Download steps to the politioal

STEPS
TOTHEPOLITIOAL,
EOONONIIO
AND MILITARY
DIVISION
OF EUROPE:
PARTI
By the end of 1949Europehad beendivided into
two separate.spheresof influence,.In
september1949,following the BerrinBlockade,the Federar
R.p.,t ti. of Germany(FDR),
alsoknown aswest Germany,was established.
A month later the GermanDemocratic
Republic(GDR), alsoknown as EastGermany,was
established.
Thus the two Germanys
becamethe heart of the physicaldividing line between
the two superpowerblocs.The eight
keystepslistedbelow show the eventsthat led to this
division:
NATOestablished,
April
WestGermanyestablished,
September
EastGermanyestablished,
October
BerlinBlockade,
June1949
CzechCoup,February1949
RedArmy Occupationof EasternEurope,1g45_1g47
MarshallPlan,June1947
TrumanDoctrine,March 1947and Cominform
,October 1947
Churchill's
lronCurtainSpeechat Fulton,Missour
i, March1946
Kennan'sLongTelegram,February1946
Warti me Conferences:
TehranI 943,yaltu t S+S,potrdu,;;
Thesestepsare coveredin this and the next chapLer.
ffi
t
A s y ou r e a dt h e s et w o c h a p te r sco n sid e rth e fo jlo win g
e ssa yq u e s ti ons
o W a st h e b r e a k d o w no f th e wa r tim eGr a n d
Allia n cein e vita b lei
o Cana n y o n e p e r s o n a l i ty
o r co u n tr yb e b la m e dm o r eth a n o th e rs?
o W h a t i s s u e si n p o s t - w arEu r o p eca u se dtn e
m o st te n sio n ?
: ta iand
19 39 Ger m an
inv as ion
of p o l a n dBri
n France
declare
waron Germany
Beginning
of Winter
Warbetween
U S SR
a n dF i n l a n d
1940 Hitler's
Blitzkriegthrough
Europe
takeover
of Norway,
Denmark,
theNetherlands,
Belgium
andFrance
Battleof Britain
1941 Germany
'Operation
begins
Barbarossa,
andinvasion
ol U SS R
Britain
andUSAsignAtlantjc
Charter
Pearl
Harbor
attackbyJapan
bringsUSAjntothewar
STEPS
To rHE PoLirlcAL,ECoNoMtcANDMtLtrARy
DtvtstcNoF EURCPE:
PARTr
1942 German
assault
on Stalingrad
German
defeatat ElAlamein
in NorthAfrica
1943 German
defeat
at Stalingrad
Alliedinvasion
of ltaly
Tehran
Conference
1944 D-Day
landings
byBritish
andAmerican
forces
beginin Normandy
Rome
fallsto alliedforces
1945 Warsaw
fallsto Soviet
troops
YaltaConference
Russian
forces
enterBerlin
President
Roosevelt
diesandisreplaced
byTruman
UnitedNations
meets
forthefirsttimein SanFrancisco
Ge rm a ns yu rre n d ers
Potsdam
Conference
N u c l e abro mbds ro pped
on H i roshi ma
andN agasaki
Japan
Surrenders
1946 Kennan
Telegram
lrancrisis
Churchill's
lronCurtain
speech
at Fulton,
Missourr
1947 Announcement
ofTruman
Doctrine
of aidto Greece
andTurkey
Marshall
Planforeconomic
recovery
of Europe
proposed
Creation
of Cominform
1948 Czechoslovakian
Coup
Marshall
Planpassed
byCongress
B e rl iani rl i ft
1 9 4 9 C 0 ME C 0eNs ta b l i shed
NAT0established
Berlin
Blockade
ends
USSR
explodes
itsfirstatomicbomb
Federal
Republic
of Germany
established
German
Democratic
Republic
established
The breakdownof the GrandAlliance
the NazisattackedRussiain lune 1941,both British Prime Minister Winston S.
@fvn."
Churchill and Rooseveltsent aid to the Soviets.This marked the beginningof the
Grand
Alliance.However,this did not mark a changein how stalin,ssoviet union was
seen,
particularlyby the British. Churchill retainedhis dislikeof the Sovietleader,remarking
'If Hitler invadedHell, I would make at leastfavourablereference
to his secretary,
to the
Devil in the Houseof Commons'.Thus, relationsbetweenthe Westand the USSR
werestill
cloudedby mutual suspicion,asthey had beenin the r920sand 1930s.
Despitethe fact that the two Westernpowerssenta considerableamount of aid to
the USSR,
Stalin demanded more action- nothing lessthan the opening of a 'secondfront' in Europe
to
takesomeof the pressureoff the USSRin the east.The Allies agreedto this'in principlel
but
said that they would not be ableto open this 'secondfront' until the time was deemed
right.
Stalin was suspiciousthat they were deliberatelydelayingthis offensivein the hope of
,..irrg
the soviet Union permanentlyweakenedby the continuing German onslaught.
At the first of the threewartime conferences,
Tehranin lg43,relationsbetweenthe Big
Three seemedto improve a little, asthe Westernleadersproposeda definitedate
for the
Normandy invasion:May l944.In return, Starinpromisedto declarewar on
Japanonce
Germanywas defeated.
-
Step
During tl
structure
before th,
into the f
o the sta
o the sta
o the Ur
TheT
The first
Stalin rep
Minister
what bec
The statr
turningon the E
NorthAl
yet launc
continue
machine
war agai
German
defeated
USA anc
of the Al
ofVersa
future o1
of Germ
invasion
Poland:
future ol
secureh.
a pro-So
invasion
Poland i
this, the
ensured
looked I
security
a massI
by the S
suspect
Eastern
betwee
Finland
British i
1941A1
Step One:The wartimeconferences
During the war, the decisionsof the Grand
Alliance determined the territorial and political
structure of post-war Europe. There were three
historic conferencesbetweenthe Allies
before the end of world war TWo.The key issues
under discussionat the conferencesfall
into the following categories:
r the stateof the war
o the status of Germany,poland, Eastern
Europe and Japan
o the United Nations.
TheTehranConference,
1g43
The first conferencewas held in Tehran'Iran
in November 1943.Thosepresentwere
Josef
stalin representingthe USSR,PresidentFranklin
Rooseveltrepresentingthe USA and prime
Minister winston churchill representingthe
united Kingdom. This wa-sthe first meeting of
what becameknown asthe Big Three.Their discussions
focusedon thesekey areas:
The state of the war: By r943,the Allies had
begun to win the war, following critical
turning-point victories in 1942'The soviets
were now pushing the Germansinto retreat
on the Easternfront, while the Americans and
the British had driven the Germansfrom
North Africa and had invaded Mussolini's Italy.
However,the uK and the USA had not
yet launchedthe kind of secondfront that
staiin hud beendemanding.Therefore,stalin
continued to presshis allies to take on more
of the burden of confron-tingthe German war
machine from the USSRby invading north-western
Europe. There was discussionof the
war against/apan in the pacific, which had entered
rts brutal .israndhopping,phase.
The key question for the Allies was what to
do with Germany after it had been
lermany:
defeated'The soviets had very different views
about the future of Germany from those of
the
usA and Britain' Many of thesedifferencesstemmed
flom the varied wartime experiences
of the Allies, the 'lessons'that seemedto have
beenlearned from the failure of the Tieaty
of versailles,and their widery differing ideologies.
Thus there was no agreementon the
future of a defeatedGermany.However,tt.y Jla
confirm that.unconditional surrender,
of Germanywas their objective'Rooseveltalso
supported 'operation overlord, (the Allied
invasionof northern Francethat beganwith
D-Day on 6 iune 1944) asapriority.
Poland: stalin's main concernwas'security'.
This coloured not onry his demandsover the
future of Germany,but also over the shapeof Poland's
post-war borders.stalin wanted to
securehis westernborder by gaining territory from poland,
and by ensuringthat poland had
a pro-soviet government.He arguedthat Poland
had beenthe traditional launching pad for
invasionsof Russia'It was thus agreedthat the
usSR was to keepterritory seizedin 1939,and
Polandin turn would be given territory on its
westernborder from Germany.By agreeingto
this,the Allies createda situation that no truly
independentporand could agreeto, and also
future hostility betweenGermanyand poland.
Thus, a puppet regime in poland
1nrured
looked like a real possibility' and that regime presumably
would haveto look to the uSSR for
security'Tensionsbetweenthe Polesand soviets
were increasedin l943with the discoveryof
a massgraveof 10,000Polish soldiersin the Kat1,n
Forest.Thesesoldiershad beencaptured
by the Sovietsin 1939.TheSovietsblamed the
Germansfor the massacre,but many poles
suspected(rightly) that the Sovietswere responsible.
Eastern Europe: The soviets demandedthe right
to keep the territory that they had seized
between 1939 and r 940' This meant remainin!
in control of the Baltic states,parts of
Finland and Romania in EasternEurope.with
much reluctance,the Americans and the
British agreedto the soviet annexation of these
territories. However,this was againstthe
1941Atlantic charter'agreementbetweenthe
United statesand the united Kinsdom.
fitl
@
The Atlantic Charter of
August 1941
fr
The AtlanticCharterwas
an agreementbetween
the USA(before it had
enteredthe war)and the
UK,which broadlyset
down their mutual,vision,
ofthe shapeofthe postwar world.Thecharter
focused on the future
#
of occupiedterritorjes,
which would r€turnto
selfrule.Both countries
alsoagreedon freeglobal
trade,and the charter,s
high moral ideasprovided
ffi
the firststepstowardsthe
formationof the United
N atl ons.
srEPSTC THEPoLlrlcAL,ECoNCN/lc
ANDtvtltrARyDtvlsroNoF EURCPE:
PAFTI
fapan: The United Statesand the United Kingdom pressedthe USSRto enterthe war with
Japan.They wantedStalinto open a Soviet'secondfront'in Asia.However,Stalin could not
be convincedto do this until the war with Germanywaswon.
The united Nations: The Americans,in particular,werevery keento establisha
replacementfor the Leagueof Nations.The British and the Sovietsgavetheir general
approvalto the idea of a new internationalorganizationbeing established.
This would,
again,be designedto settleinternationaldisputesthrough collectivesecurity.The USA
hoped that lessonswould havebeenlearnedfrom the'mistakes'thatweremade in the
structureand make up of the Leagueof Nations and that the proposedUnited Nations
Organizationcould more successfully
fulfil this brief.
conclusions: Thereweretwo main positiveoutcomesfrom the Tehranconference:
.
agreementon a new internationalorganization
.
agreementon the needfor a weakpost-war Germany.
Rooseveltand Stalin seemedto work reasonablywell together.Indeed,on his return to the
USA, Rooseveltpublicly statedin a radio broadcast:'Igot along fine with MarshalStalin
... I believethat we aregoing to get alongvery well with him and the Russianpeople...'
However,asthe war continued,the next meetingof the Big Threerevealeda growing gap
betweenStalin'spost-waraims and thoseof the Westernpowers,though thesedifferences
seemedmore acutebetweenStalin and Churchill. Churchill did not trust Stalin,and
Roosevelthoped to play the role of 'mediator'betweenthe British and the Russians.
Rooseveltseemedto believethat the more seriousproblem for post-warstabilitywas British
imperialism,rather than Sovietstrength.Rooseveltis supposedto havetold Stanislaw
Mikolajczyk,the leaderin London of the Polesin exile,'...of one thing I am certain,Stalin
is not an imperialist.'Rooseveltdid not appearoverlyconcernedabout the future of poland,
nor washe worried about the Allies taking the German capital,Berlin, beforethe Soviets.
TheYaltaConference,
1g4S
By the time of the February1945YaltaConferenceon the Black Seain the southern
Ukraine, Stalin'sdiplomatic position was greatlystrengthenedby the physicalfact that
the RedArmy occupiedmost of EasternEurope.once again,the Big Threepowerswere
representedby Stalin,Rooseveltand Churchill.The topicsunder discussionwerethe same
asat Tehran:
The state of the war: Germanywas now on the vergeof being defeated.With the Normandy
landings in 1944,a secondfront had finally beenopened.The sovietshad driven the
Germansfrom EasternEurope,and were now readyto invade Germanyitself.The British and
Americanshad forced the Germansfrom France,and were now poisedto crossthe Rhine and
invade Germanyfrom the west.Japanwas still fighting on, but had been under heaq, aerial
bombardment from the Americans.The USA was now in control of the air and seain the
Pacific,and the Japanese
werepreparing for the final desperatedefenceof their homeland.
Germany: The Allies decidedthat Germanywould be disarmed,demilitarized,de-Nazified,
and divided. It was agreedthat post-war Germanywould be divided into four zonesof
occupationbetweenthe USA, the USSR,the uK and France.This division wasto be
'temporary',and Germanywas to be run asone country.An Allied control commission
(ACC) would be setup to govern Germany.Stalin demandeda largepercentageof reparations
from Germanyafter the devastationthat the war in the Easthad wreakedon the Russians.It
was agreedthat Germanywould pay $20 billion, and 50 per centwould go to the USSR.
Poland: Pola
drawn, and l
new frontierr
be drawn at t
been beforet
territory fror
got what he I
democratic1
areaof disag
known asth
1939,while 1
to form the r
ftr-
l/ )
h
I
II
l-
I lKe
lt -le
EasternEu
governmen
be ableto d
victory for
most signi
]apan: Sta
waswon.H
This would
acceptedth
UnitedNal
Organizat
SecurityC
16 SovietR
American
and Belaru
Poland:Polandpresentedthe greatestproblem - wherewould the linesof its bordersbe
drawn, and what would be the political make-up of her post-war government?At Yaltathe
new frontiers of Poland were decided.The border between Poland and the USSRwas to
be drawn at the'Curzon Line' (seemap below).This put the frontier back to whereit had
beenbeforethe Russo-Polishwar of 1921.The Poleswereto be compensatedby gaining
territory from Germany.This would be eastof the'oder-NeisseLine'.Thus, stalin had
got what he had wanted territorially. In return, he agreedto the establishmentof a more
democratic government in Poland, following'free elections'.This developedinto the key
areaof disagreementbetweenthe British and the Soviets.The British supportedthe group
known asthe'London Poles',who werethe pre-war governmentthat had fled to Englandin
1939,while the Russianswanted the Communist-dominated Lublin Committee in Poland
to form the new post-war government.
{
EasternEurope: There seemedto be agreementat Yalta over the future nature of the
governmentsof EasternEurope. Stalin agreedthat the countries of EasternEurope would
be ableto decidewho governedthem in'free elections'.This wasperceivedas a major
victory for the USA and Britain. Indeed, for the British and Americans this was seenas the
most significant of the wartime dealsmade with the Soviet Union.
fapan: Stalin now promised to enter the war with Japan,as soon asthe war in Europe
waswon. However,the Sovietsdemandedterritory in return from ]apan as a'reward'.
This would include South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.The Americans and the British
acceptedtheseterms.
United Nations: Stalin agreedthat the Soviet Union would join the United Nations
Organization.The Allies agreedthat there would be five permanent members of the
SecurityCouncil, eachwith the power of the veto. Stalin went on to demand that all
16 SovietRepublicshave separateseatsin the UN GeneralAssembly.The British and
Americansagreedin the end to only three seatsfor individual republics:Russia,the Ukraine
and Belarus.
thir rup showsthe new
borders
of Poland.
CF EUBOPE:PART]
STFPSTO THFPOITICAI ECCNCMICAND ["ILITABYDIVISICN
Conclusions:Therewerethree main positiveoutcomesof the YaltaConference:
ln sof
powe
r zrgreement
on the United Nations
meth
o Sovietagreementto join the war in the Pacificagainstlapan
o the Big Three signinga'Deciarationfor LiberatedEurope'pledgingtheir support for
clemocraticgovernrxentsbasedon free electionsin all Etiropeancountries,including
gover
statec
+h^" ^
Lt lctq
EasternEurope.
i
I
no 0r
differ
lwas
Who were the London Poles and the Lublin Poles?
T h e L o n d o n Po le s:M a n yth o u sa ndsof Pol esmanagedto escapefrom Poand dur ng the tw o assauts
o n th e ir co u n tr yb yGe r m a n a n d Sovi etforcesl nl g3gl g4O.Thesei ncudedmembersottheP ol i sh
'l O0,0OO
refugeePol l shi roops regroupedi n Franceand
g o ve r n m e n ta n d a r m e dfo r ce s.Ap proxl matel y
lt
co n tr lb u te dto th e A le d wa r e ffo r t.A though the Pol l shgovernmenti n exl l ei nl ti al l yw as al sol n France,
uc
Lct I
cann
force
YOUTT
m o ve dto L o n d o na fte rth e fa o f F rancei n I 940.
onwr
untl l he di ed l n a pl anecrashi n .l ul y1943.
aw Si korski
T h e L o n d o nPo le swe r e le d b y Ge n eral Wl adys
He h a d a lsob e e nCo m m a n d e rln - C hl efofthe Pol l sharmedforces.H e w as succeededas P ri meMi ni ster
fal rLyefr
P artylMi kol aj czykw as
who had been l eaderof the'Peasant
M iko la jczyk,
in e xileb y Sta n isla w
C
ommander
in
the
new
H
ow
ever,
w
i
th
the
Sovi
ets.
an
agreement
win g , a n d o p e n to th e id e ao f r e a chi ng
^t{^-r
on th
the fu
w as opposedto any
w l th other l eadi ngPol es,
together
Sosnkow ski
,
l zim terz
Ch ie fo f th e a r m y,Ge n e r aKa
d e a lswith th e So vie ts.
I hav.
now (
i fw e l
the
Ch u r ch illh a d a ve r yto u g h ttm e p e rsuadl ngthePol estoacceptashi fti nthei rbordertothew estof
the l andthey had
Cu r zo nL jn e( se em a p o n p a g e 13 ) .The Pol esi nsi stedthat l f they w ere to sacri fi ce
governmentw ou d be
that Pol ano's
n ey must havecasti ron guarantees
g a in e din wa r ( ,l9 2 0 - 1 9 2 1 ) ,th eth
Y O US
'free'afterthe war.
of thi
poss
futuregovernment
y i kel ythat Pol and's
Bu t.a s So vie tfo r ce sm o ve dwe st jn 1944,l t seemedi ncreasi nglunl
wou d indeed be free of Sovietrnterference.
Real
deve
T h e L o n d o nPo le sp la ye da n im p o r tantpart l n the doomedWarsawR i si ngol August 1944.Whenthe R -^d
the Pol i shundergroundforces,commandedby the
Ar m y r e a ch e dWa r sa wo n its a d va nceto Germany,
R edArmy w al tedoutsi deWarsawunti lthe N azi shad
Sta lino r d e r e dth e Re dAr m y to sto p l ts advance.The
S ovi etsthen moved i n and
frghters.The
, nga most 200,000resi stance
b r u ta llyp u t d o wn th e r e b e L lio nkilli
' lib e r a te dwa
' r sa wa n d Po a n d ,p u tti ng i n thel row n prov si onalgovernment the Lubl i nP oLes.
IBier
o r th r
desi
of a n
T h e L u b lin Po le s:No t a l Po e s we re anti Sovi et,and some had fel tj ust as patri oti csupportl ngthe
Lubl i n,a
, Co m mi tteeof N ati onalLi berati onw as set up i n Sovi et-occupl ed
Co m m u n ists.n .1 u 11y9 4 4 a
g r oup then cameto be know n asthe Lub i n C ommi ttee,and they stated
la r g eclty in e a ste r nPo la n d .T h is
Bish
Buya
Polis
nsteadofmovngl ntoassi sttheattackontheGermans,
L o n d o n Po le s,r o se u p a g a in stth eGermans.
th a t th e y we r e a co a litlo no f d e m o crattcand patrl otl cforces,w ho w i shedto w ork w i th the S ovi etU nl on.
T h isg r o u p a g r e e dto th e Cu r zo nL ineboundaryand commi ttedi tsef to a far reachi ngproqrammeot
aw fulauthori tyi nP ol and.
so cla a n d e co n o r n icr e fo r m .T h e U S sR recogni zedthi sgroupastheony
of the Lubl i nC omml ttee.
n d e e d ,th e Re dAr m y wa s tn str u ctedto co operateonl y w i th representati ves
State
exam
gove
i nsi
T o wa r d sth e e n d o lth e wa r ,th e seLubl l nP ol esbecamemorei nfl uentl
a deP ol andthantheLondon
g r o u p .Alth o u g hth e L u b linPo le swere supposedto l i ai sec osel yw i th the LondonPol esi n the post w ar
Go ve r n m e n to fNa tio n aUn lty,th eydomi natedpostw arpol l trcsi nP oand.Leadi ngmembersofthe
L u b linCo m r njtte ewe r eWla d ysa w Gomu ka and Bo esl awBi erut.
I hop
a n yv
It go
with
earli
ilcc
Mos
Document analysis
Frln
Behind the scenesat Yalta
to Stalinon
FranklinRoosevelt
The letterbelowwaswritten by President
6 February1945while both wereat Yalta.lt is about the situationregardingPoland:
February6, 1945
St alin:
M y dearM ar s hall
I havebeengivinga greatdealof thought to our meetlngthis afternoon,and I want to teii
i so n m y m i n d .
y ou in ailf r ank neswhat
s
c
Docum
1
Whatis1
2
Roose
3
Whatsu
4
Whatdc
l
In so far asthe PolishGovernmentis concerned,I am greatlydisturbedthat the threegreat
powersdo not havea meetingof mindsabout the politicalsetupin poland lt ,uurn, a
me that it puts all of us in a bad lightthroughoutthe world to haveyou recognizingone
go ve rnme ntwh ilewe and t he Br it is har er ec ogniz in a
g n o t h e r : nL o n d o n I. a m s u r et h i s
::.1
stateof affairsshouldnot continueand thar if ir doesir can only leadour peoplero think
there is a breachbetweenus,which is nol the case.I am determinedtnat thereshallbe
no breachbetweenourselves
and the SovietUnion.Surelythere isa way to reconcileour
d ifferences.
5
I was very much impressedwith someof the thingsyou saidtoday,particuiarly
your
deLermination
that your rearmust be safeguarded
you
asyour army movesinto Beriin.
cannot,and we musr not,tolerateany temporarygovernmentwhich will giveyour armed
forcesany troubleof this sort.I want you to know that I am fullymindfulo1this.
You must believeme when I tell you that our peopleat home lookwith a criticaleye
on what they considera disagreement
betweenus at this vitalstageof the war.They,in
effect,saythat if we cannotgel a meetingof mindsnow when our armiesareconverging
on the common enemy,how can we get an understanding
on evenmore vitalthingsin
the future.
I havehad to makeit clearto you that we cannotrecognizethe LublinGovernmentas
now composed,and the world would regardit as a lamenrableoutcomeof our work here
if we partedwith an open and obviousdivergencebetweenus on this issue.
Yousaidtodaythat you would be preparedto supportany suggestions
for the solution
of this problemwhich offereda fairchanceof success,
and you alsomentionedthe
po ssibility
ol brin gings om em em ber sof t he Lubling o v e r n m e n h
Lere.
Realizing
lhat we all havethe sameanxietyin getting Lhemartersettled,I would liketo
developyour proposala littleand suggestthat we invitehereto Yaltaat once Mr Beirut
fBierutland Mr osubka losobkalMorawsk.i
irom the Lublingovernmentand alsotwo
or threefrom the followinglistof poles,who accordingto our informationwould be
desirableas representatives
of the other elementsof tf,e Polishpeoplein development
of a new temporarygovernmentwhich all threeof us could recognizeand support:
Bishop5apiehaof Cracow,VincenteIWincenty]Witos,Mr.Zurlowski[Zulawski],
professor
Buyak[Bujak],and ProfessorKutzevalKutzeba].lf, as a resultofthe presenceofthese
Polishleaders{rom abroadsuchas Mr Mikolajczyk,
M. Grabski,
and Mr Romer,the United
StatesGovernment,
and I feelsurethe Britishgovernmentaswell,would be preparedto
examinewith you conditionsin which they woutd dissociaLe
themselvesirom the London
governmentand transfertheir recognitionto [he new provisional
government.
I hope that I do not haveto assureyou that the UnitedStateswill neverlend itssupportin
any way to any provisional
governmentin Polandthat would be inimicalto your interest,
It goeswithout sayingthar any interimgovernmentformedasa resultof our conference
with the Polesherewould be pledgedto the holdingof freeelectionsin Polandat the
earliestpossibledate.I know this is completely.onrl,.n, with your desireto ,"" u n.*
freeand democraticPolandemergefrom the welterof th;swar
Most sincerelyyours
Franklin Roosevelt
Document Questions
Whar isthe general'tone'ofthis letterto Stalinfrom Roosevelt?
Roosevelt
showssympathyfor which of Stalinskeyconcerns?
what suggestions
aremadefor resolvingthe disagreement
overthe polishgovernment?
what doesthis suggestabout the relationship
betweenRoosevelt
and stalin?
o Examiner's hint: Questions
I and 4 areaskingyou to
'readbetweenthe linesji.e.,to
show the examinerthat you
understandwhat Roosevelt
s
attitudewastowardsStain.
Lookcarefullyat the language
he usesand quote any useful
worosor pnrasestnat support
your answer.
CF EUROPEIPARTI
DIVISICN
AND \IILITARY
ECONOIVIC
STEPSTC TH= POLIT|CAL,
1945: >
Conference,
TheYalta
andStalin.
Roosevelt
Churchill,
thattookplace
Whatwerethe crucialdevelopments
betweenthe Yaltaand PotsdamConferences?
Therewere somecrucial eventsthat radicallychangedthe atmosphereof, and the influences
on, the next meetingof the Allies in 1945.
r PresidentRooseveltdied in April 1945and was replacedby Truman,who was to adopt a
more hardline,or'get tough] policy towardsthe Soviets.
o Germanyfinaily surrenderedunconditionallyon 7 May 1945.
r Winston Churchill'sConservativeParty lost the 1945UK generalelectionand Churchill
asPrime Minister by the Labour Party leader,ClementAtlee.
was succeeded
o As the war in Europeended,the SovietRedArmy occupiedterritory asfar west asdeep
insideGermany.
r
On the very day afterthe PotsdamConferencebegan,17 Jt;Jy1945,the United States
testedits first atomic bomb.
successfully
1945
ThePotsdamConference,
The PotsdamConferencetook placein |uly 1945in Potsdam,Germany.Thoseparticipating
wereJosefStalinrepresentingthe USSR,PresidentHarry S Tiuman representingthe USA
and Prime Minister ClementAtlee representingthe UK.
The stateof the war: In May 1945,Germanysurrendered'unconditionallylAlthough war
in the Pacificragedon, the Americanswerenow poisedto invadethe mainland.By the time
the PotsdamConferencebegan,the USA was planning to usetheir new atomic weapon
againstJapan- ifthe testson it proved successful.
Germany: The Allies had agreedat Yaltato disarm,demilitarize'de-Nazifr and divide
Germany,but at Potsdamthey could not agreehow this should be done.Finally it was
decidedthat they would carry out the de-Nazificationand demilitarizationof Germanyin
their own waysin their own respectivezonesof occupation.The Germaneconomywasto
be run asa'whole',but it wasto be limited to domesticindustry and agricultute(at74 pet
cent of 1936levels).The Sovietswereto receive25 per cent oftheir reparationbill from the
Westernzones.The more agriculturalEasternzonewas to givefood in exchange.
E
Poland: T
Poland,s<
Germany
're-organ
not feeltl
'London
EasternI
Agreeme
page18)
future fat
that this i
control o
Thus, it l
want to s
push the
could do
wasbeg
fapan: T
success
Threedi
finally a
their Br
And, for
join in t
Unitedl
of SanI
USA,th
of the L
initiativ
{
Poland: The new u.s. president,Harry s riuman, was not happy with the agreementsover
Poland,so he challengedthe decision over the new western frontier betweenPoland and
Germany(the Oder-Neisseline). Truman also insistedthat the Polish government be
're-organized'.In other words the Americans wanted an entirely new government.They did
not feelthat there had beena'free and democratic'vote,and Stalin'soffer to include more
'London'Poleswithin the predominantly'Lublin'-ledgovernmentdid not appeasethe USA.
EasternEurope: The new U.S.leadershipwas also unhappy about the so-called'percentages
Agreement'thathad beenmade bilaterallybetween Stalin and Churchill in October 1944(see
page18).Spheresof influence had been discussedin terms of 'percentages'whendeciding the
future fate of countries in Eastand South-easternEurope.Tiuman challengedthe influence
that this agreementhad given Stalin over Romaniaand Bulgaria.However,Sovietmilitary
control of EasternEuropewas a fact - the RedArmy was literally standingon the territories.
Thus'it wasvery difficult for the Westto force Stalin to make any changes.Tiuman did not
want to seeEasternEuropebecomea Soviet'sphereof influence',but without threateningto
pushthe RedArmy back with ground forcesthere was little practicallythat the United States
coulddo. The RedArmy from the East,which had come to liberatethe areafrom the Nazis,
wasbeginning to look like an army of 'occupation'to the Americans.
fapan: Truman was told during this conferencethat the atomic bomb testshad been
successful.
On 6 August 1945the first atomic bomb usedin war was dropped on Hiroshima.
Threedayslater another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.Soon after the Japanese
finally agreedto'unconditional surrender'.However,although the Americans liaisedwith
their British allies,Tiuman did not tell Stalinthe'full story'about this new'superweapon'.
And, for the first time, at this conferencethe Americans did not encouragethe Sovietsto
join in the war against|apan.
United Nations: The United Nations becamea reality. It was offrcially createdat the Tieaty
of san Franciscoin 1945.The USSRwas the only communist power of the 'Big 5' (the
uSA, the USSR,France,Britain and NationalistChina),who werethe permanentmembers
of the UN Security Council. Stalin used the power of veto this gavethe USSRto block any
initiatives that he perceivedto be againstSoviet interests.
the PostdamConference,
'1945:
seatedareAtlee,
Trumanand Stal i n.
srEPSTC THEPoLlrlcAt,ECCNCMIO
ANDlvlLlrARY
DlvtstoNcF EURCPE:
PART
I
Conclusions:Thereweretwo positiveoutcomesfrom the PotsdamConference:
o agreementfor the immediate,practicalcontrol of the defeatedGermany
o the establishmentof the United Nations.
The Percentages Agreement of October 1944
On 9 Octo b e r1 9 4 4 a
, I a m e e tin gin Moscow Stal
,
i nand C hurchi ldevi
l
sedw hat i s know n asthe
' Pe r ce n ta g eAg
s r e e m e n tiwh ich r el atesIo i nfl uenceand controlthe WesternP ow ersand the U S S R
w oul d
wa n t to h a vein va r io u sa r e a sa fte rthe defeatof Germany.C hurchi lapparentl
l
yw as concernedthat i t
wo u ld a p p e a rr a th e rcyn icath
l a t the tw o l eadersscri bbl edthe fateof mi l i i onson a pi eceof paper.H e
su g g e ste dto Sta linth a t h e b u r n th e paperi t w as w ri ttenon.'N o,you keepi ri sai dStal i n
Ramania
o Russia9070
o Oth e r s1 O7 o
Greece
o United Kingdom 90%
( in a cco r dw l th U S A )
Yugoslavia
c 500/o-5Ao/o
Hungary
o Sao/o SAa/o
Bulgaria
o Russia
/570
r Others250lo
o RussiaI0olo
During the ele
disqualified;1
electoralregis
book Struggle
surprisingtha
The Sovietpe
they were see
victory over'!
Thepoliticalgt
(by British anc
su
government
Sovietsarrived
NikitaKhrushch
Review questions
Lookoverrhe issuesthat werediscussed
at the threeconferences.
which issueswere
satisfactorily
resolved?
2
3
Whichdecisionswere likelyto causetensionin the future?
Fromwhat you havereadso far in both chaptersI and 2, what do you considerto be the
'seeds'ofEast-West
conflictthat were sownfrom 1917onwards?
Key developments1946-1947
Beforemoving on to StepTwo it is important to look at somekey developmentsthat were
to havean impact on U.S.-sovietrelations.
Salamitactics
One way the SovietUnion gainedincreasingpolitical control over EasternEuropewasby
the method known as'salamitactics'.This term is saidto havecome from a remark made
by the Hungariancommunist leader,Rakosi,commentingon how the USSRsecured
Communist control in EasternEurope,'like slicingoff salami,pieceby piece':
o StageOne: The Sovietssupervisedthe organizationof governmentsin the Eastern
Europeanstates,initially establishinga broad allianceof 'anti-fascists'.
o StageTwo: Eachof the partieswas'slicedoff', one afterthe other.
r
StageThree:The Communist'core'wasleft, and then ultimatelythe local Communists
were replaced(if needbe) with Moscow-trainedpeople.
By the end of 1946,the so-called'Baggage
Tiain'leadershad returnedto EasternEurope.
Thesewere the men who had spent much of the war in Moscow,and were consideredby
the Sovietsto be'trustworthy', for example,Bierut (who returned to poland), Kolarov
(who returned to Bulgaria),Pauker(who returned to Romania) and Rakosi (who
returned to Hungary).Theseleaderswould thus ensurethat the post-war governments
of their respectivecountrieswould be dominated by Moscow-backed,'stalinist'
Communists.
Casestudy: Poland The'free elections'promisedby Stalinat Yaltato occur in a matter of
'weeks',werenot held until 19 January1947.Beforethe electionstherehad beena campaign
of murder,censorshipand intimidation. It is estimatedthat over 50,000peoplewere
deportedto Siberiabeforethe elections.
This pattern c
EasternEurol
- Bulgaria,Rc
semblanceof
Sovietp
Another plac
the war wasIt
Sovietswoulc
but Stalin left
down interna
However,the
government(
that Stalin re
wartime agre
had as much
dayslater,Trr
revealedthat
Straits.He al
in the makin
made a form
this new pre
lnstab
After World'
Communist
believedthat
in particula
Comm
Communist
their memb
the war in E
Communist
concernthal
During the electionsin fanuary, Mikolajczyk's porish peasant
party had 246 candid,ates
disqualified; r49 werearrestedand 1g
murdered. one million voters were taken
off the
electoralregisterfor some reasonor another.
As Desmond Donnelly contendsin his
book strugglefor the world,'rnthese appalling
circumstancesof intimidation, it was not
surprising that Bierut's communists secured
complete control in poland,.
The soviet perspectiveo1 thly elections
was quite different from that of the west,
where
they were seenas a breach of the yalta ug.."r.r.'.r,r.
The Soviets,however,sawthem as a
victory over'Western expansionism:
in cahoots
with churchiilrequired,lroril**iiuo*a
Tlte!o!i!i:al coalssetbyMikolajczyk
the,slvjetay1 reached
ie citv.rho, *ov o p,o-western
gouernment
supported
'::,::'::::,i*::::,Y::::!:f:"
byMikorajczyk
wouldarready
bein controrof ,i, ,i,i) uy thetimethe
sovietsarrived.But it didn'twoik out thatway.
our troopsunderRokossoirrry
gottherefirst.
Nikita Khrushchevinlerushchev Rem. b",",@
This pattern of securing soviet-communist-style
governmentswas emerging in the other
EasternEuropean countrie-sthat the Red
Armyhad occupied at the end of
JT worrd
YYVIIU
war
VVd I
Two
IM
- Bulgaria' Romania and Hungary. in czechoslovakia
and Finland there remained only a
semblanceof democracy.
Sovietpressureon lran
Another place in which the USSRtried to
increaseits political control in the aftermath
of
the war was Iran' At the Tehran conference,
it had been agreedthat both the British
and
the
sovietswould withdraw their troops from
Iran after the war. The UK took its troops
out,
but stalin reft 30,0000f his in the north, claiming
that they were neededthere to help put
down internal rebellion.
However,thesesoviet troops encouraged
a communist uprising, and the Iranian
governmentcomplainedto the USSR's
former allies.The Britisliand,tmericans
demanded
that Stalin remove his troops immediately.
They also saw this as another breachin the
wartime agreements.on l lanuary 1946,
starin refused.He berievedthat after the
war he
had asmuch right to the Black SeaStraits
and to Iranian oil asdid his former allies.
Four
dayslater, Truman wrote to his Secretary
of State,/ames Byrnes.In this letter Truman
revealedthat he thought the uSSR was planning
an invasion of T[rkey and the Brack sea
straits.He also wrote, '... unressRussiais faced
with an iron fist and ,t.orrg rurrg.rage,
war is
in the making'' In March the united Nations
had its first crisis to deal with - Iran. Iran
had
madea formal protest to the UN concerning
the continued presenceof Soviet forces.
under
this new pressure,Moscow finally pulled
its"troops out.
Instability
in GreeceandTurkey
After world war TWothere were anti-imperialist,
nationalist and, to a certain efient, .pro_
communist'rebellions in Greeceand Turkey.
The British, and to a lesserdegreethe uSA,
believedthat theserebellions were being
directed and supported by the Soviets.churchill,
in particular' was annoyed at stalin's apparent
disregardfor their'percentagesAgreement,.
Communist
partiesin ltalyand France
communist partiesin both these'western
democracies,
grew strongerin post_war.Europe,
their membership increasingdue to the
economic deprivations andiardships at the
end of
the war in Europe' The Americans and the
British were suspiciousthat thesenewly
popular
communist parties were receiving'encouragement,
from Moscow.Indeed there was
concernthat Italy and Francecould be'weak
links'in anti_communistwestern Europe.
STEPSTO THEPCLITICALECCNCN/IC
AND MILITARY
DIVIS|ON
CF EURCPE:PARTI
Cartoon analysis
o Examiner's hint: In
Qu es t ion3 y o u n e e dt o m a k e
(r rr a th :r
\i^
i < t n r . ir
f o \ ?^,
r
a ns werc lear l yS. t a r ty o u r
a ns werwit h 'T h eo v e r a
me s s ageis . . . ' a n dt h e n g i v e
Who is the dancerin the
cartoon?
2
What do rhe daggersrepresent?
3
\A/h:t iq the m e< <aoo nf tho
StepT
March
On 5 March
Westministe
behind him r
momentsin
cartoon?
det ailsf rom t h e c a r t o o nt o
su pporiy our a n s w e r .
Churchill's s
A shadowha
what Sovietl
immediatef
I havea stro
comrade,Ma
Russias
... r,
renewalof G
of the world .
positionin E
T h isF r e n chca r to o nfr o m 1 9 50i s )
e n title d ' Ca u ca siaDa
n n ce l
StepTwo:Kennan'slongtelegram,February1946
ffi
In February 1946,akeyU.S.diplomat in Moscow,Georgep. rennan, ,.n, u
@
telegramto the U.S.StateDepartmenton the nature of Sovietconduct and
foreign policy.His viewson the motivesbehind Sovietforeign policy were
to havea lastinginfluenceon the StateDepartment.The key idea in this
telegramwas that the Sovietsystemwasbuoyedby the'threat'of a'hostite
world outsideits borders',that the USSRwas'fanaticallyand implacably'
hostileto the West:'Imperviousto the logic of reasonMoscow [is] highly
sensitiveto the logic of force.For this reasonit can easilywithdraw - and
usuallydoes- when strongresistance
is encounteredat any point'.
To summarize,the key points of Kennan'stelegramwere:
o The USSR'sview of the world was a traditional one of insecurity.
o The Sovietswantedto advanceMuscoviteStalinistideology (not simply
'Marxism').
L,
Ge orgeF.K en n a nU
, .S.
d i p lomatin M o s c o w .
o The Sovietregimewas cruel and repressive
and justified this by
perceivingnothing but evil in the outsideworld. That view of a hostile
outsideenvironmentwould sustainthe internal Stalinistsystem.
o The USSRwas fanaticallyhostileto the West- but they werenot'suicidal'.
Kennan's'logicof force'argumenthelpedto hardenattitudesin the USA and wasto play a
key role in the developmentof the U.S.policy of containment(seeChapterSix).
From Stettin
Continent.B
-Warsaw,Bt
citiesand the
or another,n
from Moscou
enorm0usan
on a scalegri
wereverysm
powerfar be
Policegotern
from thesefa
which conta
On theothe
. . . I do not b
indefiniteex
removedby c
happens;nor
Russianfrien
so muchassl
weakness
...
the UnitedN
... If, howev
overwhelmu
Winston S. Chu
StepThree:Churchill'slronCurtainSpeech,
March1946
on 5 March 1946,former British prime Minister winston churchill gavea
speechat
westminister college in Fulton, Missouri, with president Harry s riuman
sitting just
behind him on the speakers'platform. This speechis now seenas one of
the defining
moments in the origins of the Cold War.
Churchill's speechwarned of a new danger for Europe:
A shadowhasfallen upon the scenesso lately lighted by the allied victory.Nobody
knows
whatSovietRussiaand its Communistinternationalorganizationintendsto
do in the
immediatefuture, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansiveproselytizing
tendencies.
I havea strongadmiration and regard the variant Rurio, propr, ord yo,
for
iy war-time
comrade,Marshal stalin. Thereis sympathyand goodwill ... tow)rd. thepeoples
of all the
Russias
... WeunderstandtheRussianneedto besecureon her western
fionliersfrom ail
relre.wal
of German aggression.Wewelcomeher to her rightful ptaceamong the l"eading
nations
of theworld . . . It is my duty, however,to pracebeforeyoi iertiin
facts about thepresit
positionin Europe.
From Stettin in the Bahic to Tiiestein theAdriatic, an iron curtain hasdescended
across
the
Continent.Behind the line lie all the capitak of the ancientstatesof centraland
easternEurope
- wrsaw, Berlin, Prague,vienna, Budapest,Belgrade,Bucharest
ind sofia. A1 thesefamoui
citiesand thepopulations around them lie in the Souietsphereand all aie subject
in ine form
o-ranother,not only to Sovietinfluencebut to a very higi and increasingmeasure
of control
from Moscow... TheRussian-dominated
Polishgovernmenthasbeenencouraged
to make
enormousand wrongful inr,oadsupon Germany,and massexpulsionsof millions
of Germans
on a scalegrievousand undreamedof are now takingplace.Th, co**unist parties,
which
werevery small in all theseeasternstatesof Europe,havebeenraisedto pre-eminence
and
powerfar beyondtheir numbersand areseekingeverywhere
to obtain titolitarian control.
Policegovernmentsareprevailing in neaily everycase...Whatever conclusions
may be drawn
from thesefacts . '. this is certainly not the liberatedEuropewefought to build up. Nor is it one
whichcontainsthe essentials
of a permanentpeace...
On theotherhand I repulsethe idea that a new war is inevitable;stitl morethat it
is imminent
" ' I do not believethat Soviet Russiqdesireswar. Wat they desireis thefruits of war and the
indefiniteexpansionof theirpowerand doctrines... our ifficutties and dangers
will not be
removedby closingour eyesto them. They will not be remov'edby merewaiting
to seewhat
happens;
nor will they be re,lieved
by a policy of appeasement
... From what I haveseenof our
Russianfriends and alliesduring the war, I am convincedthat thereis nothing they
admire
somuch as strengthand thereis nothing
for which they have lessrespectthan-for military
weakness
... If the westerndemocracies
stand togetherin strict adhirenceto ihe principl'esof
the United NationsCharter,their influence
for furthering theseprincipleswill be immense
... If, however,they becomedividedor
falter in their d"ty ... thin inieed catastrophe
may
ouerwhelmus all.
winston s, churchill, Address at westminster colrege, Furton, Missouri, s
March 1946
Documentand revlewquestions
why didchurchillusethephrase'iron
curtain'to describe
eventsin Europe?
InwhatwaydoesChurchill
alludeto theideaof'salami
tactics'
takingplacein Eastern
Europe?
lmagine
thatyouareStalinreading
thisspeech.
what mightyourreaction
be?
ST=PSTC THE
DIVISION
OF EURCPE:PARTI
AND N/ILITABY
ECCNCI\4IC
Whatwasthe basisfor the lronCurtainspeech?
Docum
In his Iron Curtain speech,Winston Churchill was referring to the fact that by 1946'Sovietdominated Communist governmentswere setup in Poland,Hungary,Romaniaand Bulgaria.
This was in spite of the hopesexpressedat Yaltathat there would be free and democratic
electionsin EasternEuropeafter the war. Communist regimesnot linked directly to Moscow
had been establishedin Albania andYugoslaviaaswell. Within two to threeyearsthis Soviet
His remarkswere also
influencewould be extendedto EastGermanyand Czechoslovakia.
prompted by the presenceof the RedArmy in thosecountries'liberated'from Germanyby
the Russians- and by the cloak of secrecywhich descendedover EasternEuropewithin a few
Stalin/
months of the end of the war.
nason
speech
to Churchill's
Sovietreaction
inclina
'Hitler
I
Germ
warwit
arecal
Churc
'lt !sab
^ll:^!
dllcu
+h^
Lt tg
The responsefrom the Sovietleadershipwas quick and one of outrage.Within a week Stalin
had comparedChurchill to Hitler. He sawthe speechasboth'racist'and as'a call to war
with the SovietUnionl Within threeweeksthe Sovietshad taken severalsteps:
L(
Lih.
ltuc
itsfutu
Union
o They withdrew from the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF).
Quest
o They steppedup the tone and intensityof anti-Westernpropaganda.
1
Expla
o They initiated a new five-yearplan of self-strengthening.
2
ln wha
Therefore,the'Iron Curtain' speechled to a further hardeningof opinions on both sides.
Churchill had definedpublicly the new front line in what was now being seenasa new war.
Reviel
Revie
headi
r The
Documentanalysis
DocumentA
j. ,ll irtr.ll-llilt
;1 l,i
,r1.'{i
In t his S ov letca r t o o n
P
Churc hillwav efsl a g sr e a dn g
An lronCurt a i nr so v e r E u r o p e '
a nd'A nglo-S a x o nMsu s t R u l e
th e W orldl
r The
. T-o
r
Cle
.
HiK
.
Re
r
Sa
.
Ge
.
lra
o Ke
. Ch
'll
:ii
lit,
!
r .1
ii
ti .
liriil
.
lns
.
Co
DocumentB
Stalin 's
Ma rch i9 46 r es pons e
t o lhe, lr onCur t ain, s pe e c h :
].1rrerbeganhiswork of unleashingwar by proclaiminga,,race
theory,,declaringthat only
German-speaking
peopleconstituteda superiornation.Mr Churchjll setsout
to-unleasha
war with a racetheory,assertingthat only English-speaking
nationsaresuperiornations,who
1 arecalledupon to decidethe destiniesof the entireworld . . . Therecan be no doubt that
Mr
po sitio nis a c allf or war on t he USSR.
Ch urchill's
i'
., 'lt isabsurdto speakof exclusive
controlbythe USSR
inVienna
andBerlin,
wherethereare
I alliedcontrolcouncils
madeup of the representatives
of fourstates
andwherethe USSR
hasonlyone-quarter
of thevotes.fhe Soviet
Union's
lossof life[inthewarlhasbeenseveral
timesgreater
thanthatof Britain
possibly
andthe USAputtogether.
in somequarters
an
inclination
isfeltto forgetaboutthesecolossal
sacr;fices
of theSovietpeople,
whichsecured
the liberation
of Furope
fromthe HiLlerite
yoke.ButrheSovieL
Unioncannotforgetabourt
them.Andsowharcantherebe surprising
aboutthe factthatthesovietunion,
ro,.
itsiuturesafety,
isrryingto seeLoir rhatgovernments
royar rr.l"'r.
;;,;. -*,o*
tou'.,
Unionshouldexistin theseLo.rntries?,
"i',r0"
'.
!ii,,l,
*i
{;
Questions
Explain
the message
of the Soviet
cartoonon page22.
ln whatwaysdoesthecartoonsupportthe ideasexpressed
in Stal;n,s
speech?
Review activities
+il
Reviewthesekey Coldwar issuesup to r946.Add briefnotesto the bulletpoint
subheadings.In your notes,considerhow eachpoinraddedto rens;onb.;;;;i.;,
and wesr.
o fhe openingofa secondfront
.
ln e warsawup r is ing
.
Tensionsaf Yalta
r Cleardivisionsat Potsdam
o Hiroshima
r RedArmy in EasternEurope
. Salamitactics
e Ge rman y
r lran
l,
o Ke nn an 's'L on gTelegr am '
r Churchill's
Fultonspeech
e lnstabilityin Greeceand Turkey
. Corrrnirt
Ourayrraa"r, in ttatyanOf,ance
rl
@
ToKTime
Howcanchanges
in
'language'affect
our
understanding
of thepast?
ln whatwayscanour
cultureimpacton our
interpretation
of historical
events?
o Examiner's hint: ln
Questi on2 you are Jooki ng
for w aysi n w hi ch the sources
saythe samethi ng.Focuson
thi sand not on di fferences.
Be
speci fi ci n your compari sons :
pi ckout phrasesi n the speec h
w hi ch you can quote i n
supportofthe cartoon.