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Transcript
Why Are There S o Many Communication Theories? by Robert T. Craig, University of Colorado at Boulder Present trends in communication theory suggest a paradox. Even as the field has grown and matured, even as communication researchers have contributed more and better original theory in recent years, confusion, uncertainty, implicit dissension, and to a lesser degree, explicit controversy about the proper foci, forms, and functions of communication theory have markedly increased.’ Yes, the field remains in “ferment” (Ferment in the Field, 1983) and more than ever requires “rethinking” (Dervin, Grossberg, O’Keefe, & Wartella, 1989). What communication theory should look like, what it is for, the boundaries and internal divisions of the field, how communication research should be conducted and how such research properly relates to the development of theory-all must be regarded as open questions at the present time. So, even as we do more theory, we become (collectively if not individually) less certain of exactly what we are doing o r should be doing. I do not intend to propose this correlation as a scientific “covering law.” Doing more theory has not chiefly caused our present state of disorientation, nor has our uncertainty about the nature and purpose of theory caused us to do more theoretical work. To continue the metaphor in the idiom of quantitative analysis, the correlation, I believe, is largely spurious: Both our increased theoretical productivity as well as our increased confusion about theory are best explained by the influence of a third variable: a general transformation of the human sciences, which is transforming communication along with many other disciplines. I Kecent communication theory cannot be reviewed in detail in this short essay. For diverse examples, see Dervin, Grossberg, O’Keefe, and Wartella (1989, especially Vol. 2 ) and current issues o f Communication Theory, which began publication in 1991. “More”and “better” are relative terms: One is not yet tempted to doubt whether additional improvements to the field are still possible. Kobert 1’.Craig is an associate professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado at Boulder. Copyright 0 1993Journal qf Communication 43(3), Summer. 0021-9916/93/$5,00 26 Communication Theories Definitions of Theory and Other Curios As recently as the 1970s, communication researchers were quite sure they knew what theory was, even though they had to admit that they themselves had not yet produced a lot of it. Optimism prevailed. Philosophers of science and sociologists specializing in “theory construction” had pointed the way to a social science of communication and we had only to follow their guidance. Theory, we knew, comprised a body of scientific generalizations describing functional relationships among empirically measured o r inferred variables. The goals of scientific theory were explanation, prediction, and control of phenomena. Following Merton (1957), we knew that what we needed were “theories of the middle-range”-theories that would yield rigorously testable hypotheses concerning a delimited range of phenomena. Such theories (Festinger’s [19571 theory of cognitive dissonance was a highly influential example) were considered superior both to speculative “grand theories” like Parsonian social theory, and to isolated empirical generalizations concerning, for example, the effects o f fear appeals o n attitude change. We had learned from Popper (1959) that the sine qua non of scientific theory was falsifiability, and that speculative grand theories inherently lacked this essential quality. Isolated empirical generalizations o r “sets of laws,” o n the other hand, lacked the organizing and heuristic advantages of conceptually integrated middle-range theories. Following (however inconsistently) Kuhn’s (1962) postpositivist history and philosophy of science, we knew, finally, that our communication science was in a “preparadigmatic” state as we searched for a paradigm. Thus, in the 1970s we thought we knew what theory was. Indeed, if we believe publications such as the Handbook of Communication Science (Berger & Chaffee, 1987) and current communication theory textbooks, which continue to define theory largely in the traditional terms discussed in the preceding paragraphs, we still think we know what theory is. Those who continue to understand theory exclusively according to the received view of scientific theory may think preposterous my claim that communication theory is flourishing today as never before. Berger (19911, for example, writing in response to the question “Why are there so few communication theories?” bemoans the relative lack of original theory in the field and even cites Craig (1988) in support of the view that communication science has produced no major, seminal theories. This remains true, although as both Berger (1991) and Craig (1988) point out, the field has generated some notable efforts in that direction in recent years. The present essay, however, takes a broader view of the field, looking well beyond the boundary of communication science as surveyed, for example, by the Handbook of Communication Science (Berger & Chaffee, 1987; cf. Craig, 1988). Berger (1991) clearly presupposes that we know what theory is: “Some 27 Journal of Communication, Summer 1993 researchers,” he writes, “simply have never learned what a theory is” (p. 106); but, in a good graduate seminar in theory construction, “by the end of several weeks, most students have a good grasp of what a theory is” (p. 109). According to this view, we know what theories are but have not yet created nearly enough of them. More such theories are needed, no doubt, and Berger’s analysis of our field’s shortcomings points out some really serious problems. But in a broader perspective it becomes apparent that communication scholars are already doing a great deal of work that they regard as theory, but that would not qualify as such according to the received view of theory that Berger takes for granted.2Hence, only if we are willing to admit that we no longer know what theory is are we able to see that communication theory is now flourishing. Conventional definitions of theory have lagged far behind practice; they no longer reflect the actual range of theoretical work in the field. This is our present state of confusion. We lack even a coherent vocabulary with which to discuss the great variety of ideas that currently announce themselves as communication theory. Different lines of theoretical work are premised on fundamentally different views of theory. The very notion of theory is radically contested. Why are there now so many communication theories? This development is best understood in the context of trends that have transformed not only our own discipline but the human sciences generally. Blurred Genres The essential transformation of the human sciences that best explains both the recent proliferation of communication theory as well as our present confusion about theory was aptly named by Geertz in his famous essay “Blurred Genres” (1980). As Geertz pointed out, the formerly clear boundary between the social sciences and the humanities has become indistinct (hence the increasing usefulness of a term like “human sciences,” which includes both). Scholars in many disciplines “have become free to shape their work in terms of its necessities rather than received ideas as to what they ought or ought not to be doing” (Geertz, 1980, p. 167). Redding (1992) and Purcell (1992) also comment o n the narrowness of Berger’s implicit definitions of theory and the field of communication. In response, Berger (1992) complains that he “cannot see how either single individuals or departments can possibly embody completely and competently the full spectrum of content included in the field” (p. 103). This is a reasonable view, but it does not address the point at issue, which concerns the range of intellectual products that will be admitted to constitute legitimate forms of communication theory, a field that n o individual or department, of course, can hope to master in depth across its full breadth. How to cope with the blessing and curse of specialization in graduate programs is another problem. 28 Communicution 7heories The humanities have recently become, in a certain sense, more scientific. By this I d o not refer primarily to the use of computers and statistics for documentation, textual analysis, and the like, although such technological developments have certainly occurred and are perhaps not without their own importance. What I wish to emphasize is that the humanities have become increasingly theoretical. If in the past we thought that the humanities were concerned with the understanding and appreciation of historically particular acts and artifacts while the proper business of philosophy and the sciences were questions of a general or theoretical nature, this definitely is no longer the case. Interdisciplinary theory in the humanities now engages philosophy, social theory, rhetoric, and cultural studies as well as literary and artistic critical theory in a common, though heterogeneous, discourse. Through this interdisciplinary discourse, strands of postmodernism, deconstruction, reader response theory, historicism, feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and so forth, emerge, split, recombine, and spread across disciplines and continents. Now it may be a little misleading to say that the humanities, in becoming more theoretical, have become more scientific, for the new schools of interdisciplinary theory show little resemblance to traditional forms of theory in the empirical sciences. Instead they have mounted a serious challenge to received notions of scientific theory. They have sensitized us to the inescapable literary and rhetorical dimensions of all language and all discourse, including all academic discourse, especially scientific theor y itself. Increasingly, schools of theory in the human sciences are thought of as literary genres in their own right. In what Simons (1990) has called “the rhetorical turn,” theory is conceived as practical, historically situated discourse, not altogether different from those discourses of the arts and public life that were formerly the special province of the humanities. For those who understand theory to be an essentially literary-rhetorical enterprise, the relation of theory to such epistemological criteria as falsifiability or scientific explanation becomes problematic in the extreme. Theory-as-discourse has no clear relation to theory-as-knowledge. The traditional vocabulary of scientific theory construction may thus be largely irrelevant to the new forms of theory. However much one may like or dislike this situation, to ignore or deny it can only serve to worsen our present state of confusion about theory. While the humanities have become more scientific in this admittedly rather special sense o f the term, the humanistic elements and tendencies within the social sciences, influenced by the same international-interdisciplinary trends, have flourished anew. It should be emphasized that the “harder”approaches to the social and behavioral sciences have also continued to flourish. Their vitality apparently has not diminished, but it would be pointless to deny that their relative dominance in some of these fields has declined as other styles of social science have gained adherents and recognition. Postmodernism, feminism, and other such interdisciplinary movements have infected the social sciences no less than the hu- 29 Journal of Communication, Summer 1993 manities. Moreover, the practice of broad, speculative social theory-inspired by such prominent exemplars as Habermas, Foucault, Giddens, and others-has regained the prominent place from which it had apparently been dethroned by the vogue of middle-range theory in the decades after m i d - ~ e n t u r yIncreased .~ attention to the historical dimension of social processes; increased interest in textual, discourse analytic, and ethnographic methodologies; increased appreciation and use of qualitative methods more generally-these trends are much in evidence across the social sciences. Each of these trends, along with the emergence of interdisciplinary theory in the humanities, contributes to the blurring of boundaries among the human sciences and calls into question the metatheoretical vocabulary of explanatory scientific theory in social science, according to which the social sciences can advance only by becoming harder, more quantitative, more like the physical and natural sciences. Theory and Practice Thus, as Geertz (1980) claimed, the boundary between the social sciences and humanities has become blurred. But the transformation of the human sciences has involved more than just an emergence of theory in the humanities accompanied by a resurgence of “softer”approaches to the social sciences. A blurring of the boundary between theory a n d p r a c t i c w a development that raises basic questions about the purposes and goals of theory-also has been important to that transformation. The goals of social scientific theory have traditionally been formulated as explanation, prediction, and control, but the logic of explanation that frames this epistemological holy trinity has become deeply problematic as attention has been drawn to the potentially constitutive role of theory in social life. Theory, on this view, influences how people in society think and talk about their own activities and thereby shapes those activities and the emergent social structures produced and reproduced in them. But, according to the logic of scientific explanation, a theory that actively shapes the very phenomena it purportedly explains is essentially untestable and thus irreparably unscientific. Any observations that might be adduced to test predictions derived from such a theory are hopelessly contaminated, and the logic of explanation falls into a vicious circle. Faced with this situation, social scientists might adopt either of two basic strategies. First, they could insulate society as much as possible from any influence of social scientific theories in order to preserve the Note, for example, the title of Quentin Skinner’s (1985) anthology: TheReturn ofCrund Tbeoly in the Human Sciences. 30 Communication Theories logic of explanation. But the futility (at least in relatively open, liberal societies) as well as the ethical absurdity of such a stance is obvious. A second approach would be to embrace the constitutive potential of theory and to take due responsibility for its consequences. Among those consequences, however, is the fact that explanation, prediction, and control as goals of social scientific theory become insufficient. Given a constitutive rather than just an explanatory function, theory must now address other issues and pursue other goals in order to justify itself as an activity. As Hesse (1980) points out, social scientific generalizations, to the extent that they are undecidable empirically according to the logic of scientific explanation, are warrantably-indeed, inescapably-judged by other values, whether aesthetic, moral, or political. Again we find that theory must be regarded, by those who embrace its potentially constitutive role, as something other, or more, than knowledge only. Theory becomes not the crowning achievement of an objective social science but rather an integral component of an engaged social practice. N o t only epistemic but broadly practical criteria enter into the discourse of theory. Whether values other than epistemic (and, supplementarily, aesthetic) ones should serve as criteria for theory remains highly controversial. Many self-identified communication theorists remain strongly committed to the ideal of an epistemically grounded, empirical social science. M o r e over, even among those committed to the cultivation of a closer relationship between theory and practice, precisely how our moral or political concerns should bear upon theory is subject to a great inany different interpretations-another index of our present confusion about theory. In the spirit of the dictum attributed to Lewin, that “there is nothing so practical as a good theory” (cited in Thayer, 1982, p. 211, some might advocate the application of traditional social scientific methods to address socially significant problems, even while continuing to adhere to the received view of scientific theory. Social action in the service of moral and political ends, according to this view, should be informed by episternically sound, scientific knowledge. Explanation, prediction, and control remain the essential goals of science as such, but science should be used (without compromising its methodological and ethical principles) to advance toward moral and political objectives. In contrast, to advocate social actions based on false or empirically untestable beliefs about the consequences of those actions, beliefs contaminated by ideological dogma o r wishful thinking (i.e., theories based on moral and political predilections rather than scientific research), would be morally irresponsible. Traditional social science might acquire, then, a moral rationale. Although this argument is not without merit, especially in regard to the moral implications of scientific method, it fails to take full account of the potentially constitutive role of theory in society as discussed above. My own view is that we should largely set aside the traditional models of scientific theory even while continuing to grant empirical research methods Journal of Communication, Summer 1993 an important place. A “practical”communication theory would be essentially normative, and we would continue to conduct empirical and other types of studies, to investigate the empirical assumptions and consequences of practical theory (Craig, 1989). Both of the views just sketched derive largely from a single school of philosophy: American pragmatism. They are by no means the only current views on how to merge theory and practice. Critical theorists, feminists, social constructionists, and postmodernists display a bewildering variety of approaches to this question. Hence, considering the state of theory on the whole, we cannot conclude that theory and social practice have now merged in any definite way, but that the boundary between them, like the boundary between the social sciences and the humanities, has become blurred, indistinct. This blurring of boundaries has opened our own field to many new, hybrid varieties of theoretical work, all now calling themselves communication theory, and all creating a relative abundance of communication theory today-and its equally impressive disarray. The Future of Communication Theory Does our present moment, one in which the boundaries of theory and communication seem to be in flux, offer us an opportunity to reconfigure the future of the field so as to breach old barriers and open u p new possibilities for communication research? Perhaps ways can be found by which the various, apparently incompatible o r unrelated modes of communication theory that now exist can be brought into more productive dialogue with one another. Perhaps an updated scheme of paradigms for communication research will reduce our confusion and broaden our awareness of alternatives. Perhaps communication science can be understood as an integrated “practical discipline” in which critical, interpretive, and empirical research as well as philosophical reflection and applied work have deeply related, essential functions to perform (Craig, 1989). However broadly the discipline is understood, however confused about theory we may collectively be, each of us who works at communication theory must do so in some specific way, according to some relatively definite, even narrow, notion of theory (cf. Berger, 1992). Even so, we may also hope that our work might speak to larger problems of the discipline. Basic questions about theory and research are now open and unsettled. Every contribution to communication theory, including one’s own, exemplifies an approach to those questions-and the biases and limitations of that approach. Dialogue in the discipline will be advanced as we reflect on the various modes of theory and their characteristic biases and limitations. Situated within such a dialogue, work in our field cannot fail to engage with issues of broad concern throughout the human sciences. 32 Communication Theories References Rerger, C. R. (1991 1. Communication theories and other curios. Communication Monographs, 58, 101-113. Berger, C. R. (1992). Curiouser and curiouser curios. Communication Monographs, 59, 101-1 07. Berger, C. K., & Chaffee, S. H. (Eds.). (1987). Handbook bury Park, CA: Sage. vf communication science. New Craig, R. T. (1988). The Handbook of Communication Science: A review. Quarterl.y,Journal of Speech, 74, 487-497. Craig, K. T. (1989). Communication as a practical discipline. In B. Ilervin, L. Grossberg, R. J. O'Keefe, & E. Wartella (Eds.), Rethinking communication; Volume 1; Paradigm issues (pp. 97-122). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Dervin, B., Grossberg, L., O'Keefe, B. J., & Wartella, E. (Eds.). (1989). Rethinking commzcnication ( 2 vols. ). Newbury Park, CA Ferment in the Field [Special issue]. 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