedthe screwfurtherbyplacing restrictionsonneutral shipping.Anyshipwhichput intoaBritishportwas thenceforthconsideredtobe strippedofitsnationalityand subjecttoseizure,aswasany shipthatcompliedwiththe Britishdemandthatitbe searchedbytheRoyal Navy.34Itwasagranddesign towinthewarwithBritainby destroyinghereconomyand turningthemercantile community,whichwasso powerfulintheHouseof Commons,againstBritain’s warpolicy. TheContinentalSystem alsohadimportantdomestic implications.WithFrance alreadycutofffrommany overseasandcolonial markets,Napoleonsoughtto createawiderdomestic EuropeanmarketthatFrance couldcontrolanddominate bykeepingBritishgoodsout. Customspostswerebuilt alongthefrontierofthis greaterEurope–three hundredcustomsmenwere postedalongthebanksofthe Elbealonein1806.35This wasmorethanatradeban;it wasacomplexsystemof economicwarfaredesignedto denyBritainaccesstoneutral shipping,andhencetoher markets,andthustodestroy thegreatestmercantile economyoftheday.Andit didbringbenefitstocertain commercialandindustrial sectorsinFrance,which enjoyedalevelofprotection fromcheaperBritishproducts thattheyhadnotseensince theEdenTreatyin1786. GeoffreyEllisexplainshow, inAlsaceforexample,the ContinentalSystem establishedanewentrepôt tradewithGermanyand encouragednewindustrial enterprises,amongthe biggestoftheminMulhouse. Itcreatedwhatheterms‘a FrenchContinentalmarket design’thatworkedtothe benefitofFrench manufacturersandtraders. Andheshowsthatitwasfar morethanablockadeand moreofaneconomic strategy,with‘theBlockade decrees,theroughtreatment ofwould-beneutrals,the proclamationoftheclosed market(marchéréservé)in Italy,andtheseriesof preferentialtradetreatieswith clientstates’allhelpingto ensurethat,forFrench manufacturesandforthe industrialareasofthenorth andeast,thebenefitswould berealandpermanent.36 Napoleon’swillingnessto supportindustrialinnovation andtofundtechnological changehelpedensurethatthe economicimpactwasoften favourabletothoseinthe manufacturingsector,and thattextiletownswereamong thosethatprosperedmost undertheEmpire. Butthesuccessofthe strategymustbequalified.If theAlsatianeconomy expanded,itwasinpartdue tofraudulenttradeand widespreadsmuggling, backdoormethodsbywhich Frenchmenprofitedfromthe blockade.And,asinmany easternandnorthernareasof France,expansionwas closelytiedtothemilitary market’shugedemandfor armamentsandtextiles.37In othersectorstherestrictions ontradecausedgreatmisery, especiallyinsuchportcities asMarseille,Nantesand Bordeaux,alongthe MediterraneanandAtlantic coasts.TheAtlanticportsin particular,oncesoprosperous onthebackofthewinetrade, colonialproduceand Caribbeanslavery,had alreadyseentheireconomies underminedinthe1790sby theHaitianrevolution,and nowslippedintoaseemingly terminaldecline.38Yetin 1806theideaofwaging economicwarfareagainst Britain,acountrymore dependentthananyotheron itstradeandcommerciallinks withtheworld,didnotseem absurdsolongasFrench strategistscontinuedto believethattheycoulduse theblockadetodestroy Britain’spoliticalwillto pursuethewar.Thatthey failedwaspartlyduetothe inherentstrengthofthe Britisheconomy,butalsoto France’sinabilitytoenforce itsdecreesonanoften unwillingpopulation. Nationalfrontiersproved porous,withsmugglingand contrabandunderminingthe powerofthelawand resultinginsuchbreachesof theblockadethatthe ContinentalSystemwas underminedfromwithin.39 In1807Napoleoncan justifiablybeseenatthepeak ofhissuccess,withTilsitthe crowningmoment.Hehad destroyedthemilitarypower ofthegreatGermanstates, AustriaandPrussia,tothe pointwherehisempire stretchedacrosshalfof Europe–farbeyondthemost fertileimaginingsofLouis XIV,whothoughtonlyof naturalfrontiersalongthe Rhine.Yethestillwas dissatisfied,usingtheRussian alliancetobuytimerather thanachievealastingpeace, anddetermined,tothepoint ofobsession,todefeat France’sperpetualenemy, Britain.Inretrospect,the ContinentalSystemmustbe seenasastrategicerror,a measurethatrancounterto theinterestsoflocal communities,thataroused resistance,andthatledto furthermeasuresofpolice repressionacrossEurope.It wasacrudelyexploitative systemthatservedtobully andalienateNapoleon’s allies,anditfailedinitsmain objectiveofbringingBritain toherknees.By1807even CharlesJamesFox,whohad beenthemostconsistentof Britishpoliticiansinhis oppositiontothewar, acceptedthatNapoleonmust bedefeatedifpeacewastobe achieved.Inrejectinga Russianofferofmediationin 1807,theBritishForeign Secretary,GeorgeCanning, madeitclearthatinhis government’seyesthe problemwasNapoleon himself,sincehisexcessive powerandhisoverweening ambitionexcludedthe possibilityofsecuringa lastingsettlement. Canningexplainedthis positioninaprivateletterto thediplomatLordGranville inOctober.‘Couldanypeace settleEuropenow,’heasked rhetorically,‘inaconditionin whichitcouldremain? Unquestionablynot.Butit wouldsanctionandsettle somedozenofgreenand totteringusurpations;and leaveBonapartetobegin anew.’Peace,inotherwords, intheconditionsof1807, couldserveonlytheinterests oftheFrench,andforthat reasonithadtoberesisted. ‘Ourinterestisthattillthere canbeafinalsettlementthat shalllast,everythingshould remainasunsettledas possible:thatnousurper shouldfeelsureof acknowledgement;nopeople confidentoftheirnew masters;nokingdomsureof itsexistence;nospoliator secureofhisspoil;andeven theplunderednotacquiescent intheirlosses.’40War,in otherwords,hadtogoon,for anyultimatepeacedemanded it.Andwardidgoon, relentlessly.Indeed,itwas warthatwoulddeterminethe historyoftheremainingyears ofNapoleon’sreign. 9 AVisionofCivil Society ThehistoryofNapoleonic Europeistoooftenpresented aslittlemorethanthehistory ofmilitaryconquest:the submissionofacontinentto oneman’sall-consuming dream.Ofcourseitistrue thattheneedsofwarwere paramountinNapoleon’s France.Thewareffort indubitablydistortedthe economyandimposedahuge burdenonthepopulationin theformofconscriptionand requisition,whiletheFrench armyenjoyedgreaterprestige andprominencethanatany timesincethereignofLouis XIV.Generalswererewarded withthebatonofmarshals; marshalswithtitles,wealth andlands;andthemajorityof thoseawardedtheLegionof HonourduringtheFirst Empirewereservingsoldiers, especiallyofficers.Thepomp andeleganceofmilitary uniforms,theuseofmilitary bandsandmartialmusic,and theincreasedmilitary presenceinstateceremonial wereallsymptomaticofthe growingpowerofthearmy. IfNapoleonwastoachieve hisgoals,hedependedonhis armytodeliverthem,andhe wouldneverforgethisdebtto thegeneralsandmarshals whosupportedhim.They wouldberichlyrewarded, andmilitaryvaluesattaineda newprominenceinFrench society:thegloryofwarwas seenasthesupremegood.1 Somehavesuggestedthat Napoleon’sdebttothearmy wasstillgreater,thatthevery legitimacyoftheEmpire derivedfromthemilitary victorieswhichsustainedit andwhichhadtheeffectof concentratingauthorityso unambiguouslyintheperson oftheEmperor.OnSaint Helena,replyingtoaquestion fromLasCasesaboutthe personalcharacterofthe regime,Napoleonvirtually concededthispoint.‘That situationwasnotofmy choice,’hereplied.‘Itwas notmyfault.’Hemaintained thatitwastheconsequenceof thecircumstancesofthetime, andthatthelegitimacyofhis ruledependedonhis continuingtowinbattles,and withthemglory:‘Iwasthe keytoacompletelynew building,’hesaid,‘andone withsuchshallow foundations!Ifitwasto endureitwasreliantoneach andeveryoneofmybattles.’2 ThoughNapoleon’s Empirewastheproductof war,andtheEmperorhimself wasoftenabsenton campaign,spendingmonths atatimeonhorseback,his visionofEmpireremained stubbornlythatofacivil society.Hedidnotappoint armyofficerstoministriesof state,thoughsome,Duroc andSébastianiamongthem, wereentrustedwith diplomaticmissions;andit wasobserved,notalways approvingly,thatNapoleon appointedseveralofhis generalstoembassiesaround Europe(Bruneto Constantinople,Lannesto Lisbon,Andréossyto London).3Buttherethe army’spoliticalinfluence stopped;officerswerenot givenpoliticalcontrol,and thearmyasaninstitutionwas keptfirmlyanswerabletothe civilauthorities.Despiteits overarchingmilitary ambitions,therefore,itis misleadingtoindict Napoleon’sregimefor militarism,sincethearmy wasneverallowedtoexercise powerautonomously.Indeed, itismoreaccuratetoseethe Empireasanexercisein state-building,ininstitutional reformandmodernisation–a processthatwouldleave behindmonumentsto administrativeefficiency whichmanyinthenineteenth centurywouldseekto emulate.Napoleonsaw himselfasamoderniser,and hisimpatiencewithold structuresandprivileges– shownmostnotably,perhaps, inhiswillingnessto challengethePapacyandtear downwhatremainedofthe HolyRomanEmpire–isa symptomofhismodernising zeal.Likemanyofhisideas, ithaditsrootsinthe revolutionaryperiod,when firsttheJacobinsthenthe Directoryhadpursueda policyofconquest,imposing administrativeandjudicial reformsonthecountriesthey invaded,andrecreatingthem asnewdepartmentsofFrance orsisterrepublicsalliedto Paris.TheFrench,they preached,broughtliberty– newfreedoms–tothe peoplesofEurope. Fewatthetime,withthe notableexceptionof MaximilienRobespierre,4had expressedanydoubtsabout thewisdomofthispolicy, andtheyhadshownlittle understandingtothosewho preferredtoresistthe impositionoflibertyatthe pointofaFrenchsoldier’s bayonet.Itwasonlytooeasy toequateoppositionwith counter-revolution,banditry, orreligiousobscurantism, andtoseektoquellsuch oppositionwithmilitary force.Inthisrespectthe Empiremerelycarriedonthe policyofitspredecessors, thoughwithgreaterefficiency andruthlessness.The Imperialregimesweptaside suchrebellionsasit encounteredandimposed French-styleinstitutionson thepeoplesitconquered.It wasnot,ofcourse,perfect, certainlynoteverywhere,and itleftpocketsofresistance thatwouldneverbebroken. Andtheinstitutionsthatwere putinplacehadceased,as JohnDavishasnotedinthe caseofItaly,toofferanytrue reflectionofthe‘egalitarian aspirationsofthe Revolution’.Insteadthey were‘instrumentsof administration’thatservedto strengthenthepowersofthe state,withtheconsequence that‘whathadremainedonly aspirationineventhemost powerfuloftheeighteenthcenturymonarchies’was finallygivensubstanceinthe serviceofNapoleon.5Serving thestatehadbeen transformedintothehighest ofpoliticalideals. Stateserviceimplied loyaltyaboveanydeep ideologicalcommitment. Napoleonwentoutofhisway todeclarehimselfapragmatic leaderwhotookadvantageof suchcircumstanceas presenteditself,andwho actedopportunisticallyin mattersofdiplomacyjustas hedidonthebattlefield.He didnot,heboastedto Dalberg,thenewlyappointed ruleroftheConfederationof theRhine,in1806,workin accordancewithpreconceivedsystemsor inflexibleplans:‘Iseize eventsandpushthemasfar astheywillgo.’6Likemany ofNapoleon’sflash judgments,thisisperhapstoo facile,butitisclearthatin foreignpolicymattershedid actinstinctively,attimes impetuously,topresshome hisadvantageortoavengea perceivedslight.Therewas nosingleblueprintofEmpire inhismind,nostagedplan thathestucktocoherently fromthemomenthecameto power.Theearlyyears, however,canmostplausibly bepresentedaspartofa consistentstrategythatbuilt ontheexpansionofFrench powerundertheDirectory andConsulate.Italywas alreadyanestablishedsphere ofinfluenceintowhichit seemedlogicaltoexpand further;thenheturnedto Germany,establishinga bridgeheadthroughhis allianceswithBavaria,Baden andWürttemberg.Thedefeat ofPrussiaandthepeace signedwiththeRussiansat Tilsitallowedhimtoharbour muchgranderambitions,and fromthismomentNapoleon coulddreamofanew CarolingianempirewithParis atitsheart.AnewEurope‘of federatedstates,oratrue Frenchempire’wastobe created,hedeclared.7With thedestructionofPrussia’s militarypoweratJena,allthe piecesseemedtobeinplace fortherealisationofhis dream;yetwithinmonthshe wasbeingdivertedbyother short-termgoalsorpassing irritations. Thelateryearsofthe Empirecametobedominated byattemptstoimplementthe ContinentalSystemagainst Britainandbylongandcostly invasions,firstoftheIberian Peninsula,thenofAlexander I’sRussia.Imperialpolicy hadbecomepreytooverarchingambitionandto Napoleon’sownrashand opportunisticdecisionmaking. TheEmpireevolvedover time.Partofit,theso-called ‘FrenchEmpire’,was organisedasdepartmentsof France,landsannexedby conquestthatweresucked intoagreaterFrancewhich, by1812,extendedtoone hundredandthirty departmentsandforty-four millioninhabitants.The Frenchdepartmentswere largelyconcentratedinthe territoriesadjoiningFrance herself–theLowCountries, GermanyandnorthernItaly– andtheywereadministered exactlylikeotherpartsof France.Muchmoreinchoate andfarflungwasthe‘Grand Empire’,aseriesof independentkingdomsand electoratesmorelooselytied toFrance,whichincorporated afurtherfortymillionpeople. Theseterritorieswere generallyruledbyalocal princewhohadagreedto cooperatewithNapoleon, ofteninreturnforhonours andtitles,or,increasingly,by amemberoftheBonaparte family.Therewaslittlesign ofconsistency,evenwithina singleregion.In1802,for instance,Napoleonhadsetup theRepublicofItalyinMilan withhimselfaspresidentand theMilanesepatricianMelzi d’Eril,amoderniserlike himself,ashisvice-president. ButafterhebecameEmperor, heabruptlytransformedthe RepublicintotheKingdomof Italy,towhichhe progressivelyaddedvarious conqueredterritories–the VenetoandIstriain1806,the Marchein1808,SouthTyrol in1810.Inonesenseitmade littledifference,insofaras whatevertheirtitularstatus, theywerestillclientstates, supplyingsoldiersforthe Frencharmyandproviding fortheupkeepoftroops stationedontheirterritory.8 AcrossGermanytherewas nocommontemplate,though theloyaltyoflocalrulerswas oftenrichlyrewarded. Napoleonpresentedhimself astheProtectorofthevarious Rhinelandterritoriesthrown togetherintothe ConfederationoftheRhine; elsewhereheelevated BavariaandWürttembergto thestatusofkingdoms,soon followedbySaxonyand Westphalia;andKarl FriedrichofBadensawhis landsquadrupleinsizeand wasraisedtothestatusof GrandDuke.9Otherstates foundthemselvesfavouredin adifferentway,receivingas kingamemberofthe Bonapartefamily: Napoleon’sbrotherLouiswas crownedKingofHolland, JeromewasmadeKingof Westphalia,andJoseph becametheKingofNaples. Eventhesearrangements couldbeofshortduration.In 1808Josephwasmovedto theevenmoretroublesome throneofSpain.In1810 Louis,distrustedbyhiselder brotherforbeingtoo sympathetictohissubjects andseekingtoharmonisehis rulewiththewishesofthe Dutchpeople,wassimply removed.Onlyfouryears afteritwasestablished,the KingdomofHollandabruptly ceasedtoexistandthe Netherlandswereannexedto France.10Allpretenceof independencewas abandoned. ToadministertheEmpire Napoleonneededtrusted collaborators,menwho wouldservehim unswervingly.Whatmattered wastheirloyalty,bothtohis personandtotheEmpire,and hegavehistrustaseasilyto menoftheRightasofthe Left,asmuchtoaristocrats andreturnedémigrésasto formerJacobinsandterrorists oftheYearII.Hewas concernedthatmenofall politicalcolourscouldfind somethingwithwhichto identifyintheimperialorder, qualitieswhichtheycould embrace.ThustheRight wouldfindsomethingofthe stabilityofmonarchy,and perceivedinitsstrong executivepowersanditslack ofconcernforelectedbodies andpopularopinionthekind ofauthoritywhichthey craved.Theformersecond andthirdconsuls, CambacérèsandLebrun,both recognisedinthepolitical cultureoftheEmpire somethingredolentoftheold monarchy,somethingthat Catholicsandconservatives mightfinddeeplyreassuring. Lebrunbelievedthathewas witnessingthedawnofan ‘imperialmonarchy’; Cambacérèsnotedsuccinctly that‘everythingistakingus backtotheformerorderof things’.11Thefactthatthe Empirehadmadepeacewith theVaticanandallowed,even welcomed,thereturnof aristocratswhohadfled FranceduringtheRevolution helpedtoconsolidatethe sensethattherevolutionary yearswerefinallyoverand thatmenwerenolonger judgedbytheirpoliticalpasts. Republicans,too,hadlittle difficultyinservingan Emperorwhomthey identifiedwithatleastsome oftheidealsofthedefunct Republic,amanwitha republicanpastwhowas committedtoacultureof serviceandmeritocracy.That wasthebeguilingambiguity ofNapoleon’sregime,the natureofitsrelationshipto theRevolutionthathadmade wayforit.ThéophileBerlier wasamongtherepublicansof allhueswhoallowed themselvestobepersuaded thattheycouldfindanew politicalhomeintheFirst Empire,since‘intheheartof anoldandmonarchical Europe,thebestFrancecould reasonablyhopefor definitivelywasa representativegovernment underanewdynasty,whose powerwouldbelimitedby liberalinstitutions’.12And RegnauddeSt-Jean d’Angély,whowouldbe amongNapoleon’smore loyalsupporters,agreed, thoughhehadnotalways sidedwiththeJacobinsinthe 1790sandwasidentifiedwith themoreliberalwingof republicanthought.He insistedthatcivilliberties werebestservedbythe impositionofahereditary empire,whichcouldhelpto guaranteethegainshis generationhadmadefrom 1789,gainswhichhedefined as‘individualliberty, religiousfreedom,the inviolabilityofproperty,the irrevocabilityofthesaleof thebiensnationaux,the politicalequalitythatopens allpositionstoallcitizens, thecivicequalitywhich assuresthatallcitizensare judgedaccordingtothesame laws,andtheapprovalof theselawsandoftheannual levelsoftaxationbya nationalrepresentation’.13 These,heargued,hadnot beendilutedbythedemiseof theRepublic. Notallagreed;evensome whohadservedBonaparte whilehewasFirstConsul foundtheabandonmentof republicaninstitutionstoo muchtobearand,like Carnot,preferredtostepback intothepoliticalwilderness.14 Buttheywereaminority. Mostrepublicansdidagreeto servetheEmpire,some arguing,withFouché,thatit wouldbe‘absurdonthepart ofthemenoftheRevolution tocompromiseeverythingin ordertodefendour principles,whilewehad nothingfurthertodobut enjoythereality’.15Napoleon intheireyesremaineda standardbearerforthe Revolutionanditsideals. Theirpastsupportfor egalitarianprincipleswasnot heldagainstthem,anymore thanwastheirinvolvementin votingfortheexecutionof LouisXVI(whichthe Bourbonswouldnever forgive,evenafterthe RestorationofLouisXVIII). Regicides,indeed,playeda significantroleintheEmpire: Sieyèsasasenator,Fouchéa governmentministerand chiefofpolice,Davidinthe roleofcourtpainter,Lakanal giventhetaskhehadalways relishedofreorganisingthe educationsystem,and Cambacérèshimselfas archichancelierandthe secondmostpowerfulmanin theEmpire.16Manyofthem werefirst-classofficialsand loyaladministrators,andthey wereassuredNapoleon’s supportprovidedthatthey weresingle-mindedin servingtheneworder.Their collaborationensuredthatthe newregimehadan abundanceoftalentatits disposalandexperienceof governmentonwhichto draw,whichtheEmperordid nothesitatetouse. Theministersand dignitariesoftheEmpire weretheoutwardsymbolsof thenewmeritocracy–men drawnfromwidelydiffering backgroundsbuteachwith therelevantexperienceto occupythegreatofficesof state.Afewexampleswill suffice.17Talleyrand,in chargeofforeignaffairsuntil 1807,hadalreadybeen ForeignMinisterunderthe Directory;before1789he wastheBishopofAutunand hadservedasAgent-General oftheClergyofFrance. Maret,whoheldtheforeign ministrybetween1811and 1813,wasalawyer,attorney attheParlementofDijon beforetheRevolution,thena deputytotheEstates-General in1789.Portalis,entrusted withthedelicateportfoliofor EcclesiasticalAffairs,also camefromalegaland politicalbackground,an attorneyattheParlementof Aix-en-ProvenceintheOld Regimewhohadhelpedto drafttheCivilCode.The MinistryofWar, unsurprisingly,wenttomen witharmyexperience. AmongthemwereAlexandre Berthier,whohadservedin AmericaunderRochambeau, remainedinthearmyduring theRevolution,andbecame chiefofstafftoBonapartein ItalyandEgypt;andHenri Clarke,whohadbeenan officerintheoldlinearmy duringthe1780sandwas PrivateSecretarytoNapoleon after1802. Suchlinkswereseenas signsofadeep,personal loyaltytotheEmperor,and somewentalongwayback. RenéSavary,Fouché’s successorasMinisterof Policein1810,hadbeen aide-de-camptothefuture EmperorinItalyafter Marengo.Navyandthe Colonies,again unsurprisingly,wasgivento anexperiencednavalofficer, DenisDecrès,whohadfirst joinedthenavyattheageof eighteen,risentotherankof captainundertheRevolution, andthenbeencashieredin 1793becauseofhisnoble origins.ItwasDecrès’ subsequentactioninMalta andtheNilethatwon Napoleon’sfavour.18 Napoleon’sappreciationofa man’spastrecorddidnot, however,dependonhissocial origins,andifDecrès belongedtotheOldRegime nobility,otherministerscame fromthehumblestoforigins. OfhisMinistersofthe Interior,forinstance,JeanAntoineChaptalwastheson ofapeasantfamilyinthe Lozère,whileEmmanuel Cretet’sfamilywere shopkeepersinasmalltown nearGrenoble.Thisdid nothingtohinderCretet’s careerundertheEmpire.He servedinturnasGovernorof theBankofFranceand,from 1807to1809,asMinisterof theInterior.Hewouldendhis lifeennobled,astheComte deChampmol. Byappealingtoallmenof goodwill,regardlessoftheir socialoriginsortheirpolitical pasts,Napoleonhopedto establishtheEmpireona solidfoundation,providingit withefficientleadershipand appealingtoabroadswathe oftheFrenchpublic.Healso soughttosecurethesupport ofthelandedinterestandto helpdevelopanewcapitalist classinFrance.19Here, Napoleonwascontinuingthe policyhehadinitiatedduring theConsulate,offeringthe promiseofinternalorderand stabilityand,withit,anend tothebitterfactionfighting thatpoliticalideology generated.Hepreferred,like DeGaulleinthetwentieth century,toplaydownspecific ideologicalcommitments,and soughttorallythepopulation tohisperson.Afterthebitter schismsoftherevolutionary yearstherewereattractionsin thisseeminglyopen approach,withitspromiseto bringanendtointernal divisionsandthekindof revengekillingthathad fracturedtheSouthduringthe previousdecade.Butthere werealsodangersinthis approach,mostnotablythat theEmpirewouldbejudged anunsatisfactory, unsustainablecompromise betweenthewarringparties. Cambacérèsexpressedthis succinctlyinhismemoirs.On theonesidewerethemany Frenchmenwhohadnot entirelylosttheiraffectionfor theirformerkings,andto whomBonapartewould alwaysbeanimpostor.‘A numberofthemadheredwith alacritytothereestablishmentofthethrone, buttheywillnotunderstand thatitcouldbeoccupiedby anyoneotherthanthepresent headoftheHouseof Bourbon.’Forcommitted republicans,Cambacérès believed,theEmpireoffered anequallyunsatisfactory outcome,since‘theprojectto restoreheredityin governmentandtostartanew dynasty’wouldnotsuitany ofthem.And,hewarned Napoleonpresciently,‘Ifear thatitwilldepriveyouof friends,andespeciallyof supportinthegeneral public.’20 Cambacérès’pessimism abouttheEmpire’sdurability provedill-founded,andmost formerrepublicansdutifully fellintoline,acceptingthat theConsulatehadrunits courseandthatNapoleon wouldtakecaretosafeguard thegainstheyhadmadefrom theRevolution.Indeed,itcan plausiblybearguedthatthe Empireretainedenoughof thepolicythatitinherited fromtheRepublictosatisfy allbutthemostfiercely ideological,andeventhat Napoleon,forallhiscraving afterrespectabilityand dynasticlegitimacy,had remainedloyaltothemost crucialofthebeliefsofhis youth.Napoleonhada markedauthoritarianstreak, ofcourse.Hispreferencefor controlandefficiencyleft littleplaceforlocal accountabilityandwas translatedintoamarked distrustofelections.Butthese traitswerenotbornwiththe Empire;theyhadbeen evidentsincethebeginningof theConsulateandthe constitutionalreformsof 1800.Theinstitutionofthe prefectandthevastauthority giventotheMinistryofthe Interiorwereproof,ifproof wasneeded,thatthiswasa regimewhereauthority emanatedfromthecentre, andnotfromlocalelectors. Theprefectwasanagentof centralpower,inviting comparisonwiththe intendantundertheBourbon monarchy.21Underthe EmpireFrancemovedfurther awayfromtheliberal individualismoftheearly Revolution,imposing controlsandcensorship, extendingtheoutreachofthe police,andrestoring constraintsontheoperation ofthefreemarket.By1810, forinstance,onlyfour newspapershadlicencesto publishinParis;22whilethe city’sbooktradewas subjectedtonewcontrolsand regularsurveillance.Indeed, thenewlyestablishedGeneral DirectionoftheBookTrade setouttomonitor‘notonly everyprinter,publisherand booksellerintheentire Empire,butalsoeverypiece ofprintedmatter’.23 Thiswasnotaliberal regime–butitwasnotantirevolutionary,either: Napoleon’smostsignificant programmesofreform,to education,theChurchandthe justicesystem,hadasolid foundationinthe achievementsoftheprevious decade.Hesawlittlereason tochangetheinstitutional structures–thedepartments anddistricts,communesand cantons,courtsandtribunals hehadinheritedfromthe Revolution,andwherehe innovateditwasgenerallyto increasetheirauthorityand theirprofessionalexpertise. Therewaslittleherethat formerrepublicanscould reasonablyobjectto.The Francetheyhadsocarefully forgedin1790and1791was scrupulouslyretained,and therewasnosuggestionofa returntotheOldRegime. Napoleonwasan authoritarian,buthewasno reactionary,andmany beyondthefrontiersof Franceidentifiedhisregime withprogressiveand enlightenedvalues. Twoareasofpolicyin particularweresuggestiveof thecontinuinginfluenceof revolutionaryvalues.One waseducation,where Napoleonexpandedonthe ideaswhichtheRevolution hadpreachedbutneverfound theresourcetoimplement.He envisagedanimperial educationsystem,monitored bythenewUniversityof France,inwhichstate-run lycéesprovidedsecondary educationtothegiftedwhile alevelofpublicinstruction wasmadeavailabletoall.But thecostsofwartookpriority and,liketherevolutionaries, theEmpiresoonfoundthatit didnothavethemoneyto provideaschoolinevery parish.Asaconsequence, freeprimaryeducationwould notbeofferedtoallfor anotherhalf-century.Greater attentionwasgiventothe lycées,whichthegovernment sawasvitalintrainingan educatedelite;thougheven here,budgetcutsmeantthat feeshadtobeimposedwhich madethemthepreserveof familieswithmoney.Asfor theUniversity–foundedin 1806andimplementedin 1808–itwasgivena monopolyintheawardof degreesthroughoutthe Empire;asinglesecular institution,itwould,through intensiveinstruction, contributetotheprocessof nation-building.The Universitywasdividedinto twenty-sixacademies,with theloftymissionofspreading enlightenmentthroughout Europebutalsothedutyto trainnewgenerationsinthe skillsneededtorun government.Educationpolicy shouldnotbeseenuniquely intermsofspreadingliberal values.Itwasalsodevisedin theserviceofthestate.24 Theotherpolicy,andin Napoleon’seyesthemore important,wasthe codificationofthelaw,a hugetaskinwhichhetooka personalinterestoverfour yearsuntiltheCivilCodewas finallydecreedin1807. Againhehadinherited unfinishedbusinessfromthe revolutionaries,whohad rippedawaytheoldcodes basedonRomanorcustom law,abolishedfeudallaw, removedclericaljurisdiction inmoralmatters,consecrated certainprinciplesin constitutionallaw,andpassed animpressivenumberof decreesandstatutes.The result,though,was considerableconfusion, especiallyoverland ownershipandthelawsof inheritance,andNapoleon, withhiscustomaryconcern fororder,determinedto resolveitinasinglelegal code.Attheheartofthecode wastheideaofpropertyasan individualright,tobeenjoyed freeofanyfeudalobligations. Nobleprivilegewas everywhereabolished,buthe alsosweptawaysomeofthe moreegalitarianlegalreforms oftherevolutionaryyears, upholdingtheauthorityof husbandsoverwives,parents overchildren. Marriagelaw,too,was revisedtoguaranteethe man’srighttoadminister propertyinmarriage,and thoughdivorcewas maintainedasasecular institution–asthe revolutionarieshaddecreedin 1792–thelawnow demandedaclear demonstrationofmutual consent,orevidenceofilltreatment,adulteryora criminalconviction.Thisled toplummetingdivorcerates, deprivingwomenofthe escaperoutethathadbeen openeduptothembythe Revolution.Illegitimate childrenwerestrippedofany propertyrights.TheEmpire wasanorderedsocietywhere therightsofproperty-owners andoftheheadsoffamilies hadpriority.Inthissensethe Codehadeducational significance,too,presentinga templateforthekindof ordered,strictlyhierarchical societythatNapoleon favoured.25Itdefinedthe individual’srelationshipwith thestate,andwouldbea centralfeatureofimperial administrationinallthe countriesFranceannexed duringtheNapoleonicWars. WherevertheFrenchwent, theCodenecessarily followed. Inhisadministrative appointmentsintheterritories Franceinvaded,Napoleon lookedforprofessionalism andgoodjudgmentaboveall else–thekeyattributes,ashe sawit,ofmoderncivil administration.Atthevery top,ofcourse,hemighthave littlechoice:princesand electorshadtobewonoverto workfortheimperialproject, andtherewardofatitleora kingdomseemedasmall pricetopayifitboughttheir loyaltyandmaintained administrativecontinuity. Wherenosuchsolution presenteditself,asinNaples, HollandorSpain,amember oftheBonaparteclanwould besentintoruleovera conqueredpeople.Thoughin theseinstancesfamilyinterest wasclearlyinplay,even Napoleon’sbrothershadto provetheirefficiencyand defertotheEmperor’swillif theyweretoavoidhis contemptandriskhaving theirauthorityoverruled.He hadnohesitation,aswehave seen,inundermininghis brotherLouisinHollandin 1810,whenhisfailureto enacttheContinentalSystem ledtheEmperortoannexhis kingdomand,quite arbitrarily,toabolishLouis’ positionasmonarch.26More generallyhelookedtomenof somestandingintheirlocal society:menofacertain wealthwhowouldbecapable ofdistinguishingpublic servicefromfamilyinterest andself-aggrandisement–a distinctionthatwas sometimesdifficultto maintaininthecorrupt politicalcultureofsouthern Europeandthe Mediterranean. Inotherwords,Napoleon soughtmenofsubstance,akin totheBritishorAmerican notionofindependence,with adegreeofwealthandease thatcouldmakefora disinterestedservantofthe state.This,asmuchasany innatesocialconservatism, waswhatledhimtosearch outthenotablesineach department,tocomposelists ofthesixhundredhouseholds thatpaidmosttax,orto bestowtitlesandhonourson hismosttrustedcollaborators. Italsoledtoagreaterrigour inthechoiceof administrativepersonnel;he replacedearlyempiricism withatargetedtraining programmeforfutureprefects andsub-prefects,magistrates andjudges,aprogrammethat wasmadeavailabletothe sonsofthenewelite.With theaimofchannellingthe brightestamongtheminto keyadministrativeroles,he createdauditorstothe CouncilofStatein1803,and withintenyearsaquarterof theprefectshadstartedinthis role.Theschemeproved attractiveasachannelof advancementforthenew socialelite,the‘massesof granite’whowouldrallyto theEmpireacrossFranceand beyond,forthose‘sons,sonsin-lawandnephewsof ministers,senators,state councillors,generals, prefects’whowouldattach theirstartothefateofthe Empire.27Itwouldcontribute significantlytobuildingthe imperialadministrativeelite. Onlysuchmen,Napoleon believed,couldseethings withanobjectiveeye;and theyalone–civilised Europeansworkingfora secularstateinapostEnlightenmentculture,men who,likehimself,hadlived throughandassimilatedthe valuesoftheFrench Revolution–couldhopeto governwithobjectivity, submergingpersonalinterest inthegreatergoodthatwas theinterestoftheEmpire. Theydidnothavetobe Frenchaslongasthey understoodthevaluesthat madetheFrenchthegreat imperialnationtheyhad become;andinthosepartsof Europe(generallythoseinthe northandthewest,closestto France)wheremenof standingcouldbefound, willingandabletoassume thekeyadministrativeroles, thegovernmentofthe countrywouldbeentrustedto them.Elsewhere,inplaces wherethesequalitieswere deemeddeficient,French administratorsweredrafted in.Criminaljustice,tax collectionandarmy recruitmentweremuchtoo importanttobeconsignedto menwhoseloyaltiesor probityweresuspect.Yet thesewereexactlytheissues mostlikelytocausepopular angerandeventoincite rebellion. InmanypartsofEurope theFrenchtaxedrelentlessly, extractingthewealthand grainwhichtheinhabitants producedinordertoraise soldiersandfeedtheirarmies. Thedemandforconscripts wasevenmoredivisive, turningfamilyagainstfamily, richagainstpoor,anduniting wholecommunitiesintheir oppositiontothestate.Across NapoleonicEurope,deserters anddraft-dodgersdefiedthe authorities,seekingprotection fromlocalpeople,joining armedgangs,andattacking thegendarmesandagentsof thestatewhoweresenttoact againstthem.28Law enforcementandpolicing fuelledpopularresentments, especiallyinmountainous regionsofsouthernEurope liketheAlps,theApennines andtheDolomites,where feelingsofautonomywere strongandtraditionsof banditryingrained.Nowhere wasthisresentmentmore damagingthaninthefurthest outpostsofEmpire–the Illyrianprovincesand Dalmatia.29 Partoftheproblemfrom theFrenchpointofviewwas thatinsuchregions,which hadtraditionallybeenpoorly policedandloosely administered,imperialagents wereoftenresentedas intruders,impingingonlocal customsandimposing unwelcomeregulation.In southernEuropeinparticular, manypartshadlainoutside thecontrolofanyformof statepolice,whiletax collectorsandcustoms officerswererarelyseenin ruralareas.Thegreater efficiencyandlonger outreachoftheNapoleonic statemeantthatgendarmes andtroopswereusedtodo jobsthathadpreviouslybeen leftundone;taxeswerenow collected,smugglingrings broken,requisitionsimposed, draft-evadersandtheir protectorsroundedup.To localpeopletheseinnovations smackedlessofgood governmentthanofforeign interferenceinlocalmatters wherethestatehadno businesstomeddle.Similarly, havingarmiesbilletedon localvillagerswasseennotas asourceofwelcome protectionfrombanditsand robbers,butratherasaharsh impositionthatwaswidely resented.Soldiersstoleand looted,sincetheimperial armiescustomarilytravelled lightanddependedon requisitioningandforagingif theyweretofeedtheirmen andhorses.Theirpresence wasoftenactivelydetestedto thepointthat,inmanyareas, peasantshidtheirgrainand theiranimalsandrefusedto sellthemfood.Thefactthat thesoldierswereforeign couldfantheembersof nationalism;butitwastheir presencethatgaveoffence anddrovemanyvillagersto taketosmugglingorside withbandits,brigandsand partisansfromtheirown community. Itdidnothelpthe Empire’scivilisingmission whenitsdemandswere perceivedasunethicalorits agentscondemnedasbullies. Itmerelyunitedthepeople, especiallythoseinruralareas, againstthedemandsof outsiders,againstwhatwas presentedtothemas modernisation.Thiswastrue evenwheretherewereno ideologicaldifferenceson whichtheoppositioncould play.Wheretherewas,asin deeplyCatholicregions wheretheFrenchtriedto imposesecularcivicvalues, theEmpirecouldeasilybe seenastheAntichrist.In muchofItaly,forinstance, traditionalpietywasnot extinguished,andreligion gavethosewhoopposed Napoleonasenseof occupyingthemoralhigh groundwhichtheyexploited tothefull.Here,theconflict wasseeninbroadertermsas one‘betweentheconceptof societythatemergedfromthe FrenchRevolution,as nurturedbytheNapoleonic regime,andtheCatholic religion’,or,asMichael Broersaptlytermsit,a‘war againstGod’.30Thatwasone conflictNapoleoncouldnot hopetowin. Napoleonwasnotoverly concernedthathispolicies leftmanyEuropeansfeeling asthoughtheyhadbeen colonisedbytheEmpire. Onceacountrywasannexed oroccupied,theFrench suddenlyhadaverydifferent mission.Itwasnolongera conqueredforeignstate,but partofanorganicwhole, subjecttothesamelawsand administrativedictatesas France.TheFrenchwereno longermereoccupiers;they hadtoestablishasustainable imperialrule.31Thisinvolved morethanforce:itinvolved persuasion,aninculcationof Frenchvalues,andachange intherelationshipbetween thecentreandthelocal powerbrokers.Itexaggerated thecontrastbetweenthose countrieslikeHolland, northernItalyandlargeparts ofGermanythathadlittle troubleembracingimperial institutions,andthose,further eastandsouth,wherethe elitesprovedunreceptiveand popularresistancewas widespread.Europedivided intoaninnerandanouter empire,astheFrenchwere verywellaware.Inthe former,locallawyersand landowners–somewith radicalideas,manydeeply conservative–collaborated readilywiththemtoprovide strongjusticeand administration;thelatter offeredlittlecooperation,and wasalwayspreytorebellion andcounterrevolution.32 Theexceptionineastern CentralEuropewasthe GrandDuchyofWarsaw, establishedbetween1807and 1813,where,afterthe miseriesofthePartition betweenAustria,Prussiaand Russia,Napoleoncouldhope tobeseenasaliberatorand appealtoPolishnational aspirations.TheGrandDuchy enjoyedlittlefreedom;itwas asatellitestate,incorporated intheContinentalSystemand alloweddiplomaticrelations onlywithFrance.Butthere werecompensations.The administrationwasrunby Poles,theDuchyraisedits ownregiments,andthe officiallanguagewasPolish. Besides,thePolishnobility hadalong-standingsympathy forFrenchideasandFrench culture.Thiswasonecorner ofEuropewhereNapoleon’s arrivalwasguaranteedtobe greetedwithadegreeof sympathy.33Butitmustbe seenasanexception,and furtherFrenchexpansion after1807,inSpainand PortugalatoneendofEurope andintoRussiaattheother, onlyservedtounderlinehow fragiletheirholdoverthe outerempirereallywas. Popularresistancecouldso easilyspilloverintoguerrilla fighting,andpeasantanger intoafull-blownpeople’s war. Moresoberingwasthe receptiongiventotheFrench inNaples,wheretheyhad soughttoexploitthe weaknessoftheBourbon monarchy.Napoleonhad reasonforsomeoptimism becausetheFrenchinvasions undertheRevolutionhad beenwidelywelcomedbythe country’sliberalelite,even thoughtheundisguisedanticlericalismoftheFrench soldiershadantagonisedlarge swathesofthisintensely Catholicsociety.Napoleon himselfwasscornfulofthe NeapolitanBourbons.He proclaimedafterAusterlitz thatthedynastyhadsimply ‘ceasedtoreign’andsentan armyoffortythousandmen todethronetheminresponse towhathesawastheir ‘treacherous’supportforhis opponents.Theterritories aroundthemhetreatedas politicalpawns,turningthe GrandDuchyofTuscanyinto anindependentkingdom, thensummarilyannexingit; andin1808heoccupied RomeandtookthePope prisoner,thesecondpopeto beseizedbyNapoleonina decade.Meanwhile,in1806, hehadgiventheNeapolitan thronetohisbrotherJoseph Bonaparte;then,whenJoseph wasmovedtoSpain,Naples passedtoNapoleon’sbrotherin-law,JoachimMurat.The Emperorclearlysawstrategic importanceinNaples,and waspreparedtoimposehis rulewhateverthecostin publichostility.Itmatteredto himintermsofhiscontrolof thenorthernMediterranean, andalsoplayedanimportant partinenforcingthe ContinentalSystem.Murat wasgivenaheavylegislative programmetoimplement, includinganewlandtaxand aneworganiclawthatwould spreadtheburdenoftaxation moreequallyandbring justicetoall,partofwhat Napoleontriedtoselltothe Neapolitansashis modernisingmission. ButtheEmperorwell knewthatthesereformsran countertomuchof Neapolitantraditionaswell astotheinterestsofpowerful familiesinthecity.His administrators,many themselvesNeapolitans,were thwartedorforcedtoresign bytheforceofpublic outrage,andmagistrates refusedtoenforcethenew laws.Governmentproved impossibletoenact:taxes wentuncollectedand conscriptsfadedintothe landscape,whileproposed reformstotheChurchand publiceducationhadtobe abandoned.Bytheendofthe war,thestate’sfinanceswere inruinsandpublicanger againsttheFrenchboiled over,withthecentral bureaucraticmodelof governmentwhichtheyhad introducedwidelyheldto blameforthecountry’s failures.Therewaslittle sympathyfortheFrench,and littlethattheyhadlegislated onsurvivedtheregime’s collapse.Itissurely indicativeoftheirangerthat JoachimMurat,aloneofthe rulersinstalledbyNapoleon acrosshisEmpire,should havebeenexecutedbythe peopleoverwhomheruled.34 10 TheReinventionof Monarchy Oneofthesecretsofimperial successlayintheJanus-like qualityoftheEmpireandof thevalueswhichNapoleon soughttonurture.Henever renouncedtheprinciplesof therevolutionaryyears; indeed,inhisinsistenceon theruleoflawand implementationoftheCode, orhisviewofthestateasan essentiallysecularentityfree ofecclesiasticalinterference, heshowedadeterminationto stickbythoseaspectsofthe FirstRepublicwhichhe identifiedwithanordered, modernsociety.Tosome, indeed,heremaineda republican,albeita republicanwhowaswedded toideasoforderand authority.Whereherejected therevolutionarymodelwas initsbeliefthatFrenchmen wereendowedwithrights ratherthanobligations,that citizenshipimplieda necessaryinvolvementinthe processesofgovernment. Iftherewerestill parliamentaryinstitutionsand periodicelectionsunderthe Empire,theywerebutapale reflectionofthemassive changestopoliticalculture thathadfollowedafter1789. Ofthetwohouses,the Tribunatelastedonlyuntil 1807beforeitwas condemnedtoextinction, probablybecauseithadfailed tosecuretheobedienceofthe legislators.Andthe LegislativeAssemblyitself hadalimitedrole,withthe combinedsessionsof1809 and1810lastingfornomore thanfourmonths.1Local government,too,sawits autonomyreduced;itwas mademoreanswerabletothe ministriesinParis,reporting upthroughthesub-prefect andprefecttotheMinisterof theInterior,whilethejudicial systemwasfirmlydirectedby theMinisterofJustice.At everyleveltheEmpire emphasisedauthorityand obedience,themaintenance and,ifnecessary,the imposition,oforder.The Emperorshowedlittleinterest inaccountabilitydownwards tothelocalcommunityorthe localelectorate.Forhimthese werepracticeswhichhad becomedangerously exaggerated,luxurieswith whichhecoulddispense. Electoralaccountability, whichtherevolutionarieshad insistedonateverylevelof administration,was dramaticallycutback.The electoratewasreduced,along withthenumberofelected officials;andformanyyears theelectoralprocessceased tooperateonaregularbasis. Napoleon’sownpreference, whenitwasnecessaryforthe peopletobeconsultedonan issueofconstitutional importance,wasfora plebisciteratherthanan election.Therewerefour plebiscitesinallduringthe successiveNapoleonic regimes,alltoratifyproposed constitutionalchange:two wereheldbefore1804(onthe constitutionoftheConsulate in1800andthesubsequent establishmentoftheLife Consulatein1802),athirdin 1804toendorsethe proclamationoftheEmpire, thennothingtillavoteonthe supplementaryconstitution (orActeadditionnel)in1815. Onallfouroccasionsthere werenocantonalassemblies orcollectivevotes,asthere hadbeeninthe1790s.Those takingpartsignedaregister individuallytoindicatetheir agreementordisagreement; someaddedafewsentences toqualifytheiropinion;but, significantly,veryfewdared toexpressdissent.2Asan exerciseinconsultationthe processwasclearlyflawed. YetitallowedNapoleonto claimthathewasannexing partoftherevolutionary heritagebyassociatingthe peopleinhisconstitutional reforms,whileensuringthat theiropinionsremained mutedandcontrolledinthe executiveinterest.3 Consultationhaditsplacein theEmpire,butonlyaslong asitcouldbecarefully managed.YetNapoleondid notdiscarditentirely.Hedid nothingtoremovethe ambiguityabouthis commitmenttorepublican idealsortohisown revolutionarypast,an ambiguitythathadbeen evidentsincehisacceptance oftheLifeConsulatein1802, andwhichhadre-emerged amidthesymbolicsplendour oftheimperialcoronationin 1804.Hewasstillreadyto presenthimselfasthe people’semperorwhen circumstancesdemandedit. Hisprogressiveadoption ofthetrappingsofmonarchy was,however,obviousforall tosee.Heclearlyenjoyedthe pompandceremonialthat camewithhisimperialstatus andwasconsciousofthe politicalgainstheyconferred. Afterthecreationofthe Empire,Napoleonic propagandachangedsubtly, nolongerfocusingsolelyon hispersonorhisclaimto publicconsideration,but insistingonthedignityofthe imperialofficeandonthe standingthatitgaveFrancein internationalaffairs.Above all,hesoughttoestablishhis legitimacyintheeyesofthe internationalcommunity,a legitimacythatwas proclaimedbutstillhadtobe puttothetest.Theimperial coronationceremony,withits sumptuouscostumesand carefullychoreographed movement,hadbeenintended asamomentoftheatreto impressallEuropewithan imageofstatepower.The EmperorandEmpresswere surroundedbytheirretinue andbythegreatofficersof state,andthePope,inturn, bythebishopsand archbishopsoftheCatholic Church.Butthecoronation wasaFrenchaffair,where theEmperorwassurrounded bythepoliticalandlegalelite ofFrance:theSenate,the CouncilofState,the LegislativeBody,the Tribunate,thevariouscivil andcriminalcourtsofthe land.4ThePopewastheonly foreignleadertoattend. Therewerenokingsor queens,noheadsofother Europeanstates,manyof whomcontinuedtoregardthe Frenchemperorasaparvenu, anupstartwhohadno legitimateclaimtothethrone. IntheyearsaheadNapoleon wasonlytooconsciousof theircontempt,andofthe needtogaintheirrecognition. Heknewthattoestablishhis Empireonasoundfootinghe firsthadtoestablishhis legitimacyamongthe crownedheadsofEurope, andthishesetouttoachieve asamatterofthehighest priority.Hemighthopeto wintheapprovalofthe Frenchpeoplebyappealing tohisrepublicanroots,but thesewoulddolittletowin overEurope’straditionalists. FirstinParis,thenlaterin Milan,heusedthesymbolism ofthecoronationceremonyto establishadifferentsortof legitimacy,thatofa hereditarymonarch.5 Byimitatingestablished monarchieswhileadopting hisownstyleofmonarchy, Napoleonwasnotmerely playingtohisownfantasies: hewaslayingclaimtothe powerthattraditionally belongedtokingswhomhe increasinglysummonedupas hisancestorsinoffice.6He couldnot,ofcourse,appeal directlytotheBourbonlinein France,orinanywayinvite comparisonbetweenhis powerandtheirs;thelast Bourbon,LouisXVI,had endedhislifeindefeatand humiliation,dethronedbythe revolutionariestobecomethe mostprestigiousofthe guillotine’ssixteenthousand victims.Napoleonwaswell awarethattheFrenchpeople couldbefickleintheir loyalties,notleasttokings; hehadwatchedastheParis crowdhadoverturnedthe equestrianstatuesofpast monarchsintheircity’s squares,andhewasequally wellawarethatinthefuture hemightenjoynomore flatteringafate. Butsomeofthegreat Europeanmonarchswerea differentproposition, especiallythemighty Carolingianemperorswhose powerhadextendedbeyond anyonekingdomtoembrace amultinationalempire.In them,Napoleonfoundworthy pointsofcomparisonthat wouldhelptocementhisown reputation.Inhisspeeches andhiscorrespondencehe openlyappealedtothe memoryofCharlemagne, himselfadoptingtheinsignia oftheoldFrankishkingsand conjuringupimagesofanew HolyRomanEmpire stretchingproudlyacross Europe.Itwaswiththeaim ofreinforcingtheparallels betweenhisreignand Charlemagne’sthathemade anofficialvisitinthefirst monthsofhisEmpire–in October1804–toAix-laChapelle,nowtheGerman cityofAachen,tovisit Charlemagne’stomband veneratethemedieval emperor’smemory.Itwasa momentpregnantwiththe symbolismofpowerand filledwithpropagandist intent.7 IfNapoleonwentto Aachentolayclaimto Charlemagne’ssuccession,he madethepointmore forcefullyinthefollowing yearwhen,justsixmonths afterhisimperialcoronation inParis,hehadhimself crownedasecondtime,as KingofItaly,inMilan.This wasmorethanempty ceremonial,thepresentation ofNapoleonandJosephineto theItaliannation:the consequenceofthis coronationwastodissolve theItalianrepublicwhichthe Frenchhadestablishedand replaceitwithamonarchyin March1805–amovethat followedtheexclusionof AustriafromLombardyand helpedclearthewayfor Napoleon’smajor reconstructionofItaly.8 TheEmperordidnot intendtoruleItalyinperson. Despitetheinsistenceof variousItalianrulersthathe shoulddoso,onthegrounds thathewasofItalianstock andathomeintheItalian language,hetookcareto brushsuchclaimsasideand showedlittledesireto concentratehisenergieson Italy.Hedividedhistime betweentheaffairsofstatein Parisandhismanyabsences oncampaign;theday-to-day businessofgovernmentin Italyhegaveintothehands ofhisviceroyinMilan, Josephine’sson,Eugènede Beauharnais.Butthatdoes notmeanthatthecoronation ceremonylackedpurpose.On thecontrary,Napoleontook greatcaretoleaveastrong impressionontheItalians, surroundinghimselfonce againwithsymbolsand artefactsthatlinkedhimin thepopularimaginationtothe Carolingians.Oncemorehe waslayingclaimtohistorical antecedentsthatprovidedhim withpopularlegitimacy:the IronCrown,keptinthe treasuryofthecathedralat Monza,wasregardedwith aweandvenerationbythe peopleofLombardy.9 Napoleonwouldshowthathe wasdeeplyconsciousofthe dignitythatwasbestowedon him,andafter1805the officialdocumentsofthe Empirewouldrefertohimby thedualtitleof‘Emperorand King’. Yetthoughhetookcareto presenthimselfabroadasa legitimatemonarch,itisnot clearhowmuchhereally respectedking-shipasan institution.Kingsmighthave heredityontheirsideandbe bolsteredbylegitimate succession,butinthefinal analysisimperialpower resteduponthearmyandon efficientadministration,and Napoleonhadby1807 demonstratedthathewas morepowerful,moretobe fearedandobeyed,thanany monarch.Acrossthe continent,indeed,hemade andunmadekings,seemingly atwill.Legitimacyseemedto countforlittleinthischess game;pieces,includinghis brothers,weremovedaround theboardatNapoleon’swill. Localrulersfoundthemselves promotedtotheroyaltitleat thewhimoftheEmperor,asa rewardfortheirreliabilityand loyaltyoraspartofhis strategyforadministering CentralEurope.InBavaria, forinstance,Napoleon elevatedMax-Joseph,who hadbeenElectorsince1789, toKingfromJanuary1806. Atthesametimetheelector ofWürttemberg,FrederickII, wasalsogivenakingdom, andbeforetheendoftheyear asimilarrewardwasheaped ontheElectorofSaxony, nowcrownedKingFrederick AugustusI.10Royaltitles,it seemed,camecheaply;the titlethatreallymatteredwas Napoleon’salone.Kings werenotsupposedtowield sovereignauthority,andtheir kingdomswouldremain clientstates,providing suppliesandconscriptsfor theEmperor’sarmy,atleast untilFrenchpowerbeganto crumblearound1813andthe Germanrulerswerepresented withthechallengeofthe WarsofLiberation.The Bavariankinghadlittle loyaltytotheEmpire,and washappytochangesides whenhisnationaland dynasticinterestdemandedit. Some,however,wereless astute,mostnotably FrederickAugustus,who failedtojumpshipintime andpaidforhiscontinued allegiancetoNapoleonby losingthree-fifthsofhis territoryattheCongressof Vienna.11 FortheEmperor–asfor alltheroyalcourtsofEurope –gaininglegitimacymeant alsomaintainingalifestyle thatheequatedwith monarchy:alevelofgrandeur toimpresstheothercrowned rulersandtheirretinues. ThoughNapoleonhimself, unavoidably,spentmuchof histimeoncampaign,heand Josephinenevertheless lavishedconsiderable attentionontheirvarious imperialresidences–atthe TuileriesinParis;atSaintCloud,anelegantchateau overlookingtheSeinewhich Napoleonhadusedashis consularresidenceandon whichhehadspentsome threemillionfrancsbetween 1801and1803,12laterat Fontainebleau,which Napoleonsoughttoconvert intoasecondcountryhome; andatMalmaisontothewest ofthecapital,whichthe couplehadboughtjointlyin thelate1790sandwhich Josephinecametoregardas herhome.Comparedto Versailles,ofcourse,these propertiesmayseemmodest, butmodestywasnot Napoleon’sstyle.In1804it wasalreadybeingobserved thatatSaint-Cloud ‘everythingwasassumingthe appearanceofasovereign court’:thelavishmusic,the publicmassonSundays,the audienceswhichNapoleon grantedinthegalleryafterthe service–all‘recalledthe vanitiesofVersailles’.13 Thehouseswereusedto stageelaboratestate ceremonials,dinnersand receptionsthatgrewmore lavishwiththeyears.And acrossEuropeweredottedthe manypalacesreservedfor membersoftheBonaparte family.Fromhisexperience oftheAustrianandBavarian courts,Napoleonlearnedthe importanceofpompand luxury,andheaimedto createinParisacourtofhis ownthatwouldoutshineall others.Nothingwasleftto chance.TheEmperor employedahugestaffto ensurethateverythingran likeclockwork,andtherules governingetiquettewereof exemplaryprecision, especiallytheetiquette surroundingformalmeals, sinceeatingwasatthevery heartofcourtlife.‘When theirMajestieseatinpublic, theGrandChamberlain proffersabasinforthe Emperortowashhishands; theGrandEquerryoffershim hisarmchair;theGrand MasterofthePalacetakesa napkinandpresentsittoHis Majesty.TheEmpress’sFirst Prefect,theFirstEquerryand theFirstChamberlain performthesamefunctions forHerMajesty.TheGrand Almonergoestothefrontof thetable,blessesthemeal, andretires.’14Itallseemsa worldawayfromthe puritanical,ratherSpartan moresoftheJacobin Republic. Intheorganisationofcourt lifetheEmpressJosephine wasakeyfigure,thetwo coronationceremonieshaving pressedherintothespotlight andgivenheratastefor publiclife.Shelongedto assumeanevenmorecentral role,feelingmortifiedtobe leftbehindinFrancewhen herhusbandwenton campaign,andseveraltimes pleadedwithhiminvainto beallowedtoaccompanythe army.Fromtimetotime,we aretold,hewouldrelentand agreetoheraccompanying himonthefirststageofhis journey,whereshewould holdaninformalcourtin citieslikeMainzorMunich. Butbeyondthatitwasmade clearthatshewasnot welcome:thewarzone,in Napoleon’seyes,wasaman’s worldwhereshehadno place,andsoshereturnedto herdomesticstage.Onthe way,ofcourse,shewas caughtupinanunavoidable roundofofficialreceptionsin thetownsandcitiesthatshe passedthrough;shecould neverreturnwhollytothelife ofaprivatecitizen.Butwith Napoleonaway,shedidhave timeonherhands;andduring thelongmonthsofwarshe filledherdaysadorningand embellishingherpalaceat Malmaisonandinteresting herselfinthelivesofher family–Hortense,marriedto Napoleon’sbrotherLouis, andhersonEugene,now ensconcedinMilan.15At timessheseemedlonely, bored,andevenslightly disaffected. Thewarconsumedlong periodsofNapoleon’slifeas hecrisscrossedEurope,and Josephinewasleftbehindfor monthsonend,sometimesin garrisontownsbehindthe warzone,butmoreoftenin theprivatespaceof Malmaison.Whenshewas awayfromParissheatleast hadaroletoplay,andshe continuedtoplayit.In Strasbourg,forinstance,she hostedabusyroundof receptions,balls,concertsand operas,wherethevarious Germanprincescouldpay homagetothepowerof imperialFrance.Here,as elsewhereinFrance,shewas receivedasEmpressinher ownright,withfullmilitary honours:officerspresented armsandtheartilleryfired welcomingsalvos.According toonebiographer,she enjoyedthebustleofcourt lifeinsuchcities, surroundingherselfwith courtiersandequerries,and spendingfreelyon‘plantsfor hergardenatMalmaison, animalsforherzoo,art objectsandbric-a-brac’.16 Themenageriewasher specialcreation,anditsfame spreadtothepointwhere shipsreturningfromexotic landswouldbringapresent fortheEmpress:thusthe cargoesoftwoshipsarriving inLeHavreinJune1803 included‘anantelope,agnu, azebra,afalcon,fiveparrots, variousothertropicalbirds, andseventeenassorted tortoises’.17 Butsheremained discontented.Herletters makeitclearhowmuchshe missedherhusband,how muchshewantedtotravel withhimandresentedwhat shesawasherenforced isolation.Inreply,Napoleon provedaregular correspondent,sendinghera successionoflettersoutlining theprogressofhismilitary campaignsandavowinghis loveforher.By1806,asthe wardraggedon,Josephine remaineddissatisfied,and becamemoreandmore insistentthatshewantedto accompanyhimoncampaign. ButNapoleonwashaving noneofit:thearmyquarters weremiserable,hewas constantlyonthemove,and thetownsintheleeofthe armywereunsuitableplaces toreceiveher.‘Ireceived yourlettersinamiserable barn’,hewrotefromPultusk on31December1806,‘amid mudandhighwinds,and withstrawforbedding. TomorrowIshallbein Warsaw.Ithinkeverythingis overforthisyear.Thearmy willgointoitswinter quarters.’Hethen discouragedherfromgoing toCassel,wheretherulerhad justbeendeposed,andurged hertotryDarmstadt instead.18Afewdayslaterhe virtuallyorderedhertoreturn toParis.‘GototheTuileries,’ hecommandedheron7 January,‘holdreceptionsand carryonthesamelifeto whichyouwereaccustomed whenIwasthere;suchismy will.’19Onthefollowingday, respondingtoyetanother pleafromJosephine,hespelt outhiswishes.‘Ihadbegged youtoreturntoParis.The seasonistooinclement,the roadsunsafeanddetestable, thedistancestoogreatforme topermityoutocomehither, wheremyaffairsdetainme.It wouldtakeyouatleasta monthtocome.Youwould arriveill;bythattimeit mightperhapsbenecessaryto startbackagain;itwould thereforebefolly.’20Histone wasbusinesslike,atmoments evenperemptory.Thoughhe continuallydeclaredhislove forhiswife,hepreferredto keepheratarm’slengthin wartime,sothathecould pursuethewarand concentrateonmilitary strategy. Itwassoonevidentthat Napoleonhadothergood reasonsforkeepingJosephine atbay,andthatthelovehe professedforher,andwhich wassurelygenuineandoften passionateinthefirstyearsof theirmarriage,wasbeginning tofade.Backinthe1790s, indeed,ithadbeenNapoleon whocontinuallyavowedhis lovewhileJosephine’s capriciouswaysandeasy moralshadattractedawhiff ofscandal.Therewere,of course,manywomeninhis life,too,includingaseriesof passingaffairsthathadbegun inEgypt,andmayinpartbe explainedasaprotestatthe storiesheheardof Josephine’srepeated infidelitybackinParis. However,conjectureis perhapsoflittlehelphere. Alreadyin1799their marriagehadseemed precarious.Thatitlasted anothertenyearsspoke volumesabouttheirdesireto persevereinaunionthat remainedstubbornly childless,andshowedthat Josephinewaspreparedto reformhersomewhat profligatelifestyle.Withthe Consulatecametheneedfor greaterrestraint,and Josephinedulyobliged.As EmperorandEmpressthey wouldbeevenmoreinthe publiceye,andevenmore carefultoappeaseopinion. Theiroriginalmarriage,in truerevolutionarystyle,had beenasecularaffair, conductedinfrontofthe mayor;nowahastilydevised religiousmarriageceremony tookplacein1804inthe privatechapelatthe Tuileries,whichestablished thelegalityoftheirunionin theeyesofRomeandof CatholicEurope. Butthemarriagewasnow facingnewproblems, exacerbatedbyNapoleon’s lengthyabsencesandthe streamofrumoursassailing Josephineaboutthenew womeninherhusband’slife. Mostwerenomorethan passingaffairs,withlittle long-termconsequence, thoughafleetingdalliance withEléanoredelaPlaigne presentedtheEmperorwitha sonlatein1806.Butin Poland,atastateballthrown bytheFrenchForeign Minister,Talleyrand, somethingmoresignificant happened:Napoleonmeta womanwithwhomhefell passionatelyinlove,the beautifulandsensitivePolish countess,MariaWalewska. Thiswouldnotbesomething thatwouldlastamerematter ofafewhoursorafewdays: indeed,theirswouldbecome oneofthemostfamous romancesofthecentury,a lovestorymadefor Hollywoodanddulyfilmed in1937asMarieWalewska (alsoknownasConquest), starringGretaGarboand CharlesBoyer.Maria Walewska,escortedbyher brotherandwiththefull knowledgeandconnivanceof herhusband,droveoutof WarsawonasnowyApril morningin1807tojoin Napoleonathiswinter quartersinOsterodeinEast Prussia.21 TheCountess’sbrother wouldlaterclaimthatshe sawthisasapatriotic mission,herdutyasaPolish aristocrat,andwecanonly assumethatherhusband agreed,thoughitismore probablethatshewasdazzled bytheEmperorandhis recordofmilitaryglory. Whatevertheexplanation, Mariawouldneverreturnto herhusband,andshelater hadasonbyNapoleon, AlexanderWalewski,who wouldgoontohaveahighly distinguishedmilitaryand politicalcareer.In1851he wasappointedFrench ambassadortoLondon,andin thatcapacitywouldrepresent hiscountryattheDukeof Wellington’sfuneral;he wouldalso,notwithouta certainirony,presentthe CourtofStJameswiththe credentialsofFrance’snew regime,theSecondEmpire.22 NordidMariadisappearfrom Napoleon’slife.Shewas acceptedintotheBonaparte clan,andin1815shewould sailtoElbatovisithimin exile.23 Mariacouldprovidethe Emperorwithason,buther positionmeantthatshecould notprovidehimwithanheir –theheirheneededifhewas toprepareadynastic succession,whichby1806 hadbecomeamajorissuefor Napoleonandhisadvisers.At theageofthirty-sevenhestill lackedalegitimateheir,had littlereasontoputtrustinhis brothers,andwasnolonger attractedbythenotionofan ‘adoptivesuccession’which hehadcontemplatedatthe timeofhiscoronation.His closeadvisersmadeitclear thatthey,too,felttherewasa pressingneedforanheirif theregimewastobe establishedonsolid foundations.Norshouldthat heirbeamerecommoner; thatwoulddonothingto impressorappeasethe crownedheadsofEurope. WhatNapoleonneededwasa familyconnectionwithoneof thegreatEuropeandynastic families.Ifhewastobe treatedastheirequal,hehad tobehavelikethem,andin theirworldmarriagewasnot aboutloveandspontaneity;it wascloselyplannedtoform powerfulpoliticalandfamily alliances.That,intheopinion ofsuchministersasFouché andTalleyrand,couldmean onlyonething:thatNapoleon mustseekthehandofaroyal princess,preferablyfrom eitherRussiaorAustria,in ordertosecurehisthrone. Failuretodosowould endangerthefutureofthe Empire.Or,asFouché indiscreetlyexpresseditto Josephinein1807,the welfareofFrancedemanded thatsheshouldseeka divorce.Itwasnotaquestion ofemotions;itwasanissue ofpolitics,ofRealpolitik. Asrumourscirculated abouttheEmperor’s intentions–theAustrian ambassador,Metternich, passedtheseontoVienna, andtongueswaggedacross Europe–Josephinefelt depressedandresentfulat whatsheimaginedtobethe machinationsofNapoleon’s brothers,whomshehadlong seenasherenemies.Yet monthspassedwithoutthe situationbeinginanyway clarified,andthemarriage wasnotfinallyannulleduntil January1810.Josephinehad littlechoicebuttoagree;she wasforty-six,andaccepted thatshecouldnolongerhave children.Shewas compensatedbybeing allowedtokeepthetitleof Empress-Queen,andwas givenMalmaisoninfull ownershipandtheElysée PalaceasherParisresidence. Thegovernmentalsovoted heranannualpensionoftwo millionfrancs,towhich Napoleonaddedathird milliontosupporther lifestyleandhelppayoffher considerabledebts.24 Withtheembarrassmentof Josephineconveniently removed–theCatholic authoritiesinParishad obliginglyconfirmedthe annulmentinrecordtime– Napoleonwasfreetoweigh upthediplomaticadvantages ofamarriagealliancewith eitherRussiaorAustria.In fact,hismindwasalready madeup,andbothhis advisersandhisfamily declaredthattheirpreference laywithAustria,inthe personofeighteen-year-old MarieLouise,daughterofthe AustrianEmperorFrancisI. InMarch1810theywere marriedbyproxyinthe AugustineChurchinVienna withoutNapoleoneven meetinghisbride.Shethen leftforParis,where,afteran initialmeetingintheForest ofCompiègne,theymarried forasecondtimeon2April, inareligiousservice followingacivilceremony thepreviousday.Again,the CatholicChurchproved astonishinglycooperative, withFesch,afellowCorsican andclosecollaboratorof Napoleon’s,theretoofficiate. Withinthreemonthsthe Emperorhadobtaineda divorceandfoundanew bridefromtheoldest monarchyinEurope.Itwasa symbolicmoment,onethat definedthetransformationof theregimefromarepublic foundedonrevolutionand regicideintoanempire legitimisedbyheredityand dynasticsuccession.Or,as onehistorianhaselegantly expressedit,itwasthe momentwhentheenfantsde lapatrieofthe1790s mingledtheirbloodwiththat oftheoldestmonarchyin Europeandbelievedthatthey could‘transformthemselves frombeingregicidesto fatheringkings’.25Asonof theRevolutionagreedto marrythenieceofMarieAntoinette,and,perhapseven moreastonishingly,hewas accepted,however reluctantly,intotheroyal familyofAustria.26If Napoleonhadintendedto stupefyEurope,hesurely succeeded.Andwithinayear hehadfulfilledanother ambition:inMarch1811, MarieLouiseprovided Napoleonwithasonandheir. Themarriageceremony andtheformalcelebrations thatframeditshowjusthow farNapoleonhadmoved awayfromhisrepublican roots.Thecivilceremonywas heldintheGalleryofApollo atSaint-Cloud,thepalace beautifullyilluminatedforthe occasion,beforetheimperial partyleftforParis.The religiousservicethen followedintheChapelofthe Tuileries,copyinginevery detailthewordingusedfor thelastroyalmarriageheldin France,betweenLouisXVI andMarie-Antoinettebackin 1770.27Itwasalavishand dignifiedaffair:theimperial processionsweptintoParis amidstavastcrowd,entering theTuileriesgardensthrough aspeciallyerectedtriumphal archandatemporary colonnade,andafterthe marriagetheyreceivedthe delegationsthatcameto congratulatetheminthe throneroomofthepalace. AllPariswasbedecked withflagsandpublic buildingsfloodlittomarkthe occasion;andwithaneyeto popularreaction,carewas takenthatthisshouldalsobe apopularfestival,which ordinaryParisianscouldjoin inandadmire.Therewere fireworksalongthebanksof theSeine,displaysof horsemanship,gamesand dancingontheChampsElysées,amilitaryprocession andmilitarymusic.Onthe ChampdeMarsahot-air ballooncarryingMadame Blanchardroseintothesky againstthebackdropofthe ÉcoleMilitaire.Napoleon,as washiswont,aimednotjust toimpressonlookerswiththe solemnityoftheoccasion,but alsotoprovidespectacleand amusement.Indeed,itwasa characteristicofNapoleonic festivalsthattheydeliberately incorporatedelementsofthe spectacularandfantastic,and understoodthepropaganda valueoffun.Inthisthey stoodinstarkcontrasttothe moreprosaic,staidly educativefestivalsthathad beenstagedbythe revolutionaries;therewasa modern,flamboyantelement inthemthataimedtosetthe publicpulseracing.The Emperor’sadvisersand designersmadesurethatthe dayofhismarriagetoMarie LouisewasonethatallParis wouldrememberwith pleasure;andthedetailofthe celebrationswaslovingly recordedbytheartistLouisPierreBaltard.28 Festivalswerepartofan armouryofpropagandist devicestowhichNapoleon turnedtoprojectbothhisown imageandthatofhisEmpire. Heusedwhatheknewofthe historyofpastregimes,from AncientRometothecourtof LouisXIV,toseehowothers beforehimhadexploited pompandsymbolismto burnishtheirimageand imposetheirauthority.Ifthe publicpersonaofLouisXIV wasa‘fabrication’,theresult ofadeliberatecampaignof exposureandselfadvertisement,29so,too,was thatoftheEmperor;andthe increasinggrandeurofhis courtandthepublic glorificationofhisvictories inbattlewereintendedtoadd bothtohisownreputation andtothelustreofhis regime.Inhisearlierlifehe hadsoughttopresenthimself asahero,tocaptivatethe imaginationoftheFrench peoplethroughhisvalourand hismilitaryexploits;nowthe emphasischangedtostress hisseriousdevotiontothe causeoftheEmpireandhis roleassaviourofhispeople. Heassumedthetraditional monarchicalroleoflaw-giver anddispenserofjustice,who hadhelpedpreservethehardwonrightsofthepeople whilebringingstabilityand securitytothewholeof Europe.Sometimes,perhaps, hetooktheprocesstoofar,as when,in1806,anewsaint, SaintNapoleon,was introducedintotheCatholic calendar,hissaint’sday,15 August,convenientlytimed tocoincidewithboththe Emperor’sbirthdayandthe festivalofAssumption,a majorholidayintheChristian year.Theaimwasclear enough:todrawattentionto Napoleon’sachievements– anditisnoaccidentthathe waspresentedasawarriorsaint,thevictorofJenaand Austerlitz–andtomarkthe returnofCatholicworshipto landssecularisedbythe JacobinRepublic.Butthe festivalwasgivenamuted reception.MostCatholics seemtohaveremained unimpressed,findingthe wholenotionofSaint Napoleonmildlyridiculous, andcontinuedtomark Assumptiontraditionally,as thefeastoftheVirgin.30 ForNapoleonhimselfthe imageappearedanythingbut ridiculous;indeed,inhis proclamationsandhisuseof languagehecementedthe ideathathewasall-powerful, omniscient,amancapableof seeingclearlywhereothers gotlostinafogofconfusion. Themagnificenceofpublic festivalsandtheloveof sumptuousparadesallserved asinglepurpose,thatof reinforcinghisauthority. Therewassomethinggodly aboutthewayinwhichhe wasspokenofand represented,analoofnessthat isolatedhimandkepthim apartfromhispeople.31 Thisimagewasreinforced bythestatesmanlikeportraits andclassicalbustsproduced bytheleadingartistsofthe day,allofwhichservedto identifytheEmperoras someonewithspecialabilities andunchallengedpower, presentinghiminturnasa militaryhero,afar-sighted law-giver,andapatronofthe arts.Image,itseemed,was everything,anaspectofhis reigninwhichNapoleon,like theSunKingbeforehim, tookapersonalinterest.As hehadinthe1790s,he visitedtheParissalonsand tookanactivepartin choosingprizethemesforthe Academy.Hewasapatronof artistsandsculptors,and turnedtotheleading portraitistsandhistory paintersofthedaytopresent hisimageandhencefurther tolegitimatehispower.Gros, Ingres,DavidandGéricault wereamongthosehe commissionedtopaint canvasesinhishonour, whethertriumphalbattlefield scenesofJenaandAusterlitz, imagesofcareand compassionlikeGros’ famous1804pictureshowing himtendingtheplague victimsinJaffa,orthose whollyimaginedscenesthat appealedtotheromantic imagination,likethatby DavidshowinghimasFirst ConsulcrossingtheAlpsona romanticwhitecharger.Was thispropaganda?AsDavid O’Brienpointsout,the governmentdidmakesome attempttogaugepublic opinion,butthis‘doesnot alterthebasicfactthatunder thenewregimeofficial paintingsoughttoshape, ratherthanrespondto, popularsentiments’.Under theBourbons,officialarthad increasinglytriedtorespond totheartcriticismgenerated bytheSalon,whereas Napoleonwaslessinterested ininteraction,andastrict regimeofcensorshipseverely limitedtheinfluenceof popularsentiment.32Artists struggledtofulfil commissionswhilestill maintainingadegreeof autonomyfromthestate;they knewthathistorypainting thatappearedtoodeferential attractedlittlecriticalinterest. Someadmittedtofeeling frustratedthattheirtalentwas beingundermined.Asthe painterGirodetwrote,‘We areallenlistednow,evenif wedon’tweartheuniform.’33 Napoleonwaswellserved byhisartists,someofwhom, suchasDavid,tooktheshort stepfromservingthe Revolutiontobecomingthe officialcourtpainterofthe Empire.HiscanvasLeSacre, forexample,completedin 1808,didnotjustimpressby itssizeoritscastof hundreds;itexudedtheglory andmajestythatNapoleon wassoeagertoproject. Militarypainters,too,were carefultofocusthe onlooker’seyeonthe glamouranddashofthe Emperor,alwaysprominently deployedinhissignature greatcoatandtricornehat.He wastheherowhothrew himselfandhismeninto battle,thestrategistwho plannedeverydetailofthe engagementandout-thought theopposition.Theemphasis onwarandempire-building hadafurtherconsequencein thattheirportrayalwas largelymasculine,instriking contrasttothe revolutionaries’identification ofthenationthrougha predominantlyfeminine symbolism.Thenewimagery hadmalemilitarybodiesatits core,bodieswhichdefined thecharacteroftheEmpire bycontrastingthemwith thoseoftheirenemies.34 WhileNapoleon encouragedtheseportrayals andexpressedapprovalfor theworkofthosepainters whospecialisedinmilitary scenes–Prud’honand Lefèvre,forinstance–there islittletosuggestthathehad anyrealappreciationofart foritsownsake.Whathedid appreciatewastheinfluence artcouldexercise,andfrom earlyinhiscareerhesaw patronageasavaluabletool tomanipulateopinionand buildhisreputationasa leaderintheculturaldomain. Ofcourse,thepainters concernedmadeagoodliving fromstatepatronage;there wasanannualbudgetofsixty thousandfrancsexpressly reservedforpurchasesof ‘new,high-qualitypictures andforencouragingtheartof painting’.35Buttheycould alsoexpecttocapitaliseon theirfameinthemarket place,astheprivateart marketrevivedunderthe Empire.Therevolutionary ageofausteritywasatlast over,andartistsand craftsmen,fromportrait painterstolandscape gardenersandthemakersof fineporcelain,sawtheir businessrevive.Thereturnof someofthegreatnoble familiesfromemigration, whenaddedtoNapoleon’s owntasteforluxury,meant thatthoseartistswhohad sufferedmostgrievously duringtheRevolutionnow hadfreshopportunitiesfor sales,andhenceforprofit. Thestrongbondbetween Napoleonandhisartistswas mutuallybeneficial. ThebenefitthatNapoleon couldderivefromartis exemplifiedbytheflurryof paintingsrecordingand commemoratingtheEgyptian Campaign.Themilitary effort,aswehaveseen,was anundisputedfailure,with theremnantsofhisarmy returningintatterstoFrance andanimportantpartofthe artisticplunder,includingthe RosettaStone,falling ignominiouslyintoBritish handsbeforeitcouldbe broughtbacktoEurope.Yet, evenatthetime,Napoleon hadinsistedthatthese engagementswouldprovide thesubjectmatterfor dramatichistorypaintings; andthroughouttheEmpire suchpaintingsbecame regularhighlightsof Napoleonicsalons.Itdidnot concernhimthatthebattles hadbeenlost,orthatsomeof thescenesdepictedwere moreinventionthanhistorical truth.Mostimportantwasthe opportunitytopaintscenes thatwouldetchthemselves onFrance’simagination,and appealtothecolonialideal thathadbeguntodissolve withthelossofQuebecinthe SevenYearsWarandthe PeaceofParisthatfollowed. InthepaintingsofGros, GirodetandLejeune,anew colonialidyllwasdeveloped thatcouldappealtothe Franceoftheearlynineteenth centuryandtothepostrevolutionaryworld.The paintingsnoddedinthe directionofthecurrent fashionfortheexoticandthe oriental,lingeringlovinglyon thevividcloaksandglinting weaponsofFrance’s opponents.Buttheywerenot intendedonlytodazzleor entertain:theyinvoked memoriesthatplacedthe Frenchinthedirectlineof othergreatempires,whether ofEgyptorofRome.Andby contrastingtheFrenchwith theSyriansorEgyptians,the paintingsalsoplayedtoideas ofnationalstereotypes,that pitted,inToddPorterfield’s words,‘Frenchscience, morality,masculinityand intellectualrigoragainst supposedlyrepresentative traitsofEasterners: fanaticism,cruelty,idleness, vice,irrationality,deviance anddegeneracy’.36The Frenchencompassedthe highestvaluesofcivilisation; theycouldadmirethese paintingsandfeelgoodabout themselves. Napoleonhadneitherthe timenortheexpertiseto exerciseartisticjudgmenton hisownaccount,and understoodthatheneededan artisticdirector,someone whocoulddevelopanational policyofcollectionsandtake chargeofthemasterpieces. Manyofthesehadbeen pillagedfromGermany,Italy andelsewhere,andwouldbe placedinthenewmuseum Napoleonintendedtofound intheLouvre.Themanhe choseforthetaskwas Dominique-VivantDenon,an engraverandformerroyal curatorintheOldRegime, whohadgonewithNapoleon toEgyptwhere, accompanyingDesaix’s army,hehadtravelledwidely inthecountrysideandboth writtenaboutandsketched thehundredsofantiquitieshe cameacross. Denonwasan indefatigabletravellerwho, onhisreturntoFrancein 1802,publishedhisfindings, andhissketches,inhis VoyagedanslaBasseetla HauteEgyptependantles campagnesduGénéral Bonaparte,abookthat broughthiminstantfame,as muchforhisdescriptionsof thecountrysideandof everydaylifeinEgyptasfor thetechnicaldetailonthe ruins.37Hecommentedonthe Egyptians’costumesandtheir diet,andnotedtheextremes ofwealthandpovertythat characterisedurbansocietyin Cairo.Helivedthroughthe Cairouprisingwithallits extremesofviolenceand cruelty,yetnotedthatthe ringleaderswereatypicalof thecitizenryasawhole. ‘Whilemurderwasdevoutly preachedfromthegalleriesof theminarets,andwhilethe streetswerefilledwithdeath andcarnage,allthosein whosehousesanyFrenchmen werelodgedwereeagerto savethembyconcealment andtosupplyandanticipate alltheirwants’.38Denon’s descriptionswererichand detailedand,likeall eighteenth-centurytravellers, steepedinthetravelliterature oftheage,foremostamong themthewritingsofVolney. PassingthroughAlexandria, forinstance,henotedthat everythinghesawconfirmed Volney’sgraphicaccountof thecity,tothepointwhere, onrereadinghimseveral monthslater,alltheshapes, coloursandsmellscame floodingbacktohim.39If NapoleonwarmedtoDenon’s writing,healsotrustedhis politics,forDenonwasa committeddisciple. DescribingtheBattleofthe Pyramids,hehadconcluded, withadegreeofliterary licence,that‘ahandfulof French,ledbyahero,had justsubduedaquarterofthe globe’.40Itwasnottrue,but itwasthesortofdistortion thatappealedtotheEmperor. VivantDenonwas appointedin1802asthefirst directorofNapoleon’sgrand projectforanimperialart gallerytobeformedoutof theLouvre,andhewould retainthepostuntilafterthe falloftheEmpirein1815.It gavehimgreatinfluenceover theartistictasteofhis generationinhiseffective managementofNapoleon’s culturalpolicy.Hebuiltup thecollectionsintheLouvre andatVersailles,aswellas arrangingsalonsandgiving helptostrugglingartists.The Louvreheinheritedfromthe Revolutionwasamuseum whichhadbeenestablished withaclearrepublican mission:astheGirondin ministerJean-MarieRoland explainedtoDavidin1792, ‘Themuseummust demonstratethenation’sgreat riches.Francemustextendits glorythroughtheagesandto allpeoples:thenational museumwillembrace knowledgeinallitsmanifold beautyandwillbethe admirationoftheuniverse.’41 UndertheEmpirethepurpose ofthemuseumbecameless educationalandmore celebratory,astorehousefor thecultureofEuropeandthe conquestsofNapoleon’s militarytriumphs.Artworks weresedulouslypillaged frompublicgalleriesand privatecollectionsinItaly, Germany,andacrossEurope, andbroughtbacktoParis wheretheyweredisplayedin chronologicalsequenceto reflecttheevolutionof culture,building,ofcourse,to thegreatpaintersof Napoleon’sownday.42 InthestreetsofParis,too, largenumbersofpublic buildingsandmonuments proclaimedthegloryofthe regimeandactedaseveryday remindersofimperialmilitary triumphs.IfNapoleon dislikedstatuesofhimself, whichwouldhaverecalled toodirectlythereignsof long-deposedmonarchs,he aimedtomakeParisacityof rarebeauty,afittingcapital forhisEmpire.Theobelisk onthePlacedelaConcorde recalledthesplendoursofan empirehehadovercome;the Pantheoncommemorated contemporaryheroes;the TrajancolumninthePlace Vendômeconjuredup memoriesofclassicalRome. Thetriumphsofhisarmies areproclaimedontheArcde Triomphe,designedforthe Emperorthoughnot completeduntilthe1830s.In architecture,classicalfacades dominatedintheperfectly balanced,ifemotionallycold, frontagesofbuildingssuchas theMadeleineortheFrench parliamentbuilding,the PalaisBourbon.Napoleon wasnotthelastFrenchleader todreamofleavinga permanentmarkonParis– thepresidentsoftheFifth Republichaveinturn bestowedtheirarchitectural trademarkonthecapital–but fewhaveleftsucharangeof palacesandmonuments.43 Napoleonjealously guardedhisreputationasa patronofthearts,since generosityandpatronage werepartofhisimageasa monarch.Hewasdetermined toshowthathewasmore thanagreatwarrior,andthat hebroughtpeace,culture,and civilisationtotheterritories heruled.Hisartisticinterest extendedbeyondpaintingand theplasticarts.Hesaw himselfasapatronofmusic, too,andthroughtheComte deRemusatheintervened directlyintheselectionof prizewinnersintheannual competitionattheImperial MusicAcademy.Likethe Bourbonsbeforehim,he showedaninterestinthe playsthatwerestagedinthe Paristheatre,andmost particularlyinthe performancesstagedatthe ParisOpera,whichhe attendedregularlywhenhe wasinthecity.Heeven insistedonplayingarolein programmeselection,which allowsonerecenthistorianto talkofNapoleonhavinga politiquedelascène.44This wasespeciallysoduringthe yearsofhisgreatvictories, whenoperasandplaysoften madespecificreferencetohis achievementsbut,shrewdly perhaps,hemaintainedtight controlovertheParisstage throughouttheEmpire.For therecanbenomistakeabout hisintentions,ortherootof hisartisticinterest.Like everythinghedid,hismotive waspoliticalbeforeitwas cultural.Patronageofthearts wasyetanotheraspectof imperialpower. 11 FromthePeninsulato Leipzig In1807,aswehaveseen, Napoleonwasatthevery zenithofhispower.Inafaceto-facenegotiationwithTsar AlexanderIontheNiemen, hehadeffectivelydivided EuropeintoFrenchand Russianzonesofinfluenceto theexclusionofdefeated powerssuchasAustriaand Prussia–aswell,ofcourse, asGreatBritain.Theglorious surroundings,thetrappingsof imperialauthority,the intimacyofthemoment– alliesandevenadviserswere excludedfromthemeetingof thetwoemperors–allserved toemphasisethatthiswasa verypersonaltriumph,one thatmightyetallowhimtobe perceivedbytheFrench peopleasamanofpeace.Yet theaccordsdrawnupatTilsit heldtheseedsoffuture conflicts.Thoserulerswho hadnotbeeninvolvedinthe negotiationswereunlikelyto acceptwithgoodgracea treatyimposedonthemby FranceandRussia;their feelingsofresentmentwould smoulderuntiltheyhadan opportunityforrevenge.The KingofPrussia,inparticular, hadreasontofeelaggrieved, sincehislandswere cavalierlycarvedupinthe interestsofthetwoempiresto hiseastandwest.Prussialost athirdofitsterritoryand nearlyhalfitspopulation, withitsshareofPoland remodelledintotheGrand DuchyofWarsawandplaced underthehereditaryruleof theKingofSaxony.1Prussia wouldbidehertime, restructureherarmedforces, andseeknewalliances;in thispartofCentralEurope Tilsitwasaninvitationto furtherwarfare,anditis surelyunsurprisingthatthe GrandDuchydidnotsurvive Napoleon’sfall.Manyofthe Germanprinceswhose loyaltyNapoleonhadbought withfavoursandhonours becameincreasinglyrestive astheEmperorrode roughshodovertheir interests,whiletheirsubjects wereattractedtothenew forcesofGerman nationalism. TilsitwouldproveashortlivedtriumphforNapoleon, exposinghimtothe resentmentsandjealousiesof others.Itlefthimwith responsibilityforaEuropewideempire,tobesure,but alsovulnerabletotheperils thatwide-flungterritoriesand distantfrontierzones imposed.Stablegovernment dependedincreasinglyon gainingthecooperationof localrulersandlocalelites.In particular,Napoleonwas overlydependentonthe supportofAlexanderIto maintainhisterritoriestothe east,totheextentthatRussia became,inLuigiMascilli Migliorini’sphrase,‘the keystonetothestabilityofthe Empire’seasternfrontier’.2 Theforeignpolicysuccesses oftheearlyyearscamewith dangersoftheirown. Itwasnotonlyaquestion ofdefendingthesefar-flung borders,difficultasthat mightattimesappear.The sheergeographicalextentof theEmpiretookthe Napoleonicsystemintonew politicalzones,whichhad hiddenperilsoftheirown. Frenchterritorieswerenotall contiguouswithFranceitself; atitsheight,theEmpirealso controlledprovincesalong theAdriatic,inIstria,Croatia andDalmatia,which borderedonRussiaandthe OttomanEmpire.Inthe BalkansandtheNearEast, Napoleonhaddreamtaslate as1806ofcreatingalliances withbothTurkeyandPersia, atriplealliancethatwould helpFrancetowardoff RussiaandattackBritish India.Butbythefollowing yearhisprioritieshad changedbecausethespeedof hisvictoryagainsttheTsar obviatedanyfurtherneedfor aidfromPersiaorTurkey; whilerelationsbetweenthe twoNearEasternpowers, nevergood,haddisintegrated intoopenwarfare.Napoleon hadtochoosebetweenthem: hedecidedthatthestabilityof theOttomanEmpirewas threatenedbyinternal decadence,andsoheoptedto abandontheOttomansforthe sakeofaPersianalliance.3 This,too,wouldhave seriousdiplomatic consequences,alarmingboth theBritishandtheRussians andalertingforeign governmentstohisfurther ambitionsbeyondEurope.It wasalsoareminderthat, howevergreatFrance’s militarypower,theEmperor couldnotforceothersto sharehisinterestsorbully themintounnatural friendships.Besides,inside theenvelopeofthe NapoleonicWarstherewould beareasofconflictthathad littletodowithFrance,but whichreflectedlocalgoals andregionalanimosities.The Europe-widewarsprovideda contextinwhichambitions couldberealisedandold scoressettled.Amilitary coupinSwedenin1809,for instance,overthrewGustav IVandprovidedRussiawith anexcusetointervene; Finlandthenbattledtosecure liberationfromtwocenturies ofSwedishrule,anda popularinsurrectionbroke outintheTyrolagainst Austria.Noneofthishad muchtodowithNapoleon’s Empire,atleastnotdirectly. Nor,ostensibly,didthefirst murmuringsofaSpanishAmericanrevolutionin Venezuelain1810,though theinsurrectionarymoodwas firedbynewsofNapoleon’s invasionofSpain.The revolutionaryleadersinLatin America,likeFranciscode Miranda,wereprofoundly influencedbyFrance’s revolutionandlookedfor inspirationtoits iconography.4Conflictinone areacreatedaspirations elsewhereintheworld,thus transferringtheNapoleonic Warsontoaworldstage. ElsewhereinEurope,the demandsofNapoleonic administrationservedtowhip upoppositionandstimulatea desirefornationalautonomy. ThroughoutGermanyit sowedtheseedsofanew Germannationalismthat wouldbeapowerfulforcein theWarsofLiberationin 1813,whileRussiaand Austriacontinuedtocast covetouseyesonNapoleon’s GrandDuchyofWarsaw. Napoleonhimselfshowedno desiretoendthewar,orto acceptthatthebalanceof powerestablishedatTilsit wasinanysensedefinitive. Rather,hearguedthatfurther warsofexpansionwere needed,thatfurther punishmentmustbemeted outtothose,likeBritain,that hadnotbeenconquered,if thestabilityoftheEmpire wastobeguaranteedandthe formationofnewcoalitions averted.Hemay,ofcourse, havebeenrighthere,inthe sensethatthedynasticrulers ofEuropewereunlikelyto acceptaslegitimatethe patchworkofclientstates withwhichtheEmperorhad surroundedhimself,most oftenwithoneofhisrelatives atitshead.Itwasnotonlythe KingofPrussiawhowas harbouringresentmentsor bidinghistime.Austria,too, humiliatedbyNapoleonin battleandhumiliatedagain diplomaticallybythe dissolutionoftheHoly RomanEmpire,hadgood reasontoseekrevenge.And internally,acrossmuchof Europe,therewasthedanger ofrestivenessaspeople sufferedthefullweightof taxesandrequisitions,the burdenofconscription,and theintrusionofimperial administrationandpolicing. Forawhile,untilaround 1808,itmusthaveappeared thattheNapoleonicsystem wasworkingwell, introducingefficient governmentandattracting localnotablestoitsservice; andfromBelgiumtoVenice andacrossmuchofGerman CentralEurope,landowners, merchants,lawyersandeven thegreatnoblefamilies seemedreadytoattach themselvestotheimperial standard.Butalreadythere wereseriousfissuresbelow thesurface,andintheyears thatfollowedNapoleonic Europewouldbeengulfed oncemoreinwarandcrisis. Attherootofthecrisis wasNapoleon’s determinationtoattack Britain’stradingand economicpower,whichhe believed,withsomereason, toholdthesecretofher militarysuccess.The destructionofhercommercial wealthandtheimpactthis wouldhaveontheCityof Londonwould,heargued, forcetheBritishgovernment tosueforpeaceandthereby removehismostimplacable opponent.Hewouldclaim thatthispolicywasforced uponhimbyBritain’s dominanceatseaafter Trafalgar,andtheaggressive usethatshewasmakingof hernavalsuperiority.In London,thePortland administrationshowedno desiretotreatwiththe Empireand,evenmorethan itspredecessors,seemedset onafighttothedeath.The Frenchresponsewasto implementtheContinental Blockade,withtheaimof cuttingoffthecoastsof EuropefromBritish shipping.5Britain’sresponse wasimmediate,anditwas openlyaggressive–anattack onDenmarkin1807inwhich theBritishfleetbombarded Copenhagen,causing thousandsofciviliandeaths, andseizedtheDanishnavy beforeitcouldfallinto Napoleon’shands.For Britainhadgoodreasonto feartheeffectofNapoleon’s blockade,atleastuntilsuch timeasshehadfoundnew marketsforhergoods,and sheputintensepressureon heralliestobreakit. KnockingouttheDanish navywasnecessary,the Britishfelt,iftheywereto maintaincommandofthe seasandcontrolthecoastline ofEurope.6 Napoleondidnotdoubt thathewouldbringBritainto herknees.Asastrategy,the ContinentalSystemhehad initiatedwasbynomeansan unpromisingidea,norwasit certainin1806thatthe Britishcouldundermineit. However,asmentioned earlier,itwasharderto enforcethanNapoleonhad envisagedandwasproving deeplyunpopular,evenin partsofFrance.Acrossthe EmpiretheContinental Systemwasresented,and blamedforcreatingshortages andforcingupprices;itwas alsoseen,quitejustly,asa Frenchpolicytopromote Frenchinterests,oftenat others’expense.7Intheshort term,thegreatEuropean portsweresavagelyaffected, losingtheirdomestic commerceandbecoming increasinglydependenton neutralshipping.Inthelonger term,merchantsdevisedtheir ownstrategiestosubvertthe policy,andmanymanagedto carryonintrade.8Butthe policy,asadevicedesigned toundermineBritain,clearly failed.Meanwhile,inports likeHamburg,themiseryit causedandthesensethatthey werebeingexploitedforthe benefitofFrancelefta burningsenseofresentment whichhelpedtomilitarise opinionandpersuadea commercialcivilsocietyto takeuparmsagainstthe Empire.9 ItwasNapoleon’s determinationtoenforcethe ContinentalSystemthatled mostimmediatelytothe extensionofthewar,toforce otherrulerstoimplementthe BerlinandthelaterMilan Decreesandtoclosetheir portstotheBritish.This broughtheightenedtensions inmuchofItalyandledtothe occupationofthePapal States.Moreimportantlyit explainsNapoleon’sfateful decisiontoinvadeSpain. Spainwasnotahostile power;indeed,theSpanish monarchyhadbeencounted amongtheEmpire’smilitary allies,albeitarather lukewarmandinefficientally attimes.ButtheSpanish courtwasahotbedofcabals andfactions,somestrongly anti-French,andtheKing’s chiefminister,Manuel Godoy,wasplottingtotear uptheFrenchallianceand crossthePyrenees.This treacheryalonewasenough topersuadeNapoleonthatthe timehadcometotakefirm action,butjustasimportant wasthethreatthatIberia presentedtotheContinental System,Lisboninparticular offeringamajorentrypoint forBritishgoodsonthe continent.InOctober1807 Frenchforceshadcrossedthe Spanishborderandinvaded Portugal,thefirstofthree invasionswithinfouryears, andinMay1808,atBayonne, NapoleonbulliedtheKingof Spain,CharlesIV,into signingoverhisrightstothe throneandforcedhisson Ferdinandtoabdicate.He thenbrusquelytransferredhis ownbrother,Joseph,from NaplestoreplaceCharlesas KingofSpain. AtBayonne,Spainwas transformedintoyetanother imperialsatellite,orsoit appeared;intheevent,the arrivaloftheFrench,with theircustomarydemandsfor heavytaxesandmilitary levies,triggeredwidespread popularresistanceinsupport oftheBourbons,includinga bitterinsurrectioninMadrid thatwouldbeimmortalised bytheSpanishartistGoya. Provincialrisingsfollowedin manypartsofthecountry, pinningbackFrenchforces, andbytheendof1808the Britisharmyhadliberated Portugal.Itwasnowclear thattheFrenchwereengaged inadifferentkindofwar fromthosetheyhad encounteredontheplainsof CentralEurope.Many Spaniardsremaineddeeply loyaltotheirroyalfamily, nowexiledinBrazil,andsaw Josephasausurperandthe puppetofaforeignpower. Theiracquiescencecouldnot betakenforgrantedasit couldinmanyoftheGerman electorates,whereNapoleon sealeddealswiththeirrulers andensuredthattheir subjects’loyaltyremained undivided.Thiswouldbea waragainstciviliansand partisansaswellasregular soldiers,aguerrillawar,in whichitwasdifficultto distinguishsoldiersfrom villagers,foughtagainstan enemythatmeltedawayinto forestsandmountainpasses. Itwassomethingnewinthe imperialera:apeople’swar thatNapoleonfoundhecould notwin,awarthatdragged onmiserablyanddrained Frenchmanpowerand resources.10 Ofcourse,Francedidnot gointoSpainunprepared,and thearmythatNapoleonsent acrossthePyreneeswasa powerfulmilitaryunitof aroundonehundredand twentythousandmen, certainlythebesttrainedand equippedinSpainatthetime, evenifitwascomposed mainlyofrawconscriptsand second-linetroopstransferred fromwarinItaly.Intheearly stagesofthewarthearmy advancedacrossthenorthof thecountrymeetingonly limitedresistance,but Spanishopinionrallied againsttheFrench,withthe oppositioncentredin provincialgovernmentsand localjuntas.Militarily,the Spanisharmyitselfwasin poorshape,badlyneglected duringtheyearsofGodoy’s government,andthemajor militaryoperationsagainst theFrenchwereledbythe BritishunderWellesley,for whomthePeninsulawasthe principaltheatreof operations.Soon,around twenty-threethousandBritish troopswereassembledin Portugal,thebasefromwhich theBritishdefendedthe Portugueseandlaunched attacksonFrenchpositions, withbothSpanishand Portuguesetroopsplayinga secondaryrolealongside them. Until1809itlookedas thoughtheFrenchinvasion wouldsucceed.Theyhadput downthemajorityofthe insurrectionstheyhad encounteredinthenorthern areasofthecountryand,with theexceptionofasurprise defeatatBailénin1808,they hadsystematicallydefeated theSpanisharmyinopen battle.Butthenthepolitical climateinEuropechanged dramatically.Inresponseto theTyroleanrebellionAustria re-enteredthewarandlooked toformanewcoalition againstFrance.Napoleon hurriedlyreturnedtoParis, leavingtheday-to-day conductofthePeninsular Wartohismarshalswhilehe concentratedonhostilitiesin theeast.And,increasingly,it wasnottheSpanisharmythat theFrenchfoundthemselves pittedagainst,butthe guerrillasontheonehand, andtheBritisharmyonthe other.TheBritish,fromtheir baseinPortugal,provedmore thanamatchforthemonthe battlefield,whereWellesley– soontobecreatedViscount Wellington–wouldprovea skilledtactician.Butforthe averageFrenchsoldier thrownintothecauldronof theSpanishwaritwasthe unfamiliarity,andoftenthe sheersavagery,ofguerrilla warfarethatleftthedeepest mark.Officers’memoirsand soldiers’lettersagreein expressingahatredofthe Spanishfrontthatwas unequalledintheirprevious experienceofwarfare.Asone Frenchofficerrecalled,no onecouldbetrusted: ‘Treasonwasaconstantrisk, dayandnight,whetheratthe othersideoftheroadoratthe headofone’sbed.Everyone wastobefeared,eventhose seeminglyhospitablepeople whotookyouintotheir homes.’11 Increasingly,Francefound herselfatwarwithwhatmust haveseemedliketheentire population.Josephfailedto winpopularsupportforhis government,andtheFrench armybecameembroiledinan increasinglybrutal,ruthless andrepressivecampaign againstSpanishirregulars,the guerrillaswhohavegone downinnineteenth-century Spanishhistoryasnationalists andfreedomfighters.Their motiveswerealmostcertainly moremixed,manyofthem choosingserviceinthe guerrillalessfrompolitical idealismthanasameansto combatpovertyorescape conscriptionintotheofficial army;andsomeofthosewho ledtheguerrillabandswere littlebetterthanrobbersand bandits.12 Theirreputationamong theFrenchtroopswas characterisedbytalesof tortureandcruelty:they ambushedFrenchcolumnsin impenetrablemountainareas, cuttingoffstragglersand subjectingthemtosadistic torturebeforemutilatingand killingthem.Inpartsof southernSpain,notably Andalusia,civiliansjoinedin theseactsofcruelty,and therewerehorrifictalesof soldiersbeingburiedalivein sandandlefttodieinthesun, reportsofmutilationand, worse,decapitation,andof menhavingtheirgenitalscut offandstuffedintotheir mouths–watchedbythe entirevillage–inafinal, repugnantactofsexual humiliation.13Itisimpossible toguesshowmuchthesetales wereexaggeratedorasingle incidentmultipliedmany timesintheretelling.Butlike anyactofterrorism,ithadthe effectofdestroyingFrench disciplineandinviting retaliation;andtheFrench werenotslowtooblige, hangingpartisansfromolive treesandinflictingcollective punishmentonentirevillages suspectedofaidingthe guerrillafighters.Likethe civilwarinthewestof Franceinthe1790s,which wasalsofoughtagainst peasants,thewarinSpain sparkedhatredsthatwouldbe difficulttoquench.Fora trainedprofessionalarmy, accustomedtofightinbattle formation,itwasamiserable andoftenfrightening experienceandledmanyof theFrenchsoldierstoregard theirSpanishopponentsas barbaricanduncivilised.This wasanopinionthatsomeof Wellington’stroops,their supposedalliesagainstthe French,confessedtosharing. Exacerbatingthepoor relationsbetweenthe invadingarmyandthelocal population,theFrenchoften equatedSpanish backwardnesswiththe excessivepietyofapeople whohademergedfromthe eighteenthcenturyuntouched bytheEnlightenment.They furtherfuelledtheanimosity oflocalpeoplebypillaging anddesecratingchurchesin theregionsthearmypassed through,where,asone historianhasremarked, ‘Frenchtroopsbehavedasif theywerechargedwiththe de-Christianisationofthe province’.14 IftheFrenchwere harassedbytheguerrillas, theywerenot,however, defeatedbythem;the PeninsularWarwouldbe wonbytheBritisharmy, aidedbythePortugueseand someSpanishdivisions,in regularfighting.Threetimes theFrenchinvadedPortugal totryanddislodgetheBritish army,andthreetimes,in 1808,1809and1811,they weredrivenback.TheBritish armywashelpedinnosmall measurebythePortuguese policyofdestroyingtheir cropsandfarmsteadsand retreatingbehindthewallsof LisbontothwarttheFrench attack.ButinSpainitself Wellington’sonlysignificant incursion–anattempttotake Madridin1809–hadended infailure,andtheBritishhad retreatedtoLisbon,leaving thedefenceofSpaintothe severelymauledSpanish forces.Intheyearsthat followed,theFrench marshalsentrustedwiththe Spanishcampaignscored significantmilitarysuccesses, conqueringAndalusiaand Extremadurainthefaceof fierceresistance.Butthe Britishunderstoodhow seriouslyotherwarfronts weredistractingNapoleon fromSpainandhowrapidly theywereconsumingFrench militaryresources.Itwasnow decidedtoincreasetroop deploymentinthePeninsula andtopushonintoSpain, beginninginthesouthand withtheliberationofMadrid. Thetacticworkedbrilliantly. WiththeFrenchnowfighting majorcampaignsinGermany andRussia,Wellingtonhad, by1813,driventheirarmies outofeverySpanishprovince exceptCatalonia.Bythe followingyearthePeninsula waslost,andFerdinandVII, whohadbeenheldcaptivein Franceformostofthewar, wasabletoreclaimhis throne. Napoleon’sstrategic approachhadcomebadly unstuckinSpain.Hehadnot securedtheacquiescenceof thepopulationtoJoseph’s kingship,andthisleftthe countryapreytoinsurrection. Andhistroopshadbeen unusuallyvulnerabletoattack fromtheguerrillas.Thetactic ofseizingterritorybymeans ofarapidmanoeuvre,with theaimofengagingand destroyingtheenemy’sarmy –atacticthathehadusedso deftlyelsewhere–failedhim here.Hisforceswereheldoff byguerrillaattacksinthe inhospitablemountain countryoftheinterior,or delayedbytheneedtosend outforagingpartiesifmen andhorsesweretobefed. Andwithlittlecooperation fromthelocalpeople,rations andfodderwereoftenscarce, orhadtobewrenchedfrom thepeasants’graspbythreats andviolence.Inhostile terrainofthesorttheFrench encounteredbeyondthe Pyrenees,thewisdomofa logisticalpolicythathad remainedintactsincethe Revolution,thatofexporting thesupplyproblemandliving offtheland,waslessassured, andthearmy’smarchwas continuallyslowedbythe needtostockupfromlocal granaries.15Therewereother problems,too.With Napoleon’sattentiondiverted byothertheatresofwar,he spentlittletimeinSpain, leavingcampaigndecisionsto hismarshals,whocertainly showedlittleofthepolitical understandingthatwas necessarytowinoverpublic opinion.They,too,were shuntedaroundtoservethe interestsofthewiderwar, andtheablermarshals,like SoultandMarmont,were removedfromSpaintoserve inwhatNapoleonregardedas themoresensitivewarzones ofCentralEurope.Thosewho remainedwereofonly moderateability,anditis hardnottoconcludethat Napoleonsystematically underestimatedthethreathe facedinSpain,giving insufficientcreditto Wellingtonasacommander andshowingcontemptforthe guerrillas.Hewouldpay dearlyforit,astheSpanish Ulcerpinneddownnearly twohundredthousandFrench andAlliedtroops,thus restrictinghisabilitytomove againstRussiaandCentral Europe.16 PerhapsNapoleonalso failedtounderstandthe resentmentthathisrapid victoriesoverthegreat Europeanpowershadcreated, ortheextentoftheiranxiety abouthisfutureambitions. After1806bothPrussiaand Austria,whichhadbothbeen humiliatedinwarbythe FrenchEmperor,planned majorreformsoftheir militarystructures,attempting tolearnfromNapoleon’s tacticsandprepare themselvesforafuturewarof revenge.Austriainparticular sawanewwarasinevitable andencouragedexpressions ofGermannationalism;in 1808theArchdukeCharles establishedtheLandwehr throughoutAustriaand Bohemia,withcompulsory militaryserviceforallmen betweeneighteenandfortyfive.InRussia,too, AlexanderIwasbidinghis time,temporarilyfocusingon militaryobjectivescloserto home,inFinlandandTurkey, yetfullyawarethatRussia wouldneedtofightanother waragainsttheEmpire. Britainwasequally convincedoftheneedto defeatNapoleon,butCanning sawlittleadvantagetobe gainedfromspreading Britain’smilitaryresources, preferringtoconcentrateon thestruggleinthePeninsula wherehebelievedthatthe Frenchweremostvulnerable. BesidesthePeninsular campaign,Britaindeployed hertraditionalweaponagainst Frenchhegemony–theRoyal Navy–respondingtothe ContinentalSystemby imposingablockadeofthe Frenchcoastline.This strategywasreasonably effectiveasitseriouslycut thevolumeofFrench commercialshipping,though, after1808,developments elsewhereweakenedits impact,fromthegrowthand diversificationofBritishtrade toanexplosionofsmuggling alongtheChannelcoast.17 Britainhad,however,noneed forconcern,asherstronger andmorediversified economyandthesupportof internationalfinanceprovided herwithadecisiveadvantage. Britaincouldsimplyrunup debt,thankstothemoney marketsandthepeople feelingsecureinthebelief thattheircreditwassafe. Internationalmerchants, industrialists,landowners, planters,banksand speculatorsallrushedtobuy intoLondon.Napoleon enjoyednosuch confidence.18 InCentralEuropeandin Italyconflictcontinued,fired byrevoltsandpopular insurrectionsagainstthe Empire,whileNapoleon’s contemptuoustreatmentof thePope–whowasseized andimprisonedbyFrench forcesin1809–outraged Catholicopinionacross Europe.Therewastalkofa newmilitaryallianceagainst France,butinApril1809 Austriabrokeranksand, buoyedbypublicopinionand anewsurgeofnationalism, resumedthewaragainst Napoleononherown;ofthe otherpowersonlyBritain signeduptotheso-called FifthCoalition.TheAustrian Emperor,FrancisII,andthe majorityofthearchdukes believedthat,withtheFrench boggeddowninSpain,they shouldseizethemomentto re-establishAustrian dominioninsouthern GermanyandItaly.Austria’s armywasinbettershapethan ithadbeenfouryearsearlier, whileNapoleonseemedillpreparedbecauseofhisheavy involvementinSpain.Hehad athisdisposalsomeninety thousandmenoftheArmyof theRhine,towhichheadded aroundahundredthousand alliedtroops,mainly Germans,DutchandPoles. Toplugthegaps,hethen calledupafurtherone hundredandfortythousand conscripts,sothatbyMarch 1809hehadeffectively assembledanewarmyin Germany,somethree hundredthousandstrong.19 Hedidsoinrecordtime, forsakinghiscustomary meticulouspreparation;the consequencewasamessy campaignthatsawNapoleon defeatedbytheAustriansina bloodyencounteratAspernEssling,inwhichLannesand anumberofgeneralswere killed.Napoleonrallied, defeatingtheAustriansat Wagramandforcingthemto sueforpeaceatSchönbrunn. Butthevictoryborenoneof themystiqueofhisearlier campaigns.Therewere enormouscasualtiesonboth sides,andtheFrenchwere tooexhaustedtodestroythe enemy.TheEmperor’s militaryreputationwasleft tarnishedbyacampaign chieflyrememberedin Germanyforthefailed insurrectionoftheTyrolean patriotAndreasHofer. Napoleon’sambition, however,wasnotsatisfied, andhisattentionsoonturned toRussia.Hewas disappointedinthefruitsof hisRussianallianceandwas angeredbyAlexander’s reluctancetoimplementthe ContinentalSystemand excludeBritishtrade.When thetwoemperorshadmetat Erfurtin1808,Alexanderhad lookedtotheFrenchfor concessionsover Constantinople,butgot none.20Napoleonwasalso irritatedbythecoolreception totheproposalthathemight marryaRussianprincess afterhedivorcedJosephine. Hehad,however,other,more political,reasonstodistrust hisRussianally:Alexander hadnotstoodbywhenhesaw theFrenchstretchedonother fronts,buttookadvantageof Napoleon’sdistractionin Spaintopursuehisown traditionalforeignpolicy objectivesinEasternEurope. WithinwhatRussiasawas hersphereofinfluenceshe wasdefiantlyexpansionist, goingtowarwithSwedenin thenorthandwithTurkeyin thesouth.FromtheSwedes, RussiatookFinlandand Aaland,intheprocess unleashingaconstitutional crisisinSwedenthatwould overthrowthereigning monarchandmaketheformer Napoleonicmarshal, Bernadotte,theSwedish CrownPrince.This Alexandersawasan opportunityratherthana threat.Hesought Bernadotte’sfriendshipand triedtoforceaschism betweenhimandhisformer Emperor;andBernadotte, flatteredbytheTsar’s attentions,outragedby Napoleon’sseizureof SwedishPomerania,and attractedbyAlexander’soffer ofafreehandagainst Denmark,agreedtocommit SwedentotheRussian cause.21Butthiswasnotthe onlyreasonforNapoleon’s rupturewithAlexander.Even moreprovocativewas Alexander’sdecisionin1810 tobreakformallywiththe ContinentalSystem,andhe wassoondemandingthat NapoleonrecogniseRussia’s righttotradewithneutrals, whichunderminedthe economicstrategyofthe Empire.22Therewerealso persistentrumoursofan imminentRussianattackon theGrandDuchyofWarsaw, aloyalFrenchallyinthe region.Russiawasposinga threattotheverysinewsof theEmpire. Forallthesereasons, relationsbetweenthetwo emperorscooledrapidly,and bothunderstoodthatthey wouldhavetofightanother war.By1811Napoleonwas drawingupplanstoassemble aGrandeArméedelaRussie, callinguponhisalliesacross Europetomakecontributions ofmenandmaterials.His intentionswereclear. Alexanderandhischief minister,Speranski,werealso buildinguptheirmilitary strength,initiatingarmy reformsand,crucially, makingpeacewithTurkeyin 1812,whichreleasedmore forcesfornationaldefence. Timingwaseverything.In 1811theRussianshadfeared beingoverrunbyNapoleon. Ayearlater,withhisarmy enlargedandreformedby BarclaydeTollyandhis strategyinplace,Alexander wasmoreconfidentthathe wasnowinapositiontotake fulladvantageofRussia’s vastterritorialexpanseto repelanyFrenchinvasion. Whathemayhave underestimatedwas Napoleon’scapacitytoshrug offhislossesinthePeninsula andcreateamassivenew armysixhundredthousand strong,includingahuge cavalryforceofeighty thousand. Itwasinonesensea remarkableachievement:an armydrawnfromacross occupiedEurope,itsmen forciblyconscripted,the horsescompulsorily purchasedforarmyservice. InFranceitself,ifthelevies weremet,itwasinthefaceof glumfatalismandoccasional sparksofresistance.But barelyhalfofthesoldiers wereFrenchmen.Thefourth corpswasone-thirdItalian, whilethefifth(under Poniatowski)consisted entirelyofPoles.Otherswere drawnfromBavaria,Saxony, Westphalia,Austriaand Prussia,andthosecorpsthat werepredominantlyFrench wereaugmentedbyforeign auxiliariesfromSwitzerland, Spain,Portugal,Croatia, PolandortheConfederation oftheRhine.Eventhe ImperialGuardhadbrigades ofPortugueseandHessian cavalry.23Yetbythesummer of1812,withAustriaand Prussiaofferingsupport,this hugearmywasalready marchingeastwardsandthe firstunitshadcrossedthe Niemen.24TheRussian campaign,whichmustsurely beseenasNapoleon’smost audaciousmilitarygamble, wasunderway. Ifitwasaudacious,itwas alsofoolhardy.Napoleon’s timinginlaunchingamighty campaignagainstthehuge expanseoftheRussian empirecouldscarcelyhave beenworse.Alarge contingentofhisforceswas stillcutoffinSpain;andin CentralEuropetherewere increasingsignsthathis Germanempirewas becomingrestive.Thiswasa warthatwouldbefoughton enemyterrain–theopen steppesofRussia–wherethe Frenchhadlittlefeelforthe topographyandlowtolerance fortheextremecoldofthe Russianwinter.These conditionshandedahuge advantagetothosewithlocal knowledge.Napoleonseems tohaverecognisedallthis andyetstillfeltdrivento fighttheRussiansratherthan makethepolitical concessionsthatpeacekeepingwouldrequire.One oftheEmperor’sclosest aides,Armandde Caulaincourt,wouldrecallin hismemoirsthewarningshe hadgiventoNapoleonatthe time.‘Idescribedthecountry tohim,theclimate,the advantagetheenemywould haveinallowinghimto advanceandwearhimselfout bymarchingwithoutthe chancetofight.Ialsorecalled tohimtheprivationsand discontentofthetroops duringhislastcampaignin Poland.’But,Caulaincourt reportssadly,‘toallmy argumenthisreplywasthatI hadturnedRussian,andthat Iunderstoodnothingofgreat affairs.’Napoleondidnot reconsider;heinsistedthathe hadnochoice,andthatitwas Alexanderwhowantedwar.25 Thoughthiswasaselfservinglypartisanview,he wasnot,ofcourse,entirely wrong.Russiawasnot dedicatedtomaintaining peace;Alexander,too,had predatoryinstincts,andhis armyhadbeenpreparingfor warsince1810.26 ThestoryoftheMoscow Campaignisamongthebestknownbattlehistoriesofall time,thanksinlargepartto thefictionalaccount presentedinTolstoy’sepic noveloftheperiod,Warand Peace.HereNapoleonis showntohesitatefatallyand theFrencharmytoblunder anddelaytillitwasthwarted byacombinationofthe Russianwinterandthestout heroismoftheRussian people.WhatTolstoy downplaysistheskillofthe Russiancommandersandthe tacticstheyadoptedto frustratetheinvader–tactics wellsuitedtotheirstrengths, tothelandscape,andtothe logisticalshortcomingsofthe enemy.Napoleon,asalways, chosetoliveofftheland, foragingforfoodinthe countrieshepassedthrough, withtheresultthatmuchof CentralEuropehadbeen denudedofgrainandfodder cropsduringthepassageof theFrencharmy,whilehorses andcattlehadbeenseizedto mountthetroopsandprovide foodonthehoof.Ratherthan engagethetroopsinbattle, Russiancommanders withdrewbeforethem, retreatinghundredsofmiles intotheinterior,thusdrawing theFrenchintotheempty, barrensteppeswhile destroyingfoodsuppliesas theywent.Napoleonsoughta decisivevictoryinRussia,but histacticalgoalswerevague andhisstrategyamountedto littlemorethanhuntingdown theRussianstodefeatthem. AndtheRussianseludedhim. TheirarmiesunderKutuzov andBarclaydeTolly continuallyfrustrated Napoleon,avoiding engagementonanyotherthan theirownterms,whilepulling himfurtherandfurtherinto theinterior.TheRussian generalshadmadetheir calculationscarefully;they acceptedthatiftheywere drawnintoopenbattlesto defendtheirterritorytheyhad littlechanceofsuccess againstNapoleon’sseasoned troops.BarclaydeTollyhad beenforbiddenbytheTsarto adoptanoffensivestrategy; histaskwastodefend Russianterritory,andthishe did,drawingback,harassing Napoleon’spositions,and goadingtheEmperor relentlessly,almosttaunting theFrenchtopursuehim towardsMoscow.27 Inthefirstweeksthe fightingconsistedoflittle morethanirregular skirmishesinasilent countrysideofsmokingbarns andburned-outvillages,as thepaceoftheFrench advanceslackenedandthe armygrewweakerfromthe effectsofheatandfatigue. Then,behindcarefully prepareddefences,the Russiansatlastgavebattle, firstatSmolenskinAugust, thenatBorodinoin September.Neitherbattlewas conclusive;certainlyneither wasagreattactical Napoleonictriumph.The carnagewasfrightful,the lossesshockingonbothsides. EachtimetheRussians withdrewafterthebattle,and eachtimeNapoleonwas luredfurtherintotheRussian heartland.Sevendaysafter Borodino,heentered Moscow–butthiswasa Moscowthathadbeen torchedbytheMuscovites andnowlayinruins, sacrificedbytheRussiansin abidtohalttheFrench advance.Ascanbeseenina lettertoMarie-Louise, Napoleonsharedthehorrorof hismenonseeingMoscow burnbeforehiseyes:‘Ihad noconceptionofthiscity.It hadfivehundredpalacesas beautifulastheElysée, furnishedinFrenchstylewith incredibleluxury,several imperialpalaces,barracks, andmagnificenthospitals. Everythinghasdisappeared, consumedbyfireoverthelast fourdays.’28Anintegralpart ofEuropeancivilisationhad beenlost. ButfortheFrencharmy theworstwasfarfromover. Facedwithanemptycity,and unabletoaccessfresh supplies,Napoleonnowfaced theprospectofalongretreat, harriedbytheRussianarmy, andwithwinterclosingin. Napoleonfatefullydelayed hisdeparturefromMoscow untilmid-October,andalmost atoncehitdifficulties.He hadintendedtoreturnbya moreclementsoutherlyroute, butatMaloyaroslavets,south ofMoscow,hewascutoffby Kutuzovandforcedback north,retracingthesame routethathehadfollowedon hisadvanceeastwards–the sameburnedvillages,the samescarredlandscape, whereanyfoodtheremay oncehavebeenhadbeen alreadypillagedand consumed,thesameharrying fromCossacksoldiers.Inlate Octobercamethefirstfrosts ofwinter,andbythetimethe armyreachedSmolenskin Novemberthethermometer haddippedtominustwenty orthirtydegreescentigrade. France’stroopswere weak,sickandhungry.Men diedbytheroadside,some pleadingwiththeircolleagues toendtheirmiserylestthey fallintoRussianhands;those takenprisonerriskedbeing strippedoftheirclothesand possessionsbytheCossacks andsoldtoRussianvillagers, afatewhichtheyequated withslaveryandaslow,cruel death.Manymorefrozeto deathintheirsleep.Theyate whatlittletheycouldfindto keepthemselvesalive;life becamealottery,survival dependentondesperate makeshiftmeasures. Increasingly,theywere reducedtoeatingtheirown horseswhentheanimalsdied ofstarvation,orsimply slaughteredthemforfood.A Frenchofficerwrotefrom Smolensk:‘Thearmyhas beenwithoutbreadonits march,butitdidhavelarge numbersofhorseswhichhad diedfromexhaustion,andI canassureyouthataslabof horse-meat,slicedand cookedinapanwithalittle fatorbuttermakesavery reasonablemeal.’29Inthese desperateweeksitwas probablytheonly‘reasonable meal’theycouldhopefor. Theretreathadturnedintoa humandisaster,as disorganisedasitwaspoorly planned.Somesixtythousand mendiedonthemarch,and thesupplieswhichNapoleon hadorderedforSmolensk provedwoefullyinadequate. Foodintendedtofeedthe armyfortwoweekswas consumedbydesperate soldiersinjustthreedays. AnythoughttheEmperor mayhavehadofwinteringin thecityhadtobequickly abandoned.30 Itwaslittlecomfortthat theRussians,too,had sufferedmassdesertionsand seenmenandhorsesdiein theirthousands.Kutuzovand Wittgenstein,thegeneral chargedwiththedefenceof SaintPetersburg,madeno efforttoengagetheFrench, contentingthemselveswith harryingtacticsastheragged, dishevelledarmyplodded westwardsinsearchofsafety. Thefinalhurdlewasthe Berezinariver,whichthey hadtocrosstofindthat safety,andhereNapoleon showedsomeofhisold decisiveflair,orderinghis sapperstobuildpontoons– temporarybridgesthatwould allowthementomaketheir wayacrossthebloatedriver. Despiteconstantharryingand sniping,mostofthe remainingtroopssurvivedthe ordeal,thoughtheystillfaced themiseryoffrostbiteand near-starvationontheirlong marchhome. Napoleonhimselflefthis troopsunderMurat’s commandandhastily returnedtoParis.Butthere wasnowayhecoulddisguise thescaleofthecatastrophe. InthecourseoftheMoscow Campaignhehadlostthe largestarmyoftheentirewar, possiblythelargestin Europeanhistory.Thelosses werestupefying.Though therearenodefinitivefigures, norecordsofmanyofthose whoperished,ithasbeen estimatedthatsomefive hundredandseventy thousandmenandtwo hundredthousandhorsesdid notreturn.Thefamed ImperialGuard,oncefifty thousandstrong,hadbeen reducedtoameagrerumpof fifteenhundredmen.31And Napoleon’sprestigeasa militarystrategistand battlefieldtactician,which morethananything guaranteedtheloyaltyofhis troops,wasnowseriously damaged,althoughtheir continuingaffectionforhim wouldsuggestthattherewas moretohispersonal chemistrythanmilitary success.WhattheMoscow Campaigndemonstratedwas thattheremarkablemilitary abilitieshehadshownasa youngermanwerefading;he waslesssupple,more corpulent,andmorefatigued bylongdaysinthesaddle. Hishealth,too,was beginningtodeserthim;he complainedofproblemswith hisdigestion,andithasbeen suggestedthathewas sufferingfromtheearly stagesofduodenalcancer.He couldnolongermaintainhis gruellingworkethicand increasinglydependedonhis marshalstomakekey militarydecisions,despitethe factthattheywereofvariable abilityanddidnotalways enjoyhisfullconfidence.The marshalsof1813didnot alwaysdisplaythesame qualitiesasthoseoftheearly years.Napoleonhadnever learnedtodelegate,andhad tendedtopromotethosemost loyaltohim.Hisfailureto developthetalentsofhis officersortoreshapethe highercommandsystemof thearmywasasourceof weaknessthatwouldbe increasinglyevidentinhis finalcampaigns.32 Russiahadserious internationalconsequences too.ThescaleofNapoleon’s defeatputhisearlier conquestsinjeopardywhen theotherEuropeanpowers realisedthefullextentof Frenchmilitaryweakness.In Spain,thewithdrawalof Frenchtroopstoserveinthe eastprovidedtheBritishwith anopportunitytomounta majoroffensivethatleftthe wholeofsouthernSpain, alongwithborderfortresses atBadajozandCiudad Rodrigo,inAlliedhands. Wellingtonalsowonamajor battleagainsttheFrenchat Salamanca,whichagain servedtopuncturethe reputationforinvincibilityof theimperialarmiesandgave newhopetoboththeBritish andtheguerrillas.In1813he attackedthenorthern fortressesofPamplonaand SanSebastianbefore repellingtheFrench,now underSoult’scommand,at theBattleofthePyrenees.By NovemberWellingtonhad advancedtothefrontier, pushingSoultbackonto Frenchsoil,andthe remainingmonthsofthe campaignsawtheBritishlay siegetoBayonnebefore attackingBordeauxand Toulouse.Theverylast actionofthewar,inApril 1814,wasabloody engagementbetweenthe Britishandthegarrisonat Bayonne.33Itwasafinal humiliationfortheFrench.In thefarsouth-westofFrance theoncemightyimperial armyhadshownthatitwas nowincapableofdefending France’sownterritory. IftheRussiancampaign pavedthewayforaBritish victoryinSpain,inCentral Europeitproduceda diplomaticrevolutionthat shatteredNapoleon’salliance systemandheraldedtheend oftheEmpireitself.The Emperorhadpiledtoomuch miseryandhumiliationonthe othercrownedheadsof Europetoescapetheir vengeancewhenthey believedtheirmomenthad arrived.Towardstheendof hislife,fromexileonSaint Helena,Napoleonwouldlook backwithregretonthe debacleinRussia,but ascribingittotheRussian winterandtomisfortune ratherthantohisown overweeningambitionor tacticalmisjudgements.It wasthemoment,hedecided, when‘fortuneceasedtosmile onme’.Buttherewasmore thanself-justificationhere;he wasexpressinggenuine regret.Herecognisedthe damagethathadbeendoneto hisarmyandmilitary capacity,butalsotohis reputation.‘Ishouldhave diedatMoscow,’he lamented,withmorethana touchofself-pity.‘ThenI wouldprobablyhavehadthe reputationofthegreatest conquerorofalltime.’34It wasthereputationhecraved, butwhichwouldeludehim. EvenduringtheRussian Campaign,thefirsttentative stepstowardsaSixth CoalitionagainstFrancewere beingtaken,beginningwith analliancebetweenBritain andRussiainresponseto Napoleon’smarcheastwards. In1813,thisrapidlyextended toencompassPrussia, Austria,andotherGerman powersnowawakenedtothe scaleofNapoleon’sdefeatby thesightofhisfamishedand bedraggledtroopsretreating acrossPolandandnorthern Germany.Theywerealso increasinglypressuredby popularfeelingathome, whichnolongersawFrance asafountofjusticeand citizenship,butasacolonial powerintent–seemingly withoutend–ontaxingthem, conscriptingtheirsonsand requisitioningtheirgoodsand livestock.Beforetheendof theRussiancampaign Napoleon’sPrussianallies wereabandoninghim. Prussianunitsweredeserting inlargenumbersandfleeing theimperialcause,while someleadingPrussian officers,amongthemthe greatmilitarystrategist Clausewitz,weresoappalled bythethreatNapoleonposed totheircountry’s independencethatthey travelledtoRussiatoadvise theTsarandsteelhisresolve tocarryonthestruggle.35 Somesoldiers,cutoffin RussiaduringNapoleon’s retreat,offeredtheirservices totheTsar.Indoingsothere isnodoubtthattheywere exceedingtheirorderssince, forthePrussians,their alliancewithNapoleon servedaseriouspurpose:that ofguaranteeingtheirsecurity. Now,however,withthe GrandeArméeintattersand Napoleon’sinvincibility punctured,manyinCentral Europethoughtthemoment ripetorenegeonthatalliance anduniteagainsthim.As wellasRussiaandPrussia, whohadsignedtheirmilitary allianceasearlyasFebruary 1813,Britainpromised financialcontributionstothe wareffort,andSweden pledgedhersupportforthe Allies.InAugust,Austria declaredwarafterMetternich convincedhimselfthat Napoleonhadnofurther interestinpeace.Frederick WilliaminPrussiadidnot hesitatetosummonupthe languageofGerman nationalismtorallyopinion againsttheFrench,whilethe Tsarseemedintentonfreeing allEuropefromNapoleon’s control.Anewphaseofthe Wars,knowninGerman historyastheWarsof Liberation,hadbegun. Napoleonhadhad warningsofthestrengthof Europeanopinionandthe dangersofanewGerman war.HisbrotherJeromehad alreadyadvisedhimin1811 thatanewwarinEurope wouldunleashpopular insurrections‘inallthe provincesbetweentheRhine andtheOder’;while Caulaincourt,aconsistent criticoftheRussian campaign,continuedto discouragefurthermilitary aggression.36ButNapoleon paidnoattentiontotheir pleas,showingwithindaysof hisreturntoParisthathewas intentonraisinganewarmy toreplacethemenlostin Russia,whateverthecostfor acountrythatwasbecoming increasinglydrainedof manpower.Hewaseagerto resumetheconflict,eagerto gainrevengeonthosehe believedhadbetrayedhim. Thatwasnotquitethestory hereservedforposterity, however.Hadpeacebeen concludedatMoscow,hetold LasCasesin1816,itwould havebeenthelastofhis militarycampaigns,apeace thatfinallywouldhave guaranteednationalsecurity. ‘Anewhorizon,newprojects wouldbeundertaken,all devotedtothewellbeingand prosperityofeveryone.’37 Thiscanonlybedismissedas fantasy.Aseriesofimperial edictsincorporatednational guardsmenintotheregular armyandcalleduprecruits fromthe1814conscription roll,whiletheFrench provinceswererequiredto providetwentythousand men,trainedandequipped, forthenewcampaign. Astonishingly,France responded,despitethe enormouscostinmenand taxes. WithinmonthsNapoleon againheadedanarmyof morethantwohundred thousandmen,thoughitdid notbearcomparisonwiththe superblytrainedforceshehad ledinpreviouscampaigns. Theinfantrywasrawand lackedbattleexperience,and evenmoredamaginglythe cavalrywascriticallyshortof horsesofthenecessary quality.Mostoftheone hundredandseventy-five thousandhorsesthathadleft forRussianeverreturned,and thearmyhadnochoicebutto requisitionsuchhorsesasit couldfind,orcallonFrench civilianstovolunteertheir ridinghorsesformilitaryuse. TheFrenchcountrysidecould notsupplymore;besides, manyofFrance’sstrongest cavalryhorseshad traditionallycomefrom northernGermany,whose resourcesNapoleoncouldno longerexploit,thougheven heretherewasaserious shortageofhorsesforsupply andartillerytransport.38The newcampaignwasarushed affair,launchedwithoutthe carefullogisticalbuild-upit required,whichwasa reflectionofNapoleon’s impatience.Hisadversaries werestronger,too,buttressed bymilitaryreforms, supportedbyatleasta modicumofpopularopinion, andsubsidisedbytheBritish treasurytothetuneofover tenmillionpounds.Butthis wasmoreavictoryfortheold Europeanaristocraciesthan forthenewforcesof nationalism.Napoleonhad startedoutbylaunchinghis armyintoSaxony,scoring earlysuccessesoverthe RussiansandPrussiansat LützenandBautzeninMay 1813,andforcingthealliesto seekabriefarmistice.Buthis refusaltoacceptthe mediationoftheAustriansat DresdeninlateJunebrought Austriaintothewar,and thereaftertheFrenchwere heavilyoutnumberedand increasinglyoutfought. Despitebeatinganallied armyatDresden,theFrench sufferedaseriesofminor defeatsinAugustand Septemberthatforced Napoleontoconcentratehis forcesaroundLeipzig. Here,inOctober,was foughtthedecisivebattleof thewarinCentralEurope,the BattleoftheNations,where theFrenchtookonthe combinedarmiesofAustria, Prussia,andRussia,their numberssupplementedby severalofNapoleon’sformer Germanallieswho,sensing whichwaythewindwas blowingandthreatenedby popularinsurrectionsat home,nowthrewintheirlot withhisenemies.Leipzigwas abloodbath,withhugelosses onbothsides;Frenchdeaths wereestimatedatfifteen thousand,whileafurther thirtythousandwere wounded.Itwasadecisive defeatforNapoleon,which forcedhimtoretreatto Mainz,thenontoFrench territory.Eventheinner empirewasnowcollapsingas hewasforcedtothrow reservistsandboysof seventeen–theconscriptsof 1815–intothefray.The northernItalianstateshad alreadyfallentothe Austrians;nowitwastheturn ofthelandsonthewestbank oftheRhine,Holland,and thenBelgium.Bythe beginningof1814Blücher’s armyhadcrossedtheRhine, leavingthefinalstagesofthe wartobefoughtonhome turf,ineasternandnorthern France.39 TheCampagnedeFrance woulddragonforthree increasinglydesperate monthsbeforeMarmont decided,on31March,that furtherresistancewasfutile and,seeminglyonhisown initiative,suedforthe armisticethatendedthewar. TheAlliesnowenjoyedclear militarysuperiorityover France,andtheFrencharmy sufferedfrombotha breakdowninitscommand structureandasappingloss ofmorale.Desertionlevels soared.Withinamonththe marshalswereforcedto abandontheRhineandretreat totheMarne,evacuating territoryinthehopethatthey couldplayfortimeand regroup.40 Predictably,Napoleondid notgiveupwithoutafight, winninganumberofminor engagementsagainstboththe AustriansandthePrussians beforecuttingofftheadvance guardofajointPrussianand Swedisharmyontheplateau ofCraonneinearlyMarch. Significantreversesfollowed, however:firstatLaonatthe handsofthePrussiansand Swedes,thenatArcis-surAube,wherehewasforcedto withdrawbytheAustrians andRussians;thereafter,the Alliesdecidedtomarch directlyonParisandputan endtoFrenchresistance. Surprisingly,perhaps,given thedisruptionhehadbrought totheEuropeanpolitical order,theywerestillwilling tonegotiatewithNapoleon, offeringtomaintainhimon histhroneandleaveFrance withher1792borders.This factaloneallowedthe Emperortoemergefromhis defeatwithsomedignity.So didthemanneroftheselast weeksoffighting.InSpain andItaly,CroatiaandRussia, wherevertheFrenchhad encounteredguerrillaactivity, theyhaddenounceditas brigandageandtheworkof criminals.YetwhenFrance wasinvadedciviliansrosein armstohelptheirtroops,and brigandagewasmagically transformedintothepatriotic courageofpartisans,fighting todefendtheircommunities againsttheinvader.Theirs wasahopelesscause,but manymen,simplepeasantsin themain,chosetodieforit. ThattheFrenchdidnotlie downbeforetheinvading armiesbecamesomethingof abadgeofhonourinthelast daysofthewar.Itrestoreda littlelustretothecause,and helpedtostokethe Napoleoniclegendofabrave andgloriousdefeat.41 12 TheHundredDays Defeated,sick,andreportedly contemplatingsuicide,the Napoleonwhoreturnedto Franceinthespringof1814 wasasadlydiminished shadowoftheEmperorhe hadbeenonlyafewmonths earlier.Hehadwantedto fighton,butsuperiorAllied numbers,highdesertion figures,andhungerinthe ranksofhisarmyall conspiredtodenyhimthe optionofafavourable militaryoutcome.InParis therewasapoliticalvacuum assomeofthoseonwhomhe haddependedforsupport abandonedhim–orhesitated tocommitthemselvestohim whiletheyweigheduphis prospectsofsurvival.The Emperorwasnolongerthe masterofthesituation;he wantedtobelievethathe couldconcludeapeaceonthe basisofthetermsheldoutto himatFrankfurtandsought toplayonthedifferent ambitionsoftheAllied powersashelookedtoa politicalsolutionthatwould leaveFranceintactandhis imperialauthorityassured. Butthatwasnotgoingto happen.Byrefusingtomake peacewhenitwasonoffer, andbyallowingFrancetobe invaded,Napoleonhad weakenedhisown negotiatingpositionand abandonedtheinitiativeto thevictors. FromChaumonthemade peaceoverturestotheAllies, sendingCaulaincourttothe enemycamptonegotiateon hisbehalf,butwithout success.TheEmperor’s envoywasnotevengranted anaudience.Theother leadershadnoreasontotrust Napoleonortobelievehis promises;theywereno longerinterestedinmaking concessionsbutwantedto pressontoParisanddrive hometheirvictory.And Napoleonfoundhimself unable–ineitherhisownor hiscountry’sinterests–to exploitimportanttactical differencesbetweenhis opponents.Bytheendof MarchtheFrencharmywas effectivelybeatenandthe Allieswereatthegatesof Paris.Therewaslittle defence.Napoleonhad baulkedatbuilding fortificationsaroundhis capitaland,beyondthe incompleteoctroiwallanda fewtrenchesandredoubts, thecitywasundefended whentheAlliesattacked.1 Pariswasoccupied,and althoughNapoleon,camped atFontainebleau,considered onelastassaultonhiscapital todislodgethem,hisplans cametonought.Theywere undoneasmuchbyhis supportersandbypublic apathyastheywerebythe Allies. ForitwasNapoleon’sown marshals,themenhehad entrustedwiththedefenceof Parisandthecommandofhis armies,whotookthedecision tohoisttheflagofsurrender. Theywereencouragedinthis byNapoleon’sbrotherJoseph who,aslieutenant-generalin Parisandheadofthe RegencyCouncil,hadlostall tasteforfurtherbloodshed andsawhismain responsibilityaspreventing theEmperor’syoungson fromfallingintoenemy hands.On29Marchhe orderedareluctantEmpress toescorttheyoungkingaway fromParis,takinghimfirstto Rambouillet,thentothe comparativesafetyofBlois. Withindays,however,they wereonthemoveagain,this timetojoinMarie-Louise’s familyinVienna,backatthe Austriancourt.Thisdeprived Napoleonofhislast diplomaticcardandremoved anylingeringchancethatthe Allieswouldallowtheboyto accedetothethroneashis father’ssuccessor.2 Increasingly,byearlyApril heacceptedthepossibility thathewouldlosehisthrone, andplannedtoabdicatein favourofhisson,establishing theimperiallineand providinganhonourableexit strategy.Buthere,too,he wasdoomedtofail.Ever opentoconspiracytheories, Napoleonwasquicktosmell treasonamonghismarshals andministers.Marmont,who authorisedthesurrenderof Paris,quicklyralliedtothe Bourbons,andthosemarshals whosurroundedNapoleonat Fontainebleau–amongthem closeadviserslikeLefebvre andMacdonald,Oudinotand Ney–refusedtomarchon thecapital,anxioustoavoid firingonParisians.Behind thescenes,politicianslobbied andplotted,mostnotablythe cunning,unscrupulousfigure ofTalleyrand,whointhese vitalfewdaysbecamea powerfuladvocateofthe Bourboncause.Talleyrand washighlypersuasive,urging TsarAlexanderI,Frederick WilliamofPrussia,andthe AustrianEmperorFrancisIto rejectanegotiatedpeaceand demandunconditional surrender.3Dealswerestruck aboutthefuturewithouteven consultingtheEmperor. Napoleonwasoutraged;he hadbeenoutmanoeuvred, and,ashecontinuedto protest,betrayed.4 TheEmpirewasover,and itwasoveronAlliedterms. Napoleonwouldneitherbe grantedthepeacewith honourthathehadheldout for,norwouldhebeallowed toholdontohisthrone.At thispointthemost determinedofhisadversaries wasRussia’sAlexanderI. TheTsarrefusedallformsof politicalcompromiseand quiteunambiguously demandedthatNapoleon abdicateandrenounceall claimtotheFrenchthrone. TheEmperorwasleftwithno choicebuttoagree,andon6 April1814,bytheTreatyof Fontainebleau,hesigneda letterofabdication,receiving inreturntherighttoretainhis imperialtitle,sovereignty overthetinyislandofElba (whichevenhedismissedasa ‘royaumed’opérette’),5and anincomeoftwomillion francsayear,tobepaidto himbytheFrench government.Therewere othersmallconcessions,too: clausesinthetreatygavethe EmpressthetitleofDuchess ofParma,andmadefinancial provisionforvarious membersoftheBonaparte clan.Butallthatwasmere window-dressing.What matteredwasthatNapoleon Bonaparte,theself-created EmperorofFrance,was strippedofhispower,and thathisclaimtodynastic legitimacywasfirmly rejected.Europecould breathemoreeasily,safein theknowledgethat,once banishedtoElba,theman theyregardedasausurper andaserialaggressorcould dothemnofurtherharm.Any settlementconcludedin1814 hadtobeacceptabletothe Europeanpowers,andthey werenotinaforgivingmood. TherestorationofLouis XVIIImayhavebeen acceptedbytheFrenchand championedbysomeoftheir number–withTalleyrand,as ever,tothefore–butthe finaldecisionwasnottheirs tomake.Thiswasa settlementbytheAlliesfor theAllies–somethingthat Francewasnotallowedto forget. Afortnightlater,on20 April,Napoleonleft Fontainebleauforhisnew kingdom.Asever,hisexit lineswerecarefullyprepared, hissenseofbetrayalintact. Hespokewithdignity,even withwarmth,ofhisBritish opponents,who,hesaid,had alwaysbehavedproperlyin warandwhomhetherefore respected.Butheremained bitterinhiscondemnationof theFrenchProvisional Government,which,he believed,wasloadinghim withpettyrestrictionsthat wereinsultingand demeaning.ThenewMinister ofWar,forinstance,had orderedthewithdrawalof gunsandstoresfromElba, displayingthegovernment’s distrustoftheirprisonerand leavinghimwithoutthe meanstodefendhimself– not,heinsisted,againsthis fellowFrenchmen,but againsttheraidersand Barbarypirateswhowerestill thescourgeofthe Mediterranean.Napoleonwas scathinginhisdismissalof thenewgovernment, accusingthemofcowardly collaborationwiththeenemy andquestioningtheir legitimacy.Heseemedkeen todrawacleardistinction betweenhisBritishcaptors andrepresentativesofthe Bourbons,withwhomhe refusedtohaveanydealings. Histreaty,hesaid,wasnot withtheFrenchmonarchybut withtheAlliedgovernments, andhelookedtothose governmentstofulfiltheir obligationstohim.6Inthe samespirit,oncehehad reachedFréjus,wherebotha BritishfrigateandaFrench corvettewaitedtoescorthim toElba,heavoidedall communicationwiththe French.Onbeingtoldthatthe Frenchcaptainhad instructionsfromhis governmenttoembarkhim andtakehimtoElba, Napoleontookpainstoinsist thathetravelontheBritish vessel.7 Despitehisrepeated claimstorepresentthe patrioticinstinctsofhis people,thereislittleto suggestthattheysharedhis outrage.InParisasin London,cartoonistsmocked Napoleon’slittlekingdom, withitstoydefencesandits travestyofanimperialcourt. AnEnglishcaricature showingthedeposedleader beingwelcomedbythe savageinhabitantsofthe islandwasentitled‘Napoleon dreadinghisdolefuldoom,or hisgrandentryontheisleof Elba.8Anotherpopular image,firstprintedin London,thenwidely circulatedinFrance,mocked ‘thejaystrippedofhis borrowedfeathers’,and depictedNapoleonbeing pluckedofhispeacock feathersbytwocrowned eagles.9Frenchcaricaturists wereequallydismissive, depictingNapoleonasa murderoustyrant,half coveredinatigerskin,witha handsawreplacingthehand ofjusticeandpapersscattered onthegroundtoremindthe onlookerofhissavagery:one read‘conscription’,theothers ‘Spain’,‘Moscow’,and ‘Jaffa’–remindersallofthe costinbloodofhisregime.10 AcrossEuropereliefandglee mingledeasily.Evenin Franceitselftherewerefew outsidethearmywhodidnot sharethatrelief,happyat leastthattheEmperor’sfall fromgracemeantarespite fromwarandfromthe dreadfultaxinbloodtheyhad paidforit.Somedidnot hesitatetoblameNapoleon personallyortoaccusehimof beingunmovedbythelossof somanyyounglives.A proclamationbythe departmentoftheSeineon2 Aprilwasunambiguousinits condemnationofthe Emperor,remindingthe inhabitantsofParisthathe alonewasresponsibleforthe miseriestheyhadendured. ‘Youoweallthewoeswhich havebefallenyoutooneman andonemanalone,’it intoned,amanwho‘year afteryearhasdecimatedyour familiesbyhiscontinuous conscription.’11Therewere manyinFrancewho,inthe immediateaftermathofthe defeatandinvasion,thought ofNapoleonasthecauseof theirtroublesandwere preparedtowelcomeany rulerwhopromisedthema respitefromwar. On3MayLouisXVIII madehisofficialentryinto Paris,hiscoachdrawnby eightwhitehorsesandhis arrivalgreetedwithchurch bellsandasalvoofartillery fire.Tojudgeby contemporaryaccounts,the cityreactedwithcaution ratherthanexuberance; peoplelinedthestreetsor lookeddownfromtheir balconies,butdidsoquietly, drivenmorebyfearand curiositythanbyjoy.There wereroyalistsamongthem, ofcourse,cheeringforthe Bourbonsandthewhiteflag andshoutingtheirhatredfor thetyranttheyhadtoppled. Buttheywereaminority. Mostpeoplewereless concernedbythechangeof regimethanbytheprospect ofpeace,andthedominant emotionwasreliefthatthe warwasover,thatcivilian lifecouldresume,andthat futuregenerationsofyoung menwouldbefreeofthe obligationsofconscription.12 Therewasnoclamourfor areturntoBourbonrule.But thedrainingeffectsofover twentyyearsofwarwere takingtheirtoll,withhigh prices,shortages,andtheloss ofsons,servantsandhorses, allinthenameofpatriotism andtheEmpire.Bemused, oftenunenthusiastic, Parisianslookedonas momentouschangestook placeintheirmidstandpeace wasrestored.Thetreatywas signedattheendofMayand theAlliedarmiesthenbegan theirwithdrawal.On4June, inthepresenceofthenew king,thecharterwasread beforethetwoChambers,and thoughitprovidedthe constitutionalframeworkby whichLouiswastorulethe country,thesymbolismof monarchywouldprove powerful,especiallyfora nationandagenerationthat hadknownonlyrevolution andempire.‘Theperiodof revolutionandwarswas over’,wroteHenryHoussaye duringthemostrepublican yearsoftheThirdRepublic, anditseemedasifnothing hadchanged;LouisXVI mightstillbeonthethrone. ‘Hereditarymonarchyandthe authorityofdivinerightwere re-established;thelegitimate kingwasintheTuileries,on thethroneofhisancestors,in “thenineteenthyearofhis reign.”’Butthatdidnotmean thatthesechangeswere consentedto,orapprovedby thepopulation;manyin Francewerebewilderedand confused,whileothers, especiallyinthearmy, refusedtoacceptthe consequencesofdefeat.If Louispromisedanamnestyto hisopponents,hedidnot extendthattoregicides. ThosewhohadvotedLouis XVI’sdeathweretobe banishedfromhisrealm.And therestoredmonarchsoon startedtosnubformer revolutionaries,however willingtheymightbetoserve him.13Thecountrywasnot reunited;asHoussaye perceptivelyadded,the Bourbonsmayhavebeen restoredtothethrone,but‘all thatremainedwasto govern.’14 Thedifficultiesofthenew regimeweregreatlyincreased byNapoleon’srefusalto accepthisowndefeat,bythe dreamsandtheresentments hetookwithhimtoElba.His proudwordsoffarewellto theofficersandmenofthe OldGuardinthecourtyardat Fontainebleau,ashelefton hisjourneytoElba,contained morethanasuggestionofthe perilstocome.‘Adieu,mes enfants,’headdressedthem withanalmostpaternal affection,‘wouldthatIcould pressyoualltomyheart.’ Instead,ashismenlinedup beforehim,hesolemnly kissedtheirstandard. Betweenthesoldiersand theircommandertherewasa genuinebond,builtonthe manypainfulcampaignsthey hadsharedandthemoments ofglorytheyhadrevelledin together.AtFontainebleau, Napoleon’sgesturewasnot innocent.Rather,hewas sealingthatbondforthe future,revealingvery publiclytheloveandesteem inwhichheheldthosewho servedhim.Thereportofthe ceremonyofferedno commentarybutletthe poignancyofthemoment shinethrough.‘Thesilence wasbroken,’itnoted,‘only bythesobsofthesoldiers.’15 Manywhowerethere,like manyotherswhohadseen serviceunderhim,continued toreverehimandtolook backontheiryearsinthe GrandeArméewithaffection andnostalgiaasaperiodof adventureandcomradeship, whentheyhadbeenplucked fromtheircottagesand workshopsandhelpedto makehistory.Withpeace restoredandtheBourbons deeplysuspiciousoftheir politicalmotives,theyfelt poorlyrewardedfortheir yearsinuniform,pensioned offorplacedonhalf-pay,the yearsofdreamingbroughtto asuddenandsavageend. Amongthemwereromantics whodreamedthatNapoleon wouldreturntoleadthem again,andtheyheldonto theirsacredrelicsofwar– themedals,thetricolour cockades,theeagles–inthe hopethattheymightsee furtherservice.16Forthem, Napoleonwouldalwaysbe theirleader,thecommander whohadsharedtheir sufferingsandhadinspired themtogreatness;asoldier’s soldierwhohadrisenthrough theranksofthearmyandhad broughtthemglory,honour andnationalpride. Theconditionsofhisexile wereinnosenseSpartan, thoughafterhislongyearsat theheartofaEurope-wide empire,Elbamusthavefelt curiouslyremote,evenfora manbroughtupinCorsica. Hewasaccompaniedfrom Francebythreecollaborators whohadvolunteeredtoshare hisexile,Cambronne,Drouot andBertrand,andonceon Elbahisentourageincluded twosecretaries,abutler,a doctorandaconsiderable domesticstaff.Therewere alsotheofficersofthesmall militaryforcehemaintained forceremonialoccasionsand fortheisland’sdefence.He livedcomfortably,ifsimply, inthePalazzinadeiMuliniin Portoferraio,wherehespent longhoursoutsideinthe gardenoverlookingthe TyrrhenianSea.Therewasno prohibitiononreceiving visitors;indeed,he maintainedregular communicationwiththe outsideworld,mostlythrough thesea-linktoNapleswhere Muratwasstill(temporarily) inpower.Forpolitical reasons,thegovernment refusedtoallowtheEmpress Marie-Louise,ortheirson, theKingofRome,tovisit himonElba,butthe Bonapartefamilyrallied round.Heentertainedhis favouritesisterPauline,while hismother,Letizia,showed solidaritywithhersonby electingtolivewithhimin hisnewkingdom.Ofthe otherwomeninhislife, MariaWalewskaalsocameto visit,withtheirfour-year-old son,Alexander,thepairbeing smuggledsecretlyontoElba, whereNapoleonpreferredto receivetheminprivate,ina simplecottageinthe mountainsatthefarendof theisland,farremovedfrom publicgaze.Josephine,to Napoleon’sprofoundsorrow, nevermadethejourney.She diedatMalmaisonon29 May,withinweeksofhis arrivalonElba.17 Duringthetenmonthshe spentinPortoferraio Napoleonretainedmuchof hisastonishingenergy,which henowtransferredtotheland andtoimprovingthequality oflifeoftheislanders.He had,asever,noshortageof plansorprojects,fromnew cropstoirrigationschemes andplanstoimprovethe profitabilityofiron-mining, allofwhichbroughthimthe lastingrespectandaffection oftheislanders.18Andhe dreamedupbuildingprojects ofhisown.Theunofficial Britishrepresentativeon Elba,NeilCampbell, remarkedinoneofhisregular despatchestoLondonthat Napoleonwas‘engagedin perpetualexercise,andbusy withprojectsofbuilding, which,however,arenotput intoexecution’.19Butwith thepassageoftimeCampbell begantonoticeasignificant changeintheEmperor’s concentration.On20 Septemberhewrotethat ‘Napoleonseemstohavelost allhabitsofstudyand sedentaryapplication.Hehas fourplacesofresidencein differentpartsoftheisland, andtheimprovementsand changesoftheseformhissole occupation.Butastheylose theirinteresttohisunsettled mind,andthenoveltywears off,heoccasionallyfallsinto astateofinactivitynever knownbefore,andhasoflate retiredtohisbedroomfor reposeduringseveralhours oftheday.’Campbellrushed toaddthattheEmperor’s healthwasstillexcellent,and thathewasofteningood spirits.Hedidnotraise questionsofboredomor depression.‘Ibegintothink’, heconcludes,‘heisquite resignedtohisretreat,and thatheistolerablyhappy, exceptingwhenthe recollectionsofhisformer powerarefreshenedby sentimentsofvanityor revenge,orhispassions becomeinfluencedbywant ofmoney,andhiswifeand childbeingkeptfromhim.’20 Itwasanintelligentguess basedonhisobservations, but,aseventssoonproved,a verymistakenone. Napoleon,itturnedout, wasbothboredandfrustrated withwhatlifecouldofferon asmallMediterraneanisland. Hewasnotcontent,ashehad toldCampbellhewasinthe courseofaprivate conversation,to‘leadthelife ofanordinaryjusticeofthe peace’;andhecertainly wantedmorefromtheworld than‘myfamily,mylittle house,mycowsandmules’.21 Butthenheneverhad restrictedhimselftosucha domesticarena.Asaruler, albeitofatinystate,hehad setaboutprovidingforits defence,againstbothan Alliedattack–neveralikely occurrence–andthemore probableincursionsofpirates fromtheBarbarycoast.To thisendheraisedanarmyof justundertwothousandmen, whichincludedmorethansix hundredformermembersof hisImperialGuardwho electedtofollowhimout fromFrance;amongthese wereasmallnumberofPoles andMamelukeswho remainedloyaltohisperson. AndgiventhatElbawasan island,andthatanyattack mustcomefromthesea,he alsobuiltasmallnavywithat itshearttheFrenchfrigate Inconstantwhichhad accompaniedhimfrom Fréjus.Elba’snavyhad aroundahundredsailorsand wasusedmainlytosailtothe mainlandonmissionsfor Napoleonandhisfamily.But weshouldnotunderestimate theimportanceofthistiny forcetoNapoleon’sambition. TheEmperorhimselfstillcut amilitaryfigure.Hetooka deeppersonalinterestinhis troops,reviewingthemonthe mainsquareofPortoferraio, remindingthemoftheir loyaltytoFranceandoftheir dutytothepeopleofElba.In all,thearmyandnavy consumedthree-quartersof hisannualbudget.22They wouldalsoformthekernelof hissupportwhenthemoment cametoinvadetheFrench mainland. Thatmomentcamein earlyMarch1815.Napoleon hadkeptintouchwithevents inFrancethroughoutthe winterandhadlearntfromhis correspondentsagreatdealto givehimhope.Theinitial goodwilloftheFrenchpeople towardsLouisXVIIIseemed tohavefaded.TheKinghad neversucceededin harnessingpopular enthusiasm,andthefirst monthsofhisreignhaddone littletoincreasehissupport. Manyresentedthedynastic symbolismoftherestored monarchy,theinsistenceon thewhiteBourbonflag,and thereturnoftheCatholic clergytotheinnercouncilsof state.Taxeshadrisenina periodofeconomicausterity, grainpriceshadincreased sharply,andthepresenceof anarmyofoccupationand theimpositionofalarge indemnitydispelledany vestigeofgloryandnational pride.Napoleon’ssources toldhimthattheregimehad becomeunpopularwiththe people–thosewhostill sharedthevaluesofthe Republicandgloriedinthe nameofthenation.Manyof Napoleon’sfellow countrymenhadstartedto lookbackonhisreignwitha tingeofnostalgia, rememberingatimeofgood harvestsandaffordablebread. Itwas,heconvincedhimself, themomenttoofferthe Frenchpeopleanalternative, themomenttotakeaction. Whatfollowedwasabizarre adventurestory.Napoleon choseamomentwhen Campbellwasabsentfrom theislandandtherewereno Britishnavalvesselsinthe vicinity,andleftElbafor ever.Hetookwithhima handfulofships,someforty horses,andasmallnumberof troops–justsixhundredand fiftymenoftheGuard,plusa hundredPolishlancersanda handfulofCorsicanand Elbanvolunteers.23Withthis punyforcehecrossedthe Mediterraneantothesouth coastofFrance,landing safelyonthecoastnear Antibes,fromwherehebegan hismarchnorthwardstowards Parisandtheresumptionof power. Theideaseemed ridiculous,thepitfalls innumerable.ButNapoleon, aboveall,wasagamblerwho believedinhisabilitiesandin hispowertocharmand persuade.Hewashelped,of course,bytheslownessof communicationintheFrench provinces,sothatnoonein Parisknewanythingabouthis returntill5March,fourfull daysafterhislanding.The journeywaslongand arduous,throughthefoothills oftheAlpsalongwhatis todaydubbedtheRoute Napoléonbythetourist authorities,toGrenoble,then Lyon,andonthrough Burgundytothecapital. Alongthesouthernpartofthe routehislittlearmypassed throughdividedand embitteredcommunities,the sortsofplaceswhereroyalists lurkedandvillagerswere embroiledinWhiteTerror andrevengekillings.Yetthe journeyprovedalmost unreasonablyeasy.During thefirstdaystheparty encounterednoopposition, nosoldiers,nochallengeto theirprogress.Ashemoved north,andaswordspreadof hisapproach,localpeople begantojoinhim:villagers, peasants,mendazzledand overawedbyhisreputationor attractedbythepromiseof libertyheappearedtohold out.Popularcrowdsgreeted himrapturouslyinthebigger citieswherehepassed,first Grenoble,thenLyon.When soldiersdidappear,sentby thenewgovernmenttostop him,hischarismaticcharm didnotfailhim.AtVizille, LyonandAuxerretheunits thathadbeensentagainsthim werewonovertohisside. NearGrenoble,inoneof themostfamousincidentsof thewholeadventure,hewas approachedbyseveralFrench regimentswithordersto arresthim.Openinghis greatcoattoexposehischest, hecalledonthemto recognisehimandchallenged themtocarryouttheirorders: ‘Ifthereisoneamongyou whowouldkillhisgeneral, hisEmperor,hemay;hereI stand’.24Noonemoved.The sameemotionalappeal workedforgeneralsandmen oftheline;atGrenoble civiliansmingledwithhis troopsandhewasassailed withenthusiasticcriesofVive l’Empereur!25WhenMarshal Ney,havingtakenanoathof loyaltytoLouisXVIII,was senttoarresthim,hisresolve failedassoonashemet Napoleonfacetoface.With everydaythelittlearmythat hadleftAntibesposeda greaterthreattotheBourbon regime.Witheveryday,the voldel’aiglegainedafurther holdonthepopular imagination.Everystep Napoleontookseemedtoadd furtherlustretohisromantic legend. On20March,littlemore thanafortnightafter disembarkingonthesouth coast,Napoleonwasbackin Paris,whereheatonce occupiedtheTuileries,his formerpalace,hurriedly abandonedbyafugitive LouisXVIII.Butheno longerpresentedhimselfin allthefineryoftheEmpire, orplayedonthepompofhis imperialoffice.Rather,ina quiteremarkableactof politicaltheatre,hespoke directlytothepopulace, presentinghimselfasaman ofthepeople,wrongedby foreigntyrantsandBritish treason,andappealing directlytothetraditionofthe FrenchRevolution.He showedthat,unlikeLouis, whohadlearnednothingand forgottennothingduringhis yearsofexile,hehadlearned agreatdealandwaswilling tomakeimportant concessionsinordertowoo opinion.Overtheyearsofthe Empire,therightsand libertiesofFrenchmenhad beenwhittledawayasthe powerofthestatewas reinforced,conscription extended,andpolicing reinforced.Yet,duringthe HundredDaysNapoleondid nottireofexpendingefforton gainingsupportfromformer republicanswhofeared discriminationatthehandsof themonarchy.Hedrew attentiontothenew government’sattemptsto appeasetheChurchand welcomebackpriestsfrom emigration.Hepointedtothe dangeroftheirseizingback churchlandsthathadbeen soldoffduringthe Revolution.Heofferedliberal reformsandwidervoting rights,andsoughttowinthe supportofthebourgeoisieby confirmingtheabolitionof feudalism,banishingthose émigréswhohadreturnedto Franceduringthe Restoration,and expropriatingtheirlanded estates.26Herestoredthe LegionofHonour,theaward whichmorethananyother imposedmilitaryvaluesatthe veryheartofcivilsociety; thisappealedtothespiritof thearmy,placingsolidarity andthedefenceofthepublic goodaboveselfish materialism.27Andhe unashamedlytappedinto whathebelievedtobea potentseamofpopular opinion:fearofareturntothe OldRegime,usingalanguage ofanti-privilegethatthe Jacobinscouldhardlyhave bettered.‘Ihavecome,’he insisted,‘tosaveFrenchmen fromtheslaveryinwhich priestsandnobleswishedto plungethem,’adding ominouslythat‘Iwillstring themupfromthe lampposts.’28 Ifthatwaslittlemorethan emptyrhetoricandanattempt tocapturesomethingofthe flavourofrepublican sentiment,hisconstitutional reformsdidrepresent somethingofabreakwiththe authoritariantoneofthelater Empireandareturntothe moreconsensualpoliticsof theConsulate.Notthatthe acteconstitutionnelof1815, whichcontainedhisprincipal reforms,canbeseenasa modelofdemocraticpractice. Inessence,itamendedthe constitutionsoftheConsulate andEmpiretotakeaccountof theBourbonCharterof1814 andtoreaffirmtheprinciples ofindividuallibertyandof equalitybeforethelaw: freedomofreligionandthe freeexpressionofopinion wereguaranteed,property wasdeclaredinviolable,and, inasignificantshiftofpolicy since1812,theEmperor promisedthatnopartof Frenchterritorywouldin futurebeplacedundersiege unlessFrancewasinvaded.29 Legislativepowerwastobe sharedbytheEmperorand twochambers,onecomposed ofhereditarypeersnominated byNapoleon,theotherof deputieselectedindirectly, throughatwo-tierelectoral process.Theactwastobe ratifiedbythepeopleina plebiscite,thoughopinion differsonjusthowsignificant thisconsultationwas.For some,thelowturn-outand theapathyamongyoung voterssuggestthatthe constitutionfailedtoignite thepublic,andtheypointout thatBonaparte’ssupporters wereonlyhalfasnumerousin theHundredDaysastheyhad beenduringtheConsulate.30 Othersminimisethe significanceofthefactthat only1.3millionFrenchmen botheredtorecordtheirvote. Therewaslittlelocal encouragementtodoso,no interventionbyprefectsor sub-prefects,withthe consequencethatarounda thirdoftheregisterssentout tomayorstorecordthevotes oftheirconstituentswere returnedentirelyblank.31Any popularenthusiasmforthe regimewasmoreaboutthe personoftheEmperorthan aboutconstitutionalrights. Thereisnoreasonto believethatNapoleonwas enthusiasticaboutthisnew, moreliberalempire,which hadbeenlargelyforcedupon himbyhiscollaborators, thosementowhomheturned in1815toestablishcivil government,manyofwhom werecommittedtopeaceand lukewarmabouthisprospects ofunitingthecountry.Some werelongstandingimperial allies,likeFouché,who returnedtotheMinistryof Police,orCambacérès,who waschargedwiththe MinistryofJustice. Caulaincourtwasmade ForeignMinister,Maret SecretaryofStateandDavout MinisterofWar,withDecrès MinisterfortheNavy.Two oftheEmperor’sstaunch supporters,Boulaydela MeurtheandRegnauddeStJeand’Angély,becameheads ofsectionintheCouncilof State.Otherpillarsofthenew regimeweremoresurprising choices.Theyincludedmen whohadpreviously quarrelledwithNapoleon overhisauthoritarian appetites,orhiscontemptfor theinstitutionsofthe Republic.LazareCarnot,for instance,wasastaunch republicanwhohadrefused toservetheEmpireafter 1804buthadralliedto Napoleonin1814when Francewasinvaded;he agreedtostayonas Napoleon’sMinisterofthe Interior,convincedthathe wasnowcommittedtoamore liberalempire,andthatthis representedtheonly remaininghopeofrescuing somethingfromthe revolutionarylegacy.32 Perhapsmostsurprisingofall wasthemantowhomthe Emperorgaveresponsibility fordraftingthenew constitution,thenotedliberal thinkerBenjaminConstant. Constant,havingproclaimed hisoppositiontothe Emperor’stastefor dictatorship,nowmadeithis prioritytorestrainhis excessesthrough parliamentarycontrols.What emergedthroughtheacte additionnelwassomething akintoconstitutional monarchy.33 IfNapoleonmanagedto persuadeapercentageof Frenchdomesticopinionthat hehadchangedhisspotsand wishedtorepresentthe interestsofhispeople,he enjoyednosuchsuccess beyondhisnational boundaries.AcrossEurope theleadersoftheGreat Powerswereinnomoodto compromise,continuingto viewhimasausurperanda threattothepeaceofthe entirecontinent.Andthough inthevariouslandsNapoleon hadannexedorconquered thereweregroupsof powerfulandeloquent defendersofhisregime,they weredrawnfromthe educatedelite–thelawyers andjudgesandprofessional administrators–seldomfrom thepopulationatlarge.The masses,andespeciallythe ruralmasses,continuedto viewtheNapoleonicstateas anartificialimposition,what MichaelBroershascalled ‘thepracticalexpressionofan alieneliteculture’.34The Alliessawnoreasonto hesitateorplayfortime;to theireyesNapoleonwasan outlaw,andtheconstitutional arrangementsheoffered Franceatotalirrelevance. Indeed,assoonasnews reachedthemofNapoleon’s escapefromElba,the Europeanmonarchs understoodthattherewasno alternativetowar,awar whichtheywoulddeclarein ordertoforceasecond abdication.Asearlyas7 March1815,Metternich summeduptheAllies’mood, writingthatNapoleon ‘appearsanxioustorungreat risks.Thatishisbusiness. Ourbusinessistogivetothe worldthatreposewhichhe hastroubledalltheseyears’. FrancisIcommitted himselftousingmilitary forceifnecessarytodislodge Napoleononcemorefromhis throne.‘Goatonceandfind theEmperorofRussiaand theKingofPrussia,’he instructed.‘TellthemthatI ampreparedtoordermy armiesonceagaintotaketo theroadtoFrance.Ihaveno doubtthatthetwoSovereigns willjoinmeinmymarch.’ TheAustrianEmperorwas, ofcourse,right.TheAllied powersworkedtogetherto produceaconcertedpolicy, andon13Marchissueda jointdeclarationinthename ofAustria,France,Britain, Prussia,Russia,Spain, PortugalandSweden.Once againdrawingaclear distinctionbetweenNapoleon andtheFrenchpeople,they undertooktoprovide‘the KingofFranceandthe Frenchnation’withallthe helptheyrequiredtorestore whattheytermed‘public tranquillity’.Atthesametime theynotedthat‘Napoleon Bonapartehadplacedhimself outsidethepaleofciviland socialrelations,’andthathe stoodcondemnedas‘the disturberofworldrepose’.35 Thecoursewasagainset forwar.On25Marchthe fourmajorAlliedpowers, Austria,Britain,Prussiaand Russia,undertook,bythe TreatyofVienna,torally theirarmiesagainstNapoleon soastodisablehimand preventhimfromcausing furthertrouble.Castlereagh hammeredthepointhomein adispatchtoWellington, insistingthattroopsbe deployedon‘thelargest scale’,withAlliedforces ‘inundatingFrancefromall sides’.36Evensomeof Napoleon’sclosestallies viewedthisprospectwithillconcealedunease,themore soasitnecessitatedyet anotherroundof conscription,drainingthe countryofstillyoungermen andboysandarousingpublic discontentacrossthelength andbreadthofFrance.After watchingthedecimationof twoarmiesduringtheretreat fromMoscowandatLeipzig, andwiththegreaterpartof thosewhoreturnedin1814 nowretiredor decommissioned,therenewal ofhostilitiesmeantthe creationofyetanothernew armywithwhichtoconfront theAllies.Francewas exhausted,herlocal communitiescryingoutfor peace;yetbymid-June Napoleonhadassembleda forceofonehundredand twentythousandmen,with whichhecrossedthefrontier intotheNetherlands,driving awedgebetweenBritishand Dutchforcesunder WellingtonandthePrussians ofBlücher.37Hisfinal campaignagainsthis enemies,nowrangedagainst himinaseventhcoalition, hadbegun. Napoleonwasdeafto thoseofhisministerswho counselledcaution,who shrankfromsquanderingyet morebloodonthebattlefield inacausewhichtheydeemed alreadylost.Andhehadspilt plenty–oneofthecharges thatwouldalwaysbe mountedagainsthimbythose seekingtodiminishhis statureasamilitary commander.Hisabilityto drawonamassconscript armymeantthathehadlarge numbersofsoldiers,often rawandill-trained,athis disposal,andheoftengave theimpressionthathecared littleaboutlosses,thatmen couldalwaysbereplacedand thattheirlivescamecheap. Indeed,hefamouslyboasted thathehadgrownupon battlefieldsand‘caredlittle aboutthelivesofamillion men’.38Somehaveestimated theselossesmuchhigher;the nineteenth-centuryhistorian HippolyteTainesuggested thatNapoleon’swarskilled onemillionsevenhundred thousandmenbornwithinthe limitsofpre-revolutionary France,besidesafurthertwo millionEuropeans,bothallies andfoes.39Thoughthese figuresareprobably exaggerated,thescaleof losses,whetherfromwounds sustainedinbattleorfrom feversanddisease,was unprecedented.Toadegree thisreflectedthemannerof fighting:thegrowinguseof artillery,theresorttoever moremobileguns,andthe increasedfirepowerofthese gunsinbattle.Jean-Paul Bertaudhastoldthestory movingly,inrawstatistics.If theFrenchartillerymenfired twentythousandcannonballs duringthebattleofValmy,at Leipzigtheyfiredahundred thousand.Artilleryaimedto kill,tomowdowntheir opponentsinalargely anonymousslaughter.And witheverycampaignthe carnagegrewworse.Iflosses werearoundsixpercentat Fleurusin1792,theyhad risentofifteenpercentat Austerlitzin1806andthirtyonepercentatEylauthe followingyear.Atthe upcomingBattleofWaterloo, casualtieswouldhita staggeringforty-fiveper cent.40Notwithoutreason wasNapoleonaccusedbyhis enemiesofbeingacrueland heartlessbutcher,preparedto condemnthousandstodiein pursuitofglory. OnceagainNapoleon facedtheproblemof manpower.WiththeAllies abletomusteramillionmen, hewasyetagainforcedto raiseanarmyvirtuallyfrom scratch.ItprovedaHerculean task,thoughbytheendofthe springextraordinaryprogress hadalreadybeenmade.In March,allnon-commissioned officerswererecalledtothe colours,andbytheendof Aprilhecouldputfour armiesandthreeobservation corpsinthefield.Moneywas quicklyraised,andtensof thousandsofhorsesprepared forbattle.41Buttimewas short,tooshorttoallowhim toassemblethearmyofeight hundredthousandofwhich hetalked.AlreadyaPrussian armyunderBlücherandan Anglo-Dutcharmyunder Wellingtonweretakingup positionintheNetherlands, leavingNapoleonlittlechoice buttolaunchaquickpreemptivestrikeagainstthem. Thisheachievedwith remarkableprecision.He imposedatotalnews blackout,andspreadfalse intelligencetounnervehis opponents.On2Junehe orderedtheonehundredand twenty-fourthousandmen whomadeuptheArméedu Nordtoapositionjustsouth oftheBelgianborder, seeminglywithoutprovoking anyresponsefromtheAllies. Histacticwasworkinglikea dream.Tendayslaterheleft Paristotakepersonal commandofthearmy, withouthisopponents realisingwhatwashappening aroundthem.Aslateas13 JuneWellingtonwasstill reassuringLondonthatitwas unlikelyNapoleonwould leaveParis–justtwodays beforehelaunchedan incisiveattacktoseparatethe Alliedarmiesandprevent themfromformingaunited front.42 Hostilitieswerejoined quitedramaticallyon16June, whentheFrencharmy attackedboththePrussians andtheAnglo-Dutcharmyto thesouthofBrussels.At Ligny,Napoleonengagedthe Prussiansandscoredwhat turnedouttobehislast victoryinthefield,thoughit waslessdecisivethanhe wouldhavelikedsinceitleft thePrussianarmyabletoreformandfighton.Itwasa bloodyencounter,pitting aroundeighty-threethousand Prussiansagainstsixty-three thousandFrenchmen,andfew prisonersweretakenoneither side.Napoleonreadthebattle well,butcreditforthevictory didnotliewithhimalone:of hisgenerals,Gérardwasfarsightedandtacticallyshrewd, butthevictorycanalsobe ascribedtothequalityof thoseunderhiscommand, especiallyhisjuniorofficers andnon-commissioned officers.43Thesignificanceof Lignywasdiminished, however,byeventselsewhere inthefield.Anarmyof twentythousandmenunder Drouetd’Erlon,instructedto keeptheEnglishintheir sights,washarassedand delayed.Atthesametime, Neyfailedtotakethekey crossroadsofQuatre-Bras fromtheAnglo-Dutcharmy, whichallowedWellingtonto pullbacktowardsBrussels.44 TheFrenchhadsoughtto destroythetwoarmies individuallysoastoavoid havingtofacetheircombined onslaught,butneitherbattle wasdecisiveandtheAllies wereabletoregroup.The bloodshedatLignyand Quatre-BrasbythePrussian andBritisharmieshadserved itspurpose:ithadboughtthe Alliestime.Wellingtonand Blücherwerefarfrom defeated,andtwodayslater theywouldengageNapoleon again,muchmoredecisively, atWaterloo. TheBattleofWaterloo wasanevenlymatchedaffair, andoneinwhichNapoleon againdemonstratedhis qualitiesasacommanderand astrategist.Heunderstood onlytoowellthatthiswasa life-or-deathstruggle,an engagementhehadtowinif hewastosurvive,andhis principalaimafterQuatreBraswastoforcetheBritish toengagehimbeforethey hadthechancetojoinforces withBlücher’sPrussians.The Frenchopenedtheattackwith afrontalassault,ledby Napoleon’sbrotherJérôme, againsttherightflankofthe Britisharmynearthefortified farmofHougoumont.Atthe sametimeNapoleonordered aninfantryattackonthemain bodyofBritishtroopsatLa HaieSainte.Both manoeuvreswerecarriedoff withacertainélan,butboth failedtodislodgetheenemy, necessitatingathirdassault. Thiswasacavalrychargeled bythebraveifheadstrong Ney,whichwasalsorepulsed bytheBritishsquares.The Britishlineshadheldfirm. Worse,fromtheEmperor’s pointofview,wasthefact thatGrouchy,whomhehad sentwiththirtythousandmen tofindandpindownBlücher, hadnotsucceededinlocating thePrussianarmy;and thoughhewaswithinearshot ofthebattle,hehadstuck limpet-liketohisinstructions insteadofturningbacktoadd freshtroopstotheFrench attack.ShouldGrouchybe heldtoblame–asNapoleon didnothesitatetodofromhis exileonSaintHelena–or wastheEmperor’sown strategyatfault?Whatever thecause,itprovedafatal blunder,andwhenBlücher himselfturneduponthe battlefield,hisPrussianforces emergingthroughthesmoke andmisttoaddweightto Wellington’sAnglo-Dutch army,thegamewassurely up.Itwasnotinanysensea rout;indeed,Wellington wouldfamouslydescribeitas ‘thenearestrunthingyou eversawinyourlife’.45The Frenchemergedwithhonour. TheImperialGuardfoughta memorablebattle,thecavalry attackedtheenemywithflair, andtheyinflictedterrible casualtiesontheiropponents. ForWaterloowastrulya murderousbattle,withsome twohundredthousandmen concentratedinaconfined areabarelytwoandahalf milessquare.Themost reliablecasualtyfigureslist thelossesinWellington’s armyatthreeandahalf thousanddead,three thousandthreehundred missingandsometen thousandtwohundred wounded–withthePrussians sufferingafurthertwelve hundreddead,allinasingle day.46ButforallNapoleon’s tacticalskill,thebattlewas lost,andwithithisimperial ambitions. Hisfirstinstinctonthe morningafterthebattle, however,wastofighton,to engagetheBritishand Prussianarmiesyetagain, andturndefeatintovictory. Heinsistedthatithadbeena gloriousdefeatfromwhich histroopsemergedwith creditandhonour,andthatis howitwouldenterFrench collectivememory.ToVictor Hugo,Waterloowasamorne plaineforevershroudedin mistandgunsmoke;Charles Péguysummarisedtheregrets ofhisgenerationwhenhe wroteofWaterloothatitwas oneofthoseraredefeats which‘morethananyvictory, andmorepositivelythanany victory,fixthemselvesinthe memoryofmen,inthe commonmemoryof humanity’.47Though Napoleonremainedindenial, itsignalledtheendofhis Empireandtheendofa dream.Forwhereashe seemedeagertofighton, demandingthatJosephraisea furtherhundredthousand men,thetwoChamberswere overtlyhostile,understanding onlytooclearlythatpeace wouldbeunattainableaslong asFrancecontinuedto harbourmilitaryambitions. Thedeputiesalsoknewthat theAllieswouldhaveno truckwithNapoleon,andthat thebesttheycouldnowhope forwaspeaceonEurope’s terms.IntheChamberof Deputiestheunthinkablewas beingsaid,thattheEmperor’s abdicationwasanessential preconditionofpeace,and NapoleonreturnedtoParisto faceawallofhostility.To savehisEmpirewould requiredrasticmeasures:he wouldhavetodissolvethe twoChambers,assume dictatorialpowersandturnto thearmy,stepsthatwould riskplungingthecountryinto civilwar. Afewofhisadvisers, notablyhisbrotherLucien, advisedthiscourseofaction but,perhapsmindfulofwhat hadhappenedafterthe EighteenthofBrumaire, Napoleonhadnoappetitefor awaragainstFrance.On22 June,informedbythe Chambersthathemust abdicateorbedeposed,he addressed‘theFrenchpeople’ forthelasttime:‘Inopening wartosupportnational independence,’hedeclared,‘I countedonaunionofall effortsandallwills. Circumstancesseemtometo havechanged.Ioffermyself insacrificetothehatredof theenemiesofFrance.’ Expressingthesomewhat forlornhopethattheAllies aimedonlyatdestroyingthe personoftheEmperor,he namedhisyoungsonashis successor.‘Mypoliticallifeis over,’hetoldthem,‘andI proclaimmyson,underthe titleofNapoleonII,Emperor oftheFrench.’48Butthetime fordynasticambitionwas longpast.Itwasaprospect thatneithertheChambersnor theAllieswerepreparedto contemplate. 13 YearsofExile Followinghissecond abdication,Napoleon understoodthathecouldhave nopoliticalfutureinEurope, andhetookadviceonwhere toseekrefuge.Oneideawas theUnitedStates,the Americasbeingafavoured destinationforBonapartists andimperialofficerslooking toescapefromFrance;andin June,heandhisclose collaboratorsmadefor Rochefortwiththeapparent intentionofembarkingforthe NewWorld.TheFrench governmentwascomplicitin theseplans,thenavalminister sendinginstructionstothe prefectinRochefortand assigningtwofrigatesto accompanytheexpedition.1 ButtheRoyalNavyhad blockadedFrance’sAtlantic coast,cuttingoffanypossible escaperoute.Napoleonchose nottoriskrunningthe blockade,preferringtoboard aBritishwarship,the Bellerophon,andaskfor refugeinEngland.Hehimself seemedalmostsatisfiedwith thatsolution,whichhadthe virtueofoffering internationalprotectionfrom hismorevengefulenemiesat home,anditisclearthathe expectedtheBritish governmenttotreathim honourably:toimprisonhim orkeephimunderhouse arrestinEngland,somewhere wherehecouldretirefrom publiclifeandconcentrateon writinghismemoirs.Orsohe mused.Afterhisrecent adventures,however–his escapefromElbahad plungedEuropeoncemore intoabloodywar–thiswas nothingmorethanautopian dream.Hisformer adversarieswerenotina conciliatorymood,and,in BritainjustasinPrussiaor Russia,unforgivingvoices calledforexemplary punishmentthatwouldteach boththeformerEmperorand theFrenchpeopleapowerful lesson.Tokeephimin Englandwouldcreatea politicaloutcryaswellas poseinsuperableproblemsof statesecurity. TotheBritishpublic Napoleonwasmorea criminalthanavictim,andit becamefashionablefor cartooniststoportrayhimas England’sprisoner,suffering thehumiliationofdefeator appearingbeforetheLondon populaceintheguiseofa cagedbeast.InJuly1815 Rowlandsondrewhim disguisedasaharlequinand imprisonedinasmallcage mountedonacartdrawnby twomules.Thecaption proclaimedhimtobe‘ARare AcquisitionfortheRoyal Menagerie’,aformer potentatewhonowhadno otherfunctionthantoamuse anddiverttheKingandhis guests.2Politiciansjoined journalistsandartistsin demandinghisexclusion fromEurope,someeven proposingthathebetriedasa warmongerandsentencedto death.TheFrancophobe editorofTheTimes,John Stoddart,hadnotimefor clemencyandarguedthat Bonaparteandthosewhohad ralliedtohimshouldbe exposedtothefullrigoursof thelaw.3Othersexpressed theviewthatheshouldhave beenlefttothemercyofthe BourbonsandtheFrench courts.Thepoliticalproblem, ofcourse,wasacute–the sameasforanydeposed ruler,whetherBonaparteor LouisXVI.Ifheweretobe executedbyorderofhis enemieshewouldbecomea politicalmartyrandaheroto hisadmirers,anoutcome whichtheAllieswantedto avoidifatallpossible.If,on theotherhand,heweretobe imprisonedonBritishsoil,or inanearbycountry,herisked becomingthefocalpointfor futureinsurrection,aleader waitingtoberecalledto power.Allwereagreedthat Napoleoncouldnotbe trusted,andthathispromised goodconduct–‘Iwouldhave givenmywordofhonourto haveremainedquietandto haveheldnopolitical correspondenceinEngland,’4 hesaid–waswholly worthless.Theapprenticeship inexilethatwasElbahad demonstratedhowtight securitywouldhavetobeif hewasnottoescapefora secondtime.Ifhewere imprisoned,escapemustbe impossible;theremustbeno secondvoldel’aigle. Theseconsiderationsled theBritishgovernmentto alight,asaplaceofexile,on SaintHelena,an impoverishedandwindswept outpostofEmpirecutoff fromtheworldinthefar SouthAtlantic.Batteredby Atlanticstorms,itwasa bleakandinhospitableisland –especiallyduringthelong wintermonths–arocky outcroppinginadistant ocean,dominatedbythe mountainpeakswhich puncturedthelowcloudsthat greetedNapoleonandhis party–HighPeaktothewest, andthetwinpeaksof ActaeonandDiananearerto thecentreoftheislandand dominatingthehouseat Longwoodwhere,afterthe earlymonths,Napoleon wouldtakeupresidence. WhenCharlesDarwinlanded onSaintHelenain1836it wasthebleaknessthathe emphasised:‘thehabitable partissurroundedbyabroad bandofblackdesolaterocks, asifthewidebarrierofthe oceanwerenotsufficientto guardthepreciousspot’.5The islandhadnonative population,butitwasan importantstagingpostfor shipsoftheEastIndia Companyandsustaineda populationofuptofive thousand,includingaBritish garrison,alargenumberof slavesfromMadagascar,and Chineseindenturedlabourers; itservicedandsupplied aroundathousandships everyyear.6Jamestown,the capital,was‘avillage squeezedbetweentwo mountains’,withoutport installations,whereshipslay atanchoroffthecoastand passengerswerebrought ashoreinopenboats.7 AssurancesfromtheBritish governmentthattheisland’s climatewashealthywere morethanalittledeceptive. Summersweresemi-tropical, butinwinterSaintHelena wasexposedtofiercestorms thatregularlypiledinfrom theAtlantic,andtherewasa pervasivedampthatclungto wallsandseepedintothe foundationsofbuildings.8 ThejourneyfromEurope totheSouthAtlanticwasdull andseeminglyendless, introducingtheformer emperortosomethingofthe boredomthatwouldafflict himoncehereachedSaint Helena.FirsttheBellerophon broughthimtoPlymouth, fromwherehewouldbegin hisvoyageintoexile.Hewas transferredtotheseventyeight-gunBritishwarship Northumberland,which wouldtakehimtotheSouth Atlantic,alongwiththe Frenchentouragethatwould becomefamousthroughtheir associationwithhim: Bertrand,withhiswifeand threechildren;the Montholons,husbandand wife;theyounggeneral, GasparGourgaud,andthe onlycivilianamongthem, ComteEmmanuel-Josephde LasCases,whowas appointedNapoleon’s chamberlainandwas accompaniedbyhisyoung son.Otherswouldhavegone, too,buttheBritishauthorities hadnowishtocreatea thrivingBonapartistcolony onSaintHelenaandwere especiallydeterminedto avoidanymilitary concentrationthere.Ofthe fifteenarmyofficerswhohad accompaniedNapoleonfrom France,onlythreewere allowedtosharehisexile.He wasalsogiventherightto taketwelveservants, includinghispersonalvalet, LouisMarchand,ayoung manoftwenty-fourwhohad servedintheimperial householdsince1811andhad beenwithNapoleononElba. Theservantsincludedacook, abutler,and,mostfamously, thedevotedSaint-Denis,who hadfollowedtheEmperor acrossEuropeandwas universallyknownas MamelukeAli.9Ashisdoctor onSaintHelenahechosean Irishnavalsurgeon,DrBarry O’Meara. Conditionsonboardthe Northumberlandwere crampedandratherSpartan, andtheship’scaptainwas adamantthatNapoleon shouldbegrantedonlythe spaceappropriatetoastate prisoner;hewasnolongeran emperor,andcouldnolonger bankonspecialprivileges. Whenhecameaboardhewas greetedwiththehonours appropriatetoageneral,but nottoaheadofstate.Hedid notcomplain,comparing conditionsonboardtothose inthebivouacshehad enduredoncampaign.The shipitself,thoughithadbeen extensivelyrefittedforthe voyageandappeared resplendentwithanadmiral’s ensign,wasoldandcreaky. Thereweresomeone thousandandeightymenon board,manyofthemsoldiers, andtheshipwas accompaniedtoJamestown bytwosmallertroopships, theCeylonandthe Bucephalus.Thevoyagefrom Plymouthtooksixty-seven days,duringwhichthelittle flotillawasbatteredbywinds andhighseas.10Despite claimsthatitwasoneofthe bestsailingshipsintheRoyal Navy,theNorthumberland’s voyagetoSaintHelenawould beherlastinactiveservice. OnherreturnfromSaint Helenashewasretiredand convertedtoahospitalship, inwhichcapacityshewould remaininserviceuntilshe wassenttothebreaker’syard in1850.11 Bertrand,Montholon,Las CasesandGourgaudwould becomeNapoleon’sclosest companionsonSaintHelena –theywerecommonly referredtoasthe‘four apostles’,andeachwould leavehismemoriesofthe formerEmperor’sfinalyears. Theywereinsomewaysa motleycrew,unitedonlyby theirloyaltytoNapoleonand byyearsofserviceinhis cause.CountBertrandhad risentotherankofgeneralon meritalone;hewasatalented artilleryofficerwhowould staywithNapoleonuntilhis deathin1821,aswouldthe secondofthe‘apostles’,the CountdeMontholon. Althoughalsoageneral, Montholonhadnotenjoyeda notablemilitarycareerand, unlikeBertrand,wasthe scionofanoldaristocratic familyandamanof traditionaltastes.LasCases,a formermaîtredesrequêtesin theCouncilofState,hadno militaryexperience,butcame tounderstandNapoleonwell. Hewouldbecomehis confidantandmemorialiston SaintHelena,notingdownhis intimatethoughtsand discussingwithhimthehigh andlowpointsofhisEmpire. FortheBritish,indeed,the bondbetweenLasCasesand theformerEmperorwas uncomfortablyclose,and wheninNovember1816he wasdiscoveredsmugglinghis secretcorrespondenceoutof theislandLasCaseswas promptlydeported.The fourthofNapoleon’s companions,General Gourgaud,alsoleftbefore Napoleon’sdeath.In1815he wasayoungmanofthirtytwowhohadenjoyedrapid promotionintheimperial armyandwhosetalentshad favourablyimpressedthe Emperor.Unliketheothers, hehadvolunteeredhimself fortheexpedition. Disappointedtobeomitted fromtheofficiallistofthose whoweretogo,hepleadedto beincludedinanemotional tirade.‘Hewas’,heshouted, ‘aBaronoftheEmpire,a LieutenantGeneral;hislife hadbeendevotedtoserving theEmperor!Hehadfought inthirteencampaigns,had receivedthreewoundsduring thattime,hadevensavedthe Emperor’slifeattheBattleof Brienne,andhadborne Napoleon’slettertothe PrinceRegent’.12Death,he said,wastobepreferredto suchaninsult.Napoleon listenedtotheyoungman’s pleadings,notedthestrength ofhisdevotion,andrelented. Gourgaudgothisway,butby 1817Napoleonhadhad enoughofhisjealous outbursts,hisquarrelswith theothersandhisseemingly closerelationshipwiththe Britishgovernor,Hudson Lowe.Gourgaudwasfast becomingadisruptive influence,andNapoleon askedthatheberemoved.13 ThepresenceofhisFrench companionsundoubtedly helpedtomakelifeonthe islandmorebearable,ashis exilewouldotherwisehave condemnedhimtolong periodsoftotalsolitude.With LasCases,aswithBertrand, Napoleonbuiltasolid foundationoftrust,anditwas tothemthathevouchsafed histhoughtsabouthis achievements,abouthis victoriesanddefeats,and aboutthegloriesofhis Empire.Theyspenthours closetedtogether,with Napoleonholdingforthon someaspectofhisreignor denouncingsomebêtenoire hechosetoblameforhis failures.LasCasesand Bertrandwouldscribbleaway faithfully,recordingtheir master’swordsand preservingthemforposterity. Theirpresencesuppliedhim withcongenialcompany, whichwasitselfimportantfor him.Theyalsogavehima senseofpurposeinhisexile, ashepreparedhismemoirs, embellishingandmassaging hissideofthestory,his versionoftheeventshehad livedthroughandhadso oftendominated.In1816,in hisconversationswithLas Cases,andthereafterwith Bertrand,heoffereda commentaryonthepast whichhehopedwould providethemasternarrative forhiscontemporariesand forfuturehistoriansofthe Empire.Nothingthathe wroteordictated,however, shouldbereaduncritically; everywordwascarefully chosenanditsimplications weighed.Heremaineda subtlepropagandist,andhis memoirsweretobeakey toolinsecuringhisplacein history.Hemayalsohave hopedthatBritishhatredof himwouldbeassuaged,and thathemightreturntoEurope fromwhatheincreasinglyfelt asahatefulexile.Thathope wasdilutedbyBathurst’s dismissivereplyonbehalfof theBritishgovernmentin 1817,thenextinguished completelybytheAlliesin 1819atAix-la-Chapelle.14 Curiouslylittlehadbeen preparedfortheNapoleon’s arrivalonSaintHelena.The housethathadbeenidentified ashisplaceofcaptivity, Longwood,required considerableworkbeforeit wasreadyforoccupation, whilethetemporarylodging allocatedtohimbythe Britishgovernment, PlantationHouse,waswholly unsuitable.Inthefirstmonths ontheisland,hepreferredto stayinapavilionattachedto afamilyhouseatTheBriars, thesamehousewhere Wellingtonhadlodgedwhen helandedonSaintHelena backin1805.Thecurrent owner,WilliamBalcombe, employedassuperintendent forpublicsalesfortheEast IndiaCompany,agreedtothe arrangementandmadehimas comfortableashecould,and, despitethesimplicityofhis surroundings,Napoleonlater acknowledgedthatthiswas thehappiestperiodofhis enforcedsojournonthe island.Yetalreadyhewas beginningtobaulkatthe pettyrestrictionsimposedby hiscaptors.Hewassubjectto acurfew;ifheleftthegarden hehadtobeaccompaniedby aBritishsoldier;andifhis friendscametovisit,they wereobligedtoreturnto Jamestownbynineinthe evening.15AtLongwood, onceHudsonLowehadbeen installedasgovernor,the restrictionswouldbecome morenumerousand Napoleon’scontemptfor themmoreunbridled.By 1816hisrelationswith Britishbureaucracywere tenseandacrimonious,with Lowethecustomarytargetof hisanger.AfterAugust1816 herefusedallface-to-face discussionswiththe governor,andovertime becamemorewithdrawnand moredepressedabouthislot. EvenwhentheBritish governmentrecognisedthe inadequaciesofLongwood andstartedbuildinganew houseforhim,herefusedto showanyinterest.Nodoubt hewasawarethatthiswasno generousgesturebutthe confirmationofwhathemost feared:thathewouldspend therestofhisdaysonSaint Helena. Longwoodwassetamong lavafields,whatLouis Marchandwoulddescribein hismemoirsas‘volcanic terrainwithoutatraceof vegetation’.YetNapoleon admittedthathefoundthe sceneryhauntingandrather inspiring.Behindthehouse wastheforestofDeadwood, whichcontrastedvividlywith thelayersofcooledblack lava.‘Pocketsofsoilspread bytimegavebirthtoafew stuntedtreesandpatchesof greenery’.Buttheinitial impressiondidnottakelong towearoff.‘Foronewhohad remainedatTheBriarsforsix weekswithoutgoingoutside’, hewrote,‘thiscountryside wasnotwithoutcharm;but thisfavourableimpression dissipatedmoreandmorethe closerIapproachedthe house.Thetreesforminga greenroofwerereallyvery stunted,withsuchsparse foliagethattheyprovidedno shade.Thelawnthat appearedfreshwassoonlyby comparisonwiththerocky ravinesandvolcanicland separatingmefromit.’His initialsenseofaverdant landscape,oftreesandlawns, didnotsurviveclose inspection.Thefoliagewas stunted,thelawnsdriedand shrivelled.‘Scorchedbythe sunitwas...morelikea fieldofstrawthanofgrass.’16 Longwoodwasaspacious residencebythestandardsof SaintHelena,thoughithardly comparedwiththepalacesto whichNapoleonhadbecome accustomedasEmperor.It containedabilliardroom,a salon,adiningroomanda library,aswellas accommodationfor Gourgaud,LasCasesand O’Meara,andfamilyquarters forMontholon.Bertrand,at hiswife’sinsistence,lived awayfromthemainhouse, firstatHutt’sGateandlater inacottagethefamilybuilt ongroundoppositethefront entrancetoLongwood.17 Long-woodalsohada substantialgarden,setagainst thebackclothofvolcanic rocks,whereNapoleonwas giventotaketheairand,in 1819,developedabrief passionforgardening.He declaredhisloveofnature, plantingtreesandeven raisingafewsheep,butthis wasonlyafaçade:foraman whohadalwaysbeen physicallyactivehisyearsof captivityprovedacumulative torture.Inthefirstmonthsof hisstayatLongwoodhetook longwalksorwentridingto keephimselfingoodphysical condition,buthebecame quicklybored,acutelyaware thathewasmerelyfillingin thehours,andhebeganto loseinterest.Moreandmore, histimeonSaintHelenawas spentinreminiscence, lookingbackoverhiscareer anddictatinghisreflections toLasCasesoroneofthe otherapostles.Healsoread profusely.Helookedforward avidlytoshipmentsofbooks fromEurope,andenjoyed listeningasMarchandorone oftheothersreadtohimofan evening.18Hisothergreat pleasurewastoentertain visitorsandindulgeingood foodandwine.Weknowthat Napoleon’shouseholdgreatly exceededthedomesticbudget itwasallocatedbytheBritish government,andthathuge quantitiesofdrinkwere consumed.Inthelastthree monthsof1816alone,over thirty-sevenhundredbottles ofwineweredeliveredto Longwood,amongthemeight hundredandthirtybottlesof Bordeaux.19 Athisbest,Napoleonhad alwaysbeenasocialanimal whoenjoyedconversation andgoodcompany.Inhis earlymonthsatLongwoodhe appearedrelaxed–even courtly–whenhereceived visitors,evenEnglishones, andhedidnothesitateto discusshispast achievements,orthestateof currentaffairs,orsuch changesasthefuturemight bring.Hewasinterestedby storiesoftheoutsideworld andstruckvisitorsaswell informedaboutwhatwas happeninginEurope.He particularlywelcomednaval visitors,ships’captainsand officerswhoputashorefrom Britishvesselspassing throughontheirwayto India.20Throughouthislife heremainedsomethingofa ladies’man,andwasnotably morewelcomingtofemale visitorssuchasLady Malcolm,thewifeofSir PulteneyMalcolm,aBritish admiralwhocameto Jamestownwiththe commissionersoftheAllied powersandstayedtherefor somemonthsin1816and 1817.Relationsbetweenthe twomenwereamicable,and LadyMalcolmvisited NapoleonatLongwood.A navalcaptainanddiarist, HenryMeynell,waspresent atoneoftheirmeetings, takingnotesonwhathesaw andheard.Hewasimpressed bythevarietyandlightnessof Napoleon’sconversation, whichclearlysurprisedhim. ‘OntheirarrivalB.received LadyM.mostgraciously;’he notes,‘askedherseveral questions;howsheboreso longaseavoyage;andifshe wasnotverysea-sick?He thenaskedherifshewas fondofhunting,ashe understoodthatladiesin Englandwerepartialtothat amusement.’Then,turningto anotherofhisfavourite topics,‘hetalkedtohermuch aboutOssian’spoems,which hehadalwaysadmired’.His conversationwasartistic, animated,andinformed.‘He saidhehadseentwo translationsofthemin French,thatneitherwere good,butthattheonehehad seeninItalianwasexcellent andbeautiful.Hethenasked LadyM.ifshethoughtthem genuine,thattherehadbeen manycontroversiesabout them,andwhethershedidnot thinkthatMacphersonhad writtenthem.’Napoleon showedhecouldlistentoo: ‘LadyM.repliedthatshedid notthinkMacphersoncapable ofwritingthem,thatthe HighlandSocietyhadtaken muchpainstoinvestigateit andprovedtheir authenticity.’21 Butby1817these convivialsocialgatherings werebecomingathingofthe past.Napoleonwouldspend longhoursaloneinhisroom atLongwood,skimming throughafewbooksorlostin adepressivedaze.Thereis littletosuggestthathe enjoyedsolitudeoradjusted easilytotheconstraintsofhis captivity.OvertimeLongwoodtookitstoll:his capacityforconviviality dimmedandhegrew increasinglyself-absorbed. Lethargyovercamehim,and hewouldsitaloneorlieon hisbedforhours,plungedin thoughtorsimplydoing nothing–classicsymptoms ofdepression.By1818he wasfurtherisolatedbythe departureofanumberofhis contactsontheisland: Gourgaud–whosedeparture hehadrequested–butalso theBalcombesandhistrusted physician,O’Meara,whowas transferredbytheBritish becausehewasseenastoo friendlywiththeirprisoner. Hewassaddened,too,bythe deathofoneofhisservants, hismaîtred’hôtelCipriani,a fellowCorsicanwhomhe likedandtrusted.Bytheend oftheyearhehadevengiven upworkonhismemoirs, whichhadpreviouslygiven hiscaptivitysomeshapeand purpose. TheNapoleonwhois depictedinthepagesofLas Cases’Mémorialisnotthe workaholicwhohadonceled greatarmiesandpresided overacontinent.Heappears diminished,bothphysically andmentally,increasingly resemblingsomecolonial planterinhisstrawhat, wanderingroundhisgarden inspectingtheproduce.22This wastheimagethatwouldbe seizeduponbycartoonists andpilloriedbyhis opponents.Itwastheimage ofamanwhowasnolonger youngandvigorous,who tendedtoobesity,andwas increasinglytorturedbypoor health–inshort,amanwho nolongerposedanythreatto hisformerenemies.By1820 caricaturistscouldevenallow themselvesadegreeof sympathyforhiminhisexile. AnIrishcartoonof1820, entitled‘TheSorrowsof Boney’,portrayedhiminhis terriblesolitude,crouchedon abarrenrock,surveyingthe oceanandruminatingonthe depthstowhichhehasfallen. Hehadbecomearathertragic figure,capableofeliciting pityratherthanangeror condemnation.23 Therewasadegreeofselfpity,too,asNapoleonrelived hiscampaignsandlamented thedefeatsthathadcosthim histhrone.Inparticularhe foughtandrefoughttheBattle ofWaterloo,arguingabout thereasonsforthedefeat, persuadinghimselfthatonly aminorerrorhadrobbedhim ofvictory.Usually,aswashis wont,thaterrorwasnothis butwasattributedtooneof hiscommanders,amarshal whoserashnessorlossof faithhadcosthimtheday. Bertrandrecordsanumberof hisrecurrentregrets:‘Imade agreatmistakeinemploying Ney.Helosthishead.A senseofhispastconduct impairedhisenergy.’ Elsewherethefaultwas Soult’s.‘Soultdidnotaidme asmuchashemighthave done.Hisstaff, notwithstandingallmy orders,wasnotwell organised.Berthierwould havedonebetterservice.’He wouldhavedonebetterwith Suchet.Orthefaultlaywith thewholearmy.‘Themenof 1815werenotthesameas thoseof1792.Mygenerals werefaint-heartedmen. PerhapsIshouldhavedone bettertohavewaitedanother monthbeforeopeningthe campaigntogivemore consistencytothearmy.’24 Napoleon,itwouldseem,had becomepersuadedofhis invincibilityandsought scapegoatstoexplainhisown failures.Ashetold Montholon,Waterloocould onlybeexplainedbythefact thatfatehadabandonedhim. ‘Ididnotlosethebattle becausetheAllieshadthree timesmoremen.Ilostit becauseSoulthadmadeabad choiceofofficersofhis generalstaffandoneofthem didnotdelivermyorders.If themessengerssentto Grouchyhadnotbehavedlike simpletons,ifmyordershad beencarriedtoGuyot...the battlewouldhavebeen mine.’25Alwayssomeone elsewastoblame. Inhislateryearsat Longwoodhewastormented bydeterioratinghealthand reducedmobility,asalifeof extraordinarilyhardworkand physicalexertion,muchofit spentinthesaddleandin militaryquartersacross Europe,finallytookitstoll. Despitehisloveofrapid militarymovementsandtaste forincisivedecision-making, Napoleonwasaperfectionist whoneverlosthisfaithin carefulplanning.Hehad workedprodigiouslyover manyyears,bothasamilitary commanderinthefieldandas Emperor,planninghisevery moveinmeticulousdetail, dictatinghugenumbersof lettersanddispatches,and poringoverhismapslateinto thenight.Overalong militarycareerthatstretched fromToulonin1793to Waterlooin1815,hehad beenwoundedonseveral occasions,survivingtwoshell burstsandaseriesofminor injuriestohischest,his Achillestendonandhisleft leg.Hehadnevershirked fromdangeroravoidedthe thickofabattle;inthecourse oftwenty-twoyearshehad survivednumerousattacks andhadseennineteenhorses killedunderhim.AtArcis- en-AubeinMarch1814, whenashelldroppedtoearth onlyafewfeetfromwherehe stood,Napoleoncalmlyrode overit.AccordingtoDavid Chandler’saccountofthe incident,‘theshellexploded, thehorse,disembowelled, wentplungingdown,taking itsriderwithit.TheEmperor disappearedinthedustand smoke.Buthegotupwithout ascratch’.26Therewasno questioninghisphysical bravery.Increasingly, however,asthecampaigns followedoneupontheother inquicksuccession,hehad sufferedfromsuddenboutsof illnessthatcontrastedwith hisnormallyrobustgood healthandaffectedhis capacitytoleadhisarmyin thefield.BeforeBorodinohe haddifficultybreathingand hispulseratewasirregular; afterDresdenhewasassailed byvomitinganddiarrhoea;at Leipzighesufferedacute stomachpains;andatLigny hewasincapacitatedby illnessimmediatelyafterthe battle.27Hisfreneticlifestyle andrefusaltoresthisbody had,itseemed,finallycome hometoroost. OnSaintHelenaNapoleon wasnotoriouslydistrustfulof doctors,especiallyonce O’Mearaleftandhehadonly thephysiciansallottedtohim bytheBritishauthorities.He dismissedasincompetentthe doctorsentoutbyhisfamily in1819,theCorsican FrancescoAntommarchi,who tendedhimduringhisfinal monthsandperformedthe officialautopsyafterhis death.28Inall,hehadsix doctorsduringhissixyears ontheisland,arateof expenditurethatreflectedhis fearofBritishperfidy–and ofHudsonLoweinparticular –andhistendencytobelieve inplotsandconspiracies wheremedicinewas concerned.29Thislackof trusthasmadeitdifficultfor historianstoestablishreliable medicalrecordsforhislast illness,thoughfromthe observationsofthosecloseto himitisclearthathishealth hadbeenfailingforsome years.From1817hewas sufferingliverproblemsand stomachpains,possiblythe resultofcancer;orhemay havebeenassailedby hepatitis,whichwas prevalentinSaintHelena’s unhealthyclimate.30Bythe autumnof1820hehadtaken tohisbed,ofteninpain, unabletodigestfood,and growingsteadilyweaker.Itis clearthatheknewhewas dying;indeed,heaccepted deathwithacalmfatalism, comfortingLouisMarchand withthethoughtthathis deathwaspre-ordainedand admittingtoBertrandthathe woulddiewithnobeliefinan afterlife.‘Iamluckynotto believe,’heisquotedas saying,‘forIdon’thave chimericalfearsofhell.’31He alsofoundtheenergyinApril 1821tomakeawill,an elaboratedocumentinwhich heleftbequeststohisfamily, aswellastoBertrand, MontholonandMarchand, whomheappointedashis executors,andtoseveralof hisformercompanionsin arms.Eveninhisfinalillness herevivedfromtimetotime andhadmomentsof astoundingclarity,though theybecameincreasingly rare.BythefirstdaysofMay hewassufferingincreasing painandwasprescribedeverlargerdosesofdrugs. Napoleondiedon5May 1821,attheageoffifty-two. Hewassurroundedbythose ofhisfriendswhohadstayed withhimtothelast:Bertrand andMontholonandtheir children,andhistwomost loyalservants,Marchandand Ali. Thisisprobablynotthe placetoresurrectthe controversythathasraged overthecausesofhisdeath sincetracesofarsenicwere discoveredinthestrandsof hishair.Thesehadbeen lovinglytakenbyMarchand asakeepsakeafterhis master’sdeath,andonly muchlatersubjectedto scientificanalysis.The evidenceofferedtosuggest thatNapoleonwaspoisoned seems,atbest,circumstantial. Thereareotherexplanations thatcouldaccountforthe arsenic,includingtheeffect ofdampseepingintothe wallpaperatLongwood. Napoleon’shealthwas sufficientlypoortobe consideredlife-threatening, andthedoctorsatthetime attributedhisdeathto hepatitis,stomachcancerand anulceratedstomachlining. Morerecentmedicalopinion agrees.Inthelastdaysofhis lifetherewasclearevidence ofgastricbleeding;some havetalkedoftuberculosis, othersoflongstandingrenal problemswhichhad weakenedhimthroughouthis life.32Napoleonhadwornout andabusedhisbodyuntilit couldtakenomore.Itneeded noexternalagencytokill him. Thereremainedthe questionofhisfuneral. Napoleonhadexpressedhis wishtobeburiedinParis,but therewasscantchanceofthat beingacceptabletoeitherthe BritishorthenewFrench government.Hisother expressedwishwasthathis bodyshouldreturntoCorsica andbeplacedalongsidehis ancestorsinthecathedralat Ajaccio.That,too,was rejected.Napoleon,itwas agreed,muststayonSaint Helena;hecouldnotbe allowedtoreturntoEurope where,evenindeath,his presencewouldbeathreatto thenewpoliticalorder. HudsonLowedid,however, grantNapoleonhischoiceof burialsite,intheverdant GeraniumValley,underthe willowtreesandclosetothe springwherehehadwatched theChineselabourersloading drinkingwaterfor Longwood.Forthefuneral processionheauthoriseda levelofceremonial appropriatetoanarmy general;again,theBritish governmentcouldnot contemplategivinghimthe honoursduetoaheadof state.Nonetheless,thefuneral couldnotfailtomakean impressionontheislanders. Theentirepopulationlined therouteasNapoleon’s coffinwascarriedbytwelve grenadierstoitsfinalresting place;sodidthetwo thousandorsoBritish soldiersandsailorswhowere ondutyontheisland.The coffinwascoveredinblue velvet,andonitwereplaced hisswordandthecloakthat hehadwornatMarengo;the tasselsonthefourcornersof thepallwereheldby BertrandandMontholonat therear,andbyLouis MarchandandBertrand’s eldestson,Napoleon,atthe front.Thecoffinwas followedbyNapoleon’sstate horse,ledbyhisgroom,in frontofthegovernor,the hatedHudsonLowe– resplendentinfull-dress uniform–andaretinueof Britishstaffandarmy personnel. Amidthepeaceof GeraniumValleyNapoleon’s bodywaslaidtorestbeneath hugeflatstones.Honour,it seemed,hadbeenupheld,but therewouldbeonelastspat withtheBritishoverthe inscriptiononNapoleon’s tomb.TheFrenchwantedto commemoratehimsimplyas Napoleon,hisnamewhenhe wasemperor;whereasthe British,eversensitivetothe dangersofgrantinghis Empireanyvestigeof legitimacy,insistedon NapoleonBonaparte.And therethesquabblerested. Ratherthangivegroundon whattheysawasamatterof principle,theFrench preferredtoleavetheirformer Emperorinanunmarked grave.33 14 LifeafterDeath Napoleonhadshown repeatedlythroughouthis careerthathewasamasterof persuasionandanarchpropagandist,awareofthe powerofwordsandphrases, imagesandmusictowinover publicopiniontohiscause. HisvictoriesatToulonand Marengo,hisventureinto Egypt,hiscoronationand marriagetoMarie-Louise,his relationswithhismen,his youthfulexperienceasa revolutionarygeneral,andhis longhoursspentasaruler andlegislatorintheinterests ofhispeople–everyaspect ofhiscolourfulcareerwas carefullypublicisedin newspapersandbulletinsto constructaheroicimagethat wouldbepasseddownto posterity. Throughouthiscareer, Napoleonhaddemonstrated aninsatiabledesiretoproject hischosenimage,toreserve hisplaceinhistory.Andso, inexilehespentmuchofhis time,especiallyduringhis earlymonthsonSaintHelena, withpurposeand deliberation.Therewasat firstnobroodingoverthe past,nopreparingfordeath, andnoplanninghisreturnto Europe.Whatheengagedin wastheblackartof propaganda,ofwhichhewas amaster,tellingandretelling hisstorytomakesurethathis sideofeventswouldsurvive forfuturegenerations.He discussedpaststrategies,the outcomesofhiscampaigns, thewayshehadintended thingstoworkout,often justifyinghisactions, sometimesexpressingregrets, andcharacteristicallyblaming othersfortheirweaknessor indecisiveness.Thatwasthe pointofthelonghoursspent inhisstudy,dictatinghis thoughtstohis‘apostles’ certainintheknowledgethat theywouldrecordhisviews faithfullywhenhis compositionwascomplete. Ofcourse,therewasamore immediatepurpose,too,in thattheyhelpedwhileaway boredomandgaveshapeto hisdays.Buthisrealaim cannotbeindoubt:thiswasa tacticalcampaignascomplex asanyhehadwononthe battlefield. OnSaintHelenahe convincedhimselfandhis listenersthathehadbeen consistentinhisaims,thathis hadindeedbeenaliberal empirewhichhehadcreated andgovernedintheinterests ofhispeople.TheEmperorof thesefinalyearsturnedfull circletoberebornasthe revolutionaryof1793,the manofthepeoplewho identifiedwiththepopulace andremainedloyaltothe libertyandfraternityofthe FirstRepublic,breaking downprivilegeandspreading thevaluesofindividualism andeconomicfreedom.1 Hisargumentsandself- justifications,astheyare recordedbyLasCasesinthe MémorialdeSainte-Hélène, arelessarecordofhis achievementsthanapleato beunderstoodasasonofthe Revolution,amanof principlewhohadremained loyaltohisrepublicanideals. Napoleonwascarefully placinghimselfinhistoryasa democratwhoreflectedthe popularwillandwholistened totheFrenchpeople,instark contrasttotheBourbonsand thepoliticiansofthe Restoration.Hewas,ina quiteexplicitway,makinga pitchtobeseenbytheFrench publicasamanoftheLeft,a manofdemocraticinstincts. LasCasesrecordshimtalking of‘theirresistibleriseof liberalideas’,forwhichhe claimedthathisEmpirewas largelyresponsible.The claimwasboldand audacious.‘Nothingshould henceforthdestroyorefface thegreatprinciplesofour Revolution’,hedeclared, addingthattheywerenoble truthsthatwouldlastforever, andthattheglorywithwhich hehadembellishedthemhad madethem‘immortal’.Inthis process,revolutionarypolitics andimperialarmshadplayed complementaryroles.‘The productofthepolitical rostrum,cementedbythe bloodofbattles,decorated withthelaurelsofvictory, salutedbypopular acclamation,sanctionedby thetreatiesandalliancesof rulers,theyshouldnever againbeforcedtoretreat.’By carryingthetorchforthese ideals,headds,hewill foreverbelinkedtothemand totheirsuccessacrossthe globe.2Hetalksthelanguage ofrightsandofcitizenship, andcarefullypresentsthisfor exportacrossEuropeasthe rightsofpeoplestowin freedomfromtheirempires andmonarchiesandestablish themselvesasnationstates. HeevenalludestotheEmpire as‘theregularisationofthe republicanprinciple’.3 Napoleonalsotookthe opportunityinhisdiscussions withhisentouragetomount attacksonhiscritics, especiallythoseintellectuals whohad,whetherthrough ideologicalconvictionor personalspite,denouncedhis policiesordeniedhisvirtue. Napoleonmightrelishpower, buthewasvainenoughto valuehisreputation,too.He cultivatedartistsandauthors, andheresentedthecontinual snipingthathesufferedfrom oneortwokeyliterary figures–writerswhomhe hadadmiredandwhomhe read.Itshouldnotbe forgottenthathehadbeenan omnivorousreadereversince hisearlydaysongarrison duty,whenheconfessedthat hereadnovelsasameansof killingboredom.4Hewas certainlyfartooconsciousof thepowerofwordsnotto recognisethedamagethey weredoinghim.Evenon SaintHelenahecouldnotlet theircriticismsrest unanswered. Chateaubriandwho,like Napoleon,hadbegunlifeasa youngarmyofficerinthe Revolution,wasa conservativeandaroyalist. Hebecamequickly disillusionedasthemonarchy gavewaytotheRepublicand pluralismtoauthoritarian centralism.Hejoinedthe armyofthecounterrevolutionandlaunchedhis literarycareerinexilein London.After18Brumaire, hebrieflyralliedtoNapoleon beforebecomingangeredand disgustedbytheexecutionof theDucd’Enghien,which drovehimintoopposition.By theendoftheEmpirehis attacksonNapoleonhad becomeunremitting,notleast thevenomoustracthe publishedin1814,within daysoftheAlliedentryinto Paris–atimewhenitcould becalculatedtodothe greatestpsychological damage.Here,henotonly challengedthelegitimacyof Napoleon’srulebuthitatthe heartofhismilitary reputation,accusinghimof beingamediocregeneralwho hadmadecrassdecisionsin thefieldandsquanderedthe livesofhismen.‘Born largelytodestroy,’hewrote, ‘Bonapartecarriesevilinhis breastjustasnaturallyasa motherbearsheroffspring, withjoyandasortofpride.’5 Hismostfamouswork,the Mémoiresd’outretombe,was apassionateindictmentofthe Empire.ForNapoleonthis constitutedanactofbetrayal byaconvincedreactionary. Yetheremainedanadmirer ofChateaubriandasawriter, evenashedeploredhis disloyaltyanddenouncedthe virulenceofhisprose.On SaintHelenaNapoleonwould insistthathis1814pamphlet hadbeensovituperativeand libellousthatitcouldinspire onlydisgust,beforeadding, withsurprisingindulgence, that‘itistobebelievedthat henowregretswritingthem’, andthat‘suchafinetalentas hiswouldnotprostituteitself byreproducingthemtoday.’6 TheliberalBenjamin Constantalsothrewinhislot withtheRestoration,making clearinapiecehecontributed totheJournaldesDébatsjust whyhisconsciencewouldnot allowhimtocompromise withtheEmpire.It represented,hesuggested,the worstofcompromises,since ‘ontheKing’ssideare constitutionalliberty,security andpeace;onthatof Bonaparteslavery,anarchy andwar’.Thecontrastcould notbeemphasisedmore starkly,andNapoleon resenteditdeeply.7Benjamin Constant’sconversionfrom liberalismtosupportforthe legitimistmonarchyhad seemeddramatic–too dramaticnottoarouse Napoleon’ssuspicions.Who couldberesponsibleforthis suddenvolte-faceand apparentbetrayalof liberalism?Napoleon’s animusfocusedononeofhis long-termbêtesnoires,the liberalauthorMadamede Staëlwho,overacareerbuilt onacerbicwritingand brilliantsalonconversation, hadevokedabitterhatredfor Napoleonandallthevalues hestoodfor.Hermajor politicalworks,whichwere publishedposthumously, werethinlyveiledattackson hisregime. GermainedeStaël resentedalmosteverything aboutNapoleon:hisorigins inCorsica,hismilitary background,andthemanner inwhichhehadseized power,allofwhichhelped convinceherthathewaslittle morethanatyrantanda usurper.Thepolitical allusionsandallegorical referencestotheEmperorthat litteredhertextswere intendedtoberecognised acrossEurope,andthusto woundhim.8InDe l’Allemagne,arguablyher mostpoliticalwork, Napoleonisportrayedasa newAttila,acomparisonthat causedthebooktobepulped bytheFrenchcensors.And thoughthesubjectfocusedon GermanyratherthanFrance, theGermanrulerswerenot itsprincipaltarget.Thebook wasadenunciationof tyranny,andtoherEuropean readersin1810theveryuse oftheword‘tyrant’conjured upimagesofBonaparte.9 Ofgreatersignificance thanherdislikeoftyranny, however,wasacontemptthat resultedfromherpersonal vanityandherfiercefamily loyalty.Germainewaswidely admiredforhersparkling conversation,butnotforher beauty;andNapoleon,onthe fewsocialoccasionswhen theymet,eithertreatedher rudelyorchosetoignoreher altogether.Foroneofthe mostprominentsocialitesof herday,awomanwhohad hadasuccessionofequally prominentloversandmay havesetoutwithan infatuationfortheyoung Bonaparte,hiscontemptwas unbearable,andshealleged thatNapoleonhadno appreciationofwomen,that, indeed,hewasuncomfortable intheircompany.Justas importantwastheresentment shefelttowardsamanwho didnotshareherpassionate beliefinherfather’sgenius. Shewasthedaughterof JacquesNecker,themost reformistcontroller-general putinchargeofFrance’s financesunderLouisXVI. Neckerwasnotonlyherdear father,hewasalsoherhero, andtheoffhandtreatmenthe hadreceivedatNapoleon’s handsshockedandangered her.Shepursuedhim relentlesslythroughouthis reign,andsowearied Napoleonthathesentherinto exiletoridhimselfofher attentions.OnSaintHelena hecontinuedtomarvelhow shehadcontinuedto‘fight withonehandandbegwith theother’.10Ofherfamily relationsheremarkedthat herswasindeeda‘singular family’:‘herfather,her motherandherself,allthree ontheirkneesinconstant adorationofoneanother,and breathinginreciprocal incenseforthebetter edificationandmystification ofthepublic’.11Itwas,asso often,awell-aimedrapierblowbeforethetribunalof History. Likesomanymodern politicalmemoirs,the MémorialdeSainte-Hélène wasanexerciseinselfjustificationthatpresentedthe Emperorinthebestpossible lightandgavecoherenceto hispoliciesanddecisions.It wasaworkofcreative literaturethatgaveanarrative overviewtotheperiodwhich impressedandexcitedits readers,sinceitborethe stampofexperience,the authenticityofNapoleon’s ownvoice.Firstpublishedin Parisin1823,shortlyafterhis death,itbecameaninstant best-sellerandwasrapidly translatedintoanumberof Europeanlanguages, includingEnglishand German.Thememoirbecame oneofthemostinfluential worksofthefirsthalfofthe nineteenthcentury,providing sustenancetothosewhohad sharedtheNapoleonicdream andwhoregrettedthepassing oftheEmpire.Itwouldalso haveacrucialpoliticalrolein disseminatingtheNapoleonic legendacrossnineteenthcenturyEurope. TheMémorialwasthe first,andbyfarthemost influential,ofthememoirs andautobiographical accountstoemergefromthe yearsofexile.Montholonand Gourgaudpublishedan accountofNapoleon’sItalian campaignsin1823,whereas Bertrand’stwo-volumework onthewarinSyriaandEgypt onlyappearedin1847,almost agenerationlater.12Buttheir morepersonalaccountsof NapoleononSaintHelena andreflectionsonhisyearsof exilehadtowaitmuch longer:Gourgaud’sjournal from1815to1818,intwo volumes,waspublishedonly in1899;while,astonishingly perhaps,Bertrand’sCahiers deSainte-Hélènelay undiscovereduntilafterthe SecondWorldWar.13 Napoleon’stwovalets, MarchandandAli,also publishedtheirmemoriesof theirmaster’sexile, managingtoworkinsome domesticanecdotesthat betrayedtheiraffectionfor theirmaster.14Marchand, whowasoneofNapoleon’s executors,givesconsiderable spacetothetermsofhiswill, andnotestheairofsadness thatengulfedLongwood whenhedied.15 Otherswhowerenotwith himinhisexilewerealso movedtocontributetheir reflectionsandmemories.A Napoleonicpublishing industrycameintobeing, dispensingtheNapoleonic mythbothtoveteransofthe Empirenostalgicforthe worldtheyhadlost,andtoa newgenerationofyoung men,growingupafter1815 andavidforthegloryand politicalexcitementthat Napoleonpersonified.If ChateaubriandandMmede Staëlsowedtheseedsofa blacklegend,Napoleonand hisapostlesmadesurethat theworldknewhissideofthe story,andtheirwritings appealedtotheromantic imaginationofthenineteenth century.Bertrand,bythis timereinstatedinthe Restorationarmy,phrasedit memorablywhenhewrote thattheEmperor‘remained ourStandard,ourrallyingpoint.Thememoryofour gloriouspastmadeusforget foramomentthemiseriesof ourcountry,andwefeltthat ourheart,withalloursoul, wentouttohim,eventhough armydisciplinemadeus obedienttotheWhiteFlag.’16 EvenBritainwasnotimmune fromhisappeal:ageneration ofpoetsandnovelists,from ScottandByrontoSouthey, deQuinceyandThackeray, fellunderthespellofthe Emperor.Inthewordsofone leadingliterarycritic,intheir workis‘adesirethateschews abstinenceandorderin favourofindulgentfantasies ofviolentbecoming–indeed, theverystuffofNapoleonic identity.’17 IfNapoleoncanclaim creditforcreatinghisnew identityasamanofthe peopleandthelegitimateheir totheideasof1789,his enemiesgavehimhuge assistance.Everyactionof theRestorationmonarchy,it seemed,intensifiedthe equationofRevolutionand Empireinthepopularmind: theencouragementgivento Catholicmissions,which touredsouthernvillages annihilatingeveryvestigeof theRepublic;theuprootingof libertytreesandbanningof thetricolour;andthepurging ofmenknownforrepublican orBonapartistsympathies fromanyformofpublic office,allsymbolisedthe monarchy’sdeterminationto returntoanoldorderwhere thepeoplewereoncemore subjugatedandnoblesand clergyweresecureintheir wealthandprestige.18In somepartsofthesouth, WhiteTerrorreturnedas well,asthosewhohad sufferedtheexcessesofthe Jacobinperiodjoinedforces withreturnedémigrésand newlyempoweredpriestsina concertedcampaignof denunciationandrevenge killing.Againstthis backgrounditwasnot difficulttodevelopnostalgia foramoreegalitarianage, andNapoleon’sapologists exploitedthosefeelingswith consummateskill.Political realitiesgavewaytoan idealisedimageofatimeof equalityandopportunity.Ina particularlyunrealistic portrayaloftheEmpirein 1840,theliberalnovelist FrédéricSoulliéwrote, ‘Remember,thatequalitywas thelawunderhisreign.Itis becauseofthisthatheisour hero;itisforthisreasonthat hehasremainedsogreatand reveredinourmemories.’19 Seldomhasthehistoryofa regimebeensosinglemindedlyconcentratedon thatofasingleman. Prefectsworriedaboutthe secretambitionsofformer soldiers,nowdemobilisedon half-pay,andthroughout easternFranceminiature statuesofNapoleonand Marie-Louisewerereported tobeinhighdemand.20For some,unconvincedbythe newsofhisdeath,he remainedalivinghero,aman who,theyhoped,wouldplay apartinthefuturelifeofthe nationjustashehaddonein thepast.Policeand administrativereportsmade repeatedreferencesto individualswhoclaimedthat hewasnotdead,somewho expressedthehopethathe wouldreturn,somewhohad evenseenhimintheflesh. Unsurprisingly,thesewere mostcommoninpeasant France,inthedepthsof countrysidewhere superstitiousbeliefsremained widelyheldandwhere visionsoftheVirginMary werenotunknown.Inthe Creuse,notfarfromthetown ofGuéret,arumourspread thatBonapartehadappeared, almostChrist-like,‘escorted byangels’,toamotherand herchildattheverymoment whenthestoryofhisreturn wasbeingrecounted.21 Religiousthemeswereoften strongintheimagery surroundingthesevisions,as simplecountrymenstruggled toputtheirfaithintowords. Someevenallegedthatthe taleofNapoleon’sdeathhad tobefalsesincehewasnotas othermen,andwouldnotdie. In1815,indeed,intheMassif Central,onemanwas overheardtosaysimplythat Napoleonwas‘immortal’,a beliefthateasilyledto expectationsofaSecond Coming.22Suchanevent wouldbeeagerlyawaited, too,sincethereturnofthe Emperorwouldputbreadon theirtablesandguaranteethe returnofprosperity,andthe governmentwasalerttothe possibilitythatsupportfor Napoleonlayattherootof seditionandconspiracy.The factthatmanyyoung conscripts,insteadofturning intheirweaponsorbreaking themtoshowtheircontempt fortheneworder,had preferredtokeepthemfor futureuse,onlyaddedtothe senseofemergency.23 In1819thegovernment’s approachbecamemore repressive,followingthe murderoftheDucdeBerry lateatnightinParisashe accompaniedhissickwife homefromthetheatre.He wastheyoungersonofthe Comted’Artois,theKing’s brotherandfutureCharlesX, andthoughthemurderwas demonstrablytheworkofa lonefanaticintenton destroyingwhatremainedof theBourbonline,itunleashed ahugepoliticalbacklash,and policespiesworkedhardto unearthnewplots.24Inthe yearsthatfollowedthey devotedparticularattentionto theactivitiesoffreemasons, andsecretrepublican societiescallingthemselves Carbonariwhocombinedan enlightenedorprogressive viewofthestatewithataste forintrigueandconspiracy. Romanticsandneo-liberals wereamongthosemostprone togetcaughtupinsuch conspiracy,notleastthose whohadservedunderthe Emperorduringhismilitary career.ButtotheBourbons theyrepresentedan intolerablethreat,andthey weredeterminedtoeliminate everytraceofNapoleonic sympathies.Youthfulor romanticdreamingwasnot takenasanexcusebya governmentconcentratedon repression.TheFour SergeantsofLaRochelle, whohadbeenarrestedfor membershipofasecret societyandforplotting againstthemonarchyin1822, wereamongthemosthighprofilevictimsofthis juridicalcampaign. Denouncedtotheauthorities, theywereofferednoquarter, weresummarilycondemned todeath,andwereguillotined beforethepublic’sobvious sympathyforfourromantic youngsoldiersrisked becomingpoliticised.Their martyrdomcouldonlyplay intothehandsoftheliberal opposition.25 ThePariscrowdwas especiallyfearedbythe authoritiesinviewofitspast recordofpoliticalactivism, bothintheRevolutionand duringtheOldRegime. Disillusionmentwiththe restoredmonarchycombined withhighlevelsof unemploymenttoheighten theappealofthepast,and here,inthebarsanddrinking densofthecapital,thecultof Napoleonrapidlytookroot. Singingwasafavourite pastimeamongParisian workersatthetime:recalling hismemoriesofhisParisian youth,PierreVinçard describestheyearsaround 1818asatimewhensinging societies(orgoguettes)were beingestablishedinanumber ofworking-classdistricts. Thesesocieties,heexplains, weremainlycomposedof workers;theyoperatedfreely withtacitauthorisationfrom thelocalpolice,andthesongs theysangwerethosemost popularintheworkers’ repertoireoftheday, includingmanythatwere criticalofthegovernmentand theCatholicchurch.26Itwas atimewhensingingwas becomingincreasingly political,aformofpopular resistancetoauthority.And amongthesongsthatwere especiallypopularwere nostalgicdittiesaboutthe Empire,notablythosewritten byPierre-JeanBérangerand EmileDebraux,whosesong sheetscontributed significantlytothemoodof nostalgia.Theworkers’ voicesroseindenunciationof thearistocracyandofa Churchwhichtheysawasa rampartofthesocialelite; theysangtothememoryof Napoleonandofthearmies heled;andtheyturnedthe Napoleoniclegendagainstthe authorityoftherestored monarchy.Debraux’sverses abouthisexileonSaint HelenaandBéranger’s evocationsofthespiritofthe departedEmperorwere emotionallyhighlycharged; sentimentalsongsthat broughttearstotheeyes.27 Buttheywereasnothing comparedtoBéranger’smost powerfulandhauntinglyric, sungwithforceandpassion. Thetitle,inthe1820sor 1830s,calledforno explanation:‘Heisnotdead’. Orsotheywouldconvince themselvesastheyfantasised abouttheirEmperor’sreturn: Wesoldiersknow,thatfrom hisjailer-band Ashipatmidnightcarried himaway; Sincethen,disguised,through hisbelovedland Hewanders,lonely,hunted, daybyday. Thatwearyhorseman,with hisfurtiveglance, Thatpoacher,hidinginthe woodshishead, ’Tishe,perhaps;hecomesto rescueFrance! Itisnottrue,ohGod!Heis notdead!28 Wheresongsheetshelped politiciseworkersinthe towns,othersconsumedthe Napoleoniclegendinvisual form,throughpopular woodcutsandimages d’Epinal,thebrightly colouredimagesthatwereso popularintheFrench countrysideduringthefirst halfofthenineteenthcentury. Thefirstimages,producedin theVosgesbytheworkshop ofJean-CharlesPellerin,had dealtprimarilywithreligious subjectmatter,picturesof saintsandscenesfromthe Bible,alongwithmoraltales abouthumanbehaviour.By theearlynineteenthcentury thesehadbecomepartof popularculture,soldat marketsandcountryfairstoa largelypeasantaudience.And theirrangehadincreased exponentially,howevermuch theyreliedonastapleof traditionalthemesandwellwornvisualclichéslikeThe AgesofManandThe WanderingJew.Pellerinwas anadmirerofNapoleonand, withhisteamofartistsand engravers,devotedgreat energyafterthe1830 revolutiontopopularising imagesoftheEmpire.Those ofFrançoisGeorginare probablythebest-known:a seriesofdetailedbattle scenesthatevokedallthe gloryoftheimperialarmies, fromtheBattleofthe PyramidsduringtheEgyptian Campaignthroughtothe touchingmomentwhen Napoleontookhisfinalleave ofthearmyatFontainebleau. Thereweremorethanfortyin all,producedinlargeformat andofferingamemorable tributeinpicturestothe GrandeArmée.They representedgoodbusinessfor Pellerin,too,astheysoldin hugenumbersacrossthe countryandwerereprinted manytimesinthecourseof thecentury.Inthe countrysideespecially,they hadanimportantrolein spreadingtheimperial myth.29 After1830thecultofthe Emperorbecamemoreopen andrespectable;itwasno longersomethingthathadto bepractisedinsecret, concealedfromthe authorities.Hisformer soldiersnowspokeopenlyof theiraffectionforhim,in cafésandcerclesandinthose placeswhereoldsoldiersmet toreminisce.Hewasspoken ofwithaweaswellas affection,theawethat soldiershaveforagreat leader,butonewhomthey consideredasoneoftheir own.Hehadbroughtthem victory,respectandglory, andhadrewardedthemwith medalsandbattlehonours. Hehadledthemtotheendof Europe,totheendsofthe worldastheyknewit,and hadopenedtheireyesto differentculturesandexotic civilisations.Ithadbeen–as theysawittwentyyearslater –awonderfuladventure,a momentwhentheyhadbeen presentatthemakingof history.Eventhefactthatit hadendedindefeatand disappointment,andthat Napoleonhadlivedouthis finalyearsinsolitaryexile, addedtothepoignancyofhis legend,turningtheirEmperor intoyetanotherofthose tragicheroesofwarthe Frenchtreasuresomuch–a heroundonebyhisenemies, badlytreatedbyhiscaptors, andlefttorotanddieinthe dankwildernessofSaint Helena.Defeat,inother words,becamepartofhis legend,anecessaryingredient inaromantichero,andone thatplacedhim–asitwould intheschooltextbooksofthe ThirdRepublic–inthe exaltedcompanyofthose otherFrenchheroesand heroinesofwar,Roland, Duguesclin,BayardandJoan ofArc.30Inthepaintingsof theperiodthesecomparisons wereoftenmadequite explicitly,asinDelacroix’s greatcanvasonthedeathof CharlestheBoldbeforethe wallsofNancy,aworkthat hintedatthedangersof vaultingambitionandwas seenbymanyasadirect referencetoNapoleon’sown career.31 WiththefallofCharlesX in1830,thegovernmentno longerlivedinfearofthe Emperor’slegacy,andanew generationofpoliticalleaders competedforthehonourof appealingtohismemory. Theyactivelysoughttoshare inthepublicesteemthat flowedfromassociationswith theFirstEmpire,goingto ever-greaterlengthstolink thememoryoftheEmpireto theircurrentpoliticalcause. Followingthe1830 revolutiontheBourbon monarchyhadfinallyended, andpowerpassedtothe Orléanslineandtothe ‘bourgeoismonarchy’of Louis-Philippe.Thenewking hadreachedadulthoodaround theoutbreakoftheFrench Revolution,inwhichhis fatherhadbrieflybecomea popularherobeforebeing arrestedandguillotinedunder theTerror.Theson,however, didnotbreakwiththe Revolution,servingbravely asanofficerintherepublican armies,whichallowedhimto appearinlateryearsasaman ofcompromisewhocould, perhapsuniquely,unite warringfactionsandavoid unnecessarybloodshedafter 1830.32 Louis-Philippewaswell awareofthepowerof Napoleonicsymbolism,and hedidnothesitatetocultivate thenotionthathewasthereal heirtotheimperialtradition. Athiscoronationin1831he wasostentatiously surroundedbyfour Napoleonicmarshals;in1833 heapprovedtheplacingof Seurre’siconicstatueof NapoleonatoptheVendôme Column,apermanent remindertoParisiansofthe manwhohadoncebeentheir Emperor;in1836he inauguratedtheArcde Triompheatthetopofthe Champs-Elyséestohonour thememoryofthe Napoleoniclegions;andin 1837headmittedNapoleon tohisculturalshowpiece,the MuseumoftheHistoryof FranceatVersailles.33Even indeath,itseemed,Napoleon continuedtoexerciseasmuch influenceandfascinationover theFrenchpeople–civilians andoldsoldiersalike–ashe hadduringhislifetime.The hugeandexpectantcrowds thatlinedthebanksofthe Seinein1840towelcome theirEmperorhomebore eloquenttestimonytotheawe andaffectionthathestill commandedtwodecades afterhisdeath. Hisreputationasa strategistandbattlefield technicianalsoseemed secure,withpublicand professionalmemory focusingonhisvictories ratherthanhisdownfall.Itis interestingtolook,for instance,atthecourse programmesattheFrench militaryacademyatSaint-Cyr duringthe1880sand1890s,a timewhenthenewrepublican governmentfeltvulnerableto outsideattack.Despitethe intenselyrepublicanethosof theschool,andthe widespreadbeliefthat France’sdebacleinthe Franco-PrussianWarof1870 –whenanarmywidely believedtobethebestin Europehadbeenutterly overwhelmedbythe Prussiansinonlyafew weeks,leadingtoan ignominioussurrenderat Sedanandthecollapseofthe regime–hadbeencausedby theabandonmentofmass conscriptioninthecourseof thenineteenthcentury,itis interestingthattheFrench revolutionaryarmieswere presentedmoreasalessonin civicresponsibilityandpublic moralitythanasatactical exemplar.Valmywasseenas aclarioncalltoarms,notasa modelofbattlefieldtactics, andinthecourseonmilitary historytaughtontheeveof theFirstWorldWar,the royalarmyoftheeighteenth century,pre-revolutionary tacticsandthecampaignsof theFrenchRevolutionwere eachdismissedinasingle lesson.Afourthlessonwas devotedtothetransformation ofthearmyinItalyby Bonaparte;thenafurtherten sessionsweredevotedto Napoleon’scampaigns.34The professionalperceptionwas clear–thatherewasagreat Frenchgeneral,fromwhose tacticsandapproachtowar therewasstillmuchtobe learned.Ifhewasfinally overwhelmedbysuperior numbers,hestillhadhis placewiththegreatgenerals ofhistory,amongwhomthey countedAlexandertheGreat fromtheAncientworldand FredericktheGreatfromtheir own. Thatisalso,largely,how thepublicseeshim,even today;andhowthehistoryof theEmpirecontinuestobe presentedinart,inthe galleriesoftheLouvreorin theGreatGalleryat Versailles.35Ofcoursethere isatendencyinanycountry tocelebratevictoriesrather thanbemoandefeats, especiallyinhistorypainting, sothisimbalancemaynot seemsosurprising.But thoughNapoleonwas defeatedatWaterloo,itis interestingtoreflectonhow thatbattlefieldispresentedto thevisitortoday,andonwhat itisthatthetouristswho flocktherewantandexpectto see.NeitherWellingtonnor Blücherisreallythemain attraction.TheButte,the moundconstructedin1826to commemoratethebattlewith theLionofWaterlooatits summit,andtosomedegree alsothemuseumandvisitor centreonthebattlefield,are dedicatedprincipallytothe memoryoftheFrench,andof theGreatManwhose imperialadventureended there.TheclassicBelgian travelguidebyFierensGevaertexpressesthis admirably:‘Thereisnoplace moresuitedtodreamingof themajestyofNapoleon,to evokingthelegendary grandeurofhisreign,to appreciatingwithalookinto thepasttheepictaskofhis soldiers,thanthesummitof thistriangulartombraisedon thecorpseofimperial heroism.Ihaveseenmany visitors,scorningtheirguides, sunkinprolonged contemplationofthemighty battlefield.Rarelyhavethey turnedtowardsWaterlooand theheightsoccupiedby Wellington;almostalways, theireyeswerefixedonthe bluishhazeofthehorizon wheretheimperialglory finallyfaded.’Forthe museumanditsvisitors,as forEuropeanmemorymore generally,Waterloowas aboutNapoleon,hisdefeat, andthebeginningofhis myth.36 Andsoitremainsforour owntimes,andnotonlyfor France.JustasNapoleon remainedoneofthetowering influencesinnineteenthcenturyliterature,sohe wouldbetranslatedintothe massmediaofthetwentieth, andespeciallytocinema,asa tragicheroandagiantonthe Europeanstage.Sincethe greatsilentmoviebyAbel Ganceinthe1920s,through tomodernFrenchcinemaand Hollywood,theEmperorhas continuedtofascinateand confoundaudiencesacross theglobe.TheNapoleonic Warsfeaturedinmanyofthe filmsproducedinEurope betweenthetwoworldwars, whenparallelscouldreadily bedrawnbetweenthe NapoleonicEmpireandthe problemsofthepresent.In thisperiodnofewerthan fifty-fivefilmsonthesubject weremadeinGermany, considerablymorethanin eitherFranceorBritain.All nationsdrewontheperiodto glorifytheirnational histories,withNapoleon presentedeitherastheheroof thenationorasthegreatest threattolibertyandnational identity.AudiencesinFrance, forinstance,enjoyedliterary filmsaboutNapoleonand glorifiedaccountsofveterans oftheGrandeArmée.But Germanywasacaseapart,a countrybecalmedbypolitical andsocietalcrisis,andhere theWarsofLiberation againstNapoleonbecame criticalpointsofreference. Asthecontemporaryfilm historianOskarKalbus explained,onereasonforthis interestliesinthe uncertaintiesoflifeunderthe WeimarRepublicandthe ThirdReich,asaresultof which‘sentimentismore receptivetothegreatepochs ofhistoryandtheirmen’.The entryofNapoleonontothe Europeanstage,withthe destructionand reconstructionitcaused,was onesuch‘greatepochof history’.37 Napoleonalsolefta significantpoliticallegacy thatcontinuedtoresonatein Franceandwouldinspire popularinsurrectionsabroad, especiallyinCentraland LatinAmerica.Bonapartism remainedastrongpolitical traditioninFrance,onethat wasrevivednotonly(and mostobviously)byNapoleon IIIbutalso,indifferentways, byGeneralBoulangerinthe 1880sandbyPhilippePétain andCharlesdeGaulleinthe twentiethcentury.Theideaof linkingstrongpersonal authoritytopopularsupport, toaleaderthrownupbythe people,whowouldrule withoutconstantinterference fromintermediarybodiesor electedpoliticians,becamean accepted,ifformanyrather threatening,themeinmodern Frenchpolitics.38IftheJuly Monarchywastemptedto playonNapoleon’smemory inordertocurryfavourwith theelectorate,itwasplaying withfire.In1848,elections wereheldforthepresidency ofthenewlydeclaredSecond Republic,electionswhichfor thefirsttimeinvolved universalmanhoodsuffrage. Theresultwasstaggering. ThepopularappealofLouisNapoleonBonaparte–the appealinherentinhisgreatuncle’sname–wassogreat thattheothercandidateswere sweptaside,andhewas electedbyasubstantial majority.Threeyearslater,in 1851,hewouldimitatethe greatNapoleonbystaginghis owncoupd’état, overthrowingtheRepublicto declareasecondempire. Buttheretheparallel stops.Louis-Napoleonhad noneoftheincisivenessof thefirstEmperor,noclear visionofthepolicieshe wishedtopursue.Hehad littleofthepersonal charisma,either,thathad contributedsomuchto Napoleon’ssuccess.Acoup thatwasderidedbyKarl Marxasthe‘Eighteenth BrumaireofLouisBonaparte’ didnotheraldareturnto internationalglory,asLouisNapoleon’ssupportershad hoped.Republicanswere horrifiedtoberobbedofthe politicalgainstheyhad foughtsohardtoachieve,and acrossFrancepeopletookup arms,proclaiming revolutionarycommissionsin overahundredcommunes andclashingviolently, sometimesbloodily,with troopsandgendarmes. Repressionfollowed,and,if exceptionismadeforParis,it resultedinthemostruthless politicalpurgebetweenthe JacobinTerrorof1794and theResistancemovement duringtheSecondWorld War.39Therewouldbeno triumphantsecondcomingin 1851.Ifhistorydidrepeat itself,asMarxinferred,it repeateditselfasfarce.40 Notes 1:PARIS,1840 1.JeanTulard,‘LeRetour desCendres’,inPierre Nora(ed.),Leslieuxde mémoire,partII:La Nation,vol.3(Paris, 1986),p.103. 2.JeanBoisson,LeRetour desCendres(Paris,1973), pp.11–13. 3.AndréDesfeuilles,Autour d’uncentenairemanqué (Paris,1950),p.3. 4.CharlesdeRémusat, quotedinMichaelPaul Driskel,AsBefitsa Legend.BuildingaTomb forNapoleon,1840–61 (Kent,Ohio,1993),p.56. 5.Jean-MarcelHumbert (ed.),Napoléonaux Invalides.1840,Le RetourdesCendres (Paris,1990),pp.11–12. 6.Driskel,AsBefitsa Legend,pp.1–2. 7.ToddPorterfield,‘Staging thefuture’,inTodd PorterfieldandSusanL. Siegfried,Staging Empire.Napoleon,Ingres andDavid(University Park,Pennsylvania, 2006),p.185. 8.DecreeofLouis-Philippe, 10June1840. 9.AdolpheThiers,quotedin GilbertMartineau,Le RetourdesCendres(Paris 1990),p.88. 10.FrançoisGuizot,quoted inMartineau,Retour,p. 88. 11.LordPalmerston,quoted inMartineau,Retour,p. 89. 12.FernandBeaucour,Le RetourdesCendresde Napoléon:sescauseset saportéepolitique(Paris, 1991),p.9. 13.Martineau,Retour,p. 107. 14.Marie-Françoise HuyghuesdesEtages, ‘L’expéditionmaritimeet fluviale’,inHumbert (ed.),Napoléonaux Invalides,p.33. 15.Boisson,Retourdes Cendres,p.14. 16.Rémi-JulienGuillard, RetourdesCendresde Napoléon.Procès-verbal d’exhumationdesrestes del’empereurNapoléon (Paris,1841),pp.1–2. 17.Ibid.,p.3. 18.Martineau,Retour,p. 125. 19.Boisson,Retourdes Cendres,p.326. 20.GeorgesPoisson, L’aventureduRetourdes Cendres(Paris,2004),p. 231. 21.Boisson,Retourdes Cendres,p.397. 22.André-JeanTudesq,‘Le refletdonnéparla presse’,inHumbert(ed.), NapoléonauxInvalides, p.88. 23.FrançoiseWaquet,Les fêtesroyalessousla Restauration(Paris, 1981),p.78. 24.Iowethisdescription, andmuchofthedetailof theprocessionthat follows,toJean-Marcel Humbert,‘Leparcours parisienetsondécor’,in Humbert(ed.),Napoléon auxInvalides,pp.49–70. 25.Ibid.,pp.52–53. 26.Ibid.,p.71. 27.Boisson,Retourdes Cendres,p.430. 28.Ibid.,pp.448–49. 29.JérémieBenoît,Agnès DelannoyandAlain Pougetoux,Napoléon.Le RetourdesCendres, 1840–1990(Courbevoie, 1990),p.143. 30.Ibid.,pp.144–48. 31.Ibid.,pp.132–34. 2:CORSICAN BEGINNINGS 1.StephenWilson,Feuding, ConflictandBanditryin Nineteenth-Century Corsica(Cambridge, 1988),pp.14–15. 2.Ibid.,p.91. 3.Ibid.,p.16. 4.ThaddE.Hall,Franceand theEighteenth-century CorsicanQuestion(New York,1971),passim. 5.Ibid.,p.102. 6.Antoine-MarieGraziani, PascalPaoli(Paris, 2004),pp.103–11. 7.MichelVergé-Franceschi, Napoléon,uneenfance corse(Paris,2009),p.87. 8.WilliamDoyle, Aristocracyandits EnemiesintheAgeof Revolution(Oxford, 2009),pp.56–57. 9.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon(Paris,2004), pp.21–22 10.Doyle,Aristocracy,p. 224. 11.JeanDefranceschi, ‘CharlesBonaparte’,in JeanTulard(ed.). DictionnaireNapoléon(2 vols,Paris,1999),vol.1, p.273. 12.LouisMadelin,La jeunessedeBonaparte (Paris,1937),p.36. 13.StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APoliticalLife (NewYork,2004),pp. 24–25. 14.ArthurChuquet,La jeunessedeNapoléon (Paris,1897),p.45. 15.PierreBranda,Leprixde lagloire.Napoléonet l’argent(Paris,2007),p. 18. 16.JosephValynseele, ‘Bonaparte,généalogie’, inTulard(ed.), DictionnaireNapoléon, vol.1,p.258. 17.EricLeNabour,Letizia Bonaparte.Lamère exemplairedeNapoléon Ier(Paris,2003),pp.36– 37. 18.JeanandNicole Dhombres,LazareCarnot (Paris,1997),pp.225–28. 19.JamesMarshallCornwall,Napoleonas MilitaryCommander (London,1967),p.15. 20.ChristianAmalvi,Les hérosdel’histoirede France(Toulouse,2001), p.69. 21.ChristianAmalvi,Les hérosdel’histoirede France(Toulouse,2001), p.69. 22.JamesBoswell,Étatde laCorse(Paris,1769), reprintedMarseille,1977. 23.Bonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.51. 24.NapoléonBonaparte, ‘SurlaCorse’,inOeuvres littérairesetécrits militaires,ed.JeanTulard (3vols,Paris,2001),vol. 1,p.42. 25.Madelin,Lajeunessede Napoléon,pp.49–50. 26.Marshall-Cornwall, NapoleonasMilitary Commander,p.16. 27.NapoléonBonaparte, Correspondance générale,editedby ThierryLentz,vol.1:Les apprentissages,1784–97 (Paris,2004),pp.1339– 45. 28.AntoineCasanova, Napoléonetlapenséede sontemps:unehistoire intellectuellesingulière (Paris,2000),p.28. 29.PhilipDwyer,Napoleon. ThePathtoPower,1769– 1799(London,2007),p. 46. 30.NapoléonBonaparte, ‘DéfensedeRousseau’,in Oeuvreslittéraireset écritsmilitaires,ed.Jean Tulard(3vols,Paris, 2001),vol.1,p.52. 31.CitedinEnglund, Napoleon,p.30. 32.NadaTomiche,Napoléon écrivain(Paris,1952),p. 209. 33.NapoléonBonaparte, SouperdeBeaucaire, texteprésentéparJacques Bainville(Paris,1930). 34.AnnieJourdan, Napoléon,héros, imperator,mécène(Paris, 1998),p.59. 3:SONOFTHE REVOLUTION 1.JamesMarshall-Cornwall, NapoleonasMilitary Commander,p.18. 2.Ibid.,p.19. 3.NapoléonBonaparte,letter toJosephBonaparte,22 July1789, Correspondance générale,vol.1,pp.78– 79. 4.NapoléonBonaparte,letter toJosephBonaparte,9 August1789, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.81. 5.NapoléonBonaparte,letter toPascalPaoli,12June 1789,Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.76. 6.AntoineCasanovaetAnge Rovere,LaRévolution françaiseenCorse (Toulouse,1989),pp. 118–22. 7.StevenEnglund, Napoleon,pp.43–44. 8.NapoléonBonaparte, ‘LettreàMatteo Buttafuoco’,inOeuvres littéraires(3vols,Paris, 1888),vol.1,p.154. 9.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon(Paris,2006),p. 49. 10.ArchivesNationales,DIVbis6,Comitéde Division,Corsica;decree ofNationalAssemblyon thedivisionofFranceinto departments,9December 1789. 11.PhilipDwyer,Napoleon. ThePathtoPower,1769– 1799(London,2007),p. 128. 12.JeanTulard,Napoléonet lanoblessed’Empire (Paris,1979),pp.17–18. 13.NapoléonBonaparte, lettertoJoseph Bonaparte,22June1792, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.113. 14.Migliorini,Napoléon,p. 58. 15.SamuelF.Scott,The ResponseoftheRoyal ArmytotheFrench Revolution(Oxford, 1978),p.109. 16.AlanForrest,The SoldiersoftheFrench Revolution(Durham, NorthCarolina,1990), pp.15–25. 17.DavidA.Bell,TheFirst TotalWar.Napoleon’s EuropeandtheBirthof WarfareasWeKnowIt (London,2007). 18.PascalDupuyandClaude Mazauric,LaRévolution française.Regards d’auteurs(Paris,2005), pp.173–81. 19.JohnA.Lynn,‘Towards anArmyofHonor:The MoralEvolutionofthe FrenchArmy,1789– 1815’,FrenchHistorical Studies16(1989),pp. 152–73. 20.J.DavidMarkham,‘The EarlyYearsandFirst Commands’,inPhilip Haythornthwaiteetal., Napoleon:TheFinal Verdict(London,1996), p.22. 21.Jean-PierreBois, Dumouriez,héroset proscrit(Paris,2005),pp. 324–29. 22.NapoléonBonaparte, SouperdeBeaucaire (Paris,1930),p.44. 23.BernardIreland,TheFall ofToulon.TheLast OpportunitytoDefeatthe FrenchRevolution (London,2005),pp.301– 02. 24.SpenserWilkinson,The RiseofGeneral Bonaparte(Oxford, 1930),pp.19–26. 25.Dwyer,Napoleon.The PathtoPower,p.144. 26.NapoléonBonaparte, lettertodeputiesAlbitte, RicordandSaliceti,12 August1794, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.198. 27.Markham,‘TheEarly YearsandFirst Commands’,pp.27–28. 28.BronislawBaczko, Commentsortirdela Terreur.Thermidoretla Révolution(Paris,1989), chapter2,‘Lafindel’an II’. 29.‘Paul-François-JeanNicolasBarras’,inAlfred Fierro,AndréPalluelGuillardandJeanTulard (eds),Histoireet DictionnaireduConsulat etdel’Empire(Paris, 1995),p.522. 30.‘Chronologie,1795’,in NapoléonBonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.1352. 31.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 74–77. 32.MatthewShaw, ‘ReactionstotheFrench RepublicanCalendar’, FrenchHistory15(2001), pp.4–25;James Friguglietti,‘Gilbert Rommeandthemaking oftheFrenchRepublican Calendar’,inD.G.Troyansky,A.CismaruandN. Andrewsjnr(eds),The FrenchRevolutionin CultureandSociety (Westport,Connecticut, 1991),pp.13–22. 33.GeorgeRudé,TheCrowd intheFrenchRevolution (Oxford,1959),pp.176– 77. 34.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 83–87. 35.‘Joséphine(MarieJoseph-RosedeTascher delaPagerie)’,inJean Tulard(ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon,vol.2,p.86. 36.ChristopherHibbert, Napoleon.HisWivesand Women(NewYork, 2002),pp.10–14 37.Severaleditionshave appearedofNapoleon’s loveletterstoJosephine. Amongthemorerecentis JeanTulard(ed.), Napoléon.Lettres d’amouràJoséphine (Paris,1981). 38.FrankMcLynn, Napoleon.ABiography (NewYork,1997), 39.GeoffreyEllis,Napoleon (London,1997),pp.26– 27. 4:BONAPARTEINITALY 1.EmmanueldeLasCases, LeMémorialdeSainteHélène,MarcelDunan, ed.(Paris,1951),pp. 117–18. 2.GeoffreyEllis,Napoleon, pp.22–23. 3.NapoléonBonaparte,letter toJosephBonaparte,20 October1795, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.271. 4.NapoléonBonaparte,letter toJosephBonaparte,1 November1795, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.273. 5.StevenEnglund, Napoleon,p.198. 6.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon,p.86. 7.Jean-PaulBertaud,La Révolutionarmée.Les soldats-citoyensdela RévolutionFrançaise (Paris,1979),pp.174–76. 8.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 99–100. 9.AlanForrest,TheSoldiers oftheFrenchRevolution, pp.126–44. 10.MartinBoycott-Brown, TheRoadtoRivoli. Napoleon’sFirst Campaign(London, 2001),p.44. 11.NapoléonBonaparte, lettertoChauvet, commissaireordonnateur enchef,inGenoa,27 March1796, Correspondance générale,vol.1,p.301. 12.PhilipDwyer,Napoleon: ThePathtoPower,1769– 1799(London,2007),pp. 200–01. 13.JeanThiry,Bonaparteen Italie,1796–1797(Paris, 1973),p.351. 14.SpenserWilkinson,The RiseofGeneral Bonaparte(Oxford, 1930),p.80. 15.Englund,Napoleon,p. 100. 16.NapoléonBonaparte, Oeuvreslittéraireset écritsmilitaires,ed.Jean Tulard(Paris,2001),vol. 3,p.109. 17.Afullaccountof Napoleon’smilitary campaigninItalycanbe foundinAlanSchom, NapoleonBonaparte (NewYork,1997),pp. 43–60. 18.JeanTulard,Napoléon. Lesgrandsmomentsd’un destin(Paris,2006),p.97. 19.Wilkinson,TheRiseof GeneralBonaparte,p. 142. 20.RobertB.Holtman, NapoleonicPropaganda (BatonRouge,Louisiana, 1950),pp.244–45. 21.MarcMartin,‘Journaux d’arméesautempsdela Convention’,Annales historiquesdela Révolutionfrançaise44 (1972),pp.567–605. 22.Dwyer,Napoleon:The PathtoPower,pp.306– 08. 23.PhilipG.Dwyer, ‘NapoleonBonaparteas HeroandSaviour.Image, RhetoricandBehaviourin theConstructionofa Legend’,FrenchHistory 18(2004),p.386. 24.Jean-PaulBertaud, Guerreetsociétéen FrancedeLouisXIVà NapoléonIer(Paris, 1998),p.147. 25.NadaTomiche,Napoléon écrivain(Paris,1952),p. 206. 26.AlanForrest, ‘Propagandaandthe LegitimationofPowerin NapoleonicFrance’, FrenchHistory18(2004), p.433. 27.JeremyD.Popkin,The Right-WingPressin France,1792–1800 (ChapelHill,North Carolina,1980),p.22. 28.WayneHanley,The GenesisofNapoleonic Propaganda,1796to 1799(NewYork,2005), pp.48–49. 29.JournaldeBonaparteet deshommesvertueux, issue1,18February 1797. 30.Ibid.,issue8,27 February1797. 31.Jean-YvesLeclercq,‘Le mythedeBonapartesous leDirectoire,1796–1799’ (mémoiredemaîtrise, UniversitédeParis-I, 1991),p.162. 32.Dwyer,Napoleon:The PathtoPower,p.319. 33.DavidO’Brien,Afterthe Revolution:Antoine-Jean Gros,Paintingand Propagandaunder Napoleon(University Park,Pennsylvania, 2006),p.39. 34.Hanley,TheGenesisof NapoleonicPropaganda, p.132. 35.Dwyer,Napoleon:The PathtoPower,pp.471– 72. 5:LUREOFTHEORIENT 1.NapoléonBonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.2–La campagned’Egypteet l’Avènement(Paris, 2005),p.38. 2.YvesLaissus,Description del’Egypte.Uneaventure humaineetéditoriale (Paris,2009),p.7. 3.PhilipG.Dwyer, Napoleon.ThePathto Power,1769–99p.30. 4.Louis-AntoineFauveletde Bourrienne,Mémoiresde M.deBourrienne, ministred’état,sur Napoléon,vol.2(Paris, 1831),p.226. 5.RobinHarris,Talleyrand. BetrayerandSaviourof France(London,2007), p.99. 6.EmmanueldeWaresquiel, Talleyrand,leprince immobile(Paris,2003),p. 243. 7.VivantDenon,Voyage danslaBasseetlaHaute Egyptependantles campagnesdugénéral Bonaparte,with introductionbyRaoul Brunon(Paris,1990),p. 57. 8.Jean-MarcelHumbert, ‘Introduction’,in Bonaparteetl’Egypte: feuetlumières,exhibition catalogue(Paris,2008), pp.40–43. 9.StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APolitical Life,p.127. 10.Afulllistofthebooks Napoleontookwithhim toEgyptcanbefoundin LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon(Paris,2006),p. 149. 11.Jean-PaulBertaud, ChoderlosdeLaclos (Paris,2003),pp.512–13. 12.FrankMcLynn, Napoleon:ABiography (NewYork,1997),p. 161. 13.Englund,Napoleon,p. 127. 14.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon,p.150. 15.Bonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.2,p.311. 16.HenryLaurens(ed.), L’Expéditiond’Egypte, 1798–1801(Paris,1989), pp.30–32. 17.Dwyer,Napoleon.The PathtoPower,1769–99, p.343. 18.TimothyWilson-Smith, NapoleonandhisArtists (London,1996),p.75. 19.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 127–28. 20.EdwardSaid, Orientalism(NewYork, 1978);seeJuanCole, Napoleon’sEgypt. InvadingtheMiddleEast (NewYork,2007),p. 246. 21.RobertAsprey,TheRise andFallofNapoleon Bonaparte(2vols,New York,2000),vol.1,The Rise,pp.310–12. 22.Jean-YvesLeclercq,‘Le mythedeBonapartesous leDirectoire,1796–99’ (mémoiredemaîtrise, UniversitédeParis-I, 1991),pp.82–85. 23.AlanForrest, ‘Propagandaandthe LegitimationofPowerin NapoleonicFrance’, FrenchHistory18(2004), p.433. 24.FrédéricRégent, ‘L’expéditiond’Egypte deBonapartevueparla presseparisienne,1798– 99’(mémoiredemaîtrise, UniversitédeParis-I, 1992),p.40.The quotationisfromLa Décadephilosophique. 25.Wilson-Smith,Napoleon andhisArtists,p.79. 26.DavidO’Brien,Afterthe Revolution:Antoine-Jean Gros,Paintingand Propagandaunder Napoleon(University Park,Pennsylvania, 2006),pp.131,136. 27.Ibid.,pp.90–91. 28.Laissus,Descriptionde l’Egypte.Uneaventure humaineetéditoriale,pp. 25–27. 29.Régent,‘L’expédition d’EgyptedeBonaparte’, p.42. 30.NellyHanna,‘Ottoman EgyptandtheFrench Expedition:SomeLongtermTrends’,inIreneA. Bierman(ed.),Napoleon inEgypt(Reading,2003), p.11. 31.Jean-PaulBertaud, ‘Kléber,Jean-Baptiste’,in Tulard(ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon,vol.2,pp. 116–17. 32.Jean-EdouardGoby, ‘Menou,Jacques-François deBoussay,baronde’,in Tulard(ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon,vol.2,pp. 301–03. 33.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 139–40. 34.Cole,Napoleon’sEgypt, p.245. 6:FIRSTCONSUL 1.NapoléonBonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.2–La campagned’Egypteet l’Avènement,p.1088. 2.PhilipDwyer,Napoleon: ThePathtoPower,1769– 1799p.444. 3.JuanCole,Napoleon’s Egypt.Invadingthe MiddleEastp.244. 4.JacquesBainville, Napoléon(Paris,1931; nouvelleéditionavec préfacedePatrice Gueniffey,Paris,2005), p.129. 5.Bonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.2,p.1089. 6.StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APolitical Life,p.153. 7.JeanTulard,Napoleon: TheMythoftheSaviour (London,1984). 8.Ibid.,p.70–71. 9.Bonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.2,pp. 1089–90. 10.PatriceGueniffey,Le dix-huitBrumaire: l’épiloguedela Révolutionfrançaise (Paris,2008),pp.160–61. 11.BronislawBaczko,‘Une passionthermidorienne: larevanche’,inPolitiques delaRévolution Française(Paris,2008), pp.165–338. 12.BernardGainot,1799,un nouveaujacobinisme? (Paris,2001),p.268. 13.IsserWoloch,Jacobin Legacy:TheDemocratic Movementunderthe Directory(Princeton, NewJersey,1970),pp. 134–36. 14.JosephFouché, Mémoires,ed.Michel Vovelle(Paris,1992),p. 93. 15.GermainedeStaël, Considérationssurla Révolutionfrançaise(2 vols,Paris,1818),vol.2, p.4;thetranslationis takenfromMalcolm Crook,NapoleonComes toPower.Democracyand Dictatorshipin RevolutionaryFrance, 1795–1804(Cardiff, 1998),pp.100–01. 16.JeanTulard,Le18 Brumaire.Comment terminerunerévolution (Paris,1999),pp.9–10, 13–29. 17.D.J.Goodspeed, BayonetsatSaint-Cloud: TheStoryofthe18th Brumaire(London, 1965),p.107. 18.Crook,NapoleonComes toPower,pp.1–3. 19.Jean-LucSuissa,‘Lucien Bonaparte’,inJean Tulard(ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon,vol.2,p.227. 20.Jacques-OlivierBoudon, HistoireduConsulatetde l’Empire(Paris,2000),p. 457. 21.Ibid.,p.46. 22.Gueniffey,Ledix-huit Brumaire,p.308. 23.AlbertVandal, L’Avènementde Bonaparte,vol.1–La genèseduConsulat, Brumaireetla Constitutiondel’anVIII (Paris,1902),pp.408–09. 24.ThierryLentz,LeGrand Consulat,1799–1804 (Paris,1999),p.151. 25.JeffreyKaplow,Elbeuf duringtheRevolutionary Period:Historyand SocialStructure (Baltimore,Maryland, 1964),pp.254–55. 26.FrançoisFuret,La Révolution,1–1770– 1814(Paris,1988),p. 383. 27.Lentz,LeGrand Consulat,p.74. 28.QuotedinMartynLyons, Franceunderthe Directory(Cambridge, 1975),p.233. 29.QuotedinCrook, NapoleonComesto Power,p.117. 30.JeanTulard,Napoleon: TheMythoftheSaviour, pp.86–87. 31.IreneCollins,Napoleon andhisParliaments, 1800–1815(London, 1979),p.11. 32.Crook,NapoleonComes toPower,p.66. 33.Jean-PaulBertaud,La FrancedeNapoléon, 1799–1815(Paris,1987), pp.32–33. 34.Lentz,LeGrand Consulat,pp.118–19. 35.Jacques-OlivierBoudon, ‘L’incarnationdel’Etat deBrumaireàFloréal’,in Jean-PierreJessenne (ed.),DuDirectoireau Consulat.3:Brumaire dansl’histoiredulien politiqueetdel’EtatNation(Rouen,2001),pp. 333–34. 36.MalcolmCrook, ElectionsintheFrench Revolution(Cambridge, 1996),pp.190–91. 37.ClaudeLanglois,‘Le plébiscitedel’anVIIou lecoupd’étatdu18 pluviôseanVIII’, Annaleshistoriquesdela Révolutionfrançaise, 1972. 38.MichaelBroers,‘Internal Conquest,1799–1804:the DomesticHistoryofthe Consulate’,inVittorio ScottiDouglas(ed.), L’Europascopre Napoleone,1793–1804(2 vols,Alessandria,1999), vol.2,p.1030. 39.HowardBrown,Ending theFrenchRevolution: Violence,Justiceand RepressionFromthe TerrortoNapoleon (Charlottesville,Virginia, 2006),pp.308–24. 40.DavidChandler, ‘AdjustingtheRecord: NapoleonandMarengo’, inScottiDouglas(ed.), L’Europascopre Napoleone,1793–1804, vol.2,p.864. 41.CliveChurch,Revolution andRedTape:The FrenchMinisterial Bureaucracy,1770–1850 (Oxford,1981),esp.pp. 145–74. 42.NicholasRichardson, TheFrenchPrefectoral Corps,1814–1830 (Cambridge,1966),p.2. 43.AnnieJourdan,L’empire deNapoléon(Paris, 2000),pp.233–34. 44.GeorgesLefebvre, Napoleon.From18 BrumairetoTilsit (London,1969),p.152. 45.Jacques-OlivierBoudon, L’épiscopatfrançaisà l’époqueconcordataire, 1802–1905(Paris,1996), pp.11–14 46.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 180–85. 47.ClaudeDucourtial, ‘Introduction’,to NapoléonetlaLégion d’honneur,exhibition cataloguepublishedasa specialissueofLa Cohorte(Paris,1968),p. 3. 48.PierreBrandaand ThierryLentz,Napoléon, l’esclavageetlescolonies (Paris,2006),p.236. 49.CarolynFick,The MakingofHaiti:The Saint-Domingue RevolutionfromBelow (Knoxville,Tennessee, 1990),p.236. 50.YvesBenot,Ladémence colonialesousNapoléon (Paris,1992),pp.101–02. 51.SylvainPagé, L’AmériqueduNordet Napoléon(Paris,2003), pp.76–77. 52.Dwyer,Napoleon,pp. 506–07. 53.ChristopherHibbert, Napoleon.HisWivesand Women,p.106. 7:FROMCONSULATETO EMPIRE 1.IsserWoloch,Napoleon andhisCollaborators: TheMakingofa Dictatorship(NewYork, 2001),pp.186–87. 2.StuartSemmel,Napoleon andtheBritish(New Haven,Connecticut, 2004),p.20. 3.Ibid.,p.33. 4.Jean-LouisHalperin, ‘Tribunat’,inJeanTulard (ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon(2vols,Paris, 1999),vol.2,p.873. 5.Woloch,Napoleonandhis Collaborators,pp.123– 24. 6.DuffCooper,Talleyrand (London,1958),pp.82– 83. 7.JosephFouché,The MemoirsofJoseph Fouché,DukeofOtranto, MinisteroftheGeneral PoliceofFrance(2vols, London,1896),vol.1,p. 1. 8.JeanTulard,Figures d’Empire(Paris,2005),p. 631. 9.MartynLyons,Napoleon BonaparteandtheLegacy oftheFrenchRevolution (London,1994),p.118. 10.JeanTulard,Joseph Fouché(Paris,1998),p. 142. 11.MarcelLeClère, ‘Fouché’,inTulard(ed.), DictionnaireNapoléon, vol..1,pp.818–19. 12.HubertCole,Fouché,the UnprincipledPatriot (London,1971),p.121. 13.HowardG.Brown, EndingtheFrench Revolution:Violence, JusticeandRepression fromtheTerrorto Napoleon,pp.326–29. 14.Woloch,Napoleonand hisCollaborators,pp.66– 79. 15.ThierryLentz,LedixhuitBrumaire.Lescoups d’étatdeNapoléon Bonaparte(Paris,1997), p.411. 16.ElizabethSparrow, SecretService:British AgentsinFrance,1792– 1815(Woodbridge, 1999),p.267. 17.AlanSchom,Napoleon Bonaparte(NewYork, 1997),pp.273–81. 18.ThierryLentz,LeGrand Consulat,1799–1804,p. 537. 19.Jean-PaulBertaud,Le ducd’Enghien(Paris, 2001),pp.11–12. 20.NapoléonBonaparte, Correspondance générale,vol.4:Ruptures etfondation,1803–1804 (Paris,2007),p.648. 21.Lentz,LeGrand Consulat,p.540. 22.Chateaubriand, Mémoiresd’outre-tombe, quotedbyLuigiMascilli Migliorini,Napoléon,p. 236. 23.ComtedeLasCases,Le mémorialdeSainteHélène,editedbyMarcel Dunan(2vols,Paris, 1951),vol.2,pp.622– 629. 24.RobertAsprey,TheRise andFallofNapoleon Bonaparte,vol.1,p.344. 25.Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau,Mémoires, 1799–1815(Paris,1913), pp.70–71. 26.Jean-Jacques Cambacérès,Mémoires inédits,editedby LaurenceChatelde Brancion(2vols,Paris, 1999),vol.1,p.633. 27.MalcolmCrook, ‘Confianced’enbas, manipulationd’enhaut:la pratiqueplébiscitairesous Napoléon,1799–1815’,in PhilippeBourdin,JeanClaudeCaronand MathiasBernard(eds), L’incidentélectoraldela RévolutionFrançaiseàla VeRépublique(ClermontFerrand,2002),pp.77– 87. 28.StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APolitical Life,p.219. 29.Thibaudeau,Mémoires, p.69. 30.Napoleon’smessageto theSenate,3August 1802,inMalcolmCrook, NapoleonComesto Power,p.134. 31.ChristopherHibbert, Napoleon,HisWivesand Women,p.75. 32.PhilipG.Dwyer, ‘NapoleonBonaparteas HeroandSaviour.Image, RhetoricandBehaviourin theConstructionofa Legend’,FrenchHistory 18(2004),pp.391–93. 33.Hibbert,Napoleon,His WivesandWomen,p. 118. 34.WilliamH.C.Smith,The Bonapartes.TheHistory ofaDynasty(London, 2005),pp.19–20. 35.LouisdeFontanes, ParallèleentreCésar, Cromwell,Monket Bonaparte,fragment traduitdel’anglais(Paris, 1800). 36.RogerBarny,‘L’image deCromwelldansla Révolutionfrançaise’, Dix-huitièmesiècle25 (1993),pp.387–97. 37.AnnieJourdan,‘La Hollandeentant qu’<objetdedésir>etle RoiLouis,fondateur d’unemonarchie nationale’,inidem(ed.), LouisBonaparte,Roide Hollande(Paris,2010), pp.28–29. 38.VincentHaegele, NapoléonetJoseph Bonaparte.Lepouvoiret l’ambition(Paris,2010), pp.73–74. 39.Ibid.,p.171. 40.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon,p.233. 41.ArchivesMunicipalesde Nantes,I1–29,dossiers 18–20,22. 42.PeterBurke,The FabricationofLouisXIV (NewHaven, Connecticut,1992),pp. 71–83. 43.Thibaudeau,Mémoires, pp.121–22. 44.Englund,Napoleon,p. 230. 45.Crook,NapoleonComes toPower,p.134. 46.Schom,Napoleon Bonaparte,pp.336–41. 47.Lentz,LeGrand Consulat,pp.568–69. 48.Schom,Napoleon Bonaparte,p.336. 49.ErnestJohnKnapton, EmpressJosephine (Cambridge,Mass., 1964),p.227. 50.SylvainLaveissière,Le sacredeNapoléonpeint parDavid(Paris,2004), p.48. 51.JeanTulard(ed.), Napoléon:leSacre(Paris, 1993),p.xxxix. 52.TimothyWilson-Smith, Napoleon,ManofWar, ManofPeace(London, 2002),pp.161–62. 53.E.E.Y.Hales,Revolution andPapacy,1769–1846 (London,1960),pp.165– 66. 54.Ibid.,p.159. 55.Laveissière,Lesacrede Napoléonpeintpar David,p.50. 56.Proclamationofthe ConsulstotheFrench Peopleof15December 1799,inJohnHall Stewart,ADocumentary SurveyoftheFrench Revolution(NewYork, 1951),p.780. 57.JeanandNicole Dhombres,LazareCarnot (Paris,1997),pp.503–08. 8:QUESTFORGLORY 1.ThierryLentz,LeGrand Consulat,1799–1804 (Paris,1999),p.298. 2.ChristopherD.Hall, BritishStrategyinthe NapoleonicWar,1803–15 (Manchester,1992),p.2. 3.See,forinstance,Charles Esdaile,TheWarsof Napoleon(London, 1995),esp.pp.29–36. 4.PaulSchroeder,The Transformationof EuropeanPolitics,1763– 1848(Oxford,1994),pp. 235,243. 5.GeorgesLefebvre, Napoleon.From18 BrumairetoTilsit (London,1969),p.172. 6.CharlesEsdaile,The FrenchWars,1792–1815 (London,2001),p.28. 7.PeterH.Wilson,‘The MeaningofEmpirein CentralEuropearound 1800’,inAlanForrestand PeterH.Wilson(eds), TheBeeandtheEagle. NapoleonicFranceand theEndoftheHoly RomanEmpire,1806 (Basingstoke,2009),p. 34. 8.SeeDavidBell,TheFirst TotalWar(NewYork, 2007);Jean-Yves Guiomar,L’inventionde laguerretotale,XVIIIe– XXesiècle(Paris,2004); RogerChickering,‘A TaleofTwoTales:Grand NarrativesofWarinthe AgeofRevolution’,in RogerB.Chickeringand StigFörster(eds),Warin anAgeofRevolution, 1775–1815(Cambridge, 2010),pp.1–17. 9.AlanForrest,Karen HagemannandJane Rendall(eds),Soldiers, CitizensandCivilians. Experiencesand Perceptionsofthe Revolutionaryand NapoleonicWars,1790– 1820(Basingstoke,2009), p.2. 10.RobertAsprey,TheRise andFallofNapoleon Bonaparte,vol.1,pp. 481–87. 11.Jean-PaulBertaud,Alan ForrestandAnnie Jourdan(eds),Napoléon, lemondeetlesAnglais. Guerredesmotsetdes images(Paris,2004),pp. 176–79. 12.SimonBurrows,‘The StruggleforEuropean Opinioninthe NapoleonicWars:British FrancophonePropaganda, 1803–1814’,French History11(1997),pp. 41–53. 13.SimonBurrows,‘The WarofWords:French andBritishpropagandain theNapoleonicEra’,in DavidCannadine(ed.), TrafalgarinHistory:A BattleanditsAfterlife (Basingstoke,2006),p. 51. 14.LouisBergeron,France underNapoleon (Princeton,NewJersey, 1981),p.64. 15.FernandBeaucour, Lettres,Décisionset ActesdeNapoléonà Pontde-Briquesetau CampdeBoulogne (Levallois,1979). 16.MichaelDuffy,‘British Diplomacyandthe FrenchWars,1789– 1815’,inH.T.Dickinson (ed.),Britainandthe FrenchRevolution,1789– 1815(London,1989),pp. 139–41. 17.JohnD.Grainger,The AmiensTruce:Britain andBonaparte,1801–03 (Woodbridge,2004),pp. 180–81. 18.RobertoConti,IlTesoro. Guidaallaconoscenza delTesorodelDuomodi Monza(Monza,1983), pp.5–8;AlanForrest, ‘NapoleonasMonarch:A PoliticalEvolution’,in AlanForrestandPeterH. Wilson(eds),TheBee andtheEagle: NapoleonicFranceand theEndoftheHoly RomanEmpire,1806,pp. 117–18. 19.PeterH.Wilson,‘The MeaningofEmpirein CentralEuropearound 1800’,ibid.,pp.22–41. 20.Esdaile,TheFrench Wars,p.33. 21.N.A.M.Rodger,‘The SignificanceofTrafalgar: SeaPowerandLand PowerintheAngloFrenchWars’,in Cannadine(ed.), TrafalgarinHistory:A BattleanditsAfterlife, pp.86–88. 22.JayLuvass(ed.), NapoleonontheArtof War(NewYork,1999), pp.89–91. 23.NapoleonBonaparte, Proclamations,Ordresdu Jour,Bulletinsdela GrandeArmée,ed.Jean Tulard(Paris,1964),pp. 45–46. 24.JacquesGarnier, Austerlitz,2décembre 1805(Paris,2005),p. 403;StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APolitical Life,pp.272–74. 25.JacquesGarnier,‘La batailled’Austerlitz’,in Austerlitz.Napoléonau cæurdel’Europe, ouvragecollectif,Musée del’Armée(Paris,2007), pp.76–79. 26.Thefullestrecent discussionofthe developmentofthebattle isJacquesGarnier’sstudy ofAusterlitz,referredto above.Forasuccinct summaryofthebattle,see CharlesEsdaile, Napoleon’sWars:An InternationalHistory, 1803–15,pp.226–28. 27.MichaelBroers,Europe underNapoleon,1799– 1815(London,1996),pp. 41–43. 28.ClausTelp,‘The PrussianArmyintheJena Campaign’,inForrestand Wilson(eds),TheBee andtheEagle,p.166. 29.Sixty-fourthBulletin,2 March1807,inJ.David Markham,Imperial Glory:TheBulletinsof Napoleon’sGrande Armée,1805–1814 (London,2003),p.148. 30.ChristopherPrendergast, NapoleonandHistory Painting:Antoine-Jean Gros’sLaBataille d’Eylau(Oxford,1997), pp.1–19. 31.Pierre-FrançoisPercy, Journaldescampagnes duBaronPercy, chirurgien-en-chefdela GrandeArmée(Paris, 1904),p.165. 32.Esdaile,Napoleon’s Wars:AnInternational History,1803–15,pp. 295–99. 33.NapoleonBonaparte, FifteenthBulletin,22 October1806,in Markham,Imperial Glory,p.148. 34.CliveEmsley,The LongmanCompanionto NapoleonicEurope (London,1993),p.253. 35.SilviaMarzagalli,Les boulevardsdelafraude. Lenégocemaritimeetle Blocuscontinental,1806– 1813(Villeneuved’Ascq, 1999),p.192. 36.GeoffreyEllis, Napoleon’sContinental Blockade:TheCaseof Alsace(Oxford,1981), pp.266–67. 37.Ibid.,p.271. 38.FrançoisCrouzet,‘La ruinedugrand commerce’,inFrançoisGeorgesPariset(ed.), Bordeauxaudix-huitième siècle(Bordeaux,1968), pp.500–02. 39.FrançoisCrouzet,‘Les originesdusousdéveloppement économiqueduSudouest’,AnnalesduMidi 71(1959),pp.71–79. 40.RoryMuir,Britainand theDefeatofNapoleon, 1807–1815(NewHaven, Connecticut,1996),p.6. 9:AVISIONOFCIVIL SOCIETY 1.LouisBergeron,France underNapoleon (Princeton,NewJersey, 1981),p.64. 2.EmmanueldeLasCases, MémorialdeSainteHélène,vol.1,pp.1181– 82;forcommentsee RobertMorrissey, Napoléonetl’héritagede lagloire(Paris,2010),p. 172. 3.Louis-AntoineFauveletde Bourrienne,Mémoiresde M.deBourrienne, ministred’état,sur Napoléon(10vols,Paris, 1831),vol.5,p.32. 4.DavidP.Jordan,The RevolutionaryCareerof MaximilienRobespierre (NewYork,1985),p.86. 5.JohnA.Davis,Conflict andControl.Lawand OrderinNineteenthCenturyItaly (Basingstoke,1988),p. 23. 6.StuartWoolf,Napoleon’s IntegrationofEurope (London,1991),p.21. 7.Ibid.,p.27. 8.AlexanderGrab,Napoleon andtheTransformationof Europe(Basingstoke, 2003),pp.159–60. 9.MichaelRowe,‘Napoleon andStateFormationin CentralEurope’,inPhilip G.Dwyer(ed.),Napoleon andEurope(London, 2001),p.209;Geoffrey Ellis,TheNapoleonic Empire(Basingstoke, 2003),pp.55–6. 10.AnnieJourdan(ed.), LouisBonaparte,Roide Hollande(Paris,2010), pp.423–24. 11.WilliamDoyle,‘The PoliticalCultureofthe NapoleonicEmpire’,in ForrestandWilson(eds), TheBeeandtheEagle,p. 86. 12.Précisdelaviepolitique deThéophileBerlierécrit parlui-mêmeetadresséà sesenfantsetpetitsenfants(Dijon,1838),pp. 92–95,quotedinIsser Woloch,Napoleonand hisCollaborators.The MakingofaDictatorship, p.103. 13.OlivierBlanc,Regnaud deSaint-Jeand’Angély. L’éminencegrisede Napoléon(Paris,2002), pp.67–72;Woloch, Napoleonandhis Collaborators,p.101. 14.JeanandNicole Dhombres,LazareCarnot (Paris,1997),pp.503–08. 15.JosephFouché,Memoirs (2vols,London,1896), vol.1,p.226. 16.JeanTranié,Napoléonet sonentourage(Paris, 2001),p.83. 17.Fortheexamplesthat follow,seeBergeron, FranceunderNapoleon, pp.73–79. 18.NicoleGotteri,Grands dignitaires,ministreset grandsofficiersdu PremierEmpire. Autographesetnotices biographiques(Paris, 1990),pp.106–07. 19.Bergeron,Franceunder Napoleon,p.72. 20.LaurenceChatelde Brancion(ed.), Cambacérès.Mémoires inédits(2vols,Paris, 1999),vol.1,p.714. 21.NicholasRichardson, TheFrenchPrefectoral Corps,1814–1830 (Cambridge,1966),p.1. 22.Ellis,TheNapoleonic Empire,p.34. 23.CarlaHesse,Publishing andCulturalPoliticsin RevolutionaryParis, 1789–1810(Berkeley, California,1991),pp. 235–36. 24.StevenEnglund, Napoleon,pp.309–11. 25.MartynLyons,Napoleon BonaparteandtheLegacy oftheFrenchRevolution (Basingstoke,1994),pp. 96–102. 26.AnnieJourdan,‘La destinéetragiquedu“Bon Roi”Louis’,inidem (ed.),LouisBonaparte, RoideHollande(Paris, 2010),pp.428–30. 27.Bergeron,Franceunder Napoleon,p.31. 28.AlanForrest,Conscripts andDeserters:TheArmy andFrenchSociety duringtheRevolutionand Empire(NewYork, 1989),pp.219–37. 29.MichaelBroers, Napoleon’sOtherWar: Bandits,Rebelsandtheir PursuersintheAgeof Revolutions(Oxford, 2010),pp.81–83. 30.MichaelBroers,The PoliticsofReligionin NapoleonicItaly:The WaragainstGod (London,2002),pp.188– 89. 31.MichaelBroers, NapoleonicImperialism andtheSavoyard Monarchy,1773–1821: StateBuildingin Piedmont(Lampeter, 1997),p.276. 32.MichaelBroers,Europe underNapoleon(London, 1996),pp.180–82. 33.Grab,Napoleonandthe Transformationof Europe,pp.180–81. 34.JohnA.Davis,Naples andNapoleon:Southern ItalyandtheEuropean Revolutions,1780–1860 (Cambridge,2006), passim,esp.pp.161–255, 259. 10:THEREINVENTION OFMONARCHY 1.IreneCollins,Napoleon andhisParliaments, 1800–1815(London, 1979),pp.114–20. 2.MalcolmCrook, ‘ConfidencefromBelow? Collaborationand Resistanceinthe NapoleonicPlebiscites’, inMichaelRowe(ed.), Collaborationand ResistanceinNapoleonic Europe:State-Formation inanAgeofUpheaval,c. 1800–1815,pp.19–21. 3.Ibid.,p.34. 4.JeanTulard(ed.), Napoléon,LeSacre (Paris,1993),pp.59–60. 5.ThierryLentz,Lesacrede Napoléon(Paris,2004),p. 9. 6.Thisargumentismore fullydevelopedinAlan Forrest,‘Napoleonas Monarch:APolitical Evolution’,inAlan ForrestandPeterH. Wilson(eds),TheBee andtheEagle: NapoleonicFranceand theEndoftheHoly RomanEmpire,1806 (Basingstoke,2009),pp. 116–20. 7.ThierryLentz,‘Napoléon etCharlemagne’,in ThierryLentz(ed.), Napoléonetl’Europe: regardssurunepolitique (Paris,2005),p.17. 8.GeoffreyEllis,The NapoleonicEmpire (Basingstoke,2003),p. 54. 9.RobertoConti,IlTesoro: Guidaallaconoscenza delTesorodelDuomodi Monza,p.6. 10.MichaelBroers,Europe underNapoleon(London, 1996),p.62. 11.MichaelKaiser,‘A matterofsurvival: Bavariabecomesa Kingdom’,inForrestand Wilson(eds),TheBee andtheEagle,p.106. 12.StevenEnglund, Napoleon:APolitical Life,p.203. 13.AnnieJourdan, Napoléon:héros, imperator,mécène(Paris, 1998),p.117. 14.ChristopherHibbert, Napoleon,HisWivesand Women,pp.142–43. 15.ErnestJohnKnapton, EmpressJosephine (Cambridge,Mass., 1964),pp.233–34. 16.Ibid.,p.236. 17.Ibid.,pp.274–75. 18.NapoléonBonaparte, lettertoJosephine,31 December1806, Correspondance générale,vol.6,pp. 1302–03. 19.Knapton,Empress Josephine,p.245. 20.HenryHall(ed.), Napoleon’sLettersto Josephine,1796–1812 (London,1901),p.93. 21.ChristineSutherland, MarieWalewska: Napoleon’sGreatLove (London,1979),pp.84– 87. 22.Ibid.,p.247. 23.Ibid.,pp.219–24. 24.Knapton,Empress Josephine,pp.284–95. 25.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon(Paris,2004),p. 357. 26.Englund,Napoleon,p. 360. 27.Knapton,Empress Josephine,p.296. 28.ChristopheBeyeler, Nocesimpériales:Le mariagedeNapoléonet Marie-Louisedessinépar Baltard(Paris,2010),pp. 7–10. 29.PeterBurke,The FabricationofLouisXIV (NewHaven, Connecticut,1992), passim. 30.AlanForrest, ‘Propagandaandthe LegitimationofPowerin NapoleonicFrance’, FrenchHistory18(2004), pp.437–38;forthelater historyofthefestivalsee SudhirHazareesingh,The Saint-Napoleon. Celebrationsof Sovereigntyin Nineteenth-century France(Cambridge, Massachusetts,2004). 31.Jourdan,Napoléon,pp. 109–10. 32.DavidO’Brien,Afterthe Revolution:Antoine-Jean Gros,Paintingand Propagandaunder Napoleon(University Park,Pennsylvania, 2004),pp.4–8. 33.DavidO’Brien,‘Antonio Canova’sNapoleonas MarsthePeacemakerand theLimitsofImperial Portraiture’,French History18(2004),p.377. 34.ToddPorterfieldand SusanL.Siegfried, StagingEmpire. Napoleon,Ingresand David(UniversityPark, Pennsylvania,2006),pp. 9–10. 35.UdolphovandeSandt, ‘LeSalon’,inJeanClaudeBonnet(ed.), L’EmpiredesMuses. Napoléon,lesartsetles lettres(Paris,2004),p. 77. 36.ToddPorterfield,The AllureofEmpire.Artin theServiceofFrench Imperialism,1798–1836 (Princeton,NewJersey, 1998),p.7. 37.VivantDenon,Voyage danslaBasseetlaHaute Egyptependantles campagnesduGénéral Bonaparte(revised edition,Paris,1990). 38.TerenceM.Russell,The DiscoveryofEgypt. VivantDenon’sTravels withNapoleon’sArmy (Stroud,2005),p.102. 39.BéatriceDidier,‘La descriptionde monuments:leVoyage danslaBasseetlaHaute Egypte’,inFrancis ClaudonandBernard Bailly(eds),Vivant Denon(Chalon-surSaône,2001),p.218. 40.Russell,TheDiscoveryof Egypt,p.41. 41.AndrewMcClellan, InventingtheLouvre:Art, PoliticsandtheOrigins oftheModernMuseumin Eighteenth-centuryParis (Cambridge,1994),pp. 91–92. 42.PhilippeBordes,‘Le MuséeNapoléon’,in Jean-ClaudeBonnet(ed.), L’EmpiredesMuses,pp. 79–80. 43.Englund,Napoleon,pp. 303–04. 44.DavidChaillou, Napoléonetl’Opéra:la politiquesurlascène, 1810–1815(Paris,2004), p.43. 11:FROMTHE PENINSULATO LEIPZIG 1.TimBlanning,ThePursuit ofGlory.Europe,1648– 1815(London,2007),p. 658. 2.LuigiMascilliMigliorini, Napoléon(Paris,2004), pp.301–03. 3.VernonJ.Puryear, Napoleonandthe Dardanelles(Berkeley, California,1951),pp. 168–69. 4.RebeccaEarle,‘The FrenchRevolutionary WarsintheSpanishAmericanImagination, 1789–1830’,inRichard Bessel,NicholasGuyatt andJaneRendall(eds.), War,EmpireandSlavery, 1770–1830(Basingstoke, 2010),pp.186–93. 5.MichaelBroers,Europe underNapoleon,1799– 1815,p.144. 6.CharlesJ.Esdaile,The FrenchWars,1792–1815 (London,2001),p.39. 7.StevenEnglund, Napoleon.APoliticalLife (NewYork,20011),p. 325. 8.SilviaMarzagalli,Les boulevardsdelafraude: lenégocemaritimeetle Blocuscontinental,1806– 15(Villeneuved’Ascq, 1999),pp.277–78. 9.KatherineB.Aaslestad, ‘WarwithoutBattles: CivilianExperiencesof EconomicWarfareduring theNapoleonicErain Hamburg’,inAlan Forrest,KarenHagemann andJaneRendall(eds), Soldiers,Citizensand Civilians:Experiences andPerceptionsofthe Revolutionaryand NapoleonicWars,1790– 1820(Basingstoke,2009), pp.118–19. 10.Forathorough discussionofthe Peninsularcampaignssee CharlesJ.Esdaile,The PeninsularWar:ANew History(London,2002). 11.JeanMarnier,Souvenirs deguerreentempsde paix(Paris,1867),p.36. 12.CharlesJ.Esdaile, FightingNapoleon: Guerrillas,Banditsand AdventurersinSpain, 1808–14(NewHaven, Connecticut,2004),pp. 111–13. 13.Fordetailsoftheseand otheratrocities,seeJeanMarcLafon, L’Andalousieet Napoléon:contreinsurrection, collaborationet résistancesdansleMidi del’Espagne,1808–12 (Paris,2007). 14.JohnLawrenceTone, TheFatalKnot:The GuerrillaWarinNavarre andtheDefeatof NapoleoninSpain (ChapelHill,North Carolina,1994),pp.147– 49. 15.AlanForrest,‘The Logisticsof RevolutionaryWarin France’,inChickering andFörster,Warinan AgeofRevolution,pp. 187–90. 16.JonathonRiley, NapoleonasaGeneral (London,2007),pp.34– 35. 17.Jean-JoséSégéric, NapoléonfaceàlaRoyal Navy(Rennes,2008),p. 222. 18.PierreBranda,Leprixde lagloire.Napoléonet l’argent(Paris,2007),p. 485. 19.GeorgesLefebvre, Napoleon,vol2,pp.52– 53. 20.AdamZamoyski,1812: Napoleon’sFatalMarch onMoscow(London, 2005),p.37. 21.AlanPalmer,Bernadotte: Napoleon’sMarshal, Sweden’sKing(London, 1990),pp.185–90. 22.CliveEmsley,The LongmanCompanionto NapoleonicEurope (London,1993),p.17. 23.FrançoisButtner, ‘GrandeArmée’,inJean Tulard(ed.),Dictionnaire Napoléon(2vols,Paris, 1999),vol.1,pp.893–94. 24.DavidGates,The NapoleonicWars,1803– 1815(London,1997),pp. 204–05. 25.ArmanddeCaulaincourt, AtNapoleon’sSidein Russia(NewYork,2008), pp.28–29. 26.DominicLieven,Russia againstNapoleon.The BattleforEurope,1807to 1814(London,2009),p. 124. 27.ThierryLentz,Nouvelle histoireduPremier Empire(4vols,Paris, 2002–2010),vol.2: L’effondrementdu systèmenapoléonien, 1810–14(2004),p.268. 28.AlainFillion,La Bérézinaracontéepar ceuxquil’ontvécue (Paris,2005),p.11. 29.LéonHennetandEmile Martin,Lettres interceptéesparles Russesdurantla campagnede1812(Paris, 1913),p.228. 30.Zamoyski,1812,p.409. 31.RichardRiehn,1812: Napoleon’sRussian Campaign(NewYork, 1991),p.395;Bates,The NapoleonicWars,p.221. 32.Riley,Napoleonasa General,pp.199–200. 33.Emsley,Longman Companion,p.16. 34.Englund,Napoleon,p. 378. 35.Gates,TheNapoleonic Wars,p.221. 36.HeziShelah,Napoleon 1813(London,2000),pp. 78–79. 37.EmmanueldeLasCases, LemémorialdeSainteHélène(2vols,Paris, 1951),vol.2,p.232. 38.Shelah,Napoleon1813, pp.90–91. 39.Emsley,Longman Companion,p.19. 40.Thefullestaccountofthe militarycampaignis MichaelV.Leggiere,The FallofNapoleon:The AlliedInvasionofFrance, 1813–1814(Cambridge, 2007). 41.ThierryLentz,Nouvelle histoireduPremier Empire,vol.2,pp.522– 50;seealsoJacques Hantraye,Lerécitd’un civildanslacampagnede Francede1814:les ‘Lettreshistoriques’de PierreDardenne,1768– 1857(Paris,2008),pp. lxix–lxxiii. 12:THEHUNDREDDAYS 1.F.LorainePetre, NapoleonatBay,1814 (London,1914),pp.199– 200. 2.DominiquedeVillepin, LesCentJoursoul’esprit desacrifice(Paris,2001), p.10. 3.AlanSchom,Napoleon Bonaparte,p.697. 4.OwenConnelly(ed.), HistoricalDictionaryof NapoleonicFrance, 1799–1815(London, 1985),pp.3–5. 5.ThephraseisfromGuy Godlewski,Napoléonà l’îled’Elbe:300jours d’exil(Paris,2003) 6.NeilCampbell,Napoleon onElba:Diaryofan EyewitnesstoExile,ed. JonathanNorth(Welwyn GardenCity,2004),p.31. 7.Ibid.,p.46. 8.Ibid.,p.57. 9.CatherineClerc,La caricaturecontre Napoléon(Paris,1985),p. 172. 10.AnnieDuprat,‘Une guerredesimages:Louis XVIII,Napoléonetla France’,Revued’histoire moderneet contemporaine47(2000), p.500. 11.Schom,Napoleon Bonaparte,p.697. 12.HenryHoussaye,1814 (Paris,1889),pp.548–49. 13.IsserWoloch,Napoleon andhisCollaborators,p. 222. 14.HenryHoussaye,1815 (Paris,1893),pp.1–2. 15.Connelly,Historical Dictionary,p.4. 16.AntonyBrett-James (ed.),TheHundredDays: Napoleon’sLast CampaignfromEye- witnessAccounts (London,1964),p.2. 17.ChristopherHibbert, Napoleon,HisWivesand Women,pp.220–22. 18.StevenEnglund, Napoleon:APolitical Life,p.420. 19.Campbell,Napoleonon Elba,p.96. 20.Ibid.,p.130. 21.QuotedinAlanSchom, OneHundredDays: Napoleon’sRoadto Waterloo(NewYork, 1992),p.1. 22.ThierryLentz,Nouvelle histoireduPremier Empire(4vols,Paris, 2002–10),vol.4,Les Cent-Jours,1815,pp. 194–97. 23.FrankMcLynn, Napoleon,p.604. 24.Englund,Napoleon:A PoliticalLife,p.428. 25.Lentz,LesCent-Jours,p. 295. 26.McLynn,Napoleon,pp. 608–09. 27.Jean-PaulBertaud, Quandlesenfants parlaientdegloire: L’arméeaucoeurdela FrancedeNapoléon (Paris,2006),p.176. 28.RobertS.Alexander, Bonapartismand RevolutionaryTradition inFrance:theFédérésof 1815(Cambridge,1991), p.2. 29.Acteadditionnel,in FrédéricBluche,Le plébiscitedesCentJours, avril–mai1815(Geneva, 1974),pp.134–35. 30.Bluche,Leplébiscite,p. 123. 31.MalcolmCrook,‘”Ma volontéestcelledu peuple”:Votinginthe Plebisciteand ParliamentaryElections duringNapoleon’s HundredDays,April– May1815’,French HistoricalStudies32 (2009),p.628. 32.Woloch,Napoleonand hisCollaborators,p.231. 33.Englund,Napoleon:A PoliticalLife,p.430. 34.MichaelBroers,Europe underNapoleon,p.269. 35.HaroldNicolson,The CongressofVienna (London,1961),pp.227– 30. 36.Schom,Napoleon Bonaparte,p.721. 37.DavidGates,The NapoleonicWars,1803– 15,p.268. 38.Jacques-OlivierBoudon, NapoléonIeretsontemps (Paris,2004),p.93. 39.HippolyteTaine,Les originesdelaFrance contemporaine(2vols, Paris,1986),vol.2,p. 432. 40.Jean-PaulBertaud, Guerreetsociétéen FrancedeLouisXIVà NapoléonIer(Paris, 1998),p.74. 41.McLynn,Napoleon,p. 610. 42.AndrewUffindell,The Eagle’sLastTriumph: Napoleon’sVictoryat Ligny,June1815 (London,1994),p.23. 43.Ibid.,p.192. 44.Themostrecentaccount ofthebattleisMike Robinson,TheBattleof QuatreBras,1815 (Stroud,2009). 45.AndrewRoberts, Waterloo:Napoleon’s LastGamble(London, 2006),p.120. 46.AlessandroBarbero,The Battle:AHistoryofthe BattleofWaterloo (London,2006),pp.419– 20. 47.CharlesPéguy,quotedin Actesducolloque Napoléon,Stendhaletles Romantiques:l’armée,la guerre,lagloire(Paris, 2002),p.9. 48.MichaelThornton, NapoleonafterWaterloo: EnglandandtheSaint HelenaDecision (Stanford,California, 1968),pp.4–6. 13:YEARSOFEXILE 1.GeorgesBordenove,La viequotidiennede Napoléonenroutevers Sainte-Hélène(Paris, 1977),pp.27–32. 2.A.M.Broadley,Napoleon inCaricature,1795–1821 (2vols.,London,1911), vol.2,p.5. 3.Jean-PaulBertaud,Alan ForrestandAnnie Jourdan,Napoléon,le mondeetlesAnglais: Guerredesmotsetdes images(Paris,2004),p. 191. 4.MichaelJ.Thornton, NapoleonafterWaterloo, p.222. 5.BrianUnwin,Terrible Exile:TheLastDaysof NapoleononSaintHelena (London,2010),pp.57– 58. 6.Ibid,pp.59–60. 7.Jean-PaulKauffmann,The BlackRoomat Longwood.Napoleon’s ExileonSaintHelena (NewYork,1999),p.8. 8.Arangeofdescriptions anddramaticimagesof SaintHelenacanbefound inBernardChevallier, MichelDancoisneMartineauandThierry Lentz(eds.),Sainte- Hélène,îledemémoire (Paris,2005). 9.FrankMcLynn,Napoleon, p.638. 10.Acontemporaryaccount ofthevoyagebythe captainofthe Northumberlandis Buonaparte’sVoyageto SaintHelena:comprising thediaryofRearAdmiral SirG.Cockburn,during hispassagefromEngland toSaintHelenain1815 (Boston,1833). 11.GilbertMartineau, NapoléonàSainteHélène,1815–1821 (Paris,1981),p.14. 12.Thornton,Napoleonafter Waterloo,pp.198–99. 13.McLynn,Napoleon,pp. 646–47. 14.Unwin,TerribleExile, pp.167–68. 15.Ibid.,pp.64–66. 16.LouisMarchand, Memoirs,translatedasIn Napoleon’sShadow,ed. ProctorJones(San Francisco,California, 1998),pp.368–69. 17.Unwin,TerribleExile,p. xix. 18.Bertrandregularlylists thebooksthatNapoleon readorcitesthepassages thatwerereadtohim.See Henri-GratienBertrand, CahiersdeSainte-Hélène, 1816–17(Paris,1959), passim. 19.Ibid.,p.118. 20.Ibid.,p.139. 21.HenryMeynell, Memorandaof Conversationswith Napoleon.SaintHelena, 1816(Guildford,1909), pp.2–3. 22.MarcelDunan, ‘Introduction’,in EmmanueldeLasCases, LeMémorialdeSainteHélène(2vols,Paris, 1951),vol.1,pp.x–xi. 23.Broadley,Napoleonin Caricature,vol.2,p.12; AlanForrest,‘Propaganda andtheLegitimationof PowerinNapoleonic France’,FrenchHistory 18(2004),p.444. 24.ElizabethLatimer,Talks ofNapoleonatSaint HelenawithGeneral BaronGourgaud (London,1904),pp.185– 90. 25.CharlesdeMontholon, vol.1,p.469.xxxx 26.DavidChandler, ‘Foreword’toSten ForshufvudandBen Weider,Assassinationat SaintHelena:The PoisoningofNapoleon Bonaparte(Vancouver, 1978),p.2. 27.Ibid.,p.4. 28.FrancescoAntommarchi wentontopublishhis accountofNapoleon’s finalmonthsasLes derniersmomentsde Napoléon(2vols,Paris andLondon,1825). 29.MartinR.Howard, PoisonedChalice:The EmperorandhisDoctors onSaintHelena(Stroud, 2009),passim. 30.Ibid.,p.53. 31.Jacques-OlivierBoudon, Napoléonetlescultes (Paris,2002),p.43; Englund,Napoleon,p. 454. 32.AlbertBenhamou, L’autreSainte-Hélène:La captivité,lamaladie,la mort,etlesmédecins autourdeNapoléon (London,2010),p.350. 33.Byfarthemostmoving accountsofGeranium Valleyandthesiteof Napoleon’stombareto befoundintheworkof historianswhohave visited,andoften photographed,Saint Helena.Thedescription ofthefuneralceremonyis takenfromUnwin, TerribleExile:TheLast DaysofNapoleonon SaintHelena,pp.57–58 14:LIFEAFTERDEATH 1.DidierLeGall,Napoléon etLeMémorialdeSainteHélène:analysed’un discours(Paris,2003),p. 15. 2.MarcelDunan, ‘Introduction’to EmmanueldeLasCases, LeMémorialdeSainteHélène(2vols,Paris, 1951),vol.1,p.xiii. 3.StevenEnglund, Napoleon,p.453. 4.PeterHicksandEmilie Barthet,‘Interpretationof ClissonetEugénie’,in NapoleonBonaparte, ClissonetEugénie–a lovestory(London, 2008),p.41. 5.François-Renéde Chateaubriand,‘De Buonaparte,desBourbons etdelanécessitédese rallierànosprinces légitimespourlebonheur delaFranceetceluide l’Europe’,in Chateaubriand,Ecrits politiques,1814–16,ed. ColinSmethurst,p.72. 6.LasCases,LeMémorial deSainte-Hélène,vol.1, p.668. 7.ThierryLentz,LesCentJours,1815(Paris,2010), p.313. 8.AngelicaGoodden, MadamedeStaël:The DangerousExile(Oxford, 2008),p.262. 9.JohnClaiborneIsbell,The BirthofEuropean Romanticism.Truthand PropagandainStaël’sDe l’Allemagne(Cambridge, 1994),p.93. 10.LasCases,LeMémorial deSainte-Hélène,vol.2, p.190. 11.Ibid.,vol.2,p.187. 12.Jacques-OlivierBoudon (ed.),NapoléonIeretson temps(Paris,2004),p. 227. 13.Englund,Napoleon,p. 531. 14.Henri-GratienBertrand, ‘Lesderniersjoursde l’EmpereuràSainteHélène’,Lesæuvres libres39(1949),pp.107– 08. 15.MémoiresdeMarchand, premiervaletdechambre etexécuteurtestamentaire del’EmpereurNapoléon, ed.JeanBourguignonand HenryLachouque(Paris, 1985),pp.567–613. 16.NataliePetiteau, Lendemainsd’Empire. 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Acknowledgement ThiswasnotabookI undertooklightly.The gradualtransitionthathas takenmefromthesocial historyoftheRevolutiontoa biographyofNapoleon Bonapartehasbeenmany yearsinthemaking,a transitionthathaditsrootsin thestudyofFranceatwar, andoftheconscription, banditryandresistancethat markedtheyearsfrom1792 to1815.Ihavenot,ofcourse, whollyabandonedthe Revolution:theEmperor whomIdiscusshereremains, atleastinpart,the revolutionarygeneralhehad been,whiletheEmpirehe ruledoverhaditsrootsinthe spiritoftheenlightenedage thatwentbefore.Thisbookis aboutcontinuityaswellas change,achangethatwas imposedbypersonalambition asmuchasbythesavage, grindingimperativeofawar thatlasted–inthecaseof Franceandhermost persistentopponents,Britain andAustria–formorethan twentymurderousyears. InmakingthistransitionI haveunavoidably accumulatedalargenumber ofdebtstofellowscholars andhistorians,whohavebeen unstintinginmakingmefeel welcomeintheirmidst. Some,ofcourse,understood verywellthechallengeIwas facing:likeJohnLynnand Jean-PaulBertaud,theytoo hadstartedoutfromthe FrenchRevolutionandhad followedsomethingofa similartrajectory,seeingthe warratherthananypolitical regimeasthedefiningperiod forFranceinthisparticular fin-de-siècle.Indeed,itis perhapsnoaccidentthatI havecometotheEmperor throughstudyinghisarmies. ButIhavebenefitedalso fromthefriendshipand collegialityofthecommunity ofNapoleonicscholarship itself,fromhistoriansin Britain,Franceandbeyond, thosewhoareatthismoment rewritingthehistoryofthe Empireanddoingitinnovel andexcitingways.Theextent ofmydebttothemwillbe clearfromthetextitself,butI shouldparticularlyliketo mentionMichaelBroersand GeoffreyEllis,Michael Rowe,CharlesEsdaile,Peter WilsonandSudhir HazareesinghinBritain; ThierryLentz,Natalie PetiteauandJacques-Olivier BoudoninFrance;David Bell,RafeBlaufarb,and KatherineAaslestadinthe UnitedStates;JohanJoorand AnnieJourdaninHolland; andPhilipDwyerin Australia.Whilewritingthis bookithasbeenmyprivilege alsotoworkclosely,through anAnglo-Germanresearch projectontheexperienceand memoryoftheNapoleonic Wars,withKarenHagemann atChapelHill,North Carolina,andEtienne FrançoisinBerlin,andwith threeresearchersinthis country,LeightonJames, CatrionaKennedyandMarieCécileThoral.Ourwork togetherprovedespecially enriching,asdidthe experienceofexaminingthe periodinaconsistently comparativeway.Itis instructive,indeed,howmuch ofthemostinnovative researchontheNapoleonic erainrecentyearshasbeen donebythosewhoapproach thesubjectfromaEuropean– ortransnational-ratherthan fromanationalperspective, andwhosemajorresearch interestslieoutsidethe hexagone,inGermanyor ItalyorSpain. Theideaofwritinga criticalbiographyof Napoleon,andofwritingfor ageneralreadershiprather thanapurelyacademic audience,wasfirstputtome byTonyMorris,andthoughI mayhavehesitatedatfirst,I amsogladthathepressedthe ideaonme.AtQuercusJosh Irelandhasprovedan understandingeditorandan enthusiasticcollaboratorin thisventure;ithasbeena pleasuretoworkwithhim. Butmygreatestdebtin writingthisbookliescloser tohome–tomywife, Rosemaryandmydaughter Marianne,whoseenthusiasm wascriticalinpersuadingme toundertakethisprojectin thefirstplace. York,August2011. Index Aboukir,Battleof104,115 AboukirBay,Battleof104, 112 Acis-sur-Aube,Battleof (1814)267–8 Acre105,115 Addington,Henry152,177, 180 Aix-la-Chapelle221 Ajaccio25,26,29,35,44,46 Alessandria79 AlexandertheGreat103 AlexanderI,Tsar190,241, 242,253,255,256,271 Alexandria97,115,238 Amiens,Treatyof(1802) 134,173,174,175 Angély,RegnauddeSaintJeand’86,164,184–5,201– 2 Antomarchi,Francesco309 Appiani,Andrea89 ArcdeTriomphe(Paris)xii, 3,327 Arcola,Battleof(1796)80 ArméedesCôtesdel’Océan 179 ArméeduNord288–9 ArmyofEgypt112 ArmyofEngland94,179 army,French50–1,195 changesinrecruitmentof soldiersandofficersafter (1789)52–3 andFrenchRevolution50 gettingsupportofforFirst Consul129–30 growthinpowerof195 limitationsonpolitical influence196 mutinies(1790)50 Napoleon’sreforms130 officersdrawnfromthe nobility24,50 andThermidorians60,61 seealsoindividualarmies; wars ArmyoftheInterior70–2 ArmyofItaly73,74–5,86, 87 ArmyoftheOrient91,101– 2,105–6 ArmyoftheRhine254 Arnault,Antoine159 art/artists233–6 Egyptiancampaignas subjectmatterforhistory paintings236 andtheLouvre238–9 Napoleon’spatronageof 234,235–40 portrayalofNapoleon89, 109–10,235 representationofEmpire by328 artillery29 Artois,Comted’seeCharles X Aspern-Essling,Battleof254 Assumption,festivalof233 Aubry61 Auerstädt,Battleof187 Augereau,MarshalPierre76 Austerlitz,Battleof13,185– 6,288 Austria180,243,244,252–3 establishmentofLandwher 253 andFamilyCompact173 Italiancampaign75–6, 78–9 peacetreatywithFrance (1797)80–1 peacetreatywithFrance (1801)134 andPeninsularWar248 andWarofThird Coalition182,184–5,186, 187 andWaroftheFifth Coalition254 andWaroftheSixth Coalition264,266 warsagainstFrance51, 134 Auxonne42 Baden186,198,200 Balcombe,William302,306 Baltard,Louis-Pierre232 banditry,attemptstocombat byNapoleon133 barbets74 Barde,Paul33 Barras,Paul58,61–2,63–4, 71,72,121 BasilicaofSaint-Denis (Paris)3 Bastia45 Bastille,fallof(1789)45 Bathurst,Lord7,301 BattleoftheNations(1813) 266–7 Bavaria184,186,198,200, 222 Bayonne,Battleof263 Beauharnais,Alexandrede66 Beauharnais,Eugènede222 Beauharnais,Josephinesee Josephine,Empress Beaulieu80 Bell,David177 Belle-Poule(frigate)6–7,9 Bellerophon(warship)295, 298 Béranger,Pierre-Jean324 Berlier,Théophile201 BerlinDecree(1806)191 Bernadotte,MarshalJeanBaptiste125,255 Berry,Ducde12,322 Bertaud,Jean-Paul130,288 Berthier,Alexandre89,203, 307 Bertrand,General2,7,36, 277,298,299–300,301,303, 307,309,311,319,320 CahiersdeSainte-Hélène 319 Bey,AmirAli98 Blücher,FieldMarshal267, 289,290,291,329 BonaparteontheBridgeof Arcole(painting)89 Bonaparte,Carlo(later Charlesde Bonaparte)(father)24–6,28, 29,30 Bonaparte,Caroline(sister) 27 Bonaparte,Elisa(sister)27 Bonaparte,Jérôme(brother) 27,161,200,265,290 Bonaparte,Joseph(brother) 27,30,71,160,161,270 asCommissionerofWar fortheArmyofItaly160 asKingofNaples200, 214 asKingofSpain200,247, 249 marriage65 relationshipwithNapoleon 163 Bonaparte,Letizia(mother) 27,28,47-8,67,160,277 Bonaparte,Louis(brother) 27,166 asKingofHolland161, 162–3,200 removaloffromthroneof Holland162,200,209 Bonaparte,Louis-Napoleon seeNapoleonIII Bonaparte,Lucien(brother) 27,31,46,124,126,132, 149,160 Bonaparte,Napoleonsee NapoleonI Bonaparte,Pauline(sister) 27,277 BonaparteVisitingthe Plague-StrickeninJaffa (painting)110 Borodino,Battleof259,308 Boswell,James22 JournalofaTourto Corsica22,32–3 Bougainville,Admiral102 Boulanger,General330 Boulogne,Campde,military festival(1804)179 Bourbonmonarchy12,37, 164,167,206,214,220,234, 271seealso RestoredMonarchy Bourrienne,LouisFauvelet 95,143,144 Briennemilitaryacademy29, 30–1,32 Britain abortedFrenchplanto invade(1798)90,93–4, 178 abortedFrenchplanto invade(1804)178–9 andBattleofWaterloo 290–1 andContinentalSystem 191–4,199,245–6,253 andCorsica19–20 declareswaronFrance (1803)174–7,180–2 andEgyptiancampaign 94,104–5,113,115 and‘GrandConspiracy’ 152 imposingofblockadeof Frenchcoastline253 Napoleon’sanimosity towards177,190 peacetreatywithFrance (1802)134,173,174 andPeninsularWar247, 248–9,250–1,253,262–3 andSiegeofToulon57 andWarofThird Coalition183 andWaroftheFifth Coalition254 andWaroftheSixth Coalition264 warsagainstFrance57, 173 Broers,Michael212,285 Brumaire,18(1799)121–8, 316 Brune,Marshal196 Brunswick,Dukeof51 Buttafoco,Matteode35,45 Cabarrus,Thérésia(Madame Tallien)65,66 Cadoudal,Georges152,153– 4 Cairo97–8,106 calendar,introductionofnew (1793)62–3 Cambacérès,Jean-Jacques 131,138,147,157,164,202, 205,284 Cambronne,GeneralPierre 277 Campbell,Neil278,280 CampioFormio,Treatyof 80–1,88,89,134 Canning,George194,253 CapeFinisterre183 Carbonari322 Carnot,Lazare29,60,73, 100,167,171,202,285 Soiréeducamp84 Carteaux,General56,57 Castlereagh,Lord287 CatherinetheGreat181 CatholicChurch139,168–70 Caulaincourt,Armandde 156,257,265,269,284 censorship133,145,206,234 ChamberofDeputies3 Chandler,David134–5,308 Chaptal,Jean-Antoine204 Charlemagne167,168,176, 182,221 Charles,Hippolyte90,143 [Hyppolytep.90] CharlesIV,KingofSpain 247 CharlesX(Comted’Artois) 152,322,326 Chateaubriand316 Mémoiresd’outretombe 155–6,316 Choiseul,Ducde95 chouans152,153 Cipriani(servant)306 CisalpineRepublic163,175 CivilCode138–9,207–8, 217 Clarke,GeneralHenri62, 203 Clary,Désirée64–5,66 Clary,Julie65 Clausewitz,Karlvon264 Clauzel,Marshal3 CommitteeofDivision47 CommitteeofPublicSafety 54,62 Concordat(1801)139–40, 168–9 Condé,Princede154 ConfederationoftheRhine 187,198,200 CongressofVienna223 conscription210–11 ConseildesAnciens126 ConseildesCinq-Cents120, 126 Constant,Benjamin285, 316–17 Constantinople255 Constitution (1815)283–4,285 Consulate130–1,132, 158,170 imperial(1804)165 oftheYearIII128–9 oftheYearVIII158 Consulate131–2,145,174, 204,205 constitution130–1,132, 158,170 erosionofcivilliberties during145–6 establishmentof124–7 newinstitutional frameworkimposed128–9 plotsagainst150–1,152 proclamation128–9 seekingpublicacceptance ofregime129–30 seealsoNapoleonI:First Consul ContinentalBlockade245 ContinentalSystem191–4, 199,209,213,214,245–6, 247,253,255 Cook,Captain Voyages99 Coquereau,Father7 Corsica16,17–24,35,43 familyhonourandhonour killingsin17–18 andFrenchRevolution43 Genoeserule18,20 history18–19 independence20–1 integrationofintoFrance (1790)46–7 invasionofbyFranceand annexationof(1769)23–4, 25,43 andNapoleon32–3,35, 43–4,46–7 andPaoli21–2 aspawninrelations betweenthegreatpowers 19–20 revoltagainstGenoese (1729)20 stratificationofsociety 23–4 CouncilofState151,210 CouronnedeFer141 Courrierdl’Arméed’Italie (newspaper)84,86 Courrierdel’Egypte (newssheet)107 Cretet,Emmanuel204 crime133 Cromwell,Oliver161 Cuba141 Dalberg198 Dalmatia211 Darwin,Charles297 Daunou124 David,Jacques-Louis134, 202,234,238 LeSacre234–5 Davis,John197 Davout,MarshalLouis Nicolas284 deGaulle,Charles330 deJoinville,Prince7,14 Debraux,Emile324 DécadeEgyptienne,La (newssheet)107–8 Decaen175 Decrès,Denis203–4,284 Delacroix326 Denmark Britishattackon(1807) 245 Denon,Dominique-Vivant 97,108,237–8 VoyagedanslaBasseetla HauteEgypte237–8 Desaix,GeneralLouis Charles134 Descriptiondel’Egypte110– 11 Dessalines,Jacques142 Directory64,70,71,71–2, 83,85,87,90–1,93,115, 118,136,197 overthrowof(18 Brumaire)121–8 divorce208 Djezzar,Ahmed101 Douai,Merlinde138 Doyle,William24 Drouot,GeneralAntoine277 Dubois,Louis152 Duffy,Michael181 Dugommier,General58 Dumouriez,GeneralCharles François53–4 Duroc,GeneralChristophe 196 Dwyer,Philip57–8 EasternQuestion19 EcoleMilitaire(Paris)31 EdenTreaty(1786)177,192 education137,206–7 Egypt96–8,seealso NapoleonI:EarlyCareer: Egyptiancampaign Elba,Napoleon’sexileon 272–4,277–9 electoralprocess218 Ellis,Geoffrey192 Empirevii,ix–x,15,195–215 administrationof200 administrative appointmentsinconquered territories208–9 andCivilCode138–9, 207–8,217 collapseof267,271 conscription210–11 constraintsandcensorship 206 creationof166,167 education206–7 electoralprocess218 evolvementof199–200 geographicalextentof242 impositionofFrench-style institutionsonconquered people197–8 ministersanddignitaries 203–4 andNaples214–15 Napoleon’sstrategy198, 204–5 oppositiontoand insurrectionsagainst Napoleon211–12,213–14, 244,253 organisationof199–200 representationofinart328 andrepublicans201–2, 205 resentmentoflaw enforcementandpolicing 211–12 andrevolutionarymodel 197,201,202,205,206–7, 210,217 roleofregicides202–3 andtaxation210 visionofasacivilsociety 185–6 Enghien,Ducd’154–6,316 Enlightenment36 Eril,Melzid’199 Erlon,Drouetd’290 EstatesofCorsica25 Eylau,Battleof(1807)188–9 FamilyCompact173 Favorite,La(corvette)6–7 FerdinandVII251 Férino,General133 festivals164 Napoleonic232,233 Fierens-Gevaert329 Finland243 Fontainebleau223 Fontainebleau,Treatyof (1814)271–2 Fontanes,Louisde ParallelbetweenCaesar 160–1 Fouché,Joseph120,121, 127,148,148–9,152,202, 229,284 FourSergeantsofLa Rochelle323 Fourès,Pauline116 Fox,CharlesJames194 Francevuedel’ArméeItalie, La(newspaper)84,86 FrancisI,Emperor230,271, 286 FrancisII,Emperor254 Franco-PrussianWar(1870) 328 FredericktheGreat38 FrederickI,King223 FrederickII,King222–3 FrederickWilliam,Kingof Prussia21,88,144,187,241, 264,271 FrenchAcademy100 FrenchProvisional Government272–3 FrenchRevolutionviii,x–xi, 41–2,45,46,48–50,170 andEmpire197,201,202, 205,206–7,210,217 Jacobindownfall58 NinthofThermidor revolutionandpurges58, 59 strugglebetween GirondinsandJacobites 53–4,58 Terror58,120 Fréron,Stanislas58 Friedland,Battleof189 Friedrich,Karl,GrandDuke ofBaden200 Gance,Abel329 Ganteaume,Vice-Admiral 116 Garnier,Jacques186 GeneralDirectionofthe BookTrade206 Genoa18,20,80 annexationofbyNapoleon 182 Georgin,François325 Gérard,General289 Géricault,Theodore234 Germanes,Abbé33 Germany74,180,186–7, 242,330 andContinentalSystem 192 nationalismin244 waragainstFrance134 Girodet234,236 Girondins53–4,60,147 Godoy,Manuel246 Goetheviii SorrowsofYoungWerther 99 Gohier,Louis122,127 Gourgaud,GeneralGaspar7, 298,299,300–1,306,319 Goya247 ‘GrandConspiracy’(1803) 152–4 GrandeArmée10,180,256– 7,276,325,330 Granville,Lord194 Gribeauval,JeanBaptistede 75 Gros,Antoine-Jean89,109– 10,189,234,236 Grouchy,MarshalEmmanuel 290–1 Guadeloupe142 Guérin,Narcisse109 Guibert75 Guillard,Rémi-Julien7–8 Guizot,François5–6 GustavIV243 Haitianrevolution193 Hanover187 Hardouin-Manssart,Jules4 Hoche,Lazare14,53,118, 122 Hofer,Andreas254 Hohenlinden134 Holland73,80,162–3,175, 200,209,267 annexationofbyNapoleon 200,209 HolyRomanEmpire73,182– 3,197 dissolutionof187,244 Hood,Admiral56 horses,shortageof266 HôteldesInvalides(Paris)4 Houssye,Henry275 Hugo,Victor15,291–2 HundredDaysseeNapoleon I:HundredDays illegitimacy208 ImperialGuard186,257, 261,279,291 ImperialMusicAcademy240 India90,94 Ingres,Jean-Auguste234 InstituteofEgypt103,107–8 Invalides,Churchofthe (Paris)xii,2–4 Istria199 Italiancampaignsee Napoleon:EarlyYears: Italiancampaign Jacobins48,49,53,55,58, 197 Jaffa110,146,234 Jamaica178 Jamestown(SaintHelena) 297–8 Jena,Battleof187,198 Josephine,Empress(née Beauharnais)66–7,89,90, 163,168,223,224–5 affairwithHippolyte90, 143 annulmentofmarriageto Napoleon229–30 andcourtlife225–6 death278 indebt143 depression144 discontentwith Napoleon’sabsences225, 226 infidelities90,227 andMalmaisonpalace225 marriagetoand relationshipwithNapoleon 66–7,90,143–4,225, 226–7 Joubert,GeneralBarthélemy 118,122 Jourdan,Annie14,38 JournaldeBonaparteetdes hommesvertueux (newspaper)87 JournaldesDébats316–17 journées62 judicialsystem218 Jullien,Marc-Antoine86 Junot,Androche61 Kalbus,Oskar330 Kellermann,Desaix14,134 Kléber,GeneralJean-Baptiste 100–1,113,115–16 KnightsofStJohn104,176 Koran99 Kutuzov,GeneralMichael 258,260,261 LaMeurthe,Boulayde284 LaPlaigne,Eléanorede228 Laclos,Choderlosde LesLiaisonsdangereuses 99–100 Lacretelle,Charles86 Lafayette,Marquisde48,49 Lakanal202 Lannes,General14,76,184, 196,254 Laon,Battleof267 LasCases,Comte Emmanuel-Josephde7,27, 196,298,299,300,301 MémorialdeSainteHélène314–15 LatinAmerica243 LePérouse102 Lebrun,Charles-François 131,156,201 Lefebvre,Georges138–9, 235,271 LegionofHonour4,14,140– 1,170,179,195,283 LegislativeBody120,128–9, 131,143,217 Leipzig,Battleof(Battleof theNations)(1813)266–7 Lejeune236 Lentz,Thierry167,173 Levant94 Ligny,Battleof289–90 Lisbon247 localgovernment reductioninautonomy 217–18 reformof137 Lodi,Battleof(1796)80,81, 82–3 Longwy51 Lotharingia176 LouisPhilippe,Kingxi-xii,1, 2,5,14,326–7 LouisXIV,King14,193,232 LouisXV,King25,231 LouisXVI,King12,50,202, 220 LouisXVIII,King272,274, 280,282 Louisiana,saleoftoUnited States142 Louvre237,238–9 Lowe,Hudson300,302,309, 310,311 Lucca182 Lunéville,Treatyof(1801) 134,174 lycées137,207 Lyon54 Macdonald,Marshal Alexandre14,122,271 Mack,General184 Malcolm,Lady305 Malcolm,SirPulteney305 Malmaison5,143,223,230 Malta104,176 Mamelukes104,113 Mantua,assaulton77,88 Marbeuf,Comtede28–9 Marchand,Louis298,303, 309,310,311,319 Marengo,Battleof13,134–5, 313 Maret203,284 MarieWalewska(film)228 Marie-Antoinette12,231 Marie-Louise,Empress230– 1,270,272,277 Marmont,Marshal61,168, 252,267,271 marriagelaw208 Marseille54,56 Marx,Karl331 Masséna14,76 Max-Joseph,KingofBavaria 222 MehemetAli(Pashaof Egypt)6,113 Melito,Miotde95,159 Memningen185 MémorialdeSainte-Hélèneix 318–19 Menou,General113 Metternich,Count229,264, 286 Meynell,Henry305 Migliorini,LuigiMascilli242 Milan79–80,199 MilanDecree(1807)191 militarycourts150 MinistryoftheInterior205 MinistryofWar203 Miranda,Franciscode243 Modena80 Moniteur(newspaper)84,86 Montenotte,Battleof(1796) 79 Montesquieu99 Montholon,Countde299, 300,311,319 Montmédy51 Moreau,GeneralJeanVictor 53,118,122,153 MorningPost146 Mortier,MarshalAdolphe14 MoscowCampaign258–9 Moulin,GeneralJean122 Mount-Tabor,Battleof104 Murat,Joachim80,115,184, 214,215 MuseumoftheHistoryof France(Versailles)327 Naples andEmpire214–15 invasionof(1806)187 receptionofFrench214 NapoleonI EarlyYears andabortedinvasionof Britainplan(1798)94 armypostings34,53 attempttowinover intellectualelite100 Barrasaspatronand supporterof58,61–2,71, 72,73 atBriennemilitary academy30–1,32 andBrumaireinsurrection (1799)121–8 cultivationofkeyJacobins 58 atEcoleMilitaire(Paris) 31–2,33–4 Egyptiancampaign91, 93–113,115 achievements112–13 battlevictories104,115 consentgivenforgo ahead96 asaculturaland scientific expedition102–3,107, 108–9,110–11 dealingswithcivil society105 departurefromandreturn toFrance115–17 enthusiasmfor95,96–7, 98–9 establishmentofInstitute ofEgypt103,107–8 fascinationwiththe Orient99,100,110 militarydefeatsby British104–5,112,115 portrayalofbyartists 109–10,236 propagandaoffensive 101,106–10,111–12 readinesstoforgive enemies109–10 readingmaterial99 retreatfromAcre105 tactics105 weakeningofarmyby plague anddisease105–6 FrenchAcademy membership100 andFrenchRevolution 42–3,44–5,45,46,48–9, 54,55,69 Italiancampaign73–87, 73–89,159 andBattleofLodi(1796) 80,81,82–3 battlevictoriesagainst Austrians79–80 commandofpropaganda andmanipulationofthe newspapers83–8 cultivationofand relationshipwithtroops 76–8 oratory77 portrayalofbypainters andpoets86–9 portrayalofin newspapers85 shortcomingsofarmy 74–5 tacticsandbattleplan75, 78–9,82 andTreatyofCampo Formio(1797)80–1,88, 89,134 militaryeducationand academicrecord29,30–1 andParisianhighsociety 65–6 philosophicalandpolitical beliefs35–8 promotiontobrigadiergeneral58 promotiontogénéralen chefoftheArmyofthe Interior70–2 rejectionofbyCorsican peopleandfamilyforced toleaveCorsica47–8 republicansympathies38, 46 returnvisitstoCorsicaand politicalactivitiesin34–5, 44–5,46,117–18 sidelinedby Thermidorians60–1,62 andSiegeofToulon (1793)56–8,59,69 suspicionofestablished elites38 underhousearreston chargeoftreason59 andVendéecampaign61 andVendémiaireriots (Paris)(1793)62–4,69 FirstConsul129–65 armyreforms130 assassinationattempt (1800)150–1 authoritarianismof132–3, 146,149–50,151,156 andBattleofMarengo 134–5 campaigntorecapture Saint-Dominguefrom Toussaint(1801)141–2 circleoftrusted counsellors146–7 CivilCode138–9 andConcordat(1801) 139–40,168,169 contemptforTribunate 146 dealingwithVendée rebellion(1800)139 deliveringofpeace134, 135 domesticreforms135–9, 145 dynasticambitions165, 170 educationalreform137 gettingsupportfromarmy 129–30 ‘GrandConspiracy’ against(1803)152–6 increaseinpowers158–9 institutingofLegionof Honour140–1 lifeconsulshipbestowed on(1802)143–4,163 localgovernmentreform 137 masteryofpropaganda 133 andPlotoftheRueSaintNicaise150–1 repressivemeasurestaken againstneo-Jacobins151– 2 andresumptionofwar withBritain(1803)174–7 stepstakentocombat crimeandbanditry133–4, 135,150 styleofleadership145, 146 andtaxation136–7 visionofunitedEurope 176 Emperor abdication(1814)271–2 abortedinvasionofBritain (1804)178–9 adoptionoftrappingsof monarchy219 alliancewithPersia243 animositytowardsBritain 177,190 andBattleofAusterlitz13, 185–6,288 buildingofpalacesand monumentsinParis239 ContinentalSystem implemented191–4,199, 209,213,214,245–6,247, 253,255 coronationasemperor (1804)165–70,176,219– 20 coronationasKingofItaly (1805)182,221–2 criticismof315,316–18 fadingofmilitaryabilities 262 andfestivals232,233 finalleaveofarmyat Fontainebleauafterdefeat 276,325 imperialresidences223 lifestyle223–4 andLouvre238–9 marriageceremonyto MarieLouise231–2 patronageoftheartsand music234,235–40 andPeninsularWarsee PeninsularWar portraitsandpaintingsof 233–5 projectionofimage throughpropagandist devices219,232–4 reformsandmodernisation 196–7 Russiancampaign199, 256–62,263 assemblingofGrande Arméé delaRussie256–7 difficultconditions257 international consequencesof262 losses260,261 retreatfromMoscowand difficultiesfaced259–61 strategyandtactics258 seekingtoestablish legitimacy amonginternational community219–22 andsuccession166–7,229 tasteforlavishdisplay 159–60 andWarofThird Coalition183–7 andWaroftheFourth Coalition187–90,193 andWaroftheFifth Coalition254 andWaroftheSixth Coalition263–8,269–70 seealsoEmpire ExileonSaintHelena295– 311 acrimoniousrelationswith Britishgovernor302 caricaturesof306 conditionsonisland297–8 death309–10 deteriorationinhealthand reducedmobility307,309 entourageaccompanying andclosecompanions 298–300 funeralandburialplace 310–11 lifestyle303–4 andpropaganda313 receivesvisitors304–5 recordingofmemoirsand reminiscingoncampaigns 301,304,306–7,313–15 residence(Longwood) 302–4 restrictionson302 solitudeofandboutsof depression305–6 voyageto298,299 will309 HundredDays14,279–82 assemblingofarmy againstAllies287,288–9 andBattleofLigny289– 90 andBattleofWaterloo 288,290–2,307,329 constitutionalreforms 283–4 establishmentofcivil government284–5 invasionofFrench mainlandandmarchto Paris280–1 localsupportofNapoleon 281 occupationofTuileries 282 raisingofarmyandnavy onElba279–80 secondabdication292–3 tacticsagainstAllies289 viewofbyAllies285–6 winningofFrenchunitsto hisside281–2 LegendandCultofxi–xii, 16,313–28 biographicalaccountsand memoirsof319–20 andcourseprogrammesat SaintCyrmilitary academy327–8 defeataspartof326 furtheringofbyformer soldiers325–6 growthofdueto repressive Restorationmonarchy 320–1,322–3 andLouis-Philippe326–7 mythof88,112,118,134, 319–20,325,329,8382 paintingsof326 politicallegacy330–1 portrayalofinfilms329– 30 publishingofMémorialde Sainte-Hélène318–19 SecondComingrumours 321–2 songsabout323–4 woodcutsandimages d’Epinalof324–5 Personal affairs227,228 ambitions33,73,81–2, 87,98,157 annulmentofmarriageto Josephine229–30 andbirthofson231 charactertraitsand attributes31,64,177 childhoodandupbringing 26–7 andCorsicanroots32–3, 35,43–4,46–7 exileonElba272–4,277– 9 amilybackground24–6 furtheringinterestsofhis family27–8,160,161 giftforself-publicityand self-promotion55,83–8, 107,123–4,232–3,313 healthproblems262,308 influenceofmother27 interestinParistheatre88 loveforMariaWalewska 228 andMalmaison143–4 marriagetoMarie-Louise 230–1 portraitsof88–9,233 relationshipwithbrother (Joseph)163 relationshipwithbrother (Lucien)160–1 relationshipwithand marriagetoJosephine66– 7,90,143–4,226–8 andreligion139,169 romanticinvolvementwith DésiréeClary64–5 Seurre’sstatueof327 woundedinbattles308 ReturnoftheAshes(1840) xii,1–16 celebrationsmarking journeytoParis9–10 choiceoftheInvalidesas restingplaceand constructionoftomb2–5 costs2 culturaldepictionsof15– 16 exhumationofbody2,7–9 funeralprocession11–14 funeralservice14–15 negotiationswiththe British5–6 Writings35,36–7,38 appreciationforpowerof thewrittenwordix CorsicanLetters36 ‘DissertationonRoyal Authority’37 LettertoMatteoButtafoco 45 MémorialdeSainteHélèneix,318–19 SouperdeBeaucaire38, 55 NapoleonII270–1,277–8 NapoleonIII(LouisNapoleon)330,331 NapoleonPardoningthe RebelsofCairo(painting) 109 Napoleon,Saint233 NapoleonicWars208,243, 329–30 deathtoll287–8 seealsoindividualwars NationalAssembly45,47,48 NationalConvention54,57, 59,61,62,63,71,72,142 NationalDay164 NationalGuard35,44,49, 63,123,124 navy,French94,178 Necker,Jacques318 Nelson,Horatio104,183 neo-Jacobins120–1,122 Napoleon’srepressive measurestakenagainst 151 Netherlands200 newspapers84–6,133,206 declineinnumberduring Consulate133 inEmpire206 andItaliancampaign84–6 Ney,Marshal14,271,282, 290,307 Nile,Battleofthe(1798)104, 105 NinthofThermidor, revolutionof(1794)58,59– 60 Noailles,Marshalde20 Normandie(river-steamer)9 Northumberland(warship) 298,299 NouvellesPolitiques (newspaper)86 O’Brien,David234 O’Meara,DrBarry299,306, 308 Otranto,DukeofseeFouché, Joseph OttomanEmpire243 Oudinot,MarshalNicolas Charles271 Palmerston,Lord6 Paoli,Pascal21–2,23,24, 28,32,35,43–4,45,46,47 Papacy139–40,197 Paris239 artmarket109 booktrade206 highsocietyin65 occupationofbyAllies (1814)270 theatre88 Vendémiaireriots(1793) 62–4,69 withdrawalofAllied forces275 ParisOpera240 Parma175,182 Péguy,Charles292 Pellerin,Jean-Charles16,325 PeninsularWar199,246–52, 262–3 andBritain247,248–9,250– 1,253,262–3 failureofNapoleon’s strategicapproach251–2 guerrillawarfare249–50, 251 invasionofSpainand placingofJosephon throneofSpain(1808) 246–8 invasionsofPortugal247, 250–1 militarysuccesses251 Napoleon’sshortcomings over252 Percy,Baron189 Perpignan53 Persia98,103,242,243 Pétain,Philippe330 Piacenza182 Pichegru,General122,152, 153 Piedmont175 Pitt,William180,191 PiusVII,Pope139,168–9, 254 PlacedelaConcorde(Paris) 239 plebiscites218 PlotoftheRueSaint-Nicaise 150–1 police/policing135,149 Polignac,Armandde153 Portalis203 Porterfield,Todd237 Portugal,invasionsofby Napoleon247,250–1 prefect137,205,206,209, 210 Pressburg,Treatyof(1806) 186–7 Prud’hon,Pierre-Paul235 Prussia180,252–3 andTilsitpeaceaccords 198,241–2 andWaroftheFourth Coalition187–8,190 andWaroftheSixth Coalition264 andWaroftheSeventh Coalition289,291 warwithFrance(1792)51 Publiciste,Le(newspaper) 112 Pyramids,Battleofthe (1798)104,109,238 Pyrenees,Battleof263 Quatre-Bras,Battleof290 Rastadtcongress89–90 Raynal,Abbé36 Réal,PierreFrançois155 Rémusat,Charlesde3,240 Restorationmonarchy320–1 repressivemeasures320, 322–3 ReturnoftheAshessee NapoleonI:Returnofthe Ashes ReturnoftheHero(play)118 Richardson,Nicholas137 Rivière,Marquisde153 Robespierre,Augustin58,59 Robespierre,Maximilien51, 148,197 Rochefort295 Roland,Jean-Marie238 Rome139,167,214 Romme,Gilbert63 RosettaStone111,236 Rousseau,Jacques35,37,99 Rowlandson296 RoyalNavy56,94,152,178, 183,190–1,253 Rudé,George64 Russia180,181,242,243, 244,253 alliancewithFrance255? breakingofwith ContinentalSystem255–6 Napoleon’srupturewith AlexanderI255–6 andTilsitpeaceaccords 198,241 andWaroftheThird Coalition182,183,185–6 andWaroftheFourth Coalition188–90 andWaroftheSixth Coalition264 warwithSweden255 seealsoNapoleonI: Emperor:Russian campaign Said,Edward103–4 SaintHelenaseeNapoleon: ExileonSaintHelena StVincent,Lord183 Saint-Cloud223–4,231 Saint-Cyr,militaryacademy at327–8 Saint-Cyr,Gouvion184 Saint-Denis(Napoleon’s servant)298–9 Saint-Domingue(Haiti)141– 2,193 Saint-Jean-d’Acre105 Salamanca,Battleof262 Saliceti,Christophe45,54, 58,59 Savary,René203 Saxony200 Schroeder,Paul175 Scott,Walter99 Sébastiani,Colonel196 Senate,MarshalJeanPhilbert 128,157–8,164–5 Sérurier,Marshal76 Servan,Joseph75 SevenYearsWar20,78 Sieyès,AbbéEmmanuel120, 121,122,123,127,131,202 singingsocieties323 Smith,Sidney117,119 Smolensk,Battleof259 SociétédelaRueduBac121 Soullié,Frédéric321 Soult,MarshalJean10,185, 252,263,307 SouthTyrol199 Spain Napoleon’sinvasionof 246–7seealsoPeninsular War SpecialMilitaryTribunal133 specialtribunals150 Speranski256 spynetwork149 Staël,Germaine,Madamede 122,317–18 Del’Allemagne317 Stoddart,John296 Sweden overthrowofGustavIV 243 warwithRussia255 andWaroftheThird Coalition183 Taine,Hippolyte288 Talleyrand,CharlesMaurice de95–6,147–8,164,203, 228,229,271,272 Tallien,Madame(Thérésia Cabarrus)65,66 Tascher,Joseph-Gaspardde 66 taxation136–7,210 Teil,Jeandu53 Thibaudeau156–7,158 Thiers,Adolphe2,5 Thionville51 Tilsitpeaceaccords(1807) 189–90,193,198,241–2 Tolly,Barclayde256,258, 259 Tolstoy,Leo WarandPeace258 TopographicalBureau62 totalwar177 Toulon,Siegeof(1793)56– 8,59,313 ToussaintLouverture141–2 Trafalgar,Battleof183 Tribunate128–9,138,146, 151,158,166,217 Trichot,François15 Tuileries(Paris)223,231 Tulard,Jean118 Turkey98,242 Tuscany,GrandDuchessof 214 Ulm184,185 UnitedStatessaleof Louisianato142 UniversityofFrance137,207 Valetta104 Valmy,Battleof51–2,328 Vauban4,14 Vendéeriots54,60,61,139 rebellionin(1800)139 revoltin(1793)54,60,61 Vendémiaireriots(Paris) (1793)62–4,69 Veneto199 Venezuela243 Venice81 Verdun51 Vergennes95 Vernet,Horace15 VictorAmadeus,Kingof Sardinia79 Vienna,captureofby Napoleon185 Vienna,Treaty(1815)286 Vinçard,Pierre323 Visconti,Louis4,5 Volney,Constantin238 Voltaire52,99 Walewska,Maria228–9, 277–8 Walewski,Alexander228 WaroftheThirdCoalition 183–7 BattleofAusterlitz13, 185–6,288 BattleofTrafalgar183 endingof186–7 plantolureRoyalNavy awayfromChannel183 surrenderofAustriansat Ulm184,185 WaroftheFourthCoalition 187–90,193 BattleofEylau188–9 BattleofFriedland189 Tilsitpeaceaccords(1807) 189–90,193,198,241–2 WaroftheFifthCoalition 254 WaroftheSixthCoalition 223,244,263–8,269–70,330 assemblingofarmyand shortfallsof265–6 BattleoftheNations (1813)266–7 defeatofNapoleon267–8, 269–71 occupationofParisby Allies270 peaceovertures269–70 shortageofhorses266 WaroftheSeventhCoalition 286–93seealsoNapoleon: HundredDays WarsofLiberationseeWar oftheSixthCoalition Warsaw,GrandDuchyof 213,241,244,256 Waterloo,Battleof288,290– 2,307,329 WellesleyseeWellington, Dukeof Wellington,Dukeof249, 251,252,262–3,287,289, 290,291,329 WestIndies178 Westphalia200 Wilkinson,Spenser82 Wilson,Stephen18 Wittgenstein261 women,andCivilCode208 Württemberg186,198,200 TheBonapartefamilyhome inAjaccio:paintingby Fontenay,1849.©akgimages/LaurentLecat TheBridgeofArcole,scene ofalegendaryvictory,1796; byBaronLouis-AlbertGuillainGros.©TheArt Archive/MuséeduChâteau deVersailles/GianniDagli Orti BonaparteattheBridgeof Arcole:Antoine-JeanGros, 1801.©Corbis TheVictorofItaly:an unfinishedportraitby David,1797.©TheArt Archive/MuséeduChâteau deVersailles/GianniDagli Orti TheLureoftheOrient:the BattleofAboukirasseenby Lejeune.©TheArtArchive/ MuséeduChâteaude Versailles/GianniDagliOrti TheBattleofthePyramids:a 19thcenturypopularprint.© TheArtArchive/Musée CarnavaletParis/Gianni DagliOrti TheImperialMoment: Napoleon’sCoronation asrecordedbyDavid.©The ArtArchive/Muséedu LouvreParis/GianniDagli Orti TheCorsicanSpiderinHis Web:acaricaturebyThomas Rowlandson.©Guildhall Library,CityofLondon/The BridgemanArtLibrary FightingfortheDunghill: JamesGillray’sVisionof 1798.©Courtesyofthe WardenandScholarsofNew College,Oxford/The BridgemanArtLibrary ConsolidatingChristianity:a satirical19thcentury broadsheet.©Roger-Viollet/ Topfoto MariaWalewska,Napoleon’s Polishmistress:aportraitby RobertLefevre.©akgimages/ErichLessing Napoleoninhisstudyatthe Tuileries:astudybyDavid, 1811.©TheGallery Collection/Corbis ThePassageoftheBérésina: themiseriesofthe MoscowCampaign.©TheArt Archive/MuséeCarnavalet Paris/GianniDagliOrti Above:LongwoodHouseon SaintHelena:where Napoleonspenthiscaptivity. ©KentKobersteen/National GeographicSociety/Corbis Left:GeraniumValley: imaginingNapoleon’sfinal resting-placeonSaintHelena. ©TheArtArchive/ NapoleonicMuseumRome/ GianniDagliOrti Belowleft:Napoleontalking toasoldier:aromantic representationby HippolyteBellangé.© BrooklynMuseum/Corbis Oppositetop:Apotheosis, afterHoraceVernet:a favouredthemeof19th centuryartists.©TheArt Archive/MuseoGlauco LombardiParma/Gianni DagliOrti Oppositemiddle:Napoleon workingintheLongwood Garden:mid-19thcenturyby OlivierPichat.©Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis Oppositebottom: TransferringtheAshestothe Invalides:lithographby NapoléonThomas,1840.© TheArtArchive/Marc Charmet Napoleonandthecinema: AbelGancein1927.©SGF/ Gaumont/TheKobal Collection Napoleonandthecinema: SachaGuitryin1955.©Les FilmsC.L.M./Album/akgimages

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