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6 Sep 2016 Research Briefing | UK Fiscal policy options ahead of the Autumn Statement Economist Andrew Goodwin Lead UK Economist +44(0)20 7803 1417 There is strong case for a fiscal stimulus and our modelling suggests that a package centred on a temporary increase in infrastructure investment would provide the biggest boost to GDP growth. However, while such a package offers upside risk to our forecast, we have low expectations of it being implemented. In our view the case for a fiscal stimulus is incontrovertible. The vote to leave the EU has dampened the outlook for growth, while there is limited scope for monetary policy to offer more support. The existing fiscal plans will exert a sizeable drag on growth and with borrowing costs so low, there is a strong case for relaxing the squeeze. Scenarios run on the Oxford Global Model suggest that raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in each of the next two years could boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. We also find that the package would, in some respects, pay for itself, with the public sector net debt-to-GDP ratio peaking at a lower level. The main bar to this package would be whether there are sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects available. Political considerations might encourage the government to opt instead for packages geared towards boosting current spending – perhaps on the NHS – or cutting taxes. But our modelling suggests that this would offer a smaller boost to activity and would also generate poorer fiscal outcomes than an infrastructure-led package. While the case for a stimulus package is very strong, our expectations for delivery are fairly low. The Conservatives have enjoyed electoral success on the back of a strong austerity message and suggestions that they might loosen fiscal policy appear to be aimed at averting a worst-case scenario, rather than a conviction that this would be a positive policy to boost both short- and long-term growth prospects. So if the economic data remains firm, the prospects of a sizeable stimulus package will recede. And if a package is implemented, the temptation to favour crowd-pleasing tax cuts over higher investment may prove to be irresistible. Therefore, we view a large stimulus package as an upside risk to our forecast, not a core assumption. We find that raising government investment would offer the greatest support to GDP growth Our modelling suggests that the government would achieve the best economic outcomes by choosing a stimulus package centered on higher infrastructure investment. Raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19 would boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. Higher current spending could boost growth by 0.5% a year, but the boost from tax cuts would be much smaller at just 0.2% a year. Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 Introduction When campaigning ahead of the referendum on EU membership, the former Chancellor, George Osborne, had suggested that there would need to be what the media termed a “Punishment Budget” should the UK vote to leave, involving a substantial tightening of fiscal policy. We had always thought that unlikely – imposing further austerity on an economy which was already slowing would almost certainly exacerbate the downturn. And since the referendum it has become clear that the Government has no intention of following through on the threat, with new Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, promising to “reset” fiscal policy if the post-referendum data suggests that it is necessary to do so. In this Research Briefing we look at what this reset might look like, using the Oxford Global Model to quantify the likely impact of various fiscal policy measures. The fiscal mandate’s “significant negative shock” knockout will be triggered Mr Hammond had inherited the much criticised fiscal mandate from his predecessor. This required the government to achieve a budget surplus by 2019-20 and to continue to run surpluses thereafter, “unless and until the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) assess, as part of their economic and fiscal forecast, that there is a significant negative shock to the UK. A significant negative shock is defined as real GDP growth of less than 1% on a rolling 4 quarter-on-4 quarter basis.” In all likelihood the OBR will judge that a ”significant negative shock” has occurred and that the fiscal rules will be suspended. But in any case both Mr Hammond and Prime Minister Theresa May have already publicly said that the goal of a surplus by the end of the decade will be dropped in light of the economic uncertainty prompted by June’s vote. So the Government faces pretty much a clean sheet as far as its fiscal plans are concerned. The huge uncertainty around Brexit risks undermining the credibility of any new longer-term rule There are both short- and long-term issues to consider with regards to overhauling fiscal policy. Dealing with those in reverse order, the huge uncertainty surrounding the timing of Brexit and the future shape of the UK’s trading relationship with the EU will make it very difficult to establish any credible medium-term plan for the public finances. As we demonstrated in our Brexit research programme, the various post-Brexit options present a wide range of potential outcomes for the economy, so the Government would be attempting to aim at a rapidly moving target if it were anything other than vague about its medium-term fiscal ambitions. Ultimately a reversion to the 2010-15 version of the fiscal mandate would be sensible Once the Brexit end game has become clearer, the most sensible course of action would be for the Chancellor to roll back the fiscal rules to something more akin to the 2010-15 vintage, aiming to balance the current budget over a rolling five-year period while borrowing to invest. As we have regularly argued, running outright budget surpluses would be very difficult to achieve, particularly given the constraints of an ageing population, and risks condemning the UK to a prolonged period of weak economic growth. The only bar to such a change would be political, given that the Labour party has since adopted a variation of this rule, although the regular chopping and changing of fiscal frameworks since 1997 suggests that the political cost of switching would probably be fairly low. Shorter-term, the automatic stabilisers will be allowed to operate… With regards to the shorter-term, the Chancellor has been careful not to give any firm commitments. Our baseline forecast takes a relatively conservative view of how this plays out. Weaker activity weighs on tax revenues and leads to higher government spending, but we assume that the government allows these so-called automatic stabilisers to operate, tolerating the higher borrowing that results without making any further discretionary changes to fiscal policy. This, in itself, would represent a significant change relative to the government’s current plans, as our modelling suggests that it would require the government to borrow almost £50bn more over the period 2016-17 to 2018-19 than the OBR forecast at the time of the March Budget. Page 2 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 …but there is an incontrovertible case for going further… However, in our view, the case for a temporary loosening of fiscal policy has become incontrovertible and the Government should go further. Even on our above-consensus forecast, by the end of fiscal year 2018-19 the level of GDP is expected to be 2½% lower than the OBR had forecast back in March. Given that there was evidence that the economy already had a sizeable amount of spare capacity prior to the referendum, there is a clear need to stimulate demand to avoid wasting more untapped economic potential and reduce the chances of hysteresis effects taking hold. …with little scope for monetary policy to offer support… This stimulus must come from fiscal policy because monetary policy is clearly reaching the outer limits in terms of what it can do to support demand, with interest rates likely to reach what the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has termed the “effective lower bound” and the scope for asset purchases to provide further support looking limited. …and the existing fiscal plans set to exert a sizeable drag on growth Furthermore, the current plans impose a significant tightening of fiscal policy over the next five years. The most recent forecasts from the OBR imply that fiscal policy will exert an average drag of 1 percentage point (pp) a year on GDP growth until 2019-20 (see Chart 1). This fiscal squeeze will compound the pressures from a slowing economy and Brexit, so easing this burden would increase the chances of a better outcome for growth. Chart 1 The OBR’s most recent forecasts imply that the existing plans for fiscal policy will, on average, exert a drag of 1 percentage point a year on GDP growth between 2016-17 and 2019-20. The government could finance a stimulus package at a very low cost Arguably there has never been a better time for the government to embark on a loosening of fiscal policy because, as Chart 2 demonstrates, borrowing costs are currently at historically low levels. At one point in August, thirty-year yields were trading on the secondary market at levels as low as 1.20%, while the Government recently sold a 20year inflation linked bond for an average yield of -1.72%, an issue which was oversubscribed 1.6 times. There is clearly a strong appetite for government debt, particularly over long maturities, with the scarcity of such assets meaning that the Bank of England struggled to find enough investors willing to sell, even at well above market prices, in one of its first gilt purchasing operations. Therefore loosening fiscal policy and increasing gilt issuance would dovetail nicely with the monetary stimulus already in train. Page 3 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 Chart 2 We have modelled the impact of various packages on growth, borrowing and debt Government bond yields dropped sharply in the aftermath of the referendum on EU membership as investors anticipated looser monetary policy. With the MPC going further than many expected, yields then stepped down again. In August, the 30-year bond yield averaged just 1.35%, its lowest ever level and more than 70bp below where it was prior to the referendum. Over the past decade, the average yield on a 30-year gilt has been 3.68%. If the case for a fiscal stimulus package is strong, what form should it take? We have run a series of scenarios on the Oxford Global Model to quantify the degree to which the various options would boost GDP growth and to assess the impact on levels of government borrowing and debt. In each case we consider stimulus packages which loosen policy by 1% of GDP in fiscal years 2017-18 and 2018-19. We have chosen this size of stimulus because for this two year period, the package would broadly offset the tightening of fiscal policy already in the pipeline. With regards to timing, given that the Autumn Statement is unlikely to take place until November or December, the government will struggle to begin any stimulus package in the current fiscal year, while we feel that it is unlikely that any temporary stimulus would last beyond two years. All of the scenarios also assume that the MPC maintains the same monetary stance as in our baseline forecast (Bank Rate is cut to 0.1% in November and left there for two years, while the current programmes of gilt and corporate bond purchases are completed, but not extended), with the large amount of spare capacity in the economy meaning there is no pressure on the MPC to tighten monetary policy to offset the looser fiscal stance. An increase in investment in infrastructure projects would make sense… During the short-lived Conservative party leadership campaign, several leading figures in the party advanced the idea of a stimulus package built around higher infrastructure investment. The most radical proposal came from Stephen Crabb, who suggested the creation of a £100bn infrastructure investment fund, which would be financed through the issue of £20bn of long-dated bonds each year for the next five years. Sajid Javid also advocated £100bn of additional infrastructure funding as part of his own five-point plan. While such an ambitious package seems unlikely – neither MP is part of the new Treasury team, while any public support from their colleagues has hinted at more modest ambitions – an increase in infrastructure investment certainly has its attractions. As Chart 3 demonstrates, on a national accounts basis, government investment is much lower in the UK than in most other G7 countries, while the government’s existing plans for the next five years involve levels of public sector net investment which fall some way short of historical norms. In addition, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competiveness Report found that the quality of the UK’s infrastructure was below the average for advanced economies. Page 4 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 Chart 3 …provided that the government can find sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects On a national accounts basis, the UK has consistently achieved low levels of government investment. Between 2006 and 2015, government investment averaged 2.8% of GDP in the UK, well below the G7 average of 3.7% of GDP. Based on current plans this situation will not improve over the next five years, with UK government investment forecast to average 2.5% of GDP, compared with a G7 average of 3.4% of GDP. One potential constraint on a large increase in infrastructure investment would be the ability to find sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects to advance. Large infrastructure projects often take a long time to go through the planning system, while the government’s longterm investment strategy remains a work in progress, with the National Infrastructure Commission not due to publish the National Infrastructure Assessment – its analysis of the UK’s infrastructure needs over the next thirty years – until 2018. This means that any package would have to focus on projects where permissions are already in place and much of the planning is already complete, constraints which would rule out high profile projects such as the High Speed 2 rail line and airport expansion in South East England. But with the government’s National Infrastructure Pipeline containing almost £500bn worth of planned projects, there should still be plenty of other projects which could be completed more quickly, or which had previously been delayed because of a lack of funding. The experience of 2008-09, when an increase in government investment formed part of a sizeable stimulus package, would suggest that a rapid upscaling of infrastructure investment would be achievable; between the Budgets of 2008 and 2009, the then Labour Government increased the level of public sector net investment by 0.4% of GDP for 2008-09 and 0.9% of GDP for 2009-10. A programme of public sector house building could be a viable alternative If the Government did struggle to find sufficient infrastructure projects to offer a short-term stimulus then it could instead focus the additional funding on building housing. The Government looks set to fall some way short of its pledge to build one million homes by 2020, but could act to plug the gap by building new houses on some of the unused brownfield sites that it owns. This would represent a departure from the policies of recent years, where brownfield sites have been sold to developers. But large public sector building projects have been pursued in the past and would have the advantages of both fulfilling a genuine need while also potentially being easier to get off the ground than large infrastructure projects. An increase in government investment of 1% of GDP over two years would raise GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period We have modelled the impact of an increase in government investment worth 1% of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19, an ambitious package which would raise the level of public sector net investment by £40bn over that two-year period. We find that this generates a markedly better outcome for GDP growth – which averages 2% a year in 2017-18 and 2018-19, compared with 1.3% in the baseline forecast – with the extra investment creating additional activity and employment. And though we are focusing on the next two years in this Research Briefing, we would expect such an increase in infrastructure investment to Page 5 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 also underpin stronger activity over the longer term, because it would boost the productive potential of the economy. Higher capital spending could effectively pay for itself Interestingly, our modelling suggests that though the package will initially increase government borrowing, stronger activity will boost tax receipts and close this gap substantially over the course of the two year period. And with the package generating stronger nominal GDP growth, the ratio of public sector net debt to GDP peaks at a slightly lower level in 2017-18 and is almost 1pp lower than the baseline forecast by the end of 2018-19, so it could be argued that, at least in this respect, the extra investment effectively pays for itself. Would higher current spending be more popular with the electorate? While a package centred on higher government investment would appear to offer significant economic benefits, the Government might decide that there are better political alternatives. The benefits of infrastructure projects tend to be visible to relatively small numbers of people, or only become apparent to the general public over a long period of time, so do not offer the immediate and broad political gains that a tax giveaway or increased current spending might offer. In this context, an easing of the squeeze on government spending might be a popular choice in Whitehall. Almost half of the fiscal tightening currently planned is due to come from deep cuts to departmental spending. On average, government departments face a cut in real terms spending of nearly 12% between 2015-16 and 2019-20, with many facing much larger falls because some parts of departmental spending – the National Health Service (NHS), defence, overseas aid and schools – will enjoy either real terms increases or – at worst – have their past spending levels maintained. There are genuine concerns about the impact that such deep cuts will have on the quality of public services, so reducing the scale of the cuts would have its attractions. An increase in the NHS budget looks to have a reasonable chance… Furthermore, though the government plans to increase its spending on the NHS by £8bn in real terms by 2020, the NHS Five Year Forward View estimated that up to £21bn of additional funding could be required over this period. Spending more on the NHS would be politically popular; the recent Ipsos MORI Issues Index found that 38% of people felt that the state of the NHS, hospitals and healthcare was an important issue facing the UK today, the same proportion that cited immigration and only a little lower than those who were concerned about the EU. And with a central plank of the Leave campaigns’ offer having been the opportunity to spend more on the NHS, this has also created a degree of expectation amongst the population. …while easing the squeeze on welfare spending would also be an option… Another alternative would be to ease the squeeze on welfare spending. This squeeze is planned to reduce borrowing by 1.3% of GDP by 2019-20 – representing around a quarter of the fiscal consolidation – with the bulk of the savings coming via a four-year freeze on the rates of most working age benefits. Given that inflation is likely to be higher over the next couple of years, following the steep depreciation of the pound, pressure on the real incomes of benefit claimants will be more severe than had previously been expected. With the new Prime Minister keen to pursue a social justice agenda, she may find it attractive to either abandon or delay the freeze planned for the next two years, with these benefits temporarily reverting to being uprated in line with inflation in the interim. However, polling by Ipsos MORI suggests that the majority of people see the welfare cuts as “necessary”, suggesting that the political gains from reversing, or postponing, them may not be as great as some of the other alternatives. As such, we would see this as being a less likely alternative than increasing spending on public services. Page 6 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 …though any increase in current spending is likely to be permanent, not temporary The Autumn 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review set departmental budgets out to 2019-20 and, in some cases, 2020-21, so theoretically reopening departmental settlements after a year may present some logistical challenges. But departments will surely find it easier to spend extra funding, rather than have to find additional savings, as they have in the past. A much more important constraint is that it is much harder to ensure that any boost to current spending is temporary. Whereas capital spending can more easily be turned on and off – once a project is completed, the spending associated with its construction ceases – when departments commit to hiring extra staff or buying in more services, it is difficult to do that on a short-term basis. This would not be a major constraint if the Chancellor also loosens the fiscal rules, but if he were to continue to target an outright budget surplus at some point in the future then any additional spending now would have to be reversed later on or equivalent savings would have to be made elsewhere. Higher current spending would boost activity, but by a little less than increasing investment We have modelled the impact of increasing current spending by 1% of GDP in both 201718 and 2018-19. Some of the additional money is used to postpone the cash terms freeze on working age benefits, with the remainder being allocated to government departments. We find that this generates stronger economic growth over the next two years – GDP growth averages 1.8% a year in 2017-18 and 2018-19, compared with 1.3% in the baseline forecast – but the uplift is a little smaller than that seen through increasing investment by the same amount. The finding that capital spending offers a larger boost to GDP growth than current spending is in keeping with the literature – for example, IMF (2009), OBR (2010) and Gechert (2013) – with the increase in capital spending offering an immediate boost to aggregate demand, followed by second-round effects on both household incomes and on household wealth through higher productivity. With the boost to activity being weaker, the current spending option would see borrowing run above the baseline throughout. And the public sector net debt-to-GDP ratio would end 2018-19 at a similar level to the baseline, in contrast to the scenario involving higher investment, which ultimately sees a lower debt ratio. The former Chancellor mooted a corporation tax cut… Previous soundings from influential Conservative MPs suggest that tax cuts could also form an important part of any stimulus package. Corporation tax cuts have been an important policy tool for this government and the previous Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition and in July the former Chancellor, George Osborne, suggested that the government should cut the main rate of corporation tax to 15% as a signal that the UK is still “open for business.” Such a move would have the advantage of targeting an area of the economy – business investment – which is likely to be most at risk from Brexit. But it is far from certain that this change would make any difference to corporate decision-making, with the UK already having the lowest corporation tax rate in the G20 and a further reduction to 17% planned for 2020. …while the idea of a temporary VAT cut also has its supporters Another move which has been mooted is a temporary cut to VAT. This was the main lever of the last major stimulus package in late-2008, with the government of the time arguing that a VAT cut had the advantages of quick implementation, the likelihood of triggering rapid changes in behaviour and being targeted at an area of the economy which was struggling. It is less obvious that households are in need of this type of support at the current time, with recent data suggesting that consumer demand has remained strong, although we do expect spending growth to slow as the sharp depreciation of the pound puts upward pressure on inflation. And if the VAT cut were temporary – something which is very likely given the large fiscal cost associated with a permanent reduction – then choosing when to reverse it might prove difficult, as we expect Brexit to take several years Page 7 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 to happen, resulting in a lengthy period of weak growth and a cycle which looks more ‘L’ or ‘U’ shaped rather than the more traditional ‘V’. A more direct way of putting money into the household sector would be through the income tax system. Changes to income rate rates look unlikely because they would be very difficult to reverse and too costly to make permanent. But the government could accelerate its progress towards fulfilling its manifesto commitments to raise the personal allowance to £12,500 and the basic rate limit to £50,000. However, when discussing stimulus options, there has been surprisingly little mention of this idea from prominent Conservatives, which leads us to believe that the probability of a decisive move in the Autumn Statement is fairly low. In modelling the impact of tax cuts we have combined a temporary VAT cut to 17.5%, beginning in 2017-18 and lasting for two years, with an acceleration in the planned cuts to corporation tax, such that the main rate becomes 17% at the start of fiscal year 2017-18 rather than 2020-21. These seem the most plausible options for tax cuts and the HMRC ready reckoner suggests that the combined cost of these measures is 1% of GDP, making the size of the stimulus equivalent to the capital and current spending options. A temporary VAT cut and lower corporation tax rate would offer only modest support to activity The results suggest that such a package would boost GDP growth – which averages 1.5% a year in 2017-18 and 2018-19, compared with 1.3% in the baseline forecast – but by less than either the capital or current spending variants. There are several reasons why the VAT cut would offer a relatively small boost to activity. Retailers are unlikely to fully pass it on in the form of lower prices, while some of the boost would leak abroad through higher imports. Consumer behaviour would also be important; consumers are likely to take some time to adjust to their higher purchasing power, while they may use some of the extra purchasing power to increase savings. It is possible that these results might understate the scale of the boost over this two-year period if consumers are fully aware that the VAT cut is temporary and bring forward planned spending to take advantage of lower prices. But the flip side of this would be a more marked slowdown once the VAT rate had been restored to 20%. With regards to the corporation tax cut, the reduction in the tax liability will bolster the funds available for investment, but at the macro level it is not a shortage of funds which is holding back capital spending, it is heightened uncertainty, so the scope for the tax cut to boost activity is limited. In addition to offering the smallest boost to growth, the package of tax cuts also results in higher levels of borrowing and the public sector net debt-to-GDP ratio rising more than 2pp above the baseline forecast. Conclusion: a package based on higher infrastructure spending would be most effective… The results of our scenarios are summarised in Chart 4 and the Table over the page. Our modelling suggests that a stimulus package centred around higher infrastructure spending would offer the best results in terms of the impact on activity; by the end of fiscal year 2018-19, the level of GDP would be 1.5% above the baseline if the government raised capital spending by 1% of GDP in each year, whereas higher current spending would raise the level of GDP by 0.9% and tax cuts would increase it by 0.5%. The larger boost to activity also means that the infrastructure package generates the better fiscal outcomes, with stronger tax receipts meaning that the public sector net debt-to-GDP ratio peaks lower than in the baseline forecast. The results of our scenarios are in the same ballpark as the fiscal multipliers which the OBR has used since its inception in 2010. However, it is possible that these results may understate the potential boost to activity from a fiscal stimulus package given that there is Page 8 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] 6 Sep 2016 evidence to suggest that fiscal multipliers are larger when interest rates are at the zero lower bound. This would strengthen the case for a stimulus package still further. Chart 4 Table Our modelling suggests that the government would achieve the best economic outcomes by choosing a stimulus package centered on higher infrastructure investment. Raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19 would boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. Higher current spending could boost growth by 0.5% a year, but the boost from tax cuts would be much smaller at just 0.2% a year. Impact relative to baseline of loosening fiscal policy by 1% of GDP by policy lever (averages for 2017-18 and 2018-19 fiscal years, unless otherwise stated) Government investment Current spending Tax cut (VAT & corporation tax) GDP growth (% year) 0.7 0.5 0.2 PSNB (% of GDP) 0.6 0.7 0.8 Public sector net debt (end 2018-19, % of GDP) -0.8 0.0 2.2 Source: Oxford Economics …though it is far from certain to happen… If the case for an infrastructure-led fiscal stimulus is so strong then why might it not happen? Quite simply it comes down to the politics. The Conservatives have enjoyed electoral success on the back of their austerity policy and, though there are signs that austerity fatigue is gradually setting in, polling suggests that it remains a popular policy, particularly amongst their core support. The Government displays little obvious enthusiasm for a stimulus package, with it seemingly being viewed as a necessary step to stave off the prospect of a deeper downturn, rather than a positive policy which could boost growth over both the short- and longer-term. So if the economic data holds up over the next couple of months and suggests that the economy is likely to avoid recession, the probability of a sizeable stimulus package will recede. And if the Government does indeed come up with a stimulus package, we fear that the temptation to include crowd-pleasing, but less economically-effective, tax cuts will prove irresistible. …so a stimulus package represents an upside risk Therefore, while in our view the case for a sizeable package based around infrastructure investment is very strong, our expectations for the Autumn Statement are set fairly low and a large stimulus package represents an upside risk to our forecast, rather than being a core assumption. Page 9 Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected] Fiscal policy options ahead of the Autumn Statement Recent publications Data Insights Services PMI confirms August rebound Manufacturing PMI rebounds strongly in August Household credit sees a post-vote weakening Q2 delivers a better-balanced expansion Deficit reduction continues to stall UK Weekly Economic Briefings Post-Brexit blues ease A quiet, but largely heartening, week of economic data First post-Brexit ‘hard’ data offer some reassurance Consumers resilient as the referendum dust settles MPC passes the baton to the Chancellor Research Briefings and Viewpoints Post-Brexit CRE – risks to the economy MPC reaches for the big guns MPC action imminent, but "sledgehammer" unlikely Brexit – velvet divorce or messy breakup? Is the consensus always a good benchmark? UK Recession Watch Latest edition: 2 September 2016 We have recently launched our Brexit monitoring service. If you would be interested in accessing this service please contact your account manager for more information. Contacts Andrew Goodwin Martin Beck 020 7803 1417 020 7803 1426 [email protected] [email protected] Contact: Andrew Goodwin | [email protected]